Supreme Court of India
RAM LALversusJARNAIL SINGH (NOW DECEASED) THROUGH ITS LRS & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 301
- Decided
- 25 February 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
A decree affirmed by an appellate court merges the trial decree, making the appellate decree executable; in the absence of a stipulated time‑limit, the decree‑holder must pay within a reasonable period, and the High Court's order setting aside the execution was erroneous.
Summary
The appellant filed a suit for specific performance of a sale agreement, which was decreed in his favour on 20‑01‑2012 directing him to deposit the balance consideration within two months. The decree was affirmed by the first appellate court on 21‑04‑2015, but no time‑limit for payment was stipulated. After a two‑year delay, the appellant filed an execution petition and was permitted to deposit the balance amount in May 2019. The High Court set aside the executing court's order, holding that the appellant was too late to deposit the consideration, and allowed the respondents' revision. The Supreme Court held that the appellate decree supersedes the trial decree (doctrine of merger) and that the appellate court should have fixed a time‑limit; in its absence, the appellant was expected to pay within a reasonable period, which he did. Consequently, the High Court's interference was erroneous, the executing court's order was affirmed, and the appellant was directed to pay interest on the deposited amount.
Issues considered
- The effect of the doctrine of merger on the decree for specific performance after affirmation by the appellate court.
- Whether the High Court erred in holding that the appellant was barred by delay from depositing the balance sale consideration.
- The power of the appellate court to specify or extend the time‑limit for payment under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act.
- The applicability of the limitation period for execution of a decree for specific performance.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XX, Rule 12A
- Limitation Act, 1963
- Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 28
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Suit filed by appellant seeking specific performance of contract based on an agreement of sale executed by respondents was allowed on 20-01-2012 and appellant was directed to deposit the balance sale consideration within two months. The judgment and decree was upheld by Court on 21-04-2015. Two years thereafter, the decree holder preferred execution petition wherein he sought permission to deposit the balance sale consideration. On 20-05-2019, the executing court permitted the decree holder-appellants to deposit the balance sale consideration and directed the
Subjects
Functus officioSpecific performanceExecutionDelay in filing execution petitionDecree-holderBalance sale considerationPreliminary decreeRescission of contractTime-limit for deposit of money by decree-holderExtension of timeAppellate courtDoctrine of merger
Judgment
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1745 : 2025 INSC 301
Ram Lal
v.
Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 3245 of 2025)
25 February 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Suit filed by appellant seeking specific performance of contract
based on an agreement of sale executed by respondents was
allowed on 20-01-2012 and appellant was directed to deposit the
balance sale consideration within two months. The judgment and
decree was upheld by the First Appellate Court on 21-04-2015.
Two years thereafter, the decree holder preferred execution
petition wherein he sought permission to deposit the balance sale
consideration. On 20-05-2019, the executing court permitted the
decree holder-appellants to deposit the balance sale consideration
and directed the Respondents to execute sale deed in favour of
appellants after receiving balance sale consideration. Revision
Application against the order of executing court was allowed by
High Court on 30-8-2022 on the ground that it was too late in the
day for the appellant (original plaintiff/decree holder) to deposit the
balance sale consideration. Whether the High Court committed a
gross error in passing the impugned order.
Headnotes†
Specific Performance – Decree for specific performance of
contract based on an agreement of sale – Delay in filing
execution petition and seeking permission of executing court
to deposit the balance sale consideration – If rendered the
decree of specific performance inexecutable:
Held: In the present case, once the appellate court affirmed the
judgment and decree of the trial court, there was evidently a
merger of the judgment of the trial court with the decision of the
appellate court – Once the appellate court renders its judgment, it
is the decree of the appellate court which becomes executable –
In the considered view of this Court, the Appellate Court, after
deciding the appeal on merits, could have called upon the plaintiff
to deposit the balance sale consideration by fixing a time limit –
1746 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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This would have at least given an opportunity to the plaintiff to
fulfil his obligation – It is too much to say that since the trial court
had granted two months time to the decree holder to deposit the
balance sale consideration the same time period would apply even
to the decree that may be drawn by the appellate court – What
is executable is the decree passed by the appellate court – The
appellate court owes a duty to specify the time period – In the
case on hand, undoubtedly, there was a delay on the part of the
decree holder in filing the execution petition and thereby seeking
permission to deposit the balance sale consideration – Also, just
because a decree of specific performance can be executed within
12 years from the date of original decree or from the date the
appellate court affirms such decree that, by itself, does not mean
that a decree holder deposits the balance sale consideration at his
own sweet will – If the appellate court had failed to stipulate any
particular time period then it is expected of the decree holder to
deposit the same within a reasonable period of time – However,
notably, the balance sale consideration of Rs. 4,87,000/- came
to be deposited by the decree holder way back in 2019 – In the
overall facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court should
not have interfered with the order passed by the executing court –
Since there was a delay of 2 years in filing the execution petition
and delay of 4 years in depositing the balance sale consideration
of Rs. 4,87,000/- the respondents-herein (judgment-debtors) are
entitled to simple interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from
the date of the judgment and order passed by the appellate court till
the date the balance consideration was deposited i.e. 20.05.2019.
