Holding

When multiple claimants to a deceased employee’s pension exist and no nomination is made, the State may conduct a bona‑fide departmental inquiry and grant benefits to the rightful heirs; a void second marriage does not deprive the children of legitimacy under Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and they share the pension and gratuity, while the second wife herself is not a legal widow.

Summary

The case concerned the entitlement to family pension and death‑cum‑retirement gratuity of a deceased government employee who had two wives. The first wife, Rameshwari Devi, claimed the benefits for herself and her son, while the second wife, Yogmaya Devi, claimed benefits for herself and her four sons, asserting a valid marriage. The State Government conducted a detailed departmental inquiry, which found that the second marriage was void under the Hindu Marriage Act but that the children were legitimate under Section 16. The Supreme Court held that when multiple claimants exist and no nomination is made, the government may hold a bona‑fide inquiry and cannot wait for a civil court decision before disbursing pension. The inquiry was not a sham, and the children of the void marriage are entitled to an equal share of the pension and gratuity, whereas the second wife herself is not a legal widow. The Court upheld the Division Bench’s decision and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

When can a State Government conduct an inquiry into pension beneficiaries in the absence of a nomination?
Does the absence of a civil court pronouncement on the validity of a second marriage preclude the State from determining pension entitlement?
Is a second marriage that contravenes Section 5(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act void, and what is the status of children born of such a marriage under Section 16?
Are the children of a void marriage entitled to share family pension and death‑cum‑retirement gratuity?
Does the departmental inquiry violate the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and Bihar Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1976?

Legislation cited

Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964s. Rule 21
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955s. 16, s. 5(1)
Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 10, s. 8, s. clause (1), s. Schedule
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 494

Subjects

family pensiondeath‑cum‑retirement gratuityvoid marriagelegitimacy of childrenHindu Marriage ActHindu Succession Actdepartmental inquiryconduct rulesbigamymultiple claimants

Judgment

A RAMESHWARI DEVI
v.
STATE OF BIHAR

JANLARY 27, 2000

B (D.P. WADHWA AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.j

Service Law:

Pension-Family pension and death cum retirement gratllity-Deceased
C employee married twice-Entitlement of second widow and her
sons-Detailed inquiry by State Government-Second Marriage presumed on
basis of cohabitation-Single Judge held, first widow, her son and sons of the
second widow only, entitled to equal share till they attain rnajority--{!pheld
by Division Bench--On appeal Held, disbursement of pension cannot wait
till civil court pronounces upon the respective rights of the parties-Second
D marriage void but children legi.timate-No error in judgement of the Division
Bench-Hindu Marriage Act, 1955-Sections 5( 1) and 16--Hindu Succession
Ac~ 1956.

Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964-Rule 21-Bihar Govem-
E ment Servant's Conduct Rules, 1976-Rule 23-Restriction over second mar-
riage-Proceedings before court of law-Held, State Government not debarred
from conducting separate inquiry to ascertain beneficiaries-Detailed inquiry
cannot be tenned sham.

The Appellunt is the first mdow of the deceased employee having one
F son. The second ltidow has four sons and claimed to have resided with the
deceased as his wife for a long period. The State Government conducted
an inquiry which proved the said cohabitation. Single Judge held that the
appellant and her son alongmth children out of the second marriage, till
they attain majority, were entitled to share the family pension and death
G cum retirement b'l'lltuity. The appellant filed L.P.A. which was dismissed.
Hence this appeal.

The appellant contended before this Court that the State Govern-
ment had no la\,ful authority to condl!ct an inquiry; that such inquiry
could be made if charges of misconduct were levelled during the lifetime
H of the decease; 1:1nd that the second marriage has to be established in a
390
-~-

RAMESHWARI DEVI v. STATE 391

court of law. A
The respondent, second widow, contended that she had been con-
tinuously staying with the deceased as his wife, raising a presumption of
a valid marriage; and that the inquiry had confirmed this continuous
cohabitation.
B
Dismissing this appeal, this Court

