Supreme Court of India
RAMDAS ATHAWALEversusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 177
- Decided
- 29 March 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- K G BALAKRISHNAN
Holding
The Court held that the January 2004 sitting was a continuation of the previous session, did not require a President’s address, the Speaker’s decision is final and beyond judicial review, and the petition under Article 32 was not maintainable as no fundamental right was infringed.
Summary
Ramdas Athawale, a Lok Sabha member, filed a writ petition under Article 32 challenging the validity of the Lok Sabha's resumption on 29 January 2004, arguing that the President’s special address under Article 87 was required because it was the first session of the year. The Court held that the December 2003 session was merely adjourned sine die and its January 2004 sitting was a continuation, not a new session, so no President’s address was needed. Under Article 122, the Speaker’s decision to reconvene the House is final and immune from judicial scrutiny, and the petition did not allege any infringement of a fundamental right, rendering Article 32 inapplicable. The petition was also deemed infructuous as the Lok Sabha had since been dissolved. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed.
Issues considered
- The resumption of Lok Sabha sittings after adjournment sine die constitutes a new session requiring a President's address under Article 87(1).
- Whether the Speaker's direction to resume the House can be challenged in a court of law under Article 32.
- Whether the petitioner has a enforceable fundamental right that brings the petition within the ambit of Article 32.
- The scope of judicial review over parliamentary procedure under Article 122.
- Whether the petition is rendered moot by the dissolution of the Lok Sabha.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 118, s. Article 122, s. Article 32, s. Article 79, s. Article 83, s. Article 85, s. Article 86, s. Article 87
- Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabhas. Rule 15
Subjects
Parliamentary procedureArticle 32Speaker's powersPresident's addressAdjournment vs ProrogationJudicial reviewFundamental rightsLok SabhaConstitutional law
Judgment
[2010] 3 S.C.R. 1059
RAMOAS ATHAWALE A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 86 of 2004)
MARCH 29, 2010
8
[K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI., S.H. KAPADIA, R.V.
RAVEENDRAN , B. SUDERSHAN RE DO~
P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950: c
Articles 87, 118, 122 - President's special address at the
commencement of session - Requirement of, when the
House resumed after it was adjourned sine die - Held:
Resumption of House for the purpose of continuing its 0
business would not amount to commencement of new session
- No special address by President required - Rules of
Procedure and Conduct of Busines.3 in Lok Sabha - Rule 15.
Articles 122, 32 - Speaker's decision directing
resumption of House which was adjourned sine die - Writ E
petition questioning the propriety of Speaker's decision -
Maintainability of - Held: Courts are precluded from making
inquiry into proceedings of Parliament on the ground of any
irregularity of procedure - Question whether the resumed
sitting was to be treated as the second part of the session was F
essen tially a matter relating purely to the procedure of
Parliament and cannot be tested and gone into in a
proceeding under Article 32 - Judicial review - Scope of.
Article 122 - Speaker - Powers and duties - Held: G
Speaker is the guardian of the privileges of the House and
its spokesman and representative upon all occasions - He
is the interpreter of its rules and procedure, and is invested
with the power to control and regulate the course of debate
1059 H
1 060 SUPR ~ ME COURT REPORTS [2010] 3 S.C.R.
A and to maintain order- Under'Article 122 (2), the decision of
the Speaker in whom powers are vested to regulate the
procedure and the Conduct of Business is final and binding
on every Member of the House. ·
Article 32 - Scope of - Held: Petition under Article 32
8
not entertainable unless it is shown that the petitioner had
some fundamental right.
Article 85 - Prorogation and adjournment - Distinction
between.
c
The Fourteenth Session of the Thirteenth Lok Sabha
commenced on 2nd December, 2003 and was adjourned
sine die on 23rd December, 2003. Thereafter on 20th
January, 2004, the Secretary General of the Lok Sabha,
0 by way of a Notice informed all the Members of the
Thirteenth Lok Sabha, duly stating that under Rule 15 of
the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok
Sabha, the Speaker has directed that the Lok Sabha,
wh ich was adjourned sine die on 23rd December, 2003
E would resume its sittings on 29th January, 2004.
In a w r it petition fil ed under Article 32 of th e
Constitution of India, a member of Lok Sabha challenged
the constitutional validity of the proceedings in the Lok
Sabha commencing from 29th January, 2004 on t he
F ground that the Session commenced on 29th January,
2004 was the first Session of the Lok Sabha in the year
2004, and there was no address by the President
informing the Parliament, the cause of its summons as
provided for and required under Article 87 (1) of the
G Constitution of India.
