Holding

A delayed FIR does not per se invalidate the prosecution, the rickshaw‑puller’s testimony is admissible given the extraordinary nature of the event, and the prosecution need not establish the precise motive for a murder conviction.

Summary

The appellants, Ravinder Kumar and Surinder Kumar, were convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC for killing broker Amar Kumar Gupta, concealing the body in a wooden parcel, and were sentenced to life imprisonment. They appealed, contending that the FIR was filed two days after the crime, that the rickshaw‑puller’s testimony was unreliable after a delay, and that the prosecution had not proved a motive. The Supreme Court held that there is no statutory time limit for lodging an FIR; a delay does not, by itself, vitiate the prosecution’s case unless it is shown to be a ploy to fabricate a version. The Court explained that a witness’s memory of an unusual, sensational event can remain vivid and be refreshed, making the rickshaw‑puller’s evidence admissible. It further observed that while motive is relevant, the prosecution need not establish the precise reason for the murder, only a possible mental element. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the convictions upheld.

Issues considered

Whether a delay in lodging the FIR defeats the prosecution’s case.
Whether the testimony of a rickshaw‑puller who identified the appellants and the parcel after several days is reliable.
Whether the prosecution must prove the exact motive behind the murder for a conviction.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

FIR delaywitness memorycircumstantial evidencemotivemurderSection 302 IPCCriminal Procedureappeal

Judgment

RAVINDER KUMAR AND ANR. A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB

AUGUST 31, 2001

[K.T. THOMAS AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.] B
..
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 154.

FIR-Delay in lodging of-Effect-Held : There is no time limit for
lodging of FIR-Hence, delayed FIR is not illegal and fatal to the prosecution C
case.

FIR-Prompt and immediate /oJging of-Advantages-Held : Allows
immediate commencement of investigation-Possible concoction of a false
version is eliminated.
D
FIR-Delay in lodging of-Reasons-Genuineness of-Explained and
reiterated.

Criminal Trial :

Witness-Testimony of-Based on memory-Evidentiary value of-Held: E
A special event creates an impact on the human mind lasting for long-
Though routine events may not be remembered yet odd or bizarre happenings
stick in the mind indelibly-Such events easily get refreshed subsequently.

Criminal law :
F
Motive-Establishing of-Held : It is generally impossible for the
prosecution to establish the precise reason for a crime-Only the possible
mental element, which is the cause of a crime, can be established.

The appellants-accused were convicted of an offence under Section 302 G
of the Penal Code, 1860 and were sentenced to undergo imprisonmef!t for
life. The High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence. Hence this appeal.

According to the prosecution, the appellants murdered the deceased,
packed the dead body in a wooden container and engaged PW-5 (rickshaw-
puller) to transport the container .to the parcel service centre adjoining a H
463
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Railway Station. As the load was something suspicious the container was
opened and the dead body of the deceased was found wrapped in a gunny
bag.

On behalf of the accused, it was contended that the Fffi was inordinately
delayed and that itself was vitiative factor; that PW-5, a rkkshaw-puller, could
B
-
not have remembered, after many days, that a particular load was transported
at the instance of the accused; and that the motive alleged by the prosecution
was not established.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

C HELD : 1.1. The attack on prosecution cases on the ground of delay in
lodging FIR has almost bogged down as a stereotyped redundancy in criminal
cases. It is a recurring feature in most of the criminal cases that there would
be some delay in furnishing the first information to the police. Law has not
fixed any time limit for lodging the FIR. Hence a delayed FIR is not illegal.
D A prompt and immediate lodging of the FIR is ideal as that would give the
prosecution a twin advantage. First is that it affords commencement of the
investigation without any time lapse. Second is that it expels the opportunity
for any possible concoction of a false version. Barring these two .plus points
for a promptly lodged FIR the demerits of the delayed FIR cannot operate
as fatal to any prosecution case. rt cannot be overlooked that even a promptly
E lodged FIR is not an unreserved guarantee for the genuineness of the version
incorporated therein. 1469-E-G]

