Holding

Any person, including a pendente lite transferee who is not a party to the suit, may invoke Order XXI Rule 99 CPC to seek re‑delivery of immovable property after dispossession, and the limitation for execution of a partition decree runs from the date of the final decree.

Summary

The appellants, representing the original decree holder, sought to enforce a partition decree dated 9 March 1970 that awarded them a share of a one‑acre property in Kerala. The decree was engrossed on stamp paper in 1990 and an execution petition for possession was filed in 1991, resulting in the plaintiff taking possession in 1994. The predecessor of the respondents, a pendente lite transferee, was dispossessed and filed an application under Order XXI Rule 99 of the CPC for re‑delivery, claiming an independent title. The High Court allowed the application, held the execution petition time‑barred under the Limitation Act, and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. The Supreme Court examined whether a pendente lite transferee, a stranger to the suit, can invoke Rule 99 and also clarified that limitation for execution of a partition decree begins from the date of the final decree, not from its engrossment. It affirmed that any person, including a pendente lite transferee, may seek relief under Rule 99 and upheld the High Court’s remand, dismissing the appeals.

Issues considered

Whether a pendente lite transferee, who is a stranger to the suit, can file an application under Order XXI Rule 99 CPC for re‑delivery after being dispossessed.
Whether the limitation period for executing a partition decree begins from the date of the final decree or from the date of its engrossment on stamp paper.

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether a pendente lite transferee, a stranger to the suit can file application under Order XXI Rule 99, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking re-delivery after dispossession. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXI, r.99 – Predecessor of the from the property in execution of the decree passed in the suit, if could file application under Or. XXI, r.99 against dispossession: Held: Yes – Under Or.XXI, r.99, where any person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for

Subjects

Order XXI Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908Pendente lite transfereeStranger to the suitDispossessionRe‑deliveryThird party to the decreeRights of a decree holderExecution petition time‑barredLimitation for execution of decreePartition decree

Judgment

[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1359 : 2024 INSC 773

Renjith K.G. & Others
v.
Sheeba
(Civil Appeal Nos. 8315-8316 of 2014)
14 October 2024
[Pankaj Mithal and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether a pendente lite transferee, a stranger to the suit can file
application under Order XXI Rule 99, Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 seeking re-delivery after dispossession.

Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXI, r.99 – Predecessor of
the respondents, a pendente lite transferee was dispossessed
from the property in execution of the decree passed in the suit, if
could file application under Or. XXI, r.99 against dispossession:
Held: Yes – Under Or.XXI, r.99, where any person other than the
judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the
holder of a decree for the possession of such property, or where
such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the
purchaser thereof, he may make an application complaining of such
dispossession – A third party to the decree has a right to approach
the Court even after dispossession of the immovable property, which
he was occupying – Predecessor of the respondents not a party
to the suit was dispossessed from the property in execution of the
decree passed in the suit and therefore, he who is purported to be
a stranger to the decree can adjudicate his claim of independent
right, title and interest in the decretal property as per Or.XXI, r.99 –
“any person” not a party to the suit or a stranger to the suit can
seek re-delivery after being dispossessed – The term “stranger”
would cover within its ambit, a pendente lite transferee, who has
not been impleaded – Once an application under Or.XXI, r.99 is
filed, it is incumbent upon the Trial Court to consider all the rival
claims including the right, title and interest of the parties under
Or.21, r.101 – High Court rightly set aside the order passed in the
execution petition and remanded the matter to the trial court for
fresh consideration leaving all the issues including the independent

