REGISTRAR GENERAL, PATNA HIGH COURTversusPANDEY GAJENDRA PRASAD & ORS.

                         [2012] 5 S.C.R. 994


A         REGISTRAR GENERAL, PATNA HIGH COURT
                               v.
            PANDEY GAJENDRA PRASAD & ORS.
                (Civil Appeal No. 4553 of 2012)
                             MAY 11, 2012
B
                [D.K. JAIN AND ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]

        Judiciary - Judicial Officer - Dismissed from service - On
   the allegation of misconduct - By Full Court of High Court on
C recommendation by Standing Committee - Writ petition -
   Allowed by Division Bench of High Court quashing dismissal
   order - On appeal, Held: Division Bench exceeded its
  jurisdiction by interfering with the decision of Full Court - The
   Court dealt with the matter as if it was exercising appellate
D powers over the decision of subordinate court - There is
  nothing on record to suggest that the evaluation made by
   Standing C9mmittee and then by Full Court was so arbitrary,
   capricious or irrational so as to shock the conscience of the
   Division Bench to justify its interference - Dismissal is justified
E - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 235 and 226.

         Constitution of India, 1950:

       Article 226 - Judicial review - Of an order of punishment
  passed in departmental proceedings - Scope of - Held: Scope
F of judicial review in such matters is very limited - Interference
  with such matters is permitted only when the proceedings are
  in violation of principles of natural justice or in violation of
  statutory regulations or when the decision is vitiated by
  consideration extraneous to the evidence or when the
G decision, on the face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious.

          Article 235 - Control over Subordinate Courts - Scope of
    - It is constitutional mandate that every High Court ensures
    that the subordinate judiciary functions within its domain and
H                                 994
   REGISTRAR GENERAL, PATNA HIGH COURT v.                      995
         PANDEY GAJENDRA PRASAD

administers justice according to law, uninfluenced by any              A
extraneous consideration - While it is imperative for the High
 Court to protect honest and upright judicial officer, it is equally
necessary not to ignore or condone any dishonest deed of a
judicial officer.
                                                                       B
    Respondent No. 1 was a judicial officer, functioning
as Railway Judicial Magistrate at the relevant time.
Sessions Judge conducted a preliminary inquiry against
him on the basis of some reports alleging misconduct.
Departmental proceedings were initiated. Four charges                  C
were framed against him. Two of the charges which
pertained to grant of bail by respondent No. 1 were
proved and the Standing Committee recommended
imposition of punishment of dismissal. The
recommendation was approved by the Full Court of High
Court and accepted by the Governor. By a Notification,                 D
he was dismissed from service. Respondent No. 1 filed
writ petition challenging the order of dismissal. Division
Bench of the High Court allowed the petition quashing
the dismissal order. Hence the present appeal.
                                                                       E
     Allowing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1 Article 235 of the Constitution of India not
only vests total and absolute control over the
subordinate courts in the High Courts but also enjoins a
constitutional duty upon them to keep a constant vigil on
                                                                       F
the day to day functioning of these courts. There is no
gainsaying that while it is imperative for the High Court
to protect honest and upright judicial officers against
motivated and concocted allegations, it is equally
necessary for the High Court not to ignore or condone                  G
any dishonest deed on the part of any judicial officer. It
needs little emphasis that the subordinate judiciary is the
kingpin in the hierarchical system of administration of
justice. It is the trial judge, who comes in contact with the
litigant during the day to day proceedings in the court                H
    996     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A and, therefore, a heavy responsibility lies on him to build
  a solemn unpolluted atmosphere in the dispensation of
  justice which is an essential and inevitable feature in a
  civilized democratic society. [Para 9] [1006-C-F]

        8.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Ors. (1995) 6 SCC
8
    749: 1995(4) Suppl. SCR 644; High Court of Judicature at
    Bombay vs.Shashikant S. Patil and Anr. (2000) 1 SCC 416:
    1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 205 - referred to.

