Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings as the statutory parameters for such exercise were not met.

Summary

Renu Kumari, the wife of Respondent No.3, filed a complaint under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act alleging dowry harassment. The police registered an FIR and a charge‑sheet was filed. The respondents sought discharge under Section 239 CrPC, which was rejected, and their revision was dismissed. They then filed a criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 482 CrPC, and the Patna High Court quashed the proceedings, holding that the case was maliciously instituted due to a personal grudge. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had not applied the correct parameters for exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 and that such power is an exception, not a rule, and cannot be used to substitute the trial court’s assessment of evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court correctly exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings.
Whether the parameters laid down in precedent for invoking Section 482 were satisfied in the present case.
Whether allegations of mala fide or personal grudge justify quashing of a prosecution under Section 482.
Whether the High Court may assess the reliability of evidence or likelihood of conviction at the pre‑trial stage.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 239, s. 482
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 3, s. 4
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 498A

Subjects

inherent jurisdictionSection 482 CrPCquashing criminal proceedingsmalicious prosecutiondowry harassmentSection 498A IPCabuse of processhigh court powermala fide

Judgment

[2008] 3 S.C.R. 1006

A RENU KUMAR!
v. 1

SANJAY KUMAR AND ORS. '
(Criminal Appeal No. 426 of 2008)
MARCH 3, 2008
8
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, C.K. THAKKER AND
LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.] . .,,

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482:
c Exercise of powers under - Scope - Appellant, wife of
Respondent No.3, filed complaint under s.498A /PC and ss.3
& 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act - Police registered FIR -
Charge sheet filed - Respondents filed application for
discharge in terms of s. 239 CrPC which was rejected -
D Revision application dismissed -Respondents filed petition
under s. 482 CrPC - High Court allowed the same holding that •
+
the proceedings had been maliciously instituted for wreaking
vengeance on the accused-respondents due to private and
personal grudge - Whether parameters for exercise of
E ;urisdiction under s.482 CrPC had not been kept in view by
the High Court- Held, Yes - Exercise of power under s.482
CrPC in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule
- It was not proper for the High Court to analyse the case of
the complainant in light of all probabilities in order to determine
F whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such '(

premise conclude that the proceedings were to be quashed -
When an information is lodged at the police station and an
offence is registered, then ma/a tides of the informant would
be of secondary importance - It is the material collected during
the investigation and evidence led in the Court which would
G
decide the fate of the accused person - Penal Code, 1860 -
s.498A - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - ss.3 & 4.
Appellant, wife of Respondent No.3, filed complaint
alleging commission of offences punishable under
H 1006
RENU KUMARI v. SANJAY KUMAR AND ORS. 1007

s.498A, IPC and ss. 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, A
1- 1961. The police registered FIR and charge sheet was
filed. Respondents filed application for discharge in terms
of s.239 CrPC which was rejected. Revision application
thereagainst being dismissed by the Sessions Judge,
· Respondents filed Criminal Misc.Petition under s.482 B .
CrPC. High Court allowed the same holding that the
,.
1
.proceedings had been maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused-
respondents due to private and personal grudge.
In appeal to this Court, it was contended that the C
parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under s.482 CrPC
had not been kept in view by the High Court.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Exercise of power under s.482 CrPC in a o
• case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The
+-
section does not confer any new powers on the High
Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court
possessed before the enactment of CrPC. It envisages
three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction E
may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order
under CrPC, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court,
and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither
possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule
which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. F
No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can
.. provide for all cases that may possibly arise. The courts,
therefore, have inherent powers apart from express
provisions of law which are necessary for proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them
by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the G
section which merely recognises and preserves inherent
powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal possess, in the absence of any express
<
provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers
as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wro:ig in H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

