Holding

A judgment of acquittal should not be interfered with when two reasonable conclusions are possible; the trial court's findings were probable, so the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal.

Summary

The appellant Rangaiah was charged with murder and causing hurt after a quarrel in his village resulted in the death of Maruchhaiah. The trial court acquitted him, finding material discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence, including inconsistencies between the dying declaration and witness testimonies, and noting that a co‑accused named in the FIR was never charge‑sheeted. The High Court reversed the acquittal, holding the trial court's findings to be perverse. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed where two reasonable views of the evidence are possible; the Sessions Judge's findings were probable and not wholly unacceptable. Consequently, the High Court’s reversal was set aside and the trial court’s acquittal restored.

Issues considered

Whether an appellate court may interfere with a judgment of acquittal under Section 378 CrPC.
What is the correct test for reversing a judgment of acquittal?
The reliability and admissibility of the dying declaration in the present case.
Whether the absence of a charge‑sheet against a co‑accused affects the prosecution's case.
Whether the trial court's findings were perverse or merely a permissible view of the evidence.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 378
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 324

Subjects

acquittalappeal against acquittaldying declarationbenefit of doubtevidence appraisalperverse judgmentSection 302 IPCSection 324 IPCSection 378 CrPC

Judgment

[2008] 17 S.C.R. 396

A RANGAIAH
II.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal No. 992 of 2005)
1

DECEMBER 12, 2008
B
[5.8. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 378 - Appeal v ...

against acquittal- Reversal of judgment of acquittal by-High
c Court- Sustainability of - Held: Not sustainable - Judgment
of acquittal should not be interfered with, if two views are
possible - On facts, High Cou1 did not apply the right tesf
for reversing the judgment~of acquittal - Findings of trial court
were probable - It cannot be said to be wholly unacceptable
o - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302 and 324 - Criminal Law -
Administration of justice.
I

According to the prosecution case, a quarrel took
place between two groups of people of the same village.
M had gone out of his house to take a cup of tea. During
E the quarrel, the appellant stabbed M with knife. M was
sitting near gymnasium. PW-6 t~ied to intervene..,Appellant
inflicted injuries to PW-6. M was taken to.the·'hospital and
he died the next day. PW-6, PW-1-son of dece~sed and
others witnessed the incident. FIR was lodged. Witnesses
F were examined. Dying dedlaration was recorded.
Appellant.was charged uls. 362 and 324 IPC. Trial court t-·
found that there were material discrepancies in the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, dying d_e~claration 1
and FIR; ·and acquitted the appellant. However, t~e 'liigh ··
G Court holding that the findings of the trial court were
perverse, set aside the order of acquittal. Hence the
.present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court

