Holding

Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 is constitutionally valid and the 1986 notification extending the 1985 Act to Chandigarh is within its scope.

Summary

The petitioners challenged a Central Government notification dated 15 December 1986 that, under Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, extended the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1985 to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The core issues were whether Section 87 itself violated the Constitution by delegating legislative power to the executive (excessive delegation/abdication) and whether the specific extension of the 1985 Act was within the scope of that provision. The Court examined the constitutional framework, the policy‑guideline theory of delegated legislation, and the historical precedent set by the Delhi Laws Act case. It held that Section 87 is a valid legislative delegation because it provides sufficient policy guidance and does not amount to abdication of essential legislative functions. The Court further found that the 1986 notification merely extended provisions that did not conflict with existing law and therefore was valid. Consequently, the appeals and writ petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 is constitutionally valid or amounts to excessive delegation of legislative power.
Whether the Central Government's 15 December 1986 notification extending the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1985 to Chandigarh exceeds the authority conferred by Section 87.
Whether the power to extend future amendments of a law under Section 87 is permissible.

Legislation cited

Subjects

delegated legislationexcessive delegationabdication of legislative powerSection 87Punjab Reorganisation ActChandigarh Union Territoryrent restriction lawconstitutional validityArticle 246(4)policy‑guideline theory

Judgment

RAMESH BIRCH & ORS. ETC. A
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.

APRIL 21, 1989
B
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.)

Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966: s. 87-Power to extend enact-

- ments to Union Territory of Chandigarh-Delegation of to the
Executive-Validity of-Held, not a case of abdication or effacement of
legislative power-Contains sufficient declaration of guideline-Power
to extend future laws and amendments necessary corollary. C·

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act 1985-
Extension of to Union Territory of Chandigarh by Central Government
Notification dated December 15, 1986--Validity of.
D
Constitution of India, Article 246(4)-Executive-Power of adap-
tation by extension of laws to Union Territory of Chandigarh by
notification-Constitutional validity of.
. )...,

Administrative Law: Central Government Notification dated
December 15, 1986--Extension of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction E

- (Amendment) Act, 1985 to Union Territory of Chandigarh-Nature
and scope of-Whether suffers from vice of impermissible delegation.

Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 empowered the
Central Government to extend, with such restrictions and modifications
as it thought fit, to the Union Territory of Chandigarh any enactment F
which was in force in a State at the date of the notification. Section 89
provided for adaptation and modification by the appropriate Govern-
ment of any law made before the appointed day, whether by way of
repeal or amendment, for application in relation to the State of Punjab
or Haryana or to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh or
Chandigarh before the expiration of two years. The State of Punjab, of G
which the Union Territory of Chandigarh originally formed part, was
then governed by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
Section 2(j) of that Act defined 'urban area' as any area administered
by a municipal committee, a cantonment board, a town committee, or a
notified area committee or any area declared by the State Government
by notification to be an urban area for the purposes of the Act. H

629·
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.
~~
The Central Government had issued under s. 89 of the Reorgani-
A
sation Act, the Punjab Reorganisation ,(Chandigarh) (Adaptation of
Laws on State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1968 with effect from
Isl November, 1966 Paragraph 4 of which directed that in all the exist-
ing laws, in its application to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, any
reference to the State of Punjab should be read as a reference to the
B Union Territory of Chandigarh. In exercise of the power conferred by )...
s. 2(j) of the Rent Act, the Central Government had also issued on 13th
October, 1972 a notification declaring the area comprising Chandigarh -~

c
to be an "urban area" for the purpose of that Act.

This notification was, however, quashed by the High Court in
Harkishan Singh v. Union, AIR 1975 P & H 160, on the ground that no
-
notification had been issued priorto 1st November, 1966 under s. 2(j)
declaring Chandigarh to be an urban area, and there was no notifica- ·-,.
tion under s. 87 making the 1949 Act operative in Chandigarh with the
necessary adaptation. Thereupon, Parliament enacted the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974. Section 3
0 of that Act extended to Chandigarh the 1949 Act subject to modifica-
tions specified in the schedule with retrospective effect from 4th
November, 1972 with a view to regularies all proceedings for eviction
which might have been initiated during the interregnum. These
included a modification of the definition of 'urban areas' as including
the area comprising Chandigarh, as defined in s. 2 of the Capital of
E Punjab (Development Regulation) Act, 1952, and such other areas com-
prised in the Union Territory of Chandigarh as the Central Govern-
ment may by notification declare to be urban for the purposes of the
Act.
-
In 1982 Parliament passed the East Punjab Urban Rent Restric- . )....
f tiou (Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982 effecting- certain amendments
in the 1949 Act in its application to Chandigarh. t·
In 1985 the Leg1stature of .the. State of Punjab enacted East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1985 to make the
1949 Act more effective. This amendment came into force with effect
G from 16th November, 1985. ~

By a notification dated 15th December, 1986 purportedly in exer-
cise of its power under s. 87 of the Reorganisation Act the Central
Government extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh the provi-
sions of the 1985 Act as in force in the State of Punjab at the date of the
H notification and subject to the modifications mentioned therein, with
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. 631

the resulf il;iat while the provisions of the 1949 Act had been brought
A
into force with effect from 4th November, 1972 by the Act of Parlia-
ment, the provisions of the 1985 Act had been extended to the said
territory by means of a. Notification of the Central Government issued
under s. 87. The High Court upheld the validity of the said notification.

In these appeals by special leave and the writ petitions it was B
~ contended for the appellants/petitioners that in the purported exercise of its
.\
~. power under Article 246(4) of the Constitution, the Parliament could not

- delegate its legislative function in favour of an executive authority to
such an extent as to amount to an abdication of its legislative function;
that by enacting s. 87, Parliament instead of legislating for the Union
Territory had left it to the Central Government to decide for all time to
come what should be the law in force in that Territory; whereas s. 89
~- gives a limited transitory power to the Central Government to adapt
c

I
existing laws within a period of two years; that such adaptation could
hold the field only until they were altered, repealed or amended by a
competent legislature or authority; that s. 87 confers on the executive
is government a wide power of cb.oice, for application to Chandigarh, of D
• not only one legislative enactment on any subject in operation in various
parts of the country but also groups of provisions from one or more of
them and thus enforce a law which would be an amalgam of various
_.l statutory provisions; that there was no legislative guidance as to the
manner in which these choices should be exercised by the executive;

'- that s. 87 enables extension by Government notification even of any
legislation which might have come into force in any part of India at any
time between 1966 and the date of the notification; that the effect,
therefore, of s. 87 could be that the entire legislation for the Union
E

Territory in respect of any particular subject would entirely depend
__l_ upon the fancy of the Central Government without any sort of legisla-
tive or parliamentary application of mind; that a power to exercise such F
wide power could not be described as a ministerial power, it is essential
~ legislative power; that these facets of s. 87 clearly render it an instance
of excessive delegation by Parliament to executive amounting in effect,
to the total abdication of its legislative powers in regard to .Chandigarh.

It was further contended that s. 87, on its proper construction, G
permits the extension of the laws of another State to Chandigarh only so
long as there is a vacuum of• laws on any particular subject; that once
Parliament itself steps in and assumes legislative responsibilities in
respect of that subject, a transplantation of laws from elsewhere by
extension is neither necessary nor valid; that as early as 1974 Parlia-
ment having applied its mind and legislated in respect of landlord- H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

tenant matters for the Union Territory, it was for Parliament and Par-
A
liament alone to legislate on the subject thereafter; that by purporting
to extend by an executive notification nnder s. 87 the provisions of the
1985 Act to Chandigarh what the Central Government had really done
was to modify or amend an existing parliamentary law operating
already in the State, which was impermissible, and that the notification
B dated 15th December, 1986 having thus exceeded the purview of s. 87 it
was, therefore, ultra vires.

c
Dismissing the appeals and the writ petitions,

HELD: 1.1 Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966
should he interpreted constructively so as to permit its object being
achi.eved rather .than in a manner that will detract from its efficacy or
-
purpose. So construed, its validity has to he upheld. [683C] --,,,..
1.2 It is impossible to carry on the government of a modern State
with its infinite complexities and ramifications without a large devolu-
tion of power and delegation of authority. While Parliament should,
D therefore, have ample and extensive powers of legislation, these should
include a power to entrust some of those functions and powers to
another body or authority. Such entrustment, however, could not be so
extensive as to amount to abdication or effacement. The legislatures
cannot wash their hands off their essential legislative function of laying
down the legislative policy with sufficient clearness and enunciating the

-
E standards which are to he enacted into a ·rule of law. This function
cannot he delegated. What can he delegated is only the task of subordi-
nate legislation which is by its very nature ancillary to the statute which
delegates the power to make it and which must he within the policy and
framework of the guidance provided by the legislature. [668G-H;
669C-D]
F
1.3 Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act did not cross the line f"
beyond which d~legation amounts to abdication and self-effacement. It
was not the power to make laws that was delegated. The provision only
conferred a power on the executive to determine, having regard to the
local conditions prevalent in the Union Territory, which one of several
G laws, all approved by one or the other of the legislatures in the country, ...,,
would he the most suited to Chandigarh. The power given as such was
more in the nature of ministerial than in the nature of legislative power
because all that the Government had to do was to study the laws and
make selection out of them. Thus viewed, it was not really an unguided
and arbitrary power. [675F-G I
H
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. 633

In re Delhi Laws Act, [1951] SCR 747 applied.
A
Registrar of Cooperative Societies v. Kunhambu [1980] 2 S.C.R.
260; R. v. Burah, [1878] 5 I.A. 178; Jatind;a Nath Gupta v. The Pro-
vince of Bihar & Ors., [1949] FCR 595; Harishankar Bag/a & Anr. v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] ·1 SCR 380; Rajnarain Singh v.
The Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna & Anr., [1955] B
- \ 1 SCR 290; Sardar Jnder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, [1957] SCR
· ' ' 605; Pandit Banarsi Das v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.,
[1959] SCR 427; The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. Beawar v. The State of
Ajmer, [1955] 1 SCR 735; The Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Munici-
pal Corporation of the City of Poona, [1959] 2 Supp. SCR 71; Hamdard
Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan v. Union of India, [1960] 2 SCR 671;
Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala ·V, The State of Bombay & Ors., C
·.lf· [1961] l SCR 341; Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Terri-
tory of Delhi, [1962] 2 SCR 125; Shama Rao v. The Union Territory of
Pondichery, [1967] 2 SCR 650; Mohammad Hussain Gu/am Moham-
mad & Anr.. v. Th~ State of Bombay & Anr. [!962] 2 SeR 659;
Corporation of Calcutta & Anr. v. Liberty Cinema, [1965J 2 SCR 477, D
Devi Das Gopal Krishan & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1967] 3
SCR 557; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Bir/a Cotton, Spinning &
Weaving Mills, Delhi & Anr., [1968] 3 SCR 251; Sita Ram Bishambhar
_\l Dayal v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1972] 2 SCR 141; Hira Lal Rattan Lal
etc. etc" v. State of U.P. & Anr. etc. etc., [1973] 2 SCR 502; Gwalior
Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. The Asstt. Commissioner of Sales E
Tax & Ors., [1974] 2 SCR 879; M.K. Papiah & Sons. v. The Excise
• Commissioner & Anr., [1975] 3 SCR 607; Brii Sundar Kapoor v. First
Additional District Judges, [1980] I SCC 651 and Sprigg. v. Sigcau,
[ 1897] AC 238, referred to .
...J...
F
2.1 Section 87 was quite valid even on the policy and guidelines
-~ theory. It is not necessary that the legislature should "dot all the i's and
cross all the t's" of its policy. It is sufficient if it gives the broadest
indication of a general policy of the legislature. [673E-F]

2.2 The policy behind s. 87 seems to be that it was necessitated by G
~ changes resulting in territories coming under the legislative jurisdiction
of the Centre. These were territories situated in the midst of contiguous
territories which had a proper legislature. They were small territories
falling under the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament, which had
hardly sufficient time to look after the details of all their legislative
needs and requirements. To require or expect Parliament to legislate H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

for them would have entailed a disproportionate pressure on its legisla-
A
tive schedule. It wonld also have meant the unnecessary utilisation of
the time of a large number of members of Parliament for, except the few
members returned to Parliament from the Union Territory none else
was likely to be interested in such legislation. In such a situation the
most convenient conrse of legislating for them was the adaptation by
B extension of laws in force in other areas of the country. [673F; 674A-B]

2.3 There could have been no objection to the legislation if it had j ,
provided thl!t the laws of one of the contiguous States should be
extended to Chandigarh. But such a provision would have been totally
inadequate to meet the situation for two reasons. There might have
been more than one law in force on a subject in the contiguous States--
-
c say one in Punjab, one in PEPSU and one in Himachal Pradesh etc.-
and Parliament was anxious that Chandigarh should have the benefit of ·---y..
that one of them which would most adequately have met the needs of the
situation in tllat territory. Or, again, there might have been no existing
law on a particular subject in any of the contiguous areas which was
D why the power had to include the power of extending the laws of any
State of India. While in a very strict sense this might have involved a
choice, it was in fact, and in general run of cases, only a decision on
suitability for adaptation rather than choice of a policy. It was a delega-
tion not of policy, but of matters of detail for a meticulous appraisal of ;,,·
which Parliament had no time. Even if it be assumed that this involved
E a choice of policy, the restriction of such policy to one that was approved
by Parliament or a State Legislature constituted a sufficient declaration
of guideline within the meaning of the "policy-guideline theory." -
[675G-H; 676A-C]
In re Delhi Laws Act, [1951] SCR 747 referred to.
,.,,.l....
F
3. Once it is held that the delegation of a power to extend a
present existing law is justified, a power to extend future laws is a t-
necessary corollary. If Parliament had no time to apply its mind to the
existing law initially to be adapted, it could have hardly found time to 'i'
consider the amendments from time to time engrafted on it in the State
G
of its origin. It would then seem only natural as a necessary corollary
that the executive should be permitted to extend future amendments to
•
)r
those laws as well. [676D-E]

In re Delhi Laws Act, [1951] SCR 747 referred to.
4.1 The concept of vacnnm is as much relevant to a case where
H there is absence of a particular provision in an existing law as to a case
•
.. RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.J. 635
-x where there is no existing law at all in the Union Territory on a subject.
A
For instance, if Parliament had not enacted the 1974 Act but had only
enacted an extension of the Transfer of Property Act to Chandigarh, it
could not have been said that a subsequent notification cannot extend
the provisions of the 1949 Act to Chandigarh simply because the subject
of leases was governed by the Transfer of Property Act, which had. been
--{, already extended and there, was, therefore, no "vacuum" left which B
could be filled in by such extension. Again, suppose, initially, a Rent
.._. Act was extended by Parliament which did not contain a provision
regarding one of the grounds on which a landlord could seek eviction-
say, one enabling the owner to get back his house for reoccupation-

• and then the Government thought that another enactment containing
such a provision also be extended, it could not perhaps be said that the
. .. latter was a matter on which there was no legislation enacted in the
-1' Territory and that the extension of the latter enactment only lilied up a
c
void or vacancy. Again, suppose the provisions of a general code like,
say, the Code of Civil Procedure were extended to the Union Territory.
In that case s. 87 could not be construed so as to preclude the extension
of a later amendment to one of the rules to one of the orders of the D
C.P.C. merely on the ground that it will have the effect of varying or
amending an existing law. There is no warrant to thus unduly restrict
the scope of a provision likes. 87. [6820-H]

4.2 The extension of an enactment which makes additions to
the existing law would thus also be permissible under s. 87 of the E

- Reorganisation Act, S!!_Jqng as it does not, expressly or impliedly
repeal or conflict with, or is not repugnant to, an already existing
law. [683A-B]

In the instant case, the extension of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1985 to the Union Territory of Chandi- F
garh only added provisions in respect of aspects not covered by the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974
and in a manner not inconsistant therewith. [683F]

Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, [1976] 2 SCR 795 and Hari
Shankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] I SCR 380 referred G
to.

