Supreme Court of India
RATAN SINGHversusSTATE OF M.P. & ANR.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 608
- Decided
- 24 April 2009
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The nature of the injury does not by itself exclude the applicability of Section 307 IPC; intention or knowledge is the determinative factor, and interference under Section 482 CrPC was not justified.
Summary
The case concerned a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC filed by the accused (respondent No.2) seeking quashing of charges framed under Sections 307, 148, 323 read with 149, 341 and 294 of the IPC. The High Court allowed the petition on the ground that the injuries inflicted were simple and did not involve any vital part, holding that Section 307 read with 149 was inapplicable and that the framing of the charge was an abuse of process. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the nature of the injury alone cannot determine the applicability of Section 307; the crucial question is whether the accused had the intention or knowledge that his act could cause death, which is a factual issue. Consequently, interference under Section 482 was unwarranted and the High Court’s order was set aside. The appeal was allowed, restoring the framed charges.
Issues considered
- Whether the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims precludes the applicability of Section 307 IPC read with Section 149.
- Whether the High Court could quash the framing of charges under Section 307 IPC by invoking Section 482 CrPC on the basis of alleged abuse of process.
- Whether intention or knowledge, as a factual question, is the determinative factor for conviction under Section 307 IPC irrespective of the severity of the injury.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 294, s. 307, s. 323, s. 325, s. 333, s. 341
Subjects
Section 307 IPCAttempt to murderIntentionKnowledgeNature of injurySection 482 CrPCAbuse of processFraming of chargesCriminal lawFactual determination
Judgment
(2009] 6 S.C.R. 976
A RATAN SINGH
v.
STATE OF M.P. & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 825 of 2009)
APRIL 24, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -- s. 482 -- Petition
c questioning framing of charges u/ss. 3231149, 3071149, 341
and 294 /PC -- Proceedings quashed on the ground that since
the injuries on the victims were simple in nature, framing of
charges u/s. 3071149 was abuse of process of court -- On
appeal, held : Nature of injuries by itself will not rule out
D applicability of s. 307 - Applicability to be detem1ined in view
~ -
of intention or knowledge -- Determination thereof is question
of fact -- Interference uls. 482 not called for -- Penal Code,
1860 -- ss. 3071149, 3231149, 341 and 294.
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 307 - Applicability -- Scope and
E
ambit of -- Discussed.
Charges were framed against respondent No. 2 u/ss. +
307/149, 323/149, 341 and 294 IPC. His petition u/s. 482
Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the same, was allowed by
F High Court. Hence the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The scope of interference u/s. 482 Cr.P.C.
at the present juncture, as was done by the High Court ~
"1-.
G is clearly unsustainable. Whether there was intention to
kill or knowledge that death will be caused is a question
of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case.
The circumstances that the injury inflicted by the accused
H 976
RATAN SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 977
was simple or minor, will not by itself rule out application A
of Section 307 IPC. The determinative question is
intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and not
nature of the injury. [Paras 9 and 11] [981-A-B-F]
2. To justify a conviction u/s. 307 IPC, it is not 8
essential that bodily injury capable of causing death
should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury
actually caused may often give considerable assistance
in coining to a finding as to the intention of the accused,
such intention may also be deducted from other C
circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be
ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds.
The Section makes a distinction between an act of the
accuseci and its result, if any. Such an act may not be
attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is
- i. concerned, but still there may be cases in which the D
culprit would be liable under this Section. It is not
necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of
the assault should be sufficient under ordinary
circumstances to cause the death of the person
assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, E
irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or
knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the
Section. An attempt in order to be criminal, need not be
the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present
an intent coupled with some overt act in execution F
thereof. The Court has to see whether the ~ct, irrespective
of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge
and under circumstances mentioned in the Section.
Therefore, an accused charged u/s. 307 IPC cannot be
_:.- acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the G
victim were in the nature of a simple hurt. [Paras 5 and 6]
[979-F-H; 980-A-C]
Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 843, relied
on
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A State of Maharashtra v. Bairam Barna Patil and Ors. 1983
(2) SCC 28; Girija Shanker v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2004
(3) SCC 793: R. Prakash v. State of Kamataka, JT 2004 (2)
SC 348; State of M.P. v. Saleem @ Chamaru and Anr. 2005
(5) SCC 554 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. lmrat and Anr.
B 2008 (11) sec, referred to.