A the course of administration of justice on the principle of
"quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine 1
.(

quo res ipsa esse non potest" (when the law gives a person
anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist).
While exercising the powers under the section, the court
B does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent
jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only , •
when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically
laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex
c debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone the courts exist. [Para 6]
[1012-A, B, C, D, E, F, G]
1.2.. When exercising jurisdiction under s.482 CrPC,
the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an
D enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or
not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it, ;
accusation would not be sustained. That is the function
of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an
instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. The
E court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising
discretion and should take all relevant facts and
circumstances into consideration before issuing process,
lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private
complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
F needlessly. At the same time the section is not an
instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and bring about its sudden death. [Para 8] •
[1013-F, G; 1014-A, BJ
1.3. The powers possessed by the High Court under
G s.482 Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very plenitude of the
power requires great caution in its exercise. The court
must be careful to see that its decision, in exercise of this
power, is based on sound principles. The inherent power
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. '
H The High Court being the highest court of a State should
RENU KUMARI v. SANJAY KUMAR AND ORS. 1009

normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a A
case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more
so when the evidence has not been collected and
produced before the Court and the issues involved,
whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be
seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. s
.\ Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in
regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at
any stage. It would not be proper for the High Court to ·
analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all C
probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction
would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a
conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It
would be erroneous to assess the material before it and
conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with.
When an information is lodged at the police station and D
an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the
informant would be of secondary importance. It is the
material collected during the investigation and evidence
led in the court which decides the fate of the accused
person. The allegations of mala tides against the informant E
are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the
basis for quashing the proceedings. [Para 9] [1015-D, E,
F, G; 1016-A, B]
R. P Kapur v. State of Punjab (1960) 3 SCR 388; State of F
Harytrna v. Bhajan Lal (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335;
Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar (1990) Supp SCC 686;
State of Bihar v. PP Sharma (1992) Supp 1 SCC 222; Rupan
Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995) 6 SCC 194; State
of Kera/a v. 0. C. Kuttan (1999) 2 SCC 651; State of UP v.
O.P Sharma (1996) 7 SCC 705; Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh G
Kumar Bhada (1997) 2 SCC 397; Satvinder Kaur v. State
(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (1999) 8 SCC 728; Rajesh Bajaj v.
State NCT of Delhi (1999) 3 SCC 259; State of Karnataka v.
M. Devendrappa (2002) 3 SCC 89; State of M.P v. Awadh
Kishore Gupta (2004) 2 SCC 691 and State of Orissa v. Saroj H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

A Kr. Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540 - relied on.
•
State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (AIR
1992 SC 604) - referred to.
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
B No. 426 of 2008.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 19.12.2005 of
the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Crl. Misc. No. 17958/
2002.
c Sunil Kumar, Anita Kanungo, Md. Gayshuddin and Sarla
Chandra for the Appellant.
S.K. Sinha for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned
Single Judge of the Patna High Court quashing the proceedings
initiated against the respondents 1 to 7, in purported exercise
E of power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (in short the 'Cr.P.C.'). A prayer was made before learned
Sessions Judge, Patna to quash the proceedings in Criminal
Revision No. 817 of2001. Learned S.D.J.M., Patna in Pirbahore
PHB Case No. 120 of 2000 had rejected the prayer of discharge
made by the aforesaid respondents. The prayer was made in
F terms of Section 239 Cr.P.C.
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Appellant was married to respondent No. 3 Rajesh Kumar
on 1. 7.1998. Alleging that she was being harassed and tortured
G both mentally and physically for having not met the dowry
demands, complaint was made alleging commission of offences
punishable under Section 498Aofthe Indian Penal Code, 1860
(in short the 'IPC') and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961 (in short the 'Act'). Police registered FIR No. 120 of
H 2000 in Pirbahore Police Station. Appellant's father-in-law filed
RENU KUMARI v. SANJAY KUMAR AND ORS. 1011
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

. a complaint alleging assault and criminal trespass by the A
' appellant. Another complaint was filed alleging an attempt to
kidnap. A suit for divorce was filed by the husband. Appellant
entered appearance in the matrimonial suit which was filed on
15.3.2000. Learned Principal Judge, Family Court directed grant
of maintenance at the rate of Rs.2000/-p.m. and the cost of B

