Holding

No one may barricade a highway to deny public use; police may impose only reasonable, minimal, non‑discriminatory restraints, and in the present case the lack of evidence precluded any finding of unlawful obstruction.

Summary

The petitioners, including Hardev Singh, challenged orders by the states of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh that placed barricades on highways to impede the movement of Akali Sikhs during a threatened Morcha coinciding with the Asian Games. They argued that highways are public thoroughfares and any obstruction is per se unlawful, violating the constitutional right to freedom of movement. The Court held that while no private person may block a highway, the police may impose reasonable, minimal restraints to maintain public order, provided they are proportionate, non‑discriminatory, and not used as a tool of oppression. The Court found no satisfactory evidence of a systematic police order authorising such barricades and therefore could not infer a violation of constitutional rights. Consequently, the writ petitions were disposed of without granting the relief sought. The judgment underscores the balance between individual liberty and the state's duty to ensure public peace.

Issues considered

Whether the placement of barricades on highways to prevent the movement of a particular community constitutes an unlawful restriction of the constitutional right to freedom of movement.
Whether the police may impose reasonable restraints on movement in the interest of public order during threatened mass agitations.
Whether the alleged police actions amounted to discriminatory or oppressive treatment violating Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 19(1)(d), s. Article 21, s. Article 32

Subjects

freedom of movementhighwayspolice powersreasonable restrictionpublic orderconstitutional rightsdiscriminationAsian GamesAkali Morcha

Judgment

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84! A
RUPINDER SINGH ~ODHI AND ANOTHER
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ...

November 18, 1982 B
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[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J. AND A.N. SI!N, J.i i
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· Freedom of movement on Hicllways-Reasonable teltrainr1 durint mas1 I

111ttatfons-Extent of.
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In the wake of a threatened Morcha by Aka lis which was to coincide
with the inauguration of the Asian Games at Delhi, sorne States apprehended
that the Morcha might interfere with the holding of the games and toolr measures
to intercept the .movement of Akalis to Delhi. On the question raised by the
petiiionors that placing of obstructions on highways so as to impede free flow ot
traffic was per se unlawful,
D
: HELD : No one is entitled to barricade a highway so as to prevent
mtmbers of the public from using It while they arc on their lawful ':Jusiness in
1be pursuit of normal avocations of life. But tho police, whose duty it is to
enforce law and order in the wnkc of threatened mass agitations which are
rmonably hkely to lead to breach of public peace, are entitled in the disc:hargc
ol tbat duty to impose reasonable restraints on the physical movement of
Jll(mbe11 of the public to protect public properly and to avoid needless in- E
convenience to other citizens in their lawful pursuits. But all such restraints
oa personal libeny, if at all, bave to be commensurate with tbc object which
furo4hea their justification, They must be minimal and ca~not exceed
conuraints of. the particular siluatioo, either in nature or in duratton. Above
all, they cannot he used as engines or oppression, persecution, harassment or
the like. The sanctity of person and of privacy bas to be J_Daintained at all costs
and that cannot ever be violuted under the guise or maJOteouoce of law and
order. The rule or law ~cquires that no person shall be subj~ted to ~arsb,
UnciVI'IIzed or discriminatory treatment even when t hcob'jeCt've
1 is the secunog of
tbe Paramount e~igcncies of law and order. [842:P-H; 843-A·G)

0 itlGlNAL JURISDICTION ; Wrl.t Pelt'tt'on N·'s.
v
8816 and 8817
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or 1982. . . G . i
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(Under. Article 32 of the Constitution of lndia)
· , for the Petitioner.
Hardev Singh and Bishambhar La/ Kr1allna .,·i i
8 i II
Mrs. $. Dikslrlt . ~

· K.G. Bhagat Addl So!·Geo.1 R.Nt Poddar and I
f
· orRespondents 3 and 4.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [198) ) l s.c.t_ . I
11 .. The Order of the Court was delivered by

· 1 CoANDRACHUD, c.J• . By these writ petitions, the . petitioners
.

some of whom are practising lawyers
. and
. d'some. Members
. of tb'e
Parliament, ask for an approprtate ·wnt . trectmg the State of
Haryana and the.State of Uttar Pradesh to remove all ob!ltructions
B on the highways and to allo~ unhin~ered and .uninterc~pte.d the use
. of highways1 railways and atrways w1thout mak~n~ any dtscrtmination
against tbe.Akali Sikhs on th~ grou~d of rehg10n. Stated ·briefly,
the case of the petitioners IS that ID the recent past, a movement . .
was set afoot . in the State of Punjab consequent upon certain
de~ands made by the members of the Akali ' Party and as a result
a of that movement, large scale arrests of Sikhs were effected, bordering .
··a n harassment and persecution. It would appear that a declaration
'·was made by certain Akali leaders that a Morcba would be taken
'to Delhi on November 19, 1982 which coincides with the inaguration
of the Asiad games. Apprehending that the Morcha will interfere
with the holding of the games, the border . States, particulariy .
D Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, appear to have taken certain measures
to intercept the movement of Akalis across the border on to Delhi
with a ·view to ensuring that the proposed Morcha is not staged in
·the manner feared and the Asiad not disrupted. .

B Mi. Hardev Singh who appears on behalf of the petitioners
argues that highways are dedicated to the public and are meant for
their · use for passin~ and repassing. Therefore, he argues, no
obstruction can be placed thereon which will impede the free fiow
of traffic, any such obstruction being per se unlawful. Having given
our anxious consideration to the submissions made by Mr. HardeY
·Singh, we agree that no one is entitled to barricade a highway so
as to prevent members of the public from using it while they arc
on their lawful business in the pursuit of normal avocations of life,
But the police, whose duty it is to enforce law and order in the
• . wake of threatened inass agitations which are reasonably likely to
lead to ~reach of public peace, are entitled in the discharge of that
G duty to tm~ose reasonable restraints on the physical movement of
members ot the public in order to the protection of public propertY
an~ the avoidance of needless inconvenience to other citizens~
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tbe1r lawful pursuits. But all such restraints on personalliber~Y· if
at ~ 11 •• ha~e to be ·commensurate with the object which furDJShes
H the1r JUstification.
. . . 1 and cannot exceed the
They must be mlntma . .
cdonst~amts of the particular situation either . in nature or tO
urahon. Above 8 11• t hey cannot be used' as engines of opprc:ssioO,
[: I
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auLii-IPER s.INClH v. UNION OF INDIA (Chundrachud, C.J.) ·
843 !,
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tion harassment or the like. The sanctity of . I
....rsecU ' . • d
r, y baS to be ma111tame at all costs and that c
nvac . .
person and of
an not ever be
A ;... .T
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violated under the gUJse ._o f mamtenance of Jaw and order. _ r 1·
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We. feel uneasy. and · concerned to hear that pol'Icemen or
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cer!B States have
in . . VIolated
.. the
f h
norms .uf decency in the'1r dea1•sng
'th
11'1
the situation artSmg
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out o t e Akah-Asiad
•
tangle• we assume B 1 I
for Jack of better evidence ~hat the gn~vance made by the petitioners 1· I
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before us is plOre_the ~~spnng of a natural feeling of resentment at
~ing stopped and ~earcbed . than 0~ any substantial invasion of '
their personal freed?m. )f and when there is proof of tatter, Courts
oiay have to step m and stop the excesses. · But the rule of law 1-
requires that no person shall . be subjected to harsh, uncivilised or c
discriminatory . treatment . even when tbe objective is the securing
of the paramount exigencies of law a~d order. Therefore, no. Sikh
can be allowed to be so treated if our Constitution has to have any :·
meaning and effect.

_-We believe it not to be true that any Chief Minister has made a 0 I

public declaration that police officers who will treat the Akali Sikhs
barsbly will be dealt with lightly·. It is incredible that any highly
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placed person in his senses can possibly make such a Statement, I -·J
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with the kind or pressure of public opinion and the press which,
fortunately, we have in our count~ to-day. ·
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• There does not appear to be any executive order in existence,
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in writing at any rate, authorising the police to barricade any high·
way or to subject every Sikh in motion~to physical restraint. But in .
an appropriate case, a presumption may well be drawn as to the !
existence of such an order if it is found that the police are generally
acting systematically according to a set and uniform pattern or are
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~t~erwise engaged in a large scale operation of an! similar or i.
IJDJster kind. For want of acceptable evidence, we hesitate to _dr~w I
that presumption in this case and will leave' the matter where It h~s I
~or . t~e time being. Redress may, if so advised, be sought 10
IDdJvJduaJ cases by those aggrieved by the· alleged acts of excesses. G
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This order will dispose of these writ petitions. i. l

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