H 396
RANGAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 397

ta.
HELD: 1.1. A judgment of acquittal passed should A :
not be interfered vvi!.h when two views are possible.
..... Therefore, it is to. be considered as to whether the view ..
~
taken by the Sessioris judge was a probable one; The
fact that the incident fook place Is not in dispute. What is
in dispute is the manner in whic.h the same took place B
and whether the appellant had participated therein. It was
not the prosecution case that the appellant was on
inimical terms with the deceased or his family. Two
.... ~ ·groups of residents of the same village had been
quarrelling with each other. An incident took place within c
a day prior to the date of occurrence. Police personnel
were posted. A police van was also stationed. If the
prosecution case is to be believed, two constables were
standing near the place of occurrence. It is beyond
anybody's comprehension as to why when one group of D
people were chasing another group of people they did
not intervene and why despite a police van being
stationed, ~he deceased should have been shifted in the
)
hospital in an auto rickshaw. The place of occurrence also
is not fixed. According to the prosecution witness, E
deceased had gone out of his house to take a cup of tea
near the hotel of P.W. 13. However, P.W.13 stated that he
closed his shop at 7.00 a.m. Why more than two hours'
time was taken for getting a cup of tea for the deceased
is again beyond anybody's comprehension. Whereas
according to the dying declaration the deceased was
F
sitting on a pial of his house, where the incident is said
to have taken place; according to P.Ws 1 and 6, the place
of occurrence was near the 'Garadimane'. [Para 17] [410-
C-H; 411-A]
G
1.2. Both in the FIR as also in the-dying declaration,.
the name of R was already stated but no charge sheet
was filed against him. No explanation has been offered
CJS to why he was. not charge-sheeted. No explanation
has also been offered as to why the dying declaration
could not be recorded by a judicial officer. The doctor on H
398 SUPREME COURT REP;ORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A the basis of whose certificate, P.W. 23-lnvestigating Officer
recorded the dying declaration, was not examined. At the
time of recording of the dying declaration, the deceased
was surrounded by his own people. Therefore, the
veracity of the said statement cannot be said to be
B completely beyond doubt. [Para 18] [411-A-C]
1.3. The prosecution version is totally different from
the dying declaration. The alleged participation of R had
been totally ignored by the High Court. It could not have
y ...
been done for the purpose of judging the truthfulness or
c otherwise of the dying declaration. The statement of the
deceased made in his dying declaration was required to
be considered from the said perspective. (Para 19] [413- r
E-F]
1.4. The High Court comm,tted an error in proceeding
o on the basis that although M.0.3 might not have been the
weapon used but the appellant could be convicted only
on the basis of the statemen~ made by P.Ws 6, 11 and
27. If M.0.3 was not the weapon of attack, the statement
of P.W.6 which has been supported by P.W.1 that he had
E snatched the said knife from the hands of the appellant
could not have been believed. The presence of P.W. 6
also becomes doubtful, as he had not been named as
ey~-witness in the FIR. As the! FIR was lodged after the
deceased was taken to hospital: and the treatment started,
F it is also difficult to believe P.W. 1 who testified that he
was an eyewitness to the role of i;>.W.6 and the fact that
he was also injured in the process. The High Court has
t
also not assigned any reason fpr holding that as to when
the statement of P.W. 11 was ,recorded by the police, is
of not much significance. The High Court has not
G adverted to the question that although in the FIR and the
dying declaration both the appellant and R had been $aid
to have assaulted t'he deceased, P.W.1 in his deposition
as also other prosecution witnesses attributed the overt
act only on the part of the appellant,. [Para 19] [413-F-H;
H 414-A-C] '· I
RANGAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 399
,..,
1.5. The High Court did not apply the right test for A
reversing a judgment of acquittal. The findings of the
Sessions Judge were probable. Such a view was
possible. By no standard, the views of the Sessions
Judge can be said to be wholly unacceptable. Thus, the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside B
and judgment of trial court is restored. [Paras 20 and 24]
(414-C-D; 419~F]
.. ·-t Himacha/ Pradesh vs. Sukhvinder Singh 2004 AIR SCW
968; Mohan Lal and Ors. vs. State of Haryana 2007 (9) SCC
151; State of Punjab vs. Kamai/ Singh 2003 (11) SCC 271; c
Devender Pal Singh vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Anr. 2002
''"\
(5) SCC 234; Mohan Lal and Ors. vs. State of Haryana 2007
(9) SCC 151; Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Kamataka
2007 (4) SCC 415; Gowrishankara Swamiga/u vs. State of
Kamataka and Anr. 2008 (4) SCALE 389; Ghurey Lal vs. D
State of U.P. 2008 (10) SCALE 616, referred to.
Case Law Reference:
)
2004 AIR sew 968 Referred to. Para 15
2001 (9) sec 151 Referred to. Para 15
E
2003 c11) sec 211 Referred to. Para 16
2002 (5) sec 234 Referred to. Para 16
2001 (9) sec 151 Referred to. Para 18
2001 (4) sec 415 Referred to. Para 21
2008 (4) SCALE 389 Referred to. Para 22 F
2008 (10) SCALE 616 Referred to. Para 23
...
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 992 of 2005.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 7.6.2004 of the I

G
High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Crl. Appeal No. 32 of
1999.
Girish Ananthamurthy and P. P. Singh for the Appellant.
"
' ~

Sanjay R. Hegde for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H'
..,
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 17 S.C.R.

A 5.8. SINHA, J. 1. Appellan~ is pefore us, aggrieved by and
dissatisfied with a judgment of conviction and sentence dated
7.6.2004 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of
Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1999
reversing a judgment of acquittal d:ated 15.9.1998 in S.C. No.
B 30/91 passed in his favour by the 1st Additional Sessions
Judge, Mysore.
2. There .is a small village 'Rammanahalli'. situate near the
town of Mysore. It has two streets called 'Kelaginakeri' an_d
'Melinakeri'. A cinema_ tent was put therein. There were two
C groups in the village residing in one or the other said streets.
One group intended the owner of cinema/theatre to exhibit films
starring Dr. Rajkumar and the other group asked them to exhibit
.'
the films starring Sri Vishnuvardhan.I They had been asking the
proprietor of the thea.tre to release the films in which their
D favourite stars were acting. The occ1.:1rrence took place at about
8.00 a.m. on 9.12.1990. ·
3. The prosecution case is as under:
I

Maruchhaiah, the deceased, had gone out of his house to.
have a cup of tea. A clash between two groups of people from
E the aforementioned streets 'Kelaginakeri' and 'Melinakeri' took
place. During the said clash, appellant is said to have stabbed
the deceased with a knife when he was sitting near
'Garadimane' (Gymnasium). Maruchhaiah was taken to K.R
Hospital at Mysore. Hedied on the nextday,·i.e. on.10.12. 1990
F at about 5.00 p.m. Appellant is said to have also caused injury
to Madhu (P.W.6) when he tried to intervene. The said
1

occurrence is said to have been witnessed by P.W. 6- Madhu,
P.W.1-Maruchhaiah son of the dee.eased Maruchhaiah and.
several others.
G
P.W. 1-son of the deceased was also known -as
Maruchhai.ah. A first information report was lodged at the
Mysore Sout~ Police Station, stating:
"On 9.12.1990 at 10 AM. my father Maruchhaiah was ..
J

