Holding

Section 427(2) CrPC mandates that a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life must run concurrently with an earlier life sentence, and remission of the earlier sentence does not ipso facto affect the later sentence.

Summary

Ranjit Singh was convicted of murder in 1979 and sentenced to life imprisonment. While on parole he committed a second murder in 1980, for which the Supreme Court in 1983 sentenced him to another term of life imprisonment, directing that the second sentence would not run concurrently with the first and that any remission granted for the earlier sentence would not affect the later one. He filed a writ under Article 32 seeking clarification that, under Section 427(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, both life sentences must run concurrently and that he should be released after serving the statutory minimum of 14 years. The Court held that a life sentence is for the remainder of the offender's natural life and that a subsequent life sentence can only be superimposed, not added, thereby requiring concurrent operation as mandated by Section 427(2). The Court further clarified that remission of the earlier sentence does not automatically apply to the later sentence and that the petitioner had not satisfied the 14‑year mandatory minimum under Section 433A, nor could he claim a fundamental‑rights violation. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as untenable and the case was disposed of as a clarification of the earlier judgment.

Issues considered

The proper construction and effect of Section 427(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 regarding a subsequent sentence of life imprisonment.
Whether the Supreme Court's 1983 direction that the second life sentence should not run concurrently contravenes Section 427(2).
Whether remission or commutation granted for the earlier life sentence automatically applies to the subsequent life sentence.
Whether the petitioner is entitled to release after serving the mandatory minimum of 14 years under Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Whether a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution is maintainable in the circumstances.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 427, s. 433A
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 303

Subjects

life imprisonmentconcurrent sentencesSection 427 CrPCremissioncommutationArticle 32mandatory minimumdouble conviction

Judgment

RANJIT SINGH
A
v.
UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH & ANR.

AUGUST 23, 1991 '~

B (M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, J.S. VERMA AND
N.D. OJHA, JJ.]

Code of Criminal P1:ocedure, 1973: Ss. 427, 433A-Life convict
-Convicted of another murder---,Subsequent sentence of life imprison-
ment-Whether superimposition to the earlier life sentence-Remissions
or commutation in respect of earlier sentence-Whether available ipso ~-
c facto in respect of second sentence. )-

Indian Penal Code, 1960: S. 302-Life convict-7\<ial for second
murder-Conviction-Imposition of Life sentence-Whether both life
sentences to run concurrently.
D
Constitution of India: Article 32-0ffender-Separately senten-
ced to life imprisonment for two different offences under section 302
4.
!PC-Court's direction that in case of remissions or commutation in
respect of earlier sentence, the latter sentenced to run thereafter-
Interpretation of~Writ Petition challenging the sentence-Whether 1
E maintainable.

The petitioner who was convicted under section 302 IPC on
6.3.1979 and sentenced to life imprisonment, was also tried for a second

F
murder committed while he was on parole after his conviction and
sentence for the first murder, and was convicted under s. 303 IPC.
Altering the conviction to one under s. 302 IPC, for the second murder
this Court sentenced him to life imprisonment instead of death sentence
A
and by its judgment dated 30.9. 1983 directed that in case any remission
and commutation in respect of his eatlier sentence was granted, the
latter sentence should commence thereafter .

.G The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution praying for his release on the ground that both the life
sentences had to run concurrently in accordance with s. 427(2) Cr.
P.C., and as he had undergone 14 years sentence of imprisonment with
remissions at the time of filing the writ petition on February 19, 1990,
he ·was entitled to be released. It was contended that this Court's direc-
H lion dated 30.9.83 was contrary to s. 427(2) of the Code of Criminal·
·.
742
RANJIT SINGH v. U .T. 743

Procedure, 1973 since it amounted to directing that the two sentences of A
life imprisonment were to run consecutively and not concurrently.

On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the direction
of this Court, properly construed, was not contrary to s. 427(2) Cr. P.C.
and, therefore, the question of issuing any writ or.directions as claimed
B
by the petitioners did not arise.

