RAMJEE PRASAD & ANR.versusSTATE OF BIHAR

                             [2009] 7 S.C.R. 70


 A                     RAMJEE PRASAD & ANR.
                                      V.
                           STATE OF BIHAR
                    Criminal Appeal No. 692 of 2002

                              APRIL 22, 2009
 B
          (HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.)
           PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT, 1954:
           ss. 16(1)(a)(i) and (ii) - Conviction by trial court u/s
 c    16(1)(a)(i) on the charge that the food article being sold by
      accused was adulterated -Affirmed by appellate court- High
      Court in revision holding that offence u/s 16(1)(a)(i) not made
      out against accused, but convicting them uls 16(1)(a)(ii)- Held:
      Evidence required for recording conviction under the two
      clauses would be distinct and different - Prejudice is writ large    ~
 0
      more particularly as the ingredients. of the two provisions are
      substantially different, and evidence of one can lead to a finding
      of guilt for the other - Accused acquitted.
          Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ram Sarup (1980) 1
 E    sec 580 - relied on
                          Case Law Reference
           (1980) 1 sec 580           relied on          para 7
           CRIMINALAPPELLATEJURISDICTION: CriminalAppeal
 F    No. 692 of 2002
           From the Judgement and Order dated 20.11.2001 of the
      Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Revision
      No. 77 of 2000.
 G         Gaurav Agrawal, Prashant Kumar, for the Appellant.
           Pranab Prakash, Manish Kumar, Gopal Singh (N.P.) for
      the Respondent.
           The following order of the Court was delivered
. H                                  70
                         RAMJEE PRASAD & ANR. V. STATE OF BIHAR               71


                      This appeal has been filed by the two accused persons A
                who stand convicted by the High Court for an offence punishable
                under Section 16(1 )(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration
                Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for having been
                found selling an adulterated food article - "Chhena Mithai".
                                                                                   B
                      In the light of what we intend to hold in this matter, the
                detailed facts would not be necessary.
          If
                    The Public Analyst in his report found that the above-
                mentioned food article was adulterated with starch.
                      This opinion was only partially maintained by the Central c
                Food Laboratory as it opined that the foodstuff was adulterated,
                but there was no reference whatsoever to the adulteration by
                starch. The tri.al court and the first appellate court tried and
                convicted the appellants, who are father and son, for an offence
                punishable under Section 16(1 )(a)(i) of the Act and sentenced D
                them to various terms of imprisonment.
                        The matter was taken in revision before the High Court
               . and the learned Single Judge in his judgment dated 20th
               ~ November, 2001 held that a case under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of E
                 the Act could not be made out against the appellants, but as the
                 trial court and the first appellate court had mis-applied the penal
                 provision, it was the obligation of the High Court to see that the
                 accused did not escape from criminal liability and accordingly
                 convicted them for an offence punishable under Section F
                 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Act.
                      It is in these circumstances that the matter is before us
                after grant of special leave.
;.
                      Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, the learned counsel for the appellants G
                has raised several arguments, but we are of the opinion that the
     -+         matter can be disposed of on a simple admitted fact. We see
                that Section 16 (1)(a)(i) of the Act is relatable to Section 2(ia)(m)
                which provides that a food article shall be deemed to be
                adulterated if the quality or purity of the article falls below the H
    72        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2009] 7 S.C.R.


A prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities          ,.
  not within the prescribed limits of variability but which does not
  render it injurious to health. The High Court has, however, thought
  it fit to render the conviction under clause 16(1 )(a)(ii) of the Act
  which stipulates that the food article shall be deemed to be
B adulterated if it is not of the nature, substance or quality which it
  purports or is represented to be. A bare reading of these two
  provisions and the finding of the first two courts reveal that the
  evidence required for recording a conviction under the two
  clauses would be distinct and different as the ingredients thereof
c are entirely different. In this view of the matter, it appears that
  the appellants were seriously prejudiced in the fact that the High
  Court had thought it fit to change the nature of the offence for
  which they had been brought to trial. While dealing with a similar
  matter, this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram
D Sarup (1980) 1 SCC 580, in para 4 has held as under:-
         "In the view we have taken we would have set aside the
         acquittal of the respondent and restored the judgment of
         the trial Court, but we are inclined to think that it will not be
         proper to do so in the facts and circumstances of this
E        case. There is nothing in the three judgments on record,
         and more particularly in the impugned judgment of the
         High Court, to show whether the respondent was put on
         trial for selling an adulterated article of food within the         "!
         meaning of clause (f) of Section 2(ia) of the Act, or whether
F        he was tried for selling, within the meaning ofclause (I) of
         that section, an article of food of which the quality or purity
         fell below the standard prescribed by the Rules. The
         possibility that the respondent was prejudiced in his
         defence because of the ambiguity cannot therefore be
G        ruled out. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to
         allow the appeal and set aside the respondent's acquittal."          ,.
        We are, therefore, of the opinion that the matter is settled
  in favour of the appellants by the cited judgment. The learned
H counsel appearing for the respondent has, however, pointed
             RAMJEE PRASAD & ANR. V. STATE OF BIHAR                  73


    out that no prejudice had been caused to the appellants on             A
    account of this change in the nature of the offence. In the light of
    what has been observed by this Court (ibidem), the prejudice is
    writ large more particularly as the ingredients of the two
    provisions are substantially different and the evidence of one
    cannot lead to a finding of guilt for the other. The appeal is         s
    allowed. The orders of the courts below are set aside and the
    appellants are acquitted. As the accused appellants are on bail,
    their bail bonds are discharged.

    R.P.                                              Appeal allowed .




•