Holding

The two provisos to Section 7(1)(e) of the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 are valid and, being protected by Article 31‑B as a Ninth‑Schedule law, are not void for inconsistency with Section 299(2) of the Government of India Act or the fundamental right to fair compensation.

Summary

The petitioners, owners of land acquired under the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948, challenged two provisos in Section 7(1)(e) that fixed compensation based on the market value as of September 1, 1939 plus 40 percent, arguing that they violated Section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the constitutional guarantee of fair compensation. The High Court dismissed the appeals but granted a certificate under Article 133(1)(c). The Supreme Court examined whether the Act, placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 and thus protected by Article 31‑B, could be struck down for inconsistency with the repealed provision of the 1935 Act or fundamental rights. Relying on earlier decisions upholding the protective umbrella of Article 31‑B for pre‑constitutional statutes, the Court held that the provisos were not arbitrary and were covered by Article 31‑B. Consequently, the Court affirmed the validity of the provisos and dismissed the appeals. A substitution order was granted in one appeal due to the death of an appellant.

Issues considered

Whether the two provisos to sub‑clause (e) of Section 7(1) of the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 violate Section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the constitutional right to fair compensation.
Whether the Act, being listed in the Ninth Schedule and protected by Article 31‑B, is immune from being declared void for inconsistency with the repealed provision of the 1935 Act or fundamental rights.
Whether the method of valuation prescribed (market value as of 1 September 1939 plus 40 %) is arbitrary or unconstitutional.

Legislation cited

Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951s. Article 31-B, s. Ninth Schedule
Constitution (Forty‑fourth Amendment) Act, 1978
Constitution of Indias. Article 133(1)(c), s. Article 31, s. Article 31(2)
Government of India Act, 1935s. 299(2)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 23, s. 3, s. 4, s. 6
Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948s. 7(1)(e)

Subjects

Article 31-BNinth ScheduleResettlement of Displaced Persons ActLand AcquisitionCompensationFundamental RightsSection 299Government of India Act 1935Constitutional validityArbitrationCertificate under Article 133Civil Appeals

Judgment

'572

A RAl\1 NATH & ORS.
v.·

UNION OF INDIA
April 25, 1984
B
[D.A. DrsA1, AMARENDRA NATH SEN AND R.B. M1sRA, n:1
i '
· C1Jnstitution of Irtdia:_Art. 31-B-Scope of-Whether protection UtZder Art.
31-B to Acts inserted in the Ninth Schedule against l'iolation of fundame,n(al
r.ights inPqrt 111 of the Cpnstiiution extends against violaiion of rights und~r
C s. 299 of the Government of India Act .1935-He/a yes.

Re.settlenie_nt of-DisplacedPersolls (larid Acqufsitiun) Act, 1948-Two· pro·
visons to sub-cl. (e) ofs•b-s. (/) ofs. 77Vq/idity of-Held, valid-