HELD 1.1. When there are two claimants to the pensionary benefits
and there is no nomination, wherever required State Government has to
hold an inquiry to find out the rightful claimant. Disbursement of pension
cannot wait till a civil court pronounces upon the respective rights of the
c
parties. Doors of civil courts are always open to any party after and even
before a decision is reached as to who is entitled to pensionary benefits.
(399-B]
1.2. Inquiry conducted by the State Government cannot be a sham D
affair and it could also not be arbitrary as a decision has to be taken in a
bona fide, reasonable and rational manner. The inquiry which was held
cannot be termed as sham. The result of the inquiry raised a presumption
that the second marriage was in accordance with Hindu rites and all
ceremonies connected with a valid Hindu Marriage \";'l!re performed, and
tlie presumption was not rebutted. However, this does not make the second E
marriage legal. (399-C-D]

Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director of Consolidation & Ors., (1978) 3 SCC
527; State of Kamataka and Another v. T. Venkataramanappa, (1996)6 SCC
455 and State of W.B. and Ors. v. Prasenjit Dutta, (1994] 2 SCC 37, relied p
on.

2.1. No civil court has pronounced if there was a second marriage in
. accordance with Hindu rites, but this would not debar the State Govern-
ment from malting an inquiry about the existence of such a marriage ond
act on thot in order to grant pensionary and other benefits. (400-D] G

2.2. The inquiry was quite detailed and two witnesses testified to the
second marriage having witnessed the same. During the course of the
inquiry it was also testified that they both were living as husband - wife
and four sons were born to them. [400-F] H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000) 1 S.C.R.

A 3. The second marriage was in contravention of Section 5 (1) of the
Hindu Marriage Act and was a void marriage, but under Section 16 of this
Act the children are considered legitimate. lJnder the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956, when u Hindu male dies intestate, property devolves firstly on
heirs in clause (1) which includes widow and son, who all get shares. The
B second widow cannot be described as widow of the deceased as their
marriage was void, but their sons being legitimate would be entitled to
equal shares along with the first widow and her son. However, family
pension and deuth-cum-governed by relevant rules. (399-F·H]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 605 of
c 2000.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.4.98 of the Patna High Court
in L.P.A. No. 613 of 1996.

Anurag Dubey, U.D. Tiwari, Rajesh Pathak, A.K. Gupta, S.R. Setia
D and Ms. Mridula Ray Bhardwaj for the Appellant.
K.N. Rawal and R.N. Trivedi, Additional Solicitor Generals, Ms.
Pratibha Jain, S.B. Upadhyay, Mis. Rekha Pandey, D.S. Mehra, B.B. Singh
and K.R. Singh for the Respondents.

E The Judgm1:nt of the Court was delivered by

D.P. WADHWA, J. Leave granted.

Appellant is aggrieved by judgment dated April 23, 1998 of the
Division Bench of the Patna High Court passed in Letters Patent Appeal
F affirming the judgment of the learned single Judge dated April 26, 1996.

Dispute concerns to payment of family pension and death-cum·
retirement gratuity to two wives of Narain Lal, who died in 1987 while
posted as Managing Director, Rural Development Authority of the State ..
of Bihar. Appellant is the first wife. Narain Lal is stated to have married
G second time with Yogmaya Devi on April 10, 1963 while the appellant was
still alive. From the first marriage he had one son and from the second
marriage four sons born in 1964, 1971, 1972 and 1976. Learned single Judge
in his judgment hdd that children born to Narain Lal from the wedlock
with Yogmaya Dt:vi were entitled to share the family pension and death·
H cum-retirement gratuity and further that family pension would be admis-
RAMESHWARIDEVIv. STATE[D.P. WADHWA,J.] 393

