Created byFuzzy Cloud

Supreme Court of India

RAM PIARIversusBHAGWANT & ORS.

Citation
1990 INSC 76
Decided
6 March 1990
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

A will executed with the active involvement of a beneficiary and under suspicious circumstances is invalid unless its authenticity is proved beyond the mere presence of a scribe, witnesses, and thumb impression.

Summary

The appellant, a disinherited daughter, challenged a will executed by her ailing father one day before his death, which left all property to the sons of her sister. She alleged that the beneficiary's father had taken an active role in drafting the will and that suspicious circumstances surrounded its execution, despite the testator's thumb impression and the presence of a scribe and witnesses. Lower courts held the will genuine, but the Supreme Court found that mere execution by a scribe and attesting witnesses does not overcome the presumption of invalidity when suspicious circumstances exist. The Court emphasized that the testator must have understood the disposition and that any active participation by a beneficiary raises strong suspicion requiring clear evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the lower courts' orders, declared the will invalid, and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

  • Whether the presence of suspicious circumstances and the beneficiary's active participation in the execution of a will rebut the presumption of due execution under the Indian Succession Act.
  • Whether the lower courts erred in law by not applying the rule that authenticity of a will must be established beyond mere thumb impression and attestation when suspicion exists.
  • Whether Article 136 of the Constitution permits interference with findings of fact when they result from erroneous application of legal principles leading to miscarriage of justice.

Legislation cited

Subjects

testamentary capacitywill validitypresumption of due executionsuspicious circumstancesthumb impressionArticle 136Indian Succession Actinheritance dispute

Judgment

                                    RAM PIARI                                          A
                                       v.
    'y                           BHAGWANT & ORS.

                                     MARCH 6, 1990

              [K. JAGANNATHA SHETIT AND R.M. SAHAI, JJ.]                               B


.             Indian Succession Act, 1925: Testamentary succession-Will-
         Execution of-Genuineness-Mere production of scribe and attesting
         witnesses-Not sufficient-Suspicious circumstances to be ruled out-
         Conscience of Courts satisfaction of-Not only on execution-Also on
         authenticity.         -
                                                                                       c
               Constitution of India, 1950: Article 136-Findings of fact-
         Erroneous application of principle of law-Miscarriage of justice--
         Interference justified.

              The appellant's father executed a Will, just oue day prior to his        D
         death, bequeathing all his property iu favour of the sons of appellant's
         only sister. The testator was ill and lived with the beneficiaries six
         months prior to his death. Though the testator could sign, he pot his
         thumb impression on the Will.

               The disinherited daughter challenged the genuineness of the Will        E
         on the ground that there were suspicious circumstances and the pro-
         pounder took active part in the execution of the Will. The Courts below
         right up to High Court held that the execution of the Will was beyond
         doubt.
I
               Aggrieved, she has preferred this appeal, by special leave.             F

               Allowing the appeal, this Court,

               HELD: 1.1 Although freedom to bequeath one's own property
         amongst Hindus is absolute both in extent and person, including rank
         stranger, yet to have testamentary capacity or a disposable mind what         G
         is requirea of propounder to establish is that the testator at the time of
         disposition knew and understood the property he was disposing and
         persons who were to be beneficiaries of his disposition. Prudence, how-
         ever, requires reason for denying benefit to those who too were entitled
         to bounty of testator as they had similar claims on him. Absence of it
         may not invalidate a Will but it shrouds ttie disposition with suspicion as   H

                                            813
    814                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [ 1990] 1 S.C.R.

A   it does not give any inkling to the mind of testator to enable the Court to
    judge if the disposition was voluntary act. Taking active interest by         ~
    propounder in execution bf Will raises another strong suspicion. Mere
    execution of Will by producing scribe or attesting witnesses or proving
    genuineness of testator's thumb impressions by themselves was not
    sufficient to establish validity of Will unless suspicious circumstances,
B   usual or special, are ruled out and the Court's conscience is satisfied not
    only on execution, but its authenticity. [8150-G]

         H. Venkatachalliah v. N. Themmajamma, AIR 1959 SC 443 and
    Kalyan Singh v. Smt. Chhoti & Ors., [1989] JT 439, relied on.