H
sitting on the paial of Garadimane and at that tim.e
. I
I
RANGAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 401
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

Rachimallaiah and Rangaiah assaulted my father and A
Rangaiah stabbed my father below the left shoulder. There
* is a dispute between one street Keelanakeri street and for
this they have injured my father. At that time Chennaiah and
Mahadeva's wife were present. I pray to take action."
(emphasis supplied) 8
4. Deceased allegedly made a dying declaration, which
was recorded by P.W. 23 -J.S. Srikanta Murthy, Investigating
A
'• Officer in the presence of duty doctor, Dr. Jagannath C.W.21.
Dr. Jagannath, however, was not examined.
c
P.W. 23, in his deposition stated:
- "He told before me in the presence of the Medical Officer
C.W. 21 that on 9.12.1990 at 10.00 a.m. while he was
sitting on the pial of his house, some people came in
group and when he questioned those persons why they D
were creating galata, at that time, accused came and held
him and stabbed him with knife. One Rachimallaiah
·-\
(subsequently deleted in the charge sheet) assaulted him
' with club and stabbed with knife, as a result of the said
injury, he fell bleeding and his son P.W. 1 admitted him to E
the hospital. He said that due to ill-will, accused (Rangaiah)
stabbed him with the knife."
(emphasis supplied)
5. P.W. 23, in his deposition, had accepted that he did not
obtain any certificate from the doctor that the deceased was F
"}
both in a mentally and physically fit condition to give a dying
...
declaration. Admittedly, no judicial officer was asked to record
...J a dying declaration although the deceased after receiving t~~
injury was alive for about 32 hours.
- G
6. P.W.3 Dr. Hemavathy examined Maruchhaiah, the

• t
deceased and found only one cut injury 1 1/2 cm x 1/2 ems on
the left side of the posterior exillery fold. She found 'bleeding
present'; air bubble was also seen from the wound.

~
7. P.W. 1- Maruchhaiah is the complainant. He is son of H

-
t

>
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2008] 17 S.C.R. e
'!
A the deceased. According to him, the people of 'Kelaginakeri'
started· chasing 'Melinakeri' people. Since they came near his
house, he also started running towards Rama Mandir. At that *
time (i.e., while running), he sa~ the appellant stabbing his
father below on.
the. left shoulder near
I
arm pit. Later appellant
B and Madhu (P.W. 6) started fighting. Madhu snatched the knife
from the hands of appellant and i:n the process he injured his
right hand finger. The knife was stained with blood. According
to this witness, there is a pial in the Rama Mandir. In his eras~- ,...
.,f.
examination, P.W. 1 stated that it cannot be seen from the road
c as to who is sitting on the pial. He saw his father at 7.30 a.m.
He took his father to the Hospital and then came back to the
police station. He found Rachimallaiah there, who was detained ;
for having injured the appellant. Reople from 'Melinakeri' street
were also present. In the First lnf9rmation Report (FIR), he did
D not disclose that Madhu was an eye-witness to the occurrence.
I

8. The other important witne ss examined on behal~ ofJ~e.. :· •..
1

prosecution is Madhu (P.W.6). He is said to have suffereet ,_
I
injuries in the incident.
Allegedly, on the day of incident at about 7.00 a.m., the
E deceased ·had asked _him to bririg a cup of tea from the hotel
which is at a distance of about 50 feet from the place of
occurrence. The incident took p'ace ~hen he brought tea for
the deceased. According to him, appellant stabbed the
deceased in the left arm pit wh~reafter he snatched the knife
F from him and in this process hei injured his fing~rs and when
he questioned the appellant, he ran away. -f
He kept the said knife with' himself. He, for reasons best -·
known to him, handed over the1 knife to the police authorities
on th~ next day of the incident. The knife did not contain any
G blood stain. Although a seizure memo must have been
prepared on the date of incident, the police had taken his
signature only on the next day. 'He was injured on the date of
j<
incident but he went to the hospital for his treatment only on the
third day of the occurrence. According to him, Rachimallaiah
H
RANGAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 403
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

was not seen near the scene of occurrence. He accepted that A
... prior to the incident police van was stationed in the village in
the 'Kelaginakeri' area and it was shifted to the scene of
occurrence thereafter.
9. Several other witnesses purported to be eye-witnesses
to the occurrence were also examined. P.W-12 Shivana, P.W.- B
13 Mahadeva and P.W.-14 Mallaiah were treated as hostile.
P ..W.10 and P.W.11 being the daughter and son of the
deceased did not speak anything incriminating the appellant.
10. Indisputably, appellant also suffered injuries. Although C
appellant and Rachimallaiah were named as the assailants of