Dismissing the writ petition, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The scheme of the Constitution, from the
compendium of Articles 79, 83, 85 and 86 reveals that
H
RAMDAS ATHAWALE v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.1061
Union Parliament consists of the President and the A
Council of States and the House of the People unless
dissolved earlier, the House of the People continues for
five years from the date of its first meeting, and the
expiration of five years operates as a dissolution of the
House except that during proclamation of Emergency, B
the period of five years may be extended at a time not
exceeding one year and not extending in any case
beyond six months after such proclamation has ceased
to operate. The President is unde·r constitutional mandate
to summon each House of the Parliament from time to c
time to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit. The
President alone is vested with the power to summon the
House from time to time and prorogue the House or either
House; and to dissolve the House of the People. The
President has a right to address either House or both the 0
Houses together _and for that purpose requ;re the
attendance of ~embers. He may send messages to either
House of Parliament, whether with respect to a Bill then
pending in Parliament or otherwise, and the House to
which message is sent is required to take the same into E
consideration. [Para 10] (1071MA-E]
1.2. A plain reading of Article 87 clearly suggests that
(a) the President shall address at the commencement of
the first session after each general election to the House
of the People; and (b) at the commencement of the first F
session of each year. In the present case, the Winter
session of the House of the People commenced on 2nd
December, 2003 and was adjourned sine die on 23rd
December, 2003. The resumption of its sittings on 29th
January, 2004, by no stretch of imagination, could be G
characterized as commencement of a new session. The
House merely resumed its sittings and contin.ued· the
Session which actually commenced on 2nd December-l
2003. As the House was adjourned sine die on 23rd
H
1062 SUPREME ·COURT REPORTS [2010] 3 S.C.R
A December, 2003, the resumption of its sittings is nothing
but reconvening of the same Session after its
adjournment sine die. It is the second part of the same
session. [Paras 12 and 14] [1071-H; 1072-A, C, D)
8 1.3. The words "first session of the year" employed
in Article 87 (1) has no reference to resumption of the
adjourned session. The session commences with the
President's.summoning. the House to meet. It is Article 85
which deals with the summoning of Sessions of
Parliament, prorogation and dissolution of the House of
C People. The constitutional provision does ri.o t require
summoning of every Session of Parliament wl1ich was
adjourned for its own reasons after commencement of its
Session pursuant to the summons of the President. It is
only when a Hou~e is prorogued and a new Session :
D thereafter summoned under Article 85(2) of the
Constitution, the special address by the President as
provided for under Article 87(1) is required with reference
to the new Session so as t9 il)form the Parliament of the
cause of its summons . . ~o such special addre.s s is
E needed, if a Sessions · ~s · adjourned sine die in the
previous year and the sittings of the same Session is
re~umed in the next year. [Para 15] [1072-E-H]
1.4. Articles 85 and 87 were amended so . as to do
F away with the summoning of Parliament twice a year and
the constitutional requirement of the President's special
address at the commencement of each Session. The I
present constitutional position is that not more than six
months are to elapse between the last Session and the
G first day of the following Session . The House is now
prorogued only once a year and the President addresses
both Houses of Parliament only at the ~ommencement of
the first Session of each year. Article 87, as it originally
stood , provided for the President's address in 'every
Session of the year'. The first amendment in 1951
H
RAMDAS ATHAWALE v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.1063
substituted the words "every Session" by " first Session A
of each year". By the first amendment, Articles 85 and
174 were also amended. [Paras 16 and 17] [1073-A-D]
Special Reference No. 1 of 2002 (2002) 8 SCC 237,
relied on.
8
Kau/ & Shakdher's Practice and Procedure of Parliament
Fifth Edition; May's Parliamentary Practic.e, referred to.
1.5. An adjournment is an interruption in the course
of one and the same session, whereas a prorogation c
terminates a Session. The effect of prorogation is to put
an end with certain exceptions to all proceedings in
Parliament then current. A Session commenced in terms
of the order of the President summoning the House can
come to an end only with the day on which the President 0
prorogue the House or dissolves Lok Sabha. It is thus
clear that whenever the House resumes after it is
adjourned sine die, its resumption for the purpose of
continuing its business does not amount to
commencement of the session. The resumed sitting of E
the House, in this case, on 29th January, 2004, does not
amount to commencement of the first Session in the year
2004. [Paras 20, 22, 23] [1073-B, G; 1076-D]
2. Under Article 122 of the Constitution, the Courts
are precluded from making inquiry into proceedings of F
Parliament. A plain reading of Article 122 makes it
abundantly clear that the validity of any proceeding in the
Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground
of any irregularity of procedure. The prayer in the writ
petition was to declare the proceedings in the lok Sabha G
pursuant to the Notice dated 20th January, 2004 issued
under the directions of the Speaker as unconstitutional.
The petitioner essentially raised a dispute as to the
regularity and legality of the proceedings in the House of
the People and propriety of the Speaker's direction to H
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 3 S.C.R.
A resume sittings of the Lok Sabha which was adjourned
sine die on 23rd December, 2003. The Speaker is the
guardian of the priv.i leges of the House and its
spokesman and representative upon all occasions. He is
the interpreter of its rules and procedure, and is invested
B with the power to control and regulate the course of
debate and to maintain order. The powers to regulate
Procedure and Conduct of Business of the House of the
People vests in the Speaker of the House. By virtue of
the powers vested in him, the Speaker, in purported
c exercise of his power under Rule 15 of the Rules of
Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha got
issued notice dated 20th January, 2004 through the
Secretary General of the Lok Sabha directing resumption
of sittings of the Lok Sabha which was adjourned sine
die on 23rd December, 2003. Whether the resumed sittings
0
on 29th January, 2004 was to be treated as the second
part of the 14th session as directed by the Speaker is
essentially a matter relating ~ purely to the procedure of
Parliament. The validity of the proceedings and business
transacted in the House after resumption of its sittings
E cannot be tested and gone into by this Court in a
proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
[Paras 25, 26] [1~79-0; G-H; 1080-A-F] '
3. Article 118(1) provides that each House of
F Parliament may make rules for regulating, subject to the
provisions of the Constitution, its procedure and conduct
of its business. The rules , in fact, are made and known
as Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok
Sabha. Article 118(1) makes it perfectly clear that when
G the House is to make any rules as prescribed by it, those
rules are subject to the provisions of the Constitution
which obviously include Fundamental Rights guaranteed
by Part Ill of the Constitution. Article 122(2) confers
immunity ·on the. officers and membe~s of Parliament in
H whom powers are vested ~~ or under the Constitution for
RAMDAS ATHAWALE v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1065
regulating procedure or conduct of the business or for A
maintaining order in Parliament from being subject to the
jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him
of those powers. [Paras 27-29] [1080-G; 1081-C-H]
4. The Notice dated January 20, 2004 is self- 8
explanatory and reveals that the House was adjourned
sine die on 23rd December, 2003 by the Speaker. It is the
Speaker's direction to resume its sittings from 29th
January, 2004 onwards. The Notice clearly says that i~
was the second part of the fourteenth session and was
likely to conclude on 5th February, 2004. The Speaker's C
decision adjourning the House sine die on 23rd
December, 2003 and direction to resume its sittings
relates to proceedings in Parliament and is of procedural
in nature. Th~ Business transacted and the validity of
proceedings after the resumption of i\5 ~ittings pursuant 0
to the directions of the· Speaker cannot ' be inquired into
by the Courts. [Para 30] [1082-B-D]
5. Under Article 122 (2), the decision of the Speaker
in whom powers are vested to regulate the procedure E
and the Conduct of Business is final and bi(tding on
every Member of the Hous~. The validity of the S~eaker's
decision adjournir.g ·the House sine die on 23rd
December,,2003 and latter direction to resume its sittings
cannot be inquired into on the ground of any irregularity F
of procedure. The business transacted and the validity
of proceedings after the resumption of sittings of the
·House pursuant to the directions of the Speaker 1cannot
be inquired into by the Courts. No decision jotthe
Speaker can be challenged by a member of the House G
complaining of mere irregularity in procedure in the
conduct of the business. Such decisions are not subject
to the jurisdiction of any Court and they are immune from
challenge. [Para 31] [1082-E-G]
In re, Under Article 143, Constitution of India (1965) 1 H
- 1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [~010] 3 S.C.R.
