Holding

A judicial officer may grant bail without a statutory bar and disciplinary action cannot be predicated on a judicial order unless there is clear evidence of malice, bias or illegal gratification; therefore the imposed punishment was set aside as disproportionate.

Summary

The appellant, an Additional District & Sessions Judge, granted bail to an under‑trial accused in a murder case after considering factors such as the filing of the charge‑sheet, the accused's ill father, and lack of prior convictions. A complaint was filed alleging the judge had taken illegal gratification for the bail, leading to a departmental enquiry that concluded the bail was granted in disregard of judicial norms, though no evidence of corruption was found. The High Court imposed a punishment of withholding two increments and later reduced the judge's rank, which the judge challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the judge was well within his jurisdiction to grant bail, there was no statutory bar, and disciplinary action cannot be based solely on a judicial order absent proof of malice, bias or illegal gratification. Consequently, the Court set aside the punishment, restored the judge to his original rank, and remitted the matter to the Full Court for fresh consideration of appropriate punishment.

Issues considered

The legality of disciplining a judicial officer for granting bail in the absence of a statutory prohibition.
Whether the High Court could initiate disciplinary proceedings based solely on a complaint and an enquiry finding no corruption.
Whether the punishment of withholding increments and demotion was proportionate to the alleged misconduct.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 307, s. 34

Subjects

bailjudicial discretiondisciplinary proceedingssubordinate judiciaryU.P. Government Servants Conduct RulesArticle 226Article 235proportionalitycorruption allegations

Judgment

A RAMESH CHANDER SINGH
v.
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD AND ANR

FEBRUARY 26, 2007

B [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJ!, LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA AND D.K.
JAIN, JJ.)
""--·
UP. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956-Rule 3-Misconduct
c by Addi. District & Sessions Judge in grant of bail-Two of three accused
in a case granted bail by High Court-Third one, continuing in custody after
three of his bail applications were rejected, granted bail on fourth
application-On a complainant that Judge had accepted illegal gratification
for grant of bail, enquiry conducted by High Court, though finding no
evidence thereof, concluded that grant of bail was in utter disregard of
D judicial norms-Full Court imposing major punishment of withholding two
-
annual increments-On a writ petition of Judge against it, High Court
substituting that punishment with reduction in rank to next below- .._
Correctness of-Judge was well within his right to grant bail in discharge t
ofhis judicial functions, especially as there was no statutory bar-Disciplinary
E proceedings by High Court for passing such an order would adversely affect
morale of subordinate judiciary-It was more so as the proceedings were
based solely on a complaint, contents of which were not believed by High
Court to be true, and there were no strong grounds suspecting judge's bona
fides or order itself being actuated by malice, bias or illegality-Though in
F previous bail applications many of contentions of accused were considered,
but he had right to file bail application at any stage as an under-trial
).._.,
prisoner, and fact that two other accused had already been enlarged on bail
was a valid reason for granting bail to him, more so when he had been in
jail for one year and charge-sheet had already been filed-It was noteworthy
that neither State nor complainant appealed against grant of bail, and State
G had not alleged he was likely to abuse it or abscond-Cognizance of fact
that Magistrate who recorded dying declaration was once tenant of
complainant was not totally unwarranted and a superfluous reasoning, and
fact that case was of daylight murder wherein two persons died was not
I "-
adequate to reject bail-Punishment imposed found to be draconian and
H unjust especially as confidential reports of the Judge indicated that his
198
RAMESH CHANDER SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD 199
integrity and honesty had never been doubted-Matter remitted to Full A
Court to consider afresh question of imposition punishment.

The appellant joined the Provincial Civil Service (Judicial). He was
promoted to the Higher Judicial Service and posted as Addi. District &
Sessions Judge. A crime registered by the Police Station was allotted to his
court for trial and disposal. Two of the three accused in that case had been B
granted bail by High Court. However, one of them continued to be in custody,
his three applications for bail having been rejected. On his fourth bail
application, the appellant granted bail to him on the ground that (i) the charge
- _x
sheet had been filed by the police (ii) his father was dangerously ill (iii) he
was a student (iv) he had no previous conviction or involvement in any criminal
case (v) the Tehsildar who recorded the dying declaration of deceased was a
c
close acquaintance of the deceased (vi) there was no likelihood of his
absconding or interfering with the trial of the case, influencing the witnesses
. or committing any fresh offence.