[Paras 43, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55]
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.28 – Decree for specific
performance – Is in the nature of a preliminary decree –
Contract between parties is not extinguished by passing of
a decree for specific performance and it subsists despite the
decree – Court does not become a functus officio after grant
of decree for specific performance and it retains its power
and jurisdiction to deal with the decree till the sale deed is
executed. [Paras 44, 45]
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.28 – Decree for specific
performance of contract based on an agreement of sale –
Time-limit for deposit of money by decree-holder – Court
has the power and discretion to extend the time to pay the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1747
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
amount – Such power can be exercised even in the appellate
stage – Factors that should weigh with the court concerned
while permitting the decree holder to deposit the balance sale
consideration beyond the time period prescribed by the trial
court in its final decree:
Held: The trial court has jurisdiction to fix time-limit for depositing
the money by the decreeholder under Section 28 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 – The decree is preliminary in nature and the
court retains control over it – The Court has been conferred with
the power to extend the time to pay the amount and while taking
into consideration the delay that is sought to be condoned by the
plaintiff, the Court does not adjudge the same like an application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, where each day’s delay must
be explained – The Court is given the discretion to extend the time
and the provision therefore seeks to provide complete relief to both
the parties in terms of the decree for specific performance – If during
the specified time period the decree holder is not in a position to
deposit the balance sale consideration or, in other words, fails
to deposit the balance sale consideration and later upon expiry
of the specified time period seeks permission to deposit, then it
would be within the discretion of the trial court to grant further
time to deposit the balance sale consideration or decline – This
discretion has to be exercised judiciously keeping in mind various
factors like bona fide of the decree holder, the cause for failure
to deposit the balance sale consideration in time, the length of
delay and also the equities that might have been created during
the interregnum period in favour of the judgment debtor – It is the
cumulative effect and considerations of such factors that should
weigh with the court concerned while permitting the decree holder
to deposit the balance sale consideration beyond the time period
that might have been prescribed by the trial court in its final
decree – Further, appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings
and the power of the Court to extend the time for depositing the
amount can be exercised even in the appellate stage by the Court.
[Paras 34, 46, 47, 48, 50]
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.28 – Decree for specific
performance of contract – Non-payment of the balance sale
consideration within time period fixed by trial court – If amounts
to abandonment of the contract and consequent rescinding
of the same – Real test must be to see if the conduct of the
plaintiff will amount to a positive refusal to complete his part
1748 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of the contract – There must be an element of wilful negligence
on the part of the plaintiff before a Court proceeds to invoke
s.28 and rescind the contract. [Para 49]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XX, r.12A - Decree for
specific performance of contract for sale - Rule 12A makes it
obligatory for the court to specify in the decree the date by
which purchase money should be paid by the vendee – Where
an appeal is filed against the decree passed by the trial court
and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify
time to deposit the balance sale consideration. [Paras 34, 50]
Doctrines/ Principles – Doctrine of Merger – The doctrine is
founded on the rationale that there cannot be more than one
operative decree at a given point of time – Doctrine of merger
applies irrespective of whether the appellate court has affirmed,
modified or reversed the decree of the trial court. [Paras 36, 37]
Case Law Cited
Prem Jeevan v. K.S. Venkata Raman and Another (2017) 11
SCC 57; V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alagappan [1999] 1
SCR 349 : (1999) 4 SCC 702; Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara
[1994] 1 SCR 542 : (1994) 2 SCC 642; Kunhayammed v. State
of Kerala [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359; Khoday
Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane
Ltd. [2019] 3 SCR 411: (2019) 4 SCC 376; Chandi Prasad v.
Jagdish Prasad [2004] Supp. 4 SCR 942 : (2004) 8 SCC 724;
Shanthi v. T.D. Vishwanathan (2019) 11 SCC 419 – referred to.
Krishnamoorthy v. Shanmugasundaram & Anr., 2022 SCC OnLine
Mad 963 – referred to.
List of Acts
Specific Relief Act, 1963; Limitation Act, 1963; Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords
Functus officio; Specific performance; Execution; Delay in filing
execution petition; Decree-holder; Balance sale consideration;
Preliminary decree; Recession of contract; Time-limit for deposit
of money by decree-holder; Extension of time; Appellate court;
Doctrine of merger.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1749
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3245 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.08.2022 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CR No. 3723 of 2019
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
S.K. Pabbi, Ms. Disha Singh, Shivendu Gaur, Ms. Nidhi Sharma,
Ajay Kumar Singh.
Adv. for the Respondents:
Ms. Aakriti Jain.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 30-8-2022
in Civil Revision Application No.3723/2019 by which the Revision
Application filed by the respondents – herein (original defendants)
came to be allowed thereby setting aside the order passed by the
Executing Court directing the defendants to execute the sale deed
in favour of the original plaintiff(s) decree holder on the plaintiff(s)
depositing the balance sale consideration of Rs.5,00,000/- within 15
days from 6-5-2019.
3. The controversy revolves around in a narrow compass.
4. The appellant before us is the original plaintiff. He instituted a suit
for specific performance of contract based on an agreement of sale
with the respondents – herein (original defendants)/judgment debtors.
The suit came to be decreed in favour of appellant – plaintiff vide
Judgment and order dated 20-1-2012. The operative part of the
decree passed by the Trial Court reads thus:-
“Suit for possession by way of specific performance of
agreement of sale dated 16.11.2006 executed between
the parties regarding approximately actually comes to 7
Kanals 17 Marlas out of agricultural land comprised in
1750 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Khewat No.334 Khtauni No.720 to 736 measuring 161
Kanals 5 Marlas comprised in Khasra Nos. 424/1min (11-
1), 425/1min (5-16), 1234/1 (1-4), 1237/1 (23-1), 1238/1,
(28-1), 1241/1/2 (15-16), 1242 min (5-1), 1246/2 min (2-6),
1241/1/1 (1-0), 1242 min (3-0), 1241/2/1 (2-10), 1241/1
(1-0), 424min (2-10), 425/1 min (1-0), 424/1/1 (0-13), 424/1
min (1-7), 425/1 min (0-13), 1246/2 min (6-0), 424/1 min
(1-7), 425/1 min (0-13), 1246/2 min (6-0), 1241/2/2 min
(2-15), 1241/2/2 min (2-0), 1234/2/1 (1-4), 424/1 min (2-
1), 4251/ min (2-0), 1234 min (8-0), 1234/1 (1-0), 1234/2
(2-13-1/2), 1234/2 (0-1/2), 1234/2 (3-6), 159/2/2 (4-10),
160/2/2 (8-1), 161/2/2 (2-15) and 423/2 (1-0), situated in
the revenue limits of Village Naruana Tehsil and District
Bathinda on payment of Rs.7,00,000/- per killa of 8
Kanals, (in fact the land with the Defendant remains 7
Kanals 17 Marlas after adjusting her other land in ther
Khata and value for ther land comes to Rs.6,86,875/- and
after adjusting the Rs.2,00,000/- paid in cash as earnest
money and Rs. 50000/- paid by the Plaintiff to the Co-
Operative Society as loan payable on their payable by
the Defendant.
