RICHHPAL SINGH MEENAversusGHASI @ GHISA & ORS.

                   [2014] 9 S.C.R. 857


                RICHHPAL SINGH MEENA                          A
                            v.
                 GHASI @ GHISA & ORS.
            (Criminal Appeal No. 341 of 2005)
                       JULY 4, 2014
                                                              B
           [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI AND
               MADAN B. LOKUR, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860: ss. 325134, 302134 - Homicide ...,...
Conviction by trial court u/s.302134 - High Court altered C
conviction to one u/s.325134 - Held: Assailants gave two /athi
blows to the victim-deceased which fractured his ribs and
pierced his lungs resulting in his death - The injuries were
not accidental or unintentional - Assailants had a common
intention of grievously injuring the deceased - The opinion D
of the doctor confirmed that the injuries caused to the
deceased were sufficient to cause death in the normal course
- Consequently, the homicide was a culpable homicide -
Assailants were guilty of the murder, the offenc~ falling u/
s.300 (thirdly) of the /PC and punishable u/s.302.             E

 - Allowing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1. In certain cases, this Court despite a
homicide have convicted the accused only for voluntarily
causing grievous hurt apparently not considering or F
overlooking the provision of Sections 299 and 304, IPC.
Such a consideration is important not only from the
jurisprudential point of view but also from the sentencing
point of view. From the jurisprudential point of view it is
important because when an act or omission of an G
accused causes the death of any person, he or she is
either guilty of culpable homicide or guilty of not-culpable
homicide. The issue of sentencing is also of utmost
importance. The reason is the quantum of punishment to
                            857                              H
    858    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 9 S.C.R.
                              •

A   be imposed in a given situation. A five-step inquiry is
    necessary: (i) Is there a homicide? (ii) If yes, is it a
    culpable homicide or a 'not-culpable homicide'? (iii) If it
    is a culpable homicide, is the offence one of culpable
    homicide amounting to murder (Section 300 of the IPC)
B   or is it a culpable homicide not amounting to murder
    (Section 304 of the IPC)? (iv) If it is a 'not-culpable
    homicide' then a case under Section 304-A of the IPC is
    made out. (v) If it is not possible to identify the person
    who has committed the homicide, the provisions of
c   Section 72 of the IPC may be invoked. Where it is possible
    to ascertain who is responsible for the homicide, the five-
    step inquiry can easily be carried out. [Paras 16, 42, 43,
    46 and 47] [866-D; 876-C-E; 877-G-H; 878-A-B, E]

      State of Punjab v. Surjan Singh (1976) 1 SCC 588;
D Sardul Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) 8 SCC 372; Rattan
  Singh v. State of Punjab (1988) Supp. SCC 456 - referred
  to.

      2. Applying the five-step inquiry, it is clear that: (i}
E there was a homicide; (ii) the assailants gave two lathi
  blows to the deceased which resulted in the fracture of
  his ribs and piercing of his lungs. The injuries were not
  accidental or unintentional - the assailants had a
  common intention of grievously injuring the deceased
F and it is not as if they intended to cause some injury to
  him other that the ones inflicted. (iii) the opinion of the
  doctor confirmed that the injuries caused to the deceased
  were sufficient to cause death in the normal course.
  Consequently, the homicide was a culpable homicide. 'G'
G and 'L' are guilty of the murder, the offence falling under
  Section 300 (thirdly) of the IPC and punishable under
  Section 302 of the IPC. [Paras 48] [878-F-H; 879-A]

        Radhey Shyam v. State of U.P. (1999) 1 SCC 168;
    Jamai/ Singh v. State of Punjab (1982) 3 SCC 221 - held
H   inapplicable.
    RICHHPAL SINGH MEENA v. GHASI @ GHISA               859


   Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465: 1958         A
SCR 1495 - relied on.

     Naresh Giri v. State of M.P. (2008) 1 SCC 791: 2007 (11)
 SCR 987; State of Punjab v. Ba/winder Singh (2012) 2 SCC
182: 2012 (1) SCR 45; Alister Anthony Pereira v. State of       8
Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648: 2012 (1) SCR 145; State
v. Sanjeev Nanda (2012) 8 SCC 450: 2012 (12) SCR 881;
State of Punjab v. Surjan Singh (1976) 1 SCC 588; Sardul
Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) 8 SCC 372; Rattan Singh
v. State of Punjab (1988) Supp. SCC 456; Ninaji Raoji           C
Boudha v. State of Maharashtra (1976) 2 SCC 117: 1976 (3)
 SCR 428; Radhey Shyam v. State of U.P. (1999) 1 SCC
168; Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab (1982) 3 SCC 221; Sk.
Karimullah v. State of A. P. (2009) 11 SCC ~71: 2009 (1)
 SCR 953; .Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P. (2002) 7
SCC 175: 2002 (1) Suppl. SCR 703; Rajwant Singh v. State        D
of Kera/a 1966 Supp SCR 230; Virsa Singh v. State of
Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465: 1958 SCR 1495; Thangaiya v.
State of Tamil Nadu (2005) 9 SCC 650: 2004 (6) Suppl.
 SCR 786; Raj Pal v. State of Haryana (2006) 9 SCC 678:
 2006 (1) Suppl. SCR 74 - referred to                           E
                    Case Law Reference:
 2007 (11) SCR 987            referred to         Para 14
 2012 (1) SCR45               referred to         Para 14       F
 2012 (1) SCR 145             referred to         Para 14
 2012 (12) SCR 881            referred to         Para 14
 (1976) 1 sec 588             referred to         Para 17
                                                                G
 c2002) 8 sec 372             referred to         Para 19
 (1988) Supp. sec 456         referred to         Para 21
 1976 (3) SCR 428             referred to         Para 23
                                                                H
    860      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A    (1999) 1 sec 168              held inapplicable Para 29
     (1982) 3 sec 221              held inapplicable Para 32
     2009 (1) SCR 953              referred to          Para 34