1.2. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgement to get
delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing the police
of a crime without any lapse of time. This kind of unconversantness is not
F too uncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think
of going to the police station. Another possibility is due to lack of adequate
transport facilities for the informers to reach the police station. The third,
which is a quite common bearing, is that the with and kin of the deceased
might take some appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquility of
G mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police station for the purpose
of furnishing the requisite information. Yet another cause is the persons who
are supposed to give such information themselves could be so physically
impaired that the police had to reach them on getting some nebulous
information about the incident. [469-H; 470-A-B]

H 1.3. The stale demand made in the criminal courts to treat the FIR
RA VlNDER KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 465
vitiated merely on the ground of delay in its lodgment cannot be approved as A
a legal corollary. In any case, where there is delay in making the FIR the
court is to look at the causes for it and if such causes are not attributable to
any effort to concoct a version no conse~uence shall be attached to the mere
delay in lodging the FIR. [470-C, DJ

Zahoor v. State of UP, [1991) Supp. 1 SCC 372; Tara Singh v. State of B
Punjab, [1991) Supp. 1SCC536 and Jamna v. State of UP, [1994] l SCC 185,
relie4 on.

2.1. Human memory is very often a conditioned characteristic.
Anything, which has any special or peculiar lineament, can create an impact C
on the human mind lasting for long. While it is true that routine events in a
man's day-to-day life may not remain in his mind for being remembered later,
any odd or bizarre happening involving him or in front of him have the·
tendency to stick in his mind indelibly. If there is any cause for him to recollect
such events again they get refreshed again. That is why he is able to narrate
such events with all details when asked to do so. This applies to all witnesses D
in criminal cases involving serious offences. (471-C-D)

2.2. Normally no porter or rickshaw-puller could speak from memory
as to whom or whose load he carried many days ago. But if the carrying of
a load on a particular day was soon followed by the flash of sensational news
in the locality-that the load contained the corpse of a murdered person, the E
instinctive reaction of the carrier is to become inquisitive to know whether it
was in respect of the load, which he himself carried. If that inquisitiveness
had turned positive it is extremely probable that all the vivid details relating
to that event would stick in his memory. For him such event would not have
been a casual occurrence but extraordinarily odd and queer. Hence it is not F
likely to fade out of the canvass of his mind. It will be unrealistic to jettison
the testimony of such a witness on the mere ground that he could not have
remembered after the lapse of a long period the identity of the persons who
engaged him and also of the load, which he carried. [471-E-F[

3. It is generally an impossible task for the prosecution to prove what G .
precisely would have impelled the murderers to kill a particular person. All"
that the prosecution in many cases could point to is the possible mental
element, which could have been the cause for the murder. (472-A, BJ

State of HP v. Jeet Singh, [1999[ 4 SCC 370 and Nathuni Yadav v. State
of Bihar, [1998] 9 sec 238, referred to. H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
881 of 2001

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.9.2000 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Crl.A.No. 339 of 1996.

B

-
R.K. Kapoor, P. Verma and Shailendra Bhardwaj for the Appellants.

· M.K. Garg and Rajeev Sharma for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMAS, J. Leave granted.
c
A railway burial was contrived for eliminating the corpse of a business
broker of Ludhiana. The coffin made for that purpose was camouflaged as
parcel container to be despatched to a distant destination. But the parcel
narrowly missed from being consigned to the railway bogie as some employees
D at the Parcel Service Center smelled foul. The suspicion led to the disinterring
of a strangled body which was later identified to be that of the aforesaid
business broker. Eventually it led to the detection of an orchestrated murder
committed by the appellants. The trial court convicted the appellants for
murder of the business broker besides the offences of abducting him and
destroying the evidence. They were sentenced to imprisonment for life on the
E main count and to lesser terms of imprisonment on the other two counts. A
Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana confinned tl)e
conviction and sentence as per the judgment which is now being challenged.

Amar Kumar Gupta (deceased) and his wife Veena were living with
their two little daughters (Sonia and Dimple) in their house at Ludhiana. He
F was making his livelihood through the brokerage earned by him in the business
transactions with the manufacturers of hosiery goods. It appears that the two
appellants were manufacturers of hosiery articles at Ludhiana and the
manufacturing concern was called "M/s. Kapoor Knitting, Harbans Pura",
anct they had engaged the deceased as a broker for the sale of goods
G manufactured in their concern. The amount which the appellant owed to the
deceased ranged around one lakh of rupees by way of brokerage.