And
Suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant
from alienating or creating any encumbrance over the
same by creating mortgage with the above said bank or
any other person in any manner value of the said for the
purpose of jurisdiction Rs.7,00,000/- value of the said for
the purpose of Court fee Rs.9176/
-
This suit has come up for final disposal before me (K.K.
Singla Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Bathinda)
in the presence of Sh. Rajneesh Kumar Rana, counsel
for plaintiff and Sh.Rajdeep Goyal counsel for defendant.
It is ordered that suit filed by the plaintiff for possession
by way of specific performance of agreement to sale
dated 16.11.2006 is decreed with costs and defendant is
directed to execute and registered the sale deed pertaining
to 157/3225 share out of the property detailed in the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1751
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
head note of the plaint within 3 months on depositing the
balance sale consideration by plaintiff within two months
from today.”
5. The respondents – herein (original defendants) being dissatisfied
with the grant of decree of specific performance challenged the same
by filing First Appeal in the District Court. The appeal came to be
dismissed vide Judgment and order dated 21-4-2015. The operative
part of the order passed by the first appellate court reads thus:-
“xx xx xx xx So, from the above said discussion and
findings, there is no merit in this appeal and hence, the
same stands dismissed with costs. Lower court record
along with copy of this Judgment be returned back. File be
consigned to the record room. Decree should be prepared
separately”
6. The defendants thereafter did not deem fit to file any second appeal.
Thus, the decree attained finality with the dismissal of the First Appeal.
7. Sometime in January, 2017, the plaintiff filed execution petition
seeking to execute the decree of specific performance. The plaintiff
also sought permission of the executing court to allow him to deposit
the balance sale consideration. The execution petition came to be
disposed of by the executing court vide order dated 6-5-2019. The
order passed by the executing court reads thus:-
“Heard. It is submitted that execution application is not
maintainable in its present form as filed and framed
because the decree has been passed by this court of Sh.
K.K.Singla, then ACJ (SD), Bathinda on dt. 20.01.2012
in favour of the Raj Kumari and now she had died and
present execution application has been filed by only one
of the LR deceased Raj Kumar ie applicant Ram Lal and
he is not entitled to get execute the decree in his favour
alone by excluding execution application is not maintainable
and the same is liable to be dismissed. The alleged will
propounded by the decree holder/applicant of the deceased
Raj Kumari is forged and fabricate document and decree
holder/applicant is not entitled to get execute in his favour
alone basis of the alleged will executed by deceased Raj
Kumari. It is further submitted that decree holder did not
1752 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
deposit the balance sale consideration, in court as per
the directions of this court, at the time of the filing of the
present execution and without depositing the balance
sale consideration, present execution application cannot
be proceed further and as such the same is liable to be
dismissed on this score. It is further execution application
of the decree holder is totally false, frivolous and vexatious
to the knowledge of the applicant and as such the same is
liable to be dismissed with costs. It is further submitted that
decree/applicant has wrongly mentioned the respondents
no.2 and 4, in array of the performa respondents, beyond
the decree. Decree has been passed by this court of Sh.
K.K.Singla, then ACJ(SD) Bathinda, on dt. 20.01.2012 in
favour of the Raj Kumari and now she had died and present
execution application has been filed by only applicant Ram
Lal and he is not entitled to get execute the decree in his
favour alone by excluding other legal heirs. Further decree
holder did not deposit the balance sala consideration. in
court as per the directions of this court, at the time of the
film of the present execution application cannot be proceed
further. Besides judgment and decree dt. 20.01.2012
has been passed against Jarnail nam Sukhpal Singh
his son. is minor and prayed for dismissal of the same.
3. In reply to the application, J.Ds has no cause of action
standi to file the objections, the objections has been filed
to delay the proceedings. The objections raised are false,
frivolous and mala fide submitted that all the legal heirs of
Raj Kumari are make passing execution. It is pertinent to
mention here that respondent/decree he succession has
acquired inheritance from Raj Kumar thorugh will more on
a matter between the heirs of original D.H & objections/Jds
has nothing with it. It is submitted that objector/Jds has no
locus standi or cause of ac raise this objection. Further
more, it is a matter of interse interest of the heirs of original
D.H. It is further submitted that execution application sought
permission to deposit the remaining sale consideration. It is
furthe submitted that matter between the parties remained
pending in the court for a quite long time. Objection raised
regarding the minority of original J.Ds (Jarnail Singh) son
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1753
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
namely Sukhpal Singh does not hold ground as per law.
Sale deed with the sanction & permission of court even
by a minor is legally valid. This ground has been raised
by the Jds with malafide intention to delay the execution
proceedings and it is prayed for dismissal of the same. 4.