- Maruchhaiah, a charge sheet was filed only against the
appellant. No reason therefor was disclosed. No explanation
was offered. ·
11. Charges were framed under Sections 302 & 324 of 0
the Indian Penal Code for committing murder of Maruchhaiah
and causing injury to P.W.6 Madhu with a knife. Before
proceeding to consider the evidence of witnesses examined
on behalf of the prosecution, we may place on record that a day
prior to the said occurrence, i.e. on 8.12.1990, a quarrel had E
taken place between the two groups. Police Personnel were
stationed in the village. Two constable$ were standing a little
away from the place where the incident had allegedly taken
_place. No police personnel was examined. Why they could not
prevent the occurrence has not been disclosed. If they were F
near the scene of occurrence, they must have witnessed the
same. At least, they should have reached the place of
occurrence immediately thereafter.
12. We may at this ju'nc;ture notice the following post-
mortem report dated 11.12.1990: G
"I. EXTERNAL APPEARANCE
1. Condition of Subject : emaciated, decomposed,
etc.
2. Wounds: Position, Size, character.
H

...
A
404

3.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Bruises: Position, Size, nature
[2008] 17 S.C.R.
- -
~

4. Mark of Ligatures on neck, dissection.1

+
· It was the dead body of an old aged male, aged
.about 70 years of normal built and nourishment, body was
cold, height 170 ems, Hairs on the head were short 1 cm.
B
long with a 5 cm. long pig tail on the back of the head. The
1

whole body upto inguinal region including the serotum
swoUen and crepitations felt pn palpation. Eyelids swollen,
cornea clear, pupils dilated conjunctivae-congested. Rigor r
mortis was established in th~ lower limbs and passing off
c from upper limbs. P.M. staining could not be made out due
to dark complexion.
I

External injuries: 1) Stitched stab wound 2 cm x 0.5
cm. x 7.5 cm (as far as it could be probed) situated over
-
the left side of chest, 6 cm duter to nipple at 2.30 o' clock
D
position, beam below mid armpit over the 3rd intercostals
region. It had three stitches. !It was hor;izontally placed. On
t·
dissection, the wound had pierced the muscles, entered l
through the 3rd intercostal~ space, piercing the pleura it
had entered the surface of upper lobe of left lung as scratch
E
0.75 cm long.
'

2. A vertically place situate(j stab would 2 cm x 0.5 cm x
7.5 ems in size with two stitches, situated over the outer
fold of left arm pit then enteting the 1st intercostals space
F obliquely piercing the pleur~.
I

The· margins of the -above injuries w.ere clean cut, -\-
-;
upper and were wide, inne~ and in No. (1) and lower and
in No. (2) were clean cut. THe left thorasic cavity contained
250 C.C. blood. Surgical emphysema present pressing
G over the chest.
3. Needle puncture mark over the inner aspect of left ankle.
All the above injuries were ante-mortem in nature. )-·

·················
H ..................

1•
RANGAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 405
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

Opinion as to cause of death: A
Death was due to Respiratory failure as a result of
surgical emphysema. Consequent upon stab
injuries to left side of chest by a single edged
weapon."
B
13. The learned Sessions Judge recorded the judgment
of acquittal, principally on the following findings:
(i). The scene of occurrence has not been firmly
established insofar as according to the deceased
he was sitting on the pial of his house whereas c
according to P.W. 1 and P.W. 6, the incident took
place near the Garadimane.
(ii) P.W.1 in his complaint as also the deceased in his
dying declaration categorically stated that there
were two cut injuries and one injury caused by club D
by the said Rachimallaiah but only one stab injury
-1
t was found. Although in the FIR both the appellant
and Rachimallaiah were said to have assaulted
and caused stab injuries but only one stab injury
was found and P.W. 6 had snatched the knife which E
had caused blood injury but no blood stain was
found on the knife.
(iii) Prosecution case was that the deceased wanted
to have a cup of tea and when P.W. 6 was taking
one cup of tea from the hotel near the place of the F
... incident and hardly he was at a distance of 5 feet
away from the deceased, the alleged incidenrtook
place.
(iv) P.W. 13 Mahadeva, the owner of the tea shop,
however, categorically stated that he opened his G
shop at 5.00 a.m. and closed by 7.00 a.m. as no
* milk was available. He reopened his shop at 10.00
a.m.
(v) P.W. 14- Mallaiah although claimed· that at the time
H

w
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 17 S.C.R.