       1.2 ·it is the constitutional mandate that every High
C Court must ensure that the subordinate judiciary
  functions within its domain and administers justice
  according to law, uninfluenced by any extraneous
  considerations. The members of the subordinate
  judiciary are not only under the control but also under the
D care and custody of the High Court. Undoubtedly, all the
  Judges of the High Court, collectively and individually,
  share that responsibility. [Para 9] [1007-B-C]

        1.3 While it is true and relevant to note that 'grant of
E bail' is an exercise of judicial discretion vested in a judicial
  officer to be exercised depending on the facts and
  circumstances before him, yet it is equally important that
  exercise of that discretion must be judicious having
  regard to all relevant facts and circumstances and not as
  a matter of course. [Para 10] [1007-E-F]
F
       1.4 The Division Bench while holding that both the
  orders by the first respondent being purely discretionary
  in terms of his statutory powers, did not warrant any
  disciplinary action on the ground of judicial indiscretion
G or misconduct, has failed to bear in mind the parameters
  laid down while dealing with the collective decision of the
  Full Court on the administrative side. It is evident that the
  Division Bench dealt with the matter as if it was
  exercising appellate powers over the decision of a
H subordinate court, granting or refusing bail, and in the
   REGISTRAR GENERAL, PATNA HIGH COURT v.                 997
         PANDEY GAJENDRA PRASAD

process, overstepped its jurisdiction under Article 226 of       A
the Constitution. [Para 11] [1008-G-H; 1009-A-B]

      1.5 The scope of judicial review, under Article 226 of
the Constitution, of an order of punishment passed in
departmental proceedings, is extremely limited. While            8
exercising such jurisdiction, interference with the
decision of the departmental authorities is permitted, if
such authority has held the proceedings in violation of
the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory
regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the       C
decision of the authority is vitiated by consideration
extraneous to the evidence on the merits of the case, or
if the conclusion reached by the authority, on the face of
it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable
person could have arrived at such a conclusion. [Para 12]
[1009-B-D]                                                       D

     High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shashikant S.
Patil andAnr. (200) 1 SCC 416: 1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 205;
State of AndhraPradesh vs. S. Sree Rama Rao (1964) 3
SCR 25; Syed T.A.Naqshbandi and Ors. vs. State of Jammu          E
and Kashmir and Ors.(2003) 9 sec 592: 2003 (1) Suppl.
SCR 114; Rajendra Singh Verma(Dead) Through LRs. and
Ors. vs. Lieuteant Governor (NCT ofDelhi) and Ors. (2011)
10 SCC 1: 2011 (12) SCR 496 - relied on.
                                                                 F
     1.6 In the present case, the recommendation of the
Standing Committee to dismiss the first respondent from
service was based on the findings in the enquiry report
submitted by the enquiry officer pursuant to the
departmental enquiry; his reply to the show cause notice;
his ACR and other materials placed before it. The                G
recommendation of the Standing Committee was
approved and ratified by the Full Court. There is nothing
on record to even remotely suggest that the evaluation
made, firstly by the Standing Committee and then by the
Full Court, was so arbitrary, capricious or so irrational so     H
   998      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 5 S.C.R.

A as to shock the conscience of the Division Bench to
  justify its interference with the unanimous opinion of the
  Full Court. Apart from the fact that an ACR does not
  necessarily project the overall profile of a judicial officer,
  the entire personal file of the respondent was before the
B Full Court when a conscious unanimous decision was
  taken to award the punishment of his dismissal from
  service. In cases of such assessment, evaluation and
  formulation of opinion, a vast range of multiple factors
  play a vital and important role and no single factor should
c be allowed to be blown out of proportion either to decry
  or deify issues to be resolved or claims sought to be
  considered or asserted. In the very nature of such things,
  it would be difficult, rather almost impossible to subject
  such an exercise undertaken by the Full Court, to judicial
  review, save and except in an extra-ordinary case when
0
  the court is convinced that some exceptional thing which
  ought not to have taken place has really happened and
  not merely because there could be another possible view
  or there is some grievance with the exercise undertaken
E by the Committee/Full Court. [Para 16] [1011-D-H; 1012-
  A-C]
      2.1 The court observed that the present system of
  recording the ACRs leaves much to be desired and needs
  to be revamped. It is deficient in several ways, being not
F comprehensive enough to truly reflect the level of work,
  conduct and performance of each individual on one hand
  and unable to check subjectivity on the other. This
  undoubtedly breeds discontent in a section of the judicial
  service besides eroding proper and effective
G superintendence and control of the High Court over
  subordinate judiciary. The process of evaluation of a
  judicial officer is intended to contain a balanced
  information about his performance during the entire
  evaluation period, but many a times, the ACRs are
H recorded casually in a hurry after a long lapse of time (in
  some cases even after the expiry of one year from the
   REGISTRAR GENERAL, PATNA HIGH COURT v.               999
         PANDEY GAJENDRA PRASAD