Now the prosecution story can be narrated compendiously. On 2.2.1994
the appellant visited the house of the deceased at about 11 A.M. and they had
a conversation, presumably about the brokerage claimed by the deceased or
H due to him. Appellants asked the deceased to go with them so that the accounts
RA VIND ER KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [THOMAS, J.] 467

could be settled conveniently. Reciprocating the offer the deceased went with A
them. He rode on a scooter along with Mohan Lal Jain (PW-8) who was a
close relative. As they reached the place of the appellants deceased relieved
l?W-8 who was iq a hurry to go away for his own work.
'
The vivid details of what all happened thereafter are not known except
that at some time during the day the two appellants murdered the deceased B
by strangulating him with a ligature. They packed the dead body in a wooden
container. It was wrapped in a gunny bag, on the top of which they scribbled
the words "To self-Arun Goel; G-1 New Delhi''. They engaged a. rickshaw-
puller to transport the container to the parcel service center adjoining the
Railway Station at Ludhiana. PW-5 Daya Ram (rickshaw-puller) collected C
the load from the premises of M/s. Kapoor Knitting and transported it in his
rickshaw to the aforesaid parcel service center. The box was unloaded from
the vehicle to the parcel building by the rickshaw-puller with the help of the
two appellants and another person.

Then the two appellants approached PW-I I who was one of the partners D
of a parcel service firm and wanted to do the needful for booking the goods
for being despatched to New Delhi. It was 4.30 P.M. but they learnt that the
next goods train available from that station would be only on the succeeding
day. However, PW-I I agreed that the goods would be despatched on the next
day itself. But when the Parcel Supervisor weighed the load and found it to
be 152 Kgs. he felt something fishy about it. But by that time both the E
appellants had left the scene. So the container was kept outside the Parcel
Office. Perhaps the staff at the parcel section felt that the load was something
suspicious and hence they wanted to see what was inside the container.

On 4.2.1994 the Chief Parcel Supervisor intimated the police about the F
suspicious container lying at their office. After the police reached, the container
was opened and all of them became stunned seeing a dead body with a
ligature tied around its neck and the legs tied up with a string stuffed inside
the box. The body was found wrapped with a black glazed paper and the box
was wrapped with a gunny bag on which the destination of the parcel was
scribbled as mentioned above. The inquest was held by PW-17 Boota Ram G
who was the Station House Officer, General Railway Police Station (GRPS),
Ludhiana.

The police suspecting the appellants detailed a guard at the house of the
accused as both were absent from the scene. On 11.2.1994, the first appellant
Ravinder Kumar returned to the house but when he noticed the presence of H

l
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the police in the vicinity of his house he realised that he was within the
penumbra of police suspicion. He then ran away from the place. On the way
he gulped some poison but before he could die he was admitted in the CMC
Hospital, Ludhiana. On 25.2.1994 he was arrested by the police when he was
discharged by the hospital authorities.

B Appellant Surinder Kumar was arrested in connection with some other
case on 2.5.1994 by the Jind Police. When PW-17 Boota Ram came to know
of his arrest he proceeded to that station and took over the custody of appellant
Surinder Kumar after formally arresting him in connection with this case.
The case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence. The trial court and the
C High Court concurrently found that the circumstances proved by the
prosecution were quite sufficient to establish that the deceased was murdered
by the two appellants and that they tried to dislodge the corpse in such a
manner as to escape from anybody's suspicion.