sible to the minor children only till they attained majority. He also held A
that the second wife Yogmaya Devi was not entitled to anything. Appeal
by the first wife Rameshwari Devi against the judgment was dismissed by
the Division Bench. According to her there was no marriage between
Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi and the children were, therefore, not
legitimate. Aggrieved Rameshwari Devi has come to this Court.
B
On filing of the special leave petition notices were issued to the
respondents. In response thereto counter affidavits have been filed by (1)
Yogmaya Devi, (2) State of Bihar and (3) Accountant General (A&E) II
Patna.
c
Stand of the State Government is that Rameshwari Devi was the
legally married wife of Narain Lal. He married again to Yogmaya Devi in
April, 1963 and that the marriage with Yogmaya Devi was against the
provisions of law as contained in Sections 5 and 11 of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955. It was, therefore, a void marriage. Second wife had thus no status
and could not claim any share from the estate of Narain Lal as per the D
provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Accordingly, State Government
sanctioned family pension and gratuity to Rameshwari Devi by its order
dated August 22, 1995. By this order the State Government cancelled its
·- previous two orders dated September 23, 1993 and October 6, 1993. Group
insurance and final withdrawal of GPF had already been sanctioned to E
Rameshwari Devi. However, in compliance with the order of the High Court
dated April 26, 1996 in writ petition filed by Yogmaya Devi, family pension,
gratuity, GPF, pay for unutilised leave and group insurance were sanctioned
to Rameshwari Devi and her son and minor sons of Yogmaya Devi.

Accountant General in his affidavit has only to refer to the action of F
the State Government in cancelling its earlier order dated September 23,
1993 and fresh order dated August 22, 1995 authorising all the payments
to Rameshwari Devi being the sole recipient of the family pension and
death-cum-retirement gratuity. Accountant General says that on the orders
of the State Government it authorised full family pension and full gratuity G
to Rameshwari Devi. Reference was then made to the writ petition filed
by Yogmaya Devi in the High Court and when the State Government, on
the basis of the order of the High Court, issued fresh order dated October
17, 1996, Accountant General, accordingly, authorised 50% of family pen-
sion and death-cum-retirement gratuity to the minor children of Yogmaya H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 1 S.C.R.

A Devi. A direction was issued to the Treasury Officer to recover excess
amount of family pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity paid to
Rame~hwari Devi and further to reduce her family pension and death-cum-
retirement gratuity by 50%. Accountant General is non-committal if the
children of Yogmaya Devi are legitimatt: or illegitimate children of Narain
B Lal and rightly so. He has merely to act as per the directions issued by
the State Government.

Rameshwari Devi has disputed the very factum of marriage between
Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi. Her case is that nothing has come on
record to show that there was any valid marriage solemnized as per Hindu
C Law between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal. Yogmaya Devi says that from
the time of her marriage with Narain Lal in April, 1963 she has been
continuously living with Narain Lal as his wife. At the time of her marriage
she had no knowledge if Narain Lal had earlier been married. She has
referred to various judgments of this Court to show that when two persons
D are living together for long years as husband and wife, in such circumstan-
ces, even in absence of proof, a presumption of valid marriage between
them would arise. She says nothing has been brought on record to rebut
that presumption. In Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director of Consolidation & Ors.,
(1978] 3 SCC 527, this Court said that a strong presumption arises in favour
of wedlock where the partners have lived together for a long spell as
E husband and wife. Although the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy burden
lies on him who seeks to deprive the relationship of legal origin. Law leans
in favour of legitimacy and frowns upon bastardy. The Court further
observed that if men and women who live as husband and wife in society
are compelled to prove, half a century later, by eye-witness evidence that
F they were validly married, few will succeed. There have been various other
judgments of this Court holding where a man and a woman live together
for long years as husband and wife then a presumption arose in law of
legality of marriage existed between the two, though the presumption is
rebuttable.