_S. 7 of lthe Reset.t_le'n1ent of Displaced Persons (Lacd A~qui~i_t_i~p)
Act, 1948 broadly. p,rovided for payment, cf com_peos1tio11 for the land to be
.D acquired for carrYin!J OUt the! purpose~ of tb-e Act aod the minner a~·d
method of computation of compensation. Sub·clause. (a) of sub-s (I) .
provided for determinirlg the compensation having due regard to the provi·
sioils of sub-scc_tion (1) 9f Sec. 23 of· the- Land Acquisition Act, 18?4,
that is the n1arkct price of the land on. the da.te -of acquisition. Tho ,two
prOvisos ·carved out ao c:iccCption. The first~ 'part of .the first proviso "Was
in cdnson1nc~ \.Vith ss. 4 and 6 or the Land Acquisition Act n1meJy that the
m.irket valuc··shall be de'crn1ined as on the date of the public.Ltioo of tho
notic\! under -section, 3. Notice under sectiOit 3 ser·ved the Purpo~e of a.
·11otificJtion under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. f! is the second paft
of the first' proviso that really affected the.compensation, when it said th1t.
either the market value referred to Jn the firSt clau~e of Sub·s. (I) of s. 23 of
the s:.iid Act shall be deemed to be the niark-:t value of such land on the
·date of .pubfii;;ition ~f the no.tice under s. 3 or rnar-ket VJ.Jue of the land on
F the Jst d:iy of Sepcemb,.::r, 1939, with an a~dition of 40% whichever was
less. The 'iec~nd p.rcvisn catered to the situ·1tit>n wnere !::ind acquired had
bee·n·h~ld by the owner thereof und::r a purchase made before the Ist'.day of
April.; 1984 but 5!fter the rst day of September, 1939. .
•
2. · ·These J>lots of lari'H i>ituated in Delhi and possessed· by the two
G appellants were aCqulred by the respondent in 1950 under the Reseitlerncnt
of Displaced Persons (Land Acq1Aisition) Act, 1948. Ari arbi.trator was
appointed as envisaged bys. 7(1) (b) of ihe Act to assess the compensation.
T_he appel"lants and the Union .of [ndia appeafed before th~· arbitr3.tor and
the compensation was determi.ned by the arbitrator. The appellants perfcr..
•
red two' separate appeals against the a~ard of the .ar~itrator in the High
H Ccurt. A Div~sion .Bench Of the High Court fo-llow ing a decision of the
Full Bench of the High Court dismissec:I the appeals, but gr'anted· a certificate
under A rt. 133( I) (c). .In these appeals-the appep ants contended that. the
two provisos to sub-clause (e) of sub·s.(1) of s.7_of the Act were violative or
573

s.299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which gdranteed a fair • A
· compensation for deprivation and/or acquisition ·or propefty,

Dismissing the appeals,

HELD: 1: The two provisoes to sub'ciause (o) of sah-s.(I) of s. 7
• of the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act 1948, are
valid. [5810] · ;1 ll

2. The contention that reducing the compens3tion to the m1rkct '"'
value plus 40% as on !st day of September, 1939 is thoroughly irrelevant
to the payment of compensation_ and arbitrarily selects the date much
earlier to the date of acq'uisiiion and ignores thC escalation Of price of the ~)
had is without much force .. The choice of the date September !st, 1939
d.Oes not appear to be arbitrary but has a real. Dexus to the Object sought to e
tie•• the 198.4 Act . . The choice of the date as !st .September 1939 is very
·relevant S.nd cannot be ~truck down as arbitrary bec~use on-o -cannot over~
loot the historical fact th~t thC Second ·World ·War· was declar'ed on
September 2, 1939 and lndf~ was dragg~d intO it· by a foreign power ·on
._~eptem_ber 3,_ 1939 an~ t~e_wa( situation contributed .to the escalation in
vrice _of the land .. It is however not neces~ary to examine iil depth this ': r;
aspect. [577E;G] . D
3. Article ,31.B ·or the' Constitution which was added by the
CODStitutioll (Firit Amendment) A.ct, '1951· provides that once. ao Act is
placed iJl. the. Nint);l_ ~chedule to th~ Con~tlt:utioll -eithe_r the Act.or any
.- P~c?''ision th~reOf shall not be de~med to be vo_id_ o_r <1,v.er to _have beCome
~9_id, ~n tli_e ~~o~-~~:that s!-lch Act_ or ~ny~ prQvis!oh· thereof is incon!t?Stent
wilb, or takes away or abridges apy of the right! cottferred by any ,provi· E
sion of part Jli of tho Constitution. The Protection under Article 31-B
against the violation of the fum;lamental rights n1entiooed in Part III must
·exfend to the rights unaer srCtion 299 of the Government at' India Act',
· 193S also which has Peen t_epealed~ s.299(2~ ,,-yas in suOStan.ce a fundamental
risht which was Hfied :b_odily as it:w!)s from 'th_C Government of India, Act, I(
1935 and put into Part Ill of the Constitution. The Re·sdttlemen\ of
Displaced Persons (Land Acqu;sition) Act, 1948 is admittedly in!erted in r
the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Fir.st Amendment) Act, 1951.
Therefore this Act' ecjoys the umbrella of protection of Article 31-B and is
immuned from t~c cballer.ge of_beiog violative Qf any of the iig]its under s.
299 of the Oover'!lment of India Act, 1935 or !fundamental rights in Part
III of the Constitution. (577G·H ; 578A; C-D ;G·H] ,, •··
, Union of India v. Sm/. Mohinder Kaur, !LR 1969 Delhi,1154, upheld.
G