5. A notification while extending a law can make only such mod-
ifications and restrictions in the law extended as are of an incidental,
ancillary or subservient nature and as do not involve substantial devia-
tions therefrom. In the instant case, the 1985 Act has been extended as H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

it is, with only very minor modifications. The notification dated 15th )<-
A December, 1986 was, therefore, quite valid and not liable to be struck
down. [684E-F]

Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, [1976] 2 SCR 785; referred to
and Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, (1980] 1SCR854; distinguished.
B ).._
6. Any addition, however, small does amend or vary the existing
law but so long as it does not really detract from or conflict with it, f ~
there is no reason why it should not stand alongside the existing law. In
the instant case the modifications introduced by the 1985 Act in the
1949 Act, as were reenacted by the 1974 Act were minor modifications
and restrictions. They do not incorporate substantial changes in the
c scheme of the pre-existing law. Both sets of provisions can stand to-
gether and effectively supplement each other. [684F, H] -f·

Hari Shankar Bag/av. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1SCR380 and
Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, (1976] 2 SCR 795 referred to.
D
7. There is a very crucial difference between s. 87 and 89 in as
much as within the period of two years mentioned ins. 89, the Central
Government could while adapting pre-existing laws make any changes
by way of repeal or amendment. But s. 87, though capable of enforce· J<.
ment indefinitely, confers a more limited power. It can be invoked only
E to extend laws, already in existence, to the Union Territory and cannot
make any substantial changes therein. The power under s. 89 is limited
in time hut extensive in scope' while under s. 87 the power is indefinite
in point of duration but very much more restricted in its scope. There-
-
s.
fore, resort to 87 did not renders. 89 redundant. [686E-F]

F CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
~~~~. ~

From the Judgment and Order dated 25,5:1988 of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in C. W .P. No. 736-of 1987.

G G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General; Harbhawan '>r
Walia, Kapil Sibal, M.S. Gujral, Anil Dev Singh, M.R. Sharma, D.V.
Sehgal, Naresh Bakshi, R. Bana, Jitendra Sharma, S.M. Sarin, S.K.
Mehta, D. Mehta, Atul Nanda, P.N. Puri, B.B. Sawhney, M.C.
Dhingra, A.K. Gupta, T.C. Sharma, Mrs. Sushma Suri, Ms. Indu
Goswami, R.S. Yadav, Manoj Prasad, Manoj Swamp M.L. Verma, S.
'H Bagga, D.S. Gupta, B.R. Kapur, Anis Ahmad Khan, S. Sehgal and
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATIIAN, J.I 637

-)< N.K. Aggarw~lforthe appearing parties. A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATHAN, J. This is a batch of appeals and writ peti-
tions challenging the validity of a notification issued on,.15 .12.1986 by
-~ the Centr(al Government under section 87)of the Punjab Reorganisa- B
1 tion Act Act of Parliament No. 31of1966 , hereinafter referred to as
·' "-t 'the Reorganisation Act'. By this notification, the Central Govern-
ment purported to extend to the Union Territory of Chandigarh-
hereinafter referred to also as 'Chandigarh'-the provisions of the
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1985 (Punjab
Act 2 of 1985) (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1985 Act'), as it was in
force in the State of Punjab at the date of the notification and subject
c
~ to the modifications mentioned in the said notification. The Punjab
and Haryana High Court by its judgment in Ramesh Birch v. Union,
AIR 1988 P & H 281 upheld the validity of the above notification and
hence the special leave petitions. The writ petitions have been dirtctly
filed in this Court challenging the validity of the notification. In view D
of the importance of the question involved, we have heard the parties
on the merits of the cases. We, therefore, grant special leave in the
special leave petitions and rule nisi in the writ petitions and proceed to
)L dispose of the appeals and the writ petitions by this common judg-
ment.
E

- Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act is in the following terms:

"87. Power to extend enactment to Chandigarh-The Cen-.
tral Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, extend with such restrictions or modifications as it
thinks fit, to the Union Territory of Chandigarh any enact- F
ment which is in force in a State at the date of the
notification."

There are other provisions of this Act which will be referred to
later. But it is necessary to refer to s. 87 here for a specific purpose and
that is to point out that the provisions of section 87 are pari materia G
with the pr0visions of Section 7 of the Debi Laws Act, 1912 and Sec-
tion 2 of the Ajmer.Marwara' (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, which,
for convenience, we shall refer to.as Act I and Act II respectively.
These provisions read as follows:

"Section 7 of Act I: The Provincial Government may, by H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A notification in the Official Gazette, extend with such res- x-
trictions and modifications as it thinks fit, to the Province
of Delhi or any part thereof, any enactment which is in
force in any part of British India at the' date of such
notification."

"Section 2 of Act Il: The Central Government may, by }.--
notification in the' official Gazette, extend to the province
of Ajmer Marwara with such restrictions and modifications t·
as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in any other
province at the date of such notification."

It is also necessary here to contrast the above two provisions with
c section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred
to, for purposes of convenience, as Act III). That provision reads as
follows:

"Section 2 of Act III: The Central Government may, by ''
D notification in the official Gazette, extend to any Part C
State (other than Coorg and the Amendment and Nicobat.
Islands) or any part of such State, with such restrictions and
modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in
force in a Part A State at the date of the notification and ~.
provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the
E repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a
Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that
Part C State."

The reference to these provisions is being made at this stage
-
because the validity of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912 and
F section 2 of Ajmer Marwara (Extension of Laws) Act 1947 were
upheld by this court in the decision reported as In re Delhi Laws Act, ,,
[1951] S.C.R. 747. The decisio.n also upheld the validity of the first
part of section 2 of Act III but struck down the second part of that
provision (underlined above) as vitiated by the vice of excessive dele-
gation. A good deal of the arguments addressed before us naturally
turned on the"'ratio and effect of the decision of this Court in the Delhi
Laws Act case (supra), but, before turning to the arguments, it is
necessary to give a brief history of s. 87, the interpretation of which is
presently in question.

WI\en the Constitution of India came into force on 26th January,
H 1950, the component units of the Indian Union were grouped into four
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.] 639

-Y types of territories. There were nine States in Part A (one of which was A
Punjab, earlier known as East Punjab), nine States in Part B (which
included Pepsu), ten States in Part C (which included Himachal
Pradesh) and only one State, namely, Andaman and Nico.bar Islands,
in Part D. At tliis stage, although several of the former Indian States
had acceded to the Indian Union_, the process of their integratior. as
. component units of the Indian Union was not complete. Some units B
----\ were accepted as units of the Union in the form in which they existed
.> . . at the time of independence while some were formed by grouping

· together one or more of the former princely States. After the recom-
mendations of the States Reorganisation Commission in 1955, the
Constitution was amertded to classify the units of the Indian Union
into States and Union Territories.
c
At the time of the 1956 reorganisation one State of Punjab was
created by merging the erstwhile States of Pepsu and Punjab. In 1966 a
new State of Haryana was created by carying out certain territories
from the'Staie of Punjab. Certain hill areas of the Punjab were merged
with the adjoining Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. A new D
Union Territory of Chandigarh was carved out which became the joint
capital of Punjab and Haryana. The Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966
gave effect to these proposals. Sections 3 and 4 dealt with the delimita-
)<. tion of the territories of the States of Pu.njab and Haryana and the
Union Territories of Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh. One of the
important aspects of the reorganisation, in respect of which specific E

- statutory provision was needed, was regarding the applicability of laws
to the various territories which underwent reoganisation. This was
effected by Part X of the Reorganisation Act Comprising of sections 86
to 97. It is however sufficient for our present purposes to refer to the
provisions contained in sections 87 to 90. These provisions were in the
...l... ·followin£terms: - ---- · · - - ·· ·· · F
·~
Section 87: Power to extend enactments· to Chandigarh-
As set out earlier.

Section ·ss:· Territorial extent of laws- The Pro-
visions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any G
change in the territories to which any law in force
immediately before the appointed day extends or applies,
and territorial references in any such law to the State of
Punjab shall, until otherwise provided by a competent
Legislature or other competent authority, be construed as
meaning the territories within the State immediately before H
the appointed day.
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A Section 89: Power to adapt laws- For the purpose of \'-
facilitating the application in relation to the State of Punjab
or Haryana or to the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh
or Chandigarh of any law made before the appointed day,
the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of
two years from that day, by order, make such adaptations
B and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or \
amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and there- r
upon every such law shall have effect subject to the adapta- ·-A
-
tions and modifications so made until altered, repealed or
amended by a competent Legislature or other competent
authority.
c Section 90: Power to construe laws- (1) Notwithstanding
that no provision or insufficient provision has been made "'f- 411
under section 89 for the adaptation of a law made before
the appointed day, any court, tribunal or authority,
required or empowered to enforce such law may, for the
D purpose of facilitating its application in relation to the State
of Punjab or Haryana, or to the Union of territory of
Himachal Pradesh or Chandigarh construe the law in such
manner, without affecting the substance, as may be neces-
sary or proper in regard to the matter before the court, .~
tribunal or authority.
E
(2) Any reference to the High Court of Punjab in any law
shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed,
on and from the- appointed day, as a reference to the High
Court of Pun jab and Haryana.
_).,.
F The dispute in this batch of cases is regarding the applicability of
certain rent laws to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The territories t' '
originally comprised in the former Province of East Punjab-later
designated as the State of Punjab-were governed by the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the
'principal Act' or the' 1949 Act'). This Act applied to all urban areas in
G the State of Punjab. Section 2(j) of that Act defined 'urban area' as
any area administered by a municipal committee, a cantonment board, )r
a town committee or a notified area committee or any are.a declared by
the State Government by notification to be an urban area for the
purposes of the Act. The Central Government had earlier issued,
under section 89, the Punjab-Reorganisation (Chandi_garh) (Adapta-
H tion of Laws on State and Concurrent Sub.iects) Order, 1968 w.e.f.
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.O.I. (RANGANAIBAN, J.] 641

-Y 1.11.66. Paragraph 4 of the Order directed that in all the existing laws,
in its application to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, any reference A
to the State of Punjab should be read as a reference to the Union
Territory of Chandigarh and para Z(l)(b) of the Order defined the
expression 'existing Jaw'. The Central Government, in exercise of the
power conferred by section Z(j) of the principal Act, issued on
. 13.10. 72 a notification declaring the area comprising Chandigarh to be B
- \ an 'urban area' for the purposes of the principal Act. The notification
,..~was published in the Gazette of India on 4.11.72. This notification was
however quashed by the Pun jab & Haryana High Court by its decision
in the case of Harkishan Singh v. Union, AIR 1975 P & H 160. That .
was on the short ground that, as no notification had been issued prior
to 1.11.66 under s. Z(j) declaring Chandigarh to be an urban area, the
... Act could not be said to have been in force within the said area prior to c
•
I ~ 1.11.66. Neither s. 88 not the notification of 13.10.72 could, it was
held, be effective to make the principal Act operative in Chandigarh
unless it had first been applied to the Union Territory of Chandigarh
or any part thereof by a notification under s. 87 with the necessary
adaptation. This decision, of a Full Bench of the High Court, was D
rendered on 9.10.1974.

Two courses were open to the Government to set right the lacuna
pointed out by the High Court. The first, as pointed out by the Full
Bench, was to extend the principal Act.to Chandigarh by a notification
under s. 87. The second was to invoke the legislative powers of Parlia- E
ment available in respect of Chandigarh under article 246(4) of the
Constitution to enact a legislation for this purpose. But it was
important that any corrective measure had to be made retrospective in
its operation ifthe large number of suits for eviction that had been
filed in the meanwhile on the strength of the notification and were
pending disposal in various courts were to be saved from being F
rendered non-maintainable consequent on the decision of the High
~
Court. Presumably for this reason, the second of the above courses
was adopted and Parliament enacted the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act (Central Act 54 of 1974)
hereinafter referred to as 'the 1974 Act'. Section 3 of this Act provided
for the enforcement of the principal Act in Chandigarh. It reads: G

"Section .3: Extension of East Punjab Act Ill of 1949 to
Chandigarh-

Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, de-
cree or order of any court, the Act shall, subject to the H
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19891 2 S.C.R.

modifications specified in the Schedule, be in force in, and Y-
A
be deemed to have been in.force with effect from 4th day of
November, 1972 in the Unio11 Territory of Chandigarh, as if
the provisions of the Act so modified had been included in
and formed part of this section and as if this section had
been in force at all material times."
B
Three features of the above legislation may be emphasised at this '>--
stage. The first was that, though this purported to extend the principal • A

Act to Chandigarh, it was in truth and substance a Parliamentary '
enactment applicable to Chandigarh incorporating within itself by
reference, for purposes of convenience and to avoid repetition, all the
C provisions of the principal Act. The second was that the Act was given
retrospe,ctive effect from 4.11.72, the date on which the previous
notification under section 89 had been gazetted with a view to ~ j.
regufarise all proceedings for eviction which might have been initiated I
during the interregnum. Thirdly, the principal Act was re-enacted sub-
ject to the modifications specified in the Schedule. These included a
D modification of the definition of 'urban area' as including the area
comprising Chandigarh as defined insection 2 of the Capital of Punjab
(Development Regulation) Act, 1952 and such other areas comprised
in the Union Territory of Chandigarh as the Central Government may
by notification declare to be urban for the purposes of the Act.

E Before turning to the issues before us, it is necessary to refer to
three subsequent developments:

(i) In 1976, when Parliament was not in session, the Presi-
dent of India promulgated Ordinance 14 of 1976 on 17.12.76. By
this Ordinance, the 1949 Act, as in force in Chandigarh, was
F amended in the following respects:
~1
(a) In section 13, an exlanation and sub-section (4A) were 1'
introduced;

(b) New sections 13A, 18A and 18B were inserted;
G
(c) A new sub-section (2A) in section 19 was inserted;

. (d) A Schedule II prescribing the form of summons to be issued
in proceedings under the newly inserted s. 13A was edded. Thi>
ordinance was allowed to lapse and was not enacted into law
H tl'ereafter.
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.) 643

-Y (ii) In 1982, Parliament passed the East Punjab Rent
A
Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act (No. 42) of 1983
(hereinafter referred to as 'the 1982 Act'). By this Act, two
amendments were effected to the principal Act in its application
to Chandigarh. One was a formal one replacing reference to
"East Punjab" by areference to "Punjab". The second was the
substitution of a new definition of "non-residential building" in B
s. 2(d) of the Act. This amendment Act did not, however,
incorporate the amendments ea~lier effected in the principal Act
(as in force in Chandigarh) by the Ordinance of 1976 which had
lapsed, though this opportunity could have been availed of by
Parliament had it been so minded, to introduce those amend-
ments as well.
c
~- (iii) In 1985, the prov1S1ons of the principal Act were
amended in their application to the State of Punjab. The legisla-
ture of the State of punjab enacted Punjab Act 2 of 1985
(hereinafter referred to as 'the 1985 Act') by which the principal
Act was amended to insert therein new sections 13A, 18A and D
18B and a new Second Schedule and to make certain amend-
ments in sections 13 and 19 of the Act. These amendments were
substantially the same as those that had been effected by the
Ordinance of 1976 except that a new definition of "specified
landlord" was added in s. 2 and the other provisions verbally
altered in consequence. This amendment came into force w.e.f. E
16.11.1985.

When the last of the above developments took place, the Central
Government considered it necessary to extend the 1985 Act to the
territory of Chandigarh. In order to effectuate this object, it issued a
notification dated 15.12.86 purportedly in exercise of its powers under F
section 87 of the Reorganisation Act. By this notification the Central
Government extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh the pro-
visions of the 1985 Act as in force in the State of Pun jab at the date of
the notification (i.e. to say as on 15.12.1986) and subject to the modifi ·
cations mentioned therein. The resultant position is that while the
provisions of the principal Act had been brought into force in the G
Union Territory of Chandigarh w.e.f. 4.11.72 by an Act of Parliament,
the provisions of the 1985 Act have been extended to the territory of
Chandigarh by means of a notification of the Central Government
issued under s. 87. The short question posed before us is whether the
latter "extension'' is pem1issible and valid in law.
H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

Ex facie, the impugned notification appears to be intra vires s. ¥-
A
87. The 1985 Act is an enactment in force in a State on the date of the
notification and s. 87 clearly permits the Central Government to
extend it to Chandigarh. If the petitioners/appellants seek to challenge
its validity, they have either to contend that s. 87 itself is ultra vires the
Constitution or that, though s. 87 is a valid provision, on a proper
B construction thereof, the notification travels beyond the area of exten-
sion permitted tinder it and is hence invalid. Both these contentions '>.-
have been urged before us. Sri Gujral had so.much confidence in the
latter ·argument that he had made it his principal argument, taking up
the former as a plea in the alternative. But young Sri Swamp boldly
·--- ..
concentrated on attacking the validity of s. 87 while also lending sup-
port to Sri Gujral's principal argument as an argument in the alterna-
c tive. We shall proceed to examine these two contentions.
"'--
The argument contesting the validity of s. 87 proceeds on the
following lines. The main premise of the argument is that, under
Article 246( 4) of the Constitution, Parliament has exclusive power to
D make laws on matters enumerated in the State List and Concurrent
List (i.e. List II and List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitu-
tion) in respect of a Union Territory except where (as in the case, say,
of Pondicherry) the territory has a legislative assembly, in which event
the power will vest in such assembly under s. 18 of the Government of ~
Union Territories Act (18 of 1963). There being no legislative assem-
E bly set up for Chandigarh, Parliament and Parliament alone has any
legislative power with regard to that territory. This power, however,
plenary and .extensive, cannot be self effacing. In purported exercise of
such power, Parliament cannot delegate its legislative function in
favour of an executive authority to such an extent as to amount to an
-
"abdication" of such legislative function. The argument is that this is ~
F exactly what has been done under s. 87. By enacting s. 87, Parliament,
instead of legislating for the Union Territory, has left it to the Central ~
Government to decide for all time to come what should be the laws in
force in that territory. This, it is said, is clear from. the extraordinary
ambit of the powers conferred by s. 87 on the Central Government in
three important directions:
0 ~
(i) S. 87 is not transitional in nature but confers an all time
power on the executive. This will be clear if one contrasts it withs. 89.
Section 89 gives a limited power to the Central Government to adapt
existing laws within a period of two years. Though, as will be noticed
later, s. 89 is wider in certain respects, it is clearly a transitory provi-
H sion -intended to enable the Central Government to tide over the
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.J 645

- 'y difficulties caused by the sudden creation of a new territory and the •A
immediate need for having laws applicable therto. The transitoriness is
indeed emphasised by the concluding words of s. 89, (which are really
superfluous) that the adaptation will hold the field only until they are
altered, repealed or a.mended by a competent legislature or authority.
But s. 87 empowers tine Central Government to extend any legislation
to Chandigarh at any time: even today, twenty three years after the B
~

- -· passing of Reorganisation Act.