G An inquiry report dated December 11, 1987 of ADM, Danapur, Sub
Division, Danapur, Patna has been brought on record. According to this
report on inquiry it was found that Narain Lal had married twice, first time
to Rameshwari Devi in 1948 and second time to Yogmaya Devi on April
10, 1963. There is mention of one son from his first marriage with Ramesh-
H wari Devi and four sons from marriage with Yogmaya Devi. Two persons
RAMESHWARI DEVI v. STATE [D.P. WADHWA,J.] 395

have testified to the marriage of Yogmaya Devi with Narain Lal. Both A
Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi had lived together as husband and wife at
all the places wherever Narain Lal was posted. This fact was also verified
from the colleagues of Narain Lal and their wives. That four sons were
born to Narain Lal from his marriage with Yogmaya Devi has also been
similarly testified.
B
Now, when first order was cancelled by the State Government and
second passed, depriving Yogmaya Devi and her children of any right in
the pensionary benefits of Narain Lal, she filed writ petition in the High
Court, which, as noted above, was allowed by the learm:d single Judge and
later appeal filed by Rameshwari Devi against that was dismissed by the c
Division Bench of the High Court which is impugned. Learned single Judge
referred to Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 holding that even
though the marriage of Narain Lal with Y ogmaya Devi was void their
children would be legitimate and thus would be entitled to claim share in
the family pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity of Narain Lal but D
only till they attained majority. Learned single Judge accordingly issued
direction to the State Government to issue fresh sanction order for pay-
ment of arrears of family pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity to the
minor children born from the wedlock between Yogmaya Devi and Narain
Lal till they attain majority but nothing would be payable to Yogmaya Devi
E
Mr. Dubey, counsel for Rameshwari Devi, submitted that inquiry
conducted by the State Government as to the marriage of Narain Lal with
Yogmaya Devi was incompetent as then: was no lawful authority with the
State Government to hold such an inquiry. It was for Yogmaya Devi tu
establish her right of her being married to Narain Lal in a court of law. F
Mr. Dubey said under the relevant Conduct Rules applicable to Narain
La~ he could be charged with misconduct of his having married a second
time during the life time of his first wife. It is only in that circumstance
when there is charge of misconduct there could be an inquiry as to the
marriage of Narain Lal with Yogmaya Devi. He referred to Rule 21 of the G
Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules as well as to Rule 23 of the Bihar
Government Servant's conduct Rules, 1976, which are as under :

CCS Rules

"21. Restriction regarding marriage H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 1 S.C.R.
A (1) No Government servant shall enter into, or contract, a
marriage with a person having a spouse living; and

(2) No Government servant having a spouse living shall enter
into, or contract, a marriage with any person :

B Provided that the Central Government may permit a Govern-
ment servant to enter int:l, or contract, any such marriage as is
referred to in Clause (1) or Clause (2), if it is satisfied that -

(a) such marriage is permissible under the personal law
applicablt: to such Government servant and the other
c party to the marriage; and

(b) there are other grounds for so doing.

(3) A Government servant who has married or marries a person
other than of Indian Nationality shall forthwith intimate the fact
D to the Government.

Bihar Government Servant's Conduct Rules, 1976

23. Restrictions regarding marriages. - (1) No Government servant
shall enter into, or contract a marriage with a person having a
,,..
E spouse living; and

(2) No Government servant, having a spouse living shall enter
into, or contract, a marriage with any person :

Provided that Government may permit a Government servant
F
to enter into, or contract, any such marriage as is referred to in
clause (4) or clause (2) if it is satisfied that :-

(a) such marriage is permissible under the personal law
applicable to such Government servant and the other
G party to the marriage; and

(b) there are other grounds for so doing.

(3) A Government servant who has married or marries a person
other than of Indian Nationality shall forthwith intimate the fact
H to the Government.'
RAMESHWARI DEVI v. STAIB [D.P. WADHWA,J.J 397

