Holding

A conviction under Section 201 IPC cannot stand unless the prosecution proves that an offence was committed and that the accused knew or had reason to believe so; therefore the appellants were acquitted.

Summary

The deceased Asha Kumari was found dead in a well at her marital home and was hurriedly cremated by her husband and relatives. The appellants, including Ram Saran Mahto, were charged under Sections 302, 34, 201, 342 and 379 IPC. While the trial court acquitted them of murder, it convicted them under Section 201 IPC for causing disappearance of evidence, sentencing some to seven years and others to three years. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the essential ingredients of Section 201, emphasizing that the prosecution must prove (i) that an offence was committed and (ii) that the accused knew or had reason to believe so, before establishing the act of destroying evidence. The Court found that the prosecution only proved the hurried cremation, which was an isolated circumstance and did not establish any underlying offence such as murder. Consequently, the conviction under Section 201 was held untenable and the appellants were acquitted.

Issues considered

Whether conviction under Section 201 IPC is sustainable when the prosecution fails to prove that a cognizable offence was committed.
Whether hurried cremation of a dead body constitutes sufficient evidence of causing disappearance of evidence under Section 201.
What are the essential ingredients required for conviction under Section 201 IPC.
Whether knowledge or belief of the accused about the commission of an offence is a mandatory element for Section 201.
Whether the highest tier of punishment under Section 201 can be imposed without proof that the underlying offence is punishable with death.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 34, s. 342, s. 379

Subjects

Section 201 IPCdisappearance of evidencefalse informationmurdercremationconvictionacquittalIndian Penal Codecriminal law

Judgment

A RAM SARAN MAHTO AND ANR.
v. ~
THE STATE OF BIHAR I
'

SEPTEMBER 8, 1999
.
B [K.T. THOMAS AND M.B. SHAH JJ.]
?
Penal Code, 1860: Sections 302, 34, 201, 342, 379-Deceased woman
found missing-Dead body ofthe deceased recoveredfrom well ofthe house-
Body ofthe deceased cremated hurriedly-Complaint lodged with the police-
c Appellants chargesheeted for offences under Section 302 read with 34, 201,
;.
I

342 and 379 /PC-Trial Court convicted the appellants under Section 20! ill'-
!PC-Appeal before the High Court dismissed-Present appeal filed-Held-
Hurried cremation stood to be an incriminating circumstance-Stood isolated
and unlinked with any other circumstance-Commission of offence in respect
D of death of the deceased not proved-Conviction under Section 201 /PC
unfounded

The deceased woman was married to one K and was living in her
husband's house. On 11-06-1986, the appellant, a cousin of the deceased's
husband rushed to the parental house of the deceased to inform them that
E the deceased was missing from her marital house. Immediately upon hearing
the said news, PW-3, brother of the deceased rushed to the martial home of
the deceased on a bicycle while PW-1, father of the deceased followed on foot.
PW-3 reached the-house earlier, in whose presence the appellant suggested
searching of the well in the house. In pursuance of the said search, the body
of the deceased was spotted and recovered from the well. Thereafter, the
F husband of the deceased along with some of his relatives insisted upon
cremation of the deceased while PW-3 asked to postpone the funeral till the
arrival of PW-1. However, after an altercation, PW-3 was tied up and his
cycle was snatched away. On his arrival, PW-1 was also fastened with a rope.
·-
The body of the deceased was then taken to a nearby orchard where it was
cremated.
G
After the whole incident, PWs-1 and 3 lodged a complaint with the
police in pursuance of which 13 persons including the appellants were
charged for offences under Sections 302 read with Sections 34, 201, 342
and 379 IPC. The Trial Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove
the charge of commission of murder. However, it convicted four of the
H 250
R.S. MAHTO v. STATE OF BIHAR 251
A
- appellants under Section 201 IPC. The Trial Court refrained from resorting
to any discussion on the culpability of the appellants regarding the offence.
One of the convicts was sentenced to 7 years RI while the remaining were
sentenced to 3 years RI. The conviction of the appellants was challenged in
appeal before the High Court, but without success. Hence, this appeal against
the conviction and sentence under Section 201 IPC.
B
Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD : 1.1. The first paragraph of Section 201 IPC contains the
postulates for constituting the offence while the remaining three paragraphs
prescribe three different tiers of punishments depending upon the degree of
offence in each situation. The two indispensable ingredients for all the three C
tiers in Section 201 are: (1) The accused should have had the knowledge that
an offence has been committed or at least that he should have had reasons
to believe it. (2) He should then have caused disappearance of the evidence
of commission of that offence. Prosecution cannot escape from establishing
the aforesaid tWo basic ingredients, for conviction of the accused· under D
Section 201. The gravest degree contemplated in Section 201 IPC is
punishable with the maximum sentence of imprisonment for~eyen years.
The minimum requirement for the offence to reach the said peak degree is
that the offender should have caused disappearance of evidence of another
offence which is punishable with death, and that should be established in
addition to the above mentioned two basic ingredients. Even ifthe two basics E
are established, and the prosecution failed to establish the next requirement
the court cannot convict the accused for the highest tier specified in the
section. [255-F-H; 256-A-B]

