Holding

The requisition must be released to the owner; the 1958 transfer was unauthorized; civil courts lack jurisdiction under Section 19, and the appeal is allowed.

Summary

The property known as Katras House was requisitioned in 1942 for Army purposes under Rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules, which later became a requisition under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, transferred the requisitioned building to a civil surgeon and subsequently to the private Ranchi Women's College under Section 11(2) of the Bihar Building Lease Rent and Eviction Control Act, 1947. The original owner filed an eviction suit in 1995, contending that the civil court lacked jurisdiction because the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent authority under Section 19 of the 1952 Act. The Supreme Court held that the requisition could not exceed the 17‑year limit prescribed by the 1970 amendment, that the 1958 transfer was unauthorized, and that the civil court was barred from hearing the suit. Consequently, the Court ordered the property to be released to the appellant, directed payment of rent arrears by the college, and set aside the High Court’s order, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

The requisition of immovable property under the 1952 Act could continue beyond the 17‑year period prescribed by the 1970 amendment.
The validity of the transfer of a requisitioned property to a private college under Section 11(2) of the Bihar Building Lease Rent and Eviction Control Act, 1947.
Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the eviction suit or whether jurisdiction was exclusively with the competent authority under Section 19 of the 1952 Act.
Whether the appellant’s payment of rent created a tenancy that would defeat the requisition authority’s rights.
Whether estoppel could be invoked against the respondent for its inconsistent jurisdictional pleas.

Legislation cited

Defence of India Ruless. Rule 75A
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952s. 19, s. 3, s. 6, s. 6(1-A), s. 6(2), s. 8(2)

Subjects

RequisitionImmobilier propertyCivil court jurisdictionSection 19TenancyTransfer of requisitioned propertyEstoppelCompensationRent ActDefence of India Rules

Judgment

[2009] 7 S.C.R. 343

·~
ROY ESTATE 'A
V.
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS.
Civil Appeal No. 3146 of 2009
MAY 1, 2009
B
[DALVEER BHANDARI AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]
Requisitioning and Acquisitioning of Immovable Properly
Act, 1952 - ss.3, 6, 6(1A), 6(2), 19 - Release from
requisitioning - Requisition of properly in 1942 for purposes
of Army during World War-I/ - Thereafter, requisitioning of c
property to doctor - On vacation, Deputy Commissioner
transferring property to college principal under Rent Act in
1958 - Application for vacation in 1995 - Maintainability of,
before Deputy Commissioner or Civil Court - Held: Competent
... Authority would have jurisdiction and that of civil court is barred D
.v by s.19 - Requisition of property could not continue indefinite
since original purpose had ceased to exist - Deputy
Commissioner was not authorized to transfer property to
principal u/s.11 (2) of Rent Act as condition for applicability of
provision did not exist, thus transfer was bad - More so,
payment of rent would not change the position - Properly
E
requisitioned to be released in favour of the owner.,.. College
principal to pay all arrears of rent due - Defence of India Rules
~-,..
- r. 75A - Bihar Building Lease Rent and Eviction Control Act,
1947 - s. 11(2).
F
The question which arose for consideration in this
appeal is whether the property which had been
requisitioned for purposes of the Army during World War-
II under r.75A of the Defence of India Rules and had been
allotted in 1958 to respondent no. 3-college principal, by
the Deputy Commissioner under the Bihar Building Lease G
.,.I( Rent and Eviction Control Act, 1947, application for its
vacation would lie before the Deputy Commissioner, or
the civil court.

