S. GUIN & OTHERSversusGRINDLAYS BANK LTD.

    818


A
                             S, GUIN & OTHERS
                                    v.
                           GRINDLAYS BANK LTD,

                            DECEk"JlER 11, 1985
B
                 [E.S, VENI<ATARAl11Ah MD R.B. MISRA, JJ,]

          Indian Penal Code and Banking Regulation Act, 1949 Prose-
    cution - Trial - Acquittal - Appeal disposed of after long delay
    quashing acquittal order - Re-trial orriered - whether justified.

          Criminal· Frocedure C.ode - S.482 - Inherent powers - Exer-
c   cise of.

          The appellants were prosecuted under s, 341 Indian Penal
    Code and under s,36AD of the Banking Regulation Act 1949, on a
    complaint filed by the Operation Manager of the reapondent-Ba."lk
    in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. It ~.,.. alleged
    that the appellants had without reasonable catJSe obstructed the
D
    officers of the &..nk from lawfully entering the premises of the
    branch of the llanl<. and had obstructed the transact1ons of normal
    business. After trial the appellants were acquitted.

          The respondent-Bank filed an appeal against the judgment of
    acquittal before the High Court, which was disposed of after
E
    nearly six years. The High Court set aside the judgment of
    acquittal and remanded the case for re-trial for offences
    punishable under s, 341 read with s.34 or s. 149 Indian Penal
    Code.

          The appellants appealed to this Court against the   judgment
F
    of the High Court ordering re-trial.

          Allowing the appeal,

          HEID: 1, The judgment of the High Court is set aside and
    the order of acquittal p;iSSed by the ~letropolitan Magistrate is
G
    restored without eA-pressing any opinion on the issues of fact and
    law, [821 F]

          2, wbatever might have been the error committed by the
    Magistrate, it was not just mid proper for the High Court to have
H
    remanded the case for fresh trial, when the order of the
    acquittal had been passed nearly six years before the judgment of
    the High Court. [ 820 D-£]
           S. GUIN v. GRINDLAYS BANK [VENKATARAMIAH, J,]          819


      3. The pendency of the Criminal Appeal for six years before       A
the High Court is itself a regrettable feature of this case. The
order directing re-trial hss resulted in serious prejudice to the
appellants. Having regard to the nature of the acts alleged to
hsve been committed by the appellants this was a case in which
the High Court should hsve directed the dropping of the
proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under s.482              B
Criminal Procedure Code even if it came to the conclusion that
the acquittal was wrong. A fresh trial nearly seven years aftel:
the alleged incident is bound to result in harassment and abuse
of judicial process. [820 E-G]

      s. Veerabadran Cbettiar v. E.V. Ramaswami Naicker & Ors.,         c
(1959] s.c.R. 1211, relied upon.

        CRihINAL AFPELLA'.IE JURISDICTION   Criminal Appeal No.848 of
1985.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 19,12.1984 of the                D
Calcutta High Court in Crl. A. No. 315 of 1978.

        D.N. Mukharjee and P.K. Chakravorty for the Appellants.

        U.R. Lalit, V.N. Roura and Ashok Grover for the Respondent.
                                                                        E
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      VEliKATAl!AHIAH, J. This appeal by special leave is filed by
the appellants against the judgment and order dated December 19,
1984 in Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 1978 on the file of the
Calcutta liigh Court setting . aside the judgment of acquittal
passed in C-3064 of 1977 on the file of the Metropolitan                F
Magistrate, 12th Court, Calcutta.

      This appeal arises out of a complaint filed before the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta by one Manindra Narayan
Choudhury, Operation Manager of the Grindlays Bank Ltd. against
the twelve appellants, referred to above, for offences punishable       G
under section 341, Indian Penal Code and section 36AD of the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 said to have been committed by them
on October 31, 1977. 1he complaint alleged that the appellants
had without reasonable cause obstructed the officers of the Bank,
particularly Shri. G. V~idya . from lawfully entering the premises
of the branch of the Bank at 41, Chowringhee Road, Calcutta and
had obstructed the transaction "of normal business at the said          H
    820             SUP~£ COURT REPORTS         [1985] SUPP. 3 s.c.R.