          1.2 Happy marriage or financially well-settlement of appellant
C   could not add to genuineness of Will. The High Court in recording this
    finding, completely misdirected itself. More so, when no findng of dire
    circumstances of respondent to help out of which testator dis-inherited
    the other daughter, was recorded by any courts. [817A-B]

D         2. Although this Court does not normally interfe~e with findings
    of fact recorded by courts below, but if the finding is recorded by
    erroneous application of principle of law, and is apt to result in miscar-
    riage of justice then this Court will be justified in interfering under
    Article 136. [817E-F]

E         Malkani v. Jamadar, AIR 1987 SC 767, distinguished.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4499
    of 1986.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 11.8.1986 of the Punjab
F   and Haryana High Courtin R.S.A. No. 974 of 1985 and Civil Misc.
    No. 1034-C of1985.

         Harbans Lal, Dr. Meera Agarwal, (N.P.) and R.C. Mishra for
    the Appellant.

O         S.K. Mehta, Aman Vachher and Atul Nanda for the Respon-
    dents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          R.M. SAHAI, J. Disinherited daughter, under a Will alleged to
ti have been executed by her father one day before his death bequea:
                      RAM PIARI v. BHAGWANT [SAHA!, J.l                     815

     thing all his property in favour of sons of her only sister, has assailed
     validity of orders of three courts below for failure to apply the rule that   A
     presumption of due execution of a pious and solemn document like
     Will stood rebutted due to existence of suspicious circumstances which
     the propounder could not rule out specially when he had taken active
     part in its execution.
                                                                                   B
           Soft comor for grand-children or likeability for a son or daughter
     or their issues is not uncommon to our society. Rather at times it
     becomes necessary either to provide for the lesser fortunate or to
     avoid the property from passing out of the family. But when disputes
     arise between heirs of same degree, and the beneficiary even chooses
     tn deny the blood ties, and that too unsuccessfully, then court's
     responsibility of performing its duties carefully and painstakingly           c
     mul~iplies. Unfortunately it was not properly comprehended by any of
(,   the courts, including the High Court which was swayed more by happy
     marriage of appellant, a consideration which may have been relevant
     for testator but wholly irrelevant for courts as their function is to judge
     not to speculate. Although freedom to bequeath one's own property             D
     amongst Hindus is absolute both in extent and person, including rank
     stranger, yet to have testamentary capacity or a disposing state of mind
     what is required of propounder to establish is that the testator at time
     of disposition knew and understood the property he was disposing and
     persons who were to be beneficiaries of his disposition. Prudence,
     however, requires reason for denying benefit to those who too were            E
     entitled to bounty of testator as they had similar claims on him.
     Absence. of it may not invalidate a Will but it shrouds the disposition
     with suspicion as it does not give any inkling to the mind of testator to
     enable the Court to judge if the disposition was voluntary act. Taking

r    active interest by propounder in execution of Will raises another
     strong suspicion. In H. Venkatachalliah v. N. Themmajamma, AIR
     1959 SC 443 it was held to render the Will infirm unless the propoun-
                                                                                   F

     der cleared the suspicion with clear and satisfactory evidence. Mere
     execution of Will, thus, hy producing scribe or attesting witness or
     proving genuiness of testator's thumb impressions by themselves was
     not sufficient to establish validity of Will unless suspicious circum-
      stances, usual or special, are ruled out and the courts' conscience is       G
     satisfied not only on execution but about its authenticity. See Kalyan
     Singh v. Smt. Chhoti & Ors., [ 1989]Judgment Today page 439.