Disposing of the petition treating it as one for clarification of the
judgment dated 30.9.1983 this Court,

HELD: .l.l A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment
for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or.impri8onment c
for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural
life unless the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the
appropriate authority. This being so at the stage of sentencing by the
Court on a subsequent conviction, the earlier sentence of imprisonment
for life must be understood in this manner and, therefore, there can be
no question of a ·subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or for D
life running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in sub-s.
(l) ofs. 427, Cr. P.C. [747G; 749D·E)

1.2 The earlier sentence of imprisonment for life being under·
stood to mean as sentence to serve the remainder of ore in prison
unless commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a person E.
having only one life span, the sentence on a subsequent conviction of
imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life as envisaged by
s. 427(2) of the Cr. P.C., can only be superimposed to the earlier life
sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the
offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human might. [749F-G)
F
It cannot be said that a sentence of life imprisonment is to be
treated as a sentence of imprisonment for a ftxed term. [748B]

Gopal Vinayak Godse v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1961)
3 S.C.R. 440 and Maru Ram v. Union of India & Anr., [1981) 1 S.C.R.
1196, followed." G
•
2.1 The operation of the superimposed subsequent sentence of life
imprisonment should no! be wiped out merely because in respect of the
corresponding earlier sentence of life imprisonment any remission or
commutation was granted by the appropriate authority. [751F-GJ
H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991] 3 S.C.R.
A 2.2 In the insta11t case, the last sentence in the direction meant
that in case, any remission or commutation was granted in respect of
the earlier sentence of life imprisonment alone then the benefit of that
remission or commutation would not ipso facto he available in respect
of the subsequent sentence of life imprisonment which would continue
B to be unaffected by the remission or commutation in respect of the
earlier sentence alone. The consequence would be that the petitioner
would not get any practical benefit of any remission or commutation in
respect of his earlier sentence because of the superimposed .subsequent
life sentence unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of the
subsequent sentence was also granted to the petitioner. It was in this
manner that the direction was given for the two sentences of life impri-
c sonment not to run concurrently. (750E-H; 751A]

The subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life had, therefore,
to run concurrently with the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life
awarded to the petitioner. (750C-D]
D
3. The .general rule enunciated in sub-section (1) of s. 427 Cr.
P.C. is that without the Court's direction the subsequent sentence will
not run concurrently but c.onsecutively. (749G]

The only situation in which no direction of the Court is needed to
E make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous _sen-
tence is provided for in sub-section (2) which has been enacted to avoid
any possible controversy based on sub-section (1) if there being no
express direction of the Court to that effect. (749G-H; 750A]

Sub-section (2) is in the nature of an exception to the general rule
enacted under sub-section (1) of section 427 Cr. P.C. (750A]
F
4.1 The mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual imprisonment
prescribed by s. 433A Cr. P.C. which has supremacy over the Remis-
sion Rules and short-sentencing statutes made by the various States
would not operate against those whose cases were decided by the trial
court before the 18th December, 1978.when s. 433A Cr. P.C. came into
G force but ihe section would apply to those sentenced by the trial court
after 18.12.1978 even though the offence was committed prior to that
date. (7480-E]

Maru Ram v. Union of India & Anr., (1981] 1 S.C.R. 1196,
H followed.
RANJIT SINGH v. U.T. [VERMA, J.] 745

4.2 In the instant case, s. 433A Cr. P.C. was applicable to A
petitioner in respect of both sentences of life Imprisonment since the
conviction by the trial court even for the first murder was after
18.12.1978, the second offence itself being committed after 18.12.1978.
The mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual imprisonment as required
by s. 433A even for the first sentence of life Imprisonment was not
served out by the petitioner, and, therefore, irrespective of the points B
raised in the instant petition on the basis of s. 427(2) Cr. P.C. the
petitioner could not claim relief much less a writ under Article 32 of the
Constitution in the absence of the remaining sentence being remitted by
the Government. [748E-G I .

