RANVEER SINGHversusSTATE OF M.P.

                           [2009] 1 S.C.R. 458


 A                         RANVEER SINGH
                                    II.
                            STATE OF M.P.
                  (Criminal Appeal No. 115 of 2009)
                          JANUARY 21, 2009
 B
            [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
                         GANGULY, JJ.]

         Penal Code, 1860:
 c
           s. s.304 (Part I) rlw ss.109 and 34 - Son of accused
     inflicting gun shot injuries to deceased resulting in her death
     - Father exhorting son to fire gun shot - Also asked him to
     get revolver when saw complainant side coming to the scene
· 0 of occurrence - Conviction of father u/s.302 rlw s.109 -
     However, High Court altered the conviction to s.304 (Part I) rl
     w ss. 109 and 34 holding that even if it is accepted that at some
    ·point of time accused was exercising right of private defence,
     the same was exceeded.,,... Interference with - Held: Not called
  E for.
        ss. 96 to 106 - Right of private defence - Exercise of-
     When.

       According to the prosecution case, there was some                 ..,
 F quarrel between P and appellant's sister-in-law. Next day,
   on exhortation by appellant, his son inflicted gun shot
   injuries to complainant's sister which resulted in her
   death. Initially, appellant and his son had thrashed P to
   ground. The complainant, prosecution witnesses along
 G with complainant's sister had reached the place of
   occurrence hearing the shouts of P. Seeing them,
   appellant had asked his son to get revolver from home.
   FIR was lodged. Investigation was carried out. Appellant's
   son being a minor, his case was referred to Juvenile
 H                                 458
                 RANVEER SINGH v. STATE OF M.P.                 459


>·    court. Trial court convicted the appellant u/s.302 r/w s.109    A
      or in alternative u/s.302 r/w s.34 IPC and was sentenced
      to life imprisonment. High Court altered the conviction to
      s.304 (Part I) r/w ss.109 and 34 IPC and sentenced him
      to 5 years imprisonment and fine of Rs. 20,000/- with
      default stipulation. Hence the present appeal.                  B
           Dismissing the appeal, the Court

            HELD: 1.1. The right of private defence is essentially
      a defensive right circumscribed by the governing statute
      i.e. the IPC, available only when the circumstances clearly     c
      justify it. It should not be allowed to be pleaded or availed
      as a pretext for a vindictive, aggressive or retributive
      purpose of offence. It is a right of defence, not of
      retribution, expected to repel unlawful aggression and
      not as retaliatory measure. While providing fQr exercise        D
      o.t the right, care has been taken in IPC not to provide a
      mechanism whereby an attack may be a pretence for
      killing. A right to defend does not include a right to launch
      an offensive, particularly when the need to defend no
      longer survived. [Para 15] [467-F-G]                            E
          V. Subramani and. Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu 2005 (10)
      SCC 358 and Salim and Ors. v. State of Haryana SLP (Crl.)
      No.463 of 2008 disposed of on 11.8.2008, relied on.

           1.2. In the instant case the High Court has rightly held   F
      that even if it is accepted that at some point of time the
      appellant was exercising the right of private defence, the
      same was exceeded and has rightly found him guilty u/
      s. 304 Part I, IPC and sentenced him to undergo
      imprisonment for five years. The sentence as imposed            G
      cannot be considered to be harsh. On payment of fine of
'f'   Rs.20,000/-, same was to be paid to the heirs of the
      deceased. There appears to be no infirmity in the order
      of the High Court. [Para 17) [468-B-C]
                                                                      H
    460        SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2009J 1 S.C.R.
                                                     '    '

A      Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Delhi Administration AIR 1968
  SC 702; State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima AIR 1975 SC 1478;
  State of U.P. v. Mohd. Musheer Khan AIR 1977 SC 2226;
  Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab AIR 1979 SC 577;
  Salim Zia v. State of U.P. AIR 1979 SC 391; Jai Dev. v. State
B of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 612; Biran Singh v. State of Bihar
  AIR 1975 SC 87; Wassan Singh v. State of Punjab (1.!396) 1
  SCC 458; Sekar alias Raja Sekharan v. State represented
  by Inspector of Police, T.N. 2002 (8) SCC 354; Butta Singh
  v. The State of Punjab AIR 1991 SC 1316 and Vidhya Singh
c v. State of M.P. AIR 1971 SC 1857, referred to.
          Russel on Crime 11th Edition Volume Ip 49, referred
    to.

                        Case Law Reference:
D                                                    Para 7
          AIR 1968,SC 702       Referred to.