B    2002 (1) Suppl. SCR 703 referred to                Para 36
     1966 Supp SCR 230             relied on            Para 36
     1958 SCR 1495                 referred to          Para 36
     2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 786 referred to                Para 41
c
     2006 (1) Suppl. SCR74         referred to          Para 41

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 341 of 2005.

D       From the Judgment & Order dated 16.04.2003 of the High
    Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, at Jaipur Bench, in D.B.
    Criminal Appeal No. 403 of 1997.

          Ansar Ahmad Chaudhary for the Appellant.
E       Uday U. Lalit, Sumita Hazarika, Archana Pathak Dave,
    Ruchi Kohli, Milind Kumar for the Respodents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

F      MADAN B. LOKUR, J. 1. The question agitating us relates
  to the circumstances (if any) under which a conviction for murder
  under Section 300/302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
  could be altered into a conviction under Section 322/325 of the
  IPC (voluntarily causing grievous hurt) or under Section 326 of
  the IPC (voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous
G weapons or means), ignoring or overlooking the intermediate -
  possibility of a conviction under Section 304 of the IPC.

        2. The question has arisen since in this appeal, despite a
    death having resulted in an incident involving the respondents,
H
   RICHHPAL SINGH MEENA v. GHASI @ GHISA                     861
            [MADAN B. LOKUR> J.]

their conviction for murder by the High Court has been altered       A
to a conviction for voluntarily causing grievous hurt, ignoring or
overlooking a homicide.

The facts

     3. On 14th December, 1996 the appellant (Richhpal Singh         8
Meena) and a few others were sitting beside a well near the
agricultural fields. Richhpal's father Sunderlal Meena
(deceased) had gone to inspect the fields. While he was there,
Sunderlal met Kailash, Ghasi, Lala and their respective wives
and their mother. Soon thereafter, there was a hot exchange          C
of words between them regarding damage to the embankment
in the agricultural fields.

      4. Kailash, Ghasi and Lala told Sunderlal that they were
looking for him and he had now walked into the trap. Saying          D
this, Kailash caught hold of Sunderlal while Ghasi gave him a
blow with a shovel and Lala gave him a blow with a lathi on his
back. On receiving the blows Sunderlal foll down and on hearing
noises, Richhpal and others ran towards the spot and found that
Sunderlal was being beaten up by the ladies. With the                E
assistance of those who were with him, Richhpal managed to
take Sunderlal to a hospital in Alwar but he succumbed to the
injuries.

    5. A post-mortem examination was carried out by Dr.
Amar Singh Rathore and he gave a report that the two injuries        F
given to Sunderlal were sufficient to cause death in the normal
course. The injuries were:

External injuries-

      1.    Contusion abrasion measuring 8 x 10 cm reddish,          G
            located on left side of the rear side of the back.

      2.    Contusion abrasion measuring 8 x 8 cm located on
            right side of chest.
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A   Internal injuries-

                 Fracture on the 4th and 5th ribs located on right
                 side of the chest. Right lung crushed measuring 4
                 x 3 x 1 cm. Blood clotting in lung. Fracture in 7th
                 and 8th rib on left side. Lung crushed. Plurae and
B
                 sic(?) of either side of the lungs torn.

          Dr. Rathore deposed that shock, haemorrhage and lung
    injuries resulted in his death. The injuries were sufficient to
    cause death in the normal course.
c
        6. On these broad facts, a charge sheet was filed against
    Ghasi and Lala for an offence punishable under Sections 302,
    302/34 and 447 of the IPC.