343 H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A Allowing the appeal, the Court ,._

HELD: 1.1 A bare perusal of section 6 (1-A) and 6(2)
of the Requisitioning and Acquisitioning of Immovable
Property Act, 1952 would show that the property cannot '
be requisitioned permanently and that the maximum
B period fixed by the Amendment Act of 1970 is 17 years
from that date and that section 6 (2) further provides that
unless the requisitioned property is acquired under
section 7 within the period of 17 years aforesaid, it shall
be released to its owner and as far as practicable, be given
c to the person from whom the possession had been taken
at the time of the requisition or to the successor in interest
of such person. The appellant is the successor in interest
of the owner from whom the property had been
requisitioned in the year 1942. Therefore, the requisition ,,.,,
D could not have been continued beyond the year 1987
unless the property had been acquired, which is "'
concededly not the case. [Para 8] [355-0-G]
1.2 It was submitted that the status inter se the parties
was that of landlord and tenant, the appellant being the
E landlord, and as the appellant had been accepting rent
·and had also sought and received an enhancement
thereof on several occasions, the suit could not be
dismissed on the ground that the civil court's jurisdiction ....
was barred. The payment of rent in such matters would
F not change the legal position with regard to the rights and
obligations of the requisitioning authority and the person
from whom the property had been requisitioned. It cannot
be accepted that if the appellant whose property has been
requisitioned in desperation seeks an enhancement of the
G rent, that would ipso-facto create a tenancy so as to
preclude the obligations imposed on the Central Govern- ,...,
ment under the Act. [Para 9] (356-A-B; 355-G-H]
1.3 Respondent No.3 had been inducted into Katras
House under the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated
H
ROY ESTATE V. STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. 345

~. 30th April 1958, under section 11 (2) of the Bihar Building A
'
Lease Rent and Eviction Control Act, 1947. It would be
clear from a bare perusal of section. 11 (2) (a) that it
postulates se~ral conditions for the transfer of a building
already in possession of a servant of the Government to
any other servant of the Government, but it does not B
authorize the transfer of such a building to any other
person. Respondent no.3, Ranchi Women's College, is
not run or controlled by the Government but is a private
college under private management. Therefore, the very
order of allotment made on 30th April, 1958 was completely
unauthorized. Also Katras House was under requisition
c
with the Union of India for purpose of the Union and there
is no provision under the Act for transfer of such a
property to any other person. Even assuming for a
moment, the Act did authorize such a transfer, the

' ..Ji<
condition of transfer visualized under section 11 (2)(a) did D
not exist and the transfer was thus, bad at the very outset.
[Paras 10 and 11] (357-C-D; 358-C-F]
1.4 A bare perusal of s.19 of the Act would show that
it is only the Competent Authority ( Deputy Commissioner)
who would have jurisdiction in respect of any matter under E
the Act, and the jurisdiction of the civil court was explicitly ,
barred. In the suit filed in the year 1995, respondent no.3
had taken a specific plea that it was only the Competent
~,,.

Authority under the Act who. could make an order of de-
requisition sought by the owner and the jurisdiction of F
the civil court was barred. It was rightly pointed out that
appellant too had been taken a vacillating stand in a
different set of proceedings. Both appellant and the
respondent have been equally ambivalent with respect
to their relationship and rights inter-se with the sole G
purpose of defeating the other party's rights by whatever
--~
means possible. This ambivalence would not however be
determinative of the legal issues that have been raised
on the basis of admitted facts. It is the admitted fact that
the property had been requisitioned in the year 1942 for H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A Army purposes under Rule 75 A of the Defence ~f India ,. _
Rules which would be deemed to be a requisition under
section 3 of the Act. The maximum period for requisition
in such cases is 17 years and ought to have ended in the
year 1987, but has in fact continued for almost 22 years
B thereafter. The creation of the so called tenancy in favour
of a respondent of a requisitioned property is not
visualized under the Act and even otherwise the
conditions for the creation of such a tenancy by virtue of r
section 11 (2) of the Rent Act do not exist. The Competent
C Authority under the Act was, therefore, under an obligation
imposed under section 6(2) to return it to its owner.
Therefore, the observations of the Munsif and High Court,
that the appellant must have his remedies in the civil court
is adding insult to injury in a situation where almost none
of the material facts are in dispute. [Para 13] [359-A-G] I
0
1.5 As regards plea of estoppel based on the "'
conflicting stand on the question of jurisdiction taken by
respondent no.3 from time to time, in view of the fact that
the appellant has been equally guilty of a similar stand
E and findings on the other issues, said aspect cannot be
gone into. [Para 14] [359-G-H; 360-A]
1.6 The order of the Division Bench of High Court is
set aside and it is directed that Katras House and the entire ~ ~
requisitioned property shall be released in favour of the
F appellant by the end of this year. The respondent is
directed to pay all the arrears of rent due and also file an
undertaking to vacate the premises. [Para 15) [360-B-C]
H.D. Vora vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 1984 (2)
G SCC 337; Grahak Sanstha Manch and Ors. vs. State of
Maharashtra 1994 (4) SCC 192 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
1984 (2) sec 337 Referred to. Para 4
H 1994 (4) sec 192 Referred to. Para 4
ROY ESTATE V. STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. 347

