Holding

In departmental disciplinary proceedings, the enquiry officer must base findings on admissible evidence and cannot rely solely on an unproved confession; where the evidence is insufficient, the dismissal order is invalid and the employee must be reinstated with back wages.

Summary

The appellant, a peon of Punjab National Bank, was accused of stealing a blank draft issue book. After a five‑year delay, a departmental enquiry found him guilty, relying mainly on a purported confession recorded by police, which the appellant claimed was obtained under duress. The disciplinary authority dismissed him without giving reasons or considering that a criminal court had earlier discharged him on the same evidence. The Supreme Court held that a departmental enquiry is a quasi‑judicial proceeding and the enquiry officer must base findings on admissible evidence, not on unproved confessions or conjecture. Since no direct or indirect evidence proved the theft, the dismissal was unsupported by law. Consequently, the Court set aside the disciplinary and appellate orders, reinstated the appellant, and awarded full back wages.

Issues considered

The adequacy of evidence required in a departmental disciplinary proceeding.
Whether a purported police confession, alleged to be obtained under duress, can be the sole basis for a finding of guilt.
Whether the disciplinary authority must give reasons for its order and consider a prior criminal discharge.
Applicability of the Evidence Act and principles of natural justice in departmental enquiries.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 380, s. 411

Subjects

service lawdisciplinary proceedingsdepartmental enquirynatural justiceburden of proofconfessionreinstatementback wagesbank theftquasi‑judicial

Judgment

[2008) 17 S.C.R. 1476

A ROOP SINGH NEGI
II.
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK & ORS. )-
I

(Civil Appeal No. 7431 of 2008)
DECEMBER 19, 2008
B
[S.8. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSPEH, JJ.]

Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings - Bank - Theft
of blank dra:_ft issue bo_ok - Appellant, a bank employee, one ..
c of the accused - Enquiry· Officer found appellant guilty by -\,
placing reliance upon a purported confession made by him
before police authorities - bisciplinary Authority without
t
considering contentions-raised by appellant including the fact
that in the meanwhile he had been discharged by Crimi[]~/
Court, directed dismissal of appellant - Held: Enquiry Officer
D performs a quasi judicial function and has a duty to arrive at
a finding upon taking into consideration materials brought on
record by parties - On facts, only basic evidence whereupon
reliance was placed by Enquiry Officer was the purported ~·
confession made by appellant before police - Said

-
E · confession should have been proved - No evidence, direct
or indirect, was brought on record to show that appellant
indulged in stealing the bank draft book - Also, order of
disciplinary authority and of appellate authority were not
supported by any reason - If Enquiry officer had relied upon
F confession made by appellant, there was no reason as to why ,
. order of discharge passed by Criminal Court on basis of self-
~-
same evidence should not have been taken into consideration
- Prqvisions of Evidence Act may not be applicable in
departmental proceeding but principles of natural justice are
- As report of Enquiry Officer was based on mere ipse dixit
G
as also surmises and conjectures, same cannot be sustained
- Appellant accordingly directed to be re-instated with full back
wages - Principles of natural justice - Requirement of
application of mind. ·r
H 1476
ROOP SINGH NEGI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1477
& ORS.

Appellant, a Bank employee was allegedly involved A
in theft of a blank draft issue book. Five years after the
incident, disciplinary proceeding were initiated against
him. The Enquiry Officer found the appellant guilty by
placing reliance .upon a purported confession made by
him before the police authorities at the time of the B
incident.
The Disciplinary Authority without assigning any
reason and without considering the contentions raised
by the appellant including the fact that in the meanwhile
he had been discharged by the Criminal Court, directed C
the appellant to be dismissed from service.
Representation made by appellant before the appell~te
authority was dismissed. Thereafter, appellant filed writ
petition which was dismissed by the High Court. Hence
the present appeal.
D
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1.1. A departmental proceeding is a quasi
judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi
judicial function. The charges levelled against the
delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. E
r The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon ,
taking into consideration the materials brought on record
by the parties. The purported evidence collected during
investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the
accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in
the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to !F
prove the said documents. The management witnesses
merely tendered the documents and did not prove the
contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the
Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been 1

treated as evidence. The only basic evidence whereupon G
reliance has been placed by the Enquiry Officer was the
purported confession made by the appellant before the
police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign I

on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police ·
station. Appellant being an employee of the bank, the said H
1478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 17 S.C.R.

