RANJIT SINGH AND ORS.versusSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

                [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 133


                  RANJIT SINGH AND ORS.                             A
                               V.
              STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
            (Criminal Appeal No. 1072 of 2006)
                     OCTOBER 27, 2010
                                                                    B
    [P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

      Penal Code, 1860 - ss.148,365,342,323,324 and 3241
149 - Murder- Allegation that an unlawful assembly indulged
in rioting and assault with deadly weapons, which resulted in       C
death of two persons and grievous injuries to three others -
Trial court convicted 10 accused including the appellants -
High Court acquitted two accused but maintained the
conviction of the remaining 8 accused - On appeal, held: Two
injured witnesses deposed alongwith other eye-witnesses             D
about the incident - Injury reports were proved - The evidence
on record and the manner in which the offence has been
committed makes it crystal clear that the appellants intended
to kill both deceased - The injuries caused to both the
deceased had been grievous in nature and inflicted on vital         E
parts of their bodies - Merely because some of the accused
were acquitted by the courts below, the statements of the
witnesses cannot be diisregarded as a whole, and the
appellants cannot be actquitted on that basis - Maxims -
Falsus in U,no, Falsus in Omnibus - Inapplicability of, in India,   F

     Criminal Law - Acr,cused not named in the FIR - Effect
of - Held: In case the informant fails to name a particular
accused in the FIR, and the said accused is named at the
earliest opportunity, when the statements of witnesses are
recorded, it cannot tilt the balance in favour of the accused.      G

     Evidence-'.- Number of witnesses required to prove the
offence by members of a large unlawful assembly - Held: In
a case involving an unlawful assembly with a very large
                              133                                   H
    134   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A number of persons, there is no rule of law that states that there
  cannot be any conviction on the testimony of a sole eye-
  witness, unless the court is of the view that the testimony of
  such sole eye-witness is not reliable -Though, generally it is
  a rule of prudence followed by the courts that a conviction may
B not be sustained if it is not supported by two or more witnesses
  who give a consistent account of the incident, in a fit case the
  court may believe a reliable sole eye-witness if in his
  testimony he makes specific reference to the identity of the
  individual and his specific overt acts in the incident - The rule
c of requirement of more than one witness applies only in a
  case where a witness deposes in a general and vague
  manner, or in the case of a riot.

       Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 32 and 157 - Statement under
  s.32 recorded -Injured witness survives - Effect of- Held: In
D such an eventuality, the statement so recorded has to be
  treated as of a superior quality/high degree than that of a
  statement recorded under s. 161 Cr.P. C. and can be used as
  provided under s157 of the Evidence Act - Code of Criminal
  Procedure, 1973 - s.161.
E
       According to the prosecution, the accused persons
  formed an unlawful assembly and indulged in rioting and
  assault with deadly weapons, which resulted in the death
  of two persons and grievous injuries to three others. The
F Session Court convicted 10 accused under sections 148,
  365, 342, 323, 324 and 3241149 IPC and awarded them life
  imprisonment alongwith other punishments. All the 10
  convicts preferred criminal appeal, upon which the High
  Court acquitted two accused - A.2 and A.20, however, it
G maintained the conviction and sentences of the
  remaining 8 accused.

         Out of the said 8 accused, only 5 convicts (A.3, A.14,
    A.17, A.18 and A.22) approached the Supreme Court by
    filing the instant appeal. During the pendency of the
H
          ,
  RANJIT "SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA            135
                   PRADESH
appeal, A-17 died. The other four appellants challenged       A
their conviction, inter alia, on various grounds, viz. that
the name of A-18 was not mentioned in the FIR; that none
of the other appellants had been named by more than
one witness as being involved in the case, and, in
respect of some of the accused, the evidence of the           B
witness had been disbelieved by the courts below, thus,
it was not proper for the High Court to maintain the
conviction of the appellants on the basis of the same
evidence; that an the witnesses were partisan and had
falsely implicated the appellants because of enmity; and      c
that the first informant, who lodged the FIR, could not be
examined as he died during the course of trial and
therefore, the FIR lodged by him could not be relied upon.
The appellants contended that the prosecution case was
to be disregarded as a whole, and, accordingly their          D
conviction cannot be maintained.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1. Accused- not named in the FIR: In case the
informant fails to name a particular accused in the FIR,      E
and the said accused is named at the earliest
opportunity, when the statements of witnesses are
recorded, it cannot tilt the balance in favour of the
accused. [Paras 6 and 9) [147-F-G; 149-A-B]
                                                              F
     Rotash v. State of Rajasthan (2006) 12 SCC 64; Rattan
Singh v. State of H.P. AIR 1997 SC 768; Podda Narayana
v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1975 SC 1252; Sone Lal v.
State of U.P. AIR 1978 SC 1142; Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish
Singh & Ors. AIR 1981 SC 631; Kirender Sarkar & Ors. v.
State of Assam (2009) 12 SCC 342;Animireddy Venkata           G
Ramana & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra
Pradesh (2008) 5 sec 368 - relied on.

    2. Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus: The maxim
                                                              H
    136   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A fa/sus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one false in all)
  does not apply in criminal cases in India, as a witness
  may be partly truthful and partly false in the evidence he
  gives to the court. The court has to assess to what extent
  the deposition of a witness can be relied upon. The court
B has to separate the falsehood from the truth and it is only
  in exceptional circumstances when it is not possible to
  separate the grain from the chaff because they are
  inextricably mixed up, that the whole evidence of such a
  witness can be. discarded. [Para 16] [151-A-B]
c     Ba/aka Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1975 SC 1962;
  Ugar Ahir & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 277; Nathu
  Singh Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2002) 10 SCC
  366; Jakki @ Se/varaj & Anr. v. State represented by the IP,
  Coimbatore (2007) 9 SCC 589; Ku/winder Singh v. State of
D Punjab (2007) 10 SCC 455; Ganesh v. State of Kamataka
  (2008) 17 SCC 152; Jayaseelan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2009)
  12 SCC 275; Mani @ Udattu Man & Ors. v. State represented
  by Inspector of Police (2009) 12 SCC 288; Ba/raje @
  Trimbak v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 6 SCC 673 and Prem
E Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana (2009) 14 SCC 494- relied
  on.