Rival submission considered. Ld Counsel for the JD had
argued that the decree had been passed by the Court of
Sh. K.K Singla, Ld. ACJ (SD), Bathinda and now JD had
expired. DH is not entitled to execute the decree in favour
of LR, Decree Holder had not deposited sale consideration,
so the present execution be dismissed, he had relied on
Md Hanif Khan Vs. Naresh Parsad, Jharkhand High Court
WP NO 1502 of 2005 decided on 07-092009 and Civil
Appeal No. 502,503,0f1999, decided on 03- 021999, VS
Palachinamy Chettar Firm Vs C Alagappan. Ld. Counsel
for the Decree holder had argued that the present objection
had been filed to delay the proceedings, all the legal heirs
of the Raj Kumari had been made party to the execution,
and prayed that these objections be dismissed, and he
relied on 2011 (1) PLR 271, Perusal of the file shows
DH had sought permission to deposit the balance sale
consideration and the application for impleading LR of
defendant/JD had been filed, the argument advanced by
Ld. Counsel for JD, that the balance sale consideration
was not deposited is not tenable in view of the clear law
laid down by our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled
as Gayatri Devi vs Darshan Ram reported as 2017 (20
PLR429), wherein para 11 it was held that if there was
no defaulting clause stipulated in the decree for payment
of the balance sale consideration then the court had right
to extend the time, even If the balance sale consideration
was not deposited, within stipulated period, such extension
of time can be ordered without application, mere failure
on the part of the Decree holder to deposit the amount
does not render the decree ineffective or release JD from
his liability to satisfy the decree, it is only a willful default
that make the court to refuse the extension, the court and
court in its discretion can grant such extension of time
and also reliance is placed on 2007 (50 RCR Civil). 655.
1754 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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In view of the above said factual matrix, these objections
are dismissed, being not maintainable at this stage, it is
pertinent to mention here that the suit had already been
decreed by the court of Sh. K.K Singla Ld. Additional
Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bathinda on 20-01-12 and
appeal had also been dismissed on 21.04-2015 by the
Court of Sh. Amarjeet Singh Ld. Additional District Judge,
Bathinda. Decree Holder is directed to deposit the balance
sale consideration within 15 days of this order and JD
(Represented through LR) are directed to execute the
sale deed in favour of the Decree Holder, meanwhile on
or before 06-07-2019, after receiving the balance sale
consideration. Rough sale deed be also filed.”
8. The defendants being dissatisfied with the order passed by the
executing court, referred to above, challenged the same by filing civil
revision application before the High Court. The High Court allowed
the civil revision application holding as under:-
“In the present case the permission to deposit the balance
sale consideration was sought by respondent No.1 while
filing the execution petition on 02.12.2017. The appeal of
the defendant (Jarnail Singh) was dismissed by the lower
Appellate Court on 21.04.2015. There is no explanation
forthcoming as to why the plaintiff (Raj Kumari) or her
successor respondent No.1 did not take any steps to
deposit the balance sale consideration upon dismissal of
the appeal by the lower Appellate Court on 21.04.2015.
No cogent or compelling reasons are also forthcoming
in the execution petition or in the reply to the objections
for not having deposited the balance sale consideration
within the time granted or within a reasonable time after
the dismissal of the appeal by the lower Appellate Court.
Keeping in view the law as discussed above as well as
the peculiar facts of the present case, it is clear that in
case there is no compliance of the judgment and decree,
except when there had been compelling circumstances
for not depositing the amount, time cannot be extended.
In my view, in the present case the decree had become
unexecutable. The Executing Court has committed an
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1755
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
illegality and perversity in granting time to the respondent
No.1 to deposit the balance sale consideration. For the
reasons aforementioned, the impugned order is set
aside and the revision petition stands allowed. Pending
applications, if any, also stand disposed off.”
9. Thus, the High Court took the view that it was too late in the day
for the appellant-herein (original plaintiff/decree holder) to deposit
the balance sale consideration as almost three years had elapsed
since the date the First Appeal filed by the judgment debtors came
to be dismissed. According to the High Court the appellant-herein
as decree holder should have acted promptly to show his bona fide.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT/DECREE
HOLDER:
10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-herein vehemently
submitted that the High Court committed a gross error in passing
the impugned order. She would submit that mere delay of three
years in filing the execution petition and seeking permission of the
executing court to deposit the balance sale consideration would not
render the decree of specific performance inexecutable. She would
submit that even otherwise a decree of specific performance can
be executed within a period of 12 years in accordance with Article
136 of the Limitation Act.
11. The learned counsel further submitted that indisputably no application
was filed by the respondents-herein/judgment debtors for rescission
of the contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. It was
further pointed out that after the executing court passed the order
the appellant herein deposited the entire balance sale consideration
of Rs. 4,87,000/- on 20th May 2019.
12. In such circumstances referred to above the learned counsel prayed
that there being merit in her appeal, the same may be allowed and
the impugned order passed by the High Court may be set aside.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS/JUDGMENT
DEBTORS:
13. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents-
herein vehemently submitted that no error, not to speak of any error
of law, could be said to have been committed by the High Court in
1756 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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passing the impugned order. He would submit that there was a gross
delay of two years in seeking permission of the executing court to
deposit the balance sale consideration. He would submit that the trial
court in its decree had directed that the balance sale consideration
shall be deposited by the plaintiff within two months from the date of
the judgment and decree. He would submit that after the appeal of
his clients came to be dismissed by the appellate court, the plaintiff
should have deposited the balance sale consideration within a period
of two months thereafter.
14. The learned counsel further submitted that just because the
respondents did not file any application under Section 28 of the
Specific Relief Act for rescission of the contract that by itself would
not be sufficient to condone the delay of four years in depositing
the balance sale consideration. In other words, he would submit
that merely because rescission of contract was not sought by the
respondents-herein/judgment debtors the same does not automatically
result in extension of time.
15. The learned counsel in support of his aforesaid submissions placed
reliance on the following decisions of this Court:-
i. Prem Jeevan v. K.S. Venkata Raman and Another. reported
in (2017)11 SCC 57
ii. V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alagappan reported
in (1999)4 SCC 702.
16. In such circumstances referred to above the learned counsel prayed
that there being no merit in this appeal the same may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any
error in passing the impugned order?