Dhirllbha Devisingh Gohil v. State of Bombay, [1935] SCR 691; State
bf Uttar Pradesh and Othets v. H.H.Maharaja Brijendre Singh, [1961] 1 SCR
362; N.B. Jeejeebhoy v. Assistant Collector, Thona Prant, Thana, [196S] I
SCR 636; Ru· tom Cavasjee Coojier v. Union of ~ndia, [1970) 3 SCR 530; ,, H
Stpre of Gujarat v. Shanti/al Mongaldas 011d Others [1969] 3 SCR 541 1
1er~rre~ to, · ·
. 574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1984] 3 s.c.R .

· C!vn. Arl'ELLATE JuRrsmcnoN : Civil Appeals Nos: 922-23
of 1971. · · . ·'

Appeals from the Judgment and Order dated the 16th
·December, 1969 of the Delhi High Court in F.A.O. No. 94-D/~9 &.
46-D/1960. ·
I . i '
K.C. Dua Co: the' Appellant.
'
M.S. Gujaral and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.

• The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\
DESAI, J. A hangover of the hey day of Article .31 permeates
the controversy ,in these two appeals: The attempt is to salvage

D
something from the debris of repealed.Art. 31 by the Constitution
(Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. · .·

In Re Civil Appeal No. 922/71 ; Ramnath, the· appe1lant, who
•-
is now dead took on Jease a plot of land bearing No. 64 'Block L,
Daryaganj,))elhi admeasuring 590 sq. yards from J)clhi Improve-
ment Trust under Exh.· A-4 dated February :10, 1942. The period
reserved under lease was 90 years. The. appellant paid Rs. 10,253 as
initial premium and had to pay recurring half-yearly reut in the
I amount of RS. 102-8-6 under the agreed terms an ct conditions oflthe
le,ase. On payment of Rs. 10,253, the initial payment, the iippeliant.
was put in"possession: ·
In.Re Civil Appeal No. 9 23/71 : Appellant R.S. Ram· Peishad
, since deceased took on lease two plots of land bearing No. 66,67 in
Block L, Darye . n', Delhi from the Delhi Improvement Trust. The
appellant ex .u• .d o registered lease deed dated March 9, 194~ in
respect of PLt 1·;0. 66 and with respect to Plot No. 67, 'the.
transact'un wa> th;ough an oral sale dated May 1, 1942. Each plot
a,dm~:isured 591.1 sq. yards. The appellant.was put in possession of
both t:.e plo• '·
G
Tho Ci:tief Commissioner ofDelhi issued the nctitfication No.
F. 6(3) SQ R & R dated December 15, 1950 under Section 3 of 1he '
Resettlement o( Displaced· Per>ons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948
('1948 Act' for, short) for acquiring the plots of both the appellants.
An arbitrator was appointed as envisaged by Section. 7(I)(b) of: the
.I Jf ·J948 ·Act to assess the compensation. Both the appellants and the
Union of India appeared before the arbitrator and t.lie compensation
I·
was determined by.thC:arbitrat()f, ·
•
ll.AM NATH v. UNION (Desai, J.) 575
Boot the appellants preferred two separate appeals against the :.
award of the arbitrator in the then High Court of Punjab at Delhi.
A
On the formation of the High Court of Delhi both the appeals
came up before the.Division Bench on two differe11t dates. The
Division Bench following the decision of the Full Bench in the
Union of Irrdia v. Smt. Mohinder Kaurl'i dismissed the appeals but .
granted a certificate under Art 133(I)(c) of the Constitution. B
Hence both these appeals by certificate. •