However, when this bail application had come up for hearing, the D
appellant noticed that complainant had filed an application before the Sessions
Judge for its transfer to some other court. But as the government counsel
stated that he had full faith in the court and the counsel for complainant did
not raise any objection, and as no stay order was produced, appellant proceeded
>
with the hearing of the case.
E
Complainant sent a complaint to the High Court alleging that the
appellant had accepted illegal gratification for granting bail. As a Prima facie
case was found against the appellant for dereliction of duty and judicial
dishonesty, the Administrative Committee initiated departmental enquiry. A
charge sheet was produced against appellant alleging that (i) he granted bail
F
for extraneous consideration with oblique motives on insufficient grounds (ii)
....-....: he was guilty of misconduct and failed to maintain absolute integrity and
devotion to duty within the meaning of Rule 3 ofU.P. Government Servants
Conduct Rules, 1956.

A sitting Judge of the High Court conducted the enquiry and gave his G
report. Though there was no specific charge that the appellant had received
money as illegal gratification, this aspect also was considered. The report
"'I concluded that there was no element of truth in the allegation that the appellant
had received illegal gratification. However, it was found that the bail application
granted by the appellant was in utter disregard of the judicial norms, on
H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 3 S.C.R.

A insufficient grounds and appeared to be based on extraneous consideration
as (i) a heinous and daring offence had been committed in broad daylight and
two persuns had been shot dead in a crowded area next to the Collectorate (ii)
the accused were named in the FIR as well as in the dying declarations (iii)
earlier bail applications were rejected on merits. Based on this enquiry report,
and after serving the appellant a notice to show cause, the Full Court imposed
B a major punishment of withholding his two annual increments. Aggrieved by
this, he filed a review application against the said punishment and but it was
rejected. Thereupon, he filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution oflndia, 1950. While dismissing this petition, the appellant was ""- ..
directed to show cause as to why the High Court should not consider
c substitution of the punishment imposed on him with his removal him from
service. Pursuant to this, the appellant presented his case, but was reduced
in the rank next below. Both these judgments of the Division Bench are
impugned by the appellant.
•
Appellant contended that he was not charged for receiving any illegal
D gratification for granting bail to the accused, and the charge, if at all, was
vague and not specific.

Respondent contended that on three previous occasions the bail had been .._
declined to the very same accused and as there was no change in the 1
circumstances, the appellant should not have considered the fourth bail
E application.

Disposing of the appeal, the Court

HELD 1.1. The appellant-officer was well within his right to grant bail
to the accused in discharge of his judicial functions. Unlike provisions for
F granting bail in TADA Act or NDPS Act, there was no statutory bar in
granting bail to the accused in this case. A Sessions Judge was competent to ..__
grant bail and if any disciplinary proceedings are initiated against the officer
for passing such an order, it would adversely affect the morale of subordinate
judiciary and no officer would be able to exercise this power freely and
G independently. [Para 11] [209-A-B]

l.2. The High Court arrived at a decision to initiate disciplinary
proceedings solely based on the complaint, the contents of which were not ·" ·-
I

believed to be true by the High Court. If the High Court were to initiate
disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there should have been
H strong grounds to suspect officer's bona fides and the order itself should
RAMESH CHANDER SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD 20 \

have been actuated by malice, bias or illegality. [Para 11] [208-A, H] A
/swar Chandra Jain v. High Court ofPunjab and Haryana, AIR (1988)
SC 1395, KP. Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Al R (1994) SC 1031, Kashi
Nath Roy v. The State of Bihar, AIR (1996) SC 3240 and Lunjarrao Bhikaji
Nagarkar v. Union of India, AIR (1999) SC 2881, relied on
B
Bra) Kishore Thakur v. Union of India, AIR (1997) SC 1157 and Alok
Kumar Roy v. Dr. S.N. Sarma, AIR (1968) SC 453, referred to

