RATILAL JHAVERBHAI PARMAR AND ORS.versusSTATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.

                 [2024] 10 S.C.R. 2227 : 2024 INSC 801

                  Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors.
                                   v.
                       State of Gujarat and Ors.
                       Civil Appeal No. 11000 of 2024
                                21 October 2024
           [Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the delay of more than one year in issuing a reasoned
       order after oral dismissal in open court proceedings as ante-dated
       by the High Court constitutes a breach of the principles of fairness,
       propriety, and discipline required to be followed by the judiciary in
       the administration of justice?

                                   Headnotes†
       Appellant filed a civil application u/Art.227 of the Constitution
       before the High Court – Dismissed on 01.03.2023 in open Court
       without saying “reasons would follow” – Appellant pleaded
       that he was under the impression that the High Court had only
       reserved the order on 01.03.2023 in the proceeding – Reasoned
       order was uploaded on High Court website on 30.04.2024 and
       ante-dated the same to 01.03.2023 – Report of Registrar General
       of High Court was called which established the Appellant’s
       allegations as being substantially correct:
       Held: Breach of norms of ethics – The concerned judge did not
       even express that “reasons would follow” for dismissal of the petition
       and hence the concerned judge ceased to retain jurisdiction over
       the petition and foreclosed assignment of reasons for the dismissal
       later in time – Even if the concerned judge were to express that
       reasons for the dismissal would follow, no valid reason to pass
       detailed reasoned order after lapse of one year rather the correct
       approach would have been to bring matter on board again, recall
       the verbal order of dismissal and place before the Hon’ble Chief
       Justice of High Court to reassign the matter to another bench for
       fresh consideration. [Paras 12-15, 17]




* Author
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    Justice must not only be done, but must also be seen
    to be done – Guidelines issued to High Courts for timely
    pronouncement of judgments – Principles enshrined in Order
    XX of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 discussed:
    Held: Practice of High Courts of pronouncing operative parts without
    timely passing reasoned order/judgment criticised – Reliance placed
    on observations made in Balaji Baliram Mupade vs State of
    Maharashtra (2021) 12 SCC 603 that judicial discipline demands
    promptness in judgment delivery as knowing result without reasons
    brings aggrieved party to a standstill and violates their right u/Art.21
    of the Constitution. [Para 5]
    Order XX CPC governs “pronouncements of judgments” – As a
    matter of practice, the learned judge dictates judgment in open court
    immediately after the hearing is over which, in their assessment,
    may not consume more than 15/20 minutes however if a judgment,
    in their assessment, is likely to take more than 20/25 minutes,
    the learned judge tends to pronounce operative part together
    with the outcome while expressing “reasons to/would follow” to
    make optimum use judicial time and hear more cases that are
    on board – However, the said practice is seemingly turning into a
    counterproductive exercise and is rather delaying justice delivery.
    [Para 19]
    It would be prudent to leave to it to learned Judges to pick any
    of three options: (i) dictation of the judgment in open court,
    (ii) reserving the judgment and pronouncing it on a future day, or
    (iii) pronouncing the operative part and the outcome, i.e., “dismissed”
    or “allowed” or “disposed of”, while simultaneously expressing that
    reasons would follow in a detailed final judgment supporting such
    outcome – In case third option is chosen, it would be in interest
    of justice to make reasons available in public domain within a
    time frame work of 2-5 days – In case the suggested timeframe
    cannot be followed owing to workload, it would be a better option
    to reserve the judgment. [Para 19]

                              Case Law Cited
    Anil Rai v. State of Bihar (2001) 7 SCC 318; Vinod Kumar Singh
    v. Banaras Hindu University (1988) 1 SCC 80; Tirupati Balaji
    Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2004) 5 SCC 1; Balaji Baliram
    Mupade v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 12 SCC 603; R. v. Sussex
    JJ., ex p McCarthy (1924) 1 KB 256 – relied on.
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     Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.


