RATHISH BABU UNNIKRISHNANversusTHE STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) & ANR.

                         [2022] 4 S.C.R. 989                               989


                RATHISH BABU UNNIKRISHNAN                                  A
                                   v.
        THE STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) & ANR.
               (Criminal Appeal Nos. 694-695 of 2022)
                                                                           B
                           APRIL 26, 2022
        [K. M. JOSEPH AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 – Scope of –
Summoning order passed against appellant u/s.138 of NI Act –
Petition u/s.438 for quashing summoning order – High Court opined          C
that the grounds agitated by the appellant are “factual defences”
which should not be considered within the parameters of limited
enquiry permissible in petition u/s.482 – According to the appellant,
the concerned post-dated cheques drawn by him in favour of the
complainant were contingent/security cheques for buyback of shares         D
of appellant’s company held by the complainant, and therefore the
cheques could not have been prematurely presented to the bank
and should have been presented for encashment only after transfer
of the complainant’s shareholding in the appellant’s company – In
other words, as the complainant was still holding the shares of the
                                                                           E
appellant’s company when the cheques were presented, the
complainant is not entitled to receive any payment at that stage,
through encashment of the cheques, made available to him – Held:
The burden of proving that there is no existing debt or liability, is to
be discharged in the trial – The transactional arrangement between
the complainant and the accused reveals the nature of obligations          F
that both had undertaken – The cheques in question were accepted
by the complainant for an agreed price consideration, for the shares
in the appellant’s company – According to the complainant, the
appellant is to first pay and then as per the usual practice in the
trade, the shares would be transferred to the appellant in due course      G
within the time permitted by law – A bare perusal of s.56(1) of the
Companies Act, 2013 indicates that a transfer of securities of a
company can take place only when a proper instrument of transfer
is effectuated – In shares transactions, there is a time lag between
money going out from the buyer and shares reaching to the seller –
                                                                           H
                                  989
990            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     A careful reading of the complaint and order passed by Magistrate
      showed that a possible view is taken that the cheques drawn were,
      in discharge of a debt for purchase of shares – In any case, when
      there is legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing
      Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without
      first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties
B
      – The quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into
      the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either
      the complainant or the defence.
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 – Quashing of
C     proceedings at preliminary stage – Propriety of – Held: The Court
      should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-
      trial stage, when the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility
      particularly because of the legal presumption, as in this matter –
      The factual defence without having to adduce any evidence need
      to be of an unimpeachable quality, so as to altogether disprove the
D     allegations made in the complaint– The consequences of scuttling
      the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable
      – Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality
      without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence
      and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial
E     Court is ousted from weighing the material evidence – If this is
      allowed, the accused may be given an un-merited advantage in the
      criminal process – Also because of the legal presumption, when the
      cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the
      balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/
      prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce
F     defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption– Situated
      thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the summoning
      order, when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed and
      considered by the trial court will not be judicious– Based upon a
      prima facie impression, an element of criminality cannot entirely be
G     ruled out here subject to the determination by the trial Court–
      Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, scuttling
      of the criminal process is not merited.



H
 RATHISH BABU UNNIKRISHNAN v. THE STATE (GOVT. OF NCT                   991
                  OF DELHI) & ANR.