          AIR 1975 SC 1478      Referred to.         Para 7

          AIR 1977 SC 2226      Referred to.         Para 7

E         AIR 1979 SC 577       Referred to.         Para 7

          AIR 1979 SC 391       Referred to.         Para 7

          AIR 1963 SC 612       Referred to.         Para 10

          AIR 1975 SC 87        Referred to.         Para 11
F
          (1996) 1 sec 458      Referred to.         Para 11

          2002 (8) sec 354      Referred to.         Para 11

          AIR 1991 SC 1316      Referred to.         Para 12
G
          AIR 1971 SC 1857      Referred to.         Para 13

          2005 (10) sec 358     Relied on.           Para 16

          CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
H No. 115 of 2009.
                      RANVEER SINGH v. STATE OF M.P.                                            461


.~       From the Judgment and Order dated 18.3.2008 of the High                                      A
     Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Crl. Appeal No.
     381 of 1996.

              Rajesh for the Appellant.

         C.D. Singh, Sunny Chowdhary, Aditya Singh and Upasana                                        B
     Nath for the Respondent.

              The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

              DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.1. Leave granted.                                                 c
            2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division
     Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior Bench.
     The appellant was convicted by learned First Additional
     Sessions Judge, Bhind, for offence punishable under Section
     302 read with Section 109 or in the alternative under Section                                    D
     302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in
     short the 'IPC'). He was sentenced to undergo imprisonment
     for life.

        , :3. T~~ High Court by the impugned iudgment altered the                                     E
     conviction' to section 304 Part I IPC read with Sections 109 and
     34 IPC. He was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for 5
     years and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- with default stipulation.
         ..                                                .   . . : : ~ ,::· ·~' '.:-~- .~ .;)\ i
              4. Prosecution version in. a n1Jtshe.ll.is,a~.follows:
                                             '. ' ,_,!:I.. .. ,_, ,, .:,1· •
                                                                                                      F
              Rep~rt Ex.P/1 waiflod~ed by complaihant Lakhansingh
     (PW1) according to which on 31.5.199()'h!~ ~cousin Pappu h~d
     some altercation with Kanthshree (DWl), sister-in-law,of
     appellant. Due to that incident when on 1j~).1.990 at 6.00 a.m.
     Pappu was going to ~swer call of nature•. he was surrounded G
     by appellant Ranveer Singh and his ,son Munnu alias Prithviraj
     and was thrashed to ground. When he shouted, complainant
     Lakhansingh (PW 1), Vasudev (P.W.3) and Vrindawan (PW 3)
     reached the spot alongwith Lalita alias Firki (hereinafter
     referred to as the 'deceased'), sister of the complainant H
    462        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2009] 1 S.C.R.


A Lakhansingh and his cousin Sunil (PW8). Seeing them,
  appellant asked his son Prithviraj alias Munnu to bring his
  licensed rifle from the home. Prithviraj alias Munnu brought the
  gun from the house. On exhortation of the present appellant,
  Munnu fired a gun shot which caused injury to Lalita on the left
B thigh. Lalita was taken to the hospital in a bullock cart but on
  the way she succumbed to the injury sustained by her.

       Report of the incident was lodged on 1.6.1990 at about 7
  A.M. at police station Dehat, Bhind. On the basis of the report
  lodged by Lakhansingh (PW 1), police registered a criminal
c case  against the present appellant and his son Prithviraj alias
  Munnu. Said Prithviraj alias Munnu being a minor, his case was
  referred to the Juvenile Court. So far as the present appellant
  is concerned, the matter was investigated by the police and
  challan was filed against him. The case was committed to the
D Court of Sessions for trial. The Sessions Court recorded the           •
  evidence and after appreciating the evidence convicted and
  sentenced the present appellant as indicated hereinabove. An
  appeal was preferred before the High Court.

E      Before the High Court the basic stand was that the
  accused had exercised the right of private defence and,
  therefore, no offence was made out. The High Court held that
  even if the right of private defence is accepted to be available
  at some point of time, it was exceeded and, therefore, the
F appropriate conviction was under Section 304 Part II IPC.
         5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
    appellant is clearly protected because he was exercising the
    right of private defence.