         7. On the evidence adduced before him, the Additional
D   District and Sessions Judge-Ill, Alwar convicted Ghasi and Lala
    for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC as well
    as for an offence punishable under Section 447 of the IPC.
    However, they were acquitted of the charge framed under
    Section 302/34 of the IPC.
E
        8. Feeling aggrieved, the convicts preferred D.B. Criminal
    Appeal No. 403/1997 in the Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High
    Court. By a judgment and order dated 16th April, 2003 the High
    Court concluded that Ghasi and Lala could be convicted only
F   under Section 325/34 of the IPC and not under Section 302/
    34 of the IPC. The High Court also held that they could not be
    convicted under Section 447 read with Section 302 of the IPC.
    The sentence awarded to them was imprisonment for the period
    undergone, that is, about 18 months imprisonment.
G        9. It will be noticed that Ghasi and Lala were not convicted
    by the Trial Judge under Section 302/34 of the IPC but were
    convicted only under Section 302 and Section 447 of the IPC.
    Clearly, therefore, the High Court did not correctly record the

H
    RICHHPAL SINGH MEENA v. GHASI @ GHISA                    863
             [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

final conclusion of the Trial Judge. However, this is a minor        A
matter.

Our initial doubts

     10. While hearing this appeal filed by the victim's son, we
were a little surprised that the fact of Sunderlal's homicide was    B
not taken into consideration by the High Court while convicting
Ghasi and Lala and also that no attempt was made to ascertain
from the evidence on record (if at all it was possible) to fix
responsibility for his death either on Ghasi or on Lala or both.
While we were ably assisted in the hearing by Ms. Sumita             C
Hazarika, learned amicus curiae, we nevertheless felt that the
issue required some greater experience. Accordingly Mr. Uday
U. Lalit, Senior Advocate was requested to assist us in the
matter, and he willingly agreed.
                                                                     D
     11. Mr. Lalit cited several decisions of this Court involving
the death of a human being but in which the only punishment
awarded to the accused was for voluntarily causing grievous
hurt and not any punishment for homicide. Learned amicus
expressed the view that the fact that a human being had died         E
could not and should not have been ignored or overlooked in
any of the cited decisions. Learned amicus was also of opinion
that all these decisions were rendered by two Judge Benches
of this Court and they needed reconsideration since they did
not lay down the correct law.
                                                                     F
     12. We propose to deal with all the judgments cited by
learned amicus as well as by learned counsel appearing for
the convicts and then determine whether they need
reconsideration.
                                                                     G
Homicide and the IPC

    13. The IPC recognizes two kinds of homicide: (1)
Culpable homicide, dealt with between Sections 299 and 304

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    864        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A   of the IPC 1 , and (2) Not-culpable homicide, dealt with by
    Section 304-A of the IPC 2 . For the present discussion we are
    1.   299. Culpable homicide.-Whoever causes death by doing an act with the
         intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury
         as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such
B        act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
    Illustrations
    (a) A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death,
         or with the knowledge ttiat death is likely to be thereby caused. Z believing
         the ground to be firm, !treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed
         the offence of culpable homicide.
    (b) A knows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know it. A, intending to cause,
c         or knowing it to be likely to cause Z's death induces B to fire at the bush.
          B fires and kills z. Here B may be guilty of no offence; but A has committed
         the offence of culpable homicide.
    (c) A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B, who is behind
          a bush; A not knowing that he was there. Here, although A was doing an
         unlawful act, he was not guilty of culpable homicide, as he did not intend
          to kill B or to cause death by doing an £Ct that he knew was likely to cause
D         death.
              Explanation 1.-A person who causes bodily injury, to another who is
          labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby
          accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his
          death.
              Explanation 2.-Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who
E         causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death,
          although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death
          might have been prevented.
              Explanation 3.-The causing of the death of a child in the mother's womb
          is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death
          of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the
          child may not have breathed or been completely born.
F         304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.-
          Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be
          punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description
          for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine,
          if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing
          death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death;
G             or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
          to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge
          that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or
          to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
    2.      304-A. Causing death by negligence. - Whoever causes the death of any
          person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable
          homicide shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
H         term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
     RICHHPAL SINGH MEENA v. GHASI@ GHISA                  865
              [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

not concerned with Section 304-B of the IPC.                       A

     14. There are two kinds of culpable homicide: (i) Culpable
homicide amounting to murder (Section 300/302 of the IPC),
and (ii) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section
304 of the IPC). A rash or negligent act that results in the death B
of a person may not amount to culpable homicide in view of
Section 304-A of the IPC. In other words, such a rash or
negligent act would be 'not-culpable homicide'. But, there could
be a rash or negligent act that results in the death of a person'
and yet amount to a culpable homicide falling within the scope
and ambit of Section 299 of the IPC. This distinction was clearly C
brought out (following Naresh Giri v. State of M.P. 3 which
contains a very useful discussion) in State of Punjab v.
Ba/winder Singh 4 in the following words:

     "Section 304-A was inserted in the Penal Code by Penal        D
     Code (Amendment) Act 27 of 1870 to cover those cases
     wherein a person causes the death of another by such acts
     as are rash or negligent but there is no intention to cause
     death and no knowledge that the act will cause death. The
     case should not be covered by Sections 299 and 300 only       E
     then it will come under this section. The section provides
     punishment of either description for a term which may
     extend to two years or fine or both in case of homicide by
     rash or negligent act. To bring a case of homicide under
     Section 304-A IPC, the following conditions must exist,       F
     namely,

      (1) there must be death of the person in question;

      (2) the accused must have caused such death; and
                                                                   G
      (3) that such act of the accused was rash or negligent and
      that it did not amount to culpable homicide."

