Holding

The principle of equal pay for equal work is a constitutional goal enforceable under Articles 14, 16 and 39(d), and driver‑constables must receive pay at least equal to that of drivers in other departments.

Summary

The petitioner, a driver‑constable in the Delhi Police Force, challenged the lower pay scale applicable to driver‑constables compared to drivers in other Delhi Administration departments, invoking the principle of "equal pay for equal work" under Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of the Constitution. He argued that his duties, which included police powers and hazardous responsibilities, were at least as arduous as those of drivers in other services, and that the Third Pay Commission had unjustifiably excluded his category. The Court held that the principle of equal pay for equal work is a substantive constitutional goal, derived from the equality clauses and Directive Principles, and is enforceable through Article 32. It ruled that where posts are identical in function and responsibility, differential pay solely on departmental lines violates Article 14. Consequently, the petition was allowed and the respondents were directed to fix the pay scale of driver‑constables at least on par with drivers of the Railway Protection Force, effective from 1 January 1973.

Issues considered

The enforceability of the principle of equal pay for equal work under Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of the Constitution.
Whether driver‑constables of the Delhi Police are entitled to the same pay scale as drivers in other government departments performing identical duties.
Whether courts can intervene in pay‑scale determinations made by the executive and the Pay Commission.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Art.14, s. Art.16, s. Art.19, s. Art.32, s. Art.39(d)

Subjects

equal pay for equal workconstitutional lawArticle 14Article 16Article 39(d)Article 32Delhi Policepay commissiondiscriminationemployment equality

Judgment

•
A 298
RANDHIR SINGH

v.
UNION OF \_NOIA & ORS.
B
February 22, 1982
(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.]

Constitution of India, Articles 14, 19 and 3~(d) "Equal pay for equal work"
c is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance.

The petitioner is a driver constable in the Delhi Police Force under the
Delhi Administn1tion. The scale of pay in the Delhi Police Force is for non-
matriculate drivers Rs. 210-270 and for m.atricuh.te drivers 225-308. The scare of
pay of a driver in the Railway Protection Force is Rs. 260-400. The scaie of pay
of drivers in the r..on·secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-6-326~EB-8-351), while
that of Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-6-290-EB-6-326-8-366-EB-8-8-8-390-10
D 400. The scale of pay of drivers in the office of the Language Commission is Ri.
260-300 while the drivers of heavy vehicles in the Fire Brigadge and the Department
of Light House is Rs. 330-480. The petitioner and other driver constabl1es made
a representation to the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered
separately by the Third Pay Commission and that their pay sca1es should be the
same as the drivers or heavy vehicles in other departments. As their claims for
better scales of pay did not meet with success, the present application has been
E filed by the petitioner for the issue of a· writ under Article 32 of the Consti-
tution.

Allowing the petition, the Court

HELD: 1:1. The petitioner was appointed as a driver in the Delhi
Police Force. After his discharge from the army question of his employment as
F a drive:.- in Delhi Police Force was considered, he was asked to appear for a· test
of proficiency in driving, directed to produce a Civil Heavy Tran.sport Driving
Licence, selected thereafter as a driver in Delhi Police Force under the category
"Employment of Ex-serviceman in Delhi Police as N.T. Driver (Con~table)."
He was desigoate..:i as Constable, because for the purposes of th~ discipline of the
Force and appointment as driver in the Ddhi Police Force he had 10 be made a
member of the Delhi Police Force and bad to be as~igned· a rank in the Force.
G The investiture of the petitioner with the "powers, fun,;tion-; and privileges of a
police Officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force.
' [302 H, 303 A-CJ

1:2. The petitioner and other drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform
the same functio1':s and duties as other drivers in the service of the Delhi Adminis-
H tration and th~ Central Government. If anything, by reason of their investiture
with the "power, f11nctions and privilegeS of a police Officer'', their duties and
~sponsibilities ~re more ardqous. 'J'.he clarifi,catioQ. that the driver$ of the
RANDffiR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 299
Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and A
that the equal pay for equal work is not a prinCipTe which the courts may
recognise and act upon is irrational. [306 A, B, C, DJ

2:1. No doubt, equation of posts and equation· of pay are matters
primarily rOr the Executive Government and expert bodies and not for the
courts, but where all thing~ are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are
the san1e, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the B
matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments. Of
course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the powers,
duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not
be heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same
rank alld the nomenclature is the same. [303 G-H, 304 A]

3:1. The principle "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract c
doctrine but one of substance. There can be and there ar'e different grades in a
service., with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher
grade often being a promotional avenue fqr officers of the lower grade. The
higher qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain
the classification of the ~fficers into two grades with di'ffer.ent scales of pay. The
principle Or equal paf for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attract·
ing Article 14 if sou11ht to be applied to them. [304 C-E] D