2. Of course, in the previous bail applications, many of the contentions
raised by the accused were considered, but an accused has the right to file
bail application at any stage when undergoing imprisonment as an under-trial C
prisoner. The fact that the two other accused had already been enlarged on
bail was a valid reason for granting bail to accused Ram Pal. Moreover,
accused Ram Pal had been in jail for one year as an under-trial prisoner and
the charge-sheet had already been filed. If accused Ram Pal were to be denied
bail in these circumstances, it would have been a travesty of justice especially D
when all factors relevant to be gone into for considering the bail application
were heavily loaded in favour of grant of bail to accused Ram Pal. [Para 101

3. Neither the State nor the complainant had filed any appeal against
the order passed by the appellant. The State did not allege that the accused
who had been granted bail was likely to abuse his bail or likely to abscond. E
[Para 81

4.1. In the bail order, the appellant stated that there was an allegation
that the Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration was once upon a time
a tenant in one of the houses owned by the complainant. Taking cognizance of
this fact by the appellant in the order could not be said to be a totally F
unwarranted and a superfluous reasoning. [Para 91

4.2. The fact that it was a case of daylight murder wherein two persons
died is not adequate to hold that the accused were not entitled to bail at all.
(Para 18]
G
5. Though the complainant filed application for transfer of case, he did
not press for stay of the proceedings. The appellant-officer came to know about
the filing of the transfer application and brought this fact to the notice of the
counsel who appeared for the complainant and also the State prosecutor. Both
the counsel had no objection to the hearing of the bail application by the H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 3 S.C.R.

A appellant and accordingly the appellant heard the bail application and passed ,.
the order granting bail to Ram Pal. It is clear that by filing a frivolous transfer
application the complainant only intended to create a sense of threat so as to
influence the appellant not to grant bail to the accused. The filing of the
transfer application by the complainant could not be viewed from any other
B angle. Despite this, the complainant did not file any application for cancellation
of bail granted to the accused. (Para 8)

6. Apart from the merits of the case, the Confidential Reports of the
appellant officer have also to be gone into. His integrity and honesty had never
been doubted at any point of time. In some of the confidential reports except
C stating that the appellant-officer was not having smooth relationship with the
advocates, no other adverse remarks had been entered. Two Senior Judges of
the High Court have entered in his confidential register that the appellant is
an officer of honesty and integrity. [Para 18)

7. The punishment of reverting the appellant to the post of Civil Judge
D (Sr. Division), in the facts and circumstances of this case could only be termed
as draconian and unjust. The appellant had been in the cadre of District Judge
for eight years at the time this grave punishment of reversion to a lower rank
was imposed on him. The punishment was clearly disproportionate to the lapse
alleged to have been committed by him. The imposition of the punishment of
withholding two increments with cumulative effect also appears to be
E disproportionate to the alleged lapse. [Para 18)
8. The appellant shall be immediately posted to the cadre of District
Judge and paid all monetary benefits due to him as a consequence thereof.
The initial order passed by the Full court of the High Court imposing the
F penalty of withholding two increments to the appellant with cumulative effect
is also set aside. As the Full Court alone is the ultimate competent authority
to consider all disciplinary matters and has indeed taken the impugned
decision before, the matter is remitted to the Full Court to consider afresh
the question of imposition of appropriate punishment on the appellant.
[Paras 19, 20, 21)
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2015 of2006.

From the Judgment and Final Order dated 3.10.2005 & 25.11.2005 of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in C.M.W.P. No. 31769/2000.