        3. Number of witnesses required to prove the
    offence by members of a large unlawful assembly: In a
    case involving an unlawful assembly with a very large
    number of persons, there is no rule of law that states that
    there cannot be any conviction on the testimony of a sole
    eye-witness, unless the court is of the view that the
    testimony of such sole eye-witness is not reliable.
    Though, generally it is a rule of prudence followed by the
    courts that a conviction may not be sustained if it is not
    supported by two or more witnesses who give a
    consistent account of the incident in a fit case the court
    may believe a reliable sole eye-witness if in his testimony
    he makes specific reference to the identity of the
  RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA             137
                  PRADESH
individual and his specific overt acts in the incident. The   A
rule of requirement of more than one witness applies
only in a case where a witness deposes in a general and
vague manner, or in the case of a riot. [Para 22) [153-D-
F]
                                                              B
     Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1965 SC 202 -
followed.

    Muthu Naicker & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1978
SC 1647; Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1997 SC
322; Kamaksha Rai & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1999) C
8 SCC 701 and Chandra Shekhar Bind & Ors. v. State of
Bihar (2001) 8 sec 690 - relied on.

    4. Statement under Section 32 recorded-Injured
witness survives: In such an eventuality the statement so     D
recorded has to be treated as of a superior quality/high
degree than that of a statement recorded under Section
161 Cr.P.C. and can be used as provided under Section
157 of the Evidence Act, 1872. [Para 25) [155-F]

    Sunil Kumar & Ors. v. State of M.P. AIR 1997 SC 940;      E
Maqsoodan & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 1983 SC 126;
Ramprasad v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1999 SC 1969;
Gente/a Vijayavardhan Rao & Anr. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh AIR 1996 SC 2791 and State of U.P. v. Veer Singh
& Ors. AIR 2004 SC 4614 - relied on.                          F

     5.1. In the instant case, two persons lost their lives
and three were injured. The complainant/informant died
before the trial could commence and thus, the contents
of the FIR could not be substantiated by him as he could      G
not be examined. However, the two injured witnesses
PW.24 and PW.25 had deposed alongwith other eye-
witnesses about the incident. The prosecution examined
PW.1, PW.16 and PW.17 before the trial court and they all
supported the case of the prosecution and proved the          H
    138   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   injury reports. So far as the eye-witnesses are concerned,
    PW.24, had named one appellant, A3, but, did not name
    either of the three other appellants. However, he had
    stated that A.3 had beaten him and the complainant.
    PW.25 attributed serious roles to A.3 and other co-
8   accused who did not prefer special leave petitions or had
    been acquitted by the trial court. He also named A.14,
    A.18 and A.22. The two injured witnesses had supported
    the prosecution case giving a complete narration o·f the
    incident from the beginning till the end. PW.24 also
c   clarified that A.3 had beaten them. In addition thereto,
    there is evidence by PW.2, daughter-in-law of the
    complainant/informant and sister of 'S', the first
    deceased, involving A.3, A.18 and and A.22. She also
    deposed that she knew A.18 and A.22 before the
    occurrence of the incident. PW.3, another sister of 'S' had
0
    also named A.3 and A.22, alongwith the other co-accused
    who either had been acquitted by the courts below or
    convicted but did not approach this Court in appeal.
    PW.8, yet another sister of 'S' named A.3, A.18 and A.22,
    alleging that they had made forced entry into her house
E   alongwith 4-5 other persons in the presence of PW.2 and
    PW.3. She identified them in the court also. All these
    witnesses had faced gruelling cross-examinations by the
    defence, but nothing could be elicited from either of them
    which may discredit their testimony. Out of these
F   witnesses, PW.24 and PW.25 are injured witnesses. The
    injuries found on the person of PW.25 were of a grievous
    nature. Their evidence had to be given due weightage as
    they are the stamped witnesses. [Paras 27 and 29] [155-
    H· 156-A" 158-E-H· 159-A-D]
      '       '         '
G
         Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 2002 SC 3652;
    State of UP. v. Jagdeo & Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 456; State of
    UP. v. Kishan Chand & Ors. (2004) 7 SCC 629; Krishan &
    Ors. v. State of Haryana (2006) 12 SCC 459; Anna Reddy
H   Sambasiva Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR
  RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA               139
                  PRADESH
2009 SC 2661 and Balraje @ Trimbak v. State of                  A
Maharashtra (201 O) 6 sec 673 - relied on.

     6. The statement of PW.25 had been recorded by the
Magistrate under the apprehension that he may die.
Therefore, his evidence is to be given due weightage and
                                                                B
generally cannot be brushed aside on any ground. [Para
30] [159-F-]

     7. The evidence on record and the manner in which
the offence has been committed makes it crystal clear that
the appellants intended to kill both the deceased. The          C
injuries caused to both the deceased had been grievous
in nature and inflicted on vital parts of their bodies. These
injuries were sufficient to cause the deaths of the
deceased persons, as revealed by the medical evidence.
PW.25 in his statement has made it clear that in spite of       D
the fact that 'S' had died, the appellants twisted his body
just to see whether he was dead or alive and after
ascertaining the fact that he was dead he was given 2-3
lathi blows just to insult him and they made derogatory
statements to PW.25 and 'Sh' (the other deceased) who           E
was still alive at that time. [Para 31] [159-G-H; 160-A-B]

