Holding

Differential promotion criteria based on educational qualification and requisite service experience constitute a reasonable classification under Articles 14 and 16 and are constitutionally valid.

Summary

The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) adopted CPWD rules that required different periods of service for promotion of Graduate Engineers (3 years as Junior Engineers) and Diploma‑Holder Engineers (8 years) to Assistant Engineer, and similarly different experience for promotion to Executive Engineer. Diploma‑Holder engineers challenged these differential criteria as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Delhi High Court struck down the rules, holding the distinctions unconstitutional. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether such classification based on educational qualification and service experience has a reasonable nexus to the duties of the higher posts. Relying on earlier decisions (Triloki Nath Khosa, Shujat Ali, etc.), the Court held that the distinction is a permissible classification aimed at ensuring technical efficiency and therefore does not breach Articles 14 and 16. Consequently, the High Court judgment was set aside and the appeals were allowed.

Issues considered

Whether prescribing different service‑experience requirements for promotion of Graduate Engineers and Diploma‑Holder Engineers violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Whether the classification based on educational qualification and service experience has a reasonable relation to the nature of the promotional posts.
Whether the High Court erred in its interpretation of the precedents set in Shujat Ali and Triloki Nath Khosa.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 16

Subjects

Article 14Article 16EqualityClassificationPromotionCivil ServiceDiploma vs DegreeDelhi Development AuthorityService RulesConstitutional Law

Judgment

ROOP CHAND ADLAKHA AND ORS.
A
v.
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 26, 1988

[RANGANATH MISRA, AND M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.] B

Constitution of India, 1950--Articles 14 and 16-Services-
Appointment and promotion-State entitled to prescribe that a candi-
date should have a particular qualification plus a stipulated quantum of
service experience.

Civil Services-D.D.A.-Engineering Cadre Promotion of C
Junior Engineers to Assistant Engineers and Assistant Engineers tu
Executive Engineers-Different conditions of eligibility for Diploma-
Holder and Graduates-Prescription of-Whether violative of Articles
14and 16.
D
The Rules of .the Central Public Works Department (CPWD)
adopted by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) stipulate and pro-
vide that 50% of the posts of Assistant Engineers in DDA be filed-up by
promotion from the cadre of Junior Engineers comprising of both
Graduates in Engineering and Diploma-Holders in Engineering in the
equal ratio (50%:50%) of the promotional posts. Half of it, i.e. 25% E
were to be filled up by promotion of Graduate Junior-Engineers with
threeJears' service experience as Junior-Engineers; the other 25% to be
filled up from Diploma-Holder Junior-Engineers, who had 8 years'
service experience as Junior-Engineers. Th• Rules further provide that
the Executive Engineers' post in DDA were purely promotio.nal and
Graduate Assistant Engineers with 8 years' service-experience and F
Diploma-Holder Assistant Engineers with 10 years' service-experience
were eligible for promotion. No inter se quota between the two class of
officers; was prescribed.

The Diploma-Holders in the Cadres of Junior Engineers and
Assistant Engineers filed separate writ petitions in the High Court G
assailing the constitutional validity of the prescriptions made by the
rules in the matter of requirement of differential service-experiences
between the Graduates and the Diploma-Holders for promotion to the
higher caders of Assistant Engineers and Executive Engineers respec-
tively. They also assailed the promotion of Graduate Engineers to the
higher cadres made on the strength of the Rules. H
253
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A The High Court allowed the writ petitions and declared the diffe-
'rent standards of service-experience prescribed for Degree-Holders and
Diploma-Holders in respect of both the cadres as violafive of Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution .

. In the appeal to this Court, on behalf of appellants it was con-
8 tended; (I) that the view taken by the High Court is demonstrably
erroneous and opposed to well settled principles; (2) that the High
Court took an erroneous view that in Shujat Ali's case (1975 (I) SCR
449) this Court struck down the service rule impugned in that case; (3)
that the fundamental distinction between Trlloki Nath Khosa's, case [1974)
I SCR 771 and Shujat Ali's case was lost sight of by the High Court; (4)
that the present case was not one in which the Diploma-Holders,
C proprio vigore and without more, were held eligible for promotion. The
educational qualification of a Diploma in engineering was not treated as
equivalent to a Degree for purposes of determining eligibility. Nor the
Degree itself was determinative of eligibility for promotion. The eligibi-
lity of promotion is based on a combination of factors which vary
D according to the basic educational qualification of the two classes of
engineers; (5) that this distinction was germane to the requirements of
higher technical and academic quality for the higher posts which
involved expertise in structural design. etc. and (6) that even where
recruitment to a particular cadre was made from different sources,
resulting in the formation of a single homogeneous cadre it was not
E impermissible to make a further classification amongst the members of
such a cadre for purposes of further promotion based on the higher
educational qualification of the candidates.