* Author
1360 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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right, title or interest claimed by the respondents in the property in
question, to be adjudicated – No illegality in the judgment of the
High Court warranting interference. [Paras 14-16, 19]
Limitation – Decree passed in suit for partition – Limitation
for execution – Respondent argued that the decree passed on
09.03.1970 was engrossed on the stamp paper on 19.11.1990,
the execution petition for delivery of possession of the property
filed only on 13.03.1991 was time-barred and the High Court
rightly allowed the applications filed by the predecessor of
the respondents seeking re-delivery of possession inter alia
contending that the execution petition was time barred:
Held: As regards the limitation for execution of a decree passed
in the suit for partition, time begins to run from the date of final
decree and not from the date on which it is engrossed on the stamp
paper – High Court rightly set aside the order passed in the execution
petition and remanded the matter to the trial court. [Paras 16, 19]

Case Law Cited
Chiranji Lal (D) by LRs. v. Hari Das (D) by Lrs. [2005] Supp. 1 SCR
359 : (2005) 10 SCC 746; Sriram Housing Finance & Investment
(India) Ltd. v. Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust (2022) 15
SCC 176 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 794 – relied on.

List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Limitation Act, 1963.

List of Keywords
Order XXI Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Pendente
lite transferee; “Stranger”; Stranger to the suit/decree; Not a party
to the suit; Dispossession; Re-delivery; Third party to the decree;
Rights of a decree holder; Third party to the suit; Right of a third
party after being dispossessed; Execution petition for delivery of
possession of the property; Execution petition time-barred; Decree
passed in suit for partition; Limitation for execution.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 8315-8316
of 2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.11.2011 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in EFA Nos. 6 and 7 of 1998
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1361

Renjith K.G. & Others v. Sheeba

Appearances for Parties
Rajeev Mishra, Sanand Ramakrishnan, Thomas Martin, Advs. for
the Appellants.
Jayanth Muth Raj, Sr. Adv., Nishe Rajen Shonker, K.S. Bharathan,
Mrs. Anu K Joy, Alim Anvar, Ajith Anto Perumbully, Advs. for the
Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
Heard Mr. Rajeev Mishra and Mr. Sanand Ramakrishnan, learned
counsel for the appellants and Mr. Jayant Muth Raj, learned senior
counsel and Mrs. Nishe Rajen Shonker, learned counsel for the
Respondent.
2. These Civil Appeals are preferred against the judgment and order
dated 11.11.2011 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam1
in E.F.A Nos.6 and 7 of 1998, whereby, the High Court allowed the
said appeals and remanded the matter to the trial Court for fresh
consideration.
3. Succinctly stated facts are that the appellants are the legal
representatives of the original plaintiff / decree holder viz., Padmakshy
(deceased), who had filed a suit in O.S.No.38 of 1956 before the Sub
Court, Parur, for partition and separate possession of her share in
the plaint schedule 13 items of immovable properties. The Sub Court,
Parur, passed a preliminary decree on 23.10.1958. Subsequently,
the said suit was transferred to the file of the Additional District
Court, Parur and re-numbered as O.S.No.82 of 1960, in which, a
final decree was passed on 09.03.1970.
4. The dispute revolved around is qua item no.4 of the plaint schedule
property measuring an extent of 1 acre 57 cents in Sy.No.120/10
situated at Muppathepadam Kara, Kodungallur Village, Paravur
Taluk, Kerala, which originally belonged to one Ayyapan, who had
eight children. In the year 1085 M.E.2 the said Ayyappan executed a