1.2. It is not necessary that the offender himself should have been F
found guilty of the main offence for the purpose of convicting him of offence
under Section 201 IPC. Nor is it absolutely necessary that somebody else
should have been found guilty of the main offence. Nonetheless, it is
imperative that prosecution should have established two premises. First is
that an offence has been committed and second is that the accused knew
about it or he had reasons to believe t~e commission of that offence. Then G
and then alone the prosecution can succeed, provided the remaining postulates .
of the offence are also established. [256-B-C]

Palvinder Kaur v. The State of Punjab, AIR (1952) SC 354, followed.

1.3. In the present case, all that the prosecution could establish was H
252 SUPREME COVRT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A that dead body of deceased was recovered from the well situated in the
compound of her marital home and that the cremation was hurried through
after physically keeping her kith and kin away from the scene. No doubt,
such a culpable hurry enkindles fumes (jf suspicion which can be regarded
-
as an incriminating circumstance against those who showed such a haste.
B But that circumstance stands isolated and unconcatenated with any other
circumstance. Prosecution has not even attempted to show, much less prove,
that any offence has been committed by any one in respect of the death of
the deceased, which should have been the foundation for establishing the
offence under Section 201 IPC. (257-D-F]

C Nathu & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1979] 3 SCC 574; Hanuman
& Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, (1994] Suppl. 2 SCC 39 and Kalawati & Anr.
v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, (1953] SCR 546, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
912-13of1999.
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.3.98 of the Patna High Court in
Crl. A. NO. 131 of 1988 and Crl. Misc. No. 20191 of 1998.

Shambhu Parasad Singh for Debasis Misra for the Appellant.

E B.B. Singh for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMAS, J. Leave granted.

The corpse of a teenaged dame was recovered from a well attached to
F her nuptial home. That corpse was consigned to flames without loss of time.
For that incident her husband Kalpu Mahto and three others stand convicted
of the offence under Section 20 l of the Indian Penal Code. Thou1* the
prosecution did not even venture to establish any other offence in re~pect
of the death of that young lady, the Trial Court passed a sentence ofrigbrous
G imprisonment for seven years on one of the convicted persons while a
sentence of RI for three years was .imposed on the remain~g convicted
persons. They appealed to the High Court of Patna, but failed.

We cannot comprehend how the Sessions Court could have ~calated
the conviction to the topmost layer of the offence for awarding the maximum
H sentence of imprisonment for seven years as the said upper limit is fixed only
R.S. MAHTO v. STATE OF BIHAR [THOMAS, J.] 253
for one category of cases falling under Section 201 IPC. The Sessions Judge A
did not even advert to the possibility of the offence falling within the aforesaid
.top category though he had chosen to award the maximum sentence only to
one of the four convicted persons. Learned Single Judge of the Patna High
Court while restating the sentence portion in his judgment seems to have
committed an error in the following manner:
B
"By the judgment and order the learned Trial Court convicted the 4
appellants under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced
them to undergo R.I. for 7 years each."

The aforesaid error in the restatement would have escaped the notice
of the learned Single Judge, but we mention it here for averting any possible C
consequences on its account.