A confession should have been proved. Some evidence
should have been brought on record to show that he had
indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there '!-- _
was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect·
evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the
8 Enquiry Officer had made up his mind to find him guilty
as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis
that the offence was committed in such a manner that no
evidence was left. [Para 10] (1485-G-H; 1486-A-E]
1.2. The order of the disciplinary authority as also the
C appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As
the ·orders passed by them have severe civil
consequences, appropriate reasons should have been
assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the •,
.~confession made by the appellant, there was no reason
as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal
D Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have
been taken into consideration. The materials brought on
record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A
decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is
legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act
E may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but
. the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the
- Enquiry Officer was based on mere ipse dixit as also
surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been
sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer
F apparently were not supported by any evidence.
Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can
under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for
legal proof. The appellant is accordingly directed to be
re-instated with full back wages. [Paras 17 and 18] (1492-
G C-H]
Union of India vs. H.S. Goel (1964) 4 SCR 718; Moni
Shankar v. Union of India and Anr. (2008) 3 SCC 484;
Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. &
ors. (2006) 4 sec 713; M. V. Bijlani v. Union of India & ors.
H (2006) 5 SCC 88 and Jasbir Singh v. Punjab & Sind Bank &
ROOP SINGH NEGI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1479.
& ORS.

ors. (2007) 1 sec 566, relied on. A
Ku/deep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police & ors.
((1999) 2 SCC 10]; Bhagwati Prasad Dubey vs. The Food

.
• --4,
Corporation of India [AIR 1988 SC 434] and Capt. M. Paul
I
Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 679,
referred to. B
Case Law Reference:
(1999) 2 sec 10 referred to Para 9
AIR 1988 SC 434 referred to Para 9
,. c2006) 4 sec 113 relied on Para 9
I- (1964) 4 SCR 718 relied on Para 11 c
c2008) 3 sec 484 relied on Para 12
(1999) 3 sec 679 referred to Para 13
(2006) 5 sec 88 relied on Para 15
c2001) 1 sec 566 relied on Para 16 ID
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
' 7431 of 2008.
(

~
From the final Judgment and Order dated 20.4.2007 of the '
~"
High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Civil Writ Petition
No. 725 of 2001. E
K.K. Rai, S.K. Pandey, A.P.S. Rawat, Subhash Oberoi,
C.M. Gopal and K.V. Mohan for the Appellant.
Dhruv Mehta, Harshvardhan Jha, Yashraj Sigh Deora and 1

T.S. Satarish (for Mis. K.L. Mehta & Co.) for the Respondents.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
',."' S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Appellant was working as a peon in the respondent -
......
~I Bank.
On or about 24.11.1993, a complaint was lodged by the G
Manager of the Bank alleging that some drafts which were
prese.nted for encashment by M/s Anil Trader and some other ,
persons and purported to have been issued from the Mall Road
\
Branch of the Bank had in fact not been issued therefrom.
H
1480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 17 S.C.R.

A A First Information Report (for short, "FIR") under Section
380/120B of the Indian Penal Code was registered. The
investigation of the said case was assigned to one Shri
Janardhan Singh, Senior Inspector. He submitted a report on ~

11 :·12.1993, inter alia, opining that the integrity of the appellant )-
\I
B who had been transferred to Rampur, Shimla was doubtful. It
was concluded:
"In view of the facts stated above we are of the view that
both the joint c1.:1stodian i.e. Shri H.C. Grover - Manager,
presently posted at BO Chandni Chowk, Delhi and Shri
~

c P.C. Gupta - AM are responsible for the loss of the
drawing book since either of the two have remained one ·~
r-
Qf the custodians from 1.6.93 to 24.8.93. The. loss of
drawing book could have been avoided had they taken due
care and precaution.

D Further, Shri Sharad Narain, Sr. Manager is also
responsible as he has failed to ensure compliance of laid
down instructions in respect of monthly checking of security
forms and also for non-submission of M.C. after 31.5.93."
In the said report, various procedural lapses on the part \~
of some officers of the Bank were also pointed out.
E
3. After five years of the said incidence, a disciplinary ,,
_)I--
proceeding was initiated against the appellant stating that
during the period 18.11.1991 and 9.10.1993, he had taken
away one blank draft issue book bearing -No. 626401 to
626425. A show-cause notice was issued. Cause was shown
F
by him. He was found guilty by the Enquiry Officer. In the said
proceeding, reliance was placed on the purported confession ,,
of the appellant before the police authorities in the year 1993. "" .
It was marked as Exhibit PE-3. ,..
J,
~--