period to which it relates), indicating only the grading in    A
the final column. It needs no elaboration that such hurried
assessment cannot but, be either on the basis of the
assessment/grading of the preceding year(s) or on
personal subjective views of the Inspecting Judge(s),
which is unfair to the judicial officer. Undoubtedly, ACRs     B
play a vital and significant role in the assessment,
evaluation and formulation of opinion on the profile of a
judicial officer, particularly, in matters relating to
disciplinary action against a judicial officer. The ACRs of
such officer hold supreme importance in ascertaining his       c
conduct, and therefore, the same have to be reported
carefully with due diligence and caution. There is an
urgent need for reforms on this subject, not only to bring
about uniformity but also to infuse objectivity and
standardisation. [Para 18] [1012-E-H; 1013-A-C]
                                                               D
    Bishwanath Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar and Ors.
(2001) 2 SCC305: 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 718; Punjab and
Haryana, Through R. G. vs. /shwar Chand Jain and Anr. (1999)
4 sec 579 - referred to.
                                                               E
     2.2 The power to make such entries, which have the
potential for shaping the future career of a subordinate
officer, casts an obligation on the High Courts to keep a
watch and vigil over the performance of the members of
the subordinate judiciary. Supreme Court also stressed         F
on the need for the assessment to be made as an
ongoing process continued round the year and the
record to be made in an objective manner. [Para 19]
[1013-E-F]
                    Case Law Reference:                        G
    1995 (4) Suppl. SCR 644 Referred to           Para 6
    1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 205 Referred to           Para 9
    (1964) 3 SCR 25            Relied on          Para 13      H
    1000    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 5 S.C.R.
                                                                      •:

A       2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 114 Relied on                 Para 14
        2011 (12) SCR 496            Relied on            Para 15

        2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 718 Referred to               Para 15

        (1999) 4 sec 579             Referred to          Para 15
B
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    4553 of 2012.                                    '

        From the Judgment & Order dated 21.05.2010 of the High
c Court of Patna in C.W.J.C. No. 11793 of 2006.
        Pravin H. Parikh, Ajay Kr. Jha, Subhashree Chatterjee,
    Utsav Trivedi (for Parekh & Co.) for the Appellant.

        Subhro Sanyal for the Appellants.
D
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        D.K. JAIN, J.: 1. Leave granted.

        2. This appeal, by special leave, is preferred by the Patna
E High Court, through its Registrar General, against the judgment
  and order dated 21st May, 2010, rendered by a Division Bench
  of the High Court in the writ petition filed by respondent no.1.
  In the said writ petition the first respondent had challenged the
  decision of the Full Court recommending his removal from
F service as a Railway Judicial Magistrate. By the impugned
  judgment, the notification/communication dismissing him from
  service has been set aside with a consequential declaration
  that the said respondent shall be reinstated and paid 40% of
  his back wages as compensation. He has also been granted
G liberty to m.ake representation to the High Court regarding the
  balance 60% of his back wages.
        3. The first respondent in this appeal was appointed in
    Bihar Judicial Service on 29th March 1986, in the cadre of
    Munsif. In October, 1999, he was functioning as a Railway
H
  REGISTRAR GENERAL, PATNA HIGH COURT v.                   1001
   PANDEY GAJENDRA PRASAD [D.K. JAIN, J.]

Judicial Magistrate, Barauni Dist., Begusarai. On receipt of        A
some reports, alleging misconduct on the part of the said
respondent, the District and Sessions Judge conducted a
preliminary inquiry. Upon consideration of his report, the
Standing Committee, consisting of five Judges of the High
Court, issued a show cause notice to respondent no. 1.              B
Dissatisfied with his reply, the StandinQ Committee
recommended initiation of departmental proceedings against
him and to place him under suspension. The said
recommendation was subsequently approved by the Full Court.