On behalf of the respondent Diploma-Holders it was contended
(I) that this Court had, more than once, cautioned against undue
F accent, in the matter of promotional opportunities, on academic-
qualification alone which might lead to elitist perferences and tend to
obscure the egalitarian principle and social justice; (2) that the effect of
the distinction is really an imperceptible extension or magnification of
insubstantial factors subverting the precious guarantee of equality and
(3) that to discriminate between Diploma-Holders and Graduates who
G belong to the same cadre and hold inter-changeable posts, both in the
present cadre and in the prospective promotional posts, on the mere
lack of some higher academiC attainment is to place a high premium on
these social and economic pursuits for the economically disadvantaged
difficult.

H Allowing the Appeals,
g R.C. ADLAKHA v. D.D.A. 255
'
HELD: I. The inherent distinction between a person with a
A
Degree and one who is merely a Diploma-Holder is much too obvious.
But the question for consideration, in the present context, is whether
the differences have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office to
which the promotion is contemplated. The idea of equality in the matter
of promotion can be predicated only when the candidates for promotion
are drawn from the same source. If the differences in the qualification B
has a reasonable relation to the nature of duties and responsibilities, that
go with and are attendant upon the promotional post, the more
advantageous treatment of those who possess higher technical qualifica-
tions can be legitimised on the doctrine of classification. There may,
conceivably, be cases where the differences in the educational qualifica-
tions may not be sufficient to give any preferential treatment to one
class of candidates as against another. Whether the classification is
c
reasonable or not must, therefore, necessarily depend upon facts of
ea.ch case and the circnmstances obtaining at the relevant time. When
the State makes a classification between two sources, unless the vice of
the classification is writ large on the face of it, the person,assailing the
classification must show that it is unreasonable and violative of Article D
14. [263A-C]

,'
2. A wooden equality as between all classes of employees irrespec-
' tive of all distinction or qualifications, or job-requirements is neither
constitutionally compelled nor practically meaningful. [2630 I
E
3. The process of classification is in itself productive of inequality
and in that sense antithetical of equality. The process would be constitu-
tionally valid if it recognises a pre-existing inequality and acts in aid of
amelioration of the effects of such pre-existent inequality. But the pro-
cess cannot in itself generate or aggravate the inequality. The process
cannot merely blow-up or magnify in-substantial or 1nicroscopic differ- ~
ences on merely meretricious or plausible differences. The over-
emphasis on the doctrine of classification or any anxious and sus-
tained attempts to discover some basis for classification may gra-
H
dually and imperceptibly deprive the article of its precious content
and end in re-placing doctrine of equality by the doctrine of the
classification. [264C-D] G

4. The presumption of good ' faith in and of constitutionality
of a classification cannot be pushed to the point of predicating some
possible or hypothetical but undisclosed and unknown reason for a
classification -relidering the precious guarantee of equality ""a mere
rope of sand". [264E] ,H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A Central Railway v. A. V.R. Siddhami, [1974] J SCR 207 at 214
and T. Devadasan v. The Union of India, [1964] 4 SCR 680 at 689 &
690 followed.

5. "To overdo classification is to undo equality". The idea of
similarity or dissimilarity of situations of persons to justify classifica-
B tion, cannot rest on merely differentia which may, by themselves
rational or logical, but depends on whether the differences are relevant
to the goals sought to be reached by the law which seeks to classify. The •
justification of the classification must, therefore, be sought beyond the
classification. All marks of distinction do not necessarily justify classifi-
cation irrespective of the relevance or nexus to objects sought to be
achieved by the law imposing the classification. [264F-G J •
c
State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors., [1974]
1 SCR 771; Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, [1956] SCR 182, relied
on; Mohammad Shujat Ali v. UOI and others, [1975] 1 SCR 449; H. C.
Sharma and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors., [1983] 3
D SCR 372 and Punjab State Electricity Board, Patiala, and Anr. v.
Ravinder Kumar Sharma & Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 617 distinguished; State
of Mysore v. Narasinga Rao, [1968] I SCR 401 and Union of India v.
Mrs. S.B. Kohli, [1973] 3SCR 117, referred to.