4. Indisputably, the forms and other important books and
G
documents belonging to a Bank never remain in the custody t
;;.,.--
of a peon. It was accepted that documentary evidences were ....
collected by the police officers. Those documents were simply
produced; they were not proved. The purported confession by ;
the appellant was also not proved. Only because the said
H
ROOP SINGH NEGI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1481
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

confession was made before the police authorities, the enquiry A
officer inferred on the basis thereof that the appellant had
connection with those persons who had used those bank drafts,
stating:
" .... Therefore, the undersigned is of the opinion that PE-4
proves that Shri Roop Singh Negi has connections with the B
said culprits. On examination of witness MDW-1 on 20/7/
99, he has said that according to the statement of Shri
Roop Singh Negi, he has confessed that on the
instructions/saying of Rajbir, Devinder alias Mental, Asif
and Brahmpal, who are the residents of trans-Yamuna area C
he had stolen the draft book ..... "
It was, inter alia, concluded:
"In view of the above details/proceedings it is proved that
the delinquent employee has admitted that drafts being no.
QWA-626401 to 626425 have been stolen from Branch. i D
office Mall Road Delhi Branch vide page no. 25057 and
has caused financial loss to the bank but he has not
admitted that he has stolen the said drafts.
As the main charge on the delinquent employee is of
stealing the draft books and other documents, therefore, in such E
matters direct proof/evidence are not available generally and
the conclusion has been arrived at on the basis of
assumptions .... "
Assumption of certain factual foundation was drawn on the
basis of the documents supplied by the police as would appear F
from the following findings of the Enquiry Officer.
"1. Efforts were made to through Lost Draft book no.
626404 dated 6.9.93 for Rs. 6,90,000/- was prepared the
fake draft and encashed through OBC Farukabad
prepared through PNB Branch Farukabad and again draft G
drawn on OBC Delhi and encashed through CBI Narain
branch.
2. From this draft no. 626402 dated 24.8.93 for Rs.
5,40,000/- made in the name of M/s Ajay Sales and
H
1482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.t •.

A encashed from Farukabad Branch.
3. From the pages, draft no. 626415 dated 27.9.93 for Rs.
7,35,000/- and draft no. 626423dated 1.10.95 for Rs. ~
8,65;000/- drawn on branch Saharanpur and encashed on
branch Khalsi Lines Saharanpur.
B 4. Arresting of culprits namely K.K. Gupta, Rajbir, Ashok
Kumar, Ravinder Pal Singh, Kante Gupta and Harvinder
alias Billa with the remaining pages of the draft book by
the Thane Mysori (Ghaziabad) police.
5. Stealing of draft book bearing no. 626401 to 626425
.
c and other documents from branch Mall Road Delhi. -\-

6. First draft was issued on 24.8.93 from the stolen draft
book which fact came to the knowledge of Mall Road Delhi
Branch from the Central Bank of India Branch Officer.
7. Before 9.10.1993 Shri Roop Singh Negi was posted in
D
the Mall Road Delhi Branch.
8. Bank Security Form Department is out of reach of non-
bank employees/outsiders."
It was purported to have been found:
,.
E "1. Stealing of drawing book and specimen signatures of
officers happened before 24.8.93.
2. The factum of stealing the drafts came to the knowledge
on 24.11.93 while the same was done on 24.8.93. Draft
book has been stolen from Security Form Department in
F such a manner which fact has come to the knowledge very
late. Possibly this draft book has been taken away
J.--
available at the last serial nos. of the draft books.
3. From the whole embezzlement it is clear that the gang
had full knowledge of the banking working or any employee
G was involved in this embezzlement/fraud.
4. That fraud has been committed so cleverly so that there
is no direct proof or evidence available."
Conclusion was drawn up on the basis of the above facts r
by the Enquiry Officer as under:
H
ROOP SINGH NEGI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1483
, '
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

"That Shri Roop Singh has direct or indirect links with the A
culprits who were arrested by the Thane Mysori (Ghaziabad)
along with pages of drafts and on the basis of whose statement
Shri Roop Singh Negi was arrested by the Delhi Police on
9.12.93 from Rampur Bushahar Himachal Pradesh and taken
to Delhi. Having links with the aforesaid accused, it is proved
B
that Shri Roop Singh Negi has stolen the draft book no. 626401
to 626425 from the Security Form Department."
5. Before the disciplinary authority, the appellant contended
)0 that there was no evidence against him. The attention of the
disciplinary authority was furthermore drawn to the fact that by
-+ c
an order dated 9.5.2000, the Criminal Court passed an order
of his discharge. Only charges under Section 411 of the Indian
Penal Code were framed against one Rajbir.
Neither the State nor the Bank preferred any revision
petition thereagainst. The same attained finality. The Regional D
Manager acting as a disciplinary authority by an order c.fated
24.1.2001 without assigning any reason and without
considering the contentions raised by the appellant including
the fact that he had been discharged by the criminal court,
1 directed the appellant to be dismissed from services, stating:
E
"That I have again gone through the facts carefully and I
hold you responsible for gross misconduct in terms of
Bipartite Settleme'nt clause 19.5 (amended from time to