      Dismissing the appeals, the Court                                 A
       HELD: 1.1 The transactional arrangement between the
complainant and the accused reveals the nature of obligations
that both had undertaken. The cheques in question were accepted
by the complainant for an agreed price consideration, for the
shares in the appellant’s company. According to the complainant,        B
the appellant is to first pay and then as per the usual practice in
the trade, the shares would be transferred to the appellant in due
course within the time permitted by law. A bare perusal of Section
56(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 indicates that a transfer of
securities of a company can take place only when a proper
instrument of transfer is effectuated. The operation of legally         C
transferring shares involves several distinct steps. At first, a
contract of sale needs to be entered upon. The nature of
transaction in this contract logically then requires payment of
the price by the prospective transferee to fulfil their promise
first. In exchange, transferor would move to fill Form SH-4 and         D
thus, effectuate a valid instrument. Depending on the nature of
the company and its Articles of Association, then upon the
presentation of the instrument of transfer to the board of the
company and its acceptance by the board, the entry of the
transferee in the register of the company in place of the transferor,
takes place. Thus, the transfer of share is complete. To say it in      E
another way, in shares transactions, there is a time lag between
money going out from the buyer and shares reaching to the seller.
In earlier days the time gap was longer. It has now become
speedier but the gap still remains. The share transactions in India
generally follows this pattern. [Para 9][996-E-H; 997-A-B]              F
       2. The burden of proving that there is no existing debt or
liability, is to be discharged in the trial. The legal presumption of
the cheque having been issued in the discharge of liability must
also receive due weightage. In a situation where the accused
moves Court for quashing even before trial has commenced, the           G
Court’s approach should be careful enough to not to prematurely
extinguish the case by disregarding the legal presumption which
supports the complaint. At any rate, whenever facts are disputed
the truth should be allowed to emerge by weighing the evidence.
[Paras 10-12][997-C, E-F; 998-B]
                                                                        H
992           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A           M.M.T.C. Ltd. & Anr. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma
            (P) Ltd. & Anr. (2002) 1 SCC 234 : [2001] 5 Suppl.
            SCR 265; Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441
            : [2010] 6 SCR 507; Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State
            of Gujarat (2020) 3 SCC 794 : [2020] 2 SCR 687 –
            relied on.
B
             3. On careful reading of the complaint and the order passed
      by the Magistrate, what is discernible is that a possible view is
      taken that the cheques drawn were, in discharge of a debt for
      purchase of shares. In any case, when there is legal presumption,
      it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a
C
      detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the
      trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing
      Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the
      wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. The Court should
      be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-trial
D     stage, when the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility
      particularly because of the legal presumption, as in this matter.
      The factual defence without having to adduce any evidence
      need to be of an unimpeachable quality, so as to altogether
      disprove the allegations made in the complaint. [Paras 13 and
      16] [998-F-G; 999-H; 1000-A-B]
E
            State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604 :
            [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 – relied on.
            4. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a
      pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing
F     proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without
      the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and
      the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial Court
      is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed,
      the accused may be given an un-merited advantage in the criminal
      process. Also because of the legal presumption, when the cheque
G
      and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance
      of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/
      prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce
      defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.
      Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the
H
 RATHISH BABU UNNIKRISHNAN v. THE STATE (GOVT. OF NCT                    993
                  OF DELHI) & ANR.

summoning order, when the factual controversy is yet to be               A
canvassed and considered by the trial court will not be judicious.
Based upon a prima facie impression, an element of criminality
cannot entirely be ruled out here subject to the determination by
the trial Court. Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent
stage, scuttling of the criminal process is not merited. [Paras 17
                                                                         B
and 18][1000-B-E]
      HMT Watches Limited v. M.A. Abida & Anr (2015) 11
      SCC 776 : [2015] 3 SCR 719; Rajiv Thapar & Ors. v.
      Madan Lal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330 : [2013] 3
      SCR 52 – referred to.                                              C
                       Case Law Reference
[2015] 3 SCR 719                  referred to           Para 7
[2013] 3 SCR 52                   referred to           Para 7
[2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 265           relied on             Para 10          D

[2010] 6 SCR 507                  relied on             Para 11
[2020] 2 SCR 687                  relied on             Para 12
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259           relied on             Para 14
                                                                         E
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 694-695 of 2022.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2019 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in Crl. M.C. No.414 of 2019 and Crl. M.A.
No.1754 of 2019.                                                         F

       Krishnamohan K., Gautam Dhamija, Ms. Dania Nayyar, Advs.
for the Appellant.
      K. M. Nataraj, ASG, Ms. Rebecca M. John, Sr. Adv., Gurmeet
Singh Makker, Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Shailesh Madiyal, Amit           G
Sharma, Joseph Pookkatt, Prashant Kumar, Shikhar Sarin, Nilesh Sharma,
Dhawesh Pahuja, M/s AP & J. Chambers, Advs. for the Respondent.



