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Supreme Court of India

RAMESH KRISHNA MADHUSUDAN NAYARversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation
2008 INSC 13
Decided
7 January 2008
Disposal
Case Partly allowed

Holding

A conviction can be based on a single wholly reliable witness, but the facts did not meet the criteria of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, so the appropriate conviction is under Section 304 Part I.

Summary

The appellant, Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar, was convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC based solely on the testimony of a single eye‑witness, PW‑5, who claimed to have seen Nayar strike the deceased with a wooden log during a quarrel. The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing that a single witness's testimony was insufficient and that the incident fell under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, warranting a conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 Part I). The Supreme Court held that under Section 134 of the Evidence Act, a conviction can rest on a single witness if the witness is wholly reliable, and that the factual circumstances did not satisfy all the ingredients of Exception 4. Consequently, the Court altered the conviction to Section 304 Part I and reduced the sentence to ten years' imprisonment. The appeal was therefore partly allowed.

Issues considered

  • Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained on the testimony of a single eye‑witness under Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
  • Whether the facts of the case fall within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, thereby reducing the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I.

Legislation cited

Subjects

MurderCulpable homicide not amounting to murderSection 300 Exception 4Section 304 Part IEvidence Act Section 134Single eyewitness testimonyReliability of witnessSudden quarrelPremeditationUndue advantageCruel and unusual mannerConviction alterationAppeal

Judgment

                          [2008] 1 S.C.R.-150


A          RAMESH KRISHNA MADHUSUDAN NAYAR                             ~I

                                   v.
                 THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
                     (Crl. A. No. 12 of 2008)
                         JANUARY 7, 2008
B
         [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.]

       Penal Code, 1860: ss. 300, exception 4, 304 (Part /) and
  302 - Murder or Culpable Homicide not amounting to murder
c - Quarrel between parties over a trivial issue - Fatal blows by
  wooden Jog on head of deceased - Convicti.on u/s. 302 by
  courts below on basis of sole testimony of eye witness -On
  appeal held: Conviction can be based on testimony.of single
  witness if he is wholly reliable - In facts and circumstances of
  the case, conviction altered to s. 304 (Part I) - Custodia/
D
  sentence altered to ten years - Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 134.
         s.300, Exception 4 - Applicability of - Explained.            ~
         s. 300, Exceptions 1 and 4-Distinction between-
    Explained.
E
          Evidence Act, 1872: s. 134 - Number of witnesses - No
    particular number of witnesses is required to establish the case
    - Conviction can be based on evidence of sole eye witness if
    he is wholly reliable - Corroboration is required when he is
    only partially reliable.
F                                                                      ~    ..
         Words and phrases: 'Fight', 'sudden fight' and 'undue
    advantage'-Meaning of-In the context of Exception 4 to
    s.300, /PC.
         Altercations took place between the appellant and
G the deceased over a minor issue dL•ring mid night. In the
  morning, complainant saw the appellant and the deceased
  quarrelling and appellant inflicting two blows by wooden
  iog on the head of deceased. The deceased became
  unconscious and was taken to the hospital. FIR was
H                            150
    .
                RAMESH KRISHNA MADHUS~DAN NAYAR v.                 151
                    THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

~         . lodged. Trial Court relying on the_ evidence of the A
            complainant-PW 5 convicted the appellant under section
            302 IPC and imposed life imprisonment. Hence the present
            appeal.
                Appellant-accused contended that the conviction
           could not be recorded solely on the testimony of one B
           alleged eye-witness PW-5; that on facts, s. 302 IPC was
           not applicable; and that in course of a sudden quarrel the
    '<'
           incident happened, as such exception 4 to s. 300 IPC was
           applicable.
                                                                         c
                Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
                 HELD: 1.1 Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872
           clearly states that no particular number of witnesses is
           required to establish the case. Conviction can be based
           on the testimony of a single witness if he is wholly reliable. D
           Corroboration may be necessary when he is only partially
           reliable. If the evidence is unblemished and beyond all
~          possible criticism and the court is satisfied that the
           witness was speaking the truth then on his evidence
           alone conviction can be maintained. [Para 7] [154-B-C]         E
                1.2 For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to
           Section 300 IPC, it has to be established that the act was
           committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the
           heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the
~          offender having taken undue advantage and not having          F
           acted in a cruel or unusual manner. [Para 8] [154-D]
                Sridhar Bhuyan v. State of Orissa JT 2004 (6) SC 299;
           Prakash Chand v. State of H. P JT 2004 (6) SC 302; Sachchey
           Lal Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh JT 2004 (8) SC 534;
                                                                       G
           Sandhya Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra 2006 (4) SCC 653;
           Lachman Singh v. State of Haryana 2006 (10) SCC 524 -
l
           relied on.
               1.3 Considering the factual background the inevitable
           conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be H
    152       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2008] 1 S.C.R.


A   under Section 304 Part I, IPC and not Section 302 IPC.              ••
    Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of
    justice. [Para 11) [156-A-B]
         CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 12 of 2008.
B
         From the Judgment and final Order dated 8.9.2004 of the
    High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in
    Crl.A. No.10/2001]

          Birnal Roy Jad and Sunita Pandit for the Appellant.
c
          R.K. Adsure for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
D       2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of Bombay
  High Court, Aurangabad Bench, dismissing the appeal of the
  appellant who faced trial for alleged commission of offence
  punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
  (in short 'IPC') and was sentenced to imprisonment for life by
E learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmednagar.