(ii) The second feature of s. 87 is this. Under it, the Central
Government could extend to the Union Territory any law in force in
any part of India. For instance, it could be the Rent Control Act in
force in Punjab or the Rent Control Act in operation in a distant State
like the State of Tamil Nadu. It could perhaps extend to the Union c
--Y" Territory some provisions of the rent control legislation in one State
side by side with certain other provisions of legislations in force in any ..,
other State or States and thus enforce a law which would be an
"amalgam" of various statutory provisions in force in various parts of
the country. Though a concession against this possibility was made in D
Delhi Laws Act case (1951 SCR 747 at p. 1005), it would seem to be
possible if such provisions are contained in independent enactments.
Here, for e.g. the 1949 Act and the 1985 Act, both of Punjab, have
been made applicable to Chandigarh. But suppose, after the provi-
't sions of the 1949 Act had been made applicable to Chandigarh by the
1974 Act, an amendment Act of the nature presently in question had E
been introduced not in the Punjab but, say, in Kerala, there is nothing
- in the language of s. 87 to prohibit the Central Government from
extending the Kerala Amendment Act to Chandigarh to stand side by
side with the 1974 Act. In other words, the section confers on the
executive government a wide· power of choice, for application to
~- Chandigarh, of not only one legislative enactment on any subject from F
,_.. among various enactments on that subject in operation in various parts
of the country but also of groups of provisions from one or more of
them. There is no legislative guidance as to the manner in which these
choices should be exercised by the executive government.

(iii) The laws that can be extended to the Union Territory under G
I
--f s. 87 would include not only the laws in force in any State in India on
the date of the Reorganisation Act (i.e. 1.11.66) but any Act that may
come into force in those States upto the date of the notification. If it
had been restricted to laws in force as on the day the Reorganisation
Act came into force, one could at least say that Parliament could be
attributed with a knowledge of the various provisions in existence in H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A the various states, and to have decided, as a matter of policy that )'-'·
anyone of them could be good enough for Chandigarh and hence left it
to the executive government to choose and extend any one of them for
application to the territory. But section 87 goes further and enables
extension, by Government notification, even of any legislation which
might come into force in any part of India at any time between 1966
a and the date of the notification. Parliament, while enacting the )..._.
Reorganisation Act, could certainly have had no knowledge or even
inkling of possible laws that might be enacted in future in any part of ~ t
the country on any subject. The effect, therefore, of s. 87 would be
that the entire legislation for the Union Territory, in respect of any
particular subject, would entirely depend upon the fancy of the Cen-
...
C tral Government without any sort of legislative or parliamentary appli-
cation of mind, except the fact that some legislature in some part of the
country has considered the law good enough for the conditions prevail- ~
ing in that territory. Learned counsel contends that these facets of
section 87 clearly render it an instance of excessive delegation by Parli-
ament to executive amounting, in effect, to the total abdication by
D Parliament of its legislative powers in regard to Chandigarh.

The prob.lem posed before us is, what Chinnappa Reddy, J. in
Registrar of Cooperative Societies v. Kunhambu, [1980] 2 SCR 260
described as, the "perennial, nagging problem of delegated legislation
and the so called Henry VIII clause". This is an issue on which there is
E an abundance of authority, of even larger Benches of this Court. The
judgments in R. v. Burah, [1878] 5 I.A. 178; Jatindra Nath Gupta,
· [1949] FCR 595; the Delhi Laws Act case, [1951] SCR 747; Hari
Shankar Bag/a, [1955] 1 SCR 380; Rajnarain Singh, [1955] 1SCR290;
Sardar Inder Singh, [1957] SCR 605; Banarsi Das, [1959] 1 SCR 427;
Edward Mills, [1959] 1 SCR 735; Western India Theatres, [1959] Supp 2
F SCR 71; Hamdard Dawakhana, [1960] 2 SCR 671; Vasantla/
Maghanbhai, (1961] 1 SCR 341; Jyoti Prashad, (1962] 2 SCR 125; t"
Shama Rao, [1962] 2 SCR 650; Mohammad Hussain Gu/am Moham-
mad, (1962] 2 SCR 659; Liberty Cinema, (1965] 2 SCR 477; Devi Dass,
[1967] 3 SCR 557; Bir/a Cotton, (1968] 3 SCR 251; Sitaram Bishambar
Dayal, (1972] 2 SCR 141; Hira/al Ratanlal, [1973] 2 SCR 502; Gwalior
G Rayon, [1974] 2 SCR 879; Papiah, [1975]-3 SCR 607 and Kunhambu,
[1980] 2 SCR 260 and Brij Sunder Kapoor, [1989] 1 SCC 561 can be
referred to for a detailed discussion and application of the relevant
principles in the context of various kinds of legislative provisions. It is
unnecessary, for our present purposes, to undertake a detailed exami-
nation of the several opinions expressed in these cases. Suffice it to say
H that these decisions have been interpreted as holding that the power of
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.) 647

-¥ Parliament to entrust legislative powers to some other body or autho- A
rity is not unbridled and absolute. It must lay down essential legislative
policy and indicate the guidelines to be kept in view by that authority
in exercising the. delegated powers. In delegating such powers, Parlia-
ment cannot "abdicate" its legislative functions in favour of such
authority. ·
B
----( Doubts have been expressed in some quarters as to the correct-
_,._-. ness of the principle indicated above. It has been suggested that, had
the question been res integra or even if one carefully analysed the
observations made in these various cases, there is much to be said for a
different view advocated by the Privy Council in R. v. Burah, [1878] 5
I.A. 178 and adhered to by it ever since. This view is that, given the
\..,- present system of Parliamentary democracy, the extensive range of c
-I governmental functions today and the kind and quantity of legislation
which modern public opinion requires, the legislatures under the Con-
stitution should be held to be supreme and unrestricted in the matter
of legislation and should not be prohibited from delegating some of
their powers of legislation to such other agencies, bodies or authorities D
as they may choose, so Jong as they do not altogether divest themselves
of their legislative power and confer them on another and so long as
they retain the power, whenever it pleases them, to remove the agency
)( they have created and set up another or take the matter directly into
their own hands. The reasons put forward in support of this line of
thought are these: E

(1) The whole doctrine of excessive delegation is based
either on the doctrine of separation of powers or on the doctrine
of the law of agency: "delegata potestas non potest delegari",
neither of which can validly apply to the constitutional context
we are concerned with. F

(2) The Privy Council, ever since its leading decision in R.
v. Burah, [1878] 5 I.A. 178, has taken this view consistently. This
is also the view to which American and Australian courts have
veered round in recent years.
G
(3) The doctrine enunciated in the above cases is so
difficult of practical application and has resulted in such a large
number of separate judgments that litigants are encouraged to
raise the plea in respect of every conceivable piece of delegation
banking on an off chance of being ultimately successful.
H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

(4) The magnitude of the controversies raised on this issue '¥-
A
is so great that legislations, if invalidated on this g~ound, have to
be invariably validated with retrospective effect. The result is
that, on the one hand, the implementation of important legisla-
tions is held up due to interim ordf:rs for the long period of
pendency of the litigation and even the final determination, on
B the other, achieves no practical result. In short, the considera-
tion of such issues is practically a waste of judicial time.

5. The doctrine is based on the theory that it is the legisla-
ture and not the executive that has to apply its mind to the basis
of all legislation. Judicial dicta are not wanting which emphasise
that this is a theory wholly unrelated to the practical realities of
c the modern functioning of a cabinet. system of Government.

6. An examination of the cases decided on this principle
show that it is very difficult to define the scope of "essential
legislative function" which cannot be delegated. In the ultimate
D analysis, only lip service is paid to the doctrine of legislative
policy and guidance and courts are inclined to grab at the
weakest of straws as a policy or guideline with which to bale out
an impugned piece of legislation rather than invalidate it.

(7) There have been. cases where the delegation of the tax-
E ing powers has been upheld by drawing on non-existent distinc-
tions such as, for example, one between the delegation of a
power to fix the rates of the taxes to be charged on different
classes of goods and the power to fix rates of taxes simpliciter.

(8) There is clear inconsistency between Shama Rao, ,>-.
F [1962] 2 SCR 650 and the decision in the Delhi Laws Act, case
upholding the delegation to the executive of the power to extend l/'
not only present but also future laws to a particular territory.
Shama Rao does not answer the question posed before it that the
validity of such legislation follows on the answer given by Delhi
Laws to categories (3) and (4) of Bose J.'s summary of its deci-
G sion in Rajnarain. ·"""'

(9) The Indian Statute book contains any number of legis-
lations, on tax matters as well as others, conferring a wide range
of delegation of powers and a search for guidelines or policy
underlying them may well prove an unending quest.
H
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATIIAN, J.] 649

( 10) Judicial dicta abound where it has been pointed out A
that, so long as the legislature has preserved its capacity in tact
and retained control over its delegate, so as to be able, at any
time, to repeal the legislation and withdraw the au)hority and
discretion it had vested in the delegate, it cannot be said to have
abdicated its legislative functions.
B
Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Kunhambu, [1980] 2 SCR 260, did not
wish to be drawn into the pros and cons of the above line of reasoning.
His Lordship observed that the clear trend of a large number of the
decisions of this Court was in favour of the "policy" and "guidelines"
theory and he was content to adopt the same for the purposes of the
case before the Court. This theory, which is capable of being for-
mulated in broad terms, though difficult of practical application to
c
individual cases as and when they arise, can be set out best in the
words of Reddy, J. in the above case:

"It is trite to say that the function of the State has long·since
ceased to be confined to the preservation of the public D
peace, the exaction of taxes and the defence of its frontiers.
It is now the function of the State to secure to its citizens
'social, economic and political justice', to preserve 'liberty
of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship', and to
ensure 'equality of status and of opportunity' and 'the
dignity of the individual' and the 'unity of the nation'. That E

- is what the. Preamble to our Constitution says and that is
what is elaborated in the two vital chapters of the Constitu-
tion on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of
State Policy. The desire to attain these objectives has
necessarily resulted in intense legislative activity touching
every aspect of the life of the citizen and the nation. Execu- F

• tive activity in the field of delegated or subordinate legisla-
tion has increased in direct, geometric progression. It has
to be and it is as it should be. The Parliament and the State
Legislatures are not bodies of experts or specialists. They
are skilled in the art of discovering the aspirations, the
expectations and the needs, the limits to the patience and G
the acquiescence and the articulation of the views of the
people whom they represent. They function best when they
concern themselves with general principles, broad objec-
tives and fundamental issues instead of technical and situa-
tional intricacres which are better left to better equipped
full time expert executive bodies and specialist public H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A servants. Parliament and the State Legislatures have
neither the time nor the expertise to be involved in detail
and circumstance. Nor can Parliament and the State Legis-
latures visualise and provide for new strange, unforeseen
and unpredictable situations arising from the complexity of
modern life and the ingenuity of modern man. That is the
B raison d'etre for delegated legislation. That is what makes
delegated legislation inevitable and indispensable. The
Indian Parliament and the State Legislatures are endowed
with plenary power to legislate upon any of the subjects

c
entrusted to them by the Constitution, subject to the limi-
tations imposed by the Constitution itself. The power to
legislate carries with it the power to delegate. But excessive
-
delegation may amount to abdication. Delegation unlimi-
ted may invite despotism uninhibited. So the theory has
been evolved that the legislature cannot delegate its essen-
tial legislative function. Legislate it must by laying down
policy and principle and delegate it may to fill in detail and
D carry out policy. The legislature may guide the delegate by
speaking through the express provision empowering dele-
gation or the other provisions of the statute, the preamble,
the scheme or even the very subject matter of the statute. If
guidance there is, wherever it may be found, the delegation
is valid. A good deal of latitude has been held to be permis-
E sible in the case of taxing statutes and on the same principle
a generous degree of latitude must be permissible in the
case of welfare legislation, particularly tho.se statutes which
are designed to further the Directive Principles of State
Policy."
-
F The same view was taken by Khanna J. in Gwalior Rayon, [1974]
2.SCR 879 when; after reviewing the entire literature on the subject, •
he observed:

"It would appear from the above that the view taken by
this Court in a long chain of authorities is that the legisla-
ture in conferring power upon another authority to make ),.
subordinate or ancillary legislation must lay down policy,
principle, or standard for the guidance of the authority
concerned. The said view has been affirmed by Benches of
this Court consisting of seven Judges. Nothing cogent, in
our opinion, has been brought to our notice as may justify
H departure from the said view. The binding effect of that
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANAlHAN, J.I 651

view cannot be watered down by the opinion of a writer, A
however eminent he may be, nor by observations in foreign
judgments made in the context of the statutes with which
they were dealing." ·

If this be the consistent view of this court on this thorny issue, Sri
1
Manoj Swamp says, section 87 clearly offends the principle so enun- B
ciated, particularly, when one considers the extremely broad sweep of
its language. In empowering the executive to extend laws to Chandi-
garh to the contents of which Parliament has not applied its mind and
further in allowing the executive to exercise a choice among several
such existing and future laws, Parliament has in fact abdicated its
essential legislative functions in relation to the Union Territory in C
favour of the Central Government and given the go-by to the elaborate
procedures and safeguards enacted in the Constitution in regard to the
process of legislation by Parliament or a State Legislature. There
would have been considerable force in this contention had it not been
for the decision in the Delhi Laws Act case 195lSCR 747. As has been
pointed out earlier, that decision clearly upheld the validity of s. 7 of D
Act I, section 2 of Act II and the first part of s. 2 of Act III which did,
in relation to Delhi, Ajmer-Marwara and Part C States, exactly that
which has been done bys. 87 in relation to Chandigarh despite the fact
that some of the judges struck a different line from R. v. Burah, (1878]
5 IA 178, refused to accept the theory of absolute freedom for Parlia-
ment to delegate its powers and enunciated the "policy-guideline" E
theory which has been taken up in subsequent decisions of this Court.
It is said that there are some difficulties in straightaway treating Delhi
Laws Act, (1951] SCR 747 as conclusive of the issue before us. In the
first place, that was a decision which reflected the advisory opinion of
this Court in a reference made by the President under Art. 143( 1) of
the Constitution which, technically speaking, is not a binding prece- F
dent. Secondly, although five of the seven learned Judges upheld the
validity of the provisions referred to above, it is difficult to clearly
formulate the principle which emerges therefrom, for, as Patanjali
Sastri C.J. observed in Kewal Raning Rawatv. State, (1952) SCR 435:·

"While undoubtedly certain definite conclusions were G
reached by the majority of the judges who took part in the
decision in regard to the constitutionality of certain
specified enactments, the reasoning in each case was diffe-
rent and it is difficult to say that any particular principle has
been laid down by the majority which can be of assistence
in the determination of other cases". H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A Thirdly, Shama Rao, [1967] 2 SC 650 is said to be a binding decision of
a Constitution Bench of this Court to the contrary and that has to be
followed by us. ·

Since the Delhi Laws Act case, [1951] SCR 747 was concerned
with provisions identical in language to the one before us, it is only
B proper and appropriate for us to refer to the reasoning of the judges in
the Delhi Laws Act case in regard to the provisions the validity of
which was upheld:

A. Kania CJ. held that all the provisions under consideration
were ultra vires to the extent they permitted the extension of Acts
C other than those of the Central Legislature to the areas in question.
·His view was that the essentials of a legislative function are the
determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of
conduct and these essentials are the characteristics of a legislature
itself. These essentials are preserved when the legislature specifies the
basic conclusions 'of fact upon the ascertainment of which from rele-
D vant data by a designated administrative agency it ordains that its
statutory command is to be effective. The legislature having thus made
its laws, every detail for working it out and for carrying the enactment
into operation and effect may be done by the legislature or may be left
to another subordinate agency or to some executive officer. His Lord-
ship was further of the opinion that, if full powers to do everything that
E the legislature can do are conferred on a subordinate authority,
although the legislature retains the power to control the action of the
subordinate authority by recalling such power or repealing the Acts
passed by the subordinate authority, there is an abdication or efface-
ment of the legislature conferring such power. Even such partial
"abdication or effacement" is not permissible. The provisions
F impugned were, therefore, invalid.

B. The salient point in the opinion of Fazal Ali J. are these: •
1. Even American Courts, which are fiercely opposed to un-
canalised delegation of legislative power to the executive, have been
G compelled, by practical considerations, to engraft numerous excep- ~
tions to the rule and, in laying down such exceptions, have offered
various explanations, one of which is this:

"The true distinction ..... is this. The legislature cannot
delegate the power to make a law; but it can make a law to
H delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things
RAMESH BIRCH 11. U.O.I. (RANGANATIIAN, J.) 653

upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own A
action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
Government. " ·
(P. 814)

2. The true import of the rule against delegation is this:
B
"This rule in a broad sense involves the principle underly-
ing the maxim, delegatus non potest delegare, but it is apt
to be misunderstood and has been misunderstood. In my
judgment, all that it means is that the legislature cannot
abdicate its legislative functions and it cannot efface itself
and set up a parallel legislature to discharge the primary C
duty with which it has been entrusted. This rule has been
recognised both in America and in England ...... "

xxx xxx xxx xxx

"What constitutes abdication and what class of cases will be D
covered by that expression will always be a question of fact ,
and it is by no means easy -to lay down any comprehensive
formula to define it, but it should be recognised that the
rule against abdication does not prohibit the Legisiature
from employing any subordinate agency of its own choice
for doing such subsidiary acts as may be necessary to make E
its legislation effective, useful and complete".
(P. 819)