3.   (2008) 1 sec 791.
4.   (2012i 2 sec 182.
                                                                   H
    866        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A        The distinction brought out in both the judgments has been
    accepted and followed, amongst others, in Alister Anthony
    Pereira v. State of Maharashtra 5 and State v. Sanjeev Nanda 6 •
    In these two cases, this Court found that a case of culpable
    homicide not amounting to murder (within Section 299 read
B   with Section 304 of the IPC) was made out and a conviction
    handed down accordingly.

         15. Therefore, it is quite clear that when there is a death
    of a human being, it may either be culpable homicide
    (amounting to murder or not amounting to murder) or not-
e   culpable homicide, but it is a homicide nevertheless. Keeping
    this distinction in mind, the decisions cited by learned amicus
    may be considered.

    Relevant decisions
D
         16. This category consists of five cases in which despite
    a homicide, this Court convicted the accused only for voluntarily
    causing grievous hurt, apparently ignoring or overlooking the
    provisions of Section 299 and Section 304 of the IPC.
E        17. In State of Punjab v. Surjan Singh 7 the Trial Court
    convicted Surjan Singh and Charan Singh for the murder of
    Labh Singh and thereby having committed an offence
    punishable under Section 302/34 of the IPC. On appeal, the
    High Court altered the conviction to an offence punishable under
F   Section 326/34 of the IPC 8 even though one of the injuries was
    5.    c2012) 2 sec 648.
    6.    c2012) 8 sec 450.
    1.    (1976) 1 sec 588
G   8.    326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means.-
          Whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 335, voluntarily causes
          grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting,
          or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause
          death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any
          poison or any corrosive substance, or by mea.1s of any explosive
          substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the
H         human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means
     RICHHPAL SINGH MEENA v. GHASI @ GHISA                                867
              [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This                    A
was on the ground that they had, on the spur of the moment,
formed a common intention to cause only grievous injury to Labh
Singh. In other words, it was held that a common intention to
cause the death of Labh Singh was lacking.
                                                                                    B
    18. In an appeal filed by the State, this Court held that the
High Court did not commit any error of law in coming to the
conclusion that it did, namely, that a common intention of
causing the death of Labh Singh was absent. The applicability
of Section 304 of the IPC was not adverted to by this Court
despite a homicide. The quantum of sentence awarded is
                                                                                    c
unfortunately not mentioned in the Report.

     19. Sardu/ Singh v. State of Haryana 9 was a case in which
the Trial Court convicted Sardul Singh for the murder of Naresh
Kumar while Jagtar Singh was acquitted. The High Court                              D
confirmed the conviction of Sardul Singh and also set aside the
acquittal of Jagtar Singh. Both were held liable for an offence
punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.

     20. In appeal, this Court held that the assailants had a                       E
common intention to inflict injuries on the deceased and not
cause his death, that being the unintended ultimate result.
Based on this conclusion, it was held that Sardul Singh and
Jagtar Singh could be convicted only for an ofience punishable
under Section 325/34 of the IPC 10 and must be acquitted of an
                                                                                    F
offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The sentence
awarded was of two years imprisonment. Again, the


     of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with
     imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years,   G
     and shall also be liable to fine.
s.   c2002) a sec 372.
10. 325. Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt-Whoever, except
    in the case provided for by Section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt,
    shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
    may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.                    H
    868      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014) 9 S.'C.R.


A   applicability of Section 299 read with Section 304 of the IPC
    was not considered despite a homicide.

          21. Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab 11 is a Record 'of
    Proceedings, two steps lower in the ladder than a judgment and
8   one step below an order, and yet it has been found worthy of
    being reported. In this case, Gaje Singh was attacked by
    number of persons and he ultimately succumbed to the injuries
    received. Of the assailants, some were convicted for an offence
    punishable, inter alia, under Section 302/149 of the IPC. In
C   appeal, the High Court upheld the conviction of three assailants,
    that is, Ram Singh, Dan Singh and Rattan Singh and acquitted
    the others. These three assailants were not only convicted for
    an offence punishable under Section 302/149 of the IPC but
    also for an offence punishable under Section 325/149 of the
    IPC and under Section 324 of the IPC.
D
         22. This Court held that Ram Singh, Dan Singh and Rattan
    Singh had only caused grievous injuries to Gaje Singh and
    therefore their conviction under Section 302 of the IPC could
    not be sustained. Therefore, they were convicted for an offence
E   punishable under Sections 325 and 326 of the IPC, as the case
    may be, and sentenced to five years imprisonment. Again, this
    Court did not examine the applicability of Section 299 read with
    Section 304 of the IPC despite a homicide.