    4. The Enquiry Officer, framed four charges against the         C
respondent. However, in his final report, he found the following
two charges as proved:

    "Charge - II
                                                                    D
    You Sri Pandey Gajendra Prasad while functioning as
    Railway Judicial Magistrate, Barauni granted bail to
    accused Ajay Kumar Yadav on 26.11.99 in Rail P.S. Case
    No.64/99 (G.R. No.2400/99) initially registered under
    section 47(A) of the Excise Act for illegal possession of       E
    several packets of Ganja not-with-standing the fact that
    recovery of Ganja falls under N.D.P.S. Act and even before
    the release of Ajay Kumar Yadav a petition was filed on
    behalf of prosecution on 4.12.99, to add section 17, 18 and
    22 of N.D.P.S. Act, but instead of passing any order on
                                                                    F
    the said petition you entertained bail application of another
    accused namely Ram Kishore Kusbaha and on 9.12.99
    allowed him bail and thereafter on 16.12.99 accepted bail
    bonds of both the accused persons and released them on
    bail.
                                                                    G
    The grant of bail in N.D.P.S. Act by a Judicial Magistrate
    is without jurisdiction raising the presumption of extraneous
    consideration.

    Your aforesaid act of granting bail to accused under            H
          1002    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 5 S.C.R.


     A        N.D.P.S. Act indicates that the bail was granted for
              consideration other than Judicial which tantamount to
              Judicial indiscipline, gross misconduct, improper exercise
              of Judicial discretion and a conduct unbecoming of a
              Judicial Officer.
     B
              Charge - Ill

             You Sri Pandey Gajendra Prasad while functioning as
             Railway Judicial Magistrate, Barauni granted bail to one
             Tara Devi alias Haseena Khatoon in Barauni Rail P .S.
     c       Case No. 76/98 (G.R. No.2428/98) not-with- standing the
             fact that her anticipatory bail application bearing Cr. Misc.
             No.7301/99, which was preferred by her against rejection
             of her anticipatory bail by the Sessions Judge, Begusarai
             vide order dated 11.12.99 in A.B.A. No.224/98, was
     D       dismissed as withdrawn by this Hon'ble Court on 30.4.99.

             The aforesaid act of your granting bail to the said accused
             being member of a gang of lifters engaged in railway
             thefts, who committed crime within Barauni Junction and
             adjoining station and was thus named accused in several
     E
             cases indicates that the bail was granted for consideration
             other than judicial which tantamount to Judicial indiscipline,
             gross misconduct, improper exercise of Judicial discretion
             and a conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer."

     F       5. The Standing Committee accepted the enquiry report
       and recommended imposition of punishment of dismissal from
       service on the first respondent. As aforesaid, the
       recommendation was approved by the Full Court and accepted
       by the Governor. Consequently, vide a Notification dated 19th
,.   G June, 2006, issued by the Govt. of Bihar; which was
       communicated to him on 24th June, 2006; the first respondent
       was dismissed from service. Aggrieved thereby, he filed a writ
       petition in the High Court. Quashing the order of dismissal, the
       Division Bench of the High Court commented on the afore-
     H extracted charges as follows:
REGISTRAR GENERAL, PATNA HIGH COURT v.                    1003
 PANDEY GAJENDRA PRASAD [D.K. JAIN, J.]

 In Re: Charge II:                                                A

  "Undoubtedly, the investigating officer had filed an
  application on 04.12.1999 to add Sections 17, 18, 22 of
  the N.D.P.S. Act which the petitioner had directed to be
  kept on record. In a criminal trial various kinds of petitions
                                                                 8
  are filed which are kept on record. Some are pressed,
 order passed, others simply remain on record and are
  never pressed. If the prosecution was so sanguine for the
  need to prosecute under the N.D.P.S. Act, it was for the
 Assistant Public Prosecutor to take steps in accordance
 with law by pressing that application. The petitioner as a C
  Judge was not expected to become the prosecutor also
 as that was not his role. If no one pressed that application,
 he was under no compulsion to suo-motu treat it as a case
  under N.D.P.S. Act to deny liberty of the citizen. The aspect
 of the petitioner was dealing with the liberty of the citizen D
  in custody based on prosecution materials laid before him
 when he exercised his judicial discretion, is a matter which
  has a foremost bearing in our mind. To us, it is primarily
 for the prosecution to answer that if the F. I .R. was lodged
 on 02.11.1999, why was it so lax in a matter as serious E
 under the N.D.P.S. Act and why it acted so casually and
 took as long as 08.02.2000 to submit final form under
 N.D.P.S. Act. The departmental enquiry report proceeds
 on a wrong presumption at paragraph 22 that in the facts
 the petitioner granted bail without having jurisdiction to do F
 so as a Magistrate under the N.D.P.S. Act. If he granted
 bail on 16.12.1999 and the N.D.P.S. Act came to be
 added on 08.02.2000, can it be simply logically concluded
 that it was a deliberate mistake in exercise of judicial
 discretion unbecoming of a judicial officer based on the G
 records as they stood on the date when he was
 considering liberty of the citizen.