.\ 'CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. A
' _.\
3146 of 2009

- From the Judgement and Order dated 01.10.2007 of the
Hon'ble High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, in Letters Patent
Appeal Bearing LP.A. No. 47 of 2006
B
Krishnan Venugopal, Aparesh Kumar Singh, Tapesh
Kumar Singh, Siddhartha (for Jitendra Mohan Sharma), with
him fortheAppellant(s).
-{
S.K. Dholakia, Gopal Pra~ad, S.K. Singh, Ratan Kumar
Chaudhuri, with him for the Respondent(s). c
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by

HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.
1. Leave Granted.
'' .... D
{
2. The facts leading to the. appeal are as under : The·
* • property in dispute known as 'Katras .House' built over an area
of 1.7 acres of land on Circular Road, Ranchi was purchased
by Late Shri Ganesh Chandra Dey vide registered sale deed
th ~
dated 26 January 1933. World War-I I broke out on 3 E
September 1939 on which the Viceroy promulgated the

-- -;
Defence of India Ordinance 1939 under which the Defence of
India Rules were issued. On 25th April 1942, Rule 75 A was
inserted in the Defence of India Rules empowering the Central
Government to requisition any property necessary or expedient F
for securing the defence of British India and other related
matters. Japan entered World War-II on the side of Nazi Germany
on the 71t1 December 1941, after its attack on the United States

- ,,
~

~

__
Seventh Fleet in Pearl Harbour, Hawai and soon after a string
of victories over the Allies in South East Asia and upto Burma G
brought the Imperial Japanese Army to India's Eastern doorstep.
It was thereafter thought prudent to shift the headquarters of the
Indian Army's Eastern Command from Kolkata to Ranchi. Vast
areas of land and other residential property were accordingly
requisitioned under Rule 75 (A) ibid. Katras House too was
H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A requisitioned for this purpose. The World War ended in 1945
but the property continued to be remain under requisition. The
>- '

Requisitioning and Acquisitioning of Immovable Property Act
1952 ( hereinafter called 'the Act') was thereafter promulgated
and Section 23 thereof provided that all the old requisitions were
B now deemed to have been made under Section 3 of the Act but
-
.
\..
by virtue of an amendment made in 1970 Section 6 (1-A), the
Central Government was not authorized to retain any property
under requisition for a period beyond 17 years. The Deputy
~
Commissioner, Ranchi however, on a misconception of the law
c transferred Katras House, undoubtedly a requisitioned property,
to the Civil Surgeon, Ranchi without the consent of its owner
and on vacation of the said property by the Civil Surgeon, vide
1
by Order dated 30 h April 1958, transferred the property to the
Principal, Ranchi Women's College (Respondent no.3 herein)
under Section 11 (2) (b) of the Bihar Building Lease Rent and
D .~
Eviction Control Act 1947 (hereinafter called the 'Rent Act' )
subject to a monthly payment of rent directly to the owner. In July 'f

1995, the then owner of the property through his attorney, filed
an Eviction Title suit no.8 of 1995 under the provisions of the
Rent Act for eviction of Respondent no.3 alleging that the college
E was a tenant in the demised premises. Respondent No. 3 as
well as the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi appeared in the said
Suit as Defendants and filed their written statements.
Respondent no.3 took a categorical stand that Katras House
had been requisitioned for purposes of the Army during World
+ 4
- ,._