5. The petitioner's incarceration was the result of a valid judicial
order and, therefore, there could be no valid claim to the infringement c
of any fundamental right which alone could be the foundation for a writ
under Article 32 of the Constitution. [747E-F]

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 116 of
1990. D

(U oder Article 32 of the Constitution of India).

R.K. a'arg, N.D. Garg, Rajiv Kr. Garg and P.C. Choudhary for
the Petitioner.
E
U .R. Lalit and Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VERMA, J. T))e short question arising for decision by us is the
true meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 427 of the Code of Criminal· F
Procedure, 1973 and its effect.

For an offence of murder committed on 17.9.1978 the petitioner,
Ranjit Singh, was convicted under Section 302 LP .C. by the Sessions
Judge on 6.3.1979 and sentenced to life imprisonment which was. con-
firmed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. While the pet1t1oner G
was on parole after his conviction and sentence for first murder, he
was tried for the second murder committed on October 25, 1980 and
convicted under Section 303 LP .C. This conviction was altered to one
under Section 302 LP .C. and for the second murder also the petitioner
was sentenced by this Court on 30.9.1983 to life imprisonment instead
of death sentence. This Court while disposing of the petitioner's H
appeal, in this manner, directed as under:
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.

"We feel that life imprisonment would be the proper sen-
A
tence that should be imposed upon the appellant. We
accordingly reduce the sentence of death imposed upon
him and sentence him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for
life. However, since the present murder was committed by
him within a span of one year of his earlier conviction and
B that too when he was released on parole we are clearly of
the view that the instant sentence of imprisonment for life
· awarded to him should not run concµrrently with his earlier
sentence of life imprisonment. We therefore, direct that in
ca_se any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier
sentence is granted to him the present sentence should
commence thereafter." ·
c
The petitioner has now filed this Writ Petition .under Article 32 of the
Constitution for issuance of a suitable writ or direction to correct the
above direction given in the order dated September 30, 1983 to bring.it
in consonance with Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. and consequently for his
D release on the ground that both life sentences had to run concurrently
in accordance with Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. and he is entitled to relief
because he has undergone. fourteen years sentence of imprisonment
with remissions at the time of filing the Writ Petition on February 19,
1990. This is how the question of construction of Section 427(2) Cr.
P .C. arises in the present case.

Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is as under:

"427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for
another offence-(1) When a person already undergoing a
sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent
F conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such
imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at
the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been
previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the sub-
sequent sent~nce shall run concurrently with such previous
sentence:
G
Provided that where a person who has been ·senten-
ced to imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in
default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such
sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence com-
mitted prior to the making of such order, the latter sen-
H tence shall commence immediately.
RANJIT SINGH v. U.T. !VERMA, J.I 747

(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent convic-
tion to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life,
the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such
previous sentence." ·

Shri R.K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously B
urged that this Court's above quoted direction in the judgment dated
30.9.1983 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 418 of 1982 while affirming
the conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. for the second murder and
imposing the punishment of life imprisonment for it also amounts to
directing that the two sentences of life imprisonment are to run
consecutively and not concurrently which is in direct conflict with Sub-
section (2) of Section 427 Cr. P.C. He urged that the life span of a
c
person could be only one and therefore any subsequent life sentence
must run concurrently and not consecutively which is the clear man-
date of Section 427(2). On this basis, it was urged that this Court's
direction in the above manner on the petitioner's conviction for the
second offence of murder is contrary to Section 427(2) of· the Code of D
Criminal Procedure, 1973. This is the basis of the reliefs claimed on
behalf of the petitioner. In reply, Shri U.R. Lalit, appearing on1Jehalf
of respondents, contended that the direction of this Court properly
construed is not contrary to Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. and, therefore,,
the question of issuing any wrii or directions claimed by the petitioner
does not arise. E

We may straightaway mention that the question of grant of relief
under Article 32 of the Constitution does not arise on the above facts.
The petitioner's incarceration is the result of a valid judicial order and,
therefore, there can be no valid claim to the infringement of any
fundamental right which alone can be the foundation for a writ under F
Article 32 of the Constitution. The only question, it appears, there-
fore, is about the correct construction of the direction given by this
Court in its judgment dated 30.9.1983 in Criminal Appeal No. 418 of
1982 in the light of the true meaning of Section 427(2) Cr. P .C.