     8. All the eye-witnesses including the injured
witnesses are closely related to the deceased. Thus, in
such a fact- situation, the law requires the court to
examine their evidence with care and caution. Such              F
close relatives and injured witnesses would definitely not
shield the real culprits of the crime, and name somebody
else because of enmity. The defence did not ask the
injured witnesses as to how they received the injuries
mentioned in the medical reports. [Para 32] [160-C-D]           G

     Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan (2008) 8 SCC 270;
Arjun Mahto v. State of Bihar (2008) 15 SCC 604 and Akhtar
& Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 13 SCC 722 - relied
on.                                                             H
    140   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A      9. The courts below have already examined the
  evidence with care and caution and separated the grain
  from chaff and acquitted a large number of persons. More
  so, it may be pertinent to mention that the High Court
  acquitted A.2 and A.8 as they have not been named by
B the injured witnesses PW.24 and PW.25. The trial court
  had acquitted all those who had not been attributed any
  specific role in causing injuries to the deceased and/or
  the injured witnesses. Therefore, the persons involved in
  rioting had been acquitted as no specific role was
C assigned to any of them. Merely, because some of the
  accused have been acquitted by the trial court and some
  by the High Court, it does not mean that statements of
  these witnesses are liable to be disregarded as a whole.
  [Para 33) [160-E-H; 161-A]

D      10. There are claims and counter-claims regarding the
  character and involvement of the claimant partY/deceased
  persons in criminal cases. However, the Investigating
  Officer (PW.30) in his deposition had made it clear that no
  criminal case was pending against the claimant party/
E deceased persons. He also produced the crime register
  to substantiate his statement and he was not aware of
  whether any person of the claimant party/deceased
  persons had ever been sentenced for committing any
  offence prior to his joining the said police station. No
F complaint against the claimant party had come before
  him for investigation. Even if some of them had been
  involved in criminal cases that could not permit the
  appellants to become the law unto themselves and punish
  the said persons. There are no cogent reasons to
G interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the
  High Court. [Paras 34 and 35) [161-A-E]
                       Case Law Reference:
          (2006) 12 sec 64     relied on           Para 6
H
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA     141
                PRADESH
  AIR 1997 SC 768      relied on     Para 7        A
  AIR 1975 SC 1252     relied on     Para7
  AIR 1978 SC 1142     relied on     Para7
 AIR 1981 SC 631      • relied on    Para7         B
  (2009) 12 sec 342    relied on     Para7
  (2008) 5 sec 368     relied on     Para 8
  AIR 1975 SC 1962     relied on     Para 10
                                                   c
  AIR 1965 SC 277       relied on    Para 11
  c2002) 1o sec 366     relied on    Para 12
  (2007) 9 sec 589      relied on    Para 13
  c2001) 1o sec 455    relied on     Para 14       D

  c2008) 11 sec 152    relied on     Para 14
  (2009) 12 sec 215    relied on     Para 14
  (2009) 12 sec 288    relied on     Para 14       E
  c201 o) 6 sec 673    relied on     Para 14
  (2009) 14 sec 494    relied on     Para 14
 AIR 1965 SC 202       followed      Para 17
                                                   F
 ·AIR 1978 SC 1647     relied on     Para 18
 AIR 1997 SC 322       relied on     Para 19
 (1999) 8 sec 101      relied on     Para 20
                                                   G
  c2001 > 8 sec 690    relied on     Para 21
 AIR 1997 SC 940       relied on     Para 23
 AIR 1983 SC 126       relied on     Para 24
                                                   H
    142    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         AIR 1999 SC 1969       relied on             Para 24
          AIR 1996 SC 2791       relied on             Para 25
          AIR 2004 SC 4614       relied on             Para 25
          AIR 2002 SC 3652       relied on             Para 29
B
          (2003) 1 sec 456       relied on             Para 29
          (2004) 1 sec 629       relied on             Parc:1 29
          (2006) 12 sec 459      relied on             Para 29
c
          AIR 2009 SC 2661       relied on             Para 29
          (201 O) 6 sec 673      relied on             Para 29
          (2008) 8 sec 210       relied on             Para 32
D         (2008) 15 sec 604      relied on             Para 32
          (2009) 13 sec 122      relied on             Para 32

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 1072 of 2006.
E
        From the Judgment & Order dated 20.10.2005 of the High
    Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Indore in Criminal Appeal
    No. 180 of 1995.

F       Sushi! Kumar Jain, Trishna and Pratibha Jain for the
    Appellants.

        C.D. Singh, Sakshi l(akkar, Sunny Choudhary and
    Shashank Parihar, for the Respondent.

G         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred
    against the judgment and order dated 20.10.2005 passed by
    the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore-Bench) in Criminal

H
  RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA                  143
        PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Appeal Nos.149 and 180 of 1995, by which the High Court has        A
dismissed the appeals against the judgment and order dated
8.2.1995 passed by the Sessions Court convicting the
appellants under sections 148, 365, 342, 323, 324 and 324/
149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called the
'IPC'), and awarded them life imprisonment along with other        B
punishments.

    2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:

