RAVINDRA SHALIK NAIK AND ORS.versusST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 126
- Decided
- 9 February 2009
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The killing, being a sudden fight without pre‑meditation or undue advantage, falls under Section 304 Part I IPC, not murder, and warrants a ten‑year rigorous imprisonment.
Summary
The appellants attacked the father‑in‑law of the complainant with an axe, knife and a gupti after a verbal quarrel that began when a bundle of cotton struck the complainant's roof. The victim died from the injuries. The trial court convicted them of murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and also under Section 324 IPC, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The High Court upheld the conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the reliability of the witnesses' testimony and the applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, concluding that the killing occurred in a sudden fight without pre‑meditation, undue advantage or cruelty. Consequently, the Court altered the conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC and imposed a ten‑year rigorous imprisonment sentence, allowing the appeal in part.
Issues considered
- Whether the facts constitute murder under Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC (Exception 4 to Section 300).
- Whether the evidence of PW‑1 and PW‑3 is reliable and can be relied upon for conviction.
- Whether the conviction under Section 324 IPC for voluntarily causing hurt with a dangerous weapon stands.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 300, s. 302, s. 304(Part I), s. 324, s. 34
Subjects
Judgment
[2009) 1 S.C.R. 1080
A RAVINDRA SHALIK NAIK AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
(Criminal Appeal No. 245-246 of 2009)
FEBRUARY 9, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.]
PENAL CODE, 1860:
c
s. 300, Exception 4 and ss. 302134 and 324 - Sudden
fight - Accused inflicting injuries on victims with axe, knife and
'gupti' - Resulting in death of one of the victims - Conviction
by trial court u/s 302134 and s.324 - Upheld by High Court-
HELD: Conviction altered from s.302134 to s. 304(part I) -
D
Sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment imposed.
The appellants (A-1 to A-3) were prosecuted for
commission of offence punishable uls 302134 IPC. The
prosecution case was that on a trivial issue, an altercation
E took place between PW-3, the husband of PW-1, and A-
2. A-1 and A-3 also joined A-2. 'K' the father-in-law of PW-
1 tried to intervene and pacify all of them. A-1 to A-3 went
inside their house, which was close by, and returned with
axe, knife and 'gupti'. All the three inflicted injuries on the
F head and abdomen of 'K'. A-1 and A-2 also inflicted
injuries on PW-3. 'K' was taken to the hospital where he
was declared dead. The trial court convicted all the ..
accused and sentenced them to imprisonment for life ul
s 302134 IPC. A-1 was also convicted and sentenced uls
G 324 IPC. The accused having remained unsuccessful
before the High Court, filed the instant appeals.
Allowing the appeals in part, the Court -
~
HELD:1. So far as the reliability of the evidence of
H 1080
RAVINDRA SHALIK NAIK AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1081
MAHARASHTRA
PWs 1 and 3 is concerned their evidence is clear and A
cogent; and though they were subjected to incisive cross
examination, nothing material could be elicited to discard
their evidence. (Para 3] (1083-G]
2. As regards appellants' plea that the case is B
covered under Exception 4 to s.300 IPC, for bringing in
operation of the Exception, it has to be established that
.. t the act was committed without premeditation, in a
sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden
quarrel, without the offender having taken undue
advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual
c
manner. Heat of passion requires that there must be no
time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the
parties have worked themselves into a fury on account
of the verbal altercation in the beginning. Considering the
background facts, the appropriate conviction would be D
-" under Section 304 (Part-I) IPC. The custodial sentence of
10 years would meet the ends of justice. [Para 6 and 7]
[1084-B; 1085-G-B-C]
Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat 2003 E
. (5) Supreme 223; Parka sh Chand v. State of H.P. 2004 (11) .
SCC 381; Byvarapu Raju v. State of A.P. and Anr. 2007 (11)
SCC 218 and Buddu Khan v. State of Uttarakhand (2009) 1
SCR 178, referred to.
~
F
- Case Law Reference:
2003 (5) Supreme 223
2004 (11) sec 381
referred to
referred to
para 6
para 6
2001 (11) sec 218 referred to para 6 G
(2009) 1 SCR 178 referred to para 6
....:Ii\
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 245-246 of 2009.
H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A From the final Judgment and Order dated 28.3.2007 of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur
in Crl. Appeal Nos. 193 and 251 of 2002.
C.N. Sree Kumar, P.R. Nayak and Dushyant Parashar for
B the Appellants.
Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by t •
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
c
2. Challenge in these appeals is to the common judgment
of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench,
dismissing the appeals filed by the present appellants. The
appellants were found guilty of offence punishable under
D Sections 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in
short the 'IPC'). The appellant Ravindra was also convicted for
offence punishable under Section 324 IPC. Appellants
Ravindra, Naresh and Shalikrao are hereinafter referred to as
A-1, A-2 and A-3. The learned Adhoc Additional Sessions
E Judge, Yuvatmal had found the appellants guilty as aforenoted.
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Appellant Shalik is father of appellants Ravindra and
Naresh. On 13.11.1999, at about 7 p. m. appellant Naresh was
F going to his house and was carrying bundle of cotton/grass. The
road to his house was adjacent to the house of complainant
Vandana (PW1). On the way, the cotton bundle hit the roof of
the complainant's house and, therefore, husband of the
-
complainant, Dewanand (PW 3) accosted appellant Naresh
G and told him that he should have been more careful while
carrying the bundle of cotton and ought to have seen that no
damage was done to the roof of the house of complainant.
Quarrel ensued between appellant Naresh and Dewanand
(PW-3) and there was exchange of words between them.
"' -
H Appellants Shalik and Ravindra also came to the spot of
RAVINDRA SHALIK NAIK AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1083
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~ incident and started quarrelling with the husband of the A
complainant- Dewanand (PW3). The father-in-law of the
complainant, Kisan Gedam (hereinafter referred to as
'deceased') intervened to pacify the quarrel between appellants
and his son Dewanand. Appellants Shalik, Ravindra and
Naresh went inside their house, which was close to the spot of B
incident and all of them returned to the spot armed with axe,
knife and gupti. All the three appellants inflicted injuries on the
... 1'
head and abdomen of deceased Kisan by means of those
weapons. Appellants Ravindra and Naresh inflicted injuries on
the hand of husband of complainant-Dewanand (PW3) with c
those weapons with intention to cause his death. Deceased
Kisan was taken to the Hospital at Ner where he was declared
dead.
After completion of investigation charge sheet was filed
_, and since the accused persons pleaded innocence trial was D
held.
Placing reliance on the evidence of complainant Vandana
(PW-1) and Dewan and (PW-3) the trial Court held the accused
persons guilty as aforenoted. E
In appeal, the primary stand was that PWs 1 and 3 should
not have been relied upon and in any event the provisions of
Section 302 IPC are not attracted to the facts of the case. The
/,,
High Court did not find any substance in the plea and upheld
the conviction and sentence as afore noted. F
)
The stands taken before the High Court were re-iterated
in the present appeals.
So far as the reliability of the evidence of PWs 1 and 3 G
are concerned their evidence is clear and cogent and though
- Ji\ they were subjected to incisive cross examination, nothing
material could be elicited to discard their evidence.
4. The main plank of the appellants' arguments relates to
applicability of section 302 IPC. It has been contended that there H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A is no pre-meditation involved and in course of sudden quarrel '1'
the incident took place.
5. For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC it has to be established that the act was committed without
premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a
8
sudden quarrel without the offender having taken undue
advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
6. The Fourth Exception of Section 300, IPC covers acts
done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case
C of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which
its place would have been more appropriate. The exception is
founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence
of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is
total !leprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is
D only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reasons and
urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There
is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury
done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact
Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a
E blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the
origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have
originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them
in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A 'sudden fight' implies
mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide
F committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation,
nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one
side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately
applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous
deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes
G place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It
may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not
aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the ,4 -
serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and
aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame
which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be
H
RAVINDRA SHALIK NAIK AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1085
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
.."1. invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a A
sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue
ii
advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the
fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case
within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be
found. It is to be noted that the 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 B
to Section 300, IPC is not defined in the IPC. It takes two to
·~
make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no
;
time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties
have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal
altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two c
and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not
possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be
deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and
whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend
~ .. upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of D
Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden
quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be
shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted
in cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage'
as used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'. These
E
aspects have been highlighted in Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai
Nayak v. State of Gujrat (2003 (5) Supreme 223], Parkash
Chand v. State of H.P. (2004 (11) SCC 381), Byvarapu Raju
v. State of A.P. and Anr. (2007 (11) SCC 218) and Buddu Khan
v. State of Uttarakhand (SLP (Crl.) No. 6109/08 disposed of
- on 12.1.2009)
7. Considering the background facts in our considered
F
opinion the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304
Part I IPC. The custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the G
ends of justice.
i.,
8. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent.
R.P. Appeals partly allowed.
H
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