Holding

The supersession order dated 27 February 1980 is vitiated by the failure to observe the principle of audi alteram partem.

Summary

The Lt. Governor of Delhi superseded the New Delhi Municipal Committee under Section 238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act, alleging incompetence, default and abuse of power. Two non‑official members of the Committee challenged the order, contending that they were not given any opportunity to be heard on the allegations. The Delhi High Court held that the Committee had sufficient knowledge of the allegations and that the lack of a formal hearing did not vitiate the order. The Supreme Court examined whether the principle of audi alteram partem applies to a statutory supersession power and held that the Committee, as a public body, had a legitimate interest and civil consequences that required at least minimal notice and an opportunity to represent itself. Consequently, the Court declared the supersession order vitiated for violating natural‑justice principles, allowed the appeal, but did not order reinstatement of the Committee, granting costs to the appellant.

Issues considered

The applicability of the audi alteram partem rule to a supersession order under Section 238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act.
Whether the failure to give the Municipal Committee an opportunity to be heard vitiates the supersession order.
Whether the existence of a specific hearing provision in Section 16 of the Act excludes the requirement of natural justice in Section 238(1).
If a 'double opportunity'—separate hearing for allegations and penalty—is required.
The appropriate relief: quashing the order, reinstating the Committee, or merely declaring the order invalid.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 136
Cooperative Societies Acts. 77(2)
Punjab Municipal Act, 1911s. 11, s. 12, s. 13, s. 16, s. 18, s. 19, s. 232, s. 233, s. 234, s. 235, s. 238(1), s. 56, s. 61

Subjects

natural justiceaudi alteram partemmunicipal committee supersessionPunjab Municipal Actadministrative lawprocedural fairnesscivil consequencesemergency powers

Judgment

;746

A

S. L. KAPOOR

v.
B
JAGMOHAN & ORS.
September 18, 1980

(R. S. SARKARIA, 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND A. P. SEN, JJ.)

Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, Sec. 238(1)-Supersession of Municipal Com-
mittee ordered-allegations on which order passed-committee whether entitled
to ofjer explanation-failure to observe principle of audi alteram par/em-whether
·vitiates order.
Administrative Law--Natural Justice-Hearing-opportunity whether to be
a 'double opportunity'--one on factual allegation and another on proposed
penalty.
·i>
The Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 which is the law applicable to the
·New Delhi Municipal Committee empowers by Section 238(1), the Delhi Admi-
nistration by a notification to supersede a Municipal Committee if in its view,
the Municipal Committee is incompetent to perform or persistently makes
default in the performance of, the duties imposed by the Act or under any
other Act, or exceeds o:r abuses its powers.
E
Exercising the powers under this section the Lt. Governor, Delhi, super-
seded the New Delhi Municipal Committee on the ground that it had made
persistent default in the performance of the duties imposed on it under the
law and had abused its powers resulting in wastage of municipal funds. Four
grounds were enumerated in thio order of supersession.
In their writ petition two non-official members of the superseded com-
F mittee impugned the order of supersession contending that the order was passed
in complete violation of the principles of natural justice and total di~regard
of fair-play. The Full Bench of the High Court dismissing the writ petition
held that although the Committ1:e should have been given an opportunity to
state its case, since the Committee was aware of the allegations in 3 out of
4 grounds, mere failure to observe principles of natural justice did not vitiate
the order.
G
In appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellants
that the Committee had no opportunity to offer their explanation in regard
to the allegations on which the order of supersession was passed and failure ..,.
to observe principles of natural justice vitiated the order of supersession.
On behalf of the Respondents, it was contended that : (1) Section 238(1)
of the Punjab Municipal Act did not contemplate that an opportunity should
H be given to the Committee before an order of supersession »vas passed, (2)
neither the Committee nor its members had any beneficial interest in the
continuance of the Commit.tee and the supersession of the Committee did not
S. L. KAPOOR V. JAGMOHAN

