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Supreme Court of India

RAMESHWARLALversusMUNICIPAL COUNCIL, TONK AND ORS.

Citation
1996 INSC 950
Decided
27 August 1996
Disposal
Disposed off

Holding

The period taken in the High Court proceedings, pursued diligently and bona fide, must be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, allowing the petitioner to file a suit despite the limitation having run.

Summary

Rameshwarlal, a former employee of the Municipal Council, Tonk, claimed arrears of salary for the period September 10, 1987 to August 18, 1988. He filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Rajasthan High Court in February 1990, which was dismissed on the ground that the claim was civil in nature and should be pursued by a suit. The Division Bench affirmed the dismissal, and by the time the petition reached the Supreme Court the limitation period for filing a civil suit had expired. The Supreme Court held that the time spent in the High Court proceedings, pursued diligently and in good faith, must be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, thereby allowing the petitioner to issue a notice within four weeks and file a suit within two months. The Court directed the trial court to consider the suit on its merits and disposed of the special leave petition.

Issues considered

  • Whether the period spent in High Court proceedings can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to permit filing of a civil suit after the limitation period has expired.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Limitation ActSection 14Article 226writ petitioncivil suitsalary arrearsmunicipal counciltime barexclusion of time

Judgment

                       RAMESHWARLAL                                                A
                             v.
               MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, TONK AND ORS.

                             AUGUST 27, 1996

 [K. RAMASWAMY, B.L. HANSARIA AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.]                              B

      Limitation Act, 1963 :

       Sectio11 14-Limitatio11 period-Enlargement of--No11-payment of
salary for a certain period-Employee filing writ petition in the High              C
Court-Single fudge as well as Division Be11ch refusing to grant relief-Only
other remedy is to file a civil suit for which time has already run out-Held,
time taken in prosecztting the proceedings before the High Coztrt and Supreme
Court, pursued diligently any bona fide 11eeds to be excluded-Petitio11er to
issue 11otice to the mztnicipality within four weeks and to file suit within two
months thereafter. T1ial Cowt to consider and dispose of the matter in             D
accorda11ce with law on me1its.

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 16339 of 1996.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 6.5.96 of the Rajasthan High                E
Court in DBCSA No. 218 of 1996.

      B.D. Sharma and Piyush for the Petitioner.

      The following Order of the Court was delivered :
                                                                                   F
      The petitioner claims that he has been denied the salary for period
from September 10, 1987 to August 18, 1988. He claims to have worked in
the office of the Municipal Council, Tonk. He filed writ petition in the High
Court in February 1990. The learned single Judge held that since it is a
claim recoverable in a civil action, the discretionary power under Article         G
226 of the Constitution is not exercisable. Accordingly, he dismissed the
writ petition. The same came to be confirmed in the impugned order of
the Division Bench made on may 6, 1996 in Special Appeal No. 218/96.
Thus, this special leave petition.

      It is not necessary for us to go into the question of the legality of the H
                                      227
    228                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   order of the High Court in refusing to grant the relief. It is axiomatic that
    the exercise of the power under Article 226 being discretionary, the learned
    single Judge as well as the Division Bench have not exercised the same to
    direct the respondent to pay the alleged arrears of salary alleged to be due
    and payable to the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the only remedy
    open to the petitioner is to avail the action in the suit. Since the limitation
B
    has run ,out to file a civil suit by now, which was not so on the date of the
    filing of the writ petition, the: civil Court is required to exclude, under
    Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the entire time taken by the High
    Court in disposing of the matter from the date of the institution of the writ
    petition.
c          Nonnally for application of Section 14, the Court dealing with the
    matter in the first instance, which is the subject of the issue in the later case,
    must be found to have lack of jwisdiction or other cause of like nature to
    entertain the matter. However, since the High Court expressly declined to
    grant relief relegating the petitioner to a suit in civil Court, the petitioner
D   cannot be left remedyless. Accordingly, the time taken in prosecuting the
    proceedings before the High Court and this Court, obviously pursued
    diligently and bona fide, needs to be excluded. The petitioner is permitted
    to issue notice to the Municipality within four weeks from today. After
    expiry thereof, he could file suit within two months thereafter. The trial
E   Court would consider and dispose of the matter in accordance with law on
    merits.

           The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly.

    G.N.                                                       Petition disposed of.


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