6. In the present case, the possession of a diploma, by itself and
E without more, does not confer eligibility. Diploma, for purposes of
. promotion, is not considered equ.ivalent to the degree. [268D]

7. If the educational qualification by itself was recognised as con-
fering eligibility for promotion, then the super-imposition of further
F conditions such as a particular period ·of service, selectively, on the
Diploma Holders alone to their disadvantage might become dis-
criminatory. This does not prevent the State from formulating a policy
which prescribes as an essential part of the conditions for the very
eligibility that the candidate must have a particular qualification plus a
stipulated quantum of service experience. [268G-H; 269AJ
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 896
to 899 of 1988 and Civil Appeal No. 3352 of 1988.

From the Judgment and Order dated 2.9.1987 of the Delhi High
H Court in C.W.P. No. 2131, 2082 of 1984 respectively.
,.;-, R.C. ADLAKHA v. D.D.A. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 257

G. Ramaswami, Additional Solicitor General, R.K. Jain, A
P.P. Rao, M.S. Gujaral, S. Rangarajan, A.K. Sanghi, Mrs.
Madhu Kapur, Arun Kr. Vijayesh Roy, Sanjay Kr. Kaul, Sardar
Bahadur, V.B. Saharaya, R.K. Khanna, Vishnu Mathur, Ashok
Aggarwal, R.N. Keswani and R.S. Sodhi for the appearing
parties. B

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATACHALIAH, J. These four Civil Appeals by
Special Leave and the Special Leav.e Petition arise out of and are c
directed against the common Judgment dated 2.9.1987, of the
High Court of Delhi in C.W.P. No. 2132 and C.W.P. No. 2082
of 1984 in which the principal controversy was wht:ther the Rules
prescribing . different conditions of eligibility for Diploma-
Holders and Graduates for promotion from the cadre of Junior- D
Engineers to that of Assistant-Engineers and from the cadre.of
Assistant-Engineers to that of Executive-Engineers in the Public
Works Department of the Delhi Development Authority
(DDA) is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and
would, therefore, require to be declared void.
E

The High Court, in the writ petitions filed by the Diploma-
Holders, has held that such differential treatment of Diploma-
Holders and Graduates by the prescription of different standards
of service-experience for purposes of eligibility for promotion to
the higher cadres is unconstitutional. F
ii'
!f'j
2. The D.D.A. which is the appellant in Civil Appeals No.
898 of 1988 and No. 899 of 1988 assails the correctness of thee.
view taken by the High Court. Civil Apper-1 896 of1988 and 897
'f
of 1988 are by the Graduate-Engineers who were respondents G
before the High Court and who are, similarly, aggrieved by the
,, decision under appeal SLP 6181 of 1988 is by the "DDA
Graduate Engineers Association" which seeks to espouse the
cause of the Graduate-Engineers. We grant Special Leave in
SLP. All the five appeals are heard and disp?Sed of by this H
-~
it·
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C:R.

A common judgment.
...
~.

" '
C.A. 899 of 1988, C.A. 896 of 1988 and SLP 6181 arise out
of C.W.P. 2132of1984. C.A. 898 of 1988, C.A. 897of1988 arise
out of C. W.P. 2082 of 1984.
B
3. The D.D.A. by its resolution No. 574 dated 13.11.1963
adopted, pro-tanto, the rules of the Central Public Works
Department (CPWD) in regard to the mode of recruitment-
both by direct recruitment and by promotion-to the posts of
Asst. Engineers. The rules, so adopted, in substance, stipulate
c and provide that 50% of the posts be filled by direct recruitment
or by deputation and that the other 50% be filled-up by promo- ~ ..
tion from the cadre of Junior-Engineers. The cadre of Junior- \.

Engineers itself comprises of both Graduates in Engineering and .
Diploma-Holders in Engineering. The twocategories of officers
D in the cadre of Junior-Engineers were provided with promo-
.
'
tional opportunities to the post of Asst. Engineers in the equal
ratio (50%:50%) of the promotional-posts. Half of it, i.e., 25%
was to be filled up by promotion of Graduate-Engineers with
three years' service-experience as Junior-Engineers; the other ""
E
25% to be filled-up from Diploma-Holder Junior-Engineers who
were diploma holders who had 8 years' service-experience as t:
Junior-Engineers. ~

By resolution No. 105 dated 16.6.1971 the DDA similarly
F adopted the relevant rules in the CPWD in the matter of recruit-
ment to the posts of Executive-Engineers. The Executive-
Engineers' post in the DOA thus became. purely promotional
and Graduate Asst.. Engineers with 8 years' service-experience
and diploma Asst. Engineers with 10 year~· service"experience
• were eligible for promotion. No inter-se quota between the.two
G. class of officers was prescribed.