Facts of the case are these: Deceased Asha Kumari was aged only 18
when she died. She was given in marriage to Kalpu Mahto (A-2). While she
was living in her husband's house A-3-Ram Saran Mahto (a cousin of her D
husband) dashed-down to her parental house during the wee hours of 11-6-
1986 and conveyed the disquieting information that Asha Kumari was missing
from the house. Immediately her brother Ram Balaj( Mahto (PW-3) rushed to
the marital home of Asha Kumari on a bicycle, followed by his father (PW-
1) on foot.
E
PW-3 Ram Balak Mahto could reach the house earlier as he was on a
two-wheeler. In his presence A-3 Ram Saran Mahto suggested that the well
of the house should be searched. When a search was made pursuant thereto
the dead body of Asha Kumari was spotted out and later that was winched
out of the well. Thus far the story seems to be, by and large, undisputed.
F
Thereafter, Asha Kumari's husband Kalpu Mahto and some other
persons, who were closely related to him, showed impatience to have the
obsequies of the departed soul. PW.3 only wanted the cremation to be
postponed till the arrival of his father but that suggestion was spurned down.
An altercation would have followed and a wrangle was ensued therefrom. G
PW-3 was trussed up and his cycle was snatched away. When PW-I 'father
of Asha Kumari arrived at the place he too was fastened with a tether. Dead
body of Asha Kumari was then removed to the nearby orchard where it was
set ablaze and cremated.

PW-I and PW-3 went to the police station and lodged a complaint. H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A After investigation the police charge-sheeted 13 persons, including the
appellants, for various offences such as Section 302 read with Sections 34,
201, 342 and 379 of the Penal Code. The Trial Court came to the undisputed ..._
conclusion that "prosecution has failed to prove the charge of commission
of murder". Nevertheless, learned Sessions Judge proceeded to award the
B sentence under Section 201 of the Penal Code and the only discussion he
made for that purpose was on the question. whether any one other than the
four appellants had committed that offence. After holding that none among
them, except the four appellants, can be convicted, learned Sessions Judge
proceeded to convict all the four appellants without even resorting to a one
sentence discussion on the culpability of the appellants regarding the said
C offence.

Of course appellant Ram Saran Mahto alone was convicted under
Sections 379 and 342 of the Penal Code also and he was sentenced to
undergo R.I. for six months and three months respectively and the High Court
has confirmed the said conviction and sentence. We are not dealing with the
D conviction and sentence on those two counts as they have not been
challenged before us. For convicting the appellants under Section 201 of the
Penal Code learned Single Judge of the High Court discussed the case only
in the fo!lowing lines:

"However, the learned trial court proceeded to consider the evidence
E on the point of charge under section 201 l.P.C. On this point the
informant himself came to his sister's village and started first and on
arrival at the village he started searching· for the sister and the dead
body was recovered from a well and when the accused persons were
contemplating to dispose of the dead body he objected and then he
was overpowered. His father (R.W.l) Moti Mahto has also supported
F the prosecution story on this point that when he arrived subsequently
,he found that the accused persons were engaged in burning the dead
body. The father (P.W.2) had arrived late because he was going on
foot; while his son proceeded on a cycle. It has been stated that cycle
of the informant was snatched by the accused persons. Thus, learned
G trial cou~ held that unless the dead body was burnt by the ~ccused,
they could not inform the police station and give opportunity to
Police to seize the dead body to hold postmortem examination. It is
therefore obvious that the appellants have disposed of the de~d body
with a view to suppress the crime."

H In this case we find it necessary to extract Section 20 l of the Penal Code
R.S. MAHTO v. STATE OF BIHAR [THOMAS, J.] 255
which is as follows: A
"201. Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false
information to screen offender.-Whoever, knowing or having reason
to believe that an offence has been committed, caused any evidence
of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of
screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention B
gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or
believes to be false,

if a capital offence shall, if the offence which he knows or believes
to have been committed is punishable with death, be punished with C
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;

if punishable with imprisonment for life and ifthe offence is punishable
with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment which may extend to
ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description ·D
for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable
to fine;

if punishable with less than ten years' imprisonment and ifthe offence
is punishable with imprisonment for any term not extending to ten
years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided E
for the offence, for a term which may extend to one- fourth part of the
longest term of the imprisonment provided for the offence, or with
fine, or with both."