                                 List of Acts
     Constitution of India, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

                              List of Keywords
     Judicial discipline; Pronouncement of judgments; Delay in reasoned
     order; Reserving of orders; Workload; Public trust; Judicial integrity;
     Article 21 of Constitution of India; Order XX of Code of Civil
     Procedure.

                             Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11000 of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2023 of the High Court
     of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in SCA No. 10912 of 2015

                          Appearances for Parties
     Ms. Anushree Prashit Kapadia, Dr. Shailesh R. Patel, Ganesh
     Khemka, Ms. Ekta Kundu, Advs. for the Appellants.
     Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Adv. for the Respondents.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                     Judgment

     Dipankar Datta, J.

1.   In recent times, on more occasions than one, this Court has suo motu
     initiated proceedings having noticed attitudinal and thought patterns
     of learned Judges of various high courts across the country which
     tended to lower the image of the judiciary in general and the high
     courts in particular. While some of the proceedings are still pending,
     one such proceeding has been disposed of recently emphasising
     the need for learned Judges to exercise restraint while expressing
     one’s views in open court.
2.   Yet again, a fortnight back, this Court set aside a judgment of a
     high court on the ground that such judgment had been signed by
     the learned Judge after demitting office.
3.   These are distressing trends indeed.
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4.    As if there is no end to it, the present case unfolds facts which are
      equally disturbing and meets with our disapproval.
5.    However, before we refer to the factual matrix giving rise to this
      civil appeal, noticing a decision of fairly recent origin of this Court
      in Balaji Baliram Mupade vs State of Maharashtra1 is considered
      imperative. Relevant excerpts from such decision read as follows:
             “1. … Judicial discipline requires promptness in delivery
             of judgments—an aspect repeatedly emphasised by this
             Court. The problem is compounded where the result is
             known but not the reasons. This deprives any aggrieved
             party of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal
             in the next tier of judicial scrutiny.
                                       *****
             10. We must note with regret that the counsel extended
             through various judicial pronouncements including the one
             referred to aforesaid appear to have been ignored, more
             importantly where oral orders are pronounced. In case of
             such orders, it is expected that they are either dictated in
             the court or at least must follow immediately thereafter, to
             facilitate any aggrieved party to seek redressal from the
             higher court. The delay in delivery of judgments has been
             observed to be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution
             of India in Anil Rai case [(2001) 7 SCC 318] and as
             stated aforesaid, the problem gets aggravated when the
             operative portion is made available early and the reasons
             follow much later.
             11. It cannot be countenanced that between the date of the
             operative portion of the order and the reasons disclosed,
             there is a hiatus period of nine months! This is much more
             than what has been observed to be the maximum time
             period for even pronouncement of reserved judgment as
             per Anil Rai case.
             12. The appellant undoubtedly being the aggrieved party
             and prejudiced by the impugned order is unable to avail of



1    (2021) 12 SCC 603
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     Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.


               the legal remedy of approaching this Court where reasons
               can be scrutinised. It really amounts to defeating the rights
               of the appellant to challenge the impugned order on merits
               and even the succeeding party is unable to obtain the
               fruits of success of the litigation.
               13. We are constrained to pen down a more detailed
               order and refer to the earlier view on account of the fact
               that recently a number of such orders have come to our
               notice and we thought it is time to send a reminder to the
               High Courts.”
6.     We are surprised, not a little, that the strong reminders issued by
       this Court from time to time have had little effect on the high courts
       in the country and that decisions, binding under Article 141 of the
       Constitution, are being persistently ignored. It has been stressed
       time and again over the years and we feel pained to observe, once
       more, that neglect/omission/refusal to abide by binding precedents
       augurs ill for the health of the system. Not only does it tantamount
       to disservice to the institution of the judiciary but also affects the
       administration of justice. For a learned Judge to deviate from the
       laid down standards would be to betray the trust reposed in him by
       the nation. We sincerely hope that learned Judges of the high courts
       while being careful and cautious will remain committed to the service
       of the litigants, for whom only they exist, as well as the oath of office
       that they have taken so that, in future, we are not presented with
       another case of similar nature to deal with.
7.     In this case, which is a civil appeal arising from a judgment and order
       bearing the date 1st March, 2023, we find the High Court of Gujarat
       at Ahmedabad2 to have egregiously breached the law.
8.     The bare facts necessary for decision, without any reference to the
       facts and law involved in the case before the High Court, culled out
       from the pleadings before us are these.
9.     R/Special Civil Application No. 10912 of 20153, being a petition under
       Article 227 of the Constitution of India, was filed by the appellant
       before the High Court challenging an order dated 16th June, 2015