' . litigation to be paid to the appellant. Respondent's father in law
filed Misc. Case No. 12 of 2001 questioning correctness of the
maintenance order on the ground that the respondent's husband
has no share in the ancestral property and maintenance cannot
be paid out of it. Charge sheet was filed on 12.8.2000. An c
application for discharge in terms of Section 239 Cr:P.C. was
filed on 28.8.2001. The prayer was rejected on 7.9.2001 by
learned SDJM. As noted above Learned Sessions Judge, Patna
dismissed-the Revision Application being Criminal Revision No.
817 of 2001. Respondents filed a Criminal Misc. Petition under
... I Section 482 Cr.P.C. By the impugned order the prayer has been
D
accepted. To complete the narration it needs to be noted that
the matrimonial case No. 49 of 2000 filed by the respondent-
husband was dismissed on 12.10.2004.
Learned Single Judge after referring to a judgment of this E
Court in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (AIR
1992 SC 604) held that the present case is a clear example of
malafide where the proceedings have been maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused
• and with a view to spite them due to private and personal grudge . F
Reference has been made to the matrimonial case stating that
the same was filed earlier to the lodging of the FIR.
4. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.PC. have not been kept in view by learned Single G
Judge, further he lost sight of the fact that the Matrimonial Case
No. 49 of 2000 was dismissed long before the disposal of the
• case before the High Court. The matrimonial suit was dismissed
on 12.10.2004 whereas the impugned judgment has been
passed on 19.12.2005. H
1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 3 S.C.R.

A 5. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondents in ..
spite of service of notice.
6. Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in a case
of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does
not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the
B inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment
of Cr.P.C. It envisages three circumstances under which the I ~

inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (1) to give effect
to an order under Cr.P.C., (it) to prevent abuse of the process of
court, and (iit) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither
c possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative
enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that
may possibly arise. The courts, therefore, have inherent powers
• apart from expr.ess provisions of law which are necessary for
D proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them ..
by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section '
which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the
High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the
absence of any express provision, as inherent in their
E constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right
and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice
on the principle of "quando lex a/iquid alicui concedit,
concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potesf' (when
the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which
•
F it cannot exist) . While exercising the powers under the section,
the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.
Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when
such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in
the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do
G
real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone
the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of
justice~ and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as·
to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse.
It wou Id be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action
H
RENU KUMAR! v. SANJAY KUMAR AND ORS. 1013
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. A
In exercise of the powers the court would be justified to quash
any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts
to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of-justice. When
no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may examine B
the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is
permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report
has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the
allegations are accepted in tote.
7. In R.P Kapur v. State of Punjab (1960 (3) SCR 388) c
this Court summarised some categories of cases where
inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the
proceedings:
(1) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
~ D
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(i1) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there E
is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly
or manifestly fails to prove the charge. (SCR p.393)
8. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal F
evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent
with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal
evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the
accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482
CrPC, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an
G
enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it, accusation would
\ not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial
process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless
harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in
H
1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

A exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and •
circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest
it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant
to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the
same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an
B accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden
death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC
and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise
its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent
abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
c of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). A note of
caution was, however, added that the power should be
exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The
illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:
D (SCC pp.378-79, para 102)
"102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
E accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
F under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
G
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute orrly a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
H without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
RENU KUMARI v. SANJAY KUMAR AND ORS. 1015
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

Section 155(2) of the Code. A
r
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. B
~ I (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is c
a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
•.\.- with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously D
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge."·
9. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very E
plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.
The court must be careful to see that its decision, in exercise of
this power, is based on sound principles. The inherent power
• should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The
High Court being the highest court of a State should normally F
' ' refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the
entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the
evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court
and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without G
sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid
down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any
stage. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the
case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order H
1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

A to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on
such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are
to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material
before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded
with. When an information is lodged at the police station and an
8 offence is registered, then the mala tides of the informant would
be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during
the investigation and evidence led in the court which decides
the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides
against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by
c themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. [See
Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar (1990 Supp SCC 686),
State ofBiharv. PP Sharma (1992 Supp (1) SCC 222), Rupan
Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995(6) SCC 194) , State
of Kera/av. O.C. Kuttan (1999(2) SCC 651), State of UP v.
O.P Sharma (1996 (7) SCC 705), Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh
D Kumar Bhada (1997 (2) SCC 397), Satvinder Kaur v. State •
(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (1999 (8) SCC 728) and Rajesh Bajaj t

v. State NCT of Delhi (1999 (3) SCC 259))
10. The above position was again reiterated in State of
E Kamataka v. M.Devendrappa (2002(3) SCC 89), State of.MP
v. Awadh Kishore Gupta (2004(2) SCC 691) and State of Orissa
v. Saroj Kr. Sahoo (2005(13) SCC 540).
11. In view of the position of law highlighted above the
impugned order is indefensible and is set aside.
F •
12. The appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs.
8.8.8. Appeal allowed.