        Paragraph 22 of the report itself states that his error
 lay in not keeping in mind that a petition was pending for       H
    1004     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A       conversion to the N.D.P.S. Act to conclude that he
        committed a grave error in law by granting bail in a case
        of allegation of recovery of Ganja and a case under the
        N.D.P.S. Act. It has to be kept in mind that even in the
        original allegation it was "Ganja like substance" and not
B       that it was ganja"

         In Re: Charge Ill:

        "In so far as charge No.3 is concerned, we have absolutely
        no hesitation in holding that the petitioner acted in terms
C       of his statutory powers under Section 437(1) proviso
        Cr.P.C. which makes an exception in favour of women.
        The women accused was granted bail after 15 days of
        custody. She was not named and there was no recovery
        from her in an allegation of luggage lifting on the platform.
D       If the male co accused had been granted bail after seven
        months of custody, the distinction to us being too apparent,
        can it be said that the exercise of discretion to grant bail
        to a women in exercise of powers under the Code of
        Criminal Procedure amounted to conduct unbecoming of
E       a judicial officer and a gross misconduct only because she
        had surrendered beyond time observed by the High Court."

    On the first respondent's general reputation, the High Court thus
    observed:

F       "We have examined the judicial records of the officer. In a
        case of grant of bail for extraneous consideration, there
        may not be direct and tangible evidence available,
        therefore impressions have to be gathered from the
        surrounding circumstances. We find it difficult to arrive at
G       any such conclusion against the petitioner. However, in
        order to fortify our thinking, we also proceed to examine
        his annual confidential report more particularly with regard
        to the column for judicial reputation for honesty and
        integrity. The consistent remarks are that "his reputation
H       is good", "yes", "judicial reputation good", "yes"."
   REGISTRAR GENERAL, PATNA HIGH COURT v.                 1005
    PANDEY GAJENDRA PRASAD [D.K. JAIN, J.]

Hence the present appeal by the High Court. The State of Bihar    A
and its twofunctionaries have been impleaded as respondent
nos.2 to 4 respectively.

     6. Mr. Pravin H. Parekh, learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellant, submitted that the case of first respondent B
having been examined first by the Standing Committee,
constituted by the Chief Justice and then approved by the Full
Court after due deliberations, the Division Bench of the High
Court ought to have refrained from interfering with the order of
punishment, particularly when the question of malafides on the C
part of the Full Court was not raised by the first respondent. It
was argued that the Division Bench has misdirected itself in
examining the findings of the enquiry officer as if it was sitting
in appeal and substituted its own findings and opinion thereon,
which is beyond the purview of judicial review under Article 226
of the Constitution. In support, reliance was placed on the D
decision of this Court in B. C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India &
Ors. 1 , wherein it was held that where the findings of the
disciplinary or appellate authority are based on some evidence,
the court cannot re- appreciate the evidence and substitute them
with its own findings. It was stressed that the judicial service E
not being a service in the sense of an employment, as it is
commonly understood; as the judicial officers exercise
sovereign judicial function; the standard principles of judicial
review of an administrative action cannot be applied for
examining the conduct of a judicial officer.                       F

     7. Per Contra, Mr. Subhro Sanyal, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the first respondent. supporting the
impugned judgment submitted that the charges framed against
the first respondent included those cases wherein the judicial    G
discretion vested in a judicial officer had been exercised and
the exercise of such power by the first respondent could not be
said to be an act tantamounting to judicial indiscipline or
misconduct. It was submitted that in the absence of any adverse
   (1995)   s sec 749.                                            H
    1006     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 5 S.C.R.

A   comments in the Annual Confidential Reports ("ACR"), the High
    Court was justified in setting aside the order of punishment of
    dismissal of the first respondent from service.

         8. Having considered the matter in the light of the entire
    material placed before us by the learned counsel, including the
8
    personal file of the first respondent and the settled position of
    law on the point, we are of the opinion that the Divisioh Bench
    exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering with the unanimous
    decision of the High Court on the administrative side.