F War-II and had been allotted to it by the Deputy Commissioner
under the Act, and an application for its vacation would lie before
the Deputy Commissioner, and as such the Court Civil had no
jurisdiction to entertain the Suit. This Suit was eventually
dismissed in default for non-prosecution in the year 1998. The
G compensation payable under Section 8 (2) of the Act was,
-t

however, regularly paid by Respondent no.3 to the owner. Katras
House was purchased by Shri L.N. Dey from its owner by a
, __
....

registered sale deed dated 9th January 2001 and pursuant
thereto the necessary mutations were made in the revenue _,,,
H record and it is the admitted position that the rent/compensation
ROY ESTATE V. STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. 349
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]

~ is now being received by the new owner. It is the case of the A
..
/
. ~ .
Appellant that a letter dated 23 November 2002 was received
"' from the Administrator, Ranchi Municipal Corporation that on
inspection it had been found that_Katras House was in a
dangerous and uninhabitable state and a direction was issued
under Section 247 (1) of the Ranchi Municipal Corporation Act B
2001 that the building which had been declared as dangerous,
should either be demolished or subjected to extensive repairs·
-I' to make it habitable. The Appellant thereupon served a copy of
1
this notice on the Deputy Commissioner on 8 h July 2003
requesting him to de-requisition the building so that it could be c
demolished or repaired,as the case may be, failing which there
was a possibility that the girls residing in the building which was
being used as a hostel, may suffer some injury The request of
,_., the Appellant was accepted and an order was made by the
,_ Deputy Commissioner on 8th July 2003, de-requisitioning the
D
_... pr~erty and directing its return to its owner. Vide order dated
25 August 2003, however, the Deputy Commissioner, in partial
supersession of the order of 8th July 2003, referred the matter
to the Secretary, Human Resource Development, Government
of Jharkhand, Ranchi and the Vice Chancellor, Ranchi University
to take a final decision with respect to the ownership and title of E

.... the said property. On receiving the revised order, the Appellant
approached the Secretary, Department of Education on 14 h
1

.* October 2003 giving evidence as to his ownership of the
property. The Joint Secretary of the Ministry, however, wrote a
1
letter of 1" March2004 to the Secretary, Building & Construction F
Department to arrange for an inspection of the property and to

-
ascertain as to whether it was unsafe and unfit for habitation.
The inspection was held over several days in May & June 2004
and a report was tendered that as the building had been
constructed before the year 1919 and as the quality of the G
..,__. construction had deteriorated, the building was no longer fit for

... ;
habitation. This report was forwarded to the Secretary, Human
Resource Development Department by the Chief Engineer,
Building Construction Department on 21st June 2004 but it
appears that no result followed on which the Appellant filed Writ H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A Petition (Civil) No.4955 of 2004 in the High Court seeking a
direction to the Respondents, specifically to Respondent No.3
to relinquish the possession of the property forthwith to the owner
so that the building could be demolished or repaired to make it
safe. Respondent No.3 filed its counter affidavit admitting that
B Katras House had been originally requisitioned for Army
purposes during World War-II and had later been allotted to the
Civil Surgeon and on its vacation b¥i the Civil Surgeon, had been
allotted to the respondent on 30 h April 1958 under Section
11 (2)(b) of the Rent Act and that it had been in use as a hostel
C for girls for more than 45 years. The matter was heard by a
learned Single Judge, who in his Judgment dated 20th
September 2005 observed that it was not possible to determine
the question of right, title and possession over the land and
building in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution
D of India and that this matter could not be decided by the
Secretary, Human Resource Development Department or the
Vice Chancellor of the Ranchi University and therefore, the Order
th
dated 25 August 2003 was bad to extent. It was, however, left
•
to the Competent Authority under the 'Act' to determine whether
the building in question should be de-requisitioned or retained
E by the Government.
3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment, the Appellant
preferred a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench
on 6th January 2006, but simultaneously pursued the libe~
F granted by the Single Bench in the judgment dated 20
December 2005 and filed a representation before the Deputy
Commissioner, Ranchi (being the Competent Authority under
the Act) seeking an order of de-requisition of Katras House.
The Deputy Commissioner by his Order dated 4th April 2006
ordered that the property should be released and handed over
G to the Appellant with effect from 4th April 2006. Faced with this
situation Respondent No.3, the Principal, Women's College,
-
Ranchi filed Title Suit No.134 of 2006 in the Court of the Munsif,
Ranchi challenging the Order dated 4th April 2006 pleading that r
the aforesaid Order was without jurisdiction and also seeking
H
ROY ESTATE V. STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. 351
[HARJIT .SINGH BEDI, J.]

