Holding

Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 does not apply to the appellant; the proceedings must continue as if the 2000 Act were not in existence, and he is not a juvenile under the 1986 Act.

Summary

In 1993 Ranjit Singh, then about 17 years old, was convicted of murder and related offences under the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed, contending that he was a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and that Section 20 of that Act should apply to his pending case. The State argued that he was over the age of sixteen, the threshold under the 1986 Act, and that the 2000 Act could not be applied retroactively. The Supreme Court held that Section 20 only governs cases pending when the 2000 Act came into force and mandates that proceedings continue as if the Act did not exist; it does not permit redefining the juvenile age to 18 for offences committed earlier. Consequently, the appellant could not invoke the 2000 Act and his appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 applies to a case where the offence was committed before the Act came into force and the accused was 17 years old.
Whether the definition of "juvenile" under the 2000 Act (age up to 18) can be applied retrospectively to pending criminal proceedings.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 323, s. 34, s. 452
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000s. 20, s. 2(1)

Subjects

Juvenile Justice ActSection 20retroactive applicationage of juvenilecriminal procedureIPC 302murdersentencing

Judgment

[2008] 13 S.C.R. 332
.. ,
A RANJIT SINGH
II.
STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal No. 1458 of 2008)
SEPTEMBER 11, 2008
B •·
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000 - s. 20 - Applicability of - Accused tried for commission
c of offence under /PC in 1993 - Age of accused more than 16
years on date of occurrence - Held: s. 20 deals with cases
related to period when 1986 Act was in force - It provides that
proceadings shall continue as if Act of 2000 is not in existence
- Even if the definition of 'iuvenile' has undergone change by
fixing age to be 18 years, proceedings shall continue on the
D
footing that accused was juvenile under 1986 Act - Thus,
accused is not legally permissible to take the applicable age
to be 18 years - Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.
In year 1993, the appellant-accused was tried for the
E commission of offences punishable under IPC. The trial
court convicted and sentenced the appellant u/s 302 and
452 IPC. The appellant contended before the courts below
that he was a juvenile in terms of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, thus, should
F be tried under the 2000 Act and in any event, Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986 was applicable. However, the courts
below did not record any definite conclusion. Hence the
present appeal.
Appellant contended that though material was
G placed before the courts below to show that the accused
appellant was a juvenile, but it did not substantially deal
with that aspect.
Respondent-State contended that even according
H 332
RANJIT SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA 333
"' .
to the case of the accused-appellant, he was about 17 A
years of age at the time of occurrence and, thus, 1986 Act
had no application to him; that for bringing the applicability
of 1986 Act, the accused should have been 16 years or
less in age at the time of occurrence; that the age of the
accused-appellant was more than 16 years at the time of B
occurrence; that by the 2000 Act, age has been increased
to 18 years; and thats. 20 of the 2000 Act was relevant.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and c
Protection of Children) Act, 2000 does not in any way
help the appellant. It deals with cases where proceedings
related to a period when 19a6 Act was in force. What
Section 20 provides is that the· proceedings shall continue
as if the Act is not in existence. To put it differently, even
D
~ if under the Act, the definition of "juvenile" has undergone
a change by fixing the age to be 18 years the proceedings
shall continue on the footing that accused was a juvenile
under the 1986 Act. What appellant contends is to reverse
the situation i.e. take the applicable age to be 18 years.
That is not legally permissible. (Para 8) [336 F-G] E

Jameel v. State of Maharashtra 2007 (2) SCALE 32 -
relied on.
Case Law Reference
--'\ F
2007 (2) SCALE 32 relied on Para 9
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal .
No. 1458 of 2008
From the final Judgment and order dated 14/2/2007 of G
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
Appeal No. 682-DB of 1997
" ;w,. Sanjay Rathi, Jamshed Bey, Neha Gaur and Parmanand
Gaur for the Appellant.
H
A
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