.. The only contention canvassed before' the High Court was
that Ist and'2nd proviso to sub,;:lause (e) of sub-section 1 of Section·
7 of the.1948 Act are violatiye of S_ec. 2<l9(2) of the Government of· a
India Act, 1935 .as it then·stood and the compensation awarded by
the arbitr.ator in consonance with the provisoes is.illusory and there-
fore both the proviso es are constitutionally. invalid. A Full Bench
of the High Court in the ·deci1ion hereina~ove noticed negatived
this contention but granted the certi.ficate under Act. 133(1}(c) on •
the ground that the decision in Union of India v. Smt. Mohinder l D
Jfaur .was pending in appeal before the Supreme Court 11nd as the ·,.,
~
,High Court in. rejecting the appeals of the presents appellants
followed tqe same decision, it was imperative that the certificate
should be granted. ·

When the appeals came up for hearing, we. enquired from Mr. ·'
...... K.C. Dua, learned counsel for.the appellants as to what happened
to the appeal preferred in Smt. M()hinder Kaur's case which enabled
. the appellents to obtain· the requisite certificate under Art. 133(I)(c):
There was no clear or straight. answer to the querry and it. appears ·
that there was no such appeal and therefore on this .short ground ' F
the certificate could have been canc.elled. But as even the other side
was not in a position to shed light on tbe questjpn ~heiher any
appeal at all was preferred against the decision of the High Court
in Smt: Mohinder Kaur's case a~d if so what fate it' met, we persua-
ded ourselves not to cancel the certificate.
G
Mr. K.C. Dua, learned counsel, who appeared f<;ir the
.. , appellants in both the appeals; was rather on uncertain ground when
he first stated ~hat he does not wish to challenge the constitution
validity of Section 7 and or the provisoes to sec. 7(i)(e) and then:
later on stated that he does challenge the two provisoes to sub-. , · ff
clause (e) of sub-sec; (I) of~ec. 7.on the /.'round that these two pro-
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R. r ,
.• ~
visoes are violative of Section 299(2) of the Government of India
l\ct, 1935 .

. Sec. 7(1)(e) and the two provis~es r.ead as under:

"7. (1) Where any land has been acquired under this Act
there shall be paid compensation, the am,ount of Y,'.hich !shall
B be paid compensation, the amount of which shall be deter- ·~ .
mined in the manner and in accordance with the principles '
.hereinafter set out, that is to say,-

xx xx xx •
xx xx xx
.' (e) the arbitrator, in making his· award, shall have due
regard to the provisions of sub-section (!) of section 23
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I ofl894) ;

D Provided that the market-value referred to in clause
first of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the said Act shall be
· deemed to be the market-value of'such land on the date of
publication of the notice under section 3, or on the first day of
September, 1939 with an addition of 40 per cent, whichever
'is less : · .
I
Provided further that where such land has been held
by t11e owner thereof under a purchase made before the first
day of April, 1948, but after the. first day of September,
1939, by a registered document, or a decree for pre-emption
I
between tbe aforesaid dates, the compensation shall be the
price actually paid by the purchaser or th.e amount on pay-
meni of which he may have acquired the land in the decree
for pre-emption as the case may· be."