1 Hereinafter shortly referred to as “the High Court”
2 Malayalam Era or the Malayalam Calendar. To get the corresponding year on the Gregorian Calendar,
add 826 which makes it 1911.
1362 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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mortgage in favour of one Kunjan and created a further mortgage in
favour of the same mortgagee in the year 1093 M.E.3 On the death
of Ayyappan, his six children assigned their 6/8 shares in favour of
one Raghuthaman, by gift deed No. 2147 dated 17.07.1963 and
the remaining 2/8 shares were obtained by the Defendant No.1, by
name, Padmanabhan, as per the deed No.1491 of 1119 M.E.4 On the
death of the mortgagee Kunjan, his rights devolved on the Defendant
No.1 and the original plaintiff Padmakshy (who was a minor at that
time). The Defendant No.1, without the concurrence of Padmakshy,
executed a mortgage for Rs.1,000/- in favour of one Nanu, in the
year 1123 M.E.5 and the said Nanu, in turn, assigned his right to the
Defendant No.10, by name, Veeran, as per deed No.101 of 1951.
As per document No.3669 of 1964, the Defendant No.10 assigned
his right to the said Raghuthaman.
5. In the final decree proceedings, qua item no.4, based on the
Advocate Commissioner’s report, the plaintiff was allotted one half
portion of the property in Sy.No.120/10 i.e., red shaded portion in
Ex.C2 plan; and the Defendant No.10 was directed to pay a sum of
Rs.461.67 towards equalisation and also mesne profit at the rate of
Rs.64.80 per year to the plaintiff. The final decree was engrossed
on the requisite stamp paper on 19.11.1990. To execute the same,
the plaintiff preferred an Execution Petition bearing No.4 of 1991,
in which, notice was ordered to the defendants / judgment debtors,
but, they did not turn up. Ultimately, the Executing Court ordered
delivery of possession and accordingly, a portion of item no.4 plaint
schedule property, as shown in Ex.C2 plan, was delivered to the
plaintiff on 22.11.1994.
6. Thereafter, the aforesaid Raghuthaman preferred E.A.No.1 of 1995
in E.P. No.4 of 1991under Order XXI Rule 99 of the Civil Procedure
Code6 for re-delivery of the property mentioned in Ex.C2 plan,
claiming independent right, title and interest in the same. Along with
this application, he also filed E.A.No.2 of 1995 seeking an order
of injunction restraining the plaintiff from committing waste till the
disposal of EA No.1 of 1995; and E.A.No.3 of 1995 for recovery

3 Gregorian Calendar year 1919
4 Gregorian Calendar year 1945
5 Gregorian Calendar year 1949
6 For short, “CPC”
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1363

Renjith K.G. & Others v. Sheeba

of damages to the tune of Rs.25,000/- from the plaintiff for having
committed waste in the property. All the three applications were jointly
heard and were dismissed, by a common order dated 12.08.1997.
7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed in E.A. Nos.1 and 3 of 1995,
the said Raghuthaman filed Execution First Appeals viz., EFA Nos.6
of 1998 and 7 of 1998, which came to be dismissed by the High
Court, by judgment dated 30.05.2007. Seeking to review the said
judgment, the respondents herein, who are the legal representatives
of the said Raghuthaman, filed R.P.Nos.1107 and 934 of 2007, which
came to be allowed, by order dated 22.03.2010. Pursuant to the
same, E.F.A Nos.6 and 7 of 1998 were re-heard and were eventually,
allowed by the High Court, by the judgment dated 11.11.2011 which
is impugned herein.
8. The first and foremost contention of the learned counsel appearing
for the appellants is that the predecessor of the respondents
(Raghuthaman) did not establish his independent right, title or
interest in the property in question and he was only a pendente lite
transferee and therefore, he cannot resist the execution of a decree
filed by the original plaintiff / decree holder. Additionally, the learned
counsel submitted that the decision in Chiranji Lal (D) by LRs. v.
Hari Das (D) by LRs.7 relied on by the High Court is not applicable
to the facts of the present case.
9. The learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent, on
the other hand, submitted that the final decree was passed on
09.03.1970; it was engrossed on the stamp paper on 19.11.1990;
the execution petition seeking delivery of possession of the property
under the decree was preferred only on 13.03.1991, which was
clearly barred by limitation as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act.
That apart, the predecessor of the respondents under Order XXI
Rule 99 CPC is entitled to raise the question of limitation for the
execution of the decree, which has become time-barred. Accordingly,
the High Court set aside the order dated 12.08.1997 passed in EA
Nos.1 and 3 of 1995 and remanded the matter to the trial Court for
fresh consideration, by the judgment impugned herein, which does
not call for any interference at the hands of this Court.