18. The following facts are not in dispute:-
a) The suit filed by the appellant-herein seeking specific
performance of contract based on an agreement of sale
executed by the respondents-herein came to be allowed on
20th January 2012.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1757
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
b) In the decree passed by the trial court the plaintiff was directed
to deposit the balance sale consideration within two months.
c) The judgment and decree passed by the trial court was
challenged by the defendants in appeal. The appeal came to
be dismissed on 21.04.2015.
d) While dismissing the appeal the appellate court did not prescribe
any particular time limit to deposit the balance sale consideration.
In other words, the appellate court did not say anything as to
within what period of time the decree holder should deposit
the balance sale consideration and get the decree executed.
e) After a period of two years from the date the appeal came to be
dismissed the decree holder preferred execution petition wherein
he sought permission to deposit the balance sale consideration.
The executing court permitted the decree holder to deposit the
balance sale consideration vide order dated 06.05.2019. It is
not in dispute that the balance sale consideration came to be
deposited on 20th May 2019.
19. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side,
we must look into two decisions of this Court, on which strong
reliance has been placed by the respondents-herein. We start with
the decision in Prem Jeevan (supra).
20. In Prem Jeevan (supra) a decree for specific performance was
granted in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs on 25-9-2008 as follows:-
“In the result, the suit of the plaintiff is decreed with costs
directing Defendant 1 to execute and register sale deed
in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule
property within two months from the date of this order
after receipt of balance sale consideration of Rs 10,50,000
(sic with interest) at 6% per annum from 27-9-2002 i.e.
from the date of agreement of sale. It is further decreed
that in case Defendant 1 refuses to receive the balance
sale consideration with interest the plaintiff is at liberty
to deposit the said amount into the Court and to obtain
regular sale deed through Court.”
21. The respondents therein claimed to have a cheque on 4-12-2008 for
the amount in question but the same was returned, as not accepted by
the judgment-debtor, appellant therein. Thereafter the decree-holders
1758 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
applied for execution sometime in the year 2010, after making the
deposit of the decretal amount on 7-10-2010.
22. The judgment-debtor filed an application before the executing court
objecting to the execution of the decree as the amount in question
was not deposited by the decree-holders within the stipulated time,
rendering the decree inexecutable in the absence of extension of time.
23. The executing court upheld the objection holding:-
“There is no documentary proof to show that he sought
enlargement of time for paying the purchase money under
Section 28(1) of the 1963 Act. Without seeking extension of
time the respondent herein filed this EP on 7-10-2010 i.e.
after a period two years two months. As per the decision
in Suggula Venkata Subrahmanyam v. Desu Venkata Rama
Rao [Suggula Venkata Subrahmanyam v. Desu Venkata
Rama Rao, (2010) 5 ALD 807 : 2010 SCC OnLine AP 670]
the execution petition for obtaining specific performance
is not maintainable.”
24. On a revision having been filed by the decree-holders, the High Court
reversed the order of the executing court and held:-
“17. The executing court was not clear, both as regards
the facts and as to law. On facts, it did not take into
account, the real purport of the decree. The relevant
portion has already been extracted. The stipulation of
two months was for the first respondent to execute the
decree. That stipulation, no doubt, is coupled with the
right to receive the balance of consideration. There was
nothing on record to indicate that he ever made any effort
to collect or demand the balance of consideration from
the petitioner, within that time. The plea of the petitioner
that when he offered the amount, the respondents refused
to receive; remained unrebutted. The first respondent did
not file any rejoinder to the counter-affidavit. As observed
in the preceding paragraphs, the executing court did
not record any evidence of the parties. Therefore, the
finding recorded by the trial court, in this behalf, cannot
be sustained. When valuable rights accrued to a party,
on account of the suit for specific performance being
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1759
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
decreed, they cannot be taken away, on the basis of
such an untenable finding.
18. On the aspect of law, the executing court proceeded
as though Section 28 of the Act gets attracted, though
it did not mention in so many words. Firstly, the first
respondent himself did not invoke that provision. Secondly,
the provision gets attracted only where, (a) the court,
which passed the decree, directs the decree-holder to pay
the purchaser money (balance of consideration) within a
period, stipulated by it, and (b) the decree-holder failed
to comply with the direction. It is then, and only then, that
the court can consider the feasibility of directing rescission
of contract. In the instant case, the time stipulated by the
trial court in its decree was for the first respondent to
execute the decree, and not directly for the petitioner to
deposit the amount.
19. There is nothing on record to disclose that the first
respondent has ever made any effort to receive the amount,
stipulated in the decree. On the other hand, the plea of
the petitioner that, when he offered to pay the amount,
the first respondent did not receive the same; remained
unrebutted. The court must ensure strict compliance with
the conditions stipulated in a provision, which has the
effect of nullifying a decree. Even where two views are
possible on the facts of the case, the one, which would
sustain the decree, must be adopted.”
25. In such circumstances referred to above, this Court held as under:-
“8. Reference to Order XX Rule 12A CPC shows that in
every decree of specific performance of a contract, the
court has to specify the period within which the payment
has to be made. In the present case, the said period was
two months from the date of the decree.
9. In absence of the said time being extended, the
decree-holder could execute the decree only by making
the payment of the decretal amount to the judgment-
debtor or making the deposit in the court in terms of the
said decree. In the present case, neither the said deposit
1760 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
was made within the stipulated time nor extension of
time was sought or granted and also no explanation has
been furnished for the delay in the making of the deposit.
No doubt, as contended by the learned counsel for the
decree-holders, relying on the judgment of this Court in
Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara reported in (1994) 2 SCC
642, in an appropriate case the court which passed the
decree could extend the time as envisaged in the Specific
Relief Act, 1963. In the present case no such steps have
been taken by the decree-holders.