A SCR 413; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain & Anr. 1975
(Supp.) SCC 1, explained.
6. It is a right of each House of Parliament to be the
sole judge of the lawfulness of its own proceedings. The
Courts cannot go into the lawfulness of the proceedings
8
of the Houses of Parliament. The Constitution aims at
maintaining a fine balance between the Legislature,
Executive ·and_J1,1diciary. The object of the constitutional
scheme is. to ensure that each of the constitutional
organs function within their respective assigned sphere.
C Precisely, that is the constitutional philosophy inbuilt into
Article 122 of the Constitution of India. [Para 31] [1082-
H; 1083-A-B]
M.S.M Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha AIR 1960 SC
0 1186, referred to.
7. One more aspect of the matter is that the petition
has become infructuous, since the Lok Sabha was
dissolved and thereafter two elections have been held.
E The issue raised in the petition was purely a hypothetical
question. There is no existing lis between the parties. It
is settled practice that this Court does not decide matters
which are only of academic interest on the facts of a
particular case. [Para 34] [1 084-E-F]
F R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antu/ay (1984) 2 SCC 183, referred
to.
8. It is equally well settled that Article 32 of the
Constitution guarantees the right to a Constitutional
G remedy and relates only to the enforcement of the right
conferred by Part Ill of the Constitution and unless a
question of enforcement of a fundamental right arises,
Article 32 does not apply. It is well settled that no petition
under Article 32 is maintainable, unless it is shown that
H the petitioner has some fundamental right. There is not
,·
RAMDAS ATHAWALE v. UNION OF INOlA AND ORS.1067
even a whisper of any infringement of any fundamental A
right guaranteed by Part Ill of the Constitution in the writ
petition. Whenever a person complains and claims that
there is a violation of any provision of law or a
Constitutional provision, it does not automatically involve
breach of fundamental right for the enforcement of which B
alone Article 32 of the Constitution is attracted. It is not
possible to accept that an allegation of breach of law or
a Constitutional provision is an action in breach of
fundamental right. The writ petition deserves dismissal
only on this ground. [Paras 37 and 38] [1085-B-F] c
Northern Corporation v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 239,
relied on.
Case Law Reference:
D
(2002) 8 sec 237 relied on Para 19
(1965) 1 SCR 413 explained Para 29
1975 (Supp.) sec 1 explained Para 31
AIR 1960 SC 1186 referred to Para 32 E
(1984) 2 sec 183 referred to Para 35
(1990) 4 sec 239 relied on Para 37
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition {Civil) No. F
86 of 2004.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
H.K. Puri for the Appellant.
G
G.E. Vahanvati, Indira Jaisingh, ASG, A. Mariaputham,
Devdatt Kamat, T.A. Vimal Dubey, Chinmoy Pradip Sharma
Anil Katiyar, P. Parmeswaran for the Respondents.
The ~udgment of the Court was delivered by
······ · H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 3 S.C.R.
A B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J . 1. This writ application
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has been filed by a
Member of Lok Sabha , challenging the validity of the
proceedings in the Lok Sakha commencing from 29th January,
2004 on the ground that the President has not addressed both
B Houses of Parliament as envisaged under Article 87 of the
Constitution. The prayer in the writ petition is to issue
appropriate Writ or direction or order declaring that the Session
of the,Lok Sabha called by the Notice dated January 20, 2004
is the first Session in the year 2004; and the proceedings of
c the Lok Sabha pursuant to the Notice dated 20th January, 2004
are unconstitutional, illegal, null and void.
2. The case set up by the petitioner is that the Session
commenced on 29th January, 2004 ~as the first Session of the
Lok Sabha in the year 2004, and there was no address by the
D President informing the Parliament, the cause of its summons
as provided for and required under Article 87 (1) of the
Constitution of India. The contention of the petitioner was that
the "first Session" means, the Session, which is held first in point
of time in a given year. According to him, the Session , which
E commenced on 29th January, 2004 was the first Session of the
House of the year 2004. The sittings thereafter continued up
to 5th February, 2004.