           Coming now to facts it has been found by all the three courts
     below that testator was a migrant from West Pakistan who after migra-
     tion resided in village Rupena, was ill for sometime and lived with his       H
    816                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (1990] 1 S.C.R.

  daughter and her sons who are the beneficiaries six months prior to his
A
  death. It was further found that appellant was also one of the daugh-
  ters. No finding was recorded that she or her sons had any sore or sour
  relations with testator. But the most important finding was that even
  though the testator could sign yet he put his thumb mark on it. It was
  found to be genuine. The execution was thus held beyond doubt. But it
B was sufficient to put the courts on alert specially when the professional
  scribe fetched by beneficiary's father admitted that when he reached
  beneficiary's residence where the Will was executed, he found testator
  covered with a quilt in the afternoon of August with whom he did not
  talk nor enquire about his health. Unfortunately none of the Courts
  paid any attention to these probably because they were swayed with
C due execution even when this Court in Venkatachalliah's case (supra)
  had held that, proof of signature raises a presumption about knowledge
  but the existence of suspicious circumstances rebuts it. Importance of        '
  these aspects would have become apparent if they had examined the             )
  Will which speaks for itself but which was taken for granted. Relevant
  part of it is extracted below:
0
                "They served me with money and the core of their heart. I
                am happy with their service. Therefore I make this Will
                without any pressure or influence that during my life time I
                shall be owner of all my property botb moveable and im-
                movable i.e. land, house etc. After my death my entire
E               property, land, houses, shops, factory, machinery, residen-
                tial house, residential goods, deposit in Bank or Post office
                (i.e. whatever is in my name in Punjab or any part of India,
                it will be in the ownership of and in possession of my grand
                sons (daughters/sons) Harmesh Singh, Mohan Lal, Sohan
                Lal son of Gurdev Singh son of Raunaq Singh in equal
F               shares. No body else who may be my near relations or
                distantly related will have any right in my property".

  What strikes immediately is professionalism of the recital. Grave
  doubt arises if recital of each and every item which could be visualised,
  was as a result of professional expertise or the old man was so unwell
G and died on the next day that he could not speak resulting in specula-
  tive narration of property depending on imagination what he must
  have been possessed of. Mention of house, factory, machinery and bank
  deposit was meaningful. House had already been sold. No evidence
  was led that he was possessed of another house or that he had any
  factory or machinery or bank deposits. Explanation of learned counsel
H that mµission was as the respondent had challenged the very relation-
                         RAM P!ARI v. BHAGWANT (SAHA!, J.(                     817

        ship of appellant could not remove the suspicion created by the recital        A
        that bequest was made· not by an independent man after understanding
        or on his dictation, but was work of a scribe. or beneficiary's father who
        did not take any chance·and attempted to rope in every possible pro-
        perty that could have been conceived of. Happy marriage or finan-
        cially well-settlement of appellant could not add to genuineness of
        Will. The High Court in recording this finding, completely misdirected         B
        itself. More so, when no finding of dire circumstances of respondent to
        help out of which testator dis-inherited the other daughter was
        recorded by any courts.

               Ratio in Malkani v. Jamadar, AIR 1987 SC 767 was relied on to
         dissuade this Court from interfering, both, because the finding that          c
         Will was genuine, was a finding of fact and omission to mention reason
         for dis-inheriting the daughter or taking prominent part by beneficiary
         by itself was not sufficient to create any doubt about the testamentary
-""-     capacity was because of misunderstanding of the correct import of the
       . decision and the circumstances in which it was rendered. Property in
         Malkani's case (supra) was land.. Beneficiary was nephew as against married   D
         daughter. Anxiety in village to protect landed property or agricultural
         holdings from going out of family is well-known. Even though it can-
         not be said to be hard and fast rule yet when dis-inheritance is amongst
         heirs of equal degree and no reason for exclusion is disclosed, then the
         standard of scrutiny is not the same and if the courts below failed to be
         alive to it as is clear from their orders then their orders cannot be said    E
         to be beyond review. Although this Court does not normally interfere
         with findings of fact recorded by courts below, but if the finding is
         recorded by erroneous application of principle .of law, and is apt to
         result in miscarriage of justice then this Court will be justified in
         interfering under Article 136.
                                                                                       F
              For the reasons stated above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.
        The order and judgment of all the three courts below, are set aside and
        the suit filed by the appellant for declaration that the Will executed by
        her father was invalid, shall stand decreed. The appellant shall be
        entitled to its costs.
                                                                                       .G
         G.N.                                                     Appeal allowed.


Search Indian case law

Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.

Try "testamentary capacity"Sign in to search

For a digitally signed copy suitable for filing, refer to the court's own website. Only the court can issue one.