on interim injunction during the pendency of the Suit. The A
Appellant filed its written statement on 2nd August 2006 pleading
inter alia that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred under
Section 19 of the Act, and also an application under Order VII,
Rule 11 of the CPC that the question of jurisdiction be treated
as a preliminary issue. This prayer was rejected by the Munsif B
vide Order dated 14th November 2006. The Appellant thereupon
-f preferred Writ Petition (Civil) No.7497 of 2006 pleading that
the proceeding before the Civil Court were barred by Sections
18 and 19 of the Act. The High Court disposed off the writ petition
with the direction that the Munsif should re-consider the pleas c
· raised in the application aforesaid without being prejudiced by
his earlier Order dated 14th November 2006. This order of the
High Court was challenged by way of a Letter Patent Appeal.
....
The Appellant also moved an application for review of the Order
dated 14th November 2006which too was rejected. These facts
~ D
were brought to the notice of the Division Bench of the High
Court in the Letters Patent Appeal proceedings vide an affidavit
dated 7th September 2007. The High Court, however, by its
1
Judgment and Order dated 1• October 2007, dismissed the
Letters Patent Appeal in spite of the changed circumstances ·
holding that the remedy of the Appellant lay elsewhere and that E
... it was for the Civil Court to decide the question of jurisdiction
~t raised in the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. It is
in these circumstances that the matter is before us by way of
Special Leave Petition.
F
4. Several arguments have been addressed before us by
Mr. K. Venugopal, the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant.
He has emphasized that it was the admitted position that Katras .
House had been requisitioned under Rule 75 A of the Defence
of India Rules in the year 1942 and by operation of law, the said
G
~ requisition would now deemed to have been made under the
Act. He has pointed out that the Order of the Division Bench

' observing that only the Civil Court could to go into the matter
was not in accordance with law as the provisions of the Act were
applicable and Section 19 thereof specifically barred any
·H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

~
A proceedings before the Civil Court. He has further pointed out
that Respondent No.3 in its written statement filed in 1995 in
the eviction suit filed by the power of attorney holder of the earlier .
owner had admitted that the property had been requisitioned
for the army and had pleaded that proceedings before the Civil
8 Court were barred. He has pointed out that this volte face had
been made in order to frustrate the Order of the Deputy
Commissioner dated 4th April 2006 which had been validly made
under Section 6 (1 A) of the Act. He has further pointed out that
the requisition of a property could not continue indefinitely as
c the original pu~pose of the requisition had ceased to exist and
more particularly as the requisition could not continue beyond
the year 1987 i.e. a period of 17 years from the year 1970 as
provided by Section 6 (1A) ibidem. For these two submissions
Mr. Venugopal has placed reliance on H.D. Vora vs. State of
..........
Maharashtra and Ors. (1984) 2 SCC 337, and Grahak Sanstha
D -;;-
Manch and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 192.
Mr. Venugopal has further pointed out that the Deputy
Commissioner was not authorized to transfer Katras House to
Respondent No.3 vide Order dated 30th April 1958 purportedly
under Section 11 (2) of the Act as the conditions for the
E applicability of this provision did not exist. He has also pleaded ,..
-. "'
that as RespondentNo.3 in the Suitfiled in the year 1995 had
claimed that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter, it ~

was now estopped from the claiming to the contrary and saying
that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction in proceedings which
F were now pending in the Civil Court.
5. Mr. Dholakia, the learned senior counsel appearing for
Respondent No.3 has, at the very outset, very fairly conceded,
that the question of title was not disputed but as the question as
to whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed inter
G
se the parties was a matter which could be examined only by 'JI-.~
the Civil Court and that this procedure that had been adopted
,,.
bYt the respondent by filing a civil suit challenging the order dated
4 h April, 2006 of de-requisition made by the Deputy """
Commissioner.
H
ROY ESTATE v.· STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. 353
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
~