3. The conclusions are set but thus:

" (1) The legislature must normally discharge its primary F
legislative function itself and not ·through others.

(2) Once it is established that it has sovereign powers
within a certain sphere, it must follow as a corollary that it
is free to legislate within that sphere in any way which
appears to it to be the best way to give effect to its intention G
and policy in making a particular law, and that it may
utilize any outside agency to any extent it finds necessary
for doing things which it is unable to do itself or finds it
inconvenient to do. In other words, it can do everything
which is ancillary to and necessary for the full and effective
exercise of its power of legislation . H
:· 654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989} 2 S.C.R.

A (3) It cannot abdicate its legislative functions, and there-
fore while entrusting power to an outside agency , it must ·
see that _such agency acts as a subordinate authority and
does not become a parallel legislature.

(4) The doctrine of .separation of powers and the judicial
B interpretation it has received in America ever since the
American Constitution was framed, enables the American
courts to check undue and excessive delegation but the
courts of this country are not committed to that doctrine
and cannot apply it in the same way as it has been applied
in America. Therd()re,-there are only two main checks in
this country on the power of the legislature to delegate,
c these being its good sense and the principle that it should
not cross the line beyond which delegation amounts to
"abdication and self-effacement".
(P. 830-1)

D 4. The learned Judge recognised that the impugned provisions,
at first sight, did appear to be very wide-they were of the same
sweeping nature ass. 87 here-and observed.

"Let us overlook for the time being the power to introduce
modifications with which I shall deal later, and carefully
E consider the main provision in the three Acts. The situation
with which the respective legislatures were faced when
these Acts were passed, was that .there were certain State
or States, with no local legislature and a whole bundle of
Jaws had to be enacted for them. It is clear that the legisla-
tures concerned before passing the Acts, applied their
F mind and decided firstly, that the situation would be met by
the adoption of laws applicable to the other provinces
inasmuch as they covered a wide range of subjects
approached from a variety of points of view and hence the
requirements of the State or States for which the laws had
to be framed could not go beyond those for which laws had
G already been framed by the various legislatures, and
secondly, that the matt~r should be entrusted to an autho~ ·
rity w.hich was expected .to be familiar and could easily
make itself familiar with the needs and conditions of the
State or States for which the laws were to be made. Thus,
everyone of the Acts so enacted was a complete law,
H because it embodied a golicy, _defined a standa~d; and
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.O.L (RANGANATHAN, J.] 655

directed the .. authority chosen to act within certain pres-
A
cribed limits and not to go beyond them. Each Act was a
complete expression of the will of the legislature to act in a
particular way and of its command as to how its will should
be carried out. The legislature decided that in the circum-
stances of the case that was the best way to legislate on the
subject and it so legislated. It will be a misnomer to B
describe such legislation as amounting to abdication of
• • powers) because from the very nature of the legislation it is
manifest that the legislature had the power at any. moment
of withdrawing or altering any power with which the
authority chosen was entrusted, and could change or repeal
the laws which the authority was required to make appli-
cable to the State or States concerned. What is even more c
important is that in each cas,e the agency selected was not
empowered to enact laws; but it could only adapt and
extend laws enacted by responsible and competent legisla-
tures. Thus, the power given to the Governments in those
Acts was more in the nature of ministerial than in the D
nature of legislative power. The power given was minis-
terial, because all that the Government had to do was to
study the laws and make selections out of them."
(pp. 838-9)

He proceeded to point out that such legislation was neither unwar- E
ranted nor unprecedented.

5: Following the line of reasoning in Sprigg v. Sigoau, [1897]
A. C. 233 the learned Judge held that what the Central Government
;
''7.'> '\ had been empowered to do under the impugned legislations was not to
enact "new laws" but only "to tran_splant" to the territory concerned F
laws operating in other 1wrts in the country. As to the absence of a
clause-such as the one in 'the enactment considered in Sprigg and the
latter part of s. 89 that any extensions made shall be subject to repeal,
alteration or variation by Parliament, the learned Judge observed,

"This provision however does not affect the principle. It G
was made only as a matter of caution and to ensure the
superintendence of Parliament, for the laws were good
Jaws until they were repealed, altered or varied by Parlia-
ment. If the Privy Council have correctly stated the princi-
ple that the legislature in enacting subordinate or condi-
tional legislation does-not part with its perfect control and H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A has the power at any moment of withdrawing or altering
the power entrusted to another authority, its power of
superintendence must be taken to be implicit in all such
legislation. Reference may also be made here to somewhat
unusual case of Dorr v. United States, [1904 I 195 US 138,
where delegation by Congress of the power to legililate for
B the Phillipine Islands was held valid."
(p. 843) '.>---
6. Indian legislation, past and present, contains numerous
".
(

instances of enactments whereunder power was conferred on a local
Government to extend to the local territory laws in force in other parts
...
of the country as on the date of such extension. The learned Judge
c observed:

"It is hard to say that any firm legislative practice had been
established before the Delhi Laws Act and other Acts we
are concerned with were enacted, but one may presume
D that the legislat)H'e had made several experiments before
the passing of these Acts and found that they had worked
well and achieved the object for which they were inten-
ded.]' (p. 846)

·1. The learned Judge concluded with a few general observations
E on the subject of "delegated legislation" in its popular sense. He
observed:

"The legislature has now to make so many laws that it has
.
no time to devote to all the legislative details, and some-
times the subject on which it has to legislate is of such a
F technical nature and all it can do is to state the broad
principles and leave the details to be worked out by those
who are more familiar with the subject. Again, when comp-
lex schemes of reform are to be the subject of legislation, it
is difficult to bring out a self contained and complete Act
straightaway, since it is not possible to foresee all the con-
G tingencies and envisage all the local requirements for which
provision is to be made. Thus, some degree of flexibility
becomes necessary, so as to permit constant adaptation to
unknown future conditions without the necessity of having
to amend the law again and again. The advantage of such a
course is that it enables the delegate authority to consult
H interests likely to be affected by a particular law, make
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. (RANGANA1HAN, J.) 657

actual experiments when necessary, and utilize the results
of its investigations and experiments in the best way possi- A
ble. There may also arise emergencies and urgent situa-
tions requiring prompt action and the entrustment of large
powers to authorities who have to deal with the various
situations as they arise.
B
xxx xxx xxx xxx

It is obvios that to achieve the objects which were intended
to be achieved by these Acts, they could not have been
framed in any other way than that in which they were
framed". (p. 851-2)
c
C. Patanjali Sastri, J. upheld the validity of all the impugned
provisions. His Lordship held that it is as competent for the Indian
Legislature to make a law delegating legislative power, both quantita-
tively and qualitatively, as 'it is for Parliament to do so provided, of
course, it acts Within the circumscribed limits. The learned judge, D
however, drew a distinction between delegation of legislative authority
and the creation of a new legislative power. He observed:

In the former the delegating body does not efface itself but
retains its legislative power intact and merely elects to exer-
cise such power through an agency· or instrumentality of its E
choice. In the latter there Is no delegation of power to
subordinate units but a grant of power to an independent
and co-ordinate body to make laws operating.of their own
force. In the first case, according to English constitutional
law, no express provision authorising delegation is re-
quired. In the absence of a constitutional inhibition, dele- F
gation of legislative power, however extensive, could be
made so long as the delegating body retains its own legisla-
tive power- intact. In the second case, a positive enabling
provision in the constitutional document Is required.

D. Mahajan J. shared the view of Kania CJ that all the impugned G
-{ provisions were ultra vires. His Lordship considered it a settled maxim
of constitutional law that a legislative body cannot delegate its power.
The legislature cannot substitute the judgment, wisdom and patriotism
of any other body for those to which alone.the people have seen fit to
confide this sovereign trust. Unless the power io delegate is expressly
. given by the Constitution-and it has not bee.il-a legislature cannot H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A abdicate its functions and delegate essential legislative functions to any ~
other body. There is such abdication when in respect of a subject in the
legislative list that body says in effect that it will not legislate but would
leave it to another to legislate on it.

B
E. To turn next to the views of Mukharjea J. the learned Judge
considered the following aspects: · f
1. The learned Judge did not accept the principle that an un- -, ~.
limited right of delegation is inherent in the legislative power itself. He '
observed:

"This is not warranted by the provisions of the Constitution
c and the legitimacy of delegation depends entirely upon its
being used as an ancillary measure which the legislature ~
considers to be necessary for the purpose of exercising its
legislative powers effectively and completely. The legisla- .
ture must retain in its own hands the essential legislative
D functions which consist in declaring the legislative policy
and laying down the standard which is to be enacted into a
rule of law, and what can be delegated is the task of subor-
dinate legislation which by its very nature is ancillary to the
statute which delegates the power to make it. Provided the ~
legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a
E standard laid down the courts cannot and should not in-
terfere with the discretion that undoubtedly rests with the
legislature itself in determining the extent of delegation
necessary in a particular case. These, in my opinion, are the
limits within which delegated legislation is constitutional
provided of course, the legislature is competent to deal )
F with and legislate on the particular subject matter".
(P. 997) ~

2. Dealing with the question whether the statutory provisions
under consideration envisaged an unwarrantable delegation of legisla-
tive powers to the executive government, the learned Judges said:
G
"If the competent legislature has framed a statute and left
it to an outside authority to extend the operation of the
whole or any part of it, by notification, to any particular
area, it would certainly be an instance of conditional legis-
lation as discussed above and no question of delegation
H would really arise. The position would not be materially
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.O.J. [RANGANATHAN, J.] 659

different, if instead of framing a statute, the legislature had A
specified one or more ei<isting statutes or annexed them by
way of a schedule to the Act and had given authority to a
subordinate or administrative agency to enforce the opera-
tion of any one of them at any time it liked to a particular
area. It could still be said, in my opinion, that in such
circumstances the proper legislature had exercised its judg- B
ment already and the subordinate agency was merely to
determine the condition upon which the provisions already
made could become operative in any particular locality".
(P. 999-1000)

3. Adverting to the wide power in the impugned provision to
extend future laws as welland that too with the modifications and
c
)(-· restrictions, he observed:

"The question is whether these facts indicate a surrender of
the essential powers of legislation by the legislature. The
point does not seem to be altogether free from difficulty, D
but on careful consideration I am inclined to answer this
question in the negative. As I have already said, the essen-
tial legislative power consists in formulating the legislative
policy and enacting it into a binding rule of law. With the
merits of the legislative policy, t.he court of law has no
concern. It is enough if it is defined with sufficient precision E
and definiteness so as to furnish sufficient guidance to the
executive officer who has got to work it out. If there is n!J
vagueness or indefiniteness in the formulation of the pol-
icy, I do not think that a court of law has got any say in the
matter. The policy behind the Delhi Laws Act seems to be
~-. that in a small area like Delhi which was constituted a F
separate province only recently and which had neither any
local legislature of its own nor was considered to be of
sufficient size or importance to have one in the near future,
it seemed to the legislature to be quite fit and proper that
the laws validly passed and in force in other parts of India
should be applied to such area, subject to such restrictions G
and modification as might be necessary to make the law
suitable to the local conditions. The legislative body
thought fit that the power of making selection from the
existing statutes as to the suitability of any one of them for
being applied to the province of Delhi, should rest with the
Governor General in Council which was considered to be H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

the most competent authority to judge the necessities and
A
requirements of the Province. That this was the policy is
apparent from several other legislative enactments which
were passed prior to 1912 and which would show that with
regard to areas which were backward or newly acquired or
extremely small in size and in which it was not considered
B proper to introduce the regular legislative machinery all at
once, this was the practice adopted by the legislature at
that time." )
(P. 1000-1)

4. one more passage from the opinion of the learned Judge may
be set out In regard to two aspects of the impugned provision that were
c touched upon before us. The learned Judge said:

"Of course the delegate cannot be allowed to change the
policy declared by the legislature and it cannot be given the
power to repeal or abrogate any statute. This leads us to
D the question as to what is implied in the language of section
7 of the Delhi Laws Act which empowers the Central
Government to extend any statute in force in any other part
of British India to the Province of Delhi with such 'modifi-
cations and restrictions' as it thinks fit. The word "restric-
tion" does not present much difficulty. It connotes lilnita-
E tion ilnposed upon a particular provision so as to restrain
Its application or limit its scope. It does not by any means
involve any change in the principle. It seems to me that in
I the context, and used along with the word "restriction",
the word "modification" has been employed also in a
cognate sense and it does not involve any material or sub-
F stantial alteration. The dictionary meaning of the expres-
sion ''to modify" is to "tone down" or "to soften the
rigidity of the thing" or "to make partial changes without
any radical alteration." It would be quite reasonable to
hold that the word "modification" in section 7 of the Delhi
Laws Act means and signifies changes of such character as
G are necessary to make the statute which is sought to be
extended suitable to the local conditions of the province. I
do not think that the executive government is entitled to
change the whole nature or policy underlying any particular
Act or take different portions from different statutes and
prepare what has been described before us as "amalgam"
H of several laws. The Attorney Gcfieral has very fairly
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.l 661

admitted before us that these things would be beyond the
A
scope of the section itself and if such changes are made,
they would be invalid as contravening the provision of sec-
tion 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, though that is no reason for
holding section 7 itself to be invalid on that ground."
' (P. 1004-5)
B
5. Mukharjee J. however joined with Kania CJ., Mahajan J. and
Bose J. in upsetting the validity of the second part of s. 2 of Act Ill.
Since this part of the judgment has been relied on by the learned
counsel for the petitioners, it may also be referred to here. On this
aspect, the learned Judge observed:

"It will be noticed that the powers conferred by this section
c
upon the Central Government are far in excess of those
conferred by the other two legislative provisions, at least in
accordance with the interpretation which I have attempted
to put.upon them. As has been stated already, it is quite an
intelligible policy that so long as a proper legislative D
machinery is not set up in a particular area, the Parliament
might empower an executive authority to introduce laws
validly passed by a competent legislature and actually in
force in other parts of the country to such area, with such
modifications and restrictions as the authority thinks
proper, the modifications being limited to local adjust- E
ments or changes of a minor character. But this pre-
supposes that there is no existing law on that particular
subject actually in force in that territory. If any such law
exists and power is given to repeal or abrogate such laws
either in whole in part and substitute in place of the same
· other laws which are in force in other areas, it would cer- F
tainly amount to an unwarrantable delegation of legislative
powers. To repeal or abrogate an existing law is the exer-
cise of an essential legislative power, and the policy behind
such acts must be the policy of the legislature itself. If the
legislature invests the executive with the power to deter-
mine as to which of the laws in force in a particular·territory G
are useful or proper and if it is given to that authority to
replace any of them by laws brought from other provinces
with such modification as it thinks proper, that would be to
invest the executive with the determination of the entire
legislative policy and not merely of carrying out a policy
which the legislature has already laid down. Thus the H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

power of extension, which is contemplated by section 2 of
,A
Part C States (Laws) Act, includes the power of introduc-
ing laws which may be in actual conflict with the laws
validly established and already in operation in that terri-
tory. This shows how the practice, which was adopted dur-
ing the early °British period as an expedient and possibly
B harmless measure with the object of providing laws for a
newly acquired territory or backward area till it grew up
into a full fledged administrative and political unit, is being
resorted to in later times for no other purpose than that of
vesting almost unrestricted legislative powers with regard
to certain areas in the executive government. The execu-
tive government is given the authority to alter, repeal or
c amend any laws in existence at that area under the guise of
bringing in laws there which are valid in other parts of
India. This, in my opinion, is an unwarrantable delegation
of legislative duties and cannot be permitted. The last por-
tion of section 2 of Part C States (Laws) Act is, therefore,
D ultra vires the power of the Parliament as being a delega-
tion of essential legislative powers in favour of a body not
competent to exercise it and to that extent the legislation
must be held to be void. This portion is however severable;
and so the entire section need not be declared invalid."
(P. 1008-1010)
E
F. Das J., who upheld the validity of section 7 of Act I, section 2
of Act II and both parts of section 2 of Act Ill, rested his conclusions
on the following reasoning:

(i) After expressing the opinion that the principle of non delega-
F bility of legislative powers founded either on the doctrine of separation
of powers or on the theory of agency had no application to the British
Parliament or the legislatures constituted by an Act of the British
Parliament and that, in the ever present complexity of conditions with