3 . There is no dispute before us that the Fourteenth
F Session of the Thirteenth Lok Sabha commenced on 2nd
December, 2003 and was adjourned sine die on 23rd
December, 2003. Thereafter on 20th January, 2004, the
Secretary General of the Lok Sabha, by way of a Notice
informed all the Members of the Thirteenth Lok Sabha, duly
stating that under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and
G Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, the Speaker has directed
that the Lok Sabha, which was adjourned sine die on 23rd
December, 2003 will resume its sittings on 29th January, 2004.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in
H terms of mandatory requirement as provided for in Article 87
RAMDAS ATHAWALE v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1069
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
(1) of the Constitution of India, the President has to address A
both Houses of Parliament at the commencement of the
Session every year and inform the Parliament of the causes of
its summons. It was submitted that the commencement of the
first Session of each year has to be with reference to the first
Session of each year and year shall mean a year reckoned B
according to British calendar. The contention was that the
sittings of the Lok Sabha from 29th January, 2004 were
unconstitutional or it could not have been assembled at all in
the absence of special address of both the Houses of
Parliament by the President. The House of People could have c
assembled only after the special address by the President.
5. The learned Attorney General submitted that in the
instant case the Winter Session of Parliament had commenced
on 2nd December, 2003 and was adjourned sine die on 23rd
December, 2003. The House resumed sitting of that adjourned D
Session in pursuance of the Notice of the Secretary General
dated 20th January, 2004 under Rule 15 of the Rules of
Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha. It was
submitted that the sitting commenced on 29th January, 2004
was not the commencement of a new Session, but was a E
continuation of Winter Session, which was adjourned on 23rd
December, 2003. The learned Attorney General further
submitted that the word "first Session" of the year in Article 87
cannot refer to the resumption of the 'adjourned Session. It must
refer to a new Session. It was submitted that the distinction in F
procedure between the resumption of an adjourned Session ·
and summoning of a new Session may have to be borne in
mind for the purpose of interpretation of Article 87 (1) of the
Constitution of India. The submission was that, for the
resumption of an adjourned Session, the Speaker, under Rule G
15 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok
Sabha, directs issuance of a notice informing the Members of
the next sitting of the Session. But if the House is prorogued, it
is only the President who can summon the next Session of the
Parliament. It was submitted that in the present case, Article H
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 3 S.C.R.
A 87 (1 ) has no application, as the Winter Session was only
resumed on 29th January, 2004 and no new Session was
summoned. ·
6. In dealing with these contentions, we sh~ll follow the
B sequence of events and examine th~ constitutionality of each
happening that would clearly demonstrate that the matter lies
in a narrow compass than what has been made to appear.
7. In the United Kingdom the Queen and two Houses of
Parliament constitutes the Legislature so that the Queen is an
C integral part of the Legislature.
8. In India tt)e same model has been adopted. Article 79
of the Constitution provides that there shall be a Parliament for
the Union, which consists of the President and the two Houses
o to be known respectively as the Council of the SJate and the
House of the People. Article 83 (2) provides that the House of
the People. unless sooner dissolved , shall continue to_r''five
years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer
..
and the expiration of the said period of five years shall oper~te
E as a dissolution of the House, except during a proclamation of
Emergency, the period of five years may be extended for a
period not extending one year at a time, and not extendingiry
any case beyond six months after such proclamation cease tO
operate. Under Article 85 (1 }, the President has to summon
each House of the Legislature at such time and place as he
F thinks fit. sp that six months do not intervene between its last
sitting in one Session and its first sitting in the next. Article 85
(2) provides as follows: ·'
"The President may from time to time-
G
(a) prorogue the Houses or either House; and
(b) dissolve the House of the People."
9. Article 86 speaks about Right of the President to
H address and send messages to Houses.
RAMDAS ATHAWALE v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.1071
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
10. The scheme of the Constitution, as is evident from the A
compendium of Articles referred to hereinabove, reveals that
Union Parliament consists of the President and the Council of
States and the House of the People unless dissolved earlier,
the House of the People continues for five years from the date
of its firs.t meeting, and the expiration of five years operates as B
a dissolution of the. House except that during proclamation of
Emergency, the period of five years may be extended at a time
not exceeding one year and not extending in any case beyond
six months after such proclamation has ceased to operate. The
President is under constitutional mandate to summon each c
House of the Parliament from time to time to meet at such time
and place as he thinks fit. The President alone is vested with
the power to summon the House from time to time and
prorogue the House or either House; and to dissolve the House
of the People. The President has a right to address either. D
House or both the Houses together and for that purpose require
the attendance of Members. He may send messages to either
House of Parliament, whether with respect to a Bill then pending
in Parliament or otherwise, and the House to which message
is sent is required to take the same into consideration.
E
11 . Article 87 is an important Article for our present
purpose and it reads as follows:
"87. Special address by the President:~ (1) At the
commencement of the first session after each general F
election to the House of the People and at the
commencement of the first session of each year the
· President shall address both Houses of Parliament
·assembled together and inform Parliament of the causes
of its summons.
G
(2) Provision shall be made by the rules regulating the
procedure of either House for the allotment of time for
discussion of the matters referred to in such address."
.
12. A plain reading of Article 87 clearly suggests that (a) H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010]..3 S.C.R.
A the President shall address at the commencement of the first
session after each general election to the House of the People;
and (b) at the commencement of the first session of each year.
13. The question is whether in this case was there any
failure in complying with the requirement as provided for under
8
Article 87 (1) of the Constitution?