· 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties al'ld A
gone through the record. Although, a feeble attempt has been
made by the learned counsel for the Respondent doubting the
factum of !he requisition made in th~ year 1942 for the purpose
of the Army, it stands virtually admitted now that such an order
had indeed been made under Rule75Aofthe Defence of India B
Rules. It is also the conceded position that by virtue of various
provisions made in subsequent laws, the said order would now
be deemed to be one made under Section 3 of the Act. In this
view of the matter, the question would arise as to whether the
Civil Court would have jurisdiction in the matter or that the c
remedy of the parties elsewhere. It is significantthat in the civil
suit filed in the year 1995 by the previous owner of the property,

-.. ~
a comprehensive written statement had· been filed by the
Principal of Respondent No.3, and the positive stand taken was
that the building in question had been requisitioned by the Deputy
D
Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Ranchi for military
purposes under the Defence of India Rules in the year 1942
and that the Deputy Commissioner had allotted the said
premises to the Ranchi Women's College by order dated 4th
April 1958 under Section 11 (2) of the Rent Act and as such the
civil suit was barred and the remedy for de-requisition lay only E
... before the Competent Authority, that is the Deputy
... t Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Ranchi. Concededly,
this suitwas dismissed in default and was not pursued any further.
It is equally true that the appellant herein too has taken a
vacillating stand with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court F
or otherwise in other legal proceedings inter se the parties ..
However, as per findings of all the Courts and as per written
statement filed, the fact that the property had indeed been
requisitioned in the year1942 under Rule 75 A of the Defence
....-"'( of India Rules stands virtually admitted. In this view of the matter G.
the controversy would be covered by Sections' 3, 6 & 19 of the
Act.
7. Section 3 of this Act gives power to the Competent
Authority to requisition any immovable property for any public
H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A purpose, being a purpose of the Union and Section 4 thereof
gives the power to the Competent Authority to take over the
possession of the requisitioned property. Section 6 deals with
release from requisition and insofar as is relevant, is reproduced
below:
8 6. Release from requisitioning. (1) The Central
Government may at any time release from requisition any
property requisitioned under this Act and shall, as far as
possible, restore the property in as good a condition as
it was when possession thereof was taken subject only to
c the changes caused by reasonable wear and tear and
irresistible force:
Provided that where the purposes for which any
requisitioned property was being used cease to exist, the •
Central Government shall, unless the property is acquired
D
under section 7, release that property, as soon as may be,
from requisition.
"(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1 ), the Central Government shall release from requisition,
E (a) any property requisitioned or deemed to be
requisitioned under this Act before the
commencement of Requisitioning and Acquisition
of Immovable Property (Amendment) Act, 1970, on
or before the expiry of a period of [seventeen years]
F from such commencement;
(b) any property requisitioned under this Act after such
commencement, on or before the expiry of a period
of (seventeen years] from the date on which
possession of such property was surrendered or
G
delivered to, or taken by, the competent authority
under section 4,unless such property is acquired
under section 7 within the period of' [seventeen years]
aforesaid.]
H (2) Where any property is to be released from requisition,
ROY ESTATE V. STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. 355
,),_
[HARJIT SINGH BED!, J.]