which Governments have to deal, a power of delegation is necessary
and ancillary to the exercise of legislative power and is a component
G part of it, the learned Judge observed:

"The only rational limitation upon the exercise of this
absolute power of delegation by the Indian Legislature as
by any Dominion Legislature is what has been laid down in
the several Privy Council and other cases from which rele-
H vant passages have been quoted above. It is that the legisla-
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.J 663

ture must not efface itself or abdicate all its powers and
A
give up its ~ontrol over the subordinate authority to whom
it delegates its law making powers. It must not, without
preserving its own capacity intact, create and arm with its
own capacity a new legislative power not created or
authorised by the instrument by which the legislature itself
was constituted. In short, it must not destroy its own B
legislative power. There is an antithesis between the
abdication of legislative power and the exercise of the
power of legislation. The former excludes or destroys the
latter. There is no such antithesis between the delegation of
legislative power and the exercise of the legislative power,
for however wide the delegation may be, there is nothing to
prevent the legislature, if it is so minded, from, at any time,c
withdrawing the matter into its own hands and exercising
its law-making powers. The delegation of legislative power
involves an exercise of the legislative power. It does not
exclude or destroy the legislative power itself, for the
legislative power is not diminished by the exercise of it. A D
power to make law with respect to a subject must, as we
have seen, include within its content, the power to make a
law delegating that power. Having regard to entry No. 97 in
y the Union List and article 248 of our Constitution, the
residuary power of our Parliament is wide enough to in-

-
clude delegation of legislative power of a subject-matter E
with respect to which Parliament may make a law. Apart
from that considertion, if a statute laying down a policy and
delegating power to a subordinate authority to make rules
and regulations to carry out that policy is permissible then I
do not see why an Act merely delegating legislative power
to another person or body should be unconstitutional if the F
legislature does not efface itself or abandon its control over
the subordinate authority. If the legislature can make a law
laying down a bare principle or policy and commanding
people to obey the rules and regulations, made by a subor-
dinate authority, why cannot the legislature, without effac-
ing itself but keeping its own capacity intact, leave the en- G
tire matter to a subordinate authority and command people
to obey the commands of that subordinate authority? The
substance of the thing is the command which is binding and
the efficacy of the rules of conduct made by the subordi-
nate authority is due to no other authority than the com-
mand of the legislature itself. Therefore, short of self: H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A effacement, the legislative power may be as freely and ~ -
widely delegated as the Dominion Legislature, like the
"'!"-
British Parliament, may think fit and choose.

xxx xxx xxx

B f.-..
1
Ibn mhy opidn.ionL,th~ true tests off the va lidity o ~ a law enacted
y 1 e 1n ian eg1s1a1ure con ernng 1eg1s1a 1ve power on a
subordinate authority are : (i) Is the law within the legisla- )" •
live competency fixed by the instrument creating the legis-
lature? and (ii) Has the legislature effaced itself or
abdicated or destroyed its own legislative power? If the
..
answer to the first is in the affirmative and that to the
c second in the nagative, it is not for any Court of justice to
enquire further or to question the wisdom or the policy of
the law.

2. Dealing with the necessity for limiting or restricting the
D powers of delegation the learned Judge observed:

"It is said that it will be dangerous if the legislature is
permitted to delegate all its legislative functions without
formally abdicating its control or effacing itself, for then
the legislature will shirk its responsibility and go to sleep
E and peoples' life, liberty or property may be made to
depend on the whims of the meanest policy officer in
whom, by successive delegation, the legislative power may
come to be vested. I do not feel perturbed. I do not share
the feeling of oppression which some people may possibly
-
entertain as to the danger that may ensue if the legislature
F goes to sleep after delegating its legislative functions, for I
feel sure that the legislators so falling into slumber will i
have a rude awakening when they will find themselves
thrown out of the legislative chamber at the next general
election. I have no doubt in my mind that the legislature
after delegating its powers will always keep a watchful eye
G on the activities of the persons to whom it delegates its
powers of legislation and that as soon as it finds that the
powers are being misused to the detriment of the public,
the legislature will either nullify the acts done under such
delegation or appoint some more competent authority or
withdraw the matter into its own hands. There is and will
H always remain some risk of abuse whenever wide legislative
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATifAN, J.] 665

powers are committed in general terms to a subordinate A
body, but the remedy lies in the corrective power of the
legislature itself and, on ultimate analysis, in the vigilance
of public opinion and not in arbitrary judicial fiat against
the free exercise of law-making power by the legislature
within the ambit fixed by the instrument of its constitution.
B
It is not for the court to substitute its own notions of expe-
diency of the will of the legislature. This, I apprehend, is
the correct position in law. In my judgment, if our law is
not to be completely divorced from logic and is not to give
way and surrender itself to sterile dogma, the widest power
• of delegation of legislative power must perforce be
conceded to our Parliament. A denial of this necessary c
power will "stop the wheels of government" and we shall
be acting "as a clog upon the legislative and executive
departments."

3. The learned Judge also referred to the Indian legislative
D
practice and relied on several instances of enactments such as the ones
in question before the Court and observed:

"During the time of the expansion of the British posses-
sions in India, small bits of territories in outlying parts of
Indian were being constantly annexed by the British but on
E
account of the smallness of such territories or the undesira-
bility of their immediate merger with the established Pro-
vinces it was not found to be practically possible to provide
legislative Councils for these enclaves. Nor was it possible
for the Governor-General in Council to enact laws for the
day to day administration of these bits of territories or for
F
all their needs. The practice, therefore, grew up for the
Governor-General in Council, by a simple legislation, to
confer power on the Lieutenant-Governor to extend to
such territories such of the laws as were or might be in force
in other parts of the territories under the Lieutenant-
Governor which were considered suitable for these terri-
G
tories. Such practice was certainly convenient, and ever
since Burah's case does not appear to have been seriously
questioned. I do not say that the argument has no merit,
but in the view I have taken and expressed above, I do not
find it necessary, on the present occasion to base my opi-
nion on this argument. H
666 SUP~EME COURT REPORTS [1989) 2 S.C.R.

G. Bose J. observed that he was not enamoured of this kind of ~-
A legislation and did not like "this shirking of responsibility, for after all,
the main function of the legislature is to legislate and.not to leave that
to others." He, however, leaned in favour of upholding the statutes in
question before the court for the following reasons.

B 1. Two of the Acts under consideration before the court were
Acts of British Parliament and had to be looked at through British
.·-
'
~·
eyes. In the face of Queen v. Burah, [1878] 5 I.A. 173, there was no
doubt that this legislation would have been upheld and it was not
necessary to enquire further because no single decision of the Judicial
Committee had thrown any do·ubt on the soundness of Burah's case.
..
c 2. Act III however, stood on a different footing as it was an Act
~
of the Indian Parliament of 1950. One had to try to discover from the
Constitution itself what concept of legislative power Parliament had in
mind while framing the Constitution. The learned Judge observed:

D "Now in endeavouring to discover from the ConstitutiC)n
what the Constituent Assembly thought of this grave prob\
!em. I consider it proper to take the following matters into
consideration. First, it has been acknowledged in all free
countries that it is impossible to carry on the government of -y
a modern State with its infinite complexities and ramifica-
E tions without a large devolution of power and delegation of
authority. It is needless to cite authority. The proposition is
self-evident. Next, the practical application of that princi-
pie has been evident through the years both in India and in
-
other parts of the British Empire and in England itself. In
the third place, even in America, Judges have had to veer
F away from the rigidity of their earlier doctrine and devise *
ways and me11ns for softening its rigour and have not always ~-

been able, under a barrage of words, to disguise the fact
that they are in truth and in fact effecting a departure
because compelled to do by the force of circumstances."

G 3. After pointing out the similarities between the Constitution
).--
and the Government of India Act of 1935, the learned Judge con-
eluded:

"I prefer therefore to hold that that which The Queen v.
Burah, authorised, whatever you may choose to call it, was
H not abrogated except in special cases.
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.] 667

I so hold for another reason as well namely, that to decide
A
otherwise would make the Government of India an exceed-
ingly difficult matter and would put back the hands of the
clock. I prefer therefore to hold-and that has the logic of
history behind it-that the concept of legislative power
which had hitherto been accepted in India continued to
hold good but that this limitation was placed upon it by the B
Constitution, namely that wherever the Constitution em-
powers Parliament to do a particular thing as opposed to

• legislating generally on a particular topic, there can be· no
delegation. Parliament must itself act."

3. Referring to the authorities and text books cited before the
Court, the learned Judge observed: c
~ "An anxious scrutiny of all the many authorities and books
which were referred to in the arguments, and of the deci-
sions which I have analysed here, leads me to the conclu-
sion that it is difficult to deduce any logical principle from D
them. In almost every case the decision has been ad hoc
and in order to meet the exigencies of the case then before
them, judges have placed their own meaning on words and
.y- phrases which might otherwise have embodied a principle
of general application. I have therefore endeavoured, as
far as I possibly could, to avoid the use of these disputable E
terms and have preferred to accept the legacy of the past
- and deal with this question in a practical way. My conclu-
sion is that the Indian Parliament can legislate along the
lines of The Queen v. Burah, that is to say, it can leave to
another person or body the introduction or application of
--,.I.. laws which are or may be in existence at that time in any F
part of India which is subject to the legislative control of
Parliament, whether those laws were enacted by Parlia-
ment. or by a State Legislature set up by the. Constitution.
That has been the practice in the past. It has weighty
reasons of a practical nature to support it and it does not
seem to have been abrogated by the Constitution." G

4. The learned Judge, however, held that second part of section
2 of Act 3 could not be held to be valid for the following reasons:

"But I also consider that delegation of this kind cannot
proceed beyond that and that it cannot extend to the repe- H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

aling or altering in essential particulars of laws which are '-i,. -
A
already in force in the area in question. That is a matter
which Parliament alone can handle.

I See no reason for extending the scope of legislative dele-
gation beyond the confines which have been hallowed for
B so long. Had it not been for the fact that this sort of
practice was blessed by the Privy Council as far back as :>---
1878 and has been endorsed in a series of decisions ever• •
since, and had it not been for the practical necessities of the
case, I would have held all three Acts ultra vires. But, so far
as the latter portion of the third Act is concerned, no case
.
was cited in which the right to appeal the existing laws of
c the land and substitute others for them has been upheld.
That was tried in a South African case, Sir John Gorden ~
Sprigg v. Sigcau, [1897) A.C. 238, but the Privy Council
held it could not be done, not indeed on any ground which
is material here but that is the only case I know where the
D attempt was made and the right litigated. It is one thing to
fill a void or partial vacuum. Quite another to throw out
existing laws enacted by a competent authority. It is bad
enough to my mind to hold that the first is not a delegation
of legislative power. But as that has been held by an .'{
authority which it is impossible now to question so far as
E the past is concerned, I bow to its wisdom. But as to the
future, I feel that a body which has been entrusted with the
powers of legislation should legislate and not leave the
decision of important matters of principle to other minds. I
am therefore of opinion that the power upheld by the
-
Queen v. Burah, does not extend as far as the latter portion __.___
F of section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act of 1950
endeavours to carry it."

A perusal of the above judgments shows that the validity of the
provisions in question were upheld on different lines of reasoning.
Nevertheless all the learned Judges seem to have agreed-and,
G indeed, as pointed out in later decisions, it is inevitable in modem
conditions-that, while Parliament should have ample and extensive 't--
powers of legislation, these should include a power to entrust some of
those functions and powers to another body or authority. They also
~eem to have agreed that there should be a limitation placed on the
extent of such entrustment. It is only on the question as to what this
H limitation should be that there was lack of consensus among the
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.) 669

- ').- judges. All of them agreed that it could not be so extensive as to
A
amount to "abdication" or "effacement". Some thought that there is
no abdication or effacement unless it is total i.e. unless Parliament
surrenders its powers in favour of a "parallel" legislature. or loses
control over the local authority to such an extent as to be unable to
revoke the powers given to, or to exercise effective supervision over,
the body entrusted therewith. But others were of opinion that such B
--\ "abdication" or "effacement" could not even be partial and it would
,. 'f be bad if full powers to do everything that the legislature can do are
· conferred on a subordinate authority, although the legislature may
.. retain the power to control the action of such authority by recalling
such power or repealing the Acts passed by the subordinate authority.
A different way in which the second of the above views has been
enunciated-and it is this view which has dominated since-is by say- c
k ing that the legislatures cannot wash their hands off their essential
legislative function. Essential legislative function consists in laying
down the legislative policy with sufficient clearness and in enunciating
the standards which are to be enacted into a rule of law. This cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is only the task of subordinate legis- D
lation which is by its very nature ancillary to the statute which dele-
gates the power to make it and which must be within the policy and
framework of the guidance provided by the legislature.

It is suggested for the petitioners that, since the reasonings of the
learned Judges are so different, we cannot derive any assistance from E
the Delhi Laws Act case and should therefore ignore it. We are unable

- to accept this suggestion. We think, with respect, that Bose J. was
right when he pointed out in Rajnarain Singh's case (1955 1 SCR 298)
and hinummary in the case, of the conclusions arrived at in the Delhi
Laws Act case has consistently been referred to with ·approval in later
...,(
decisions of this Court as an authoritative exposition-that: F
··~
"Because of the elaborate care with which every aspect of
the problem was examined in that case, the decision has
tended to become diffuse, but if one concentrates on the
matters actually decided and forgets for a moment the
reasons given, a plain pattern emerges leaving only a nar- G
row margin of doubt for future dispute."

If we apply this formula, whatever reasoning one adopts, the answer to
the question posed before us has to be in favour of upholding the
constitutional validity of s. 87. One may doubt the wisdom of attempt-
ing to trace a common ratio decidendi from such divergent views but it H

.-
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

seems equally illogical to altogether ignore a clear conclusion arrived '..{ -
A at by the majority of judges only because they arrived at that conclu-
·sion by different processes of reasoning. One would rather have
thought that a conclusion stands more fortified when it can be sup-
ported not on one but on several lines of reasoning. At least for an
identical problem, the final answer, we think, should be the same. This
B should particularly be so when we remind ourselves that the Delhi \
Laws Act case arose because, soon after India became a Republic, the ,,.._
Government, envisaging the necessity of having recourse to legislation ,. •
of this type in the context of the changing topography of India, took
the precaution of seeking the advice of the Supreme Court for its
1
future guidance and that they have acted upon the answers pn •poun-
ded by the Supreme Court in enacting a provision of this type. !In this
c situation we find ourselves unable to accept the contention that, after a
lapse of thirty-eight years, we should declare that the Delhi La.I vs Act ~
case decided nothing or, as counsel euphimistically put it, Ith at it
should be confined to its own facts.

D It is contended that the above line of approach is one of expe-
diency rather than logic and that, unless one can extract a principle of
general application from the Delhi Laws Act case, it will not be helpful
as a-precedent. Even if this is taken to be the proper approach, an
answer to the contention is furnished by Shama Rao [1955] 2 SCR 650,
on which considerable reliance was also placed on behalf of the
E petitioners. The facts in that case were that the legislative assembly tor
tile Union Territory of Pondicherry passed a Sales Tax Act (1(} of
1965) in June, '1965. Under s 1(2) of the Act, it ·was to come into force
on such date as the Pondicherry Government may. by notification,
appoint. S. 2(1) of the Act provided that the Ma,dras General Sales
-
Tax Act, 1959 as in force In ihe State of Madras immediately before the
F commencement of the Pondicherry Act, shall be extended to Pondi-
cherry subject to certain modifications. The Pondicherry Government
issued a notification on March 1, 1966 appointed April 1, 1966 as the
date of the commencement of the Pondicherry Act. Prior to the issue
of the notification, however, the Madras Legislature had amended the
Madras Act and consequently it was the Madras Act as amended upto
G April 1, 1966, which was brought into force in Pon di cherry. When the
Act thus came into fqrce, the petitioner was served with a notice to
register himself as a dealer and thereupon he filed a writ petition
challenging the validity of the Act. It was contenddd for the petitioner
that the Act was void and was a still-born legislati~n by reason of the
Pondicherry Legislature having abdicated its legislative functions in
H favour of the Madras State Legislature. It was argued that such abdica-
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.I. [RANGANAlHAN, J.] 671

- ~ lion resulted from the wholesale adoption of the Madras Act as in A
force in the State of Madras immediately before the commencement of
the Pondicherry Act, ass. 2(1) read withs. 1(2) meant that the legisla-
ture adopted not only the Madras Act as it was when it enacted the
Pondicherry Act but also such amendment or amendments in the
Madras Act which might be passed by the Madras State Legislature
~ upto the time of commencement of the Act i,e. upto April 1, 1966. On B

,. '
the other hand, counsel for the respondent relied on the decision of a
·majority of judges (5:2) in the Delhi Laws Act case "that authorisation
to select and apply future Provincial Laws was not invalid" as had been
- clearly brought out in the summary of the Delhi Laws Act Case