                                                                         H
994            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            HRISHIKESH ROY, J.
            Leave granted.
             2. The challenge in these appeals is to the judgment and order
B     dated 02.08.2019 in the Crl. M.C. No.414/2019 and Crl.M.A.No.1754/
      2019 whereby the Delhi High Court dismissed the application under
      Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred
      to as “Cr.P.C”) for quashing of the summoning order dated 1.6.2018 and
      the order framing notice dated 3.11.2018, issued against the appellant
      under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter
C     referred to as the ‘N.I. Act’). On the criminal complaint instituted by
      one Satish Gupta (respondent no.2), the order under Section 251 of the
      Cr.P.C. was issued against the appellant by the Magistrate’s Court. The
      High Court on considering the rival contention opined that the grounds
      agitated by the appellant are “factual defences” which should not be
D     considered within the parameters of limited enquiry permissible in a
      petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed
      but the accused’s liberty to raise his defence in the competent Court
      was safeguarded in the impugned order.
             3. For the appellant, Mr. Krishnamohan K., the learned counsel
E     argues that without satisfying the essential ingredients for the offence
      under Section 138 of the N.I. Act to the effect that the dishonoured
      cheque received by the complainant is against “legally enforceable debt
      or liability”, the criminal process could not have been issued. Relying on
      few judgments, it is next argued that the ingredients necessary to
      constitute the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is missing in the
F     instant case and therefore the appellant cannot be prosecuted for the
      offence under the said provision. According to the appellant, the
      concerned post-dated cheques drawn by him in favour of the complainant
      were, contingent/security cheques for buyback of shares of AAT
      Academy (appellant’s company), held by the complainant, and therefore
G     the cheques could not have been prematurely presented to the bank and
      should have been presented for encashment only after transfer of the
      complainant’s shareholding in the appellant’s company. In other words,
      as the complainant was still holding the shares of the appellant’s company
      when the cheques were presented, the complainant is not entitled to
      receive any payment at that stage, through encashment of the cheques,
H     made available to him
 RATHISH BABU UNNIKRISHNAN v. THE STATE (GOVT. OF NCT                         995
          OF DELHI) & ANR. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

       4. The complainant per-contra contends that when the cheque            A
are issued and the signatures thereon are admitted, the presumption of a
legally enforceable debt will arise in favour of the holder of the cheque.
In a situation such as this, it is for the accused to rebut the legal
presumption by adducing necessary evidence before the trial Court.
Reading the provisions of Section 118 of the N.I. Act, it is submitted by
                                                                              B
Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned ASG and Ms. Rebecca M. John the learned
Senior Counsel for the complainant, that it is obligatory for the Court to
raise the legal presumption against the accused when his cheque is
dishonoured on presentation. The learned Magistrate therefore correctly
drew such presumption which of course is rebuttable by the appellant,
by adducing evidence in course of trial. It is specifically contended by      C
the complainant that in share purchase transactions, the consideration is
first paid to the seller as per the customary practice and only thereafter
the formalities with respect to the share transfer is completed. In support
of such contention, the respondent relies on Section 56 (1) of the
Companies Act, 2013 and also the Form SH-4 in the said Act, relating          D
to transfer of securities.
       5. The records would show that there were transactions between
the parties under which the complainant invested a substantial sum in
the appellant’s company. At later stage, dispute arose amongst them but
they resolved that the invested money would be returned to the                E
complainant and the shares allotted to the complainant will be
proportionately transferred to the appellant. With such understanding,
the four cheques forming the part of the criminal complaint were handed
over by the appellant. When the complainant presented one of those
cheques, the same was dishonoured by the bank with the endorsement,
                                                                              F
“fund insufficient”. Further, the complainant issued notice stating that
the appellant had failed to make the due payment. Thereafter, he filed
the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act which led to the summons
and process against the appellant.
       6. As noted earlier, the appellant’s basic contention is that the      G
cheque in question was not issued in discharge of “legally recoverable
debt”. They also raised a contention on the obligation of the complainant
to transfer the concerned shares. A defence plea is raised by the appellant
to the effect that the cheques in question were issued as “security” and
not in discharge of any “legally recoverable debt”.
                                                                              H
996               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A            7. The learned Judge of the Delhi High Court while considering
      the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C kept in mind the scope of limited
      enquiry in this jurisdiction by referring to the ratio in HMT Watches
      Limited vs. M.A. Abida & Anr1. and in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan
      Lal Kapoor2 and opined that the exercise of powers by the High Court
      under Section 482 Cr.P.C, would negate the complainant’s case without
B
      allowing the complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination should
      necessarily not be rendered by a Court not conducting the trial. Therefore,
      unless the Court is fully satisfied that the material produced would
      irrefutably rule out the charges and such materials being of sterling and
      impeccable quality, the invocation of Section 482 Cr.P.C power to quash
C     the criminal proceedings, would be unmerited. Proceeding on this basis,
      verdict was given against the appellant, who was facing the proceeding
      under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. With all liberty given to the appellant
      to raise his defence in the trial court, his quashing petition came to be
      dismissed.
D            8. The issue to be answered here is whether summons and trial
      notice should have been quashed on the basis of factual defences. The
      corollary therefrom is what should be the responsibility of the quashing
      Court and whether it must weigh the evidence presented by the parties,
      at a pre-trial stage.
E             9. The transactional arrangement between the complainant and
      the accused reveals the nature of obligations that both had undertaken.
      The cheques in question were accepted by the complainant for an agreed
      price consideration, for the shares in the appellant’s company. According
      to the complainant, the appellant is to first pay and then as per the usual
      practice in the trade, the shares would be transferred to the appellant in
F     due course within the time permitted by law. A bare perusal of Section
      56(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 indicates that a transfer of securities
      of a company can take place only when a proper instrument of transfer
      is effectuated. The operation of legally transferring shares involves
      several distinct steps. At first, a contract of sale needs to be entered
G     upon. The nature of transaction in this contract logically then requires
      payment of the price by the prospective transferee to fulfil their promise
      first. In exchange, transferor would move to fill Form SH-4 and thus,
      effectuate a valid instrument. Depending on the nature of the company
      1
          (2015) 11 SCC 776
      2
H         (2013) 3 SCC 330
    RATHISH BABU UNNIKRISHNAN v. THE STATE (GOVT. OF NCT                         997
             OF DELHI) & ANR. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