2    High Court, hereafter
3    petition, hereafter
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      passed by the Deputy Collector, Kamrej Prant, District Surat. The
      Deputy Collector, by such order, had confirmed the order dated 23rd
      February, 2015 of the Mamlatdar, Kamrej. The petition came up for
      consideration on 1st March, 2023 before a learned Judge, having been
      listed in the cause-list as Item No.17. According to the appellant, he
      was represented before the learned Judge by his counsel. Hearing
      having concluded on 1st March, 2023, “he was under the belief that
      the detailed order is reserved in the proceeding. However, even
      an order recording the reserving of orders has not been passed or
      made available on the official website of the Hon’ble High Court till
      date”. Since the detailed order was not pronounced, the appellant’s
      counsel did not also apply for the certified copy. In the process, more
      than a year passed by. On 30th April, 2024, the appellant’s counsel
      received from the IT Cell of the High Court soft copy of a reasoned
      order dated 1st March, 2023 containing the reasons for dismissal of
      the petition.
10. The impugned order is part of the records. At the beginning of the
    said order, “ORAL ORDER” is printed in bold font, i.e., it is supposed
    to be an order which has been dictated in open court. However, the
    appellant has alleged something rather serious : that the learned
    Judge had passed the reasoned order more than a year after 1st
    March, 2023 and ante-dated the same to project that the reasoned
    order was passed on 1st March, 2023.
11. Such allegation prompted us to seek, by an order dated 12th August,
    2024, a report4 from the Registrar General of the High Court as to
    whether the allegation of the appellant that the reasoned order bearing
    the date 1st March, 2023 was communicated to him for the first time
    on 30th April, 2024 is correct or not. A report has since been filed by
    the Registrar General and on perusal thereof, we have found the
    allegation of the appellant to be substantially correct. It is revealed
    that the learned Judge dictated the reasoned order on 12th April,
    2024 to His Lordship’s personal secretary, whereafter such order
    was uploaded on the website of the High Court on 30th April, 2024
    as well as communicated to the appellant’s counsel by the IT Cell.
12. Having regard to the nature of controversy raised by the appellant,
    we also had the occasion to witness (on the virtual platform) the


4   the report, hereafter
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    Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.


     recorded version of the proceedings dated 1st March, 2023 before
     the learned Judge of the High Court. After briefly hearing counsel
     for the appellant and his adversary, the learned Judge was heard to
     say, “I will dismiss” and a few seconds thereafter, pronounced the
     outcome of the petition as “dismissed”. Counsel representing the
     appellant before the High Court being present could hear what the
     learned Judge said while his adversary acknowledged that he was
     “grateful”. Immediately thereafter, the next item on the board was
     called. This is precisely what happened on 1st March, 2023, while
     dealing with the petition.
13. There can be no two opinions that if not the appellant, but his
    counsel certainly did have knowledge of dismissal of the petition by
    the learned Judge; also, we have no doubt that the appellant feigned
    complete ignorance and deliberately did not plead that his counsel
    was well and truly aware of the outcome of the petition moments
    after hearing stood concluded before the learned Judge.
14. At the same time, from the proceedings of the court of the learned
    Judge available on the virtual platform, it is patently clear that His
    Lordship did not even express that the ‘reasons would follow’ for
    the dismissal of the petition. Not having so expressed, His Lordship
    practically rendered the court functus officio. We say so because it
    is not too clear as to whether any order of dismissal was signed by
    His Lordship on 1st March, 2023, or at any point of time immediately
    thereafter, although we have noted from the report that the Disposal
    Log Report of 1st March, 2023 of His Lordship’s court duly recorded
    that the petition stood disposed of. In Vinod Kumar Singh v.
    Banaras Hindu University,5 this Court held that when a judgment
    is pronounced in open court, parties act on the basis that it is the
    operative judgment and that signing is a mere formality; however, in
    exceptional circumstances, an order pronounced in open court can
    be amended or even altered before the same has been authenticated
    by the Judge by signing the order but such a course ought to be
    adopted judicially, sparingly and for adequate reasons and upon
    putting the parties to notice. Such is not the case here. We are
    inclined to the view that the learned Judge not having expressed
    that reasons for the dismissal would follow, His Lordship ceased