C      9. Article 235 of the Constitution of India not only vests total
  and absolute control over the subordinate courts in the High
  Courts but also enjoins a constitutional duty upon them to keep
  a constant vigil on the day to day functioning of these courts.
  There is no gainsaying that while it is imperative for the High
D Court to protect honest and upright judicial officers against
  motivated and concocted allegations, it is equally necessary for
  the High Court not to ignore or condone any dishonest deed
  on the part of any judicial officer. It needs little emphasis that
  the subordinate judiciary is the kingpin in the hierarchical
E system of administration of justice. It is the trial judge, who
  comes in contact with the litigant during the day to day
  proceedings in the court and, therefore, a heavy responsibility
  lies on him to build a solemn unpolluted atmosphere in the
  dispensation of justice which is an essential and inevitable
F feature in a civilized democratic society. In High Court of
  Judicature at Bombay Vs. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr. 2 ,
  highlighting a marked and significant difference between a
  judicial service and other services, speaking for a bench of
  three Judges, K.T. Thomas, J. observed as follows:
G       "23. The Judges, at whatever level they may be, represent
        the State and its authority, unlike the bureaucracy or the
        members of the other service. Judicial service is not merely
        an employment nor the Judges merely employees. They
                                                               .   '
H 2. c2000) 1 sec 416.
   REGISTRAR GENERAL, PATNA HIGH COURT v.                     1007
    PANDEY GAJENDRA PRASAD [D.K. JAIN, J.]

     exercise sovereign judicial power. They are holders of            A
     public offices of great trust and responsibility. If a judicial
     officer "tips the scales of justice its rippling effect would
     be disastrous and deleterious". A dishonest judicial
     personage is an oxymoron."
                                                                       B
In short, it is the constitutional mandate that every High Court
must ensure that the subordinate judiciary functions within its
domain and administers justice according to law, uninfluenced
by any extraneous considerations. The members of the
subordinate judiciary are not only under the control but also          C
under the care and custody of the High Court. Undoubtedly, all
the Judges of the High Court, collectively and individually, share
that responsibility.

      10. Bearing in mind the scope of Article 235 of the
Constitution, we may now advert to the facts at hand. As               D
aforesaid, according to the report of the enquiry officer only
charges nos.II and 111, as extracted above, stood proved against
respondent no.1. It is manifest that in both cases, the charge
is related to the grant of bail by respondent no.1. While it is true
and relevant to note that 'grant of bail' is an exercise of judicial   E
discretion vested in a judicial officer to be exercised depending
on the facts and circumstances before him, yet it is equally
important that exercise of that discretion must be judicious
having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances and not
as a matter of course. In the instant case, the findings of the        F
enquiry officer in respect of the two charges were:

     i) In Re: Charge No. II - That respondent no.1 granted bail
to the accused persons in a case falling under the ambit of the
N.D.P.S. Act. The recovery of ganja of any quantity falls within
the purview of the N.D.P.S. Act triable by a Special Court. As         G
a result, no sooner than 4th December ·1 ~99, when an
application was filed by the prosecution before respondent no.1
to add certain provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act in that particular
case, he was divested of the jurisdiction to deal with the case
and thus, ought to have transferred the same to a court of             H
    1008     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012) 5 S.C.R.


A competent jurisdiction, which was not done. It is pertinent to note
  here that in the reply to the show cause notice issued to him,
  the first respondent acquiesced that he was aware of the
  application filed to bring the case within the purview of the
  N.D.P.S. Act. However, he still chose to entertain the bail
B application of the second accused on 8th December, 1999,
  which clearly implies that he voluntarily exercised his discretion
  in granting bail in a case which was in the realm of the N.D.P.S.
  Act and wherein he lacked jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

C       ii) In Re : Charge No. Ill - That the first respondent granted
  bail to Tara Devi alias Haseena Khatoon, who was a member
  of a gang of lifters engaged in railway thefts. Admittedly,
  anticipatory bail application preferred by her was rejected by
  the Sessions Judge, Begusarai and was dismissed as
  withdrawn by the High Court vide order dated 30th April, 1999,
D with an observation that if the accused surrenders within four
  weeks, her bail application would be considered on its own
  merit. It is pertinent to note that on 6th March, 1999, she was
  declared an absconder and a permanent warrant of her arrest
  was also issued by respondent no.1 himself. However, when
E she was arrested by the police in connection with another case
  (being Barauni Rail P.S. Case No. 51/2000) she was granted
  bail by respondent no.1, on the ground that being a woman she
  was entitled to the benefit of the exception under Proviso to
  Section 437(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is
F therefore clear that respondent no.1, failed to take into
  consideration the fact that accused was a proclaimed
  absconder, had disobeyed the dire'ction of the High Court and
  had failed to surrender herself within the time frame granted to
  her.
G
        11. According to the Division Bench, both the orders by
  the first respondent being purely discretionary in terms of his
  statutory powers, did not warrant any disciplinary action against
  him on the ground of judicial indiscretion or misconduct. We
  are constrained to observe that the Division Bench has failed
H
     REGISTRAR GENERAL, PATNA HIGH COURT v.                      1009
      PANDEY GAJENDRA PRASAD [D.K. JAIN, J.]