F      23. In Ninaji Raoji Boudha v. State of Maharashtra 12 two
  persons (Ninaji and Raoji) were convicted by the Trial Court for
  an offence punishable under Sections 325 and 147 of the IPC
  and sentenced to five years imprisonment. This was despite
  the fact that the injuries caused by them ~n Bhonaji had resulted
  in his death. In an appeal filed by the State, the High Court
G convicted them for offences punishable under Section 302/34
  of the IPC for causing the death of Bhonaji.


    11.   (1988) Supp. sec 456.
H   12.   (1976)2SCC117.
    RICHHPAL SINGH MEENA v. GHASI @ GHISA                    869
             [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
                                      '
     24. Ninaji and Raoji appealed to this Court and it was held     A
that they had given several blows to Bhonaji and one of them
was "a forceful blow on the head which caused a depressed
fracture and fissures all over" resulting in his death. This Court
noted that from the evidence on record: (a) it could not be
established who had given that forceful blow; (b) the evidence       B
established that Ninaji and Raoji did not have a common
intention of causing the death of Bhonaji but there was a
common intention of causing him grievous injury. Consequently,
due to the lack of any conclusive or specific evidence of who
was responsible for the homicide and the absence of a                c
common intention, Ninaji and Raoji were acquitted of the
offence of murder but were convicted of an offence punishable
under Section 325/34 of the IPC and sentenced to five years
imprisonment. It appears to us that the principle applied by this
Court, though not so stated, is to be found in Section 72 of the     0
IPC which reads as follows:

     "72. Punishment of person guilty of one of several
     offences, the judgment stating that it is doubtful of
     which.-ln all cases in which judgment is given that a
     person is guilty of one of several offences specified in the    E
     judgment, but that it is doubtful of which of these offences
     he is guilty, the offender shall be punished for the offence
     for which the lowest punishment is provided if the same
     punishment is not provided for all."
                                                                     F
     25. Similarly, the principle laid down in Section 72 of the
IPC appears to have been invoked in Ram Lal v. Delhi
Administration in which four persons (including Ram Lal) were
accused of having murdered Har Lal. The Trial Court acquitted
one of them but convicted the others, including Ram Lal for an       G
offence punishable under Section 302/34 of the IPC. In appeal,
the High Court upheld the conviction of Ram Lal for an offence
punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, while the other two
were convicted under Section 325/34 of the IPC.
                                                                     H
    870     SWPm::ME COURT REPORTS                   (2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         26. In appeal before this Court, the question was whether
    Ram Lal could have been convicted for an offence punishable
    under Section 302 of the IPC. It was held (by a three-Judge
    Bench) that the High Court had erroneously concluded that the
    deceased received only one injury on the head. In fact, he 'had
B   suffered two injuries on the head. Additionally, it was found that
    the High Court also held that Ram Lal had given only one blow
    with a stick to Har Lal on the head. On these facts, it could not
    be said with any degree of certainty whether the blow delivered
    by Ram Lal proved fatal or the blow given by him did not prove
C   fatal. In the absence of any clear identification of the blow given
    by Ram Lal, he was entitled to a benefit of doubt. However,
    since the common intention of the three assailants was to cause
    a grievous injury to Har Lal, therefore Ram Lal was liable for
    conviction under Section 325/34 of the IPC apparently applying
    the principle laid down in Section 72 of the IPC. Accordingly,
0
    he was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

          27. It will be seen that these decisions were decided on
    their own particular facts. This Court did not lay down any law
    that if there is only a common intention to cause a grievous injury
E   without any intention to kill, an accused cannot be convicted of
    murder. This is quite obvious since it would result in an absurd
    situation in cases where a person smashes the head of another
    and pleads that he had no intention to kill the victim but only
    cause a grievous injury. The accused must be deemed to know
F   the consequences of his act, unless it was accidental or
    unintentional.

    Partially relevant decisions

         28. The second category of decisions cited by learned
G   amicus, though relevant, do not greatly advance our discourse
    any further since, in these cases a homicide had taken place
    and at least one of the accused was convicted for that
    homicide.