10. In the above circumstances, the contention advanced
on behalf of the decree-holders, respondents herein,
that unless the judgment-debtor seeks rescission of the
contract in terms of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act,
the decree remains executable in spite of expiry of the
period for deposit, with the only obligation on the part of
the decree-holders to pay interest, cannot be accepted.
11. Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act is as follows:
“28. Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts
for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific
performance of which has been decreed.—(1) Where in
any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for
the sale or lease of immovable property has been made
and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period
allowed by the decree or such further period as the court
may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which
the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor
may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made,
to have the contract rescinded and on such application
the court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far
as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice
of the case may require.
(2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1),
the court—
(a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has
obtained possession of the property under the contract,
to restore such possession to the vendor or lessor, and
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1761
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
(b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all
the rents and profits which have accrued in respect of
the property from the date on which possession was so
obtained by the purchaser or lessee until restoration of
possession to the vendor or lessor, and, if the justice of
the case so requires, the refund of any sum paid by the
vendee or lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection
with the contract.
(3) If the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money
or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree
within the period referred to in sub-section (1), the court
may, on application made in the same suit, award the
purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be
entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the
following reliefs, namely—
(a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the
vendor or lessor;
(b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate
possession, of the property on the execution of such
conveyance or lease.
(4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be
claimed under this section shall lie at the instance of a
vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be.
(5) The costs of any proceedings under this section shall
be in the discretion of the court.
12. There is no doubt that the above provision permits the
judgment-debtor to seek rescission of a contract and also
permits extension of time by the court but merely because
rescission of contract is not sought by the judgment-debtor,
does not automatically result in extension of time.”
26. Thus, the ratio of the decision in Prem Jeevan (supra) should be
understood as laying down a proposition of law that it is incorrect to
say that unless the judgment debtor seeks rescission of the contract
in terms of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, the decree remains
executable in spite of expiry of the period for deposit, with the only
obligation on the part of the decree holders to pay interest. In the
1762 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
said case this Court ultimately took the view that merely because
rescission of contract was not sought by the judgment debtor the
same would not automatically result in extension of time.
27. What is important to note in the decision referred to above is that this
Court was looking into the decree passed by the trial court prescribing
two months time period to deposit the balance sale consideration.
What was directly in consideration before this Court was the decree
passed by the trial court. It appears that in the said case the matter
was not carried further in appeal. In the case on hand the original
decree passed by the trial court was challenged by the defendants
in First Appeal and the said First Appeal came to be dismissed.
Therefore, in Prem Jeevan (supra) this Court directly considered
the effect of non compliance of the time period prescribed in the
original decree passed by the trial court for the purpose of deposit
of the balance sale consideration.
28. In V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm (supra) this Court while adverting
to the decision of this Court in Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara reported
in (1994) 2 SCC 642, held:-
“15. … This Court observed that when the decree specifies
the time for performance of the conditions of the decree, on
its failure to deposit the money, Section 28(1) itself gives
power to the court to extend the time on such terms as the
court may allow to pay the purchase money or other sum
which the court has ordered him to pay. The Court held,
after noticing the conflict of decisions by the Bombay [Maruti
Vishnu Kshirsagar v. Bapu Keshav Jadhav, 1969 SCC
OnLine Bom 39 : AIR 1970 Bom 398] High Court and the
Andhra Pradesh [Ibrahim Shariff v. Masthan Shariff, 1966
SCC OnLine AP 251 : (1967) 2 An WR 60] High Court, that
when the court which passed the decree and the executing
court is the same, application under Section 28 can be
filed in the executing court. However, where a decree is
transferred for execution to a transferee executing court
then certainly the transferee court is not the original court
and the executing court is not the “same court” within the
meaning of Section 28 of the Act. But when an application
has been made in the court in which the original suit was
filed and the execution is being proceeded with, then
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1763
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
certainly an application under Section 28 is maintainable
in the same court.”
29. In the above referred case, an agreement to sell had been executed
nineteen years earlier on 16-2-1980 and no explanation was
forthcoming as to why the balance of the sale consideration was
not deposited within the time granted by the court. No application
for extension was made under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act.
This Court observed that merely because a suit was filed within a
period of three years prescribed by Article 54 of the Limitation Act,
1963, that did not absolve the vendee-plaintiff from demonstrating
that he was ready and willing to perform the agreement and whether
the non-performance was on account of obstacles placed by the
vendor or otherwise. In that context, this Court held:-
“17. … The court has to see all the attendant circumstances
including if the vendee has conducted himself in a
reasonable manner under the contract of sale. That
being the position of law for filing the suit for specific
performance, can the court, as a matter of course, allow
extension of time for making payment of balance amount
of consideration in terms of a decree after 5 years of
passing of the decree by the trial court and 3 years of its
confirmation by the appellate court? It is not the case of
the respondent decree-holders that on account of any fault
on the part of the vendor judgment-debtor, the amount
could not be deposited as per the decree. That being
the position, if now time is granted, that would be going
beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing of the
suit for specific performance of the agreement though this
provision may not be strictly applicable. It is nevertheless
an important circumstance to be considered by the Court.
That apart, no explanation whatsoever is coming from the
respondent decree-holders as to why they did not pay
the balance amount of consideration as per the decree
except what the High Court itself thought fit to comment
which is certainly not borne out from the record. Equity
demands that discretion be not exercised in favour of the
respondent decree-holders and no extension of time be
granted to them to comply with the decree.”
1764 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Thus, under the above circumstances, this Court held that the
vendee, who had applied for extension of time to deposit the balance
price, was not entitled to such extension. This Court observed that
in deciding application under Section 28(1), the court has to see all
the attendant circumstances including the conduct of the parties. On
facts, this court found that there was no default on the part of the
vendor judgment-debtor. That no explanation whatsoever came from
the vendee decree-holder for failure to deposit the balance price. In
the circumstances, on facts, this Court refused extension of time to
deposit the balance price.