and its Articles of Association, then upon the presentation of the               A
instrument of transfer to the board of the company and its acceptance
by the board, the entry of the transferee in the register of the company
in place of the transferor, takes place. Thus, the transfer of share is
complete. To say it in another way, in shares transactions, there is a time
lag between money going out from the buyer and shares reaching to the
                                                                                 B
seller. In earlier days the time gap was longer. It has now become speedier
but the gap still remains. The share transactions in India generally follows
this pattern.
       10. It is also relevant to bear in mind that the burden of proving
that there is no existing debt or liability, is to be discharged in the trial.
For a two judges Bench in M.M.T.C. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Medchl Chemicals              C
and Pharma (P) Ltd. & Anr.3, Justice S.N. Variava made the following
pertinent observation on this aspect: -
         “17. There is therefore no requirement that the complainant
         must specifically allege in the complaint that there was a
         subsisting liability. The burden of proving that there was no           D
         existing debt or liability was on the respondents. This they
         have to discharge in the trial. At this stage, merely on the
         basis of averments in the petitions filed by them the High Court
         could not have concluded that there was no existing debt or
         liability.”                                                             E
       11. The legal presumption of the cheque having been issued in the
discharge of liability must also receive due weightage. In a situation
where the accused moves Court for quashing even before trial has
commenced, the Court’s approach should be careful enough to not to
prematurely extinguish the case by disregarding the legal presumption            F
which supports the complaint. The opinion of Justice K.G. Balakrishnan
for a three judges Bench in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan4 would at this
stage, deserve our attention: -
         “26.... we are in agreement with the respondent claimant that
         the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does                 G
         indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
         liability. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature
         of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to