14. In the present case, the Winter session of the House
of the People commenced on 2nd December, 2003 and was
adjourned sine die on 23rd December, 2003. The resumption
C of its sittings on 29th January, 2004 , by no stretch of
imagination, could be characterized as commencement of a
new session. The House merely resumed its sittings and
continued the Session which actually commenced on 2nd
December, 2003. As it is evident from the record, the House
D 'Was adjourned sine die on 23rd December, 2003, the
resumption of its sittings is nothing but reconvening of the same
Session after its adjournment sine die. It is the second part of
the same session. ·
E 15. The words "first session of the year" employed in Article
87 (1) has no reference to resumption of the adjourned session.
The session commences with the President's summoning the
House to meet. It is Article 85 which deals with the summoning
of Sessions of Parliament, prorogation and dissolution of the
House of People. The constitutional provision does not require
F summoning of every Session of Parliament which was
adjourned for its own reasons after commencement of its
Session pursuant to the summons of the President. It is only
when a House is prorogued and a new Session thereafter
summoned under Article 85 (2) of the Constitution, the special
G address by the President as provided for under Article 87 (1)
is required with reference to the new Session so as to inform
the Parliament of the cause of its summons. No such special
address is needed, if a Sessions is adjourned sine die in the
previous year and the sittings of the same Session is resumed
H in the next year.
RAMDAS ATHAWALE v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1073
. [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J .]
·16. Articles 85 and 87 were amended so as to do away A
with the summoning of Parliament twice a year and the
constitutional requirement of the President's special address
at the commencement of each Session. The present
constitutional position is ·that not more than six months are to
elapse between the last Session and the first day of the B
following Session. The House is now prorogued only once a
year and the President addresses both Houses of Parliament
only at the commencement of the first Session of each year.
17. Article 87, as it originally stood, provided for the
President's address in 'every Session of the year'. The first C
amendment in 1951 substituted the words "every Session" by
"first Session of each year". By the first amendment, Articles
85 and 174 were also amended. While intervening in the
debate Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, with reference to amendment to
Article 85, stated: D
" ... due to the word summon, the result is that although
Parliament may sit for the whole year adjourning from time
to time, it is still capable of being said that Parliament has
been summoned only once and not twice. There must be E
prorogation in order that there may be a new session. It
is felt that this difficulty should be removed and
consequently the first part of it has been deleted. The
provision that whenever there is a prorogation of
Parliament, the new session shall be called within six F
months is retained."
(emphasis supplied)
18. Kaul & Shakdher's Practice and Procedure of
Parliament (Fifth Edition, at page 180) gives the background G
to the aforesaid amendment and observed:
UBefore article 87(1) was amended in its present form by
the Constitution (First Arl)endment Act, 1951, the article
required the President to address both the Houses
H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 0] 3 S.C.R.
A assembled together at the commencement of each
session. Accordingly, the President addressed each of the
three sessions held in 1950 of the Provisional Parliament.
During the Third Session, a question arose whether the
next sessi~n might commence with the President's
B
Address or would the session be merely adjourned to meet
again on 5 February, 1951, which would obviate the
necessity of the President' s Address . Speaker
Mavalankar, in this connection , suggested that instead of
the President addressing each session, it might be
c provided that he would give his Address at the
commencement of the first session (First Amendment) Bill,
1951, as reported by the.Select Committee, observed: ·
"The real difficulty of course is that this (Address) involves
a certain preparation outside this House which is often
D· troublesome. Members are aware that when a coach and
six horses come, all kinds of things have to be done for
that purpose. Anyhow, that trouble does not fall on the
House or members thereof, but on the administration of
Delhi"."
E
Distinction between Prorogation and AdJournment:
19. In the matter of Special Reference No: 1 of 20021 , a
Constitution Bench of this Court while interpreting Article 85 (2)
of the Constitution observed:
.F
"When the House is prorogued, ·all the pending
proceedings of the House are not quashed and pending
Bills do not lapse. The prorogation of the House may take
place at any time either after the adjournment of the House
G or even while the House is sitting. An adjournment of the
House contemplates postponement of the sitting or
proceedings of either House to reassemble on another
specified date. During currency of a session the House
may be adjourned for a day o r more than a day .
I
H 1. (2002) a sec 237. ·
RAMDAS ATHAWALE v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.1075
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
·Adjournment of the House is also sine die. When a House A
is adjourned, pending proceedings or Bills do not lapse."
_(emphasis suppl\ed)
20. An adjournment is an interruption in the course of one
and the same Session, whe-reas a prorogation terminates a B
Session: The effect of prorogation is to put an end with certain
exceptions ,t?
a·u pr?ceedings in Parliament then current.
21. In May's-P-arliamentary Practice, which has assumed
the status of a classic on the subject and is usually regarded c
as an authoritative exposition of Parliamentary practice; it is
stated: ,.
- "A session is the period of time between the meeting of a
Parliament, whether after the prorogation or dissolution, . . ·
. and ·its prorogation ..... During the course of a session,·· .D
: . either House may adjourn itself of its own motion to such
· ·as it pleases. The period between the prorogation of
Parliament and its reassembly in a new session is termed
as 'recess'; while the period between the adjournment of ·
. either House and the resumption of !ts sitting is generally . E
called an 'adjournment'."
22. Kaul & · Shakdher's Practice and Procedure of
Parliament further explains the constitutional position sucCinctly
stating "the session of Lok Sabha C'omprises the period F
commencing from tne date and time mentioned in the order of ·
the Pr.esident summoning lok Sabha and ending with the day
on which the President prorogue or dissolves the Lok Sabha.
a
It is thus (flear that Session commenced in terms of the order
of the Pr~sident summoning the House can come to an end
onJy with the day on which the President ·prorogue the House
or dissolves~lok Sabha. The ParliamentarY Practice prevalent
till then has been noticed in the same treatise which is to· the
following effect:
"The Eighth Session of the Eighth Lok Sabha commenced H
1076' · SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2010] 3 S.C.R.