-
A of the incident he was also stabbed by the accused
but neither any investigation in that regard was
made nor any additional charge against the
accused for having stabbed this witness was·
framed. The prosecution has not offered any
B explanation for the said lapse. P.W. 1 or P.W. 6
however did not m~ke any reference to P.W.14 at
all. The report submitted by the F.S.I did not make
any reference to P.W.14.
(vi) Dr. Ctiannegowda, P.W. 2 in his cross-examination
C stated that the name of the assailant was
mentioned in the Accident Register to be one
Chikkavenkati. It is .nobody's case that appellant is
also called Chikka'llenkati.
(vii) Although P.W. 11 Alaiah, another son of the
D deceased in whose presence dying declaration is
said to have been made, stated about the
presence of his si$ter P.W.10 Maniyamma at the
time of dying declaration, in her deposition she
merely stated that some people had told her that
1
E appellant had stabbed her father. However, she did
not know w_ho they were.
14. The High Court howe~er, reversed the said judgment
of acquittal opining that the findings of the learned Sessions
Judge were perverse. I
F -)
The High Court relied upon the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and
s. to hold:
"We have gone thoroughly through the entire cross-
examination of these three witnesses and we do not find
G any material discrepancies in the evidence of these
witnesses to the fact 1that the deceased was near
Garadimane and that he had requested P.W. 6 to get .a
cup of tea from the near~y."
It was st~ted:
H
RANGAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 407
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

(i) P.W. 6's version could not have been disbelieved A
as the accused had made a suggestion that he had
filed a complaint against him which shows the
presence of the accused during the incident.
(ii) The trial court committed an error in disbelieving the
evidence of P.W. 11 on the ground that he had not B
disclosed the fact that the deceased told him that
it is the accused who stabbed him with knife to the
police when his statement was recorded under
Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
C:
- (iii) There is no reason to disbelieve the dying
declaration although Dr. Jagannath, C.W.21 was
not examined.
(iv) Non-examination of C.W. 21 does not mitigate the
veracity of the dying declaration. D
(v) As regards non-examination of another Dr. Jayanth
-+ who was present at the time of dying declaration
i
and who had not issued any certificate when the
dying declaration was recorded by P.W.23 and who
merely endorsed as "before me signed", the High E
Court observed that the same was merely a rule of
cause.
(vi) As the injury- suffered by the accused is of minor
nature, the same was not required to be explained.
In regard to seizure of knife by P.W. 23, it was held in para 28: F
"... Even assuming that M.0.3 may not have been the
weapon used the facts and circumstances of the case
cannot be doubted specially the dying declaration which
is corroborated by the evidence of PWs 6, 11and27. The G 1

evidence on record also discloses that in the dying
declaration the deceased has stated that not only the
present accused but also another person Rachimallaiah
- has a.Isa assaulted him with knife. But Rachimallaiah was
later on .given up by the police. It is true t~at the prosecution H
e
A
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

has not sent up Rachimallaiah for trial and the charge sheet
..
was filed only against the accused. But that cannot be a ·~

reason to acquit the respohdent when the evidence on
record pointed out that he had participated in committing
the offence. The reasoning given by the trial court that the
B name of P.W. 6 does not find a place in the complaint Ex.
P1 is also of no consequence when it has been held in
several cases by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as
High Court that it is not necessary to mention the names >"-
of all the eye witnesses in the complaint."
c 15. Mr. Girish Anantmurthy, ~learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant, would in support of the appeal contend ~
that the High Court committed a· serious error in reversing the
I

well-reasoned judgment of the trial court. Reliance has.been
placed on the decision of this Court in Himachal Pradesh vs.
D Sukhvinder Singh [2004 AIR Sf:;W 968].
It was further submitted that as the purported dying
declaration was recorded at 1.00 p.m. when all were present,
+
\
the dying declaration itself was made clearly as a result of
1

tutoring and was not a free and voluntary one. Reliance in this
E behalf has been placed on Mphan Lal & ors. vs. State of
Haryana [(2007) 9 sec
1"51).
I

16. Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the State, on the othe~J:land, would contend:

F (i) The trial court is not justified in disbelieving the
~
evidence of eye-wit~ess which clearly proved that
...
the accused was present at the time of occurrence.
(ii) The prosecution case could not have been thrown
out by the learned! Sessions Judge only on the
G ground that no charge sheet has been filed against
the Rachimallaiah.
(iii) The t~ial court cdmmitted a serious error in
*
disbelieving th,e evidence of PW 6 on the premise
that Rangaiah wars also called Chikkavenkati
H although in the Accident Register Chikkavenkati
RANGAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 409
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

was shown to be the father of the appellant. A
Reliance has been placed by Mr. Hegde on State of
Punjab vs. Kama/I Singh ((2003) 11 SCC 271) wherein this
Court opined:
"6. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing 81
the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based.
Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with
because the presumption of innocence of the accused is
further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which
runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal
cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence
c
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
favourable to the accused should be adopted. The
paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that
D
miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of