     (A) That on 21.1.1988, the First Information Repovrt
     (hereinafter called as FIR) bearing No.18/88 was lodged       C
    at 9 A.M. under sections 148, 365, 342, 323, 324 and 324/
     149 IPC in the Police Station, Namli District, Ratlam by
     Nagu, informant/complainant, stating that on 19.1.1988
    Nagu and Gangaram (PW.24) had gone to the District
     Court, Ratlam to attend a case and at about 3 P.M. the        D
    accused persons, namely, Ranjit (A.3), Kamal Das (A.12),
    Vikramsingh (both of whom died during the course of trial),
     Ramesh Patidar (A.4), Shantilal (A.6) and Pooran Das
     (A.2) reached the court compound and took Nagu and
    Gangaram (PW.24) on their bicycle to an iron factory on        E
    the pretext of reaching some compromise in the case and
    thereafter they had been taken in a truck loaded with sand
    to the outskirts of village Amleta. From there they had been
    taken to village Bhaisatiya. Nagu and Gangaram (PW.24)
    were assaulted by the accused persons with lathis and          F
    were asked the whereabouts of Shantilal, Shambhu and
    Mohan. Nagu disclosed that Shantilal was in village
    Bamankhedi and Shambhu, Kailash and Mohan were in
    village Budheda. The accused persons wrongly confined
    Nagu inside the house of Nandu and took away Gangaram          G
    (PW.24) with them. They brought Shantilal in a tractor in
    the night at 2 A.M. and put him inside the room with Nagu
    and locked the room from outside. On the next day, i.e.,
    20.1.1988 at about 8-9 A.M., they brought Kailash
    (PW.25), Shambhu and Gangaram (PW.24) and confined
                                                                   H
    144     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A       them also in the same room along with Nagu and
        Shantilal. After some time, they took all of them to the well
        of Gopal Maharaj situated at village Panched and the
        accused persons assaulted Shantilal with lathis as a
        consequence of which Shantilal became unconscious.
B       Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu were also assaulted.
        Again they took Shantilal (in unconscious condition) in the
        field of one Dhula Chowkidar and they assaulted Shantilal,
        Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu with lathis. Shantilal died
      . on the spot. Shambhu also received grievous injuries on
c       his person. The accused persons left the injured persons
        and moved to a distance watching for the consequences.
        After some time, the accused persons reached near
        Shantilal and checked whether he was dead or alive and
        once they were satisfied that Shantilal was no more, they
D       fled.

          (B) The FIR lodged by the complainant, Nagu was recorded
          by SHO Govardhan Singh (PW.30) vide Ex.P-63.
          Shailendra Kumar Shrivastava (PW.29) and another Police
          Officer reached the spot and found Shantilal dead whereas
E         Shambhu, Gangaram (PW.24) and Kailash (PW.25) were
          lying there in injured condition. Shailendra Kumar
          Shrivastava (PW.29) prepared the inquest (Ex.P-5) of the
          deceased Shantilal, seized blood-stained cloth, and
          collected earth and blood-stained. earth. He sent the dead
F         body of Shantilal for post-mortem examination. The injured
          persons, namely, Nagu, Shambhu, Kailash (PW.25) and
          Gangaram (PW.24) were sent for medical examination to
          Government Hospital, Ratlam. Kanhaiya Lal Dharia, Naib
          Tehsildar (PW.26) recorded the statement of the injured
G         witness, Kailash (PW.25). On 21.1.1988, Dr. M.A. Qureshi
          (PW.1) performed the autopsy of the deceased Shantilal
          and prepared the report (Ex.P-3). He also examined on
          the same day the injured Kailash (PW.25) and Nagu. On
          the same day, i.e., 21.1.1988 Dr. Virendra Singh (PW . 15)
H         examined Shambhu and also took his X-ray and found
  RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA                  145
        PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    fractures of the fifth metacarpal bone of left hand, right     A
    humerus and radius bones. On the same day, Dr. Jayant
    Mukund Subedar (PW.16) medically examined Shambhu.
    However, he died in the night at 11.25 P.M. in the hospital.
    Dr. Jayant Mukund also examined Gangaram (PW.24). Dr.
    Uday Yarde (PW.17) performed post mortem of the                B
    deceased Shambhu and prepared the post-mortem report.

     (C) The investigation proceeded, a large number of
    ,persons were apprehended and after completion of the
     investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against 34 persons    C
     out of which two, namely, Vikram Singh (A.33) and Ranjit,
     son of Rattan Lal Patidar (A.34) died during the trial and
     thus, the remaining 32 accused were put to trial. The
     prosecution examined in total 31 witnesses and got 79
     documents proved. The trial court vide judgment and order
     dated 8.2.1995 acquitted 22 accused and convicted 10          D
     including the present appellants.

    {D) All the said 10 convicts preferred Criminal Appeal
    Nos.149 and 180 of 1995. Both the said appeals were
    heard together and disposed of by common judgment and          E
    order dated 20.10.2005. The High Court acquitted two
    accused/appellants, namely, Pooran Das (A.2) and
    Mukesh (A.20). However, it dismissed the appeal of the
    remaining 8 appellants maintaining their conviction and
    sentences. Out of the said 8 accused, only 5 convicts          F
    approached this Court by filing this appeal and Bagadi
    Ram Qas (A.1 ), Kamal Das (A.12) and Ratan (A.24) did
    not prefer any special leave petition against the
    confirmation of their conviction by the High Court. During
    the pendency of this appeal, Gopal Das (A.17) died. So,        G
    at present, we are concerned only with four appellants,
    namely, Ranjit Singh (A.3), Balaram (A.14), Ramchandra
    (A.18) and Shambhu (A.22).