The following table delineates the effect and purport of the
rules adopted under resolution No. 574 dated 13.11.1963 and
No. 105 dated 16.6.1971. The tabie also indicates the mode of
H initial recruitmcntto the cadre of Junior-Engineers:
R.C ADLAKHA v. D.D.A. {VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 259

EXECUTIVE ENGINEERS
A

(By promotion]

Asst. Engrs.' Asst. Engrs.'
[Degree]+ (Diploma]
8years 8
+ lOyears
service service
i
ASSISTANT ENGINEERS
Graduates and Diploma-
holders

50% by promotio.n 50%. By C
Direct
recruitment
25% 25%
=I
Jr. Engr. Jr. Engr.
[Degree] (Diploma]
D
f. + 3 yrs.
service i
JUNIOR ENGINEERS
+ 8years
service

(Sectional Officers]
~ Direct recruitment
Graduates in Diploma- E
Engineering holders
[No prior (with 2
experience years
prescribed] experience
4. In the year 1984 the Diplom11-Holder in the cadre of Junior-
Engineers and in the cadre of Asst. Engineers sought to assail, by F
means of two writ-petitions presented to the Delhi High Court, the
Constitutional validity of tbe prescriptions made by the rules in the
matter of requirement of differential service-experiences between the
Graduates and Diploma-Holders for promotion to the higher cadres
viz. of Asst. Engineers and Executive-Engineers respectively. They/
also assailed the promotions of Graduate-Engineers to the higher G
cadres made on the strength of the Rules. CWP. 2132 of 1984 pertaine_d
to the resolution No. 574 dated 13.ll.l963 adopting the relevant
CPWD Rules prescribing 3 years' and 8 years' service-experience for
Graduates and Diploma-Holders respectively and the discrimination
-·' thus brought about between them. CWP No. 2082 of 1984 pertained to
the constitutionality ·of the analogous provisions in the rules adopted H
by resolution No. 105 dated 16.6.1971.
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A The High Court heard these two· petitions together and by its
common judgment dated 2.9.1987 upheld the challenge and declared
the different standards of service-experience prescribed for Degree-
Holders and Diploma-Holders in respect of both the cadres as viola-
tive of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

B 5. The principal question that arises in.these appeals is whether,
where, as here, recruitment to a particular cadre of posts is made,
from two different sources, different conditions, based on the dif-
ferences in educational qualifications, can be prescribed conditioning
the eligibility for further-promotion to a higher cadre in service.

The High Court, by the judgment now under appeal, has held
c that such prescription of differential standards-based even on the
differences in technical, educational qualifications-is violative of
Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In reaching such conclusions as it
did on the ·point, the High Court placed reliance on the pronounce-
ment of this Court in Mohammad Shujat Ali v. UOI and Others, [1975]
D 1SCR449, H.C. Sharma and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi
and. Ors.,· [1~3] 3 SCR 372 and Punjab State Electricity Board,
Patiala, and Anr. v. Ravindef Kumar Sharma & Ors., [1986) 4 SCC
617 and T;R. Kapur and Others v. State of Haryana and Others, AIR
1987 SC 415. The High Court distinguished the decision of this Court
in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Trifoki Nath Khosa & Ors., [1974] 1
E SCR 771.