G The 1948 Act was enacted. to acquire land for re~ettlement of
displaced persons. As an aftermath of the partition of India
thousands of persons were uprooted from their habitats and, they
had to be resettled. Urgen! necessity was to acquire the land at!d
that too at reasonable price. In order to circumvent the prolix and
time-consuming procedure under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
B a special act was enacted. Sec. 7 broadly provides for payment of
compensation for the land to be accquired for catrying out the
purposes of the Act and tfre. manner and method of computation· of
\)Ompensatioµ. Stib-cla11se (e) provides for determining the comenp:
•

RAM NATH v. UNION (De,·ai, J.) 577
.
$aiion having the due regard to the provisions of sub-s~ction (l) of
· the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, that is the market price of the land .
on the date ofacquisltion. The two provisoes carve out au excep-
tion. The first part of the first proviso ·is in consonance with
Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act namely that the
• market value shall be determined as on the date of the publication
of the notice under section 3. Notice under section 3' served the
purpose of a notification urider Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.
It is the second part of the first proviso that really affects the com-
pensation, when,it says that either the market value referred to in
the first clause of sub-section (I) of sec. 23 of the said A~t shall be
deemed to be the market value of such land on the date of publi-
cation of the noticiMmder section 3 or market value of the land on
the first da.y of September, 1939, with an addition of 40 per cent,
whichever is less. The second proviso caters to the situation' where
land acquired has been held by the owner thereof under a purchase
made before the !st day of April, 1948 but after the !st day of
April, 1948 but after the 1st day of September, 1939 which is not
the question herein. . ·
'
Mr. Dua urged that reducing the compensation to the market
value plus 40 per cent as on Is! day of September,1939 is
thoroughly irrelevant to the.payment of ~ompensation and arbitra-
rily .selects the date much earlier to the date of _acquisition and B:
ignores the <scalation of price . of the land. It was urged that
the situation is. not improved by adding 40 per cent to the
market value as determined on Ist day of September ; 1939. The
choice. of the date September !st, 1939 does not appear to be
arbitrary but has a real nexus to the object sought to be achieved by F:
the 1948 Act. We are of the opinion that tlte choice of the date as
Ist September, 1939 is very relevant cannot be struck down as
arbitrary because one can not overlook the historical fact that the
Second World War was de·cJared on September 2, 1939 and India
was dragged into it by a foreign powrr on September 3, 1939 and the·
war situation contriouted to the escalation in price of the land. It J Q
is however. not necessary to examine,in depth this aspect. ·

The 1948 Act is admittedly inserted in the Ninth Schedule by'
the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which also simulta-
neously added Art. 31-B. The Act firds its place at plecitum 16 in the
Ninth.Schedule. Once an act is. placed in the Ninth Schedule, H
Article 31 B, provides that either the act or any provision thereof
shall not be deemed to ·be void or ever to have becoine void.on
the ground of such act or any provision thereof is inconsistent with,

.,
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1984] 3 S.C.R.

or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any pro-
vision of Part III of the Constitut.ion. Once the act is brought
under the umbrella of protection of Art. 31-B by inserting it in the
Ninth Schedule, th~ act is not open to tqe challenge that it as a
whole or any provision thereof violates or contravenes any of the
fundamental riglits contain~d in J?art III of the Constitution. The
ll allegation here is that the two pro\lisoes violate the guarantee of
fair compensation and therefore it constitutes deprivation of pro-
perty withontjust compensation, a relic of Art. 31(2) lilied from
Sec. 29.9(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935.

The 1948 Act.is a pre-Cohstitution statute. /t was therefore
urged that it does not qualify for the protection of Art. .31-B in as
much as when enacted it was violative of Sec. 299(2) of the Govern-
ment of India Act, 1935 and as it was void ab initio, it was not an· ·
exi>ting law within the meaning of expression in Article 366(10] and
therefore is. not qualified for umbrella o( protection enacted in
D Art. 31-B.