We may also note two judgments of this Court on the question when A
there is charge of misconduct against a Government servant. In State of
Kamataka and Another v. T. Venkataramanappa, [1996] 6 SCC 455, the
respondent, a police constable was prosecuted at the instance of his wift:
for having contracted second marriage. He was discharged for want of
evidence. A departmental inquiry was instituted against him for having
B
contracted second marriage, for which he was suspended. He approached
the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal against the order of suspension and
for stopping of the inquiry against him on the ground that a criminal court
had discharged him of the offence of bigamy. Tribunal accepted the stand
of the respondent, quashed the departmental proceedings and lifted the
suspension. On appeal filed by the State this Court said as under :
c
"There is a string of judgments of this Court whereunder strict
proof of solemnisation of the second marriage, with due obser-
vance of rituals and ceremonies, has been insisted upon. The
prosecution evidence in the criminal complaint may have fallen
D
short of those standards but that does not mean that the State was
in any way debarred from invoking Rule 28 of the Karnataka Civil
Service Rules, which forbids a government servant to marry a
second time without the permission of the Government. But, hen:
the respondent being a Hindu, could never have heen granted E
permission by the Government to marry a second time because of
his personal law forbidding such marriage. It was thus beyond the
ken of the Tribunal to have scuttled the departmental proceedings
against the respondent on the footing that such question of bigamy
should normally not be taken up for decision in departmental F
enquiries, as the decisions of competent courts tending to be
decisions in rem would stand at the highest pedestal. There was a
clear fallacy in such view because for purposes of Rule 28, such
strict standards, as would warrant a conviction for bigamy under
Section 494 IPC, may not, to begin with, be necessary." G

In State of W.B. and Others v. Prasenjit Dutta, [1994) 2 SCC 37,
departmental proceedings were initiated against the respondent, who was
a member of the Police Service of the State of West Bengal under Rule
5(4) of the West Bengal Services (Duties, Rights and Obligations of the H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 1 S.C.R.
A Government Employees) Rules, 1980 for having contracted a second mar-
riage. That Rule s<tys that no government employee who has a wife/husband
living shall contract another marriage without previously obtaining the
dissolution of the first marriage in accordance with law for the time being
in force, notwithstanding such second marriage is permissible in the per-
B sonal law of the community to which he or she belongs. On an inquiry made
by an officer, appointed for the purpose, and on his report that the
respondent was guilty of misconduct alkged, an order of dismissal was
passed by the disciplinary authority. Respondent approached the High
Court and the order of his dismissal was stayed. Nevertheless High Court
was of the view that the second marriage was a serious matter, which could
C not be left to be decided by the departmental authorities, in proceedings
such as these, and a ci~ or matrimonial court needs to pronounce thereon
properly and finally. On appeal filed by the State Government, this Court
said:

D "The view of the High Court may be correct that a matter
such as the present one concerning the existence or not of a
relationship of husband and wife is normally to be dealt with in
a matrimonial or a civil court. It cannot at the same time be
said that the departmental authorities cannot go into such ques-
E tion for the limited purposes of sub-rule (4) of Rule 5 of the
aforesaid Rules. When contracting another marriage, in the
presence of the previous one, has been termed to be misconduct
visiting departmental punishment it is difficult to keep
suspended action under the Rule till after a proper adjudication
is made by the civil or matrimonial court. It would, thus, have
F to be viewed that the departmental proceeding could not be shut
in the manner in which the High Court has done and it would
have to go on to some finality at a departmental end, on the
culmination of which, it may then give rise to the delinquent
approaching the civil court for determining his matrimonial
G status."

But then it is not necessary for us to consider if Narain Lal could
have been charged of misconduct having contracted a second marriage
when his first wife was living as no disciplinary proceeding were held
H against him during his lifetime. In the present case, we are concerned only
RAMESHWARIDEVIv. STATE[D.P. WADHWA,J:j 399

with the question as to who is entitled to the family pension and death- A
cum-retirement gratuity on the death of Narain Lal. When there are two
claimants to the pensionary benefits of a deceased employee and there is
no nomination wherever required State Government has to hold an inquiry
as to the rightful claimant. Disbursement of pension cannot wait till a civil
court pronounces upon the respective rights of the parties. That would B
certainly be a long drawn affair. Doors of civil courts are always open to
any party after and even before a decision is reached by the State Govern-
ment as to who is entitled to pensionary benefits. Of course, inquiry
conducted by the State Government cannot be a sham affair and it could
also not be arbitrary. Decision has to be taken in a bona fide reasonable C
and rational manner. In the present case an inquiry was held which cannot
be termed as sham. Result of the inquiry was that Y ogmaya Devi and
Narain Lal lived as husband and wife since 1963. A presumption does arise,
therefore, that marriage of Yogmaya Devi with Narain Lal was in accord-
ance with Hindu rites and all ceremonies connected with a valid Hindu
marriage were performed. This pesumption Rameshwari Devi has been D
unable to rebut. Nevertheless, that, however, does not make the ~riase
between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal as legal. Of course, when there is
a charge of bigamy under Section 494 IPC, strict proof of solemnisation of
the second marriage with due observance of rituals and ceremonies has
been insisted upon. E