The High Court drew a distinction between the situation where
diploma-holders were wholly excluded from eligibility for promotion
to the higher cadre. and the situation where, while they were con-
sidered eligible for promotion, however, were subjected to more
F onerous and less advantageous conditions for such promotion. The
High Court distinguished Triloki Nath Khosa's case observing:

"7. This was a case where diploma holders were
found completely ineligible for promotion to the higher
post for lack of essential educational qualification but the
G considerations may vary if they are found eligible for pro-
motion to the higher post but still certain conditions are
laid as distinct from degree holders before they become
eligible for promotion. The question then would arise
whether such distinction can be justified and is based on
any rationality or not ..... "
H
R.C. ADLAKHA v. D.D.A: [VENKATACHALIAH, J.J 261

Answering this point in favour of the "Dip!Oma-Holders" the
High Court held: A

" ..... The moment the diploma holders and degree
holders are considered 'to constitute one class for purposes
of promotion there cannot be any differentiation between
the two vis-a-vis the qualification for promotion. It could B
be that for reasons of efficiency in administration the
authorities may lay down that diploma holders are not at all
eligible for promotion to the higher post and such a bar can
be upheld in view of the ratio laid down 'in the case of
Triloki Nath Kbosa but after the authorities considered them
eligible for promotion there could be no rationale in their
making any distinction between the degree-holders and c
diploma-holders for granting promotion to them to the
higher post ..... "
(Emphasis Supplied)

The point of distinction, as apprehended by the High Court, is D
that in the present case a Diploma, ipso-facto, qualifies for promotion.
The real qeustion is whether this assumption is correct and whether
the relevant Rules determine the eligibility for promotion on the basis
of a Diploma. or for that matter even a Degree, ur whether the eligib1-
lity for promotion is determined not with reference merely to the
educational attainments but on the basis of educational qualifications E
plus a measure of service-experience, stipulated differently for
Graduates and Diploma-Holders. ·

.6. Learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the view
that commended itself to the High Court is demonstrably erroneous
and is opposed to principles which, by now, should be considered F
well-settled. They submitted that the High Court fell into an obvious
error in its view that in Shujat Ali's case (1975) 1SCR449, this Court
had stuck down the service-rule impugned in that case. Learned
Counsel submitted that the fundamental distinction between the two
sets of cases, one of which Triloki Nath Khosa's case is represents, and
the other typified by Shujat Ali's case, was lost sight of by the High G
Court and the error pervading the judgment is the result of overlook
ing this essential distinction between the two sets of cases.

It was contended for the appellants that the present casewas not
one in which the Diploma-Holders proprio-vigore, and without more,
were held eligible for promotion. If the effect and intent of the rules H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

were such as to treat Diploma as equivalent to a Degree for purposes
A of further promotion then, the view of the High Court-that having
considered both class of officers equally eligible for promotion on the
mere strength of their educational qualifications; any further discrimi-
nation brought about by subjecting the Diploma-Holders alone to a
more onerous and less advantageous stipulation for such promotion
B would violate, the constitutional pledge of equality-might have some
--justification. But in the present case, counsel contended, that is not
the position. The educational qualification of a Diploma in engineer-
ing was not treated as equivalent to a Degree for purposes of determin-
ing eligibility. Nor' the Degree itself was determinative of eligibility for
promotion. The eligibility for promotion is, it is urged, based on a
coml:>ination of factors which vary according as the basic educational
c qualification of the two classes of engineers; that this distinction was
germane to the requirements of higher technical and academic quality
for the higher posts which involved expertise in structural-design etc.
Learned counsel submitted that even where recruitment to a particular
cadre was made from different sources, resulting in the formation of
D single a homogeneous cadre, it was not impermissible to make a
further classification amongst the members of such a cadre for
purposes of further promotion based on the higher educational qualifi-
cation of the candidates. ·
r
\;

E
Learned counsel for the respondent-diploma-holders, while
seeking to support the judgment of the High Court urged that this
Court had, more than once, cautioned against undue accent, in the
f
f
matter of promotional opportunities, on academic-qualification alone
which might lead to elitist preferences and tend to obscure the egali-
tarian principle and social-justice. It was, therefore, contended that··
the effect of the distinction, in the ultimate analysis, is really an ,.
F imperceptible extension or magnification of insubstantial factors sub-
verting the precious guarantee of equality. Sri Gujral, learned Senior
Counsel, sought to impart to the situation a dimension of social-justice
and made an impassioned plea t~at to discriminate between Diploma-
Holders and Graduates who belong to the same cadre ana hold
inter-changeable posts, both in the present-cadre and in the prospec-
tive promotional posts, on the mere lack of some higher academic
attainment is to place a high premium on those social and economic ills

I
of the society which rendered the further academic pursuits for the
economically disadvantaged difficult.