We have no doubt that the deceased Amar Kumar Gupta was murdered
D on 2.2.1994 by ligature strangulation and his body was packed up in a wooden
container which was camouflaged as a parcel consignment. Nor has that
aspect been disputed by the appellants. The sole question which the appellants
seriously disputed was that they were the killers of the deceased. To
substantiate that appellants were the real murderers in this case prosecution
has presented the following circumstances:
E
(I) Appellants had dealings with the deceased and a good sum was
to be paid to the deceased by way of brokerage.
(2) On 2.2.1994 appellants went to the house of the deceased and
persuaded him to go with them up to their house at Mohalla Taj
F Ganj situated in Harbans Pura.
(3) On the same evening appellants engaged PW-5 Daya Ram
(rickshaw-puller) to transport a load wrapped in a gunny bag
from the factory of the appellants at Harbans Pura to the parcel
office of the Ludhiana Railway Station.
G (4) Appellants booked the parcel to be despatched to New Delhi on
the same evening. When the parcel employees asked certain
queries regarding the heavy weight of the load appellants
advanced false excuses.
(5) The container was opened and the dead body was disintered.
H Since then the appellants remained absent from the locality itself
RA VINDER KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB (THOMAS, J.] 469
for 14 days henceforth. A
(6) The appellant Ravinder Kumar immediately on smelling that
police suspected him attempted to commit suicide.
(7) On the information supplied by the said appellant the scooter of
the deceased was retrieved from the premises of the Railway
Station, Ludhiana. B
(8) The clothes of the deceased were recovered by PW-17
Investigating Officer on the basis of the information elicited from
appellant Ravinder Kumar.

Both the courts found that the prosecution has established the above C
circumstances with convincing and reliable evidence. But learned counsel for
the appellants contended that there are some basic infirmities which did not
weigh with the two courts and those infirmities are sufficient to disrupt the
chain of circumstances. He first contended that the FIR was inordinately
delayed and that itself is a vitiating factor. His next contention was that the
two courts did not consider how a rickshaw-puller would remember, after D
many days, that a particular load was transported at the instance of the
appellants. Lastly, he contended that the appellants had no motive to murder
the deceased, and even the suggestion made by the prosecution for that
purpose remained unsubstantiated. On these grounds he pleaded for
interference with the conviction and sentence passed on the appellants. E
The attack on prosecution cases on the ground of delay in lodging FIR
has almost bogged down as a stereotyped redundancy in criminal cases. It is
a recurring feature in most of the criminal cases that there would be some
delay in furnishing the first information to the police. It has to be remembered
that law has not fixed any time for lodging the FIR. Hence a delayed FIR is F
not illegal. Of course a prompt and immediate lodging of the FIR is the ideal
as that would give the prosecution a twin advantage. First is that it affords
commencement of the investigation without any time lapse. Second is that it
expels the opportunity for any possible concoction of a false version. Barring
these two plus points for a promptly lodged FIR the demerits of the delayed
FIR cannot operate as fatal to any prosecution case. It cannot be overlooked G
that even a promptly lodged FIR is not an unreserved guarantee for the
genuineness of the version incorporated therein.

When there is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case was delayed
the court has to look at the reason why there was such a delay. There can be
a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A might be ignorant of the need for informing the police ofa crime without any
lapse of time. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among
urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the police
station. Another possibility is due to lack of adequate transport facilities for
the informers to reach the police station. The third, which is a quite common
B bearing, is that the kith and kin of the deceased might take' some appreciable
time to regain a certain level of tranquillity qfmind or sedativeness of temper
for moving to the police station for the purpose of furnishing the requisite
infcrmation. Yet another cause is, the persons who are supposed to give such
information themselves could be so physically impaired that the police had
to reach them on getting some nebulous information about the incident.
c We are not providing an exhausting catalogue of instances which could
cause delay in lodging the FIR. Our effort is to try to point out that the stale
demand made in the criminal courts to treat the FIR vitiated merely on the
ground of delay in its lodgment cannot be approved as a legal corollary. In
any case, where there is delay in making the FIR the court is to look at the
D causes for it and if such causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct
a version no consequence shall be attached to the mere delay in lodging the
FIR. Vide Zahoor v. State of UP, (1991] Suppl. 1 SCC 372; Tara Singh v.
State of Punjab, [1991] Suppl I SCC 536; Jamna v. State of UP (1994] I
SCC 185. In Tara Singh (Supra) the Court made the following observations:

E "It is well settled that the delay in giving the FIR by itself cannot be
a ground to doubt the prosecution case. Knowing the Indian conditions
as they are we cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police
station immediately after the occurrence. Human nature as it is, the
kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected
to act mechanically with all the promptitude in giving the report to
F
the police. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it
may not immediately occur to them that they should give a report.
After all it is but natural in these circumstances for them to take some
time to go to the police station for giving the report."