'• time) and there is no justification to reduce the proposed
punishment. Therefore, in terms of the Bipartite Settlement
F
clause 19.6, I confirm the proposed punishment
4, "Dismissal from Bank Service". As you are under
suspension, therefore, I order that in terms of .Bipartite
Settlement Provisions you will be eligible for subsistence
'\ allowance only till your dismissal from bank service."
G
.._ 6. Appellant made a representation against the said order
before the appellate authority. The appellate authority noticing
his contentions in details. Inter alia, on the premise that
appellant had been given an opportunity of personal hearing,

' the appeal was dismissed, opining:
H
1484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A "In view of the above, the submissions made by the
appellant in his appeal dated 23.02.2001 and his verbal
submissions made during personal hearing are devoid of ,._
merits. As such I find no reasons to interfere or alter the
order of Disciplinary Authority.
B Thus keeping in view the nature and gravity of the proven
charges, punishment of "Dismissal from Bank Service",
imposed upon Shri Negi by Disciplinary Authority vide its
order dated 24.01.2001 is hereby confirmed and appeal
of Shri Negi is rejected." -':

-c 7. The appellate authority also did not apply his mind to "t-
the contentions raised by the appellant; no reason was
assigned in support of his conclusion.
On what evidence, the appellant was found guilty was not
stated.
D 8. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said orders, the
appellant filed a Writ Petition. The same by reason of the
impugned judgment has been dismissed, stating:
" ... The writ jurisdiction can be exercised by this court only Y"
in exceptional circumstances which have not been
E mentioned by the petitioner in the petition. However, once
the petition was admitted for hearing in exercise bf the writ
jurisdiction after a lapse of so ·many years since the writ ,.
petition was admitted in the year 2001, it may not be I!,
appropriate for this Court to pass an order now that the ·.)
i

F petitioner should make out a case for reference to the
industrial tribunal and therefore the petition filed by the
petitioner is being considered."
Ar-
9. The High Court/
noticed the decision of this Court in
I
Ku/deep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police & ors. [(1999) 2 II-
..
G SCC 1OJ, Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. & ors. [(2006) 4 SCC 713] and Bhagwati Prasad Dubey ~
vs. The Food Corporation of. India [AIR 1988 SC 434]
whereupon reliance has been placed by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant, and held:
r
,.
H /

'
ROOP SINGH NEGI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1485
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