     3. Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for
the appellants, has submitted that the deceased persons/           H
    146   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   complainant party had been involved in a large number of
    criminal cases and had created a menace as all of them were
    involved in cases of theft. Complaints had been filed against
    them and villagers had been afraid of the complainant party.
    The Police had been investigating theft cases against them. In
B   fact, the complainanUdeceased party had been absconding
    because of the pendency of cases of theft against them. One
    police Constable had been posted in the village to keep an eye
    on them. The name of Ramchandra (A.18) was not mentioned
    in the FIR. None of the other appellants had been named by
c   more than one witness as being involved in the case and in
    respect of some of the accused the evidence of the witness
    had been disbelieved by the courts below, thus, it was not
    proper for the High Court to maintain the conviction of the
    appellants on the basis of the same evidence against the
D   present appellants. All the witnesses were partisan and had
    falsely implicated the appellants because of enmity. Nagu, who
    lodged the FIR, could not be examined as died during the
    course of trial and therefore, the FIR lodged by him could not
    be relied upon. The FIR which could have been relied upon was
E   by Dhula Chowkidar (PW.5). There was no intention on the part
    of the appellants to cause death, otherwise they could have
    eliminated the deceased persons on the very first day.
    According to the prosecution, some of the accused were
    armed with deadly weapons. The same had not been used as
    the deceased and other injured persons had allegedly been
F   beaten with sticks and lathis. Injuries had been caused on non-
    vital parts of their bodies. Thus, their conviction cannot be
    maintained under section 302 IPC even with the aid of Section
    149 IPC. The prosecution case is to be disregarded as a whole.
    Thus, appeal deserves to be allowed.
G
       4. On the contrary, Shri C.D. Singh, learned counsel for the
  State of Madhya Pradesh, has vehemently opposed the appeal
  contending that no case was pending against the deceased/
  complainant party and none of them had been absconding. The
H appellants had caused injuries which were sufficient to cause
  RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA                  147
        PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
death of two persons. The appellants also caused injuries to        A
the other eye-witness. Statement of Kailash (PW.25) was
recorded by a Magistrate under the apprehension of his death,
so his statement is to be considered as a statement made
under section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter called Cr.P.C.). Deposition of the injured witnesses   B
is to be given due weightage. The Court has a duty to separate
the grain from the chaff and in case, some of the accused
persons had been acquitted by the trial court and some by the
High Court, that does not mean that the deposition of the
witnesses cannot be relied upon for conviction of the appellants.   c
The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.

     5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the
record.
                                                                    D
Legal Issues:

Accused-not named in the FIR:

     6. In Rotash v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 12 SCC 64,
this Court while dealing with a similar issue held as under:        E

    "The first information report, as is well known, is not an
    encyclopaedia of the entire case. It need not contain al! the
    details. We, however, although did not intend to ignore the
    importance of naming of an accused in the first information F
    report, but herein we have seen that he had been named
    in the earliest possible opportunity. Even assuming that
    PW 1 did not name him in the first information report, we
    do not find any reason to disbelieve the statement of Mooli
    Devi, PW 6. The question is as to whether a person was G
    implicated by way of an afterthought or not must be judged
    having regard to the entire factual scenario obtaining in the
    case. PW 6 received as many as four injuries."

    7. In Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., AIR 1997 SC 768, this
Court held as under:                                                H
    148    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         "Omission of the said detail is there in the First Information
          Statement, no doubt. But Criminal Courts should not be
          fastidious with mere omissions in First Information
          Statement, since such Statements cannot be expected to
          be a chronicle of every detail of what happened, nor to
B         contain an exhaustive catalogue of the events which took
          place. The person who furnishes first information to
          authorities might be fresh with the facts but he need not
          necessarily have the skill or ability to reproduce details of
          the entire story without anything missing therefrom. Some
c         may miss even important details in a narration. Quite often
          the Police Officer, who takes down the first information,
          would record what the informant conveys to him without
          resorting to any elicitatory exercise. It is the voluntary
          narrative of the informant without interrogation which usually
          goes into such statement. So any omission therein has to
D
          be considered along with the other evidence to determine
          whether the fact so omitted never happened at all."

          (See also Podda Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
          AIR 1975 SC 1252; Sone Lal v. State of U.P: AIR 1978
E         SC 1142; Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh & Ors., AIR
          1981 SC 631; and Kirender Sarkar & Ors. v. State of
          Assam, (2009) 12 SCC 342).

        8. While dealing with a similar issue in Animireddy
F   Venkata Ramana & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of
    Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 5 SCC 368, this Court held as under:

          "While considering the effect of some omissions in the first
          information report on the part of the informant, a court
          cannot fail to take into consideration the probable physical
G         and mental condition of the first informant. One of the
          important factors which may weigh with the court is as to
          whether there was a possibility of false implication of the
          appellants. Only with a view to test the veracity of the
          correctness of the contents of the report, the court applies
H         certain well-known principles of caution."
  RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA                     149
        PRADESH [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
     9. Therefore, from the law referred to hereinabove, it is        A
evident that in case the informant fails to name a particular
accused in the FIR, and the said accused is named at the
earliest opportunity, when the statements of witnesses are
recorded, it cannot tilt the balance in favour of the accused.
                                                                      8
Falsus in Uno. Falsus in Omnibus:

    10. In Ba/aka Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC
1962, this Court observed as under:-

    "lt is true that, as laid down by this Court in Zwinglee Ariel    c
    v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 15, and other
    cases which have followed that case, the Court must make
    an attempt to separate grain from the chaff, the truth from
    the falsehood, yet this could only be possible when the truth
    i~ separable from the falsehood. Where the grain cannot           D
    be separated from the chaff because the grain and the
    chaff are so inextricably mixed up that in the process of
    separation the Court would have to reconstruct an
    absolutely new case for the prosecution by divorcing the
    essential details presented by the prosecution completely         E
    from the context and the background against which they
    are made, then this principle will not apply."

     11. In Ugar Ahir & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC
277, this Court held as under:-
                                                                      F
    " The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one
    thing, false in every thing) is neither a sound rule of law nor
    a rule of practice. Hardly one comes across a witness
    whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at
    any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments.           G
    It is, therefore, the duty of the court to scrutinise the
    evidence carefully and, in terms of the felicitous metaphor,
    separate the grain from the chaff. But, it cannot obviously
    disbelieve the substratum of the prosecution case or the
                                                                      H
    150     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         material parts of the evidence and reconstruct a story of
          its own out of the rest."

         12. A similar view was taken in Nathu Singh Yadav v.
    State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) 10 SCC 366.
B      13. The maxim has been explained by this Court in Jakki
    @ Selvaraj & Anr. v. State represented by the IP, Coimbatore,
    (2007) 9 sec 589, observing:-

          "The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus ha~ not
c         received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to
          occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution.
          All that it amounts to is, that in such cases testimony may
          be disregarded, and not that it must be discarded. The
          doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence
D         which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances,
          but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of
          evidence'."