A   branch. It was also alleged that they had thereby committed the
    offence pllllishable under· section 147, Indian Penal Code. The
    prosecution further alleged that all of them were constructively
    liable for the offences said to have been committed by them under
    section 34, Indian Penal Code. It was urged that these acts had
    been committed by the appellants pursuant to a call of strike
B   given by the employees of the Bank. The Magistrate issued summons
    to the appellants for offences punishable under section 341,
    Indian Penal Code and under section 36AD, of the llanking
    Regulation Act, 1949. After trial, the Magistrate by his judgment
    dated June 27, 1978 acquitted all the appellants. Against the
    said judgment of acquittal an appeal was filed by the Grindlays
    Bank Ltd. before the High Court of Calcutta in· Criminal Appeal
C   No. 315 of 1978. The said appeal came to be disposed of after
    nearly six years on December 19, 1984. The High Court felt that
    the trial court had missed the essence of the offences with which
    the appellants had been charged and therefore there was failure
    of justice. hence it set aside the judgment of acquittal passed
    by the Magistrate and remanded the case for retrial for offences
    punishable under section 341 read with section 34 or section 149,
D   Indian Penal Code. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court,
    the appellants have filed this appeal.

          After going through the judgment of the Magistrate and of
    the High Court we feel that whatever might have been the error
    committed by the Magistrate, in the circumstances of the case, it
E   was not just and proper for the High Court to have remanded the
    case for fresh trial, when the order of acquittal had been passed
    nearly six years before the judgment of High Court. The pendency
    of the Criminal Appeal for six years before the High Court is
    itself a regrettable feature of this case. In addition to it, the
    order directing retrial has resulted in serious prejudice to the
F   appellants. We are of the view that having regard to the nature
    of the acts alleged to have been committed by the appellants and
    other attendant circumstances, this was a case in which the High
    Court should have directed the dropping of the proceedings in
    exercise of its inherent powers under section 482, Criminal
    Procedure Code even if for some reason it came to the conclusion
G   that the acquittal was wrong. A fresh trial nearly seven years
    after the alleged incident is bound to result in harassment and
    abuse of judicial process. We may at this state refer to the
    decision of this Court in s. Veerabadran Ciettiar v. E.V.
    Ramaswami Naicker &Or.a., [1959] S.C.R. 1211. In that case this
    Court disagreed with the High Court on the interpretation of
H   section 295 of the Indian Penal Code and the order of dismissal
    of complaint by the Courts below, but it proceeded to observe at
    page 1218 thus :
         S. GUIN v. GRINDLAYS BANK [VENliATARAMIAli, J.]       821


          "But the question still remains whether, even after
          expressing   our   strong    disagreement   with   the     A
          interpretation of the section by the courts below,
          this Court should direct a further inquiry into the
          complaint, which has stood dismissed for the last
          about 5 years. The action complained o.f against the
          accused persons, if true, was foolish, to j:>ut if         B
          mildly, but as the case has become stale, we do not
          direct further inquiry into this complaint. If .there
          is a recurrence of such a foolish behavio"1" on the
          part of any section of the community, we have no doubt
          that those charged with the duty of maintaining law
          and order, will apply the law in the sense in which we     c
          have interpreted the law. 1he appeal is therefore,
          dismissed."

     We are of the view that following the above principle the
High Court should have dismissed the appeal before it even if it
                                                                     D
disagreed with the view taken by the trial court with regard to
the gist of the offence punishable under section 341 Indian Penal
Code, having regard to the inordinate delay of nearly six years
that had ensued after the· judgment of acquittal, the nature and
magnitude of the offences alleged to have been committed by the
appellants and the difficulties that may have to be encountered
                                                                     E
in securing the presence of witnesses in a case of this nature
nearly 7 years after the incident. The termination of the
criminal proceedings in that way would secure the ends of justice
as it would bring about reconciliation between the management and
the employees and also put an end to a stale criminal proceedings
in which the public had no longer sufficient interest. We accord-
ingly set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the       F
order of acquittal passed in this case by the 1'1etropolitan
Magistrate without however expressing any opinion on the issues
of facts and law involved in the case.
                                                                     G
     The appeal is accordingly allowed.



A.P.J.                                             Appeal allowed.