to bear in mind the parameters laid down in a catena of                   A
decisions of this Court while dealing with the collective decision
of the Full Court on the administrative side. It is evident that the
Division Bench dealt with the matter as if it was exercising
appellate powers over the decision of a subordinate court,
granting or refusing bail, and in the process, overstepped its            B
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

       12. It is trite that the scope of judicial review, under Article
226 of the Constitution, of an order of punishment passed in
departmental proceedings, is extremely limited. While                     C
exercising such jurisdiction, interference with the decision of the
departmental authorities is permitted, if such authority has held
the proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice
or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of
such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by
consideration extraneous to the evidence on the merits of the             D
case, or if the conclusion reached by the authority, on the face
of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person
could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar
to the above. (See: Shashikant S. Patil & Anr. (supra)).
                                                                          ·E
     13. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution, in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. S. Sree
Rama Rao 3 , this Court made the following observations:

      "The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under
      Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the
                                                                          F
      decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
      against a public servant: it is concerned to determine
      whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in
      that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in
      that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not       G
      violated. Where there is some evidence, which the
      authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has
      accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the

3.   (1964) 3 SCR 25.                                                     H
     1010      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 5 S.C.R.

A         conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge,
          it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a
          writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive
          at an independent finding on the evidence."

B         14. Elaborating on the scope of judicial review of an
    assesslT!ent of the conduct of a judicial officer by a Committee,
    approved by the Full Court, in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi & Ors.
     Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors. 4 this Court noted as
    follows:

C         "As has often been reiterated by this Court, judicial review
          is permissible only to the extent of finding whether the
          process in reaching the decision has been observed
          correctly and not the decision itself, as such. Critical or
          independent analysis or appraisal of the materials by the
D         courts exercising powers of judicial review unlike the case
          of an appellate court, would neither be permissible nor
          conducive to the interests of either the officers concerned
          or the system and institutions of administration of justice
          with which we are concerned in this case, by going into
E         the correctness as such of ACRs or the assessment made
          by the Committee and approval accorded by the Full Court
          of the High Court."

        15. In Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) Through LRs. &
  Ors. Vs. LieutenantGovernor (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. 5 ,
F reiterating the principle laid down in Shashikant S. Patil & Anr.
    (supra), this Court observed as follows:

          "In case where the Full Court of the High Court
          recommends compulsory retirement of an officer, the High
G         Court on the judicial side has to exercise great caution and
          circumspection in setting aside that order because it is a
          complement of all the Judges of the High Court who go
          into the question and it is possibl.e that in all cases
    4.   (2003) g sec 592.
H 5. (2011) 10 sec 1.
   REGISTRAR GENERAL, PATNA HIGH COURT v.                      1011
    PANDEY GAJENDRA PRASAD [D.K. JAIN, J.]

     evidence would not be forthcoming about integrity doubtful       A
     of a judicial officer."

It was further observed that:

     "If that authority bona fide forms an opinion that the integrity
     of a particular officer is doubtful, the correctness of that B
     opinion cannot be challenged before courts. When such a
     constitutional function is exercised on the administrative
     side of the High Court, any [picUudicial review thereon
     should be made only with great care and circumspection
     and it must be confined strictly to the parameters set by C
     this Court in several reported decisions. When the
     appropriate authority forms bona fide opinion that
     compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is in public
     interest, the writ court under Article 226 or this Court under
     Article 32 would not interfere with the order."                  D