7 [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 359 : (2005) 10 SCC 746
1364 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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10. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned
counsel on either side and perused the records carefully and
meticulously.
11. The facts narrated above are not disputed. Concededly, in the suit filed
by the original plaintiff, preliminary decree was passed on 23.10.1958;
final decree was passed on 09.03.1970 and it was engrossed on
stamp paper on 19.11.1990; and the Execution Petition seeking
delivery of possession of the suit properties, came to be filed only
on 13.03.1991. It is also to be noted that in the final decree, there
was no order directing the parties to furnish stamp papers for the
purpose of engrossing the decree.
12. Seemingly, the predecessor of the respondents claimed right, title
and interest qua 78.5 cents forming part of item no.4 of the plaint
schedule property, by virtue of the assignment deed dated 01.12.1964
bearing No.3669 executed by the Defendant No.10. Pursuant to the
order of the Executing Court, he was dispossessed from the subject
property, in which, he was occupying and the possession was handed
over to the plaintiff / decree holder. After repeated challenge, the
applications preferred by the predecessor of the respondents seeking
re-delivery of possession and damages, contending inter alia that the
Execution Petition was barred by limitation, came to be allowed and
the matter was remanded to the trial Court for fresh consideration,
by the judgment impugned herein.
13. It was the specific plea of the appellants that the predecessor of the
respondents being a pendente lite transferee, is not entitled to file
an application under Order XXI Rule 99 CPC and raise the question
of limitation of the Execution Petition, so as to deprive the right of
the appellants to enjoy the fruits of the decree.
14. On a reading of Order XXI Rule 99 CPC, it is lucid that where any
person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable
property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such
property, or where such property has been sold in execution of a
decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to
the Court complaining of such dispossession. It also means that a
third party to the decree has a right to approach the Court even after
dispossession of the immovable property, which he was occupying.
In the case on hand, the predecessor of the respondents was not
a party to the suit and he was dispossessed from the property, in
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1365

Renjith K.G. & Others v. Sheeba

execution of the decree passed in the suit and therefore, he who is
purported to be a stranger to the decree, can very well adjudicate his
claim of independent right, title and interest in the decretal property
as per Order XXI Rule 99 CPC.
15. In so far as the claim of appellants that the predecessor of the
respondents, namely Mr. Raghuthaman, being pendent lite transferee
and hence would have no locus to file the application seeking re-
delivery, we have already held that “any person” not a party to the
suit or in other words a stranger to the suit can seek re-delivery, after
he has been dispossessed. The term “Stranger” would cover within
its ambit, a pendent lite transferee, who has not been impleaded.
That apart, the facts in the present case disclose that the property
stood transferred to the predecessor of the respondents before the
Final Decree was passed in 1970. The fact that Mr.Raghuthaman
had successfully resisted the claim of the 9th Defendant for delivery
of possession, in the presence of the predecessor of the appellant is
not disputed. While so, it was incumbent on the appellants to have
impleaded the predecessor of the respondents by filing an application
under Order 21 Rule 97 of CPC, when they resisted the delivery.
The pendent lite purchaser has every right to defend his right, title,
interest and possession. This Court recently while adjudicating the
right of a pendent lite transferee held as under:
Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind (2024) 7 SCC 524 : 2024
SCC OnLine SC 1692
“16. The fulcrum of the dispute herein concerns the
impleadment of a transferee pendente lite who undisputedly
had notice of the pending litigation. At the outset, it appears
pertinent to reiterate the settled position that the doctrine
of lis pendens as provided under Section 52 of the Act
does not render all transfers pendente lite to be void ab
initio, it merely renders rights arising from such transfers
as subservient to the rights of the parties to the pending
litigation and subject to any direction that the Court may
pass thereunder.
“17. Therefore, the mere fact that RSD was executed
during the pendency of the underlying suit does not
automatically render it null and void. On this ground alone,
we find the impugned order to be wholly erroneous as
1366 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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it employs Section 52 of the Act to nullify RSD and on
that basis, concludes that the impleadment application is
untenable. Contrary to this approach of the High Court,
the law on impleadment of subsequent transferees, as
established by this Court has evolved in a manner that
liberally enables subsequent transferees to protect their
interests in recognition of the possibility that the transferor
pendente lite may not defend the title or may collude with
the plaintiff therein (see the decision of this Court in Amit
Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon [Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida
Khatoon (2005) 11 SCC 403] & A. Nawab John v. V.N.
Subramaniyam [A. Nawab John v. V.N. Subramaniyam
(2012) 7 SCC 738 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 324] ).”
16. The difference between the rights of a decree holder qua a third party
to the suit and the right of a third party after being dispossessed
has been laid down by this Court in Sriram Housing Finance &
Investment (India) Ltd. v. Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable
Trust (2022) 15 SCC 176 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 794, wherein it
was held as follows:
“24. On conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions,
it can be observed that under Rule 97, it is only the
“decree-holder” who is entitled to make an application
in case where he is offered resistance or obstruction
by “any person”. In the present case, as admitted by
the appellant itself, it is a bona fide purchaser of the
property and not the “decree-holder”. As available from
the material placed on record, it is the respondent Trust
along with legal heirs of late N.D. Mishra who are the
decree-holders and not the appellant. Therefore, it is
obvious that the appellant cannot take shelter of Rule 97
as stated above to raise objections against execution of
decree passed in favour of the respondent. Further, Rule
99 pertains to making a complaint to the Court against
“dispossession” of the immovable property by the person
in “possession” of the property by the holder of a decree
or purchaser thereof.
“25. It is factually not in dispute that the appellant
purchased the said property from Mr Yogesh Mishra vide
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1367