The meaning of a sentence of imprisonment for life is no longer G
res integra. It was held. by a Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak
Godse v. The State of Maharashtra and Others, [19611 3 S. C.R. 440
that a sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must
prima facie be treated as transportation or imprisonment for the whole
of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life. It was
further held: H
.._
.... '"
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.

"Unless the said sentence is commuted or remitted by
A
appropriate authority under the relevant provisions of the
Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a -~
prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law to
serve the life term in prison.;,

B The contention that a sentence of life imprisonment was to be treated
as a sentence of imprisonment for a fixed term was expressly rejected.
This view was followed and reiterated in Maru Ram v. Union of India
& Anr., [1981] 1 S.C.R. ll96 while considering the effect of Section
433A introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with effect ,_
from,18.12.1978. The Constitution Bench in Maru Ram summarised. }.
one of its conclusions as under:
c
"We follow Godse's case (supra) to hold that imprisonment
for life lasts until the fast breath, and whatever the length
of remissions earned, the prisoner can claim release only if
the remaining sentence is remitted by Government."
D
Another conclusion in M aru Ram was that the mandatory minimum of
,..
14 years' actual imprisonment prescribed by Section 433A which has
supremacy over the Remission Rules and short-sentencing statutes
made by the various States will not operate against (hose whose cases
"
were decided by the trial court before the 18th December, 1978 when
E Section 433A came into force but Section 433A would apply to those
sentenced by the trial court after 18.12.1978 even though the offence
was committed prior to that date. From these decisions it is obvious
'
that the mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual imprisonment pre-
scribed by Section 433A is applicable to petitioner in respect of both ),
sentences of life imprisonment since the convict.ion by the trial court
F even forthe first murder was after 18.12.1978, the second offence itself
being committed afier 18.12.1978. TherJ is no dispute that the
mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual imprisonment, as required by
Section 433A even for the first sentence of life imprisonment, has not
been served out by the petitioner and, therefore, irrespective ·of the
points raised in this petition on the basis of Section 427(2) Cr. P .C. the
G petitioner cannot claim relief much less a writ under Article 32 of the ""i
Constitution in the absence of the remaining sentence being remitted
by the Government. This alone is sufficient to refuse any relief under
Article 32 of the Constitution.
'
The question now is of the meaning of Sectio_n 472(2) Cr. P.C.
H and its effect, in the present case, in view of the above quoted direc-
RANJIT SINGH v. U.T. (VERMA, J.] 749

lion of this Court in its judgment dated 30.9.1983.
A
Sub-section (1) of Section 427 Cr. P .C. provides for the situation
when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is
sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or life impri-
sonment. In other words, Sub-section (1) of Section 427 Cr. P.C. deals
with an offender who while undergoing sentence for a fixed term is B
subsequently convicted to imprisonment for a fixed term or for life. In
such a situation, the first sentence, being for a fixed term, expires on a
definite date which is known when the subsequent conviction is made.
Sub-section ( 1) says that in such a situation, the date of expiry of the
· first sentence which the offender is undergoing being known, ordina-
~ rily the subsequent sentence would commence at the expiration of the
first term of imprisonment unless the Court directs the subsequent
c
sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence. Obviously, in
cases covered by Sub-section ( 1) where the sentence is for a fixed
term, the subsequent sentence can be consecutive unless directed to
run concurrently. Sub-section (2), on th<; other hand, provides for an
offender "alreadly undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life" who D
is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or
for life. It is well-settled since the decision of this Court in Gopal