[under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (1-A)} the A

- competent authority may, after such inquiry, if any, as it
may in any case consider necessary to make or cause to
be made, specify by order in writing the person to whom
possession of the property shall be given and such
possession shall, as far as practicable, be given to the B
person from whom possession was taken at the time of
the requisition or to the successors-in-interest of such
person,
(3) The delivery of possession of the property to the person
specified in an order under sub-section (2) shall be full c
discharge of the Central Government from all liability in
respect of the property, but shall not prejudice any rights
... in respect of the property which any other person may be
entitled by due process of law to enforce against the person
' to whom possession of the property is given. D
8. A bare perusal of Section 6 (1-A) and 6(2) would show
that the property cannot be requisitioned permanently and that
the maximum period fixed by the Amendment Act of 1970 is 17
years from that date and that Section 6 (2) further provides that
unless the requisitioned property is acquired under Section 7 E
,. within the period of 17 years aforesaid, it shall be released to
t its owner and as far as practicable, be given to the person from
whom the possession had been taken at the time of the
requisition or to the successor in interest of such person.
Concededly, the appellant herein is the successor in interest of F
the owner from whom the property had been requisitioned in
the year 1942. It is, therefore, obvious that the requisition could
not have been continued beyond the year 1987 unless the
property had been acquired, which is concededly not the case
-....( before us. G
....... 9. Mr. Dholakia has, however, emphasized that the status
inter se the parties was that of landlord and tenant, the appellant
being the landlord, and as the appellant had been accepting
rent and had also sought and received an enhancement thereof
H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A on severaLoccasions , the suit could not be dismissed on the
· ground that the civil court's jurisdiction was barred. We are of
the opinion, however, that the payment of rent in such matters --
would not change the legal position with regard to the rights
and obligations of the requisitioning authority and the person
B from whom the property had been requisitioned. It is impossible
to accept the plea that if the appellant whose property has been
requisitioned in desperation seeks an enhancement of the rent,
that would ipso-facto create a tenancy so as to preclude the
obligations imposed on the Central Government under the Act.
C While repelling a similar submission in H.D. Vora's case this is
what this Court had to say:
"There was also one other contention urged on behalf of
the appellant in a desperate attempt to protect his
>
possession of the flat and that contention was, since he
D had paid rent of the flat to Rukmanibai and such rent was
accepted by her, he had become a direct tenant of
Rukmanibai and the order of requisition had become totally
irrelevant so far as his possession of the flat is concerned.
This contention is, in our opinion, wholly unfounded. The
E appellant admittedly came into occupation of the flat as
an allottee under the order of requisition passed by the
State Government and even if any rent was paid by the
appellant to Rukmanibai and such rent was accepted by
her, it did not have the effect of putting an end to the order
F or requisition. The appellant was an allottee of the flat
under the order of requisition and he was liable to pay
compensation for the use and occupation of the flat to the
State Government and the State Government was in its
turn liable to pay compensation to Rukmanibai for the
requisitioning of the flat and if, therefore, instead of the
G
appellant paying compensation to the State Government
and the State Government making payment of an identical
amount to Rukmanibai, the appellant paid directly to
Rukmanibai with the express or any event implied assent
of the State Government, the order of requisition could not
H
ROY ESTATE V STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. 357
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]

cease to be valid and effective. It did not matter at all A
whether the appellant described the amount paid by him
to Rukkanibai as rent, because whatever was done by
him was under the order of requisition and so long as the
order of requisition stood, his possession of the flat was
attributable only to the order of requisition and no payment 8
of an amount described as rent could possibly alter the
· nature of his occupation of the flat or make him a tenant
of Rukmanibai in respect of the flat".

Some of the observations in H.D. Vora's case were.
modified on some other matters in Grahak Sanstha Manch case C
(Supra) but the observation in paragraph 7 afore-quoted were
duly affirmed.
10. To our mind there exists yet another circumstance which
militates against the case of Respondent No. 3 with regard to D
the creation of a tenancy vis-a-vis the appellant. Admittedly,
Respondent No.3 had been inducted into Katras House under
the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 30th April 1958,
under Section 11 (2) of the Rent Act This provision reads as
under:
E
"(2) (a) Where a servant of the Government in possession
of any building as a tenant intends to vacate such building,
he shall give fifteen day's previous notice in writing of his
inteAtion to do· so to the landlord, and to the District
Magistrate who shall under intimation to the landlord, within F
a week of the receipt of the notice either allot building to
any other servant of the Government whom the District
Magistrate thinks suitable, subject to the payment of rent,
and the observance of the conditions of the tenancy by
such servant of the Government, or direct that the landlord G
shall be put in possession of the building: '
Provided that when no such order is passed by the District
Magistrate, the landlord shall be deemed to have been
put in possession of the building.
H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S. C.R.

A (a] xxx xxx xxx xxx
(b) Where a building is vacated by a servant of the
Government, any person occupying such building other
than the persons referred to in clause (a) shall be liable to
be evicted by the District Magistrate in such manner as
B may be prescribed :
Provided that, after a landlord has been or is deemed to
have been put in possession of such building, he may let
it to any person".
C 11. It would be clear from a bare perusal of Section 11 (2)
(a) that it postulates several conditions for the transfer of a
building already in possession of a Servant of the Government
to any other servant of the Government, but it does not authorize
the transfer of such a building to any other person. It has been
D conceded before us that respondent No.3, the Ranchi Women's
College, is not run or controlled by the Government but is a private
college under private management. To our mind, therefore, the
1
very order of allotment made on 30 h April, 1958 was completely
unauthorized. Concededly also Katras House was under
E requisition with the Union of India for purpose of the Union and
there is no provision under the Act for transfer of such a property
to any other person. Even assuming for a moment, the Act did
authorize such a transfer, the condition of transfer visualized
under section 11 (2)(a) did not exist and the transfer was thus,
F bad at the very outset.
12. In this background, the question now arises is as to
whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred and whether
the appellant should undergo a trial on facts which are admitted.
Section 19 of the Act is reproduced hereunder:
G
"Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil ·,..._.
court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which
the competent authority or arbitrator is empowered by or
under this Act to determine, and no injunction shall be
granted by any court or other authority in respect of any
H
ROY ESTATE V. STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. 359
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]

,;, action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power A.
conferred by or under this Act".
13. A bare perusal of this provision would show that it is
only the Competent Authority (read Deputy Commissioner) who
would have jurisdiction in respect of any matter under the Act,
and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was explicitly barred. We B

. also find that in the suit filed in the year 1995, Respondent No.3
had taken a specific plea that it was only the Competent Authority
under the Act who could make an order of de-requisition sought
by the owner and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred.
Mr. Dholakia has, however, (and rightly), pointed out that c
Appellant too had been taken a vacillating stand in a different
set of proceedings. We find that both appellant and the
respondent have been equally ambivalent with respect to their
.. relationship and rights inter-se with the sole purpose of
defeating the other party's rights by whatever means possible. D
-le_ To our mind, this ambivalence would not be determinative of
the legal issues that have been raised on the basis of admitted
facts. It is the admitted fact that the property had been
requisitioned in the year 1942 for Army purposes under Rule
75 A of the Defence of India Rules which would be deemed to E
be a requisition under Section 3 of the Acl The maximum period
for requisition in such cases is 17 years and ought to have ended
in the year 1987, but has in fact continued for almost 22 years
~- t
thereafter. The creation of the so called tenancy in favour of a _
respondent of a requisitioned property is not visualized under F
the Act and even otherwise the conditions for the creation of
such a tenancy by virtue of Section 11 (2) of the Rent Act do not
exist. The Competent Authority under the Act was, therefore,
under an obligation imposed under Section 6(2) to return it to
its owner. To our mind, therefore, the observations of the Munsif
G
and High Court, that the appellant must have his remedies in
-.,r...( the Civil Court is adding insult to injury in a situation where almost
none of the material facts are in dispute.
14. Mr. Venugopal has also raised a plea of estoppel
based on the conflicting stand on the question of jurisdiction H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A taken by respondent no.3 from time to time. In view of the fact ;...
that the appellant has been equally guilty of a similar stand and
our findings on the other issues, we are disinclined to go into
this aspect.
15. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the Order
8 of the Division Bench and direct that Katras House and the entire
requisitioned property shall be released in favour of the appellant
by the end of this year. The respondentis directed to pay all the
arrears of rent due as of now and the rent upto December and
also files an undertaking to vacate the premises as ordered
C within a period of two months ffom today. Should such an
undertaking not be filed, we issue a direction to the Competent
Authority, that is the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi to take steps
to evict the respondent and hand over the property to the
appellant forthwith. The appellant will also have its costs from
D Respondent No.3 which we determine at Rs. One lakh .

N.J. .. Appeal allowed.