G       6. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand
    supported the judgment.                                             .r

         7. Only question which needs to be considered is the
    alleged exercise of right of private defence. Section 96, IPC
    provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise
H
                   RANVEER SINGH v. STATE OF M.P.                    463
                       [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
 )...    of the right of private defence. The Section does not define the A
         expression 'right of private defence'. It merely indicates that
         nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right.
         Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a person
         legitimately acted in the exercise of the right of private defence
         is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and B
         circumstances of each case. No test in the abstract for
 I>-.    determining such a question can be laid down. In determining
         this question of fact, the Court must consider all the surrounding
         circumstances. It is not necessary for the accused to plead in
         so many words that he acted in self-defence. If the c
         circumstances show that the right of private defence was
         legitimately exercised, it is open to the Court to consider such
         a plea. In a given case the Court can consider it even if the
         accused has not taken it, if the same is available to be
         considered from the material on record. Under Section 105 of
                                                                            D
         the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Evidence Act'), the
         burden of proof is on the accused, who sets up the plea of self-
        defence, and, in the absence of proof, it is not possible for the
        Court to presume the truth of the plea of self-defence. The Court
        shall presume the absence of such circumstances. It is for the
        accused to place necessary material on record either by E
        himself adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary
        facts from the witnesses examined for the prosecution. An
        accused taking the plea of the right o_!yrivate defence is not
        necessarily required to call evid~e;-tie can establish his plea
        by reference to circumstances transpiring from the prosecution F
        evidence itself. The question in such a case would be a
        question of assessing the true effect of the prosecution
        evidence, and not a question of the accused discharging any
        burden. Where the right of private defence is pleaded, the
        defence must be a reasonable and probable version satisfying G
-.      the Court that the harm caused by the accused was necessary
        for either warding off the attack or for forestalling the further
        reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused. The
        burden of e~~ablishing the plea of self-defence is on the
        accused arid the burden stands discharged by showing H
    464         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2009] 1 S.C.R.


A preponderance of probabiltties in favour of that plea on the basis    -<.
  of the material on record. (See Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Delhi
  Administration (AIR 1968 SC 702), State of Gujarat v. Bai
  Fatima (AIR 1975 SC 1478), State of U.P. v. Mohd. Musheer
  Khan (AIR 1977 SC 2226), and Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State
B of Punjab (AIR 1979 SC 577). Sections 100 to 101 define the
  extent of the right of private defence of body. If a person has a
  right of private defence of body under Section 97, that right
  extends under Section 100 to causing death if there is
  reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be
c the  consequence of the assault. The oft quoted observation of
  this Court in Salim Zia v. State of U.P. (AIR 1979 SC 391), runs
  as follows:

                "It is true that the burden on an accused person to
          establish the plea of self-defence is not as onerous as the
D         one which lies on the prosecution and that, while the
          prosecution is required to prove its case beyond
          reasonable doubt, the accused need not establish the plea
          to the hilt and may discharge his onus by establishing a
          mere preponderance of probabilities either by laying basis
E         for that plea in the cross-examination of the prosecution
          witnesses or by adducing defence evidence."

       8. The accused need not prove the existence of the right
  of private defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for
F him to show as in a civil case that the preponderance of
  probabilities is in favour of his plea.

       9. A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on
  surmises and speculation. While considering whether the right
  of private defence is available to an accused, it is not relevant
G whether he may have a chance to inflict severe and mortal injury
  on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private         r
  defence is available to an accused, the entire incident must be
  examined with care and viewed in its proper setting. Section
  97 deals with the subject matter of right of private defence. The
H plea of right of self defence may relate to the body or property
           RANVEER SINGH v. STATE OF M.P.                    465
               [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.)
(i) of the person exercising the right; or (ii) of any other person; A
and the right may be exercised in the case of any offence
against the body, and in the case of offences of theft, robbery,
mischief or criminal trespass, and attempts at such offences
in relation to property. Section 99 lays down the limits of the
right of private defence. Sections 96 and 98 give a right of B
private defence against certain offences and acts. The right
given under Sections 96 to 98 and 100 to 106 is controlled by
Section 99. To claim a right of private defence extending to
voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that there
were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for c
apprehending that either death or grievous hurt would be
caused to him. The burden is on the accused to show that he
had a right of private defence which extended to causing of
death. Sections 100 and 101, IPC define the limit and extent
of right of private defence.                                         o
     10. Sections 102 and 105, IPC deal with commencement
 and continuance of the right of private defence of body and
 property respectively. The right commences, as soon as a
 reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an
attempt, or threat, to commit the offence, although the offence     E
may not have been committed but not until there is that
reasonable apprehension. The right lasts so long as the
reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body continues.
In Jai Dev. v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 612), it was
observed that as soon as the cause for reasonable                   F
apprehension disappears and the threat has either been
destroyed or has been put to route, there can be no occasion
to exercise the right of private defence.

     11. In order to find whether right of private defence is G
available or not, the injuries received by the accused, the
imminence of threat to his safety, the injuries caused by the
accused and whether the accused had time to have recourse
to public authorities are all relevant factors to be considered.
Similar view was expressed by this Court in Biran Singh v. H
    466        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2009) 1 S.C.R.