The first paragraph of the section contains the postulates for
constituting the offence while the remaining three paragraphs prescribe three F
different tiers of punishments depending upon the degree of offence in each
situation. The two indispensable ingredients for all the three tiers in Section
201 are: (l) The accused should have had the knowledge that an offence has
been committed or at least that he should have had reasons to believe it. (2)
He should then have caused disappearance of evidence of commission of that G
offence. Prosecution cannot escape from establishing the aforesaid two basic
ingredients, for conviction of the accused under Section 201.

The gravest degree contemplated in Section 20 I is punishable with the
maximum sentence of imprisonment for seven years. The minimum requirement
for the offence to reach the said peak degree is that the offender should have H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A caused disappearance of evidence of another offence which is punishable
with death, and that should be established in addition to the above-mentioned
two basic ingredients. Even if the two basics are established, and the
prosecution failed to establish the next requirement the court cannot convict ,.
the accused for the highest tier specified in the section.

B It is not necessary that the offender himself should have been found
guilty of the main offence for the purpose of convicting him of offence under
Section 201. Nor is it absolutely necessary that somebody else should have
been found guilty of the main offence. Nonetheless, it is imperative that
prosecution should have established two premises. First is that an offence
C has been committed and second is that the accused knew about it or he had
reasons to believe the commission of that offence. Then and then alone the
prosecution can succeed, provided the remaining postulates of the offence
are also established.

The above position has been well stated by a three-Judge Bench of this.
D Court way back in 1952, in Palvinder Kaur v. _The State ofPunjab, AIR (1952)
SC354:

"In order to establish the charge under s.201, Penal Code, it is essential
to prove that an offence has been committed, mere suspicion that it
has been committed is not sufficient - that the accused knew or had
E reason to believe that S\lCh offence had been committed and with the
requisite knowledge and with the intent to screen the offender from
legal punishment causes the evidence thereof to disappear or gives
false information respecting such offences knowing or having reason
to believe the same to be false."
F It is well to remind that the Bench gave a note of caution that the court
should safeguard itself against the danger of basing its conclusion on
suspicions however strong they may be. In Kalawati and Anr. v. The State
ofHimachal Pradesh, [1953] SCR 546 a Constitution Bench of this Court has,
no doubt, convicted an accused under Section 201 IPC even though he was
G acquitted of the offence under Section 302. B~t the said course was adopted
by this Court after entering the finding that another accused had committed
the murder and the appellant destroyed the evidence of it with full knowledge
thereof. In a later decision in Nathu and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [ 1979] ··
3 SCC 574 this Court has repeated the caution in the following words:

H "Before a conviction under Section 201 can be recorded, it must be
R.S. MAHTO v. STATE OF BIHAR [THOMAS, J.] 257
shown to the satisfaction of the court that the accused knew or had A
reason to believe that an offence had been committed and having got
this knowledge, tried to screen the offender by disposing of the dead
body."

In this context a reference to a more recent decision of this Court would
B

..
be apposite. The following observations of the Bench in Hanuman and Ors.
v. State of Rajasthan, [l 994] Supple. 2 SCC 39 are relevant:

"The mere fact that the deceased allegedly died an unnatural death
would not be sufficient to bring home a charge under Section 20 l IPC,
unless the prosecution was further able to establish that the accused C
persons knew or had reason to believe that an offence had been
committed, causing the evidence of the commission of the offence to
disappear."

In the present case, all that the prosecution could establish was that
dead body of Asha Kumari was recovered from the well situated in the D
compound of her marital home and that the cremation was hurried through
after physically keeping her kith and kin away from the scene. No doubt, such
a culpable hurry enkindles fumes of suspicion which can be regarded as an
incriminating circumstance against those who showed such a haste. But that

- circumstance stands isolated and unconcatenated with any other circumstance.

Prosecution has not even attempted to show, much less prove, that any
offence has been committed by any one in respect of the death of Asha
Kumari, which should have been the foundation for establishing the offence
E

under Section 20 I IPC. It now stands as an unfounded conviction and hence
we have to interfere. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the F
conviction and sentence passed on the appellants. They are acquitted. We
direct the appellants to be set at liberty forthwith unless they are required in
any other case. ·

RC.K. Appeals allowed.