H Subhash Shanna, B.P.S. Dharkey, Shwetambra Singh, Ravinder Shanna
RAMESHCHANDERSINGHv. HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD [BALA KRISHNAN, J.] 203
and V.K. Vasdev for the Appellant. A
Ravi Prakash Mehrotra and Garvesh Kabra for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJ. I. The appellant is a judicial officer in thl. B
State ofUttar Pradesh. He joined the Provincial Civil Service (Judicial) in the
year 1976 and in May 1994 he was promoted to the Higher Judicial Service
and posted as Addi. District & Sessions Judge at Jhansi. A crime No. 180 of
1995 registered by the Police Station at Nawabad was committed to the
Sessions Court at Jhansi and allotted to the appellant's court for trial and
disposal. There were three accused in that case, namely, Ram Pal, Raghunath C
and Rajendra. The crime related to an incident which happened on 22.5.1995.
The allegation in the First Information Report was that accused Ram Pal and
Raghunath used fire-arms and shot dead Pratap Yadubir Singh and Devendra
Pipraiya within the compound of District Panchayat Bhawan at Jhansi. The
Police registered the case for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 D
read with Section 34 !PC. Accused Rajendra was granted bail on 19.8.1995.
The second accused, Raghunath, who allegedly used the fire-arm and killed
one of the victims, was also granted bail on 20.9.1995 by the High Court.
Accused Ram Pal continued to be in custody and moved his first bail
application on 17.11.1995 which was dismissed by the Sessions Judge, Jhansi.
On 11.4.1996, accused Ram Pal moved another bail application and the same E
was dismissed for default. In the third application, which came up for
consideration before the second Addi. Sessions Judge, Jhansi, accused Ram
Pal contended that he had no criminal history and that the Executive Magistrate
(Tehsildar) who recorded the dying declaration used to reside in the house
of the deceased Pratap Yadubir and because of his acquaintance with the F
deceased, the dying declaration recorded by him was not to be given much
credence. Accused Ram Pal further contended that he was a local resident
and there was no likelihood of he being absconding. The Sessions Judge
dismissed the bail application on 15.5.1996. In the fourth bail application,
moved by accused Ram Pal on 19.6.1996, he contended that he was a student;
he had surrendered before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi, on 8.6.1995; G
had been in custody for more than one year and that his co-accused had been
released on bail. He pleaded that his father was seriously ill and in support
of this contention, he produced a medical certificate from a Professor of
Medical College at Jhansi to show that his father had suffered a heart-attack
on 16.5.1996. By an order passed on 22.6.1996, the appellant herein granted H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 3 S.C.R.

A bail to accused Ram Pal. The main reasons attributed by the appellant for
granting bail to accused Ram Pal were that the charge sheet had been filed
by the police; the accused had stated that his father was dangerously ill; the
accused was a student; and that the accused had no previous conviction or
involvement in any criminal case. The appellant also observed in the bail
order that the Tehsildar who recorded the dying declaration was a close
B acquaintance of the deceased. Considering the totality of the circumstances
and as there was no likelihood of the accused absconding or interfering with
the trial of the case influencing the witnesses or committing any fresh offence,
the bail application was allowed by the appellant.

C 2. It may also be noticed that when the bail application of the accused
came up on 22.6.1996, the appellant noticed that the brother of the defacto
complainant had filed an application before the Sessions Judge for the transfer
of the bail application to some other court. It appears that the hearing of bail
petition was adjourned in the morning of 22.6.1996 for want of a specific
report from the Addi. District Govt. Counsel (ADGC) and later, on the same
D day, it was taken up when the ADGC stated that he had full faith in the court
and the counsel, who was engaged by the complainant, did not raise any
objection and was prepared to argue the bail application. No stay order was
produced before the appellant and therefore, the appellant proceeded with the
hearing of the case and passed the order on the very same day granting bail
1
E to accused Ram Pal on his furnishing a bond for Rs.20,000/- with two sureties.