7. A large number of authorities were cited on either side. We
H may first examine the cases relied upon by the High Court in support
R.C. ADLAKHA v. D.D.A. (VENKATACHALIAH, J.I 263

of its conclusion. The inherent distinction between a person with a
Degree and one who is merely a Diploma-Holder is much too obvious. A
But the question that falls for consideration, in the context such as the
present one, is whether the differences have a reasonable relation to
the nature of the office to which the promotion is contemplated. The
idea of equality in the matter of promotion can be predicated only
when the candidates for promotion are drawn from the same source. If B
the differences in the qualification has a reasonable relation to the
nature of duties and responsibilities, that go with and are attendant
upon the promotional-post, the more advantageous treatment of those
who possess higher technical qualifications can be legitimised on the
doctrine of classification. There may, conceivably, be cases where the
differences in the educational qualifications may not be sufficient to
give any preferential treatment to one class of canpidates as against c
another. Whether the classification is reasonable or not must, there-
fore, necessarily depend upon facts of each case and the circumstances
obtaining at the relevant time. When the state makes a classification
between two sources, unless the vice of the classification is writ large
on the face of it, the person assailing the classification must show that D
it is unreasonable and violative of Article 14. A wooden equality as
between all classes of employees irrespective of all distinctions or
qualifications, or job-requirements is neither constitutionally compel-
led nor practically meaningful. This Court in Central Railway v.
A. V.R. Siddhanti, [1974] 3 SCR 207 at 214 observed:
E
" ..... A wooden equality as between al I classes of
employees regardless of qualifications, kind of jobs, nature
of responsibility and performance of the employees is not
intended, nor is it practicable if the administration is to
run. Indeed, the maintenance of such a 'classless and
undiscernil)g 'equality' where, in reality, glaring inequali- F
ties and intelligible differentia exist, will deprive the
guarantee of its practical content. Broad classification
based on reason, executive pragmatism and experience
having a direct relation with the achievement of efficiency
in administration, is permissible .... "
G
In T. Devadasan v. The Union of India, [1964] 4 SCR 680 at 689 & 690
• this Court observed:

" ..... What is meant by equality in this Article is,
.equality amongst equals. It does not provide for an abso-
lute equality of treatment to all persons in utter disregard H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

in every conceivable circumstance o_f t~e differences such
A as age, sex, education and so on and so forth as may ·be
found amongst people in general. Indeed, while the aim of
this Article is to ensure that inv!~!m1s distinction or
arbitrary discrimination shall not be made by the State bet-
ween a citizen and a citizen who answer the same descrip-
B tion and the differences whi_ch may obtain between them_ are
of no relevance for the purpose of applying a particular law
reasonable classification is permissible. It does not mean
anything more."

But then the process of classification is in itself productive of
C inequality and in that sense antithetical of equality. The process would
be constitutionally valid if it recognises a pre-existing inequality and
acts in aid of amelioration of the effects of such pre-existent inequality.
But the process cannot in itself generate or aggravate the inequality ..
The process cannot merely blow-up or magnify in-substantial or l
microscopic differences on merely meretricious or plausible dif-
[]) ferences. The over-emphasis on the doctrine of classification or any
anxious and sustained attempts to discover some basis for classification
may gradually and imperceptibly deprive .the article of its precio)ls
content and end in replacing Doctrine of equality by the doctrine of
classification. The presumption of good faith in and of constitutiona-
lity of a classification cannot be pushed "to the point of predicating
E some possible or hypothetical but undisclosed and unknown reason for
a classification rendering the precious guarantee oi equality "a mere {
I
rope of sand".

"To overdo classification is to undo equality". The idea of simi-
larity or dissimilarity'of situations of persons, to justify classification,
F cannot rest on merely differentia which may, by themselves be rational
or logical, but depends on whether the differences are relevant to the
goals sought to be reached by the law which seeks to classify. The
justification of the classification must needs, therefore, to be sought
beyond the classification. All marks of distinction do not necessarily
justify classification irrespective of the relevance or nexus to objects
G sought to be achieved by the law imposing the classification.
f
8. In Mohd. Sujat Ali's case the validity of a prescription of the •
rules ofthe State of Andhra Pradesh treating Graduate-Engineers, on
the one hand, and engineers with diploma or equivalent qualification,
on the other, differently for purposes of promotion arose for consi-
H deration. Strictly speaking, the High Court was not right in its under-
R.C. ADLAKHA v. D.D.A. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 265

standing of the ac(\lal result of the case. The High C01,rt, in para 8 of
the judgment observed:
A