Renjith K.G. & Others v. Sheeba

sale deed dated 12-4-2004 and has been in vacant and
physical possession of the property since then. Had it
been the case that the appellant was dispossessed by
the respondent Trust in execution of decree dated 2-9-
2003, the appellant would have been well within the ambit
of Rule 99 to make an application seeking appropriate
relief to be put back in possession. On the contrary, the
appellant in the instant case was never dispossessed from
the property in question and till date, as contended and
unrefuted, the possession of same rests with the appellant.
Considering the aforesaid, the appellant cannot be said to
be entitled to make an application under Rule 99 raising
objections in execution proceedings since he has never
been dispossessed as required under Rule 99.
26. Now, as stated above, applications under Rule 97
and Rule 99 are subject to Rule 101 which provides for
determination of questions relating to disputes as to right,
title or interest in the property arising between the parties to
the proceedings or their representatives on an application
made under Rule 97 or Rule 99. Effectively, the said Rule
does away with the requirement of filing of fresh suit for
adjudication of disputes as mentioned above. Now, in the
present case, Order 21 Rule 101 has no applicability as
the appellant is neither entitled to make an application
under Rule 97 nor Rule 99 for the reasons stated above.
Accordingly, we find no substance in the argument raised
by the learned counsel for the appellant.”
Therefore, once an application under Order 21 Rule 99 is filed, it
is incumbent upon the Trial Court to consider all the rival claims
including the right title and interest of the parties under Order 21
Rule 101 which bars a separate suit by mandating the execution
court to decide the dispute.
17. As regards the question of limitation for execution of a decree passed
in the suit for partition, this Court, in the decision in Chiranji Lal
(supra), has categorically held that the time begins to run from the
date of final decree and not from the date on which it is engrossed
on the stamp paper. For better appreciation, the relevant passage
of the said decision is reproduced below:
1368 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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“24. A decree in a suit for partition declares the rights of
the parties in the immovable properties and divides the
shares by metes and bounds. Since a decree in a suit for
partition creates rights and liabilities of the parties with
respect to the immovable properties, it is considered as
an instrument liable for the payment of stamp duty under
the Indian Stamp Act. The object of the Stamp Act being
securing the revenue for the State, the scheme of the
Stamp Act provides that a decree of partition not duly
stamped can be impounded and once the requisite stamp
duty along with penalty, if any, is paid the decree can be
acted upon.
25. The engrossment of the final decree in a suit for
partition would relate back to the date of the decree. The
beginning of the period of limitation for executing such
a decree cannot be made to depend upon date of the
engrossment of such a decree on the stamp paper. The
date of furnishing of stamp paper is an uncertain act,
within the domain, purview and control of a party. No date
or period is fixed for furnishing stamp papers. No rule
has been shown to us requiring the court to call upon or
give any time for furnishing of stamp paper. A party by
his own act of not furnishing stamp paper cannot stop the
running of period of limitation. None can take advantage
of his own wrong. The proposition that period of limitation
would remain suspended till stamp paper is furnished and
decree engrossed thereupon and only thereafter the period
of twelve years will begin to run would lead to absurdity.
In Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand
Kothari [1950 SCR 852] it was said that the payment of
court fee on the amount found due was entirely in the power
of the decree holder and there was nothing to prevent him
from paying it then and there; it was a decree capable of
execution from the very date it was passed.
26. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. As
above noted, there is no statutory provision prescribing a
time limit for furnishing of the stamp paper for engrossing
the decree or time limit for engrossment of the decree on
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1369