      16. In the present case, the recommendation of the
Standing Committee to dismiss the first respondent from
service was based on the findings in the enquiry report
submitted by the enquiry officer pursuant to the departmental E
enquiry; his reply to the show cause notice; his ACR and other
materials placed before it. The recommendation of the Standing
Committee was approved and ratified by the Full Court. There
is nothing on record to even remotely suggest that the evaluation
made, firstly by the Standing Committee and then by the Full
Court, was so arbitrary, capricious or so irrational so as to F
shock the conscience of the Division Bench to justify its
interference with the unanimous opinion of the Full Court. As
regards the observation of the Division Bench on the reputation
of the first respondent based on his ACRs, it would suffice to
note that apart from the fact that an ACR does not necessarily G
project the overall profile of a judicial officer, the entire personal
file of the respondent was before the Full Court when a
conscious unanimous decision was taken to award the
punishment of his dismissal from service. It is also well settled
                                                                       H
    1012     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A   that in cases of such assessment, evaluation and formulation
    of opinion, a vast range of multiple factors play a vital and
    important role and no single factor should be allowed to be
    blown out of proportion either to decry or deify issues to be
    resolved or claims sought to be considered or asserted. In the
B   very nature of such things, it would be difficult, rather almost
    impossible to subject such an exercise undertaken by the Full
    Court, to judicial review, save and except in an extra-ordinary
    case when the court is convinced that some exceptional thing
    which ought not to have taken place has really happened and
C   not merely because there could be another possible view or
    there is some grievance with the exercise undertaken by the
    Committee/Full Court. [(See: Syed T.A. Naqshbandi (supra)].

         17. Having regard to the material on record, it cannot be
    said that the evaluation of the conduct of the first respondent
D   by the Standing Committee and the Full Court was so arbitrary,
    capricious or irrational that it warranted interference by the
    Division Bench. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that the
    Division Bench clearly exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering
    with the decision of the Full Court.
E
         18. However, before parting with the judgment, we deem
  it necessary to make a mention about the recording of the
  ACRs of judicial officers. We feel that the present system of
  recording the ACRs leaves much to be desired and needs to
F be revamped. Experience has shown that it is deficient in
  several ways, being not comprehensive enough to truly reflect
  the level of work, conduct and performance of each individual
  on one hand and unable to check subjectivity on the other. This
  undoubtedly breeds discontent in a section of the judicial
  service besides eroding proper and effective superintendence
G and control of the High Court over subordinate judiciary. The
  process of evaluation of a judicial officer is intended to contain
  a balanced information about his performance during the entire
  evaluation period, but it has been noticed that many a times,
  the ACRs are recorded casually in a hurry after a long lapse of
H
     REGISTRAR GENERAL, PATNA HIGH COURT v. 1013
      PANDEY GAJENDRA PRASAD [D.K. JAIN, J.]
 time (in some cases even after the expiry of one year from the             A
 period to which it relates), indicating only the grading in the final
 column. It needs no elaboration that such hurried assessment
 cannot but, be either on the basis of the assessmenUgrading
 of the preceding year(s) or on personal subjective views of the
 Inspecting Judge(s), which is unfair to the judicial officer.              B
 Undoubtedly, ACRs play a vital and significant role in the
 assessment, evaluation and formulation of opinion on the profile
 of a judicial officer, particularly, in matters relating to disciplinary
 action against a judicial officer. The ACRs of such officer hold
 supreme importance in ascertaining his conduct, and therefore,             c
 the same have to be reported carefully with due diligence and
 caution. We feel that there is an urgent need for reforms on this
 subject, not only to bring about uniformity but also to infuse
 objectivity and standardisation.
        19. In Bishwanath Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. 6          D
  and High Court of Punjab & Haryana, Through R.G. Vs. /shwar
   Chand Jain & Anr. 7 , highlighting the importance of ACRs, this
  Court had observed that the power to make such entries, which
  have the potential for shaping the future career of a subordinate
  officer, casts an obligation on the High Courts to keep a watch           E
  and vigil over the performance of the members of the
  subordinate judiciary. This Court also stressed on the need for
  the assessment to be made as an ongoing process continued
· round the year and the record to be made in an objective
  manner. We are constrained to note that these observations                F
  have not yet engaged the attention of most of the High Courts
  in the country.
     20. In the final analysis, for the aforesaid reasons, we allow
the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the Division
Bench and uphold the validity of Notification dated 19th June               G
2006, dismissing the first respondent from judicial service.
There will however, be no order as to costs.
K.K.T.                                             Appeal allowed.
6. c2001) 2 sec 305.
7. (1999) 4 sec 579.                                                        H