,
-t
justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less
than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where
admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the
appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence even where
the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of E
ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed
any offence or not. [See Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State
of M.P.(2002) 4 SCC 85]. The principle to be followed by _
appellate Court considering the appeal against the
F,
j-
judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are
r compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the
impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a
compelling re~son for interference."
Reliance has been placed by Mr. Hegde also on
G
Devender Pal Singh vs. State of NCT of Delhi & anr. [(2002)
5 SCC 234], wherein this Court held:
-;;
"53. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt
must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and
thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made H
410 SUPREME COURT REtPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
e
A sterile on the plea that it is, better to let a hundred guilty
escape than punish an innocent. Letting the guilty escape
.,
is not doing justice accorqing to law. [See Gurbachan
Singh v. Satpal Singh (1990) 1 SCC 445]. Prosecution
is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put
B forward by the accused. [See State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar
Srivastava (1992) 2 SCC ~6]."
17~ Before we advert to the respective contentions made _/;--
by the learned counsel, we may record the well known
principles laying down the parameters of reversing a judgment
c of acquittal.
A judgment of acquittal passed should not be interfered
with when two views are possible. We, therefore, are required
to consider as to. whether the view taken by the learned
I
Sessions Judge was a probable :one. The fact that the incident
D took place is not in dispute. What is in dispute is the manner
in which the same took place ard whether the appellant had -~

participated therein. It was not the
I
prosecution case that the
appellant was on inimical terms with the deceased or his family.
1
Two groups of residents of t he same village had been
E quarrelling with each other. An incident took place within a day
prior to the date of occurrence. ~olice personnel were posted.
A police van was also stationed. If the prosecution case is to
be believed' two constables were standing near the place of
occurrence. It is beyond anybody's comprehension as to why
F when one group of people were chasing another group of + •
people they did not intervene and why despite a police van ....
being stationed, the deceased should have been shifted in the
hospital in an auto rickshaw. THe place of occurrence also is
not fixed. According to the prose,cution witness, deceased had
G gone out of his hou~e to take a cyp of tea near the hotel of P. W.
13 Mahadeva. P .W.13, however, said that he closed his shop
j.
at 7.00 a.m. Why more than tWo hours' time was taken for
getting a cup of tea for the deceased is again beyond anybody's <
comprehension. Whereas according to the dying declaration
H the deceased was sitting on a pial of his house, where the.
..
RANGAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 411
(S.B. SINHA, J.]

incident is said to have taken place; according to P.Ws 1 and A
6, the place of occurrence was near the 'Garadimane'.
18. Both in the FIR as also in the dying declaration, the
name of Rachimallaiah was already stated but no charge sheet
was filed against him. No explanation has been offered as to
why he was not charge-sheeted. B
No explanation has also been offered ·as to why the dying
declaration could not be recorded by a judicial officer. The
·~·
doctor on the basis of whose certificate, P.W. 23- Investigating
Officer recorded the dying declaration, was not examined.
c
At the time. of recording of the dying declaration, the
deceased was surrounded by his own people. Veracity of the
said statement, therefore, cannot be said completely beyond
doubt.
In Mohan Lal & ors. vs. State of Haryana ((2007) 9 SCC 0
..., 151]. it was held: I,
I
"10. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight,
' it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of
cross- examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting
the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the E
reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration
'· should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of
the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard
that the statement of the deceased was not as,a result of
. either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination . F
~ The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was
in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe
and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that
the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can
base its conviction without any further corroboration. It G
cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the
~ dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction
unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration
is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in
several judgments the principles governing dying H
412 SUPREME COURT RE~ORTS (2008] 17 S.C.R.

A declaration, which could be summed up as under as
indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2
SCC 474: (SCC pp. 480-81, paras 18-19)
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying
declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.
1

B [See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. (1976) 3 SCC 104)
. '
·(ii) If the Cou·rt is satisfied that the dying declaration is true
and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without
corroboration. [See State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav ·
(1985) 1 SCC 552 and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar
c (1983) 1 sec 2111
(iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration
carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the
result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased
D had afl opportunity to observe and identify the assailants
and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K.
Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor(1976) 3 SCC fI
61~ '
(iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not
1

E be acted upon without corroborative evidence. [See
Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1974) 4 SCC
264]
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never
maR:e any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to
F it is to be rejected. [See Kake Singh v. State of M. P. ( 1981
Supp. sec 25)] i
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot
form the basis of conviction. [See Ram Manorath v. State
ofU.P. (1981) 2 sec 654]
G (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the
details as to the occurrence, it, is not to be rejected. [See
State of Maharashtra v. KrisHnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu
(1980 Supp. sec 455)) I!