5   (1988) 1 SCC 80
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     to retain jurisdiction over the petition and foreclosed assignment of
     reasons for the dismissal.
15. Assuming that His Lordship were to express that reasons for the
    dismissal would follow, still there could be no valid reason to write
    a detailed reasoned order after lapse of a year having expressed
    “dismissed” and upload such order on the website. No doubt, as
    per the good practice prevailing in the High Court, the order was
    communicated to the appellant’s counsel by the IT Cell but that is
    little consolation in a case of the present nature.
16. Having said thus, and bearing in mind the onerous responsibilities
    that learned Judges of the high courts across the country have to
    shoulder on a daily basis, we are persuaded to think that the duty
    and responsibility of assigning reasons for dismissal of the petition
    completely escaped the mind of the learned Judge. Perhaps, there
    is hardly any individual including any Judge who can truly claim
    to have committed no mistake in his life. It is a feature of human
    fallibility that people are prone to commit mistakes. It is how lessons
    that individuals learn from mistakes which facilitate in putting the
    past behind for moving forward.
17. Nonetheless, we regret to observe that the learned Judge having
    realised in April, 2024 of having omitted to assign reasons for dismissal
    of the petition although His Lordship had pronounced “dismissed”
    in open court proceedings on 1st March, 2023, could have avoided
    committing an act of indiscretion, by breaching all norms of ethics, in
    proceeding to assign reasons more than a year later. In accordance
    with the highest standards of fairness, propriety and discipline, the
    need of the hour required the learned Judge to bring the matter
    back on board once again, recall the verbal order of dismissal and
    place it before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High Court for
    assigning it to some other Bench for fresh consideration.
18. It cannot be gainsaid that in today’s world, particularly when more
    and more people are showing interest in court proceedings and
    there is wide coverage thereof on social media platforms, the
    presiding officers of courts are equally at the centre of attention as
    the controversy that is involved and the manner of its resolution. The
    society expects every Judge of a high court, so to say, to be a model
    of rectitude, an epitome of unimpeachable integrity and unwavering
    principles, a champion of moral excellence, and an embodiment of
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    Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.