3
    (2002) 1 SCC 234
4
    (2010) 11 SCC 441                                                            H
998               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A              raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable
               debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no
               doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the
               complainant.”
            12. At any rate, whenever facts are disputed the truth should be
B     allowed to emerge by weighing the evidence. On this aspect, we may
      benefit by referring to the ratio in Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel vs. State
      of Gujarat5 where the following pertinent opinion was given by Justice
      R. Banumathi: -
               “22. ………….. When disputed questions of facts are involved
C              which need to be adjudicated after the parties adduce
               evidence, the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act ought
               not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking
               recourse to Section 482 CrPC. Though, the Court has the
               power to quash the criminal complaint filed under Section
               138 of the NI Act on the legal issues like limitation, etc.
D              criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act
               against Yogeshbhai ought not to have been quashed merely
               on the ground that there are inter se disputes between
               Appellant 3 and Respondent 2. Without keeping in view the
               statutory presumption raised under Section 139 of the NI Act,
E              the High Court, in our view, committed a serious error in
               quashing the criminal complaint in CC No. 367 of 2016 filed
               under Section 138 of the NI Act.”
              13. Bearing in mind the principles for exercise of jurisdiction in a
      proceeding for quashing, let us now turn to the materials in this case. On
      careful reading of the complaint and the order passed by the Magistrate,
F     what is discernible is that a possible view is taken that the cheques
      drawn were, in discharge of a debt for purchase of shares. In any case,
      when there is legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing
      Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first
      permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The
G     quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the
      wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently,
      the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits
      of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant
      or the defence.
      5
H         (2020) 3 SCC 794
    RATHISH BABU UNNIKRISHNAN v. THE STATE (GOVT. OF NCT                     999
             OF DELHI) & ANR. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

      14. The parameters for invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the       A
Court to quash the criminal proceedings under S.482 CrPC, have been
spelled out by Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian for the two judges’ bench in
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 6, and the suggested precautionary
principles serve as good law even today, for invocation of power under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
                                                                             B
         “103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the
         power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised
         very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the
         rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in
         embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness      C
         or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the
         complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do
         not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act
         according to its whim or caprice.”
      15. In the impugned judgment, the learned Judge had rightly relied     D
upon the opinion of Justice J.S.Khehar for a Division Bench in Rajiv
Thapar (supra), which succinctly express the following relevant
parameters to be considered by the quashing Court, at the stage of issuing
process, committal, or framing of charges,
         “28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under          E
         Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This
         is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of
         the allegations levelled by the prosecution/ complainant
         against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining
         how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused
                                                                             F
         are. Even if the accused is successful in showing some
         suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the
         prosecution/ complainant, it would be impermissible to
         discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would
         result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the
         prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or        G
         the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same.”
       16. The proposition of law as set out above makes it abundantly
clear that the Court should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a

6
    AIR 1992 SC 604                                                          H
1000             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 4 S.C.R.


 A     complaint at a pre-trial stage, when the factual controversy is in the
       realm of possibility particularly because of the legal presumption, as in
       this matter. What is also of note is that the factual defence without
       having to adduce any evidence need to be of an unimpeachable quality,
       so as to altogether disprove the allegations made in the complaint.
 B            17. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-
       trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at
       preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an
       opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the
       proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material
 C     evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an un-merited
       advantage in the criminal process. Also because of the legal presumption,
       when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the
       balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/
       prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence
 D     evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

              18. Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the
       summoning order, when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed
       and considered by the trial court will not in our opinion be judicious.
       Based upon a prima facie impression, an element of criminality cannot
 E     entirely be ruled out here subject to the determination by the trial Court.
       Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, scuttling of the
       criminal process is not merited.

               19. In our assessment, the impugned judgment is rendered by
       applying the correct legal principles and the High Court rightly declined
 F     relief to the accused, in the quashing proceeding. Having said this, to
       rebut the legal presumption against him, the appellant must also get a
       fair opportunity to adduce his evidence in an open trial by an impartial
       judge who can dispassionately weigh the material to reach the truth of
       the matter. At this point, one might benefit by recalling the words of
 G     Harry Brown, the American author and investment advisor who so aptly
       said - “A fair trial is one in which the rules of evidence are honored,
       the accused has competent counsel, and the judge enforce the proper
       court room procedure – a trial in which every assumption can be
       challenged.” We expect no less and no more for the appellant.
 H
 RATHISH BABU UNNIKRISHNAN v. THE STATE (GOVT. OF NCT                        1001
          OF DELHI) & ANR. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]

       20. We might add before parting that the observation made in this     A
judgment is only for the limited purpose of this order and those should
not stand in the way of the trial Court to decide the case on merit. The
appeals are accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own
cost.
                                                                             B
Devika Gujral                                           Appeals dismissed.




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