"All the aforesaid decisions are not directly attracted to the A
present facts though the law laid down applies to the
1 present facts. But in the facts of the case it is not a case
of no evidence but only in regard to the conclusions drawn
based upon the evidence which reappraisal cannot be
done by this Court.
B
Coming to the arguments that there can be no
reappraisal of the evidence by this Court once the findings
have been given by the Enquiry Officer considering the '
evidence, it is not the case of the petitioner that there was
+ no evidence at all as against him led before the Enquiry ' C
Officer, but the dispute is in regard to the conclusion drawn
by the enquiry Officer based upon evidence. According to ,
law even if two views are possible to be drawn against the
petitioner on the basis of the Enquiry Report one which has
been drawn by the Enquiry Officer cannot be held to be ·
wrong taking the plea that the second view was also D
possible to be drawn based upon evidence ..
The decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder
Mohan AfYa's case (supra) clearly lays down that the
proceedings of departmental enquiry report are quasi
criminal in nature. Therefore the guilt of the delinquent E
official is not required to be proved beyond any reasonable
doubt as in a criminal case.
We have considered the report of the Enquiry Officer
and the penalty imposed by the Bank is based upon
evidence as such it is not open to this Court to consider , F
that some other view was also possible and since it was
not a case of no evidence therefore there cannot be
reappraisal of evidence. or draw its own conclusion by this
Court based upon evidence. The findings recorded by the
Enquiry Officer and the punishment imposed by the · G
respondent Bank or its officers call for no interference by , -
this court and as such there is no merit in the petition which
is dismissed accordingly."
10. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi
judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi H
1486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent
officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer
has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration r
the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported
evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating
Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to
B
be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was
examined to prove the said documents. The management
witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove
the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the '
\.
Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated
c as evidence. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic
evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the Enquiry
Officer was the purported confession made by the appellant
before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to
sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police
D station. Appellant being an employee of the bank, the said
confession should have been proved. Some evidence should
have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in
stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct "_,,..
evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of
E the report demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had made up
his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have
proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such
a manner that no evidence was left.
11. In Union oflndia vs. H.S. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718, it
F was held:
".... The two infirmities are separate and distinct though,
,...,.;-
~ {;
conceivably, in some cases, both may be present. There
may be cases of no evidence even where the Government
is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where
G the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the
conclusion of the Government not supported by any
evidence may be the result of mala tides, but that does not
mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support
the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will
r.
not issued without further proof of mala fides. That is why ;
H '
ROOP SINGH NEGI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1487
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney- A
General's argument that sine no mala tides are alleged
against the appellant in the present case, no writ of
certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent.
That takes us to the merits of the respondent's
contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third B
charged framed against the respondent has been proved,
is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General
has stressed before us that in dealing with this question,
1
we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting
-+ with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it c
is shown that the view taken by he appellant is a
reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in
appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this
Court would have taken the same view or not. This
contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which
we can legitimately apply in de~ling with this part of the D
respondents case is, is there any evidence on which a
finding can be made against the respondent that charge
'f No. 3 was proved against him ? In exercising its jurisdiction
under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot
consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy E
of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a
matter which is within the competence of the authority
which dealt with the question; but the High Court can and
must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in
support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the F
whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as
true, does the conclusion follow that the charges in
question is proved against the respondent ? This approach
will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence
as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence
legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying G
this test, we are inclined to· hold that the respondent's
grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the
~ finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing
the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him
H
1488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A is based on no evidence.
12. In Mani Shankar v. Union of India and Anr. [(2008) 3
SCC 484), this Court held: t
17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial one.
Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not
B applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural
justice are required to be complied with. The Court
exercising power of judicial review are entitl~d to consider
as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on
~
the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence
c has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have \--
been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based
on evidence which rneet the requirements of legal
principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its
own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced
by the department, even if it is taken on its face value to
D
be correct in its entirety, me.et the requirements of burden
of proof, namely- preponderance of probability. If on such
evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has
not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to
,,.
interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of
E unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of
proportionality."
13. In Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd. & ors. (supra), whereupon both the learned counsel
relied upon, this Court held:
F
"26. In our opinion the learned Single Judge and
)<:-..
consequently the Division Bench of the High Court did not
pose unto themselves the correct question. The matter can
be viewed from two angles. Despite limited jurisdiction a
civil court, it was entitled to interfere in a case where the
G report of the Enquiry Officer is based on no evidence. In a
suit filed by a delinquent employee in a civil court as also _
a writ court, in the event the findings arrived at in the
· departmental proceedings are questioned before it should f
keep in mind the following: (1) the enquiry officer is nc;>t
H
ROOP SINGH NEGI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1489
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

permitted to collect any material from outside sources A
during the conduct of the enquiry. [See State of Assam and
Anr. v. Mahendra Kumar Das and Ors. [(1970) 1 SCC
709] (2) In a domestic enquiry fairness in the procedure
is a part of the principles of natural justice [See Khem
Chand v. Union of India and Ors. (1958 SCR 1080) and 8
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Prakash Gupta (1969) 3 '
SCC 775]. (3) Exercise of discretionary power involve two
elements (i) Objective and (ii) subjective and existence of
.,. the exercise of an objective element is a condition 1

precedent for exercise of the subjective element. [See K.L.
Tripathi v. State of Bank of India and Ors. (1984) 1 SCC C
43]. (4) It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules of the
principles of natural justice which depends on the facts and '
circumstances of each case but the concept of fair play in
action is the basis. [See Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan
(1986) 3 sec 454] (5) The enquiry officer is not permitted p
to travel beyond the charges and any punishment imposed
on the basis of a finding which was not the subject matter
of the charges is wholly illegal. [See Director (Inspection
& quality Control) Export Inspection Council of India and 1

Ors. v. Kalyan Kumar Mitra and Ors. 1987 (2) Cal. LJ E
344. (6) Suspicion or presumption cannot take the place
of proof even in a domestic enquiry. The writ court is
entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact of any
tribunal or authority in certain circumstances. [See Central