H
      RICHHPAL SINGH MEENA v. GHASI @ GHISA                   871
               [MADAN 8. LOKUR, J.]
     29. In Radhey Shyam v. State of U.P. 13 three persons            A
were convicted by the Trial Court for the murder of Ram Saran.
On appeal, the High Court set aside their conviction for an
offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC but convicted
them for an offence punishable under Part I of Section 304 of
the IPC and sentenced them to imprisonment for seven years.           s
      30. Of the three persons so convicted only Rad hey Shyam
approached this Court and his contention was that he had not
inflicted any blow on the deceased. On a consideration of the
evidence, this Court concluded that there was nothing to show
that Radhey Shyam had given the fatal blow, or for that matter        C
any blow, that was likely to cause the death of Ram Saran.
Accordingly, his conviction under Part I of Section 304 of the
IPC was altered to a conviction under Section 325 of the IPC
and the sentence reduced to two years imprisonment.
    31. This decision is not so relevant since two of the             D
assailants were convicted for causing the death of a human
being and were not let off only for an offence punishable for
having caused grievous injuries.
       32. Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab 14 is a short order and   E
by no stretch of imagination can it be considered to be a
judgment and certainly not a reportable judgment- it is merely
the disposal of a case. The order does not indicate the facts
of the case and there is no discussion of the law. In any event,
a reading of the order indicates that since there was no pre-
                                                                      F
concert between Jarnail Singh and Sarwan Singh to cause the
death of the victim, their conviction under Section 302/34 of the
 IPC could not be upheld by this Court. The order does not
 indicate the nature of the injuries on the deceased or who
 inflicted them. All that can be deciphered from the order is that
Jarnail Singh gave a simple injury to the deceased. Since that        G
 is so, he obviously could not have been punished for the offence
of murder. However, it is not clear what injuries were given to

13.   (1999) 1 sec 1e0.
14.   (1982) 3 sec 221.                                               H
    872      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2014] 9 S.C.R.


A   the deceased by Sarwan Singh and whether he was convicted
    for the homicide or not.
        33. We shall have occasion a little later to deal with the
    reporting of orders passed by this Court and the reporting of a
    Record of Proceedings.
B
         34. In Sk. Karimullah v. State of A.P. 15 accused no.1 (not
    identified in the judgment) and Karimullah were convicted by
    the Trial Court for an offence punishable under Section 302/34
    of the IPC. Their conviction was upheld by the High Court.
C        35. Only Karimullah approached this Court and it was
    found, on facts, that no charge was framed against him under
    Section 34 of the IPC. Additionally, there was a discrepancy
    in the eye witness account with regard to his role in the attack
    on the deceased. One witness stated that he had assaulted the
D   deceased with a stick while another stated that he had given
    him a fist blow. Under the circumstances, on the basis of the
    evidence on record, this Court held that Karimullah was liable
    te be-punisb€)£ for an offence punishable under Section 325
    of the IPC and not under Section 302 of the IPC. In this case
E   also, at least one of the assailants was convicted for a
    homicide.
    Earlier decisions of this Court
          36. Learned amicus submitted that the cases falling in the
F   first category above, in which there is a homicide but a
    conviction only for voluntarily causing grievous hurt, may even
    fall within Section 300 (thirdly) of the IPC and, therefore, require
    reconsideration. To illustrate his point, learned amicus referred
    to three decisions, the first being Abdul Waheed Khan v. State
    of A.P. 16 which decision in turn refers to Rajwant Singh v. State
G   of Kerala 17 and Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab. 18
    15. (2009) 11 sec 371.
    16. (2002) 1 sec 175.
    17. 1966 Supp SCR 230.
H 18. AIR 1958 SC 465.
   RICHHPAL SINGH MEENA v. GHASI @ GHISA                     873
            [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
      37. It must be made clear that learned amicus did not cite     A
these decisions with a view to establish that the first category
of decisions mentioned above were either incorrectly decided
or that Section 300 (thirdly) of the IPC was attracted. That was
mentioned by him only by the way. The principal reason for
citing these decisions was to highlight the view taken by this       B
Court that where violence is deliberately inflicted and it results
in the death of a human being, culpable homicide is made out
- the only question being whether it is murder or culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.

    38. In Rajwant Singh this Court held (and it is futile to try    C
and paraphrase the view lucidly expressed):-

      " In addition to the other evidence establishing the
      connection of Unni and Rajwant Singh with this crime there
      is a confession by Rajwant Singh before the Sub-               D
      Magistrate, Cochin in which he graphically describes the
      part played by him and Unni. Rajwant Singh also stated
      that they only wanted the Lt. Commander and the sentry
   .· to remain unconscious while they rifled the safe and took
      away the money. It is contended that we must accept the        E
      confession as a whole and must hold on its basis that the
      intention was not to kill, and that the offence of murder is
      therefore not established. As this is the most important
      point in the case we shall consider it first.