3:2. It is true that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not ex·
pressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is
a Constitutional goal. Article 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims "equill pay for
equal work for both men aud women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy.
"Equal pay for equal work for both men and wom~n" means equal pay for equal
work for every one and as between the sexes. Directive Principles have to be read
E
into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the Consti·
tution enjoins the State not to deny anyfperson equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equa1ity
of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment
to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must
mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality
clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconCerned with the
11
work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some
substance if equ1t work means equal pay. Questions concerning wages and the
Hke, mundane they may be. are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is
there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance
to them. The preamble to the ·coD;stitutioo declares the solemn resolution of the
people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic
Republic. Again the word 'Socialist' must mean something. Even if it does
G
not mean 'to each according to his need', it must at ]east mean 'equal pa f
equal work'. L304 E-H, 305 A-DJ , Y or

3:3. From a construction of Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Pre •
ble and Article 39(d), it is clear that the principle ·"equal pay for equal work~~
H
deducible from !hose Articles and may be rr~perly applied to cases of uncqu:~
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982! 3 s.c.n.

A scales of pay based on no classification or irration'al clasification though those
drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer.
[305 G-H, 306 A]
Kishori Lal Mohan Lal Bakshlv. Union of India, A.J.R.' 1962 S.C.1139,
distinguished.
ORIGINAL JuRJ.IDICTION : Writ Petition No. 4676 of 1978,
B (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)

M.S. Ganesh for the Petitioner.

N.C. Talukdar, R.N. Poddar and Miss A. Subhashini, for the
Resp on dent.
c .The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. 'Equal pay for equal work' is not a
mere demagogic slogan. It is a constitutional gqal capable of attain-
ment through constitutional remedies by.the enforcement of constitu-
tional rights. So the petitioner claims; so the petitioner asserts.
D Article 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims, as a Directive Principle,
the Constitutional goal of 'equal pay for equal work for both men
and women'. Articles 14 and 19 guarantee respectively the funda•
mental rights to equality before the law and equality of opportunity
in the matter of public employment and Art. 32 provides the
remedy for the enforcement of the fundamental rights. So the
E
petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32
and bas asked us to direct the respondents to give him his due, the
same as they have · given others like him. True, he is the merest
microbe in the mighty organism of the State, a little clog in a giant
wheel. But, the glory of our Constitution is that it enables him to
F directly apRfoach the highest Court in the land for redress. It is a
matter of no little pride and satisfaction to us that he has done so.
Hitherto the equality clauses of the Constitution, as other articles of
the Constitution guaranteeing fundamental and other rights, were
most often invoked by the privileged classes for their protection and
advancement and for a 'fair and satisfactory' distribution of the
G buttered leaves amongst themselves. Now, thanks to the rising
social and political consciousness and the expectations roused as a
consequence, and the forward-looking posture of this Court, the
underprivileged also are clamouring for their rights and are seeking
intervention of the Court with touching faith and confidence in the
H Court. The judges of _the Court have a duty to redeem their
constitutional oath and do justice no less to the pavement dweller
than to the guest of the five star hotel.
UNDHIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) :JOI

m
The petitioner a Driver-Constable in the Delhi Police Force A
under the Delhi Administration and be demands that bis scale
of pay should atleast be the same as the scale of pay of other
drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration. The scale
of pay of a Driver-Constable in the Delhi Police Force is Rs.
210-270 in the case of non-matriculates and Rs. 225-308 in the case
of matriculates. The scale of pay of a Driver in the Railway
B
Protection Force is ·Rs. 260-400. The scale of pay of drivers in the
non-Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-6-326.E-B-8-350. The
scale of pay of drivers in the Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-
6-290-EB-6-326-8-366-EB-8-8-8·390- I0-400. The scale of pay of
drivers in the office of the Language Commission is Rs. 260-350. The
pay scale of drivers of heavy vehicles in the 'f'.ire Brigade and the
c
Department of Light House is Rs. 330-480. The case of the peti-
tioner is that be discharges the same duties as the rest of the drivers
in the other offices; in fact he claims that he discharges more onerous
duties than the others. He complains that there is no reason what-
soever. to discriminate against the petitioner and other driver- D
Constables merely because be and bis ilk happen to be described as
constables as indeed they are bound to be so described, belonging as
they do to the Police Force.