attempted by Bose J. in Rajnarain Singh's case, [1955] 1 SCR 290.
After a brief reference to the history of the doctrine of abdication
~ contended for by the petitioner and a discussion of the Delhi Laws Act
c
Case, Shela! J., with whom Subba Rao, CJ. and Mitter J. agreed,
accepted the contention of the petitioner. He observed:

"The question then is whether-in extending the Madras Act
in the manner and to the extent it did under sec. 2(1) of the D
l;'rincipal Act the Pondicherry legislature abdicated its
legislative power in favour of the Madras legislature. It is
manifest that the Assembly refused to perform its legisla-
tive function entrusted under the Act constituting it. It may
be that a mere refusal may not amount to abdication if the
legislature instead of going through the full formality of E

- legislation applies its mind to an existing statute enacted by
another legislature for another jurisdiction, adopts such an
Act .and enacts to extend it to the territory under its juris-
. diction. In doing so, it may perhaps be said that it has laid
down a policy to extend such an Act and directs the execu-
tive to apply and implement such an Act. But when it not F
only adopts such an Act but also provides that the Act
applicable to its territory shall be the Act amended in
future by the other legislature, there is nothing for it to
predicate what the amended Act would be. Such a case
would be clearly one of non-application of mind and one of
refusal to discharge the function entrusted to it by the in- G
;;trument constituting it. It is difficult to see how such a case
is not one of abdication or .effacement in favour of another
legislature at least in regard to that particular matter.

But Mr. Setalvad contended that the validity of such legis-
lation has been accepted· in Delhi Laws Act's case and H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.
·O

particularly in the matter of heading No. 4 as summarised
-..I, -
A
by Bose J. in Raj Narain Singh's case. In respect of that
heading, the majority conclusion no doubt was that autho-
risation in favour of the executive to adopt laws passed by
another legislature or legislatures including future laws
would not be invalid. So far as that conclusion goes Mr.
B Setalvad is right. But as already stated, in arriving at that ~
conclusion each learned Judge adopted a different reason- ' •
ing. Whereas Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ. accepted the con- .
tention that the plenary legislative power includes power of
delegation and held that since such a power means that the
legislature can make laws in the manner it liked if it dele-
-
gates that power short of an abdication there can be no
c objection. On the other hand, Fazal Ali J. upheld the laws ~
on the ground that they contained a complete and precise
policy and the legislation being thus conditional the ques-
tion of excessive delegation did not arise. Mukherjea J.
held that abdication need not be total but can be partial
D and even in respect of a particular matter and if so the
impugned legislation would be bad. Bose J. expressed in
frank language his displeasure at such legislation but
accepted its validity on the ground of practice recognised ""<
over since Burah's case and thought that that practice was
accepted by the Constitution makers and incorporated in

-
E the concept of legislative function. There was thus no
unanimity as regards the principles upon which those laws
were upheld.

All of them however appear to agree on one principle, viz.,
that where there is abdication of effacement the legislature A-
F concerned in truth and in fact acts contrary to the Instrument
which constituted it and the statute in question would be void ~
and still born."
(Underlining ours)

Bhargava, J. (with whom Shah J. agreed) did not consider it necessary
G to enter into this controversy as, according to them-and on this they ·)"-
dissented from the majority-even if it be held that the Pondicherry
Act was bad for excessive delegation of powers when it was enacted
and published, a subsequent amending Act of the Pondicherry Legisla-
ture had remedied the situation.

H Sri Sibal contended that the Pondicherry Assembly, on a true
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATIIAN, J.] 673

-').. construction of s. 18 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963
was.not a full fledged legislature but only a delegate of Parliament and, A
therefore, a delegation by it to the State Government amounted, in
effect, to a sub-delegation which cannot be justified at all and that,
therefore, Shama Rao is distinguishable. We do not think this conten-
tion is tenable in view of the observations made in Burha's case, [1878]
~ 5 IA 178 and in the Delhi Laws Act case (supra) while repelling a B
;. .,similar contention about the status of a Dominion Legislature vis-a-vis
.the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and in the Delhi Laws Act
case. Also that was not the basis on which Shama Rao was either
- argued before, or decided by, this Court. We may, therefore, tum·to
Shama Rao's interpretation of the Delhi Laws Act case and apply it
here. We think we may accept the passage in Shela! J's judgment
X which we have underlined earlier as a correct enunciation by this c
· Court of the Principle emerging from the Delhi Laws Act case; if we do
so the only question that will remain to be considered will be whether
s. 87 is a case of "abdication or effacement" and the answer to that
question has been furnished, in the negative, by the Delhi Laws Act
case itself in respect of identically worded provisions. Thus, Shama D
Rao, in effect, helps the respondents to sustain the validity of s. 87,
though it is true that, on a different, if somewhat analogous, provision
._. in the Pondicherry Act, their Lordships reached the contrary conclu-
r sion and held there was an "abdication or effacement."

-
But, these niceties apart, we think that s. 87 is quite valid even E
on the "policy and guideline" theory if one has proper regard to the
context of the Act and the object and purpose sought to be achieved by
s. 87 of the Act. The judicial decisions referred to above make it clear
that it is not necessary that the legislature should "dot all the i's and
cross all the t's" of its policy. It is sufficient if it gives the broadest
indication of a general policy of the legislature. If we bear this in mind F
~ and have regard to the history of this type of legislation, there will be
no difficulty at all. Section 87, like the provisions of Acts I, II and III,
is a provision necessitated by changes resulting in territories coming
under the legislative jurisdiction of the Centre. These are territories
situated in the midst of contiguous territories which have a proper
legislature. They are small territories falling under the legislature
-( jurisdiction of Parliament which has hardly sufficient time to look after
G
the details of all their legislative needs and requirements. To require
or expect Parliament to legislate for them will entail a disproportionate
pressure on its legislative schedule. It will also mean the unnecessary
utilisation of the time of a large number of members of Parliament for,
except the few (less than ten) members returned to Parliament from H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

the Union Territory, none else is likely to be interested in such legisla- ""{ -
A
tion. In such a situation, the most convenient course of legislating for
them is the adaptation, by extension, of laws in force in other areas of
the country. As Fazal Ali J. pointed out in the Delhi Laws Act case, it
is not a power to make laws that is delegated but only a power to
"transplant" 'laws already in force after having undergone scrutiny by
a Parliament or one of the State Legislatures, and that too, without any )..___
material change. There is no dispute before us-and it has been unani- ,
mously he.Id in all the decisions-that the power to make modifications :t' "
and restrictions in a clause of this type is a very limited power, which
permits only changes that the different context requires and that ,.
changes in substance. There is certainly no power of modification by
way of repeal or amendment as is available under s. 89.
c
~.
Sri Swamp contends that the vice in the provision lies (a) in the
choice it has left to the Central Government of one among several laws
that may be in force in various areas and (b) in the power it has given
to extend future laws as well. A power to exercise such wide power, he
D says, cannot be described as a ministerial power; it is essential legisla-
tive power, according to him. It is true that if one were to read the
section in the abstract and in its broadest connotation, it conjures up
the possibilities of the executive picking up at its fancy at any time any
law that may exist in any part of India for extension to Chandigarh "'(
without any particular rhyme or reason. The force of Sri Swamp's
E objection on this aspect has been picturesquely brought out by Maha-
jan J. in a passage in the Delhi Laws Act case:

"The choice to select any enactment in force in any pro-
-
vince at the date of such notification clearly shows that the
legislature declared no principles or policies as regards the . k
law to be· made .on any suhject. It may be pointed out that
under the Act of 1935 different provinces had the exclusive ~
power of laying do\\-11 their policies in respect of subjects
within their own legislative field. What policy was to be
adopted for Delhi, whether that adopted in the province of
Punjab or of Bombay, was left to the Central Government.
Illustratively, the mischief of such law-making may be ')--
pointed out with reference to what happened in pursuance
of this section in Ajmer-Marwara. The Bombay Agricul-
tural Debtors' Relief Act, 1947, has been extended under
cover of this section to Ajmer-Marwara and under the
power of modification, by amending the definition of the
H word 'debtor' the whole policy of the Bombay Act has been
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.) 675

altered. Under the Bombay Act a person is a debtor who is
A
indebted and whose annual income from sources other than
agricultural and manly labour does not exceed 33 per cent
. of his total annual income or does not exceed Rs.500,
whichever is greater. In the modified statute "debtor"
means an agriculturist who owes a debt, and "agriculturist"
means a person who earns his livelihood by agriculture and B
whose income from such source exceeds 66 per cent of his
total income. The outside limit of Rs.500 is removed. The
exercise of this power amounts to making a new law by a
body which was not in the contemplation of the Constitu-
tion and was not authorized to enact any laws. Shortly
stated, the question is, could the Indian legislature under
the Act of 1935 enact that the executive could extend to
c
Delhi laws that may be made hereinafter by a legislature in
Timbuctoo or Soviet Russia with modifications. The
answer would be in the negative because the policy of those
laws could never be determined by the law making body
entrusted with making laws for Delhi. The Provincial legis- b
latures in India under the Constitution Act of 1935 qua
Delhi constitutionally stood on no better footing than the
legislatures of Timbuctoo and Soviet Russia though
· geographically and politically they were in a different
situatiOn. ''
E

-
But, with respect, we think, we should not look at the provision in the
present context from that angle. We should here have regard to the
object of the provision and the purpose it was intended to achieve and,
in the historical perspective we have set out, there is no vice in the
power conferred.
F
So far as the first aspect referred by Sri Swarup is concerned, the
provision only confers a power on the executive to determine, having
regard to the local conditions prevalent in the Union Territory, which
one of several laws, all approved by one or the other of the legislatures
in the country, will be the most suited to Chandigarh. Thus viewed, it
would fall under one of the permissible categories of delegation refer- G
red to at p. 814 in the Delhi Laws Act case and extracted by us earlier
and, if so, it is not really an unguided or arbitrary power. There could
have been no objection to the legislation if it had provided that the
laws of one of the contiguous States (say Punjab) should be extended
to Chandigarh. But such a provision would have been totally inade-
quate to meet the situation for two reasons. There may be more than H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A
one law in force on a subject in the contiguous States-say one in ---+-
Punjab, one in Pepsu and one in Himachal Pradesh etc.-and Parlia-
ment was anxious that Chandigarh should have the benefit of that one
uf them which would most adequately meet the needs of the situation
in that territory. Or, again, there may be no existing law on a particu-
lar subject in any of the contiguous areas which is why the power had
B to include the power of extending the laws of any State in India. While,
in a very strict sense, this may involve a choice, it is in fact and in the
general run of cases, only a decision on suitability for adaptation
rather than choice of a policy. It is a delegation, not of policy, but of
, ..
_'.>..-

matters of detail for a meticulous appraisal of which Parliament has no ~

time. Even if we assume that this involves a choice of policy, the
restriction of such policy to one that is approved by Parliament or a
c State Legislature constitutes a sufficient declaration of guideline
within the meaning, of the "policy-guideline" theory. ~

The second aspect referred to by Sri Swarup, again, is, in the
context, not a sign of "abdication" but is only a necessary enabling
D power. Once 11 is held that the delegation of a power to extend a
present existing law is justified, a power to extend future laws is a
necessary corollary. Here again, its validity may be tested by consider-
ing what the position would have been if the section had provided only
for the extension of the laws in a contiguous territory, say Punjab. As .....
mentioned earlier, a power to extend existing statutes in Punjab could
E clearly have been delegated. If Parliament formulated such a policy as
it had no time to apply its mind to the existing law initially to be
adapted, it could hardly find time to consider the amendments from
time to time en grafted on it in the state of its origin. Hence once a
policy of extension of Punjab laws is clear and permissible it would
-
seem only natural as a necessary corollary that the executive should be k
F permitted to extend future amendments to those laws as well. The
power to extend any future law has to be considered in the above ~-
context and not only could be, but also has to be, conferred for the
same reasons as justify the conferment of a power to extend a present
contiguous law. Mukherjea J. in the Delhi Laws Act case has touched
upon this issue. As pointed out by him, the question of validity of the
G delegation of a power to extend any future law, is not free from diffi- ')---
culty. If the provision is considered in the abstract and contrued on the
basis of its fullest possible ambit, it.may be difficult to sustain it. But if
it is construed and judged in the historical context of the legislation,
the needs of the situation and a reasonably practical appraisal of the
extent of its intended application, there can be no doubt that it con-
H tains a sufficient indication of broad policy to sustain the validity of the
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.] 677

extent of deleg·ation involved ins. 87. We may, in this context, repeat
A
again that coUJrts, in the decided cases, do not envisage a meticulous
enunciation of a policy in all its details. They are satisfied even if they
can discern ev1en faint glimmerings of one from the object and scheme
of the legislation.

For the neasons discussed above, we reject the contentions of the B
petitioners challenging the constitutional validity of s. 87.

We now turn to the second contention of the petitioners based on
. the assumption of s. 87 being valid. The point made is thats. 87, on its
proper constructi<;m, permits the extension of the laws of another State
to Chandigarh orily so long as there is a 'vacuum" of laws, on any
particular subject, within the Union Territory but that, once Parlia- C
ment itself steps in and makes laws for the territory, it has assumed
legislative responsibilities in respect of that subject and a "transplanta-
tion" of laws from elsewhere by extension is neither necessary nor
valid, Sri Gujral submits that the raison d'etre of s. 87 is that, as
Parliament may not have enough time to attend to the legislative needs D
of the new territory brought into its fold, it is necessary to provide a
machinery by which some laws could enforced in the territory. But
here, as early as 1974, Parliament applied its mind and legislated, in
respect of landlord-tenant matters, for the Union Territory and having
done this, it is for Parliament and Parliament alone to legislate on the
subject thereafter. Indeed President issued an ordinance in 1976 and E
Parliament also amended the law in 1982 in some other respects indi-
cating that Parliament was in full seisin of the matter. This is one facet
of the objection. The other facet is that, by purporting to extend, by an
executive notification, the provisions of the 1985 Act to Chandigarh,
what the Central Government has really done is to modify or amend
an existing Parliamentary law (the 1974 Act) operating in the State F
already. Conceding, for purposes of argument, that, had the 1949 Act
been extended to Chandigarh in 1974 by a notification under s. 87, it
might have been open to the Government, by another notification
under s. 87, to extend the 1985 Act also to the Union Territory,
counsel contends that it was impermissible to allow the Central
Government to issue a notification under s. 87 which will have the G
effect of amending or modifying a law of Parliament already in force in
the territory. A notification could amend a notification but not a sta-
tute, he says. In support of this part of the argument, counsel strongly
relies on the decision, of a majority of Judges in the [)elhi Laws Act
case, that the second part of s. 2 of Act III considered by them was
ultra vires. He submits that, if even a specific provision in a law could H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A not validly permit a notification of extension to amend or repeal exist-
ing laws of the territory in question, a n@tification under s. 87 which
advisedly omits any reference to such an enabling power (enacted in
Act III and declared ultra vires by this court) could hardly be on a
stronger footing. On this construction of s. 87, counsel contends, the
notification dated 15.12.86 has exceeded the purview of s. 87 and is,
B therefore ultra vires.

Turning, therefore, to the judgments in the Delhi Laws Act case J •
on which counsel strongly relies in support of his contentions, we may

c
observe at the outset that the judgments of Kania CJ. and Patanjali
Sastri J. are not helpful, as according to Kania CJ, the power of dele-
gation was altogether bad except in so far as it permitted an extension
-
of laws made by the Central Legislature and, according to Sastri J.
extensive delegation of powers was valid. Fazal Ali J., in upholding its
validity, observed thus in regard to the second part of s. 2 of Act III:

"I will now deal with section 2 of Part C States (Laws) Act,
D 1950, in so far as it gives power to the Central Government
to make a provision in the enactment extended under the
Act for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law
which is for the time being applicable to the Part C State
cohcerned. No doubt this power is a far-reaching and un-
usual one, but, on a careful analysis, it will be found to be
E only a concomitant of the power of transplantation and
modification. If a new law is to be made applicable, it may
have to replace some existing law which may have become
out of date or ceased to serve any useful purpose, and the
agency which is apply the new law must be in a position to
say that the old law would cease to apply. The nearest
F parallel that I can find tu this provision, is to be found in
the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919. By
that Act, the Church Assembly is empowered to propose
legislation touching matters concerning the Church of
England, and the legislation proposed may extend to the
repeal or amendment of Acts of Parliament including the
Church Assembly Act itself. It should however be noticed
that it is not until Parliament itself gives it legislative force
on an affirmative address of each House that the measure is
converted into legislation. There is thus no real analogy
between that Act and the Act before us. However, the
provision has to be upheld, because, though it goes to the
H farthest limits, it is difficult to hold that it was beyond the
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. IRANGANATIIAN, J.] 679

powers of a legislature which is supreme in its own field, A
and all we can say is what Lord Hewart said in Kind v.
Minister of Health, [1927] 2 KB 229, namely, that the
particular Act may be regarded as "indicating the high
water-mark oflegislative provisions of this character," and
that, unless the legislature acts with restraint, a stage may
be ·reached when legislation may amount to abdication of B
legislative powers." ·