A \ __on 23 February, 1987 and ~as adjourned sine die on 12
May, 1987. The Lok Sabha, however, was not prorogued.
·_On a proposal from the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs,
the Speaker, exercising his powers under proviso to Rule
15 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in
8 Lo~ Sabha~ agreed to--reconvene the sittings of Lok Sabha
. from 27 July to 28 August, 1987. The two parts, preceding
( and-following the period of adjournment of Lok Sabha sine
die -on 12 May: 1987, were treated as constituting one
session divided into tWo parts namely, Part I and Part 11.
· Ori conciusion of the second part of the Eighth Session;
c I
Lok Sabha adjourned sine die on 28 August, 1987 and
,was prorogued on 3 September, 1987."
\
- 23. It is thus clear that whenever the House resumes after
it is adjourned sine die, its resumption for the purpose of
D continuing its business does not amount to commencement of
the session. The resumed sitting of the House, in this case, on
' ", 29th January, 2004; does not amount to commencement of the
·._· first Session in the year 2004.
··--.., \
l -...,
·E·- Speaker's Ruling: · : · /
. 24. The veiY issue reg-arding propriety of convening of the
. first session of the House on 29th January, 2004 without the
........ ___ · Presidential
, . · . .. I address· was· raised• in the House. The· Speaker .
gave. a ruling declaring that as per the provisions of the
F Constituti~n. a ~essi~n of the House comes to an end when
the _House is prorogued. As the House was f!Ol prorogued after
its adjournment sine die on 23rd December, 2003, the session
can, at best be treate-d as a second part of the 14th session of·
the 13th Lok Sabha ~notwithstanding the fact that the calendar
, G year has since ·changed• ~ The session convened. from 29th
January~ 2004 was held to be second part of the winter session.
The.ruling of the Speaker is reproduced hereunder: ·
'Tuesday, February 3, 2004/Magha 14, 1925 (Saka)
H
RAMDAS ATHAWALE v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.1077
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
Ruling by the Speaker- Regarding propriety of (i) terming A
'Vote on Account' as the 'Interim Budget' -in the Order
Paper of the day;- and (ii) convening of the first session of
the year on 29 January, 2004-~lthout the Presidential
Address. ·
B
.. ;. ·: T~~ Speaker, after hearing u~ ......... gave the _following
. ruling:- _
-Let me at the outset make it _ciear that tb_e rulings of the
Speaker are generally. in accordance. with- the. rules, the
rule book- and also the Constitution of lrtdia. At times, it so C · ·
happens that the issue requires ruling of Chair and in such
circumstances the precedents are seen. If the precedents
are not available, then the presiding _officer_has to make
- up his own mir.d and give a ruling on the issues which are
raised. In this particular case, fortunately, there are rules D
of procedure as well as definitions to guide us. I have gone
-through Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice._I would like
_ the House to listen carefully to the ruling \f!hich·J am now
' -: going to give.
' I . _- . E
Firstly, let me refer to Erskine May who has given,
a-
fortunately,- definition of the term 'prorogation'. He has
said:
'A prorogation terminates a session; an adjournment is an
. interruption in the course of one and the same session'. F
Therefore, the point which was raised here about
prorogation has been made clear by this definition.·
. / ....
-. ~ ..
G
'' But that was not the main point which was raised
-· today. The main point which was raised by Shri Somnatti
of
Chatterjee was about the very holding this Session and
this point was also raised in the House by Shri Varkala
Radhakrishnan and some other Members on 30th January, H
1078 ___SUPREME COURT -REPORTS {i010] 3 S.C.R.
A 2004 and the Hon'ble Minister of Parliamentary Affairs had
responded to the points raised by the Members on that
--day. Shri Somnath Chattef-jee has contended that was
commenced on 29th January, 2004 was the first Session
, of the year. I would like to-clarify thac there is no mention
8 f of a_djournment sine die of the House in the Constitution.
As per the provisions of the Constitution, a Se-ssion of the
House comes to an end when the House is prorogued. As
th-e House was not_. prorogued after its adjournment sine
die on 23rd Decembe'r; 2003 this Session can, at- best,
.c be treated as the second part of the Fourteenth Session
of the Thirteenth Lok Sabha notwithstanding the fact that
the ~aiEmdar year has' sine~ changed. ·-. , ;. , - _
I am giving an illustration;· I am ·giving a precedent
\ - regarding the Third Lok Sabha. On 11. th December, 1962
"' -0 - . \the House adjourned to meet on 21st January, 1963.
~. \ - .
. This was treated as Part-11 of the same Session. I
-·:may inform the House that in the past also there have been
occasions when after adjournment sine die of the House,
E · the Lok Sabha was re-convened before prorogation.
.. ·r ; 'J •
( ....For exa~ple, the.-Eighth Session of the Eighth Lok
Sabha was adjourned sine die on 12th May, 1987, but tne
' House was not prorogued ... and was reconvened after a
gap of 75 days on 27th July, 1987 as the second part of
F _the Session. Similarly, the 14th Session of the Eighth Lok
Sabha was adjourned sine die on18thAugust, 1989, but
· '- · the House v-Jas not prorogued and 'was re-convened on 11th
October, 1989 after a gap of 53 ·days as second part of
the 14th Session.
G
_....There are several other similar instances also. I
have- already made a reference to the case when the
House was adjourned and thereafter, though it was
reconvened in the next year, it was not treated as the fresh
H Session. Therefore I. must make it clear that in this
1080 ··~ SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 3 S.C.R.