Bee. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 is almost in
pari materia with repealed Art. 31(2) .. ·A Constitution .Bench of
this Court in Dhirubha IJ.evisinglz Gohil v. The State of Bombay<'>
.E while' upholding the constitutional validity of the Bombay T)llukdari
Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 on the ground that it was not covered
by the umbrella of protection of Art. 31-)3 and the Ninth Schedule
held that Sec. 299(2) of the . Government of India Act was in
substance a fundamental right which.was lifted bodily as it was from
'fl< the Go-;ernment of India Act, 1935 and put into the Patt III of the ·
Constitution. Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay
Act violated Sec. 299(2) and was not qualified for the protection of
Art,. 31-B; it was held that the marginal difference in the language
of Sec. 299 and Art. 3l'B does not make any difference because
what Art. 31-B protects is. not a mere 'contravention of the provi-
/>--·
sions' of Part Ill of the Constitution but an attack on the grounds
that. the impugned act is 'inconsistent with, or takes away . or
abridges any o.f the rights conferred by any provision o[ Part HI.'
It was accordingly held that even though the Bombay Talukdari
Tenure Abolition. Act, 1949 was a pre-Constitution statute, it would )

nonetheless be covered by the umbrella of protection of Art. 31-B.
In this connection it was observed as under :

(I) [l955] S.C.R. 691.
'·
RAM NATH v. UNION (Desai, J.) 579
"It will be illogical to construe article 31-B as affording
'Protection only so far as these rights are taken away by an
.Act in.violation of the provisions of the new Constitution but
not when they are taxen away .bl( an Act in vio~tion of sec-
tion 299 of the Government of India Act which has been
·npealed. The intention of the Constitution to protect each
and every one of the Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule B
from any d1allenge on the ground of violation of any
-0f the fundamental rights secured under Part III of the
Constitution, irrespective of whether they are p_re-existing or
new rights, is placed beyond any doubt or quest.ion by the
very emphatic .language of article 31-B which cleclares that c
none of the provisions of the specified Acts shall be deemed
to be void or ever to have become ·void on the
. ~ground of the alleged violation of- the rights indicated and
"notwithstanding any j~gment, decree or order of any court
or tribunal." That intention is also ~phasised by the positive
declaration that "each of the said Acts. or Regulations shall,
subjecl to· the power of any competent ~egislature to repeal
or amend it, continue in force."
.
This very· question again surfaced in The State of Uttar
Prade~li and Others v. II. H. Maharaja Brijendra Singhli) in which
.constitutional validity of U; P. La.nd Acquisition (Rehabilitation of
·Refugees) Ac!, 1948 was questioned. The title of the Act impugned in
that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948
both being enacted wi\h a view to acquire power to acquire land for
.rehabilitation of refu"gees and that too in· the same year. It· may as
·well be ment.ioned that U. J>. Act XXVI of 1948 is also inserted in·
the Ninth Schedu!e. The entry just precedes the 1948 Act. The
High Court while upholding the validity of Sec. 11 which is in pari
materia with Sec. 7 of 1948. Act struck down the two provisoes to
Bee. 11 similarly worded as the two provisoes to Sec. 7 (I) (e). Both
:the provisoes are in pari materia wit!i the impugned ptovisoes. This G
,Court, reversing the decision of the High Court ahd following the
-decision in Dhirubha Derisingh Gohil's case while upholding the
constitutional vafidity of the Act held that the protection under Art.
31B against the vio4tion of the fundamental rights m~ntioned therein
1DUSt extend to the rights under Sec. 299 of the Government of India
Act also. The reasons which weighed with the Con.stitution Bench
of this Court while upholding the validity of the U. P. Act. will

{I) (1961) I SCR 362.
. sso: SUl'!i.iiMB .totJRT· REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.Jt,

mutatis mutandis appply here and we must uphold the' validity of th<).
two provisos on parity of reasoning.
.
. !t is thus satisfactorily established that in view of the imertfom
of the 1948 Act in Ninth Schedule it e~joys the umbrella of protec-
tion of Art. 31-B and therefore it is immune from .the chailenge as.
B. violating any of the provisions in Part Ill of the Constitution. In·
fact this should end the controversy.