r Vinayaka Godse and reiterated in Maru Ram that imprisonment for
life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless the
remaining ·sentence is commuted or remitted by the appropriate
authority. This being so at the stage of sentencing by the (;ourt on a E
subsequ,ent conviction, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life ·
must be understood in this manner and, therefore, there can be no
question of a subsequent sentence of imprionment for a term or for life
running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in Sub-
section ( 1) of Section 427. As rightly contended by Shri Garg, and not
disputed by Shri Lalit, the earlier ·sentence of imprisonment for life F
being understood to mean as sentence to serve the remainder of life in
prison unless commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a
person having only one life span, the sentence on a subsequent convic-
a
tion of imprisonment for term or imprisonment for life can only be
superimposed to the earlier life sentence and certainly not added t0 it
since extending the life span of the offender or for that matter anyone G
is beyond human might. It is this obvious situation which is stated in
Sub-section (2) of Section 427 since the general rule_enunciated in
Sub-section ( 1) thereof is that without the Court's direction the subse-
quent sentence will not run concurrently, btlt consecutively. The only
situation in which no direction of the Court is needed to make the
subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence is H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

provided for in Suh·section (2) which has been enacied to avoid any
IA · . possible controversy based on Sub-section ( 1) if there be no express
direction of the Court to that effect. Sub-section (2) is in the nature of
an exception to the general rule enacted in Sub-section (1) of Section
427 that a sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry of
the first sentence unless the Court directs it to run concurrently. The
B meaning and purpose of Sub-sections(!) & (2) of Section 427 and the
object of enacting Sub-section (2) is, therefore, clear.

We are not required to say anything regarding the practical effect
of remission or commutation of the sentences since that question does
not arise in the present case. The limited controversy before us has
been indicated. The only question now is of the meaning and effect of
c the above quoted direction· in this Court's judgment dated 30.9: 1983.
It is obvibus that the direction of this Court must be construed to
harmonise with Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. which is the statutory mandate
apart from being the obvious truth. The s.ubsequent sentence of impri-
sonment for life has, thereJ:ore, to run concurrently with the earlier
D sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner. The real
exercise is to construe the last sentence in the direction which reads as
under:

"We, therefore, direct that in case any remission or
commutati.on in respect of his earlier sentence is granted to
l
E him the present sentence should commence thereafter."

It is in the background of this ultimate direction that the preceding
portion has to be read. This last sentence in the direction means that in
case, any remission or commutation is granted in respect of the earlier j
sentence of life imprisonment alone then the benefit of that remission
F or commutation will not ipso facto be available in respect of the sub-
sequent sentence of life imprisonment which would continue to be
unaffected by the remission or commutation in respect of the earlier
sentence alone. In other words, the operation of the superimposed
subsequent sentence of life imprisonment shall not be wiped out
merely because in respect of the corresponding earlier sentence of life
G imprisonment any remission or commutation has been granted by the
appropriate authority. The consequence is that the petitioner would -~
not get any practical benefit of any remission or commutation in
respect of his earlier sentence because of the superimposed subsequent
life sentence u·nless the same corresponding benefit in respect of the
subsequent sentence is also granted to the petitioner. It is in this
H manner that the direction is given for the two sentences of life impri-
RANJIT SINGH v. U.T. (VERMA, J.( 751

sonment not to run concurrently. A

The ultimate direction contained in the last sentence is obviously
for this purpose. So construed the direction of this Court in the judg-
ment dated 30.9.1983 in Criminal Appeal No. 418 of 1982 fully
harmonises with Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. This is the clarification we
B
make of this Court's judgment dated 30.9.1983 in Criminal Appeal
No. 418 of 1982.

We have already stated that this petition for the issuance of a
writ under Article 32 of the Constitution is untenable. We have, there-
fore, treated it -as a petition for clarification of the judgment dated
30.9.1983 in Criminal Appeal No. 418 of 1982. Accordingly, the peti- C
ti on is disposed of with this clarification. ·

R.P. Petition disposed of.