2005 (5) sec 554 referred to Para 7
2008 (11) sec 523 referred to Para 7 ~
AIR 1965 SC 843 relied on Para 8
c
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 825 of 2009.
From the Judgment & Order dated 09.04.2007 of the High
D Court Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench at Gwalior in Misc.
Criminal Case No. 833 of 2007. "' -
Ashok Kumar Sharma for the Appellant.
C.D. Singh, Sunny Chowdhary, Vairagya Vardhan Dubey,
E -. Aditya Singh, Upasana Nath, Sanjay Misra and Raj Singh Rana
for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
F
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a
learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
allowing the petition filed by respondent no.2. The High Court
by the impugned order accepted the petition filed under Section
G 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the
'Code'). Respondent no.2 had filed the petition questioning
framing of charges against him along with co-accused for
offence punishable under Sections 307, 148, 323 read with
H
Section 149, 307 read with Section 149, 341 and 294 of the
-
RATAN SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 979
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The petition was A
filed primarily on two grounds. One was that the present
respondent no.2 had suffered injuries in the incident which
admittedly had happened at two different places at a distance
of 7 kms. from each other and, therefore, the case was falsely
foisted. The other was that injuries were simple in nature and B
no injury was found on the vital part of the body and, therefore,
Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC has no application. The
High Court accepted the latter submissions and held that
framing of charge for offence punishable under Section 302 or
307 read with Section 149 IPC is an abuse of process of court. c
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
scope and ambit of Section 307 has not been kept in view. The
stand was supported by learned counsel for the State. Learned
counsel for the respondent no.2, on the other hand, supported '
the judgment. · D
4. It is to be noted that the alleged offences are of very
serious nature. Section 307 relates to attempt to murder. It
reads as follows:
E
"Whoever does any act with such intention or
knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that
act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the F
offender shall be liable either to (imprisonment for life), or
to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned."
5. To justify a conviction under this Section, it is not
essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have G
been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may
often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as
to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be
deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some
cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual H
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 6 S.C.R.
~
A wounds. The Section makes a distinction between an act of the
accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended
by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but
still there may be rases in which the culprit would be liable
under this Sectior;. It is not necessary that the injury actually
8 caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under
ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person
assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act,
irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or
knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. ·
c An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate
act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled
with some overt act in execution thereof.
6. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if
there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in
D execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable l -
of causing death should have been inflicted. The Section makes
a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if
any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its
re.suit, was done with the intention or knowledge and under
E circumstances mentioned in the Section. Therefore, an accused
charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely
because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature
of a simple hurt. -.I -
F 7. This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra
v. Bairam Barna Patil and Ors. (1983 (2) SCC 28), Girija
Shanker v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2004 (3) SCC 793), R.
Parkash v. State of Karnataka (JT 2004 (2) SC 348) and State
of M.P. v. Saleem@ Chamaru and Anr. (2005 (5) SCC 554)
G
and, State of Madhya Pradesh v. lmrat and Anr. 2008 ( 11)
sec 523.
.
,,.._
8. In Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar (AIR 1965 SC 843) it
was observed in para 6 that the mere fact that the injury actually
inflicted by the accused did not cut any vital organ of the victim,
H is not by itself sufficient to take the act out of the purview of
RATAN SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 981
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
Section 307. A
9. Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that
· death will be caused is a question of fact and would depend
on the facts of a given case. The circumstances that the injury
inflicted by the accused was simple or minor will not by itself 8
rule out application of Section 307 IPC. The determinative
question is intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and
not nature of the injury. The basic differences between Sections
333 and 325 IPC are that Section 325 gets attracted where
- grievous hurt is caused whereas Section 333 gets attracted if C
such hurt is caused to a public servant.
10. Section 307 deals with two situations so far as the
sentence is concerned. Firstly, whoever does any act with such
intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if
he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall D
- ~ be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine;
and secondly if hurt is caused to any person by such act the
offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life or to such
punishment as indicated in the first part i.e. 10 years. The E
maximum punishment provided for Section 333 is
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to 10 years with a liability to pay fine.
11. In view of what has been stated above, the impugned F
order of the High Court is clearly unsustainable. The scope of
interference under Section 482 of the Code at the present
juncture as was done by the High Court is clearly unsustainable.
The appeal is accordingly allowed. It is made clear that we have
not expressed any opinion on merits of the case and this appeal
is being decided keeping in view the parameters relating to G
e(Cercise of power under Section 482 of the Code.
'
K.K.T. Appeal allowed.
H
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