     professionalism, who can consistently deliver work of high-quality
     guaranteeing justice. Although, on the whole, the weight of work on
     learned Judges of the high courts across the country is immense
     and the Judges have also been performing commendably despite
     various odds, instances such as the one under consideration, which
     we view as nothing more than an aberration, bring disrepute to the
     judicial system of the country and show the entire judiciary in poor
     light. This, in our opinion, could have well been avoided with a little
     bit of care and caution, and deference to the decisions on the point
     by this Court.
19. The situation presents us with an opportunity where we feel it
    expedient to share our thoughts only for the purpose of future
    guidance to overcome adversity. Having regard to the demands of
    changing times, one of the significant aspects of judging that has
    been at the forefront of discussion in many a conference/conclave
    or legal circle is the need for prompt ‘pronouncement of judgments’.
    Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ordains that a
    judgment can be pronounced, in an open court, either at once or
    as soon thereafter as may be practicable on a future day. Guided
    by the principles enshrined in Order XX, number of learned Judges
    scrupulously follow the same. Learned Judges do come across
    cases requiring short orders which, in their assessment, may not
    consume more than 15/20 minutes. These orders are generally
    dictated in open court immediately after a hearing is over. On the
    other hand, if in any given case the judgment could justifiably be
    reserved after hearing of extensive arguments, it would not be
    proper to criticize a learned Judge if he dictates the judgment in
    open court notwithstanding the length of time to be taken therefor.
    As per the ordainment of Order XX, the learned Judge would be
    perfectly justified in doing so. In such cases, it could roughly take
    any time between 20 minutes to a couple of/few hours or even
    more spilling over to the next day (in rare cases) to accomplish the
    task. This approach could result in the board (if it is heavy) getting
    choked and the remaining cases on the board having slim chances
    of being considered. As the saying goes, necessity is the mother
    of invention. The necessity to strike a balance, in turn, has led to
    an innovative approach (many a times followed even by this Court)
    which, though not strictly in tune with Order XX, has transitioned into
    a regular practice by passage of time. This contemplates a rough
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    assessment made by a learned Judge of the time to be taken for
    dictating a judgment after hearing in a matter is concluded and if, in
    such assessment, it is likely to take more than 20/25 minutes, the
    learned Judge proceeds to pronounce the operative part together
    with the outcome while expressing “reasons to/would follow” and
    then concludes the exercise of pronouncing the final judgment by
    providing the reasons as soon as possible thereafter. Having regard
    to the exploding docket of a majority of the high courts, learned
    Judges consider it wise and prudent to make optimum use of judicial
    time by not dictating lengthy judgments in court. This practice, no
    doubt, seeks to serve a salutary purpose. People unversed with the
    functioning of the judicial system are perhaps unaware as to how
    development of this practice has contributed to saving of precious
    judicial time, which the learned Judges invariably devote and utilize
    for hearing more cases that are on board in the anxiety to consider
    and decide as many cases as are possible during the scheduled
    working orders. Burdened though with immense pressure of work and
    brushing aside fatigue, which is quite likely to develop, the learned
    Judges after retiring for the day dictate the judgment in their court
    chambers or in their residential offices either on the same day or
    within a few days thereafter. The hearing having concluded not too
    long back, the arguments remain fresh in the mind of the learned
    Judges and it becomes all the more easy to dictate the judgment.
    While this approach without a doubt has its own benefits, recent
    happenings leave us to lament that reasons for the conclusion
    reached are being placed in the public domain much too late, as
    in the case of Balaji Baliram Mupade (supra) as well as this case.
    In an attempt to save time to attend to as many cases as possible,
    certain learned Judges unwittingly are contributing to justice being
    delayed in given cases which, concomitantly, have been giving
    rise to criticism of unpleasant flavours. Critics of such practice (to
    pronounce the operative part with the outcome and to provide the
    reasons later in detailed final judgments) could and do legitimately
    argue in favour of reserving judgments as required by the procedural
    laws if the particular case so demands but as Judges, we know,
    reserving too many judgments has its own pitfalls. Once the files
    pile up, it becomes increasingly difficult to remember the minute
    details of the case and the arguments advanced by the parties
    in support of their respective cases which leads to a shift to rely
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     on the written notes of arguments. However, if only written notes
     were enough, there would be no need of oral hearing in court.
     Additionally, drawing from our experience on the bench, we can
     safely say that inclination of learned Judges to reserve judgments
     is invariably the course adopted where cases involving complex
     and intricate points of law do call upon learned Judges to craft
     well-researched and well-reasoned judgments. That apart, there
     are cases arising from recent enactments involving questions of
     law not having arisen hitherto and consequently such questions
     have never been answered. Such categories of cases demand the
     high courts to lay down the law in clear terms for comprehension
     of all concerned. Obviously, this process is time consuming and the
     time limit for delivering judgments by the high courts as laid down
     in Anil Rai vs State of Bihar,6 at times, is breached. We have full
     trust and confidence in the learned Judges of the high courts since
     they are well-equipped to tackle any kind of pressure situation.
     However, while it would be prudent to leave it to the learned Judges
     to pick any one of the three options [(i) dictation of the judgment
     in open court, (ii) reserving the judgment and pronouncing it on a
     future day, or (iii) pronouncing the operative part and the outcome,
     i.e., “dismissed” or “allowed” or “disposed of”, while simultaneously
     expressing that reasons would follow in a detailed final judgment
     supporting such outcome], it would be in the interest of justice if
     any learned Judge, who prefers the third option (supra), makes
     the reasons available in the public domain, preferably within 2
     (two) days thereof but, in any case, not beyond 5 (five) days to
     eliminate any kind of suspicion in the mind of the party losing the
     legal battle. If the pressure of work is such that in the assessment
     of the learned Judge the reasons in support of the final judgment
     cannot be made available, without fail, in 5 (five) days, it would be
     a better option to reserve the judgment. Also, if the ultimate order
     would have the effect of changing the status of the parties or the
     subject matter of the lis, it would always be advisable to stick to
     the course envisaged in Order XX. Since, the fraternity of learned
     Judges of all the courts are interested to preserve the dignity of
     the respective judicial institutions with which they are associated,