"The Supreme Court had then struck down this rule as
violative of fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution oflndia ...... "
B
But it is to be noticed that the writ-petition~ were ultimately
dismissed by this Court. There are, of course, certain observations
which caution against too readily resorting to the expedience of clas-
sification. After referring to Triloki Nath Khosa's case it was observed:

" . . . . . But from these decisions it cannot be laid
down as an invariable rule that whenever any classification c
is made on the basis of variant educational qualifications,
such classification must be held to be valid irrespective of the
nature and purpose of the ciassification or the quality and
extent of the differences in the educational qualifications. It
must be remembered,that "life has relations not capable D
always of division into inflexible compartments". The
moulds expand and shrink. The test of reasonable classifi-
cation has to be applied in each case on its peculiar facts and
circumstances ...... ''
(Emphasis Supplied)
E
This echoes what Vivian Bose, J. had earlier said in Bidi Supply
Co. v. Union of India, [1956]SCR 182:

"Article 14 sets out, to my mind, an attitude of mind,
a way of life, rather than a precise rule oflaw ...... "
F
" ..... In a given case that it falls this side of the line or
that and because of that decisions on the same point will
vary as conditions vary, one conclusion in one part of the
country and another somewhere else; one decision today
and another tomorrow when the basis of society has altered
and the structure of current social thinking is different. It is G
not the law that alters but the changing conditions of the
times and Article 14 narrows down to a question of fact
which must be determined by the highest Judges in the land
as each case arises ...... "

Shujat Ali's case itself recognised tbe permissibility and validity H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

of such classification if the nature of the functions and duties attached
A
to the promotional-posts are such as to justify the classification in the
interest of efficiency in public service; but, where both graduates and
non-graduates were regarded as equally fit and eligible for promot10n,
the denial of promotion to a person otherwise eligible and due for
promotion on the basis of a quota was not justified. On this point it
B was observed by this Court in Shujat Ali's case:

" ..... But where graduates and non-graduates are
both regarded as fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion,
it is difficult to see how, consistently, with the claim for
equal opportunity, any differentiation can be made
between them by laying down a quota of promotion for
c each and giving preferential treatment to graduates over
non-graduates in the matter of fixation of such quota. The
result of fixation of quota of promotion for each of the two
categories of supervisors would be that when a vacancy
arises in the post of Asst. Engineer, which, according to the
D quota is reserved for graduate supervisors, a non-graduate
supervisor cannot be promoted to that vacancy, even if he
is senior to all other graduate supervisors and more suitable
than they. His opportunity for promotion would be limited
only to vacancies available for non-graduate supervisors.
That would clearly amount to denial of equal opportunity
E to him ...... "

In the present appeals before us, the Graduates and Diploma-
Holders were not treated equal in the matter of eligibility for promo-
tion. What is, therefore, assailed is not the aspect of the mere fixation
of a quota as between the Diploma-Holders and the Graduates in the
F promotional posts, but the very prescription of different standards or
conditions of eligibility. In Shujat Ali's case the infirmity of the diffe-
rential treatment stemmed· from the fundamental basis that, at that
point, both Graduates and Diploma-holders were equally eligible but
the Rule operated to deny promotion to a Diploma-holder on the basis
of a quota. The observations in that case pertained to a stage which
G arose after the equality of eligibility for promotion between the two
classes of persons had been recognised. But in the present appeals the
different prescriptions for conditioning eligibility are themselves
questioned which need to be decided on the basis whether the discrimi-
nation contemplated and brought about in the matter of promotional-
opportunities between graduates and non-graduates, based on the dif-
H ferences in the quality of their technical qualifications, were relatable
R.C. ADLAKHA v. D.D.A. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 267

to, and justified on the basis of, the requirements of the pr'?motional-
.posts. ll is relevant to mention here. that the different, standards and
conditions for eligibility. were prescribed with a view to injecting a
higher technical quality in the promotions-cadre based on the recom-
mendations of a committee, called "Yaish-Committee", constituted
for the purpose.
B
H. C. Shanna's and Punjab State Electricity Board's cases were
also matters where Graduates and Diploma-holders were merged into
and formed part of a homogeniomr~adre with equal eligibility for
promotion and what fell for consideration was the validity of the
further prescription of quotas between them. Here-again, no question
of the validity of the different standards prescribed for the very eligi-
bility for promotion fell for consideration. The present cases, how- c
ever, are those where, havig regard to the requirements of the
promotional-posts, different co,nditions of eligibility for promotion on
the differences based on the educational qualifications and service-
experience were prescribed.
/
D
9. In State of Mysore v. Narasinga Rao, [1968] 1SCR401 higher
educational qualifications were considered relevant for fixation of
higher pay-scales. In Union of India v. Mrs. S.B. Kohli, [1973] 3 SCR
117 the requirement of a post graduate specialisation in the particular
discipline was considered not irrelevant and a classification based on
such specialisation was upheld. E