A 20th January, 2004 issued under the directions of the Speaker
as unconstitutional. The petitioner is essentially raising a
dispute ·as to the regularity and legality of the proceedings in
the House of the People. The dispute raised essentially centers
around the question as to whether the Speaker's direction to
B resume sittings of the Lo~ Sabha which was adjourned sine
die on 23rd December;· 2003 is proper? The Speaker is the
guardian of .
the privilegesI of• the
.
House
.
and its spokesman
•.
and
representative upon all occasions. He is the interpreter of its
rules and procedure, and is invested with the power to control
c and regulate the course of debate and to maintain a·rder. The
_powers !o regulate Procedure and Conduct of Business of the
Hous·e :of the People vests in the Speaker of the House. By
virtue of the powers vested in him, the Spe-aker, in purp.orted
'' , exercise of his power under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure
"· - , _and_.Gonduct of Business in Lok Sabha got issued notice <:fated ·
0
2at~ · ~anuary, 2004 throl!gh the Secretary General of the Lok
.__-~ Sabha directing resumption of sittings of the Lok Sabha which
was adjourned sine die·on 23rd December, 2003.' Whether the
resumed sittings on 29th JanuarY. 2004 was to be treated as
th~ second part of the 14th session as directed by the Speaker
E · is essentially a matter relating purely to the procedure of
-- --- . Parliament. The validity of the proceedings and busine$s
transacted in· the House after resumption of its sittings cannot
be tested-and gone into by this ·court in a proce_ eding under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India. ·
F ---.
27. There are, two Articles to which reference must be
made. Article 118(1) provides that each House of Parliament
maymake rules for regulating, subject to the provisions of the
Constitution, its. procedure and conduct of its· business. The
G rules, in fact •. are made and known as Rules of Procedure and
Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha. Rule 15 of the Rules of
Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha provides ·
that:··· . ·
_"(1) The Speaker shall determine the time when a sitting
H .. .. ...,
RAMDAS ATHAWALE v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.1081 •
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
· of the House shall be adjourned sine die or to a particular A·
day, or to an hour or part of the same day:
Provided that the Speaker may, if he thinks fit, call a sitting
of the House before the date or time to which it has been
adjourned or at any time after_the House has been
B
adjourned sine die. · _ --- ----~ ·
. .
(2) In case the House, after being adjourned is reconvened
under the proviso to sub-rule (1), the Secretary General
shall communicate to each member the date, time, place
and duration of the next part of the session; C
. --
...
· 28. Article 118(1) makes it perfectly clear that·when the
House is to make any rules as prescribed by it. those rules are
subject· to the provisions of the Constitution' which· obviously
include Fundamental Rights gliarant'eed by PC:ut Ill of the o
Constitution. -
, 29.'Similarly, Article 122(1} makes a pro~isi~n which is
relevant: It _Jays down that the validity of any proceedings in
Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any
alleged irreg.ularity of procedure. Article 122(2} confers . E
· immunity on the officers and members of Parliament in whom·
powers are vested by or under the Constitution for regulating
'procedure or conduct of the business or for maintaining order
in Parliament from being subject to the jurisdiction of any Court
in respect of the exercise by him of those po'wYer~~ Jpis Court F
In re, Under Article 143, Constitution of lndia 2 (also known as
Keshav Singh's case) while construing Article 212(1) observed
· that it may be possible for a. Citizen to call in question in the
appropriate Court of law, the validity of any proceedings inside
·the Legislature if his case· is that the said proceedings suffer G _,.
not from mere irregularity of procedure, 'but from an illegality. l_f
the impugned procedure is illegal and unconstitutional, it would
be open to be scrutinized in a Court of law, though such scrutiny
is prohibited if the complaint against the procedure is no more
2. _ 1965 (1) SCR 413.
• > H
1082 , SUPREME COURT REPORTS·- . [2010] 3 S.C.R.
. ' ; . .
A than this that the procedure was irregular. The same principle
would equally be applicable in the matter of interpretation of
,Art~~e 122 of the_Constitution .
.··--~- . " . -.. .. ~-. /
· ·. :•,.- 30. The Notice dated January 20. 2004 is self-explanatory
. 8 .~. ~nd . reveals that the House was: adjourned sine die on 23rd
.. December, 2003 by the Speaker. It is the Speaker's direction
·· to resume its sittings from 29th January, 2004 onwards. The
Notice clearly says that it was the'second part of the fourteenth
session and was likely to conclude on 5th February, 2004. The
· . - ·'_ · Speaker's decision· adjourning the House ·sine die on 23rd
. C . December.- 2003 and direction to resume its sittings e in part
. .
two ssentially relates· to· proceedings in Parliament and is of
·procedural in nature. The. Business transacted and the validity
·... of proceedings. after the resumption of its sittings pursuanf to
the. directions of the· Speaker cannot be inquired into by the·
' , _D courts. . · ,, ·-~ ' - · · ·
:,\31. Under Article 122 (2), the decision of the Speaker in
whom powers are vested to. regulate the procedure and the
Conduct of Business is final and binding on every Member of
E _,.the House. The validity of the Speaker's decision ·adjourning
the House sine die on 23rd December, 2003 and latter direction
"·-. · to res~me its sittings cannot be inquired into on the grourid of
any irregularity of procedure. The business transacted ~mq the.
validity of_ proceedings after the re-sumption of sittings of.the·
F House. pursuant t6 the directions of the Speaker cannot be '
inquired into by the Courts. -No decision of the Speaker can be
challenged by a member of the House complaining of mere
·irregularitY in procedure in the con-duct of the business. Such
decisions are not subject to the jurisdiction .of any Court and
they are immune from challenge as 'understood and explained
G in Kesfiav.Singh's case and further explained in Indira ·Nehru
Gandhf Vs. 'Raj Narain & Anr. 3 whe-rein it was ·obser\ted that
"the. House is not subject to the control of the courts in the
administration of the internal proceedings of the House." It is a·
• • ' • ; ' 'o-
H 3. 1975 (Supp.) sec 1.