Mr. Dua however urged·that in view of the decision of this-.
·court in N.B. Jeejeebhoy v. Assistant Col/eccor, Thana Pi'ant, Thanal')•
wherei~ this Court struck .down tJ:ie Land .Acquisition (Bombay'
Amendment) Act, 1.948 as constitutionally invalid, would necessitate
re,examination of the decisions in Dhirubha Dev/singh Gohil's case
and Maharaja Brijendra Singh's case. It \\as submitted that the·
decision in Jeejeebhoy's case comes later .in point of time both to
.the decision in Dhirub}ja Gohil's and flaharaja Brijendra Sing)i's
Di case, and therefore the later decision should prevail with this Court_
In J.eejeebhoy's :ase, this. (Oourt repelled the conten.tion·that t!)e
Amendment Act 1s saved by Art. 31-A of t.he Const1tut1on. The
argument of the 'learned Attorney· General th?t Sec. 299 ·of the
Government of India Act, 1935 declared a fundamental right of a
citizen', that it is bodily lifted and introduced by the Constitution ilh
Art. 31(2)thereof and that if Art. 31-A saved an attack against the
Amending Act on the ground that it infringed Art. 31(2) thereof, it
would equally save the attack based on the infringement of Sec.
299(2) of the Government of India Act, 193 5 was disposed of b)(
.F, · merely observing that the argument is far fetchetl. It may however
be mc;ntioned that in this later decision, the decisions of the Consti-
tution Bench in Dhirubhi Devisingh Gohil's case 3Dd the Maharaja.
Brijendra Singh's case were merely referred to but riot overruled.
They were distinguished on the ground that the statutes impugned
in those cases enjoyed the protection of Art. 31-13. That is a fact.
and would make all the difference. The impugned Act in Jeejeebhoy's
case did not enjoy the protection of the Ninth Schedule and Art.
31-B, and therefore the decision in Jeejeebhoy's case is hardly of any
assistance. .

It was lastly urged that the deci.sion of the larger Bench iO: , .
n· &stom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India(') would clearly sl;tow that,
r•
•• :;
- (Jl , [l965ll S,C.R. 616,
(2) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530,
' j
1t AM NATH v. UNION (Desai, J.) 581~.

the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Shanti/al Mangaldas
<ind Others(') is no more good law and therefore it ·is open to the
·Court to examine whether compensation ·offered _by the rel~vant pro-
·visions of the Statute is illusory . or prescribe principles well-recog-
:nised for valuation of land. · In our . opinion, this aspect is hardly
irelevant because once the impugned statute or the impugned provi-
oSions of the statute enjoy th~ protection of Art. 31-B, it is not open
to the Court to cxam.ine whether the principles for valuation therein
J?rescribed are -relevant to the land valuation 'because that' question
,arises where a complaint as to the contravention of fundament11!
csights enaeted in repealed A rt.31 can be entertained and examined.
!hat complaint has to be rejected at the thereshold as soon as it is 0
. i'Ointed out ·that the impugned statute or the impugned provisions
-.of statute enjoy the protection of Art. 31-B. It may be mentioned
that in Smt. Mohinder Kaur's case, a Full Bench of Delhi-High Court
'examined and upheld tlie ~onstitutfonal validity of the two provi-
iloes to Sec. 7(l)(c) of the 1948 Act. We agree with the view taken
by the High Court and upheld the same. · D
. I

Constitutional validity of the provisoes to Sec. 7(l)(e) 'of the
1948 Act was the 'only point canvassed in these two appeals and· as .
.: 'there is no merit in it, both the appeals fail and are dismissed with-
.
-out any order as .to costs. ·
E
'
In Civil Appea I No. 922 of 1971 the appellant died pending
ihe appeal and substitution is sought by one Kumari Abha Gupta
basing her claim ou the will dated July 27, 1980 of the deceased.
'The will has neither beeri probated nor anywhere its validity is de-
iermined. It is.not necessary for us to undertake this exercise here.
We grant the substitution limited'to the purposes of the appeal but
if in any appropriate proceeding, the question of the validity of the
-will arises, the same could not be said to h·ave been concluded by
this Court granting thy subs,titution. Subject to this condition, the
1lubstitutWn. is granted.

•
Appeals dismissed•

. (1) [1969] 3S.C,R. 341.