     "This point was argued by Mr J.G. Sethi on behalf of            F
     Rajwant Singh and his arguments were adopted by Mr
     Harbans Singh on behalf of Unni. Mr Sethi argued that the
     offence was one of causing grievous hurt or at the worst
     of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and
     punishable under Section 304 (second part) of the Indian        G
     Penal Code. It is quite plain that the acts of the
     appellants resulted in the death of the victim and the
     offence cannot be placed lower than culpable
     homicide because the appellants must have known
     that what they were doing was likely to kill. The short         H
    874       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         question, therefore, is whether the offence was murder or
          culpable homicide." (emphasis given by us)

    On facts, it was held that a case of murder falling within Section
    300 (thirdly) of the IPC was made out.
B          39. Rajwant Singh followed Virsa Singh (a three-Judge
    Bench) which conclusively lays down the requirements of
    Section 300 (thirdly) of the IPC in the following manner (again
    it is difficult to paraphrase the clearly articulated conclusions):-

c         "To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following
          facts before it can bring a case under Section 300 "thirdly";

          First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury
          is present;

D         Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These
          are purely objective investigations.

          Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to
          inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was
E         not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of
          irijury was intended.

          Once these three elements are proved to be present, the
          enquiry proceeds further and,

F         Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just
          described made up of the three elements set out above
          is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
          This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential
          and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
G
          Once these four elements are established by the
          prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the
          prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under
          Section 300 "thirdly". It does not matter that there was
          no intention to cause death. It does not matter that
H
    RICHHPAL SINGH MEENA v. GHASI @ GHISA                      875
             [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
    there was no intention even to cause an injury of a                A
    kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
    course of nature (not that there is any real distinction
    between the two). It does not even matter that there
    is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely
    to cause death. Once the intention to cause the                    B
    bodily injury actually found to be present is proved,
    the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only
    question is whether, as a matter of purely objective
    inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary
    course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence              c
    to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause
    death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they
    are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind,
    they must face the consequences; and they can only
    escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced,
                                                                       0
    that the injury was accidental or otherwise
    unintentional." (emphasis given by us)

     40. In Abdul Waheed Khan the Trial Court convicted three
accused under Part I of Section 304 of the IPC. The High Court,
on an appeal by the State, convicted them for an offence               E
punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. This Court discussed
Section 300 (thirdly) of the IPC, the object of the accused being
to rob the deceased, the grievous injuries voluntarily inflicted
on the deceased, the nature of injuries and then upheld the view
taken by the High Court. The case did not directly concern             F
Section 325 or Section 326 of the IPC but was cited, firstly, to
explain the analysis undertaken by this Court in its earlier
decisions and secondly, to highlight that Section 299 of the IPC
takes care of every situation of culpable homicide and thirdly
and most importantly, to illustrate that voluntarily causing           G
grievous hurt resulting in death cannot be simply relegated to
an offence punishable under Section 325 or Section 326 of the
IPC.

    41. Reference was also made by learned amicus to                   H
    876      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A   Thangaiya v. State of Tamil Nadu 19 and Raj Pal v. State of
    Haryana 20 which reiterate the view expressed in Abdul
    Waheed Khan.

    The jurisprudence
8        42. A review of the decisions in the first category of cases,
    indicates that in spite of the death of a person, and a finding in
    some of them of an act of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, this
    Court has not considered the provisions of Section 299 read
    with Section 304 of the IPC. In our opinion, such a consideration
C   is important not only from the jurisprudential point of view but
    also from the sentencing point of view.

          43. From the jurisprudential point of view it is important
    because when an act or omission of an accused causes the
o   death of any person, he or she is either guilty of culpable
    homicide or guilty of not-culpable homicide. It is for the Court
    to determine on the evidence whether, if it is culpable homicide,
    it amounts to murder as explained in Section 300 of the IPC.
    (along with all its clauses) or not as explained in Section 304
E   of the IPC. If culpable homicide cannot be proved, then it would
    fall in the category of 'not-culpable homicide'.

       44. We agree with learned amicus that the sections in the
  IPC relating to hurt (from Section 319 onwards) do not postulate
  death as the end result. In this regard, our attention was drawn
F to Section 320 of the IPC which designates various kinds of
  hurt as grievous and particularly to 'eighthly' which relates to
  any hurt which endangers life, but does not extinguish it. In fact,
  as pointed out by learned amicus, the arrangement of sections
  in the IPC makes it clear that 'offences affecting life' are quite
G distinct from offences of 'hurt'. If hurt results in death, intended
  or unintended, the offence would fall in the category of an
  offence affecting life, else not. It is this distinction that has

    19. c2oosi g sec 650.
H 20. c2006) g sec 678.
    RICHHPAL SINGH MEENA v. GHASI @ GHISA                         877
             [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
 apparently been ignored or overlooked in the first category of           A
 cases, but as mentioned above, those cases were decided on
 their particular facts.

·Sentencing

       45. The issue of sentencing is also of utmost importance 8
  in cases such as the ones that we have referred to. The re.ason
  is the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a given
  situation. If an accused is guilty of murder, say under Section
  300 (thirdly) he or she would be liable for a minimum of life
  imprisonment; if an accused is guilty of culpable homicide not C
  amounting to murder under Section 304 he or she would be
  liable for a maximum of ten years imprisonment; if an accused
  is guilty of not-culpable homicide under Section 304-A of the
· IPC the punishment would not exceed two years imprisonment.
  On the other hand, if the court ignores or overlooks the question D
  whether the homicide is culpable or not but merely treats the
  case as one of voluntarily causing grievous hurt punishable
  under Section 325 or Section 326 of the IPC for which the
  maximum punishment is seven years imprisonment or ten
  years/life imprisonment (as the case may be), then there is a E
  real danger in a given case of an accused either getting a
   lighter sentence than deserved or a heavier sentence
  (depending on the offence made out) than warranted by law. It
  is for this reason that not only a precise formulation of charges
  by the Trial Court (if necessary multiple charges) is essential F
   but also a correct identification by the court of the offence
  committed.

 Position in law

      46. Having considered all the decisions cited before us             G
 (and perhaps there are many more on the subject but not
 cited), in our opinion, a five-step inquiry is necessary: (i) Is there
 a homicide? (ii) If yes, is it a culpable homicide or a 'not-
 culpable homicide'? (iii) If it is a culpable homicide, is the
 offence one of culpable homicide amounting to murder (Section            H
    878     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A   300 of the IPC) or is it a culpable homicide not amounting to
    murder (Section 304 of the IPC)? (iv) If it is a 'not-culpable
    homicide' then a case under Section 304-A of the IPC is made
    out. (v) If it is not possible to identify the person who has
    committed the homicide, the provisions of Section 72 of the IPC
B   may be invoked. Since this five-pronged exercise has
    apparently been missed out in the first category of decisions,
    learned amicus was of the opinion that those decisions require
    reconsideration.

       47. In our view none of the decisions require any
C reconsideration. The position in law is as we have culled out
  from the cases cited before us making it clear that in most
  cases the person who has committed homicide (culpable or not
  culpable) can be identified. But it is quite possible in some
  cases, such as in Ninaji Raoji Boudha and Ram Lal that
D conclusive or specific evidence is lacking to actually pin down
  the person who has committed homicide (culpable or not
  culpable). In such cases, the accused would have to be given
  the benefit of Section 72 of the IPC. Such cases arise if the
  investigation is defective or if the evidence is insufficient. But
E where it is possible to ascertain who is responsible for the
  homicide, the five-step inquiry can easily be carried out.

    Conclusion on facts
       48. Applying the five-step inquiry, it is clear that: (i) there
F was a homicide, namely the death of Sunderlal; (ii) the
  assailants gave two lathi blows to Sunderlal which resulted in
  the fracture of his ribs and piercing of his lungs. The injuries
  were not accidental or unintentional - the assailants had a
  common intention of grievously injuring Sunderlal and it is not
G as if they intended to cause some injury to him other that the
  ones inflicted. (iii} the opinion of Dr. Amar Singh Rathore
  confirmed that tlie injuries caused to Sunderlal were sufficient
  to cause death in the normal colirs,e. Consequently, the
  homicide was a culpable homicide. Applying the law laid down
H in Virsa Singh it is clear that Ghasi and Lala are guilty of the
      RICHHPAL SINGH MEENA v. GHASI @ GHISA                          879
               [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
murder of Sunderlal, the offence falling under Section 300                    A
(thirdly) of the IPC and punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.
     49. Under the circumstances, we set aside the decision
of the High Court and restore the decision of the Trial Court and
convict Ghasi and Lala of the offence of murdering Sunderlal.
The State will take necessary steps to apprehend the convicts                 B
so that they undergo life imprisonment as required by law.
Orders and Record of Proceedings
     50. It may be mentioned, en passant, that the excessive
reporting of judgments (including orders and Record of                        C
Proceedings) has been described by Mr. Fali S. Nariman, an
eminent jurist, in 'India's Legal System' as "judgments factory"
and "case law diarrhoea". He says that there are "just too many
judgments reported which have to be cited, which have to be
looked into, followed or distinguished, all of which take up a
vast amount of judicial time". The blame for this lies partially              D
on "overweening judicial vanity", partially on the lawyers who
perceive that "everything that is said in each and every judgment
or order of the highest court in any particular case has to be
presented as binding law" and partially on competing law
 reporting agencies "who want their law reports fo sell as widely             E
as possible". One of his conclusions is that the "Laws proverbial
delays are not because there are too many laws but because
there are just too many judgments and orders concerning thecn."
       51. If all of us in\the fraternity of law desire to bring about
some judicial reforms to ensure expeditious delivery of justice,              F
we need to put our heads together and follow some sage
advice and take reme~1al action before justice delivery gets
timed out. Delays in o r justice delivery have already been
adversely commented u on 21 and it is now time for us to find
viable and realistic soluti'?ns.                                              G
       52. The appeal is all:owed.
Devika Gujral                                              Appeal allowed.

21.    William Jack Pike v. The Indian Hotels Company Ltd. [2013) EWHC 4096
      (QB).