30. Order XX Rule 12A of the CPC reads thus:-
“12A. Decree for specific performance of contract
for the sale or lease of immovable property. – Where
a decree for the specific performance of a contract for
the sale or lease of immovable property orders that the
purchase-money or other sum be paid by the purchaser or
lessee, it shall specify the period within which the payment
shall be made.”
31. The Law Commission for insertion of Rule 12A stated:-
“This rule is new, and is intended to provide that a decree
for specific performance of contracts for the sale or lease
of immoveable property should specify the period within
which the purchase-money or other amount is to be paid.
An elaborate provision regarding decrees for specific
performance of such contracts was suggested in an earlier
report of the Law Commission. The recommendation there
was to the effect, that complete relief (such as possession,
etc., rescission, refund of earnest money, etc.) in such a
suit should be available by application in the suit itself
(instead of in execution as at present), and that appropriate
provision should be made in the Civil Procedure Code
enabling such applications to be made and orders thereon
and also for appeals.
It is considered, that so far as a provision authorising the
making of an application and orders thereon is concerned,
Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (read with
Section 22) would be adequate. So far as appeals from
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1765
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
such orders are concerned, the orders, it is considered,
would fall within the definition of ‘decree’ given in Section
2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. It is thought, that the
only specific provision which is payment required is to the
effect that the decree should specify the period for of the
purchase-money or other amount due under the decree.
Necessary amendment is proposed.”
32. The Joint Committee also observed:-
“The Committee, therefore, feel that the proper place for
the proposed rule is in Order XXI and not in Order XX.
The Committee also note that the proposed Rule 12-B is
almost a verbatim copy of Rule 34 of Order XXI subject
to certain modifications. The Committee, therefore, feel
that the proposed Rule 12-B should be omitted from
Order XX, and, instead of omitting Rule 34, modifications,
as suggested by the Law Commission, should be made
therein. Proposed Rule 12-B has been omitted accordingly.”
33. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it has been said:-
“Clause 73, sub-clause (viii). – New Rule 12-A seeks
to provide that the decree for specific performance of
contracts for sale or lease of immovable property should
specify the period within which the purchase-money or
other amount is to be paid”
34. Rule 12A of Order XX, as inserted by the Amendment Act, 1976
enacts that a decree for specific performance of contract for sale or
lease of immoveable property should specify the period within which
purchase money or other sum should be paid by the purchaser or
by the lessee as the case may. Rule 12A makes it obligatory for the
court to specify in the decree for specific performance of contract
for sale or lease of immovable property the date by which purchase
money or other sum should be paid by the vendee or lessee. The trial
court has jurisdiction to fix time-limit for depositing the money by the
decree-holder under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The
decree is preliminary in nature and the court retains control over it.
35. In the case on hand, in accordance with the provisions of Order
XX Rule 12A referred to above the trial court while allowing the suit
and granting the relief of specific performance specifically stipulated
1766 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
two months time period for the plaintiff to deposit the balance sale
consideration and get the sale deed executed in his favour.
36. However, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court came
to be challenged before the appellate court. Once the judgment
passed by the trial court is challenged before the appellate court the
judgment and order passed by the trial court would get merged with
the judgment of the appellate court irrespective of the fact whether
the appeal is allowed or dismissed. In the case on hand the appeal
stood dismissed.
37. The law in the aforesaid context is well settled. The doctrine of
merger is founded on the rationale that there cannot be more than
one operative decree at a given point of time. The doctrine of merger
applies irrespective of whether the appellate court has affirmed,
modified or reversed the decree of the trial court.
38. In Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala reported in (2000) 6 SCC
359, while explaining the doctrine of merger, this Court held thus:-
“12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that
there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders
governing the same subject-matter at a given point of
time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior court,
tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available
under the law before a superior forum then, though the
decree or order under challenge continues to be effective
and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy.
Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it
either way — whether the decree or order under appeal
is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the
decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority
which is the final, binding and operative decree or order
wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court,
tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is
not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of
jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content
or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have
been laid shall have to be kept in view.”
39. Further, while explaining the position that emerges on the grant
of special leave to appeal by this Court, it was observed in
Kunhayammed (supra) that:-
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1767
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
“41. Once a special leave petition has been granted,
the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this
Court have been let open. The order impugned before
the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against.
Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order
and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger.
It would not make a difference whether the order is one
of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming
the order appealed against. It would also not make any
difference if the order is a speaking or non-speaking one.”
40. The position of law as aforesaid has been affirmed and reiterated by
a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Khoday Distilleries
Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd.
reported in (2019) 4 SCC 376.
41. The decision in Kunhayammed (supra) was followed by a three-
Judge Bench decision of this Court in Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish
Prasad, reported in (2004) 8 SCC 724, which held thus:-
“23. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of
propriety in the hierarchy of the justice delivery system.
The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction
between an order of reversal, modification or an order of
confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said
doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one
operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a
given point of time.
24. It is trite that when an appellate court passes a decree,
the decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the
appellate court and even if and subject to any modification
that may be made in the appellate decree, the decree
of the appellate court supersedes the decree of the trial
court. In other words, merger of a decree takes place
irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellate court
affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by the
trial court.”
42. The decision in Chandi Prasad (supra) was followed by a two-Judge
Bench of this Court in Shanthi v. T.D. Vishwanathan reported in
(2019) 11 SCC 419 rendered on 24-10-2018 in the following terms:-
1768 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“7. … When an appeal is prescribed under a statute and
the appellate forum is invoked and entertained, for all
intents and purposes, the suit continues. When a higher
forum entertains an appeal and passes an order on merit,
the doctrine of merger would apply. The doctrine of merger
is based on the principles of the propriety in the hierarchy
of the justice delivery system. The doctrine of merger
does not make a distinction between an order of reversal,
modification or an order of confirmation passed by the
appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there
cannot be more than one operative decree governing the
same subject-matter at a given point of time.”