       14. It is well settled in law that the maxim fa/sus in uno,
  fa/sus in omnibus (false in one false in all) does not apply in
E criminal cases in India, as a witness may be partly truthful and
  partly false in the evidence he gives to the Court. (Vide:
  Ku/winder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2007) 10 SCC 455;
  Ganesh v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 17 SCC 152;
  Jayaseelan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 12 SCC 275; Mani
F @ Udattu Man & Ors. v. State represented by Inspector of
  Police, (2009) 12 SCC 288; and Balraje@ Trimbak v. State
  of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673).

       15. This position of law has been reiterated by this Court
G in Prem Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2009) 14 SCC 494,
  wherein the Court clearly held as under:

          "It is now a well-settled principle of law that the doctrine
          "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" has no application in
          India."
H
  RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA                  151
        PRADESH.ff)R. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
     16. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to        A
the effect that the aforesaid legal maxim is not applicable in
India and the court has to assess to what extent the deposition
of a witness can be relied upon. The court has to separate the
falsehood from the truth and it is only in exceptional
circumstances when it is not possible to separate the grain from   B
the chaff because they are inextricably mixed up, that the whole
evidence of such a witness can be discarded.

Number of witnesses required to prove the offence by
members of a large unlawful assembly:
                                                                   c
    17. This question has been definitively dealt with by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Masalti v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 202, wherein the Court observed as
under:
                                                                   D
    " ... under the Indian Evidence Act, trustworthy evidence
    given by a single witness would be enough to convict an
    accused person, whereas evidence given by half a dozen
    witnesses which is not trustworthy would not be enough to
    sustain the conviction. That, no doubt is true; but where a    E
    criminal court has to deal with evidence pertaining to the
    commission of an offence involving a large number of
    offenders and a large number of victims, it is usual to
    adopt the test that the conviction could be sustained only
    if it is supported by two or three or more witnesses who
    give a consistent account of the incident. In a sense, the     F
    test may be described as mechanical; but it is difficult to
    see how it can be treated as irrational or unreasonable."

                                            (Emphasis added)
                                                                   G
      18. In Muthu Naicker & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR
1978 SC 1647, this Court explained the aforesaid judgment by
stating that in a situation where a witness has been attacked
by the members of an unlawful assembly composed of a large
number of persons, the court should carefully consider the
                                                                   H
    152    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   question of the credibility of such a witness. Where the court is
    of the view that the testimony of such a witness is in the facts
    and circumstances of the case not reliable, it should insist that
    such testimony be corroborated by one or more other witness
    before it can be accepted by the court.
B
        19. A similar view has also been taken by this Court in
    Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 322,
    wherein the Court has held:-

          ''There is no rule of evidence that no conviction can be
c         based unless a certain minimum number of witnesses
          have identified a particular accused as a member of the
          unlawful assembly. It is axiomatic that evidence is not to
          be counted but only weighed and it is not the quantity of
          eviCfence but the quality that matters. Even the testimony
D         of 'one single witness, if wholly reliable, is sufficient to
          establish the identification of an accused as a member of
          an unlawful assembly. All the same, when the size of the
          unlawful assembly is quite large (as in this case) and many
          persons would have witnessed the incident, it would be a
E         prudent exercise to insist on at least two reliable witnesses
          to vouchsafe the identification of an accused as a
          participant in the rioting."

                                                  (Emphasis added)

F       20. Similarly, in Kamaksha Rai & Ors. v. State of Uttar
    Pradesh, (1999) 8 SCC 701, this Court observed:

          "Taking into consideration the nature of attack and the
          possibility or otherwise of the identification of these
          accused persons by the prosecution witnesses and
G
          bearing in mind the principles laid down by this Court in
          the above-cited judgments, we are of the opinion that it is
          not safe to rely on the evidence of witnesses who speak
          generally and in an omnibus way without specific
H
  RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA                   153
        PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    reference to the identity of the individuals and their          A
    specific overt acts in regard to the incident ... "

                                             (Emphasis added)

     Consequently, the Court took the view that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, as a lot of witnesses had referred       8
to the accused in a vague and general manner rather than
making specific reference to the identity of the individuals and
their specific overt acts in the incident, prudence dictated that
it was necessary to fix a minimum number of witnesses needed
to accept the prosecution case to base a conviction.                C

     21. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
Chandra Shekhar Bind & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC
690.

     22. Thus, from the above, the law on the issue remains that    D
in a case involving an unlawful assembly with a very large
number of persons, there is no rule of law that states that there
cannot be any conviction on the testimony of a sole eye-witness,
unless that the court is of the view that the testimony of such
sole eye-witness is not reliable. Though, generally it is a rule    E
of prudence followed by the courts that a conviction may not
be sustained if it is not supported by two or more witnesses
who give a consistent account of the incident in a fit case the
court may believe a reliable sole eye-witness if in his testimony
he makes specific reference to the identity of the individual and   F
his specific overt acts in the incident. The rule of requirement
of more than one witness applies only in a case where a
witness deposes in a general and vague manner, or in the case
of a riot.
                                                                    G
Statement under Section 32 recorded-Injured witness
survives:

     23. In Sunil Kumar & Ors. v. State of M.P., AIR 1997 SC
940, this Court dealt with the issue and held:
                                                                    H.
    154     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         " .......... that immediately after PW.1, injured witness was
          taken to the hospital and his statement was recorded as
          a dying declaration which, consequent upon his survival,
          is to be treated only as a statement recorded under
          Section 164 Cr.PC and can be used for corroboration or
B         contradiction. This statement recorded by the Magistrate
          at the earliest available opportunity clearly discloses the
          substratum of the prosecution case including the names
          of the appellants as assailants and there is not an iota of
          material on record to show that this was the upshot of his
c         tutoring. On the contrary, this statement was made at a
          point of time when PW.1 was in a critical condition and it
          is difficult to believe that he would falsely implicate the
          appellants leaving aside the real culprits ..... that there was
          only some minor inconsequential contradictions which did
          not at all impair his evidence. Then, again, as already
D
          noticed, the evidence of the doctors fully supports his
          version of the incident."