3. On 10.7.1996, complainant Jagdeo Singh sent a complaint to the High
Court alleging that the appellant had accepted illegal gratification for granting
bail to accused Ram Pal. This complaint was placed before the Inspecting
Judge and after going through the material on record the learned Inspecting
F Judge was of the view that there was a Prima facie case against the officer
concerned, for dereliction of duty and judicial dishonesty while granting bail.
The Administrative Committee initiated departmental enquiry against the
appellant. It may further be noticed that in the complaint filed by Jagdeo
Singh, he alleged that it was being said in the village that a sum of Rs.80,000/
- had been paid to the appellant and bail would be granted by him and that
G nobody could stop it. He had also mentioned about the transfer application
filed by him before the Distt. Judge and alleged that despite the filing of the
said transfer application, the bail application was heard and allowed. He
,.
JI'-\ -
prayed for the transfer of the case to some other court.

4. In the transfer application filed by the brother of the complainant,
H
RAMESH CHANDER SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD [BALAKRISHNAN, l] 205
there was an allegation that a sum of Rs. 80,000/- was paid and that it was A
... settled through a library clerk with the involvement of two other clerks. In the
transfer application, he also alleged that the brother and father of accused
Ram Pal were found going in and coming out of the residence of the appellant.
Despite all these allegations, no charge was framed against the appellant that
he had received illegal gratification for granting bail. The charge sheet contain'ed
the only allegation that the bail order was passed by the appellant for B
extraneous consideration with oblique motives on insufficient grounds and
that the appellant was guilty of misconduct and failed to maintain absolute
--" integrity and devotion to duty within the meaning of Rule 3 ofU.P. Government
Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. The charge sheet as well as the statement of
facts are clubbed together and the gist of allegations is contained in paragraphs c
6 and 7 of the charge sheet.

5. A sitting Judge of the High Court conducted the enquiry and gave
his report. Though there was no charge specifically brought against the
appellant that he had received a sum ofRs.80,000/- as illegal gratification, this
aspect also was considered by the learned Judge. On· behalf of the complainant, D
PW-I Jagdeo Singh was examined and he made a specific allegation that the
father of the accused had withdrawn Rs.80,000/- from the bank and that the
~.,
bail application was allowed on the next day. He did not, however, claim to
have any direct knowledge. He deposed that he had gathered this information
from a labourer. He did not take any steps to summon the bank record. PW-
E
I was completely disbelieved by the learned Judge who conducted the inquiry.
The case set up by the complainant was not supported by other witnesses.
The counsel who appeared for the brother of the deceased and moved the
application for transfer, stated that the brother of the deceased did not tell
him that there was a rumour in the village about payment ofRs.80,000/-. The
Judge who conducted the inquiry elaborately considered the various aspects F
_... of the matter and concluded that there was no element of truth in the
allegation that the appellant had received illegal gratification. The evidence
of PW-I on this aspect was disbelieved. However, the learned Judge inquiring
the matter eventually came to the conclusion that the bail had been granted
by the appellant in utter disregard of judicial norms and on insufficient
grounds and based on extraneous consideration with oblique motive and the
G

.. '
;'.
.
charges had been proved. It is important to note that the Judge who conducted
the enquiry has not stated in his report as to what was the oblique motive
or the extraneous consideration involved in the matter.

6. Based on the enquiry report, the appellant was served with a notice H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A to show cause as to why his two increments should not be withheld with
cumulative effect. The matter was placed before the Full Court on 20.11.1999
and the Full Court by its resolution imposed a major punishment of withholding
two annual increments of the appellant with cumulative effect. The appellant
filed a review application against the said punishment and the same was
rejected. Thereupon, he filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the
B Constitution challenging the punishment imposed on him. By judgment dated
3.10.2005, the writ petition was dismissed and in the very same judgment the
appellant was directed to show cause within three weeks from the date of the
judgment as to why the High Court should not consider substitution of the
punishment imposed, by removing him from service. Pursuant to the notice,
C the appellant appeared and presented his case before the Division Bench. By
judgment dated 25.11.2005, the appellant was reduced to the rank next below,
that is, Civil Judge (Senior Division). Both the judgments of the Division
Bench are challenged before us.

7. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended before us that the
D appellant was not charged for receiving any illegal gratification for granting
bail to the accused in Crime No. 180 of 1995 registered by the Police Station
at Nawabad. The charge, if at all, was vague and it only stated that the bail
order had been passed by the delinquent officer [appellant] for extraneous
consideration with oblique motive on insufficient grounds, without cogent
E and tangible reasons, and that he attempted to justify his order by superfluous
reasoning by making adverse comments on the conduct of the Executive
Magistrate, who recorded the dying declaration, fully knowing that it was a
broad daylight double-murder case and that the grounds were not fit for
granting bail and these factors revealed that the order had been passed for
extraneous consideration. It was argued that there was no specific charge that
F the appellant received any monetary consideration from any of the accused
or his relatives. The appellant's counsel also pointed out that though the
complainant specifically alleged that a sum of Rs. 80,000/- was given to the
appellant-officer and that this money had been obtained from the bank on the
previous day by the father of accused Ram Pal, these allegations were not
G proved and that the complainant, at the time of enquiry, stated that he had
heard of this story from some servants and from the very nature of the
allegation, they were disbelieved and that was why a specific charge was not
framed against the appellant. It was further argued by appellant's counsel that
though there was no charge against the appellant, the Judge who conducted
the enquiry allowed the complainant to adduce evidence, and eventually he
H came to the conclusion that there was absolutely no evidence show that the
RAMESH CHANDER SINGH"· HIGH COURTOF ALLAHABAD[BALAKRISHNAN, J] 207

delinquent officer had received any illegal gratification from any party . A
...
8. The question for consideration is whether the appellant had granted
bail on insufficient grounds or was justified in passing such an order. Granting
of bail to accused pending trial is one of the significant judicial functions to
be performed by a Judicial Officer. Jn the instant case, neither the State nor
the complainant had filed any appeal against the order passed by the appellant. B
The State did not allege that the accused who had been granted bail was
likely to abuse his bail or likely to abscond. It is also pertinent to note that
_J( the accused to whom the appellant had granted bail was one of the three
accused against whom charge sheet had been filed by the police. The other
two accused were Rejendra and Raghu Nath. As per the First Information
Report, Ram Pal, to whom the appellant had granted bail, and Raghu Nath,
c
who obtained bail from the High Court, had used fire-arms as a result of which
two persons died. As per the prosecution case, the accused Ram Pal is
alleged to have caused the death of one of the victims while accused Raghu
Nath was alleged to have caused the death of the other victim. Accused
Raghu Nath was granted bail by the High Court on 20.9.1995. Accused D
Rajendra was granted bail as early as 19.8.1995. Accused Ram Pal had been
in custody for more than one year. The police had already filed the charge-
~-<
sheet against him and the court was yet to frame the charge against all the
}-
accused. Accused Ram Pal was a student and he alleged that had he suffered
a loss of one year's study. He also alleged that his father was seriously ill
E
due to a heart ailment and he produced a medical certificate from one of the
professors working in the local medical college. It was under these
circumstances that the bail application filed by Ram Pal came to be heard by
the appellant and he granted bail to him by an order passed on 22.6.1996. It
is also important that the complainant made an attempt to have the bail
application transferred from the court of the appellant to the court of the F
,........ Principal Sessions Court. Though he filed the application for transfer, he did
not press for stay of the proceedings. The appellant-officer came to know
about the filing of the transfer application and brought this fact to the notice
of the counsel who appeared for the complainant and also the State prosecutor.
Both the counsel had no objection to the hearing of the bail application by
the appellant and accordingly the appellant heard the bail application and
G
passed the order granting bail to Ram Pal. It is clear that by filing a frivolous
,._._.>':
transfer application the complainant only intended to create a sense of threat
so as to influence the appellant not to grant bail to the accused. The filing
of the transfer application by the complainant could not be viewed from any
other angle. Despite this, the complainant did not file any application for H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A cancellation of bail granted to the accused. .,.._
9. The learned Judge who conducted the enquiry held that in the facts
of the case where a heinous and daring offence had been committed in broad
daylight and two persons had been shot dead in a crowded area next to the
Collectorate at Jhansi and the accused were named in the FIR as well as in
B the dying declarations and their bail applications having been considered and
rejected twice on merits by the respective courts, the third bail application