          3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
         The complainant Sajay Vithal was serving as a Waiter in
  Sanjog Hotel for 2-1/2 months prior to the incident. Pradip
F Panjabi is the owner of the said hotel. Business in the hotel is      ~    •
  conducted from 5 p.m. to 11 p.m. After closure of the hotel,
  complainant Sanjay alongwith 5 workers of the hotel used to
  reside in a staff room. Hotel was closed on 3.11.1999 at 11.30
  p.m. Pradip Panjabi and other staff members went out at about
G 1 a.m. Thereafter on 4.11.1999 around 1.30 a.m. in the night,
  altercations took place between Ramesh Nayar and Anna Devraj
  (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') on the point of
  switching off the lights. Both used to reside in the staff room. At
  that time, complainant, Kundlik Chavhan and Chhotu intervened.
H Thereafter complainant and Anna Devraj slept in the staff room.
           RAMESH KRISHNA MADHUSUDAN NAYAR v.                     153

.
..,
          THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [PASAYAT, J.]

      At about 8.30 a.m. complainant heard loud noise relating to a A
      quarrel and got up. He saw the accused and the deceased
      quarrelling and accused inflicting two blows by a wooden log
      on the head of Anna Devraj. Ramesh Nayar threatened. the
      complainant that if he disclosed anything to anybody, he will
                a
      teach him lesson. Hence complainant went out of the room. B
      He disclosed the incident to the persons in the tiotel working as
      gardeners in the morning. At that time, Anna Devraj was not
"'    speaking anything. He was lying unconscious and moaning.
      Thereafter owner of the hotel was informed on phone. He came
      and the deceased was shifted to Civil Hospital for treatment.     c
      His right ear was bleeding. Thereafter, the complainant and hotel
      owner went to Tophkhana Police Station and reported the matter
      to police as per Exh.26. AS.I. Puri registered the offence as
      Crime No.227/99 under Sections 307, 506 of IPC and handed
      over investigation to PW.7. P.S.I. Jyoti Madhav Karandikar. After
                                                                        D
      completion of investigation, charge sheet was placed and
      accused-appellant faced trial as he denied the occurrence and
~     pleaded false implication. The trial Court placed reliance on
      the evidence of Sanjay Diwate (PW-5). It is to be noted that
      certain other persons i.e. Dhirendera Suryavanshi (PW-2),
      Ashok Palve (PW-3) and Datta Pingale (PW-6) were claimed E
      to be eye-witnesses, but they made departure from the
      statements given during investigation. The trial Court found
      the evidence of PW-5 to be credible and cogent and recorded
      his conviction and imposed the sentence of imprisonment
      for life.                                                         F

           4. The conviction and sentence were challenged before
      the High Court, which as noted above, dismissed the appeal.
             5. In support of the appeal, leaned counsel for the appellant
      submitted that the conviction could not have been recorded solely G
      on the testimony of one alleged eye-witness PW-5. Alternatively,
      it is submitted that Section 302 IPC has no application to the
      facts of the case in view of the factual scenario highlighted.
      According to him in course of a sudden quarrel the incident
      happened. In other words, according to him Exception 4 to H
    154       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2008] 1 S.C.R


A Section 300 IPC applies.                                               r-   j



        6. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other
    hand supported the judgment of conviction and sentence.
        7. Coming to the question whether on the basis of a solitary
B evidence   conviction can be maintained, a bare reference to
  Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence
  Act") would suffice. The provision clearly states that no particular
  number of witnesses is required to establish the case.
  Conviction can be based on the testimony of a single witness if
c he is wholly reliable. Corroboration may be necessary when he
  is only partially reliable. If the evidence is unblemished and
  beyond all possible criticism and the court is satisfied that the
  witness was speaking the truth then on his evidence alone
  conviction can be maintained.
D         8. For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to Section 300
    IPC, it has to be established that the act was committed without
    premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a
    sudden quarrel without the offender having taken undue
    advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
E
         9. The Fourth Exception of Section 300, IPC covers acts
   done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of
   prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its
   place would have been more appropriate. The exception is
   founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence
F· of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is       ~
   total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is
   only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reasons·
   and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do.
   There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the
G injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In
   fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that
   a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the
   origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have
   originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them
H in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A 'sudden fight' implies
                     RAMESH KRISHNA MADHUSUDAN NAYAR v.                       155
                    THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [PASAYAT, J.]
I    1         mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide                A
               committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation,
               nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side.
               For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable
               would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or
               determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which        B
               both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one
               of them starts it, but if the other had not aggmvated it by his own
    ""'\       conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is
               then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to
               apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter.           c
               The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a)
               without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the
               offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
               unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person
               killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients         D
               mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the 'fight'
               occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC is not defined in
~~         .
               the IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires
               that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in
               this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on
                                                                                      E
               account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a
               combat between two and more persons whether with or without
               weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to
               what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of
               fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily
.,,.           depend upon the proved facts of each cas.e. For the application        F
               of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden
               quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown
               that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in
               cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as
               used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'.                        G

                    10. The aforesaid aspects have been highlighted in
               Sridhar Bhuyan v. State of Orissa (JT 2004 (6) SC 299),
               Prakash Chand v. State of H.P (JT 2004 (6) SC 302), Sachchey
               Lal Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (JT 2004 (8) SC 534), H
   156        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2008] 1 S.C.R.


A Sandhya Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra [2006(4) SCC 653]
  and Lachman Singh v. State Of Haryana [2006 (10) SCC 524).
       11. Considering the factual background the inevitable
  conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be under
  Section 304 Part I, IPC and not Section 302 IPC. Custodial
8 sentence of 1Oyears would meet the ends of justice.

          ·12. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
   N.J.                                      Appeal partly allowed.


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