Mahajan J. had this to say:

- "For reasons given for answering questions 1 and 2 that the
enactments mentioned therein are ultra vires the Constitu-
C
lion in the particulars stated, this question is also answered
similarly. It might, however, be observed that in this case
express power to repeal or amend laws already applicable in
Part C States has been conferred on the Central Govern-
ment. Power to repeal or amend laws is a power which can
only be exercised by an authority that has the power to D
enact laws. It is a power co-ordinate and co-extensive with
the power of the legislature itself. In bestowing on the
Central Government and clothing it with the same capacity
as is possessed by the legislature itself the Parliament has
acted unconstitutionally."
E
The observations of Mukherjea J. are very relevant from the
point of counsel for the petitioners. His Lordship said:

"It will be noticed that the powers conferred by this section
upon the Central Government are far in excess of those
conferred by the other two legislative provisions, at least.in F
accordance with the interpretation which I have attempted
to put upon them. As has been stated already, it is quite an
intelligible policy that so long as a proper legislative
machinery is not set up in a particular area, the Parliament
might' empower an executive authority to introduce laws
validly passed by a competent legislature and actually in G
force in other parts of the country to such area, with such
modifications and restrictions as the authority thinks
proper, the modifications being limited to local adjust-
ments' or changes of a minor character. But this pre-
supposes that there is no existing law on that particular
subject actually in force in that territory. If any such law H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

exists and power is given to repeal or abrogate such laws
A
either in whole or in part and substitute in place of the
same other laws which are in force in other areas, it would
certainly amount to an unw:arrantable delegation of legisla-
tive powers. To repeal or :abrogate an existing laws is the
exercise of an essential legislative power, and the policy
B behind such acts must be the policy of the legislature itself.
If the legislature invests the executive with the power to
determine as to which of the law>; in force in a particular J
territory are useful or proper and if it is given to that
authority to replace any of them by laws brought from
other provinces with such modification as it thinks proper.
that would be to invest the executiv.e with the determina-
-
c tion of the entire legislative policy and not merely of carry-
ing out a policy which the legislature has already laid down.
Thus the power of extension which is contemplated by
section 2 of Part C States (Laws) Act, includes the power of
introducing laws which may be in actual conflict with the
D laws validly established and already in operation in that ter-
ritory. This shows how -the practice, which was adopted
during the early British period as an exp.edient and possibly
harmless measure with the object of providing laws for a
newly acquired territory or backward area till it grew up
into a full fledged administrative and political unit, is being
E resorted to in later times for no other purpose that that of
vesting almost unrestricted legislative powers with regard
to certain areas in the executive government. The execu-
tive government is given the authority to alter, repeal or
amend any laws in existence in that areas under the guise of
bringing in laws there which are valid in other parts of
F India. This, in my opinion, is an unwarramtable delegation
of legislative duties and cannot be permitted. The last por-
tion of section 2 of Part C States (Laws) Act, is therefore,
ultra vires the powers of the Parliament acs being a delega-
tion of essential legislative powers in favour of a body not
competent to exercise it and to that extent the legislation
G must be held to be void. This portion is however severable;
and so the entire section need not be decla:red invalid."
(:Emphasis added)
Bose J., again, made certain observations which arce strongly relied
upon by counsel. His Lordship observed:
H "I see no reason for extending the scope of legi.slative delegation
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.I. [RANGANATIIAN, J.] 681
beyond the confines which have been hallowed for so long. Had
it not been for the fact that this sort of practice was blessed by A
the Privy Council as far back as 1878 and has been endorsed in a
.,_,. ..;,' of decisions ever since, and had it not been for the practi-
cal necessities of the case, I would have held all three Acts ultra
vires. But, so far as the latter portion of the third Act is con-
cerned, no case was cited in which the right to repeal the existing
laws of the land and substitute others for them has been upheld. B
That was tried in a South African case, Sir John Gorden Sprigg.
. v. Sigcau, !1897] AC 238, but the PriV'J Council held it coulg not
be done, not indeed on any ground which is material here but
that is the only case I know where the attempt was made and the
right litigated. It is one think to Jill a void or partial vacuum.
Quite another to throw out existing laws enacted by a competent
authority. It is bad enough to my mind to hold that the firSt is not C
a delegation of legislative power. But as that has been held by an
authority which it is impossible now to question so far as the past
is concerned, I bow to its wisdom. But as to the future, I feel
that a body which has been entrusted with the powers of legisla-
tion should legislate and not leave the decision of important
matters of principle to other minds. I am therefore of opinion D
that the power upheld by the The Queen v. Burah does not
extend as far as the latter portion of section 2 of the Part C
States (Laws) Act of 1950 endeavours to carry it."
(Emphasis added)
~ . In support of his "vacuum" theory, counsel also refers to an ins-
tance of legislative practice referred to in Kapoor's case [1989] 1 S.C.C. E
561. Counsel points out there was a central rent law applicable t9 all can-
tonments in India, being Act 10 of 1952. In 1957, Parliament decided that
the rent law in force in the rest of a State should be allowed to be exten-
ded to the cantonment areas in Stllte as well by issue of Government noti-
e--.r. fication, and enacted Act 46 of 1957 for the purpose. However, no such
--.: extension under s. 3 of the Act 46 of 1957 was notified for the State of
U.P. until Parliament, by passing Act 68 of 1971, statutorily clarified that: F
"On and from the date on which the United Provinces (fempo-
rary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947, is extended by
notification under section 3 of the Cantonments (Extention of
Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 to the Cantonments in Uttar
Pradesh, the Uttllr Pradesh Cantonments (Control of Rent &
Eviction) Act 1952 (Act 10 of 1952) shall stand repealed." G
?>,:- In other words, though extension of local laws to cantonments by notifica·
tion was allowed, Parliament provided for the simultaneous creation of a
"vacuum" in the cantonment area by repeal of the 1952 Act which could
·be occupied by the extended law. Counsel emphasises this aspect to show
that an extension by notification can be allowed to fill a void but cannot
be allowed to knock against a superior Parliamentary enactment already H
in existence.
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

There is certainly a good deal of force in these arguments but we
A think that they proceed on an incorrect view of the effect of the notifi-
cation impugned in the present case. We might have .been inclined to
accept the submissions of the learned counsel had the effect of the
notification been to extend a law which is in "actual conflict" with any
parliamentary enactment or which has the effect of "throwing out"
B any existing law in the Union Territory. To borrow an expression used
in an analogous context, we would have considered the validity of the
extension doubtful had the extended provisions been repugnant to an Ill
Act of Parliament in force in the Union Territory. So long as that is not
the effect or result, we think, there is no reason to construe the scope
of s. 87 in the restricted manner suggested by counsel. It is no doubt
true that s. 87 permits an extension because there is no law in the
C Union Territory in relation to a particular subject and Parliament has
-
not the requisite time to attend to the matter because of its preoccupa-
tions. But this purpose does not require for its validity that there
should be no existing law of Parliament at all on a subject. Again the
concept of "subject" for the purposes of this argument is also an elastic
D one the precise scope of which cannot be defined. The concept of
vacuum is as much relevant to a case where there is absence of a
particular provision in an existing law as to a case where there is no
existing law at all in the Union Territory on a subject. For instance, if
Parliament had not enacted the 1974 Act but had only enacted an
extension of the Transfer of Property Act to Chandigarh, could it have
E been said that a subsequent notification cannot extend the provisions
of the 1949 Act to Chandigarh because the subject of leases is gover-
ned by the Transfer of Property Act which has been already extended •
and there is, therefore, no "vacuum" left which could be filled in by
such extension? Again, suppose, initially, a Rent Act is extended by
Parliament which does no: contain a provision regarding one of the
F grounds on which a landlord can seek eviction-say, one enabling the
owner to get back his honse for reoccupation-and then the Govern-
ment thinks that another enactment containing such a provision may
also be extended, can it not be plausibly said that the latter is a matter
on which there is no legislation enacted in the territory and that the
extension of the latter enactment only fills up a void or vacancy?
G Again, suppose the provisions of a general code like, say, the Code of
Civil Procedure are extended to the Union Territory, should be con-
strue s. 87 so as to preclude the extension ·of a later amendment to=e
of the rules to one of the Orders of the C.P.C. merely on the ground
that it will have the effect of varying or amending an existing law? We
think it would not be correct to thus unduly rcst.."""ict the """l'e <>f a
H provision likes. 87. The better way to put the principle, we think, is to
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. iRANGANATIIAN, J.l 683

--~ say .that the extension of an enactment which makes additions to the A
existing law would also be permissible under s. 87 so long as it does
not, expressly or impliedly, repeal or conflict with, or is not repugnant
to, an already existing law. In this context, reference can usefully be
made to the observations in. Hari Shanker Bag/a (1955] 1 SCR 380 at
391, which seem to countenance the "by-passing" of an existing law by, B
a piece of delegated legislation and to draw the line only at its attempt
to repeal the existing law, expressly or by necessary implication. In a
't sense, no doubt, any addition, however small, does amend or vary the
existing law but so long as it does not really detract from or conflict
• with it, there is no reason why it should not stand alongside the exist-
ing law. In our view s. 87 should be interpreted constructively so as to
permit ils object being achieved rather than in a manner that will C
detract from its efficacy or purpose. We may also note, incidentally,
that in legislative practice also, such successive changes have been
allowed to stand together. Lachmi Namin v. Union of India, (1976] 2
·scR 785 narrates how the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941
extended to Delhi under Act III was subsequently amended by D
Parliament Acts of 1956 and 1959 but was also sought to be modified
by various notifications from time to time. These notifications were
challenged on the ground that the power to extend by notification
could be exercised only once and that the impugned notification did
not merely extend but also effected modifications of a substantial
nature in the Act sought to be extended. No contention was, however,
raised that after the intervention of Parliament in ·1956 and 1959 there E
could have been no extension of the Bengal Act as it wo.uld have the
effect of adding to or varying the Parliamentary legislation apparently
because they could stand side by side with each other. We, therefore,
think that since the extension of the 1985 Act only adds provisions in
respect of aspects not covered by the 1974 Act and in a manner not F
inconsistent therewith, the impugned, notification is quite valid and
not liable to be struck down.

We may now briefly dispose of certain minor aspects of the
above contentions which were debated before us:
G
l. It was urged that the provisions of the 1985 Act extended to
Chandigarh cannot stand independantly and make sense only if read
along with and as supplementing the provisions of the 1949 Act already
reenacted by the 1974 Act and, .therefore, amend or modify the 1974
Act- This is true but it does not affect our line of reasoning indicated
above. H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A 2 There was considerable argument before us as to whether -1-
the modifications introduced by the 1985 Act in the 1949 Act, as
reenacted by the 1974 Act, are minor "modifications or restrictions"
or incorporate substantial changes in the scheme of the pre-existing
law. Counsel for the petitioners contended that the changes intro-
duced by the 1985 Act were substantial and far-reaching. On the other
B · hand counsel for the respondent contended to the contrary. Sri Sehgal, >...._
appearing for one of the landlords submitted that the Act already
contained provisions enabling any owner to get back his premises Ii •
when he needed it for his occupation-S. 13(3)(a)(i) and (iv)-and a
special provision enabling an Army Officer to expeditiously recover •
possession of his premises when he needed it for his family--S.
13(3)(a)(i-a) and (c)-and that the provision sought to be introduced
c by the 1985 Act was only a natural and logical extension_.thereof.
Counsel for the landlord in SLP 9217 of 1988 submitted that it was only ~
a procedural change that the 1985 Act introduced, relying on certain
observations made by this Court in Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, [1980] 1
SCR 854. All this discussion is wholly irrelevant on our line of reason-
D ing. As we have pointed out, in construing the scope of a law extended
under s. 87 qua an existing law, the question is not whether there are
changes or not, the question is only, are they inconsistent with, in
conflict with or repugnant to, the scheme of the existing law and we
have answered this question in the nagative. The question of "modifi- -.;:.
cations or restrictions" will loom large only in construing the scope of
E the notification qua the law extended by it. In Lachmi Narain [1976] 2
SCR 785 (at p. 801-2) and other cases it has been held that such a
notification, while extending a law, can make only such "modifications
and restrictions" in the law extended as are of an incidental, ancillary
or subservient nature and as do not involve substantial deviations
therefrom. Here, it is common ground that the 1985 Act has been
F extended as it is, with only very minor modifications and, hence, it is
unnecessary to consider the question debated.

3. The reference to the legislative precedent referred to in
Kapoor's case does not help us to determine the issue in the present
case. Sri Gujral pointed out that, in that case, Parliament considered it
G necessary to repeal an Act of Parliament ( 10 of 1952) and thus create a
vacuum before providing for extension of a State law to the canton-
ment. Central Act 10 of 1952 in that case, was a detailed enactment
and the State law extended under s. 3 of the Act 46 of 1957 could not
have stood alone with it. It was, therefore, decided by Parliament that
the Central Act should stand repealed. Here, on the other hand, we
H have attempted to show that both sets of provisions can stand together
RAMESH BIRCH v. U.0.1. !RANGANATHAN, J.I 685

and effectively supplement 'each other.
A
Sri Swarup pointed out that, in Kapoor's case, the words "on the
date of the notification'.' were omitted with retrospective effect. This
also does not help the petitioners. For one thing, the omission of those
words enlarges the power of notification and made possible the issue
J of a notification to extend the State law along with its future amend- B
~ ments. But that apart, the words "on the date of the notification" are
• ·• present in s. 87 and autliorise the extension of the law in force in
Punjab, as on 15.12.1986, to Chandigarh.

- 4. There was some discussion before us on the basis of the obser-
vations in Lachmi Narain & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1976] 2
SCR 785, as to whether there could be successive notifications under C
s. 87. But this question, which was answered in the affirmative in
Kapoor's case (supra), does not arise here, as there is only one notifi-
cation under s. 87.

5. Learned counsel submitted that the observations of the High D
Court in para 17 and 26 of the judgment under appeal are not helpful
as they refer to extension of laws made under the provisions of Acts I,
II and III which had been held valid in the Delhi Laws Act case. This is
~ correct but, as we have pointed out earlier. s. 87 only continued the
pattern of Acts I, II and III after being assured by the Supreme Court
that there was nothing wrong with it. This is a relevant aspect which E
has to be kept in mind in considering the issues before us.

6. Learned counsel criticised the observations made by the High
Court in para 27 of the judgment. The passage referred to seems to
echo the observations made in certain decisions of this Court (vide, for
e.g. Mukherjea CJ) in Rai Sahab Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State, [1955] 2 F
SCR 225 at p. 237 and Hedge J. in Sitaram Bishamber Dayal, [1972] 2
SCR 141 at p. 143 cited, with apparent approval, in Roy v. Union,
[1982] 2 SCR 272 at p. 317. They should not be understood as equating
the exercise of legislative power by Parliament and the Executive.

7. Both sides sought to take advantage of the history of the G
legislation in this case. As stated earlier, the main contention of
counsel for the petitioners was that, by enacting the 1974 Act and the
1982 Act, Parliament had filled in the "vacuum" which. could no
longer be penetrated by extension of laws from other parts of the
country on the subject. In addition they point out that the 1976 Ordi-
nance making the amendments which are now being sought to be H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1989] 2 S.C.R.

A extended was allowed to lapse and that an incorporation of these
amendments was not considered necessary when the 1982 Act was
passed. These two circumstances show, according to them, that an
extension of the provisions of the 1985 Act was contrary to the clear
intention of Parliament. On the contrary, counsel for the State submit·
ted that the passing of the 1974 Act and the promulgation of the
B ordinance show that it was the policy of the Parliament to extend the
provisions of the 1949 Act and, in particular, the provisions now ex·
tended, to Chandigarh as well. He further submitted that the ordi· W
nance could not be made into an Act because of the intervention of the
emergency and that the omission to convert the ordinance into an Act
and to insert the provisions of the ordinance into the 1982 Act really -
C demonstrate how Parliament is unable to keep track of legislation
necessary for a Union Territory. We do not wish to enter into this
controversy for our present purposes as we do not think that any clear
inference can be drawn one way or the other from these circumstances.
It is also not necessary to consider these developments in the view we
have taken that there can be no objection to extension of provisions
D which do not conflict with the existing law in the Union Territory.

8. Sri Swamp raised a point that ifs. 87 is read as empowering
the extension of any law at any time, s. 89 which prescribes a maximum
time limit of two years within which to adapt existing laws for their 'i ·
application to Chandigarh would become redundant. This argument
E overlooks a very crucial difference between ss. 87 and 89. This is that,
within the period of two years mentioned ins. 89, the Central Govern·
ment can, while adapting pre-existing laws make any changes therein,
including changes by way of repeal or amendment. But s. 87 though
capable of enforcement indefinitely, confers a more limited power. It
can be invoked only to extend laws already in existence to the Union •~
F Territory and cannot make any substantial changes therein. The power
under s. 89 is limited in time but extensive in scope while under s. 87 •·
the power is indefinite in point of duration but very much more
restricted in its scope.

The above discussions dispose of all the contentions urged before
G us. For the reasons set out, we are of opinion that the conclusion ~
arrived at by the Punjab and Haryana High Court was the correct one.
All these petitions and appeals fail and are dismissed and the rules nisi
discharged but, in the circumstances, we direct each party to bear
his/its own costs.

H P.S.S. Appeals & petitions dismissed.