It appears that the Third Pay Commission considered the
claims of all drivers as a common category under the head "the pay
E
scales appropriate for drivers of motor vehicles operating on roads .
After considering the qualifications etc. possessed by drivers the

-- Commission proposed pay scales for various categories of drivers.
like drivers of light motor vehicles, drivers of heavy motor vehicles,
drivers employed in organisations with large fieet of vehicles, drivers
of staff cars etc. The pay scales were professed to be fixed with
reference to the qualifications for driving, the nature and the ardu-
ousness of the duties and responsibilities, the non-availability of
adequate promotional avenues and such other usual considerations.
The Pay Commission, however, while considering the question of
the scales of pay of drivers separated the case of constable-drivers' G
on the ground that their case would be considered along with the
cases of other police personnel. The grievance of the petitioner is
that while considering the question of the scales of pay of the police
personnel, the Pay Commission failed to consid~r the drivers as a
separate category and ignored the special considerations which H
prevailed in tile case of drivers in other departments and which
should have, tilerefore, prevailed. ill ti!~ ~Ilse of driver-cons~abl.es 11Isq,
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 S.C. R.

The drivers-constables were not only required to possess heavy
transport driving licence, they were further required to undergo a
test of proficiency in driving before they were appointed as ddver-
constables in the police force. Their duties were no less arduous and
their responsibilities no less heavy than the duties and' responsibilities
of drivers in other departments. Their hours of work were long
B and inconvenient and there was, constant exposure to security risks.
The petitioner and other driver-con stables made a representation to
the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered separately
by the Pay Commission and that their scales of pay should be the
same as the drivers of heavy vehicles in other departments. As their
claims for better scales of pay did not meet with any success, the
c present application has been filed for the issue of a Writ under Art.
32 of the Constitution.

Among the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, it
was suggested that the petitioner was no more and no less than a
D constable of the Delhi Police Force and that there was no such
category of Drivers in the Delhi.Police Force. The hollowness of
this submission is exposed by a reference to the facts relating to the
individual petitioner. The petitioner who was an ex-gunner (driver)
in the artiliary corps of the Indian Army and who was experienced
in the driving,_ operation and maintenance of jeeps, trucks and heavy
E armoured vehicles was allowed to retire from the Army on compas-
sionate grounds. He held an Army driving licence as also a Civil
Heavy Transport Driving Lice.nee. After he was discharged from

F
the Army his nominal roll was forwarded by the Director General
Resettlement, Ministry of Defence to the Commandant, Delhi Armed
Police, Delhi. The question of his employment as a driver in the
Delhi Police Force was considered and he was informed that a test
of proficiency in driving would be held. He was required to produce
-
his Civil Heavy transport driving licence at the time of the test. It
is of interest to· note that the subject of the communication sent by
the Delhi Police establishment to the petitioner was "Employment of
G ex-servicemen in Delhi Police as N.T. Driver (Const)". He appeared
at the test. By a communication dated March 29, 1968, he was
informed by the Commandant, Delhi Armed Police, Delhi that his
name had been "approved for enlistment as driver in the Delhi
Police". Thereafter a certificate in the prescribed form was issued·
H to him vesting him with the. powers, functions and privileges -~
of a police ,Officer. It is clear and it cannot be seriously
disputed that th(petitioner wa~ appointQd 11s a driver in . the Delhi
RANDHIR SINGH v. UNiON OF iNDIA (Chinnappa Reddy, I.) 303

Police Force. He was designated as constable, because, for the
A
purposes of the discipline of the Force and appointment as driver in
. the Delhi Police Force, be bad to be made a member of the Delhi
Police Force and had to be assigned a rank in the Force. The inves-
titure of the petitioner with the "powers, functions and privileges of
a police Officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of
·the Force.
B

The main defence taken by the respondents is, in the words of
the deponent of the counter-affidavit, as follows :

"It is subfoitted that there can be no comparison
between the different departments of the Government of
c
India for the purpose of fixation of pay scale. A pay scale
has been fixed upon consideration of various factors. The
pay scales of the drivers of the Delhi Police bas been fixed
after duly considering all the circumstances. The drivers
in the other departments are not similarly situated as the D
petitioner and there is no question of any hostile discrimi·
nation. It is, however, denied that the driveres have been
treated as a separate class. It is also denied that the
designation of the petitioner is N. T. Driver (Constable)'

The counter-affidavit does not explain how the case of the E
drivers in the police force is different from that of the drivers in
other departments and what special factors weighed in fixing a
lower scale of pay for them. Apparently in the view of the respon;
derits, the circumstance that persons belong to different departments
of the Government is itself a sufficient circumstance to justify diffe-
rent scales of pay irrespective of their identity of their powers duties
'
·- and responsibilities. We cannot accept this view. If this view is to be
stretched to its logical conclusion, the scales of pay of officers of the
same rank in the Government of India may vary from department to
department notwithstanding that their powers duties and responsibili-
ties are identical. We concede that equation of posts and equation of
pay are matters primarily for the Executive Government and expert G
bodies like the Pay Commission and not for Courts but we-must
hasten to say that where all things are equal that is, where all
relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts
may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely
because they belong to different departments. Of course, if officers
H
of the same rank perform_ dissimilar functions and the powers,
304 SUPREME COURT REPORts [1982)3 s.C.lt.

A duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such
officers may not be heard to complain of .'dissimilar pay merely
because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the
same.

Our attention was drawn to Binoy Kumar Mukerjee v. Union of
n India('), Makhan Singh v. Union of India & Ors(')., where reference
· was made to the .observations of this Court in Kishori Mohan/al
Bakshi v. Union of India(') describing the principle of equal pay for
equal work as an abstract doctrine which· had nothing to do with
Art. 14. We shall presently point out how the principle, ''i:qual
pay for equal work", is not an abstract doctrine but one of subs-
c tance. Kishori Mohan/al Bakshi v. Union of India is not itself of any
real a'Sistance to us since what was decided there was that there
could be different scales of pay for different grades of a service. It
is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a
service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade,
() the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of
the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade,
which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on
length ,,f service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers
in lo two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of equal
pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Art.
14 if sought to be applied to them.
E
It is true that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is
not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental
right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Art. 39(d) of the
Constitution proclaims ''equal pay for equal work for both men and
women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy. 'Equal pay for
F
equal work for both men and women' means equal pay for equal
work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive principles,
as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have
1'
to be read into the fundamental r.igbts as a matter of interprelation.
Art. 14 of the Constitution enjoins the state not to deny any person
G equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Art.
16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens
in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under

(I) l.L.R. [1973] 1 Delhi 427.
H (Z) I.L.R. [1975] 1 Delhi 227.
(3) A.l.R. 1962 S.C. 1139.
RANDHlR slNOH v. UNION OF INblA (Chinnappa 1?.eddy, /.) 30S

the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean some A
thing to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality
clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcer-
ned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality
clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay.
Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying
alleged robber· barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax
evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular Governmental policy
in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered
discretion on the Executive, whether the takeover of the empires of
industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other ques·
tions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this country
untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane c
they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there,
if at all that" the equality clauses of the Constitution have any signi·
ficancc to them. The preamble to the Constitution declares the
solemn resolution of the people of India to· constitute India into a
Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word 'Socialist'
must mean something. Even if it does not mean 'To each according D
to his need', it must atleast mean 'equal pay for equal work'. The
principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is expressly recognized by all
socialist systems of law, e.g, Section 59 of ihe Hungarian Labour.
Code, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, Section 67
of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German
Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the Rumanian Code.
E
Indeed this principle bas been incorporated in several western labour
codes too. Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I
of the French Code du Travail, and according to Argentinian law,
this principle must be applied to female ·workers in all collective
bargaining agreements. In accordance with Section 3 of the Grund-
gesetz of the German Federal Republic; and clause 7, Section 123 of
F
the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given U11iversal significance
(vide: International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy p. 265). The prea-
mble of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation re·
cognises the principle of 'equal remuneration for work of equal value'
as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of
conditions "involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large
G
numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and
harmony of the world are imperilled". Construing Articles 14 and 16
in the light of the Preamble and Art.39(d) we ate of the view that the
principle 'Equal pay for Equal work' is deducible from those Article H
and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based .
-
siJi>REMil CoiJltt ltEPOltTS (1982] 3 S.C.R.

A on no classification or irrational classification though these drawing
the different scales of pay do idential work under the same employer.

There cannot be the slightest doubt that ~the drivers in the
Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other
drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central
B Government. If anything, by reason of their investiture with .the
'powers, functions and privileges of a police officer', their duties and
responsibilities are more arduous. In answer to the allegation in
the petition that the driver constabies of the Delhi Police Force
0

perform no less arduous duties than drivers in. other departments, ,_........
it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of
c the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force were onerous. What
then is the reason for giving them a lower scale of pay than others ?
There is none. The only answer of the respondents is that the ~
drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to
different departments ahd that the principle of equal pay for equal
work is not a principle which the Courts may recognise and act
D upon. We have shown that the answer is unsound. The clarifica-
tion is irrational. We, therefore, allow the Writ Petition and direct
the respondents to fix the scale· of pay of the petitioner and the
drivers-constables of the Delhi Police Force atleast on a par with
that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force. The scale of
.E pay shall be effective from 1st January, 1973, the date from which
the recommendations of the Pay Commission were given effect.

S.R. Petition allowed.