                                                    (Emphasis added)

E        24. In Maqsoodan & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC
    126, this court dealt with a similar issue wherein a person who
    had made a statement in expectation of death did not die. The
    court held that it cannot be treated as a dying declaration as
    his statement was not admissible under Section 32 of the Indian
F   Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called the Act 1872), but it was
    to be dealt with under Section 157 of the Act 1872, which
    provides that the former statement of a witness may be proved
    to corroborate later testimony as to the same fact.

       A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in
G Ramprasad v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1999 SC 1969, as
  the Court held:

          "Be that as it may, the question is whether the Court could
          treat it as an item of evidence for any purpose. Section
H         157 of the Evidence Act permits proof of any former
  RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA                    155
        PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    statement made by a witness relating to the same fact             A
    before "any authority legally competent to investigate the
    fact" but its use is limited to corroboration of the testimony
    of such a witness. Though a police officer is legally
    competent to investigate, any statement made to him
    during such an investigation cannot be used to corroborate        B
    the testimony of a witness because of the clear interdict
    contained in Section 162 of the Code. But a statement
    made to a Magistrate is not affected by the prohibition
    contained in the said section. A Magistrate can record the
    statement of a person as provided in Section 164 of the           C
    Code and such a statement would either be elevated to
    the status of Section 32 if the maker of the statement
    subsequently dies or it would remain within the realm of
    what it was originally. A statement recorded by a
    Magistrate under Section 164 becomes usable to
    corroborate the witness as provided in Section 157 of the         D
    Evidence Act or to contradict him as provided in Section
    155 thereof."

     25. This has also been reiterated in Gentela
Vijayavardhan Rao & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR              E
1996 SC 2791; and State of UP. v. Veer Singh & Ors., AIR
2004 SC 4614.

     Thus, in view of the above, it can safely be held that in such
an eventuality the statement so recorded has to be treated as
                                                                      F
of a superior quality/high degree than that of a statement
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and can be used as
provided under Section 157 of the Act 1872.

     26. The instant case requires to be considered in the light
of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.                          G

    27. In the instant case, two persons lost their lives and three
were injured. Nagu, complainant/informant, died before the trial
could commence and thus, the contents of the FIR could not
be substantiated by him as he could not be examined.                  H
    156    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (201 O] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A However, the two injured witnesses Gangaram (PW.24) and
  Kailash (PW.25) had deposed alongwith other eye-witnesses
  about the incident. Sohan Bai alias Soni Bai (PW.2), Shaku
  Bai (PW.3) and Rambha Bai (PW.8) were examined. Post
  mortem was conducted on the body of Shantilal (deceased) by
8 Dr. M.A. Qureshi (PW.1). Dr. Udai Yarde (PW.17) conducted
  the post mortem on the body of Shambhu (deceased). Dr.
  Jayant Mukund Subedar (PW.16) had medically examined
  Gangaram (PW.24). Dr. M.A. Qureshi (PW.1) had medically
  examined Kailash (PW.25). The injuries on the persons of
C deceased, as well on the injured persons had been noted by
  the courts below.

          28. Injuries:

          (A) The following injuries were found on the body of
D         Shantilal (deceased):

          1. One lacerated wound ~" ~ inch flesh deep full with
          blood on right forearm.

          2. One incised injury - dimension 3x3 inches on left elbow.
E
          3. Lacerated wound dimension 3x3 inches flesh deep on
          upper portion of right arm.

          4. One lacerated would 3x2 inches muscle deep on left calf.

F         5. Lacerated would 4x3 inches skin deep on frontal region
          in which blood clot was present.

          (B) The following injuries were found on the body of
          Kailash (PW.25):
G         1. One lacerated wound on right elbow internal side 3x2
          inches, blood was coming out on its pressing. Swelling
          in upper and lower portion of elbow. X-ray was advised
          for this injury.

H
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA                    157
      PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
 2. Swelling on right hand - pain on pressing, x-ray was          A
 advised for this also.

 3. One incised wound 4x1-1/2 inches present on left hand
 between index and middle finger. It was flesh deep.

 4. Swelling on left hand and forearm - pain on pressing.         B
 X-ray was advised for it also.

 5. Pain on pressing front and back of chest and right
 shoulder. Therefore, he was advised X-ray of chest and
 shoulder.                                                        c
 (C) The following injuries were found on the body of Nagu:

 1. Fracture of humerus bone of left hand and X-ray was
 advised.
                                                                  D
 2. Abrasion on left knee 3x3 inches.

 3. One abrasion present on left side of face and on left ear.

 4. One abrasion Y:i"x1/2" on left hip joint was present.
                                                                  E
 (0) The following injuries were found on the body of
 Shambhu:

 1. Entire left hand, from right shoulder to the hand was
 swelled and was red due to swelling and much pain for
 which X-ray was advised for left shoulder, left humerus          F
 bone, left forearm and left hand front all the four porlions.

 2. Third upper bone in upper portion of the left hand was
 fractured.
                                                                  G
 3. Fracture seemed to be in the right hand radius. Ulna
 bone for which also X-ray was advised.

 4. Swelling present in entire right hand and elbow.

                                                                  H
    158     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         5. (Contusion) in forearm of left hand several marks of
          abrasion were present.

          6. Lacerated wound in middle front part of left leg 2x2
          inches skin deep.
B         7. Lacerated wound 1.5x1 inch skin deep in front middle
          part of right leg.

          (E) The following injuries were found on the body of
          Gangaram (PW.24):
c         1. Swelling 4x2 inches back of left knee, colour was red
          and black, pain on the injury.