Triloki Nath Khosa's case is more directly in point. There,
Graduate-Engineers.and Diploma-Holders were in a common-cadre of
Asst. Engineers. But for purposes of further promotion to the higher
cadre of Executive-Engineers only the Graduate were held eligible.
Diploma-Holders were barred for promotion. Repelling the challenge F
to this provision made by the Diploma Holders, this Court said:

"The cl.assification of Assistant Engineers into
Degree-holders and Diploma-holders could not be held to
rest on any unreal or unreasonable basis. The classification
was made with a view to achieving ac1.•inistrative efficiency G
in the Engineering services. If this be the object, the clas-
sification is clearly correlated to it for higher educational
qualifications are at least presumption evidence of a _higher
mental equipment."

"Classification on the basis of educational qualifica- H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

tions made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency
cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstances and
one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstances
·of the case in order to judge the validity of a classification."

"Though persons appointed directly and by promo-
tion were integrated into a common class of Assistant
Engineers, they could, for purposes of promotion to the
cadre of Executive Engineers, be Classified on the basis of
educational qualifications the rule providing that graduates
shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of
diploma-holders does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution and must be upheld."
(Emphasis Supplied)

In Triloki Nath's case diploma-holders were not considered eligi-.
ble for promotion to the higher post. Here, in the present case, the
possession of a diploma, by itself and without more, does not confer
Jil eligibility. Diploma, for purposes of promotion, is n~t considered
equivalent to the degree. This is the point of distinction in the situa-
tions in the two cases. If Diploma-Holders-of course on the justifica-
tion of the job-requirements and in the interest of maintaining a cer-
tain quality of technical expertise in the cadre-could validly be
excluded from the eligibility for promotion to the higher cadre, it does
il not necessarily follow as an inevitable corollary that the choice of the
recruitment policy is limited only two choices, namely either to con-
sider them "eligible" or "not eligible". State, consistent with the
requirements of the promotional-posts and in the interest of the effi-
ciency of the service, is not precluded from conferring eligibility on
Diploma-Holders conditioning it by other requirements which may, as
I" here, include certain quantum of service-experience. In the present
case, eligibility-determination was made by a cumulative-criterion of a
·certain educational qualification plus a particular quantum of service
experience. It cannot, in our opinion, be said, as postulated by the
·High Court, that the choice of the State was either to recognise
Diploma-Holders as "eligible" for promotion or wholly exclude them
G as "fiOt•e.Jigible". If the educational qualification by itself was reco-
gnised as conferring eligibility for promotion, then, the super-imposi-
tion of further conditions such as a particular period of service, selec-
tively; on the Diploma-Holders alone to their disadvantage might be-
come discriminatory. This does not prevent the State from formulating
a policy which prescribes as an essential part of the conditions for the
H very eligibility that the candidate must have a particular qualification
-(,

R.C. ADLAKHA v. D.D.A. (VENKATACHALIAH, J.) . 269

plus a stipulated quantum of service-experience. It is stated that on the A
basis of the "Yaish-Committee;• report, the authorities considered the .;::'-'
infusion of higher academic and technical quality in the ,personnel
requirements in the relevant cadres of Engineering Services necessary.
These are essentially matters of policy. Unless the provision is shown
:<·,--
to be arbitrary, capricious, or to bring about grossly unfair results,
judicial policy should be one of judicial-restraint. The prescriptions B
may be somewhat cumbersome or produce some hardship in their
application in some individu_al cases; but they can not be struck down
as unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary. The High Court, in our
opinion, was not justified in striking down the Rules as violative of
Articles 14 and 16.
c
10. Accordingly, all the Appeals are allowed, the Judgment of
the High Court dated 2.9.1987 set-aside and the Civil vyrit Petitions
No. 2132 of 1984 and 2082 of 1984 in the High Court disJ1'issed. How-
ever, the parties are left to bear and pay their costs, ,both here and
I
below. /

A.P.J. Appeals allowed ..

'