-
_,
Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain (1969) 1 SCR
735, Ku/deep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Ors.
(1999) 2 sec 101."
The judgment and decree passed against the respondent
,F

therein had attained finality.
In the said suit, the enquiry report in the disciplinary G

• proceeding was considered, the same was held to have been
based on no evidence. Appellant therein in the aforementioned
situation filed a Writ Petition questioning the validity of the
disciplinary proceeding, the same was dismissed. This Court

•
' held that when a crucial finding like forgery was arrived at on
H
1490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A an evidence which is non est in the eye of the law, the civil court
would have jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. This Court
emphasized that a finding can be arrived at by the Enquiry
·officer if there is some evidence on record. It was furthermore
found that the order of the appellate authority suffered from non
8 application of mind. This Court referred to its earlier decision
in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. [(1999) 3
sec 679] to opine:
"41. We may not be understood to have laid down a law
, that in all such circumstances the decision of the civil court
or the criminal court would be binding on the disciplinary
c authorities as this Court in a large number of decisions
points point that the same would depend upon other
factors as well. See e.g. Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil
Bharatiya Ch ah Mazdoor Sangh and Anr. (2004) 8 SCC
200 and Manager, Reserve Bank of India Bangalore v.
D S. Mani and Ors. (2005) 5 sec 100. Each case is,
therefore, required to be considered on its own facts.
42. It is equally well settled that the power of judicial review
would not be. refused to be exercised by the High Court,
although despite it would be lawful to do so. In Manager,
E Reserve Bank of India Bangalore (supra) this Court
observed: :
'39. The findings of the learned Tribunal 1 as noticed
hereinbefore, are wholly perverse. It apparently
posed unto itself wrong questions. It placed onus
F of proof wrongly upon the appellant. Its decision is
based upon irrelevant factors not germane for the
purpose of arriving at a correct finding of fact. It has
also failed to take into consideration the relevant
factors. A case for judicial review, thus, was made
G out."
14. In that case also, the learned single judge proceeded
on the basis that the disadvantages of an employer is that such
acts are committed in secrecy and in conspiracy with the f.
person affected by the accident, stating:
H
ROOP SINGH NEGI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1491
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

" .... No such finding has been arrived at even in the A
disciplinary proceedings nor any charge was made out as
against the appellant in that behalf. He had no occasion
to have his say thereupon. Indisputably, the writ court will
bear in mind the distinction between some evidence or no
evidence but the question which was required to be posed 9
and necessary should have been as to whether some
evidence adduced would lead to the conclusion as regard
the guilt of the delinquent officer or not. The evidence
adduced on behalf of the management must have nexus
with the charges. The Enquiry Officer cannot base his
findings on mere hypothesis. Mere ipso dixit on his part C
cannot be a substitute of evidence.
45. The findings of the learned Single Judge to the effect
that 'it is established with the conscience (sic) of the Court
reasonably formulated by an Enquiry Officer then in the
eventuality' may not be fully correct inasmuch as the Court D
while exercising its power of judicial review should also
apply its mind as to whether sufficient material had been
1 brought on record to sustain the findings. The conscience
of a court may not have much role to play. It is unfortunate
that the learned Single Judge did not at all deliberate on E·
the contentions raised by the appellant. Discussion on the
materials available on record for the purpose of applying
the legal principles was imperative. The Division Bench of
the High Court also committed the same error."
15. Yet again in M. V. Bijlani vs. Union of India & ors. F·
(2006) 5 SCC 88, this Court held:
" .... Although the charges in a departmental proceedings
are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e.,
beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the
fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial G
function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive
at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of
probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials
on record. While doing so; he cannot take into
consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to H

\
1492 SUPREME COURT 'REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of
proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the
witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. »-- .
He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the
delinquent officer had not been charged with."
B , 16. Yet again in Jasbir Singh vs. Punjab & Sind Bank &
ors. [(2007) 1 SCC 566], this court followed Narinder Mohan
Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors. (supra), stating:
)
"12. In a case of this nature, therefore, the High Court
should have applied its mind to the fact of the mattw; with
C reference to the materials brought on records. It failed so
to do."
17. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as
also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason.
As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences,
D appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry
officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant,
there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed
by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence
should not have been taken into consideration. The materials
E brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be
proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which
is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may
not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the
principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry
Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and
F conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The
inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not J
supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known,
however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to
be a substitute for legal proof.
G 18. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed with costs and
appellant Is directed to be reinstated with fulf. back wages.
Counsel's-fee assessed at Rs.25,000/-. f
::..B.B.B. ~ppe_al allowed.
H::z