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is
H
RANGAIAH v, STATE OF KARNATAKA 413
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the A
' . statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza. v.
State of Bihar (1980 Supp. SCC 769)].
(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the
deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying
declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the B
eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and
conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical
opinion cannot prevail. [See Nanahau Ram. v. State of
M.P. (1988 Supp. sec 152)].
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version C
as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration
cannot be acted upon. [See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan
(1989) 3 sec 390].
(xi) Where there is more than one statement in the nature 0
of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be
preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration~
could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be
accepted. [See Mohan/al Gangaram Gehani v. State of
Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700]"
E
19. In this case, the prosecution version is totally different
from the dying declaration. The alleged participation of
Rachimallaiah had been totally ignored by the High Court. It
could not have been done for the purpose of judging the
truthfulness or otherwise of the dying declaration. The statement F
of the deceased made in his dying declaration was required
,,., to be considered from the said perspective.
The High Court committed an error in proceeding on the
basis that although M.0.3 might not have been the weapon
used but the appellant could be convicted only on the basis of G
the statements made by P.Ws 6, 11 and 27. If M.0.3 was not
the weapon of attack, the statement of P.W.6 which has been
supported by P .W.1 that he had snatched the said knife from
the hands of the appellant could not have been believed. The ~
presence of P.W. 6 also becomes doubtful, as he had not been H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 17 S.C.R.

A named as eye-witness in the FIR. As the FIR was lodged after
the deceased was taken to hospital and the treatment started,
it is also difficult to believe P.W. 1 who testified that he was an
eyewitness to the role of P. W.6 and the fact that he was also
injured in the process. The High Court has also not assigned
B any reason for holding that as to when the statemerit of P.W.
11 was recorded by the police, is of not much significance. The
High Court has not adverted to the question that although in the
FIR and the dying declaration both the appellant and ,,,,. .
Rachimallaiah had been said to have assaulted the deceased,
c P .W.1 in his deposition as also other prosecution witnesses
attributed the overt act only on the part of the appellant herein.
20. The High Court, in our opinion, did not apply the right
test for reversing a judgment of acqu~jttal. The findings of the
leamed Sessions Judge were probable. Such a view was
D possible. By no standard, the views of the learned Sessions
Judge can be said to be wholly unacceptable. The parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to a judgment of acquittal are
well known. We may, however, refer td a few precedents in this
1

behalf ·
E 21: In Chandrappa & ors. vs. State of Kamataka [(2007)
4 SCC '41 S], this Court held:
"42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the
following general principles regarcl1ing powers of appellate
Court while dealing With an appbal against an order of
F
acquittal emerge: ·
(1) An appellate Court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded;
G (2) The Code of Criminal Pro(:edure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power
and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach
its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and
H

..
RANGAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 415
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

compelling reasons', 'good' and ~ufficient grounds', 'very A
strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring
•• mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers
of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of
language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate IP
Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of
the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
' ..... (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in
case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of c
the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence
available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court
of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, D
the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
•
• (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not
E
disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
22. In Gowrishankara Swamigalu Vs. State.of Karnataka
and Anr. [2008 (4) SCALE 389], this Court noticed:
•.
"29. We may at this juncture notice a few precedents
operating in the field. F'
-4 In Jagdish & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (11)
~
SCALE 213], this Court held:
• "12. The High Court while dealing with an appeal
from a judgment of acquittal was, thus, required to
meet the aforementioned reasonings of the learned G
Trial Judge. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever
that irrespective of the fact that the High Court was
._
-
dealing with a judgment of avquittal, it was open to
it to re-appreciate the materials brought on records
by the parties, but it is a well-settled principle of law H'
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 17 S.C.R.
e
A that where two views are possible, the High Court
would not ordinarily interfere with the judgment of
~
acquittal. [See Rattan Lal v. State of Jammu &
Kashmir- 2007 (5) SCALE 472].
14. It is unfortunate that the High Court while arriving
B at the aforementioned conplusion did not pose unto
itself the right question. In the event, it intended to
arrive at a finding differen:t from the one arrived at
by the Trial Court, it was obligatory on its part to ~
analyze the materials on r~cord independently. The
c High,Court was also requited to meet the reasoning
of the learned Trial Judge. If the learned Trial Judge ~

upon appreciation of the evidence arrived at a
conclusion that the time of occurrence disclosed in
the First Information Report was not correct
D inasmuch whereas the occurrence is said to have
taken place at 08.00 a.m. but in fact it took place
much prior thereto, it could not be opined that the
First Information Report was lodged within an hour •,
of the incident.,."
;
E It was noticed: ~-

"17. Yet again in Kallu alias Masih and Others v.
State of M.P. [(2006) 10 SCC 313), this Court
opined:
·-'
'