(Emphasis supplied)
43. The doctrine of merger operates as a principle upon a judgment
being rendered by the appellate court. In the present case, once the
appellate court affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court,
there was evidently a merger of the judgment of the trial court with
the decision of the appellate court. Once the appellate court renders
its judgment, it is the decree of the appellate court which becomes
executable.
44. The decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary
decree. Both the parties have reciprocal rights and obligations flowing
out of the decree. The decree may fix the time limit for performance
and in some cases may also provide for the consequence for
non-performance within the time limit or the decree may even be
silent on this aspect.
45. The decree enforces specific performance of the contract. The
contract between the parties is thus not extinguished by passing of
a decree for specific performance and it subsists despite the decree.
Section 28 (1) of the Act, makes it clear that the Court does not
become a functus officio after the grant of the decree for specific
performance and it retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the
decree till the sale deed is executed.
46. The Court has been conferred with the power to extend the time to
pay the amount and while taking into consideration the delay that is
sought to be condoned by the plaintiff, the Court does not adjudge
the same like an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1769
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
where each day’s delay must be explained. The Court is given the
discretion to extend the time and the provision therefore seeks to
provide complete relief to both the parties in terms of the decree for
specific performance.
47. The power and jurisdiction granted under Section 28 (1) of the Act,
enables the Court to extend the period for payment of the purchase
money if it has not been paid within the period allowed by the decree.
It also enables the judgment debtor to seek for rescinding the contract
for non-compliance of the directions given in the decree and while
considering this application, the Court is given the discretion to
rescind the contract or in an appropriate case to even extend the
time for paying the purchase money.
48. It should also be borne in mind that appeal is a continuation of the
original proceedings and the power of the Court to extend the time
for depositing the amount can be exercised even in the appellate
stage by the Court.
49. In the considered view of this Court, the Appellate Court, after deciding
the appeal on merits, could have called upon the plaintiff to deposit
the balance sale consideration by fixing a time limit. This would have
at least given an opportunity to the plaintiff to fulfil his obligation.
The non-payment of the balance sale consideration within the time
period fixed by the Trial Court does not amount to abandonment
of the contract and consequent rescinding of the same. The real
test must be to see if the conduct of the plaintiff will amount to a
positive refusal to complete his part of the contract. There must be
an element of wilful negligence on the part of the plaintiff before
a Court proceeds to invoke Section 28 of the Act and rescind the
contract. (See: Krishnamoorthy v. Shanmugasundaram & Anr.,
2022 SCC OnLine Mad 963)
50. This litigation is an eye-opener for the appellate courts reminding that
they owe a duty to comply with the provisions of Order XX Rule 12A
of the CPC. Where an appeal is filed against the decree passed
by the trial court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court
should specify time to deposit the balance sale consideration. It is
too much to say that since the trial court had granted two months
time to the decree holder to deposit the balance sale consideration
the same time period would apply even to the decree that may be
drawn by the appellate court. What is executable is the decree
1770 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
passed by the appellate court. The appellate court owes a duty to
specify the time period. If during the specified time period the decree
holder is not in a position to deposit the balance sale consideration
or, in other words, fails to deposit the balance sale consideration
and later upon expiry of the specified time period seeks permission
to deposit, then it would be within the discretion of the trial court
to grant further time to deposit the balance sale consideration or
decline. This discretion has to be exercised judiciously keeping in
mind various factors like bona fide of the decree holder, the cause
for failure to deposit the balance sale consideration in time, the
length of delay and also the equities that might have been created
during the interregnum period in favour of the judgment debtor. It is
the cumulative effect and considerations of such factors that should
weigh with the court concerned while permitting the decree holder
to deposit the balance sale consideration beyond the time period
that might have been prescribed by the trial court in its final decree.
51. In the case on hand, undoubtedly, there was a delay on the part
of the decree holder in filing the execution petition and thereby
seeking permission to deposit the balance sale consideration. Just
because a decree of specific performance can be executed within
12 years from the date of original decree or from the date the
appellate court affirms such decree that, by itself, does not mean
that a decree holder deposits the balance sale consideration at
his own sweet will.
52. If the appellate court had failed to stipulate any particular time period
then it is expected of the decree holder to deposit the same within
a reasonable period of time.
53. As noted earlier, the balance sale consideration of Rs. 4,87,000/-
came to be deposited by the decree holder way back in 2019. In
the overall facts and circumstances of the case we have reached
the conclusion that High Court should not have interfered with the
order passed by the executing court.
54. In Ramankutty Guptan (supra) this Court while holding that the
application for extension of time for payment of balance amount
of consideration can be filed in the Court of the first instance as
well as in the appellate court, observed that. “It is to be seen that
the procedure is hand-maid for justice and unless the procedure
touches upon jurisdictional issue, it should be moulded to subserve
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1771
Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors.
substantial justice. Therefore, technicalities would not stand in the
way to subserve substantive justice”
55. The balance sale consideration deposited by the appellant-plaintiff
way back on 20-05-2019 i.e. Rs. 4,87,000/- shall now be disbursed
in favour of the defendants with interest accumulated thereon within a
period of four weeks from today. Since there was a delay of 2 years
in filing the execution petition and delay of 4 years in depositing the
balance sale consideration of Rs. 4,87,000/- we are of the view that
the respondents-herein (judgment-debtors) are entitled to simple
interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the
judgment and order passed by the appellate court till the date the
balance consideration was deposited i.e. 20.05.2019. The executing
court shall calculate the interest amount at the rate of 9 per cent
simple interest and direct the appellant-herein to deposit the said
amount within a period of two weeks from today.
56. In view of the aforesaid, the appeal succeeds and hereby allowed.
The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and that
of the executing court is affirmed.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Bibhuti Bhushan Bose
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