G In the present case, no doubt, there is apparently a long delay of two
days to give information to the police but the bereaved widow was not
absolutely certain that she lost her husband once and for all until her brother-
in-law confirmed to her, after identifying the dead body, that the same was
that of her husband. The initial tension and suspense, undergone by her
would have billowed up into a massive wave of grief. It is only understandable
H how much time a woman, placed in such a situation, would take to reach
RAVINDERKUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [THOMAS,J.] 471
some level of placidity for communicating to the strangers of what she knew A
about the last journey of her husband. We therefore find no merit in the
contention based on the delay of lodging the FIR.

The second contention relates to the evidence of PW-5 Daya Ram
(rickshaw-puller), He remembered the two appellants who engaged him to
carry the load in his rickshaw tip to the railway station. He also identified the B
wooden box in which the load was packed, with the help of the scribblings
made on it. The contention is that it is not possible for any person, much less
a rickshaw-puller like PW5, to remember who exactly employed him to carry
a particular load on a particular day, after the lapse of several days thereafter.
This contention is raised overlooking the psychological phenomenon that C
human memory is very often a conditioned characteristic. Anything which
has any special or peculiar lineament can create an impact on the human
mind lasting for long. While it is true that routine events in a man's day to
day life may not remain in his mind for b.eing remembered later, any odd or
bizarre happenings involving him or in front of him have the tendency to
stick in his mind indelibly. If there is any cause for him to recollect such D
events again they get refreshed again. That is why he is able to narrate such
events with all details when asked to do so. This applies to all witnesses in
criminal cases involving serious offences. Normally no porter or rickshaw-
puller could speak from memory as to whom or whose load he carried many
days ago. But if the carrying of a load on a particular day was soon followed E
by the flash of sensational news in the locality • that the load contained the
corpse of a murdered person, the instinctive reaction of the carrier is to
become inquisitive to know whether it was in respect of the load which he
himself carried. If that inquisitiveness had turned positive it is extremely
probable that all the vivid details relating to that event would stick in his
memory. For him such event would not have been a usual occurrence but F
extraordinarily odd and queer. Hence it is not likely to fade out of the canvass
of his mind. It will be unrealistic to jertison the testimony of such a witness
on the mere ground that he could not have remembered after the lapse of
long period the identity of the persons who engaged him and also of the load
which he carried. We, therefore, repel such contention.
G
The third contention is that the motive alleged by the prosecution was
not established and hence the area remains gray as to what would have
impelled them to liquidate the broker. No doubt it is the allegation of the
prosecution that appellants owed a sum of Rs. one lakh to the deceased and
it might not have been possible for the prosecution to prove that aspect to the H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A hilt. Nonetheless some materials were produced for showing that there were
transactions between the appellants and the deceased and that they had some
account to be settled. Only thus far could be established but not further. It is
generally an impossible task for the prosecution to prove what precisely
would have impelled the murderers to kill a particular person. All that
B prosecution in many cases could point to is the possible mental element
which could have been the cause for the murder. In this connection we deem
it useful to refer to the observations of this Court in State of Himachal
Pradesh v. Jeet Singh, [1999] 4 SCC 370:

"No doubt it is a sound principle to remember that every criminal act
was done with a motive but its corollary is not that no criminal
c offence would have been committed if the prosecution has failed to
prove the precise motive of the accused to commit it. When the
prosecution succeeded in showing the possibility of some ire for the
accused towards the victim, the inability to further put on record the
manner in which such ire would have swelled up in the mind of the
D offender to such a degree as to impel him to commit the offence
cannot be construed as a fatal weakness of the prosecution. It is
almost an impossibility for the prosecution to unravel the full
dimension of the mental disposition of an offender towards the person
whom he offended."

E An earlier decision of this Court in Nathuni Yadav v. State of Bihar
[1998] 9 sec 238, which dealt with the same aspect, has been referred to
therein and a passage therefrom has been extracted. We are, therefore, not
persuaded to change the tide on account of the inability of the prosecution
to prove the motive aspect to the hilt.
F In the result we dismiss this appeal.

v.s.s. Appeal dismissed.