Devinder Pratap Singh, A.A.G., Naresh Bakshi for the
. "
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
B 2. The only point urged in support of the appeal was that
the appellant was a juvenile at the time of commission of the
offence and, therefore, the provisions of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (in short "the Act")
had application to the facts of this case.
c 3. It is not necessary to go into the factual aspects in detail
in view of the limited controversy raised. The appellant along
with three co-ar;cused persons faced trial for alleged
commission of offences punishable under Sections 452/302
and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
D (in short 'IPC') for the murder of one Wazir Singh (hereinafter
referred to as 'deceased') on 1.8.1993. Learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Rohtak, Haryana, convicted accused Ranjit
Singh and Jai Singh for the commission of offences punishable
under Sections 302 and 452 of IPC and each accused was
E sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further
rigorous imprisonment of one year under Section 302 IPC, and
also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to
pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months under
F >--·
Section 452 IPC. Accused Sher Singh was also convicted under
Sections 323 and 452 IPC. He was sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of
Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further
rigorous imprisonment for three months under Section 452 IPC
G and also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and
:o pay a fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine to
undergo further rigorous impris.onment for one month under
Section 323 IPC. All the sentences were directed to run
..
concurrently. Accused Banto alias Satyawati was acquitted of
H all the charges by giving her the benefit of doubt.
RANJIT SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA . 335
~ [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
"
4. All the accused persons, namely, Ranjit Singh, Jai Singh A
and Sher Singh filed appeal before the High Court being Criminal
Appeal No.682-DB of 1997. During the pendency of the appeal
before the High Court, accused Jai Singh died. For that reason,
the appeal so far as he is concerned stood abated. The High
Court reduced the sentence of Sher Singh to the period already B
undergone by him.

5. Before the Trial Court and the High Court the present
appellant took the stand that he being a juvenile in terms of the
Act, the trial should be held as provided under the Act and in
any event, the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (in short "1986 Act") c
had application. The Trial Court and the High Court noted the
. submissions made by the appellant as reg;uds his contention
that he is a juvenile. Further, evidence adduced was also
referred to but no definite conclusion as regards the applicability
of the 1986 Act or the Act so far as the accused is concerned D
~
was recorded.
1'
1 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that though
material was placed before the Trial Court and the High Court
to show that the accused appellant was a juvenile, that aspect
was not substantially dealt with by the Trial Court and the High E
Court.

7. In response to the submissions made by learned counsel
for the appellant, learned counsel for the respondent-State
....... submits that even, according to the case of the accused- F
appellant, he was about 17 years of age at the time of
, occurrence and, therefore, 1986 Act had no application to him.
For bringing the applicability of 1986 Act, the accused should
have been 16 years or less in age at the time of occurrence.
i Admittedly, the age of the accused-appellant was more than 16
G
years at the time of occurrence. By the Act, age has been
-"'
increased to 18 years. It is submitted that Section 20 of the Act
)' has relevance. The same reads as under:
"20. Special provision in respect of pending cases -
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all H
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
+ ,,
A proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court
in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force
in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act
had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile
has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and
B instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile,
forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders
in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions
of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this
Act that a juvenile has committed the offence.
c Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and special
reason to be mentioned in the order, review the case and
pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile.
Explanation. - In all pending cases including trial, revision,
appeal or any other criminal proceedings in respect of a
D
juvenile in conflict with law, in any court, the determination
of juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in terms of clause
(1) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceases to be so on or
before the date of commencement of this Act and the
provisions of this Act shall apply as if the said provisions
E had been in force, for all purposes and at all material
times when the alleged offence was committed."
8. Section 20 of the Act does not in any way help the
appellant. It deals with cases where proceedings related to a
F period when 1986 Act was in force. What Section 20 provides
is that the proceedings shall continue as if the Act (i.e. Act of
2000) is not in existence. To put it differently, even if under the
definition of "juvenile" has undergone a change by fixing the
age to be 18 years the proceedings shall continue on the footing
that accused was a juvenile under the 1986 Act. What appellant
G
contends is to reverse the situation i.e. take the applicable age
I"
to be 18 years. That is not legally permissible.
9. In Jameel v. State of Maharashtra (2007 (2) SCALE
32) it was held as follows:
"'
RANJIT SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA 337 -
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

"9. It was furthermore submitted that although the age of A
the appellant on the date of the occurrence was more than
sixteen years but below eighteen yeas, having regard to
the provision of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2000 (for short "the 2000 Act"), it was
imperative on the part of the Court to follow the procedures B
laid down therein.
13. So far as the submission of the learned counsel in
regard to the applicability of the 2000 Act is concerned,
it is not in dispute that the appellant on the date of
occurrence had completed sixteen years of age. The C
offence having been committed on 16.12.1989, the 2000
Act has no applic2tion. In terms of the Juvenile Justice
Act, 1986, "juvenile" was defined to mean "a boy who had
not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not
attained the age of eighteen years." D
10. Above being the position, appeal is without merit and
is dismissed.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.

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