A State ofBihar(AIR 1975 SC 87). (See: Wassan Singh v. State
  of Punjab (1996) 1 SCC 458, Sekar alias Raja Sekharan v.
  State represented by Inspector of Police, T.N. (2002 (8) SCC
    354).

8       12. As noted in Butta Singh v. The State of Punjab (AIR
  1991 SC 1316), a person who is apprehending death or bodily
  injury cannot weigh in golden scales on the spur of the moment
  and in the heat of circumstances, the number of injuries required
  to disarm the assailants who were armed with weapons. In
C moments of excitement and disturbed mental equilibrium it is
  often difficult to expect the parties to preserve composure and
  use exactly only so much force in retaliation which is
  commensurate with the danger apprehended to him where
  assault is imminent by use of force. It would be lawful to repel
  the force in self-defence and the right of private-defence                -
D commences, as soon as the threat becomes imminent. Such               •
  situations have to be pragmatically viewed and not with high-
  powered spectacles or microscopes to detect slight or even ·
  marginal overstepping. Due weightage has to be given to, and ..
  hyper technical approach has to be avoided in considering
E what happens on the spur of the moment on the spot and
  keeping in view normal human reaction and conduct, where
  self-preservation is the paramount consideration. But, if the fact
  situation shows that in the guise of self-preservation, what really
  has been done is to assault the original aggressor, even after
F the cause of reasonable apprehension has disappeared, the
  plea of right of private-defence can legitimately be negatived.
  The Court dealing with the plea has to weigh the material to
  conclude whether the plea is acceptable. It is essentially, as
  noted above, a finding of fact.
G
      13. The right of self-defence is a very valuable right, serving
  a social purpose and should not be construed narrowly. (See
  Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P. (AIR 1971 SC 1857). Situations
  have to be judged from the subjective point of view of the
H accused concerned in the surrounding excitement and
                    RANVEER SINGH v. STATE OF M.P.                     467
                        [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
     ~   confusion of the moment. confronted with a situation of peril and    A
         not by any microscopic and pedantic scrutiny. In adjudging the
         question as to whether more force than was necessary was
         used in the prevailing circumstances on the spot it would be
         inappropriate, as held by this Court, to adopt tests by detached
         objectivity which would be so natural in a Court room, or that       B
         which would seem absolutely necessary to a perfectly cool
         bystander. The person facing a reasonable apprehension of
         threat to himself cannot be expected to modulate his.defence
         step by step with any arithmetical exactitude of only that much
         which is required in the thinking of a man in ordinary times or      c
         under normal circumstances.

              14. In the illuminating words of Russel (Russel on Crime,
         11th Edition Volume I at page 49):

-   -.        ".... a man is justified in resisting by force anyone who
              manifestly intends and endeavours by violence or surprise
                                                                              D

              to commit a known felony against either his person,
              habitation or property. In these cases, he J.s not obliged to
              retreat, and may not merely resist the attack where he
              stands but may indeed pursue his adversary until the            E
              danger is ended and if in a conflict between them he
              happens to kill his attacker, such killing is justifiable."

               15. The right of private defence is essentially a defensive
         right circumscribed by the governing statute i.e. the IPC,
                                                                             F
         available only when the circumstances clearly justify it. It should
         not be allowed to be pleaded or availed as a pretext for a
         vindictive, aggressive or retributive purpose of offence. It is a
         right of defence, not of retribution, expected to repel unlawful
         aggression and not as retaliatory measure. While providing for
         exercise of the right, care has been taken in IPC not to provide G
         a mechanism whereby an attack may be a pretence for killing.
         A right to defend does not include a right to launch an offensive,
         particularly when the need to defend no longer survived.
              16. The above position was highlighted in V. Subramani          H
    468       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2009] 1 S.C.R.

A and Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005 (10) SCC 358) and             __..
  Salim and Ors. v. State of Haryana (SLP (Crl.) No.463 of 2008
  disposed of on 11.8.2008.)

       17. In the present case the High Court has rightly held that
  even if it is accepted that at some point of time the appellant
8
  was exercising the right of private defence, the same was
  exceeded and has rightly found him guilty under Section 304
  Part I, IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for five
  years. The sentence as imposed cannot be considered to be
C harsh. On payment of fine of Rs.20,000/-, same was to be paid
  to the heirs of the deceased. Here again there appears to be
  no infirmity in the order of the High Court.
        18. Looked at from any angle, the appeal deserves to be

D
    dismissed, which we direct.

    N.J.                                       Appeal dismissed.
                                                                             -