6   (2001) 7 SCC 318
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     all learned Judges must be mindful of the impact of their actions
     on the society at large. Dealing with lakhs of litigation is no mean
     task, but at the same time we must realize that instances do emerge
     leaving absolutely no margin for error. It is our duty as Judges to
     stand tall and rise to the challenge.
20. While concluding, we are reminded of the universal truth “to err is
    human, to forgive is divine” emphasizing the human tendency of
    committing mistakes and the importance of forgiving a human error.
21. Conscious that we are of learned Judges of the high courts working
    overtime to render justice to the litigants by conducting judicial
    proceedings, at times, by sitting in excess of normal working hours,
    discharging administrative duties in addition to judicial work, etc, and
    in the process overlooking health issues and sacrificing all pleasures
    of social life, we need to look at the issue wearing glasses of grace
    and compassion. As has been held by this Court in Tirupati Balaji
    Developers (P) Ltd. vs State of Bihar,7 in the unified hierarchical
    judicial structure that we have under the Constitution, vertically the
    Supreme Court is placed over the high courts; but if the Supreme
    Court and the high courts were thought of as brothers, we as Judges
    of the apex court in the country remain as the elder brother only to
    the extent of exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Promoting empathy
    and understanding by encouraging forgiveness, which is a divine
    quality transcending human limitation, should be preferred to anything
    else in the given circumstances, particularly when the learned Judge
    has not been put on notice and is unable to place His Lordship’s
    version. This approach is considered to be a better option rather
    than remarking adversely or giving unsolicited advice.
22. We, thus, allow the controversy to rest here.
23. It is now time for us to give our decision. Notwithstanding that the
    appellant has not been entirely clean in his approach but having
    regard to the famous words of Lord Hewart, the Lord Chief Justice
    of England in R. vs Sussex JJ., ex p McCarthy 8 that “justice must
    not only be done, but must also be seen to be done”, meaning
    thereby that the outcome of proceedings should be visibly just, the


7   (2004) 5 SCC 1
8   (1924) 1 KB 256
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     impugned order bearing the date 1st March, 2023 has to be set aside
     which we do hereby order. This would result in revival of the petition
     of the appellant and it shall stand restored on the file of the High
     Court. The Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High Court is requested
     to place the petition before the learned Judge currently having the
     assignment to hear the same.
24. Needless to observe, the petition shall be considered and decided by
    the High Court uninfluenced by any observation made in the order
    bearing the date 1st March, 2023.
25. The appeal stands allowed on the aforesaid terms.
26. We make it clear that we have not examined the rival claims on merits.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Niti Richariya, Hony. Associate Editor
                                 (Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)