F "8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the
power of the Appellate Court is no less than the __,
power exercised while rearing appeals against ... I

conviction. In both types of appeals, the power
exists to review the entire evidence. However, one
G significant difference is that an order of acquittal will
not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where
1
'---

the judgment of the trial qourt is based on evidence
and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It -t
will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely ._
because a different view, is possible. The appellate
H
RANGAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 417
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

court will also bear in mind that there is a A
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused
' and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any
doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should
assign reasons for differing with the decision of the
11
trial court. B
[See also Rattan/al (supra) and Ramappa
Halappa Pujar & Others v. State of Kamataka -
~ 2007 (6) SCALE 206]. II
[See also Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Kamataka 2007
(3) SCALE 90 and Haji Khan v. State of U.P. [(2005) 13
c
•. sec 3531
Recently in Abdul Gafur & Ors. v. The State of Assam
[2007 (13) SCALE 801], a Bench of this Court held:
11
10. The accused persons are not strangers and D,
were practically neighbours of the informant and his
..,. family. The High Court noted that there was no
intention to falsely implicate accused persons
because of enmity and there was no reason as to
why dignity of two young girls would be put at stake E
by alleging rape. It is to be noted that in fact rape
was alleged but the Trial Court found that there was
no material to substantiate the plea of rape. The
evidence is totally inconsistent and lacks credence.
The High Court's observations were clearly based F
-1-- on surmises and contrary to the factual scenario.
~ The High Court has noted that the evidence of PWs.
1,2,3,5 & 8 stand fully corroborated by the medical
evidence. Significantly, on consideration of the
evidence of PW 4, it is clear that the evidence of G
this witness is clearly contrary to the medical
evidence. To add to the confusion, it is noted that
?' the High Court recorded as finding that appellant
_. Abdul Gafur was absconding. As a matter of fact
the evidence of Investigating Officer (in short the H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
e
A '1.0') shows that he h~d arrested Abdul Gafur on the
date the First Information Report (in short the 'FIR') ~
was lodged. Unfortunately the High Court has
merely referred to certain conclusions of the Trial
court without analyzing the evidence and various
B submissions made by the appellants. To add to the
vulnerability of the prosecution version, the FIR was
lodged long after the incident and in fact law was
already set on motion after the telephonic message
had been received.
c 11. The aforesaid infirmities in the background of
admitted animosity between the parties renders the
·~
prosecution version unacceptable. The Trial Court
and the High Court did not analyse the evidence
correctly and acted on m~re surmises and
D conjectures. That being so, the appellants deserve
to be acquitted, which we direct."
The High Court unfortunately failed to bear in mind the '-r-
\
aforementioned legal principles. The High Court
misdirected it.self at various stages. It was wholly unfair to
E the appellant."
23. In Ghurey Lal vs. State of U.P. [2008 (10) SCALE 616],
this Court held: ' "
"76. On marshalling the entire evidence and the documents
F on record, the view taken by the trial court is certainly a
possible and plausible view. T.he settled legal position as ~

explained above is that if the trial court's view is possible <.;

and plausible, the High Court should not substitute the
same by its own possible yiews. The difference in
G treatment of the case by two courts below is particularly
noticeable in the manner in which they have dealt with the
prosecution evidence. While the trial court took great pain
in discussing all important material aspects and to record ;.-'
its opinion on every material and relevant point, the learned _.

H Judges of the High Court have reversed the judgment of
,_

. 9'
I
RANGAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 419
')
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

the trial court without placing the very substantial reasons A
• given by it in support of its conclusion. The trial court after
marshalling the evidence on record came to the conclusion
that there were serious infirmities in the prosecution's story.
Following the settled principles of law, it gave the benefit
of doubt to the accused. In the impugned judgment, the B
High Court totally ignored the settled legal position and set
aside the well reasoned judgment of the trial court.
* 77. The trial court categorically came to the finding thar
when the substratum of the evidence of the J)rosecution
witnesses was false, then the prosecution case has to be c
........ discarded. When the trial court finds so many serious
infirmities in the prosecution version, then the trial court was
virtually left with no choice but to give benefit of doubt to
the accused according to the settled principles of criminal
jurisprudence. D
78. On careful analysis of the entire evidence on record,
we are of the view that the reasons given by the High Court
for reversing the judgment of acquittal is unsustainable and
contrary to settled principles of law. The trial court has the
advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses E
who have given evidence, therefore, the appellate court
should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the trial
court. An acquittal by the trial court should not be interfered
with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.
F
-t" 24. For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly and
"' judgment of the trial court restored. The appeal is allowed. The
appellant who is in custody is directed to be released forthwith
unless wanted in connection with any other case.
G
N.J. Appeal allowed.

-,L

-
-·