It cannot be disputed that the marriage between Narain Lal and
Yogmaya Devi was in contravention of clause (i) of Section 5 of the Hindu
Marriage Act and was a void Marriage. Under Section 16 of this Act,
children of void marriage are legitimate. Under the Hindu Succession Act,
F
1956, property of a male Hindu dying intestate devolves firstly on heirs in
clause (1) which includes widow and son. Among the widow and son, they
all get shares (see Sections 8, 10 and the Schedule to the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956). Yogmaya Devi cannot be described a widow of Narain Lal, her
marriage with Narain Lal being void. Sons of the marriage between Narain
Lal and Yogmaya Devi being the legitimate sons of Narain Lal would be G
entitled to the property of ~ain Lal in equal shares along with that of
Rameshwari Devi and the son born from th~ marriage of Rameshwari Devi
with Narain Lal. That is, however, legal position when Hindu m~e dies
intestate. Here, however, we are concerned with the family pension and
death-cum- retirement gratuity payments- which is governed by the relevant H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 1 S.C.R.
A rules. It is not disputed before us that if the legal position as aforesaid is
correct, there is no error with the directions issued by the learned single
Judge in the judgment, which is upheld by the Division Bench in LPA by
the impugned judgment. ·

Rameshwari Devi has raised two principal objections : (i) marriage \
B between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal has not been proved, meaning
thereby that there is no witness to the actual performance of the marriage
in accordance with the religious ceremonies required for a valid Hindu
marriage and (2) without a civil court having pronounced upon the mar-
riage between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal in accordance with Hindu
C rights, it cannot be held that the children of Yogmaya Devi with her
marriage with Narain Lal would be legitimate under Section 16 of the
Hindu Marriage Act. First objection we have discussed above and there is
nothing said by Rameshwari Devi to rebut the presumption in favour of
marriage duly performed between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal. On the
D second objection, it is correct that ELo civil court has pronounced if there
was a marriage between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal in accordance with
Hindu rights. That would, however, not debar the Statt: Government from
making an inquiry about the existence of such a marriage and act on that
in order to grant pensionary and other benefits to the children of Yogmaya
E Dt:vi. On this aspect Wt: have already adverted to aboVt:. After the death
of Narain Lal, inquiry was made by the ,State Government as to which
of the wives of Narain Lal was his legal wife. This was on the basis of
claims filed by Rameshwari Devi. Inquiry was quite a detailed ont: and
there are in fact two witnesses examined during the course of inquiry
being (i) Sant Prasad Sharma, teacher, DAV High School, Danapur and
F (2) Sri Basukinath Sharma, Shahpur Maner who testified to the mar-
riage between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal having witnessed the same.
That both Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi were living as husband and
wife and four sons were born to Yogmaya Devi from this wedlock has
also been testified during the course of inquiry by Chandra Shekhar
G Singh, Rtd. District Judge, Bhagalpur, Smt. (Dr.) Arun Prasad, Sheohar,
Smt. S.N. Sinha, w/o Sri S.N. Sinha, ADM and others. Other documen-
tary evidence were also colkcted which showed Yogmaya Devi and
Narain Lal were living as husband and wife. Further, the sons of the
marriage between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal were shown in records
H as sons of Narain Lal.
RAMESHWARI DEVI v. STATE [D.P. WADHWA,J.) 401

Having considered all the facts of the case as presented before us we A
do not find any error in the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of
the Patna High Court upholding the judgment of the learned single Judge
referred to in the beginning of this judgment. The appeal, therefore, fails
and is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

A.Q. Appeal dismissed. B