Renjith K.G. & Others v. Sheeba

stamp paper and there is no statutory obligation on the
Court passing the decree to direct the parties to furnish the
stamp paper for engrossing the decree. In the present case
the Court has not passed an order directing the parties to
furnish the stamp papers for the purpose of engrossing the
decree. Merely because there is no direction by the Court
to furnish the stamp papers for engrossing of the decree
or there is no time limit fixed by law, does not mean that
the party can furnish stamp papers at its sweet will and
claim that the period of limitation provided under Article
136 of the Act would start only thereafter as and when
the decree is engrossed thereupon. The starting of period
of limitation for execution of a partition decree cannot be
made contingent upon the engrossment of the decree
on the stamp paper. The engrossment of the decree on
stamp paper would relate back to the date of the decree,
namely, 7th August, 1981, in the present case. In this view
the execution application filed on 21st March, 1994 was
time barred having been filed beyond the period of twelve
years prescribed under Article 136 of the Act. The High
Court committed illegality in coming to the conclusion that
it was not barred by limitation.”
18. The above judgment was relied upon by the Constitutional Bench of
this Court while deciding the validity of an unstamped agreement,
wherein it was observed as under:
Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under A&C
Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re (2024) 6 SCC 1 :
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1666
“255. In Chiranji Lal v. Hari Das [Chiranji Lal v. Hari Das
(2005) 10 SCC 746] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court
rejected the contention that an unstamped preliminary
decree is not enforceable and, therefore, the period of
limitation begins to run when the decree is engrossed
on the stamp paper. The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure
with the object to secure revenue for the State on certain
classes of instruments. The Stamp Act is not enacted to
arm the litigant with a weapon of technicality to meet the
case of his opponent. As there is no rule which prescribes
1370 [2024] 10 S.C.R.

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any time for furnishing of stamp paper or to call upon
a person to pay stamp duty on a preliminary decree of
partition, the proposition that period of limitation would
remain suspended till stamp paper is furnished and decree
engrossed thereon was rejected.”
19. Applying the ratio laid down in Chiranjilal case (Supra) to the facts of
the present case, the High Court rightly set aside the order passed in
the Execution Petition and remanded the matter to the trial court for
fresh consideration, leaving all the issues including the independent
right, title or interest claimed by the respondents in the property in
question, to be adjudicated therein. Therefore, we do not find any
infirmity or illegality in the judgment so rendered by the High Court,
warranting our interference.
20. In view thereof, these Civil Appeals stand dismissed. However, it is
open to the appellants to raise all the contentions available to them
before the trial Court. Costs made easy.
21. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey