Holding

The FIR discloses cognizable offences of outraging a woman's modesty under Sections 354 and 509 IPC; Section 95 IPC is inapplicable, and the High Court erred in quashing the FIR and complaint.

Summary

Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj, an IAS officer, complained that the Director General of Police, K.P.S. Gill, had assaulted her modesty at a dinner party by pulling her chair, standing too close, ordering her to move, and finally slapping her posterior in front of many guests. She lodged a FIR alleging offences under IPC sections 341, 342, 352, 354 and 509; her husband filed a parallel complaint. The Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed both the FIR and the complaint under Section 482 CrPC, holding that no cognizable offence was disclosed, the conduct was trivial under Section 95 IPC, and the allegations were improbable. The Supreme Court held that the FIR did disclose cognizable offences of outraging a woman's modesty under Sections 354 and 509 IPC, that Section 95 IPC does not apply to such offences, and that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR and complaint. The Court revived the FIR, directed the magistrate to take cognizance of the offences and try the case, and clarified the limited circumstances in which a court may quash an FIR.

Issues considered

The FIR alleged offences under IPC sections 341, 342, 352, 354 and 509; does it disclose a cognizable offence of outraging a woman's modesty?
Whether Section 95 IPC, which bars penalisation of trivial offences, is applicable to the alleged conduct.
Whether the High Court was justified in exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR and the complaint.
Which categories of cases permit a High Court to quash an FIR or complaint under Article 226/Section 482 CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 155, s. 156, s. 173, s. 190, s. 210, s. 482
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 123, s. 124
Indian Penal Code, 1861s. 341, s. 342, s. 352, s. 354, s. 509, s. 95

Subjects

outraging modestySection 354 IPCSection 509 IPCSection 95 IPCquashing FIRSection 482 CrPCcognizable offencepolice investigationsexual harassmentcriminal procedure

Judgment

RUPAN DEOL BAJA.I AND ANR. A
v.
KANWAR PAL SINGH GILL AND ANR.

OCTOBER 12, 1995

[DR. AS. ANAND AND M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.J.] B

Indian Penal Code, 1861!-Sections 354, 509----Modesty of woman-
A1caning of--Test for asce1taining lvhether n1odesty has been outraged-A·ction
of offender capable of shocking sense of decency of a woman.
c
Sections 339 & 34 l-Wrongfitlly res1raine1}-{)jji:nce of-Standing in
front of a lady in such a n1anner that she had to nzove backward-It cannot
be said /Ital he 'wrongfully restrained' he1--0ffence u/s 341 not made out.

Section 95--0ffences of llivial nature-Expression 'hann' (ncludes
physical injiuy as also injurious niental reoction--Offence relating to n1odesty D
of won1an-Undcr no circ1unstances it can be llivial-Sec. 95 not applicable.

C1in1inal Procedure Code, 1973--Section 482~uashing an FIR or
con1plaint-P1inciplc of /a1v.

Section 173--:Police repon--Cotut taking cognizance--Judicial discre-
E
tion--Police repo1t reconunending discharge of accused-Person agg1ievcd
raising objection to acceptance of police repon-Necessity tu record reasons.

The Appellant, an Ollicer of the Indian Administrative Service
belonging to the Punjab Cadre ~ind then \\'orking as the Spetial Sctretar.r, F
Finance, lodged a corn plaint alleging comn1ission of oflences u/ss 341, 342,
352, 354 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code by the respondent, the Director
General of Police, Punjab at a dinner party. Treating that con1plaint as
the First Infor1nation Report a case "'as registered and investigation "'as
taken up. Husband of the appellant also lodged a complaint in the Court G
of the Chief Judicial l\1agistrate for the same otl'ences, alleging: that
respondent being a high-ranking Police Ollicer the Police had neither
arrested hin1 on his wile's complaint nor conducted investigation in a fair
and hnpartial manner and apprehending that the Police "'ould conclude
the investigation by treating the case as untraced he \Vas tiling the com-
plaint. In the meantime respondent n10\•ed the High Court by filing a H
237
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R ..

A petition u/s 482 Cr. P.C. for lJUashing the FIR. An interim order was
passed staying the investigation into the FIR lodged by the appellant, but
not the proceedings initiated on the complaint of her husband. Sub-
se11uently, however both the HR and the complaint were quashed.

In the FIR, it was stated that one evening, appellant accompanied by
B her hushand had gone to the residence of a colleague of theirs, in response
to an invitation for dinner. There were 20/25 couples present including the
respondent, who had come \\-'ithout his \\ifC, and some other senior c;overn-
ment Ollicers. The ladies were sitting segregated in a large semi-circle and
the gentlemen in another large semi-circle uith the groups facing each
C other. The respondent walked across to the circle of ladies and joined them
occupying a vacant chair about 5 to 6 chairs to the left of where the
appellant was sitting. Slowly all the ladies sitting to the right and left of
him started going into the house. The respondent called out to the appel-
lant and said that she should come and sit next to him as he wanted to
talk to her. Responding to his such request when the appellant went to sit
D in a chair next to him, the respondent suddenly pulled that chair close to •.-
his chair. Realising something was wrong she went back to sit With the
ladies. Aller about 10 minutes respondent came and stood in front ol' her
so close that his legs were about 4 11 from her knees. He then by an action
with the crook of his finger asked her to 'get up immediately' and come
E along with him. When she strongly objected to his behaviour he re11eated
his earlier command. She tried to leave the place but could not as he had
blocked her way. When she drew her chair back and turned backwards, he
slapped her on the posterior in the full presence of the ladies and gents.

F The High Court held that the allegations made therein did not
disclose any cognizable offence; that the nature ol' harm allegedly caused
to the appellant did not entitle her to complain about the same in view ol'
section 95 IPC; that the allegations were unnatural and improbable; that
the Investigating Oflicer did not apply his mind to the allegations n1ade
in the FIR as there was no reason to suspect commission of a cognizable
G otl"ence, which was unreasonable and unexplained delay of 11 days in
lodging the FIR.

These appeals had been filed against the judgment ol'the High Court.
The appellant contended that in exercise ol' its powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C., the
H High Court should not have interferred with the statutory powers of the
R.D. BAJ AT 1·. K.P.S. GILL 239

police to investigate into cognizable offences and <1uashed the Fl R specially A
when the allegations made in the FIR constituted otiences under the Indian
Penal Code and this unjustifiable interference \\'as in clear violation of the
principles laid do\vn; that the finding of the High Court that the allegations
made in the FIR attracted the provisions of Section 95 !PC was patently
wrong as in a case where the n1odesty of a W(nnan is involved, that Section
cannot have any manner of application; that the story given out in the FIR B
was neither improbable nor unreliable as the High Court thought of; that
a satisfactory explanation for the delay had been given in the FIR itself and
the delay of 11 days in lodging an FIR could not be made a ground for
quashing it, and that the High Court was wholly unjustified in taking
exception to the police officer's registering the FIR and initiating the inves- c
tigation for, once it was found that the FIR disclosed cognizable offence, it
was the statutory obligation of the police to investigate the same.

TI1e respondent submitted that the impugned judgment of the High
Court was a well considered and well reasoned one so far as it held that
the FIR did not disclose any cognizable offence; that the allegations made D
therein being trivial attracted the provisions of Section 95 !PC and that
the allegations were improbable; that even if it was assumed that he had
outraged the modesty of appellant still no offence u/s 354 IPC could be
said to have been committed by him for the other ingredient of the offence,
namely, that he intend to do so was totally lacking. E

The question raised for consideration was under what circumstances
and in what categories of cases the High Court can quash an FIR or a
complaint in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
or u/s 482 CrPC.
F
Before the High Court was moved by the respondent, the police had
completed the investigation and sent the papers relating thereto to the
Legal Remembrancer-cum-Director to Prosecution for his opinion. After
his opinion was received the investigating officer prepared the 'police
report' and forwarded it, through Senior Superintendent of Police to the
'llaka' Magistrate stating that the evidence on record did not substantiate G
the accusalions of the complaint; The Magistrate accepted the report and
ordered that the case be filed as 'untraced'. Subsequently, the Chief
Judicial Magistrate entertained an application filed by the appellant
wherein she prayed for a direction to the prosecution to give her an
opportunity to inspect the police report submitted u/s 173 CrPC. The Chief H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Judicial Magistrate was the Legal Rememberancer who had earlier given
the opinion that no case for going to the trial was made out. He hi1nself
now passed an order directing issuance of notice. Formal order regarding
the receipt of the police report was belatedly made. No reason was given
for its acceptance.

B Disposing of the matter, this Court

HELD : 1.1. The ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty of a
woman has been outraged is, the action of the offender such as could be
perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a
C woman. [251-A-B]

State of Punjab v. Major Singh, AIR (1967) SC 63, relied on.

1.2. In the instant case, the alleged act of the respondent in slapping
the appellant on her posterior amounted to 'outraging of her modesty' for
D it was not only an affront to the normal sense of feminine decency but also
an affront to the dignity of the lady - 'sexual overtone' or not, notwithstand-
ing. The sequence of events narrated by the appellant indicated that the
slapping was the final to the earlier overtures of respondent, which con-
sidered together, indicated that he had the requisite culpable intention.
Even if he had no such intention he must be attributed with such
E
knowledge, as the alleged act was committed by him in the presence of a
gathering comprising the elite of the society. There was nothing in the FIR
to indicate that the indecent act was committed by him, accidentally or by
mistake or it was a slip. Apart from the offence u/s 354 !PC, an offence u/s
509 lPC had also been made out on the allegations contained in the FIR
F as the words used and gestures made by respondent were intended to insult
the modesty of the appellant. [252-C-F]

2. So far as the offence u/s 341 IPC was concerned, the only allegation
relating to the same was that the respondent stood in front of the appellant
G in such a manner that she had to move backward. From such act alone it
could not be said that he 'wrongfully restrained' her within the meaning
of Section 339 !PC to make him liable u/s 341 IPC. [252-H, 253-A]

3. Section 95 IPC is intended to prevent penalisation of negligible
wrongs Qr of offences of trivial character. The expression 'harm' appearing
H in the Section is wide enough to include physical injury as also injurious
R.D. BAJAJ v. K.P.S. GILL 241

mental reaction. Section 95 IPC had no n1anner of application to the A
allegations made in the Fl R. On perusal of the FIR, it was found that the
respondent, the top n1ost ollicial of the State Police, ind~centl)' beha\ ed
1

with a Senior Lady IAS Otlicer, in the presence of a gentry and inspite of
her raising o~jections continued \Vith his such behaviour. Section 95
cannot have any 1nanner of application to an offence relating to modest)·
B
of woman as under no circumstances can it be trivial. [253-H, 254-A-C]

Veeda Menezes v. Yu.rnI Khan, AIR (1966) SC 1773, relied on.

4. At the stage of quashing an FIR or complaint the High Court is
not justified in embarking upon an em1uiry as to the probability, reliability C
or genuineness of the allegations made therein. An FIR or a complaint may
be quashed if the allei,oations made therein are so absurd and inherently
improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sutlicient ground for proceeding against the accused. On the
allegations in the FIR it was not possible to do so. Therefore the High
D
Court committed a gross error of law in quashing the FIR and the
complaint. (254-t'-G]

State of Hm)'ana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992] Supp. l SCC 335, relied on.

5. Since at the time of taking cognizance the Court has to exercise Ei
its judicial discretion it necessarily follows that if in a given case . as the•:
present one · the complainant, as the person aggrieved raises objectiori's i,
1
to the acceptance of a police report which recommends discharge 0C:the '
accused and seeks to satisfy the Court that a case for taking cognizance·'
\Yas made out, but the Court overrules such objection, it is just an'd'•· F
desirable that the reasons therefor be recorded. Reasons introduce 'clarity ·i
and n1inimise chances of arbitrariness. That necessarily mean·s that i
recording of reasons will not be necessary when the Court accepts such

- police report without any demur from the complainant. (257-H, 258-A·BJ

As the order of the l\1agistrate in the instant case did not contain
G
any reason whatsoever, even though it was passed after hearing the objec-
tions of the complainant it was liable to be set aside. The Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Chandigarh is directed to take cognizance upon the police
report in respect or the' offences u/ss 354 and 509 JPC and try the case
himself in accordance with law. [258-C, 259-D] H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS !1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A H.S. Bains v. State, AIR (1980) SC 1983, relied on. ,
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1183 of 1995 Etc.

From the .Judgment and Order <lated 29.5.R9 of the Punjab &
B Haryana High Court in Cr!. Miscc. Nn. 9041-M of 1988.

K.T.S. Tulsi, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Indira .laisingh, G.L.
Sanghi, C. Jayaraj, Ms. Anilha, Sunil K. Jain, .Jatinder K. Bhatia, K. Sultan
Singh, Ms. Suman Khaitan, Krishna Kumar, Darshan Singh R.S. Suri and
Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Appearing parties.
c
The .I udgment of the Court was delivered by

M.K. MUKHERJEE, J. Special leave granted. Heard the learned
counsel appearing for the parties.

D These two appeals have been heard together as they arise out of one
and the same incident. Facts leading to these appeals and relevant for their
disposal are as undeT :

On July 29, 1988, Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj, an Officer of the Indian
Administrative Service (I.AS.) belonging to the Punjab Cadre and then
E working as the Special Secretary, Finance, lodged a complaint with the
Inspector General of Police, Chandigarh Union Territory alleging commis-
sion of offences under Sections 341, 342, 352 354 and 509 of the Indian
Penal Code ("!PC" for short) by Mr. K.P.S. Gill, the Director General of
Police, Punjab on July 18, 1988 at a dinner party. Treating that complaint
F as. the First Information Report (FIR) a case was registered by the Central
Police Station, Sector 17, Chandigarh and investigation was taken up.
Thereafter on November 22, 1988, her husabnd Mr. B.R. Bajaj, who also
happens to be a senior l.A.S. officer of the Punjab Cadre, lodged a
complaint in the Court of the Chief .Judicial Magistrale for the same
offences, alleging, inter alia, that Mr. Gill being a high-ranking Police
G ()fficer the Chandigarh Police had neither arrested him in connection \vith
the case registered by the Police on his \vife's con1plaint nor conducted
investigation in a fair and in1partial manner and apprehending that the
Police would conclude the investigation by treating the case as untraced he
was filing the complaint. On receipt of the complaint the Chief .I udicial
H Magistrate transferred it to a Judicial Magistrate for disposal and the
R.D.BAJAJ v. K.P.S.GILL[M.K.MUKHERJEE . .T.J 243

latter, in view of the fact that an investigation hy the Police was in progress A
in relation to the same offence~, called for a report fron1 the lnv~.stigating
Officer in accordance with Section 210 of Code Criminal Procedure ("Cr.
P.C." for short). Jn the meantime - on December 16, .198R to he precise -
Mr. Gill moved the High Court by filing a petition under Section 482 Cr.
P.C. for quashing the F.I.R. and the complaint. On that petition an interim
B
order was passed staying the investigation into the F.I.R. lodged by Mrs.
Bajaj, but not the proceedings initiated on the complaint of Mr. Bajaj.
Resultantly, the learned Judicial Magistrate proceeded with the complaint
case and examined the complainant and the witnesses produced by him.
Thereafter, Mr. Bajaj moved an application before the learned Magistrate
for summoning Mr. Y.S. Ratra, an J.A.S. Officer of the Government of C
Punjab and Mr.-J.F. Rebeiro, Advisor to the Governor of Punjab for being
examined as witnesses on his behalf and for producing certain documents,
·which was allowed. Instead of appearing personally, the above two Officer
sought for exemption from appearance; and the District Attorney, after
producing the documents, filed an application claiming privilege under D
Sections 123/124 of the Evidence Act.in respect of them. The)earned
Magistrate rejected the prayer of the above two officers and also rejected,
after going through the documents, the claim of privilege, being of the
opinion that the documents did not concern the affairs of the State.
Assailing the order of the learned Magistrate rejecting the claim of
privilege, the State of Punjab filed a Criminal Revision Petition which was E
allowed by the High Court by its Order dated January 24, 1989. The
petition earlier filed by Mr. Gill under Section 482 Cr.P.C. came up for
hearing before the High Court thereafter and was allowed by its order
dated May 29, 1989 and both the F.l.R. and the complaint were quashed.
The ahove t\VO orders of the High C~nurl arc under challenge in these
F
appeals at the instance of Mr. and Mrs. Bajaj. Of the two appeals we "first
proceed to consider the merits of the one preferred against quashing of
the F.l.R. and the complaint (arising out of SLP (Cr!.) No. 2358 of 1989) ·
for, in case it fails, the other appeal (arising out of SLP (Cr!.) No. L161 of
1989) would, necessarily, be infructuous.
G
On perusal of the impugned judgment we find that the following
reasons weighed with the High Court in quashing the F.I.R.-

(i) the allegations made therein do not disclose any congnizablc
offence; H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A (ii) the nature of harm allegedly caused to Mrs. Bajaj did not entitle
her to co1nplaint about the same in vie\\/ of Section 95 lPC;

(iii) lhe allegations arc unnatural and improhable;

(iv) lhc Investigating Officer did not apply his mind lo the allegations
B made in the F.I.R., for had he done so, he would have found lhal there .
was no. reason to suspecl comn1ission of a cognisable offence, which was
the 'sine qua 11011' for starting an investigation under Section 157 Cr. P.C.;
and

c lodging(v)thethere was unreasonable and unexplained delay of 11 days m
F.I.R.

As regards the complaint of Mr. Bajaj, the High Court observed that
the allegations were almost identical with some improvements made there-
m.
D
Mrs. Indira Jaisingh, the learned counsel appearing in support of the
appeals strongly criticised the impugned judgn1ent and contended that in
exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the High Court should
not have interferred with the statutory powers of the police to investigate
into cognizable offences and quashed the F.I.R. specially when the allega-
E tions made in the F.I.R. unmistakably constituted offences under the Indian
Penal Code and that this unjustifiable interference was in clear violation of
the principles laid down by this Court in a number of decisions. She ne>.t
contended that the finding of the High Court that the allegations made in
the F.I.R. attracted the provisions of Section 95 !PC was patently wrong as
F in a case \Vherc the mo<lcsly of a \vomcn is involved, the sai<l section cannot
have any manner of application. She next contended that the story given
out in the F.I.R. was neither improbable nor unreliable as the High Court
thought of. As regards the delay in lodging the F.1.R., Mrs. Jaisingh
submitted that a satisfactory explanation for the delay had been given in
the F.I.R. itself. This apart, she submitted, the delay of 11 days· in lodging
G an F.1.R., could not, by any stretch of imagination, be made a ground for
quashing it. She lastly submitted that the High Court was wholly unjustified
in taking exception to the police officer's registering the F.I.R. and initiat-
ing the investigation for, once it was found lhal lhe F.I.R. disclosed
cognizable offence, it was lhe statutory obligation of the police to inves-
H tigate into the san1c. According to Mrs . .Jaisingh, the High Court committed
R.D. BAJAJ v. K.P.S. GILL IM.K. MUKHERJEE. J.i 245

grave injustice and illegality by quashing the F.1.R. and the complaint. A

Mr. Tulsi, the learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for
Mr. Gill on the other hand submitted that the impugned judgment of ihe
High Court was a well considered and well reasoned one so far as it held
that the F.I.R. did not disclose any cognizable offence, that the allegations
made therein being trivial <ittracted the provisions of Section 95 !PC and
B
that the allegations were improbable. He, however, in fairness, conceded
that the last two reasons canvassed by the High Court to quash the F.l.R.
could not be sustained.

The question under what circumstances and in what categories of C
cases the High Court can quash an F.l.R. or a complaint in exercise of its
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482
Cr. P.C. has been engaging the atlention of this Court for long. Indeed, the
learned counsel for the parties invited our attention to some of those
decisions. We need not, however, refer to them as in State of Hmyana v. D
Blzajan Lal, IJ.992] Supp. l SCC 335 this Court considered its earlier
decisions, including those referred to by the learned counsel, and answered
the above question as under :

"Jn the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles E
of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating Lo
the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories
of C(.lscs hy \vay of illustration wherein such po\vcr could he F
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
other\vise to secure the ends of justice, though it n1idy not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficienlly
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give
an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such po\ver
should be exercised. G

(l) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, e\'en if they arc taken at their face value an<l
accepted in their entirety Jo not plin1a facie constitute any offence
or .make out a case against the accusetl. H
246 SUPREME COURT HEPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
niatcrials, if any, accnn1panying the FIR <lo not disclose a cog-
nizable oficnce, justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Cock except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code.

B (3) Where the uncontroverte<l allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same <lo
not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.

c ( 4) Where, the allegations in the F.l.R. do not constitute a cog-
nizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
D absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of\vhich no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.

( 6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
E
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and con-
tinuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specilic
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

F (7) Where a crin1inal pru<.:ei.::<ling is 1nanifestly atten<lcd \Vith n1uta
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and \vith a
view to spite hin1 due to private antl personal grudge.

We also give a note of caution to Ute effect that the po1ver of
G quashing a c1i1ninal proceeding should be exercised ve1y ~JJan"ngly
and with circzunspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that
the COlllt lvill not be justified in en1barking upon an enquily as to the
reliability or genuineness or othc1wise of the al/egation.i n1ade in the
FIR or the co111plaint and that the cxtraordi11a1y or inherent po1vcrs
H do not confer an ar/Jitra1y jiaisdiction on the co1at to act according
R.D. BAJAJ v. K.l'.S. GILL [M.K. MUKHERJEE. J.j 247

to its whinz or cap1ice." A

(emphasis supplied)

In the context of the reasons given by the High Court for quashing
the F.I.R. and the complaint and the respective stands of the learned
counsel for the parties in rebtinn thereto, we have to ascertain whether the B
case presented before us comes under categories (1), (3) and (5) above.
Besides, it raises the applicability of Section 95 IPC. Since the answers lo
the above three questions have to be found out from the F.I.R. itself we
need to look into the contents thereof.

It is first stated therein that in the evening of July 18, 1988 Mrs. Bajaj
c
accompanied by her husband had gone to the residence of Shri S.L. Kapur,
a colleague of theirs, in response to an invitation for dinner. Reaching there
at or about 9. P.M. they found 20/25 couples present including Mr. Gill,
who had come without his wife, and some other senior Government officers
. (named in the F.LR.). The party had been arranged in the lawn at the back D
of the house and as per tradition in Indian homes, the ladies were sitting
5egregate<l in a large semi-circle anJ the gentlemen in another large
semi-circle with the groups facing each other. With the above preface
comes Mrs. Bajaj's account of the incident in question, which reads as
under: E
"Around 10.00 P.M. Dr. P.N. Chutani and Shri K.P.S. Gill walked
across lo the circle of the ladies and joined them occupying the
only two vacant chairs available, almost on opposite sides of the
sen1i-circlc. Shri K.P.S. Gill took a vacant chair about :5 to 6 chairs
to the left of where I was sitting. Slowly, all the ladies sitting to the
F
right and left of him, got up, and started leaving and going into
the house. I was talking lo Mrs. Bijlani and Mrs. K.P. Bhandari,
sitting on my right, and did not notice, or come to know, that those
ladies were getting up and vacating their chairs because he had
misbehaved with them. G

Shri K.P.S. Giil called out to me where I was sitting and said, ''Mrs.
Bajaj come and sit h_eie, I want to talk to you about something.":
I got up from my chair to go and sit next to him. When I was about
to sit do_wn, he suddenly pulled the cane chair on which I was going H ·
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995[ SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A to sit close to his chair and touching his chair. I felt a little
surprised. I put the chair back at its original place and about to
sit down again \Vhcn he repcat.c<l his action pulling the chair close
to his chair. I realised~ that son1ething \Vas very \vrong and without
sitting down I immediately left and went back and sat in my original
B place between the other ladies. Mrs. Bijlani, Mrs. KP. Bhandari,
Mrs. Paramjit Singh and Mrs. Shukla Mahajan were occupying
scats on my right and Mrs. Nehra was sitting to the left of me at
that time. After about 10 minutes Shri K.P.S. Gill got up from his
seat and came and stood directly in front of me, standing straight
but so close that his legs were about four inches from my knees.
c
He made an action with the crook of his finger asking me to stand
and said, "You get up. You come along with me." I strongly
objected to his behaviour and told him, "Mr. Gill How dare you!
You are behaving in an obnoxious manner, go a\vay from here''.
· Whereupon he repeated his words like a command and said, "You
D get up! Get up immediately and come along with me". I looked to
the other ladies, all the ladies looked shocked and speechless. I
felt apprehensive and frightened, as he had blocked my way and I
could not get up from my chair without my body touching his body.
I then immediately drew my chair back about of foot and half and
E quickly got up and turned to get out of the circle through the space
between mine and Mrs. Bijlani's chair. Whereupon he and slapped
me on the posterior. This was done in the full presence of the
ladies, and guests."

F Mrs. Bajaj has then detailed her in1mediate reaction to the incident
followed by the steps she took to apprise the Chief Secretary, the Adviser
lo the Governor and the Governor of Punjab of the incident. She con-
cluded her narration with the following words :

"Ordinarily, my complaint to a Police Officer (Shri J.F. Ribeiro)
G is enough to be considered as an FIR and he had duly apprised
the Governor, Punjab, and the Administrator of the Chandigarh,
Union Territory, at the earliest occasion. Since I understand that
the matter has not yet percolated down from the Governor to lead
to the registration a ease. I am formally lodging an F.I.R. with the
H authorities of the Chandigarh Administration lest there is any
R.D. llAlA.l v. K.l'.S. Glll IM.K. MlJKHElUEE • .T.] 249

prohlc1n about jurisdiction of the Police ()fliccr lalcr.'' A

Sequentially sun1111arisc<l th8 ~late1ncnts and allegations as contained
in the earlier quoted three paragraph.s of the F.l.R. \Vould read thus :

(i) Around JO P.M. Dr. Chutani and Shri Gill walked across to and
sat in the ladies' circle; B
(ii) Mrs. Bajaj, who was then talking to Mrs. Bijlani and Mrs.
Bhandari, was requested by Mr. Gill to come and sit near him as he wanted
to talk to her about something;

(iii) Responding to his such request when Mrs. Bajaj went to sit in C
a chair next to him Mr. Gill suddenly pulled that chair close to his chair;

(iv) Feeling a bit surprised, when she put that chair at its original
place and was about to sit down, Mr. Gill again pulled his chair closer;

(v) Realising something was wrong she immediately left the place and D
went back to sit with the ladies;

(vi) After about 10 minutes Shri Gill came and stood in front of her
so close that his legs were about 41! from her knees;

(vii) He then by an action with the crook of his finger asked her to E
ngct up imme<liatelyn and come along with him;

(viii) When she strongly objected to his behaviour and asked him to
go away from there he repeated his earlier command which shocked the
L1dies prescni there;
F
(ix) Being apprehensive and frightened she tried to leave the place
but could not as he had blocked her way;

(x) Finding no other ,.iternative when she drew her chair back and
turned backwards, he slapped her on the posterior in the full presence of G
the ladies and guests.

Con1ing now to the moot point as to whether the above allegations
constitute l:iny or all of the offences for \vhich the case \Vas registered, we
first turn to Sections 354 and 509 !PC, hoth of which relate to modesty of
won1an. These Sections read as under : H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 354. \Vhocvcr assaults or uses criminal force to any \\'Oman, in-
tending to outrage or knowing it lo he likely that he will therehy
outrage her n1o<lesty~ shall he punished with in1prisonmcnl of
either description for a tcrn1 \vhich tnay exten<l to t\VO years, or
with fine, or \Vith both''.

B 1
'509. Whoever, intending 10 insult the 1no<lcsly of any \VOman)
utters any \Vord, n1akes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object)
intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such
gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon
the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprison-
c ment for a term which may extend to one year, or \Vith fine, or
with both."

Since the word 'modesty' has not been defined in the Indian Penal
Code we may profitably look into its dictionary meaning. According to
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Third Edition) modesty is the quality
D
of being modest and in relation lo \VOn1an means 11womanly propriety of
behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct". The word
'modest' in r~lalion to woman is defined in the above dictionary as
"decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lewd; shamefast11•
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English language
E defines modesty as 11 freedon1 'from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a
regard for propriety in dress, speech or conduct". In the Oxford English
Dictionary ( 1933 Ed) the meaning of the word 'modesty' is given as
''womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech
and conduct (in man or woman); reserve or sense of shan1e proceeding
F fro1n instinctive aversion to in1purc or coarse suggcstions 11 •

In State of Punjab v. Major Singh, AIR (1967) SC 63 a question arose
whether a female child of seven and a half months could be said to he
possessed of- 'modesty' \Vhich could be outraged. In answering the above
question Mudholkar .J., who along with Bachawat .I. spoke for the majority,
G held that \Vhen any act done to or in the presence of a \Voman is clearly
suggestive of sex according to the con1mon notions of mankind that must
fall within the mischief of Section 354 !PC. Needless to say, the 'common
notions of mankind' referred to by the learned Judge have to be gauged by
contemporary societal standards. The other learned Judge (Bachawat J.)
H observed that the essence of a \Von1an's modesty is her sex and fron1 her
R.D. BAJAJ v. K.P.S. GILL [M.K. MUKHERJEE •.I.] 25.1

f,. very birth she possesses the n1odcsty \vhich is the attrihute of her sex. From A
the aboYc Jictionary 1neaning of 'n1odesty: and the interpretation given to
that \vord by this Court in Major Singh's case (:-;upra) it appears Lo us that
the ulti1natc test for ascertaining \vhcthcr n1odcsty has heen outraged is the
action of the offender such as could be perceived as one \vhich is capable
of shocking the sense of decency of a \VOtnan. \\1hen the ahnve test is
B
applied in the present case, keeping in view the total fact situation, it
cannot but be held that the alleged act of Mr. Gill in slapping Mrs. Bajaj
on her posterior amounted to 'outraging of her modesty' for it was not only
an affront to the normal sense of feminine decency but also an affront to
the dignity of the lady - "sexual overtones'' or not, notwithstanding.
c
It was however strenuously urged by Mr. Tulsi, that even if it was
assumed that Mr. Gill had outraged the modesty of Mrs. Bajaj still no
offence under Section 354 !PC could be said to have been committed by
him for the other ingredient of the offence, namely, that he intended to do
so was totally lacking. He urged that the culpable intention of the offender D
in committing the act is the crux of the matter and not the consequences
thereof. To buttress his contention he invited our attention to the following
passage from the judgn1cnt of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State
of Maharashtra, (1994] 4 SCC 602 : (one of us, namely Anand, J. was a
party)
E
'Thus the true ambit and scope of Section 3 (1) is that no convic-
tion under Section 3 (1) of TADA can be recorded unless the
evidence led by the prosecution establishes that the offence was
committed with the intention as envisaged by Section 3 ( 1) by
n1cans of the \VCapons etc. as enun1cratcd in the section and ''"'as F
committed with the motive as postulated by the said section. Even
at the cost of repetition, we may say that where it is only the
consequence ?f the criminal act of an accused that terror) fear or
panic is caused, but the crime was not committed \Vith the intention
as envisaged by Section 3(1) to achieve the objective as envisaged
by the section, an accused should not be convicted for an offence G
under Section 3(1) of TADA. To bring home a charge under
Section 3 (1) of the Act, the terror or panic etc. must be actually
intended \Vith a vie\v to achieve tht: result as envisaged by the said
section and not be merely an incidental fall out or a consequence
of the cri1ninal activity. Every crime) being a revolt against the H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A society, invnlvcs some violent activity which results in son1e degree
of panic or creatt.:s ~0111c fear or terror in the peoplt: or a section
thereof, hut unless the panic, fear or terror \Vas intcnde<l and \Vas
sought to achieve either of the objectives as envisaged in Section
3(1), the offence would not fall stricto scnsu under TADA."

B It is undoubtedly correct that if intention or knowledge is one of the
ingredients of any offence, it has got to be proved like other ingredients
for convicting a person. But, it is also equally true that those ingredients
being states of mind may not he proved by direct evidence and may. have
to be inferred from the attending circumstances of a given case. Since,
C ho\vever, in the instant case we arc only at the incipient stage \Ve have to
ascertain, only p;ima facie, whether Mr. Gill by slapping Mrs. Bajaj on her
posterior, in the background detailed by her in the FIR, intended to
outrage or knew it to be likely that he would thereby outrage her modesty,
which is one of the essential ingredients of Section 354 IPC. The sequence
D of events which we have detailed earlier indicates that the slapping was the
finale to the earlier overtures of Mr. Gill, which considered together,
persuade us to hold that he had the requisite culpable intention. Even if
we had presumed he had no such intention he must be attributed with such
knowledge, as the alleged act was committed by him in the presence of a
gathering comprising the elite of the society - as the names and designa-
E lions of the people given in the FIR indicate. While on this point we may
also n1ention that there is nothing· in the FIR to indicate, even remotely,
that the indecent act was committed by Mr. Gill, accidentally or by mistake
or it \Vas a slip. For the reasons aforesaid, it must also be said that, - apart
from the offence under Section 354 !PC - an offence under Section 509
F I Pt~ has been ·nu1de out on the 1iilegations contained in thi: FIR as the
words used and gestures made by Mr. Gill were intended to insult the
modesty of Mrs. Bajaj.

That brings us to the other offences 1 namely, under Sections 352, 341.,
342 IPC. We need not however take notice of the offence under Section
G 352 IPC for the offence under Section 354 !PC includes the ingredients of
the former. In other words, Section 352 !PC constitutes a minor offence in
relation to the other. Regarding the offence of wrong confinement punish-
able under Section 342 !PC there is not any iota of material in the FIR;
and so far as the offence under Section 341 !PC is concerned, the only
H allegation relating to the same is that Mr. Gill stood in front of Mrs. Bajaj
R.D. BAJAJ v. K.P.S. GILL [M.K. MUKJ-JERJEE, J.J 253

in such a manner that she had lo move backward. From such act alone it A·
Ci:innot he sai<l that he 'wrongfully restrained' her \Vithin the meaning of
Section 339 IPC to make him liable under section 34 l JPC.

Now that we have found lhal the allegations made in the FIR, p1ima
jacie, disclose offences under Section 354 and 509 IPC. we may advert lo
the applicability of Section 95 IPC thereto. The Section reads as follows : B

Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended
11

lo cause, or that it is known lo be likely to cause, any harm, if that
harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper c
would complain of such harm".

In dealing with the above Section in Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan,
.. AIR (1966) SC 1773 a three Judge Bench of this Court observed that the
object of framing the Section was to exclude from the operation of the
Indian Penal Code those cases which from the imperfection of language D
may fall within the letter of the law but are not within its spirit and are
considered, and for the most part dealt with by the courts, as innocent. In
other words, the Section is intended to prevent penalisation of negligible
wrongs or of offences of trivial character. In interpreting the expression
'harm' appearing in the Section this Court said that it is wide enough E
to include physical injury as also injurious mental reaction. As regards
the applicability of the Section in a given case, this Court observed as
follows:-

"Whether an act 1vhiclz a1nounts to an offence is t1il'ial "'Ollld
undoubtedly depend upon Lile 11ature of the injiuy, Lile position of F •
the ]Ja1ties, the knowledge or i11te11tio11 ~vith which the offending act
is done, and other related circunistances. There can be no absolute
standard or degree of harm which may be regarded as so slight
that a person of ordinary sense an~t temper would not complain
of the harm. It cannot be judged solely by the measure of physical G
1
or other injury the act causes '.

(emphasis supplied)

Viewed in the light of the above principles we are of the opinion that
Section 95 IPC has no manner of application to the allegations made in the H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A F.l.R. On perusal of the FIR we have found that Mr. Gill, the top most
official of the State Police, indecently behaved with Mrs. Baj<~ a Senior
lady IAS Oflicer, in the presence of a gentry and inspitc of her raising
objections continued with his such behaviour. If we are to hold, on the face
of such allegations that, the ignominy and trauma to which she was sub-
jected lo was so slight that Mrs. Bajaj, as a person of ordinary sense and
B
temper, would not complain about the same, sagacity will be the first
casualty. In that view of the matter we need not delve into the contention
of Mrs . .Jai Singh, - much less decide - that Section 95 !PC cannot _have
any manner of application to an offence relating to modesty of woman as
under no circumstances can it be trivial.
c
In recording its third reason for quashing the FIR the High Court
observed as under :

"In the present case there were 48 more persons present; 24 ladies
and equal number of gentlemen. It sounds both unnatural and
D unconscionable that the petitioner (Mr. Gill) would attempt or
dare to outrage the modesty of the author of the First Information
Report in their very presence inside the residential house of
Financial Commissioner (Home)."
.
We are constrained to say that in making the above observations the
E
High Court has flagrantly disregarded - unwittingly we presume - the
settled principle of law that at the stage of quashing an FIR or complaint
the High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as lo the
probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. Of
course as has been pointed out in Bhajan Lat's case (supra) an F.I.R. or a
F con1plaint n1ay be quashed if the allegations n1ade therein are so absurd
and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the ac-
cused but the High Court has not recorded such a finding, obviously
because on the allegations in ihc FIR it was not possible to do so. For the
reasons aforesaid we must hold that the High Court has committed a gross
G
error of law in quashing the FIR and the complaint. Accordingly, we set
aside the impugned judgment and dismiss the petition tiled by Mr. Gill in
the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The consequential direction that is to ordinarily follow from the
H above order is mandates lo the police to investigate into the FIR and to
R.D. BAJAJ v. K.P.S. GILL [M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.] 255

the learned Magistrate, \Vho \Vas in seisin of the coin plaint case, to proceed A
with it in accordance with Section 2]() Cr.P.C., but then we find from the·
records placed before us by Mr. Sanghi, the learned counsel appearing for
the Chandigarh Administration, that before the High Court was moved by
Mr. Gill through his petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. and the interim
order slaying investigation of the case registered on the F.I.R. was passed
B
thereon, the police had completed the investigation and sent the papers
relating thereto to the Legal Remembrancer-cum-Director of Prosecution
('LR' for short) for his opinion. After his opinion was received the inves-
tigating officer prepared the 'police (final) report' on November 22, 1988
and forwarded it, through the Senior Superintendent of Police, Chandigarh
Administration (S.S.P.) on November 28, 1988 to the 'Ilaka' Magistrate c
slating that the evidence on record did not substantiate the accusations of
the complainant (Mrs. Bajaj). The learned Magistrate, in his turn, accepted
the report on December 9, 1989 and ordered that the case be filed with
accused as 'untraced'. In the context of the fact that the High Court had,
in the meantime quashed the F.I.R. the above order was wholly unneces-
D
sary and redundant but, now that we have revived the F.I.R. and the
complaint it also revives. That necessarily means, that if we allow the above
order to stand one course left open to us is, in view of our earlier findings,
to direct the Magistrate to proceed with the complaint in accordance with
the provisions of Section 210(3) Cr. P .C., but having regard to the police
report and the manner in which it was dealt with and ultimately accepted, E
we consider it necessary to set aside the order treating the police case as
11 11
untraced •

From the records we find that while forwarding the police papers to
the 'Baka' Magistrate on November 28, 1988, the S.S.P. recommended that F
the case might be filed 'as untraced' as requested by the local police in the
final report. The papers, however, do not appear to have been dealt with
till July 17, 1989 when the Chief Judicial Magistrate entertained an applica-
tion filed by Mrs. Bajaj in connection therewith wherein she staled that is
Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 9041-M of 1988 (registered on the G
petition filed by Mr. Gill under Section 482 Cr. P.C.) the State had filed
an affidavit averring that the police had submitted its report under Section
173 Cr. P .C. and prayed for a direction upon the prosecution to intimate
the date of the filing of the report and give her an opportunity to inspect
the same. Interestingly and surprisingly enough, the Chief Judicial
Magistrate was none other than the L.R. who had earlier given the opinion H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 4 s.c.R,.

A . that the accusations of the complainant (Mrs. Bajaj) ~ere ~ot substantiated
from the evidence collected during investigation. Indeed, it is under the
influence of the above opinion that the police report was submitted as
would be. e\ident from the report itself wherein the Investigating Officer
has stated [all the statements of \vitnesses were sent to the L.R. who, vide
B _letter No. LD-88n163 dated 21.11.88, found that evidence on record do
not substantiate the accusations of the complainant" (as translated into
E~glish). It is diffic~lt- to believe that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
was not aware of the fact that he had himself opined that no case for going
to the trial was made out against Mr. Gill and therefore, it was expected
that in the interest of justice and fair play he would have declined to deal .
C \vith the case in his capacity as. the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Instead of so :
doing, he passed an order on that application on July 19, 1989 directing
issuance of notice. This was followed by another order dated July 22, 1989
whereby he directed that the application be listed on August· 8, 1989
awaiting report. On the date so fixed he passed his next order which
D indicates that the report was rea;ived on that day and placed on 'record.
It is not understood, which report the learned Magistrate was referring to
for if it is to be read in the context of the prayer made by Mrs. Bajaj in
her application dated July 17, 1989 it would necessarily mean the 'police .
report' but as already noticed, the affidavit filed by the State in the High
Court and the prayer of the Senior Superintendent of the Police dated
E · November 28, 1988 clearly indicate that it had been sent to the Court much
earlier. It can, therefore, be legitimately inferred that the formal order
regarding the receipt of the police report was belatedly m.ade on August
8, 1989. Be that as it may, it appears that even thereafter the same learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate continued to deal \vith the matter till September
F 16, 1989 when he made the follmving order :

'The matter concerning State v. KP.S. Gill was being dealt \vith by
me when ·1 was Legal Remembrancer, Chandigarh Administra-
tion, Chandigarh. Accordingly, the papers produced by the
prosecution. along\vith all other relevant papers pending in
G this court are entrusted to the Court of Sh. A.K. Suri, JMIC,
Chandigarh, for further proceedings in accordance \vith law.

Sh. A.S. Chahal, advocate, who is appearing on behalf of M.rs.
Rupan Deol Bajaj, complainant has been directed to appear before
H that court on 18:9.1989 for further proceeding.~! Papers be sent to
R.D. BAJAJ v. K.P.S. GILL IM.K. MUKHERJEE, J.J 257

that court immediately". A

It passes our comprehension as to how an Officer (L.R.) who had
given the opinion to submit a police report in favour of Mr. Gill could
entertain the request of the police for accepting lhe same while acting in
his judicial capacity. More surprising and disquieting is lhe fact that he
B
continued to deal with lhe matter till he realised that it would not be
appropriate on his part to go any further. We need not, however, dilate on
this aspect of the matter any further for in any case the order of the
transferee Magistrate on the police report cannot be sustained inasmuch
as he has not given any reason whatsoever for its acceptance though, it
appears, the parties were heard on that question for days together, obvious- c
ly to comply with the law laid down by this Court in Bhagwant Si11gh v.
Commissioner of Police AIR (1985) SC 1285.

In Abhi11a11da11 Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR (1968) SC 117 the question
arose whether a Magistrate to whom a report under Section 173(1) Cr. P.C. D
had been submitted to the effect that no case had been made out against
the acc'used, could direct the police to file a charge-sheet on his disagreeing
with that report. In answering the question this Court first observed that
the use of the words 'may take cognizance of any offence' in sub-section
(1) of Section 190 Cr. P.C. imports the exercise of )'udicial discretion' and E
the Magistrate who receives the report under Section 173 Cr. P.C. will have
to co11sider the said report a11d judicially take a decision whether or not to
take cognizance of the offence. The Court then held, in answering the
question posed before it, that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to direct
the police to submit a charge-sheet but it was open to the Magistrate to
agree or disagree with the police report. If he agreed with the report that F
there was no case made out for issuing process to the accused he might
accept the report and close the proceedings. If he came to the conclusion
that further investigation was necessary he might make an order to that
effect under Section 156(3). It was further held that if ultimately the
Magistrate was of the opinion that the facts set out in the police report G
constituted an offence he could take cognizance thereof, notwithstanding
contrary opinion of the police expressed in the report.

Since at the time of taking cognizance the Court has to exercise its
judicial discretion it necessarily follows that if in a given case - as the H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A present one · the complainant, as the pCrson ag!:,rrieved raises objections to
the acceptance of a police report which recommends discharge of the
accused and seeks to satisfy the Court that a case for taking cognizance
was mac..le out, but the Court. overrules such objections, it is just anc..I
desirable that th~ reasons therefor be recorded. Necessity to .give reasons
B which disclose proper appreciation of the issues before the Court needs no
_empha..'\is. Reasons intfoduce clarity and niinimisc chances of arbitrariness .
.That necessarily means' that recording of reasons will not be necessary
when the Court accepts such police report without any demur from the
complainant. As the order of the learned Magistrate in the instant case
does not contain any reason whatsoever, f'.Ven though it was passed after
c hearing the objections of the complainant it has got to be set aside and we
do hereby set it aside. Consequent thereupon, two courses are left open to
us; to direct the learned Magistrate to hear the parties afresh on the
question of acceptance of the police report and pass a reasoned order ·or
to decide for ourselves whether it is a fit case for taking cognizance under
.D Section 190 (1) (b) Cr. P.C. Keeping in view the fact that the case is
pending for the last seven years only on the threshold question we do not
. wish to take the former course as \hat would only delay the matter.further.
Instead thereof we have carefully looked into the police report and its
accompaniments keeping in view the following observations of this Court
E in H.S. Bai11s v. State, AIR (1980) SC 1883, with which we respectfully
agree:
\
'The Magistrate is not bound by the conclusions arrived at by the
police even as he is not bound by the conclusions arrived at by the
complainant in a complaint. If a complainant states the relevant
F facts in his complaint and alleges that the accused is guilty of an
offence under Section 307 Indian Penal Code the Magistrate is not
bound by the conclusion of the complainant. He may think that
the facts disclosed an offence under S. 324, l.P.C. only and he may
take cognizance of an offence under Section 324 instead of Section
307. Similarly if a police rep01t memio11s that half a doze11 persons
G
a
cxaniined by theni c/aini lo be eye wilnesJes to niurder but that for
rarioics reasons the witnesses could not be believed, the Magistrate
is 11ot bound to accept the opinio11 of the police regarding the .
credibility of the witnesses. He may prefer to igiiore the conclusions
of the police regardi11g the credibility of the witnesses u11d take
H cow1izance of the offence. If lie does so, it would be 011 the basis of
~ ,;..;
R.D. BAJAJ v. K.P.S. GILL [M.K. MUKHERJEE. J.J .259

the statcn1e11ts of the lvitnc.rses as revealed by the police repo11s." A

(emphasis supplied)

()ur !-iUCh exercise persuades us to hold that the opinion of the
lnvestin.g ()fficer that the allegations contained in the F.1.R. were not
substantiated by the statements of witnesses recorded <luring investigation B
is not a proper one for we find that there are suflicient materials for taking
cognizance of the offences under Sections 354 and 509 I.P.C. We, however,
refrain fro1n detailing or discussing those statements and the nature and
extent of their corroboration of the F.I.R. lest they create any unconscious
impression upon the Trial Court, which has to ultimately decide upon their C
truthfulness, falsity or reliability, after those statements arc translated into
evidence during trial. For the self san1e reasons we do not wish to refer to
the arguments canvassed by Mr. Sanghi, in support of the opinion ex-
pressed in the police (final) report and our reasons in disagreement
thereto.
D
On the conclusions as above we direct the learned Chief .Judicial
Magistrate, Chandigarh to take cognizance upon the police report in
respect of the offences under Sections 354 and 509 IPC and try the case
himself in accordance with law. We make it abundantly clear that the
learned Magistrate shall not in any way be influenced by any of the
observations made by us relating to the facts of the case as our task \Vas
E
confined to the question whether a 'prinza facic case' to go to the trial was
made or not \Vhercas the learned Magistrate \vill have to dispose of the
case solely on the basis of the evidence to be adduced during the trial.
Since hoth the offences under Sections 354 and 509 IPC are triable in
accordance \Vith Chapter XX of th-: Cri111inal Procedure Code we direct F
the learned Magistrate to dispose of the case, as expeditiously as possible,
preferably \Vithin a period of six months from the date of communication
of this order. In view of our ilbove direction and the provisions of Section
210 (2) Cr.P.C. the complaint case instituted hy Mr. Bajaj for the self same
offences loses its independent existence thereby rendering the other appeal G
which arose out of that case, redundant, though \Ve are of the opinion,
JHima jacie, that the claim of privilege, on the hasis of the affidavit of the
Chief Secretary, \Vas not sustainable.

In the result the appeal No. 1183/95 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.
235R of 1989 Gkd by Mr. and Mrs. Bajaj i> allowed and the other appeal H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A No. 1184/95 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1361 of 1989 is dismissed as
infructuous.

Before we part with this judgment we wish to mention that in the
course of his arguments, Mr. Sanghi, suggested that the matter may be
given a quietus if Mr. Gill was to express regret for his alleged mis-
B behaviour. That is a matter for the parties to consider for the offences in
question are compoundable with the permission of the Court.

R.P. Appeals disposed of.