c
granted by the charged officer in utter disregard of the judicial norms and on
insufficient grounds appears to be based on extraneous consideration. The
learned enquiry Judge did not care to take notice of the fact that the co-
accused who were similarly situate had been granted bail by the High Court
and that accused Ram Pal, who was a student and had been in jail for more
-
than one year was granted bail for cogent reasons, set out in the order passed
by the appellant. In the bail order, the appellant stated that there was an
allegation that the Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration was once
upon a time a tenant in one of the houses owned by the complainant. Taking
D cognizance of this fact by the appellant in the order could not be said to be
a totally unwarranted and a superfluous reasoning.

I0. The counsel for the respondent pointed out that on three previous .....
occasions the bail had been declined to the very same accused and as there -I
was no change in the circumstances, the appellant-officer shou Id not have
E considered the fourth bail application as well. Of course, in the previous bail
applications, many of the contentions raised by the accused were considered,
but an accused has the right to file bail application at any stage when
undergoing imprisonment as an under-trial prisoner. The fact that the two
other accused had already been enlarged on bail was a valid reason for
F granting bail to accused Ram Pal. Moreover, accused Ram Pal had been in jail
for one year as an under-trial prisoner and the charge-sheet had already been
filed. In our opinion, if accused Ram Pal were to be denied bail in these
circ:umstances, it would have been a travesty of justice especially when all
factors relevant to be gone into for considering the bail application were
heavily loaded in favour of grant of bail to accused Ram Pal.
G
11. We fail to understand as to how the High Court arrived at a decision -
to initiate disciplinary proceedings solely based on the complaint, the contents :"-<
of which were not believed to be true by the High Court. If the High Court
were to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there
should have been strong grounds to suspect officer's bona fides and the
H
RAMESH CHANDER SINGH v. HIGH COURTOF ALLAHABAD [BALAKRISHNAN, J) 209

,,, order itself should have been actuated by malice, bias or illegality. The A
appellant-officer was well within his right to grant bail to the accused in
discharge of his judicial functions. Unlike provisions for granting bail in
TADA Act or NDPS Act, there was no statutory bar in granting bail to the
accused in this case. A Sessions Judge was competent to grant bail and if
any disciplinary proceedings are initiated against the officer for passing such
an order, it would adversely affect the morale of subordinate judiciary and no
B
officer would be able to exercise this power freely and independently.

_., 12. This Court on several occasions has disapproved the practice of
initiation of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the subordinate
judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by them are wrong;
The appellate and revisional courts have been established and given powers
c
to set aside such orders. The higher courts after hearing the appeal may
modify or set aside erroneous judgments of the lower courts. While taking
disciplinary action based on judicial orders, High Court must take extra care
and caution.
D
13. In lswar Chandra Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, AIR
(1988) SC 1395, this Court observed that while exercising control over
subordinate judiciary under Art. 235 of the Constitution, the High Court is
under a Constitutional obligation to guide and protect subordinate judicial
officers. An honest and strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries. If
complaints are entertained in trifling matters and if the High Court encourages E
anonymous complaints, no judicial officer would feel secure and it would be
difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner.
It is imperative that the High Court should take steps to protect honest
judicial officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by
unscrupulous lawyers and litigants. F
.... 14. In K.P. Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1994) SC 1031,
where the High Court reversed the order passed by the lower court making
remarks about interestedness and motive of the lower court in passing the
unmerited order, this Court observed that one of the functions of the higher
court is either to modify or set aside erroneous orders passed by the lower G
courts. Our legal system acknowledges fallibility of judges. It has to be kept
,.. ~ in mind that a subordinate judicial officer works mostly in a charged
atmosphere. He is under a psychological pressure - contestants and lawyers
breathing down his neck. He does not enjoy the detached atmosphere of the
higher court. Every error, however gross it may be, should not be attributed
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210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A to improper motives. The Judges of the High Court have a responsibility to
ensure judicial discipline and respect for the judiciary from all concerned. No
.....
greater damage can be done to the administration of justice and to the
confidence of the people in the judiciary if the higher courts express lack of
faith in the subordinate judiciary for some reason or other. That amounts to
destruction of judiciary from within.
B
15. Jn Kashi Nath Roy v. The State of Bihar, AIR (1996) SC 3240, this
Court observed under a similar circumstance that in our system appellate and
revisional courts have been set up with the presupposition that the lower 'j-- -
courts in some measure of cases can go wrong in decision making in law and
c in fact. The higher courts have been established to correct errors. In cases
where intolerable error is pointed out, it is functionally required to correct the
error in an appropriate case and in a manner befitting maintaining dignity of
the court and indepen,Jence of the judiciary. The higher court should convey
its message in the judgment to the officer concerned through a process of
reasoning, essentially persuasive, reasonable, mellowed but clear and result
D oriented and rarely a rebuke.