          2. Abrasion 3.5x1 inch on left elbow, colour was black-red.
                                                '
D         3. He was mentioning pain on his knees but there was no
          mark of any other injury.

        29. Prosecution examined Dr. M.A. Qureshi (PW.1 ), Dr.
  Jayant Mukund Subedar (PW.16) and Dr. Udai Yarde (PW.17)
  before the trial Court and they have all supported the case of
E the prosecution and proved the injury reports. So far as the eye-
  witnesses are concerned, Gangaram (PW.24), had named
  Ranjit but did not name either of the three other appellants
  before us. However, he had stated that Ranjit had beaten him
  and the complainant, Nagu. Kailash (PW.25), attributed serious
F roles to the appellant, Ranjit Singh, and other co-accused who
  did not prefer special leave petitions or had been acquitted by
  the trial Court. He also named Balaram, Ramchandra and
  Shambhu. These two injured witnesses had supported the
  prosecution case giving a complete narration of the incident
G from the beginning till the end. Gangaram (PW.24) also clarified
  that the appellant before us, Ranjit Singh, had beaten them and
  not the other accused named Ranjit, who died during the trial.
  In addition thereto, there is evidence by Sohan Bai (PW.2),
  daughter-in-law of Nagu and sister of Shantilal (deceased)
H involving Ranjit Singh, Shambhu and Ramchandra, appellants.
  RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA                  159
        PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

She also deposed that she knew Ramchandra and Shambhu              A
before the occurrence of the incident. Shaku Bai (PW.3), sister
of Shantilal (deceased) had also named Ranjit Singh and
Shambhu, alongwith the other co-accused who either had been
acquitted by the courts below or convicted but did not approach
this court in appeal. Rambha Bai (PW.8), sister of Shantilal       B
(deceased) named Shambhu, Ramchandra and Ranjit Singh,
alleging that they had made forced entry into her house
alongwith 4-5 other persons in the presence of Sohan Bai
(PW.2) and Shaku Bai (PW.3). She identified them in the court
also. All these witnesses had faced gruelling cross-               c
examinations by the defence, but nothing could be elicited from
either of them which may discredit their testimony. Out of these
witnesses, Gangaram (PW.24) and Kailash (PW.25) are
injured witnesses. The injuries found on the person of Kailash
(PW.25) were of a grievous nature. Their evidence had to be        0
given due weightage as they are the stamped witnesses. (Vide:
Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 3652; State
of U.P. v. Jagdeo & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 456; State of U.P. v.
Kishan Chand & Ors., (2004) 7 SCC 629; Krishan & Ors. v.
State of Haryana, (2006) 12 SCC 459; Anna Reddy                    E
Sambasiva Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR
2009 SC 2661; and Balraje @ Trimbak v. State of
Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673).

     30. The statement of Kailash (PW.25) had been recorded
by the Magistrate under the apprehension that he may die.          F
Therefore, his evidence is to be given due weightage, as per
the law referred to hereinbefore, and generally cannot be
brushed aside on any ground.

     31. The evidence on record and the manner in which the        G
offence has been committed makes it crystal clear that the
appellants intended to kill Shantilal and Shambhu (both
deceased). The injuries caused to both the deceased had been
grievous in nature and inflicted on vital parts of their bodies.
These injuries were sufficient to cause the deaths of the          H
    160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   deceased persons, as revealed by the medical evidence.
    Kailash (PW.25) in his statement has made it clear that in spite
    of the fact that Shantilal had died, the appellants twisted his
    body just to see whether he was dead or alive and after
    ascertaining the fact that he was dead he was given 2-3 lathi
8   blows just to insult him and they made derogatory statements
    to Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu (deceased) who was still
    alive at that time.

       32. Undoubtedly, all the eye-witnesses including the injured
  witnesses are closely related to the deceased. Thus, in such a
C fact- situation, the law requires the court to examine their
  evidence with care and caution. Such close relatives and
  injured witnesses would definitely not shield the real culprits of
  the crime, and name somebody else because of enmity. The
  defence did not ask the injured witnesses as to how they
D received the injuries mentioned in the medical reports. (See:
  Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 8 SCC 270;
  Arjun Mahto v. State of Bihar, (2008) 15 SCC 604; and Akhtar
  & Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 13 SCC 722).
E       33. The courts below have already examined the evidence
  with care and caution and separated the grain from chaff and
  acquitted a large number of persons. More so, i.t may be
  pertinent to mention that the High Court had acquitted Puran
  Das (A.2) and Mukesh (A.8) as they have not been named by
F the injured witnesses Gangaram (PW.24) and Kailash (PW.25).
  The trial Court had acquitted all those who had not been
  attributed any specific role in causing injuries to the deceased
  ar.d/or the injured witnesses. Therefore, the persons involved
  in rioting had been acquitted as no specific role was assigned
  to any of them. The case of the present appellants is quite
G distinguishable from· the cases of those who have been
  acquitted by the courts below.

        Merely, because some of the accused have been
    acquitted by the trial Court and some by the High Court, it does
H
  RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MA)DHYA                  161
        PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
not mean that statements of these witnesses are liable to be        A
disregarded as a whole.

     34. There are claims and counter-claims regarding the
character and involvement of the claimant party/deceased
persons in criminal cases. However, Goverdhan Singh,                8
Investigating Officer (PW.30) in his deposition had made it
clear that no criminal case was pending against the claimant
party/deceased persons. He also produced the crime register
to substantiate his statement and he was not aware of whether
any person of the claimant party/deceased persons had ever
been sentenced for committing any offence prior to his joining      C
the said police station. No complaint against the claimant party
had come before him for investigation. Be that as it may, even
if some of them had been involved in criminal cases that could
not permit the appellants to become the law unto themselves
and punish the said persons.                                        D

      35. In view of the above, we do not find any cogent reasons
to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High
Court. The appeal lacks merit and, is accordingly, dismissed.
                                                                    E
8.8.B.                                      Appeal dismissed.