RAMDAS ATHAWALE·v. UNION OF INDIAAND ORS.1083
[8. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
right of each House of Parliament to be the sole judge of the A _.
_laWfulness of its own ·proceedings. The Courts cannot go into
the fa!Nfulness of the proceedings of the Houses of Parliament.
The Constitution aims at maintaining a fine balance between
the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. The object of the
constitutional scheme is to ensure that each of the constitutional B
organs function within their respective assigned sphere.
Precisely, that is the constitutional philosophy inbuilt into Article ·
122 of the Constitution of India. ·- ·
32. In M.S. M Sharma Vs. Or. -Shree Krishna Sinha\ a
Constitution Bench of this Court held that the validity of the C
proceedings inside the Legislature of the· State cannot be
called in question on the allegation that the proced_ure laid down
by the law had not been strictly followed. Sinha, C:J. speaking
for the Court observed:
D
"It was contended that the procedure adopted inside the
House of the Legislature was not regular and not strictly
in accordance with law. There are two answe'rs to this
contention, firstly, that according to the previous decision
of. this Court, the petitioner has not the fundamental right E
claimed by him. He is, therefore, out of Court. Secondly,.
the validity of the proceedings inside the Legislature of a·
State cannot be called in question on the allegation that
the procedure laid down by the law had ·not been stri~tly
• followed. Article 212 of the Constitution is a complete F
answer to this part of the contention raised on behalf of
the petitioner. No Court can go into those questions which
.
are within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature
•-..-
~.-.,.
itself,
which has the power to conduct its mvn business. Possibly,
· . a third answer to this part of the contention raised on
behalf of is
the petitioner is that it yet premature to G
consider the question of procedure as the Committee is
yet to conclude its proceedings. It must also be observed
that once it has been held that the Legislature has the
4. air 1960 sc 1186. H
1084 - SUPREME. COURT REPORTS [2010] 3 S.C.R.
A jurisdiction to control the publication of its proceedings and
togo into the question whether there has been any breach
of its privileges: the Legislature is vested with complete
jurisdiction to carry on its proceedings in accordance with
its rules of business. Even though it may not have strictly
s ( .complied with th~ re~uirem~nts of the procedural law laid
· ·· down tor conductmg 1ts bus mess, that cannot be a ground
for interference· by -this Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution."
I
33. In the present case, there fs no complaint of
C infringement of any guaranteed fundamental rights anq.
therefore it may not be necessary to dilate on the question as
to .parameters a.nd extent of judicial review that may be.. l
available in. case of infringement of any guaranteed]
·fundamental rights of a member of the House. · , -
D , -
· ' , ._ 34. One more aspect of the matter. The petitioner in this
writ p'etition under Article 32 of the CCJnstitution has challenged
-----the validity of proceedings in the Lok Sabha commencing from
. 29ttiJanuary, 2004 on the grounds stated hereinabove, with
. E which we have dealt with in the preceding paragraphs. The
petition has become infructuous, since the Lok Sabha was
dissolved-and thereafter two elections have been held. The issue
--- raised in the petition is purely a hypothetical question. There
is no ·existing lis between the parties. It is settled practice that
F this Court does not decide mattern which are only of academic
interest on the facts of a particular case.
.- . . ' .
-.. 35. In R.S. Nayak Vs. A.R. Antu/ay, a Constitution Bench
of this Court observed: ·
G ·, · "We· propose to adhere to the accumulated wisdom
which- has reopened into a settled practice .of this Court
not to; decide academic questions." .
36. Though the writ petition has become infructuous, having
H s. (1984) 2 sec 183.
RAMDAS ATHAWALE v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.1085
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
'
regard to the constitutional issues raised, we have considered A
the question as to the interpreta_tion of Articles85 and 87 of
the Constitution of India.
I
37. It is eq~ally well settled that Article 32 of the Constitution
guarantees the right to a Constitutional remedy and relates only
9
to the enforcement of the right conferred by Part Ill of the
Constitution an·d unless a questior1--of -enforcement of a
fundamental right-
arises, ~ Article 32
. ------- - It. is well
does not apply.
settled that no petition under Article _32 is maintainable, unless
it is shown that the petitioner tias 'some fundamental right. In C
Northern Corporation Vs. Union of lndia5, this Court has made
a pertinent observation that whe~ a person complains_and
claims that there is a violation of law, it does not automatically
involves breach of fundamental right, for the enforcement of
which alone, -Article '32 is attracted: -
·I
D
38. We have carefully scanned through the averments and
allegations made in the writ petition and found that there is not
even a whisper of any infringement o~ any fundarpental right
guaranteed by Part Ill of the Constitution. We reiterate the
principle' that 'wheneve'r a person compiains and claims that E.
there is a violation of any provision of law or a Constitutional
provision, it does not automatically involve breach -of
fundamental 'right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32
of the Constitution is attracted. It is not possible to accept that
an allegation of breach of law or a Constitutional provision is F
an action in breach of fundamental right. The writ petition-
deserves dismissal only on this ground. .. ,_._
39. We accordingly find no merit in this writ petition and
is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.
G
D. G.. Writ Petition dismissed. -
a_ (1990) 4 sec 239. H
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