16. In series of other cases also, this court disfavoured the practice of
passing strictures or orders against the subordinate officers. (See : Braj ' -
Kishore Thakur v. Union of India, AIR (1997) SC 1157; Alok Kumar Roy v. ~

Dr. S.N. Sarma, AIR (1968) SC 453).
E
17. In Lunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India, AIR (1999) SC
2881, this Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi judicial
authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the basis
for initiating disciplinary proceeding. Of course, if the Judicial Officer conducted
in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or
F there is a Prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge
of his duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had ....
passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court by virtue of its
power under Art. 235 of the Constitution may exercise its supervisory
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances it should be kept in mind
G that the Judges at all levels have to administer justice without fear or favour.
Fearlessness and maintenance of judicial independence are very essential for
an efficacious judicial system. Making adverse comments against subordinate
judicial officers and subjecting them to severe disciplinary proceedings would
"' .•
ultimately harm the judicial system at the grassroot level.
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RAMESH CHANDER SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD [BALAKRISHNAN, J.] 21 J

18. Apart from the merits of the case before us, we have also gone into A
the Confidential Reports of the appellant officer. His integrity and honesty
had never been doubted at any point of time. In some of the confidential
reports except stating that the appellant-officer was not having smooth
relationship with the advocates, no other adverse remarks had been entered.
Two Senior Judges of the High Court have entered in his confidential register B
that the appellant is an officer of honesty and integrity. The fact that it was
a case of daylight murder wherein two persons died, is not adequate to hold
that the accused were not entitled to bail at all. Passing order on a bail
application is a matter of discretion which is exercised by a Judicial Officer
with utmost responsibility. When a co-accused had been granted bail by the
High Court, the appellant cannot be said to have passed an unjustified order C
granting bail, that too, to an accused who was a student and had been in jail
for more than one year. If at all, the Inspecting Judge had found anything
wrong with the Order, he should have sent for the officer and advised him
to be careful in future. The punishment of reverting the appellant to the post
of Civil Judge (Sr. Division), in the facts and circumstances of this case could
only be termed as draconian and unjust. The appellant had been in the cadre D
of District Judge for eight years at the time this grave punishment of reversion
to a lower rank was imposed on him. In our opinion, the punishment was
clearly disproportionate to the lapse alleged to have been committed by him.
The imposition of the punishment of withholding two increments with
cumulative effect also appears to be disproportionate to the alleged lapse. E

19. Consequently, we set aside the Judgment of the High Court dated
3.10.2005 and also the Judgment rendered by the very same court on 25.11.2005.
The appellant shall .be immediately posted to the cadre of District Judge and
paid all monetary benefits due to him as a consequence thereof. We also set
aside the initial order passed by the Full court of the High Court imposing F
the penalty of withholding two increments to the appellant with cumulative
effect.

20. As the Full Court alone is the ultimate competent authority to
consider all disciplinary matters and has indeed taken the decision impugned
before us, we remit the matter to the Full Court to consider afresh the question G
of imposition of appropriate punishment on the appellant.

21. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

vs. Appeal disposed of.
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