' involve any civil consequences entitling it to a right to be hea.rd, (3) when
· the question of the disqualification of any individual member was involved,
'Section 16 of the Punjab Municipal Act expressly provided for an opportunity
being given to the member concerned, whereas section 238(1) did not provide
for such as opportunity and so by necessary implication the principle of
<audi alteram partem was excluded, and (4) section 238(1) also contemplated
-emergent situation where quick action might be necessary to avert a disaster
iand in such a situation if th<l demands of natural justice were to be met, B
'the very object of the provisions would be frustrated.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD : (1) The order dated February 27, 1980 of the Lt. Governor super-
'Seding the New Delhi Municipal Committee is vitiated by the failure to observe
the principle of audi alteram partem. [767D]
(2) (i) An administrative body may in a proper case, be bound to give a
person who is affected by their decision an opportunity of making representa-
tion. It all depends on whether he has some right or interest, or some legiti-
.mate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him. [754 C].
Schmidt and Anr. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, (1969) 2 Chancery
Divn. 149 referred to.
(ii) In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in
'his civil life, inflicts a civil consequence. [753H]
(iii) In the region of public law locus standi person aggrieved, right and
interest have a broader import. [754B]
Mo/tinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New
Delhi & Ors. [1978] 2 SCR 272 @ 308, 309, referred to.
(3) A Committee so soon as it is constituted at once assumes a certain E
-office and status, is endowed with certain tights and burdened with certain
responsibilities, all of a nature commanding respectful regard from the public.
To be stripped of the office and status, to be deprived of the rights, to be
removed from the responsibilities, in an unceremonious way as to suffer in
public esteem, is certainly to visit the committee with civil consequences.
'[756H; 757A]
(4) The status and office and the rights and responsibilities and the expec- F
tation of the Committee to serve its full term of office would certainly create
sufficient interest in the Municipal Committee and their loss, if superseded,
would entail civil consequences so as to justify an insistence upon the obser·
vance of the principles of natural· justice before an order of supersession js
passed. [757B]
Alfred Thangarajah Durayappah v. W. J. Fernando & Ors. [1967] 2 A.C. G
. 337 applied.
(5) It is not always a necessary inference that if opportunity is expressly
provided in one provision (Sec. 16) and not so provided 'in another [Sec. 238(1)]
opportunity is to be considered as excluded from that other provision. It may
be a weighty consideration to be taken· into account but the w·eightier consi-
. deration is whether the administrative action ·entails ·civil consequences.
[757D-E] ~H
Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New
.Delhi & Ors-. [1978] 2 SCR p. 272 @ 316 referred .to.
'148' SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981} 1 S.C.R.

. A. (6) A Municipal Committee under the Punjab Municipal Act is a public
body consisting of both officials and non-officials and one cannot imagine any·
thing momentous being done in a matter of minutes and seconds. And, natural
justice may always be tailored to the situation. Minimal natural justice, the
barest notice and the 'littlest' opportunity in the shortest time, may serve. ..J
The authority acting under section 238(1) is the master of its own procedure.
There need be no oral hearing. It is not necessary to put every detail of the
B case to the Committee : broad grounds sufficient to indicate the substance
of the allegations may be given. Even minimal natural justice is not excluded
when alleged grave situation arises under section 238. [757H; 758A-B] I
(7) If grave situations arise, the public interest can be sufficiently protected
by appropriate prohibitory and mandatory action under the other relevant
provisions of the statute in sections 232 to 235 of the Act. Minimum natural
c justice is, therefore, not excluded when alleged grave situations arise under
section 238. [758C-D]
(8) The opportunity which is required to be given need not be a 'double
opportunity' one on factual allegations and another on the proposed penalty.
·Both may be rolled into one but the person proceeded against must know
that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain
action being taken against him. If that is made known the requirements are
D met. [762B-C]
(9) Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is
possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not
issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice not because it approves
the non-observance of natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile
writs. [762E]
Ridge v. Baldwin & Ors. [1964] AC 40 @ 68, John v. Rees and ors. [1970 · t
E Chancery p. 345 @ 402, Annamunthoda v. Oilfields W qrkers' Trade Union,
[1961] 3 All E.R. 621 (H.L.) @ p. 625, Margerits Fuentes et al. v. Tobert L.
Shevin, 32 L. Ed. 2d. 556 @ 574, Chintepalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Co·
operative Society Ltd. etc. v. Secr1,tary (Food & Agriculture) Govt. of Andrra
Pradesh etc., [1978] 1 SCR 563 @ 567, 569-70, referred to.
(IO) The principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule depen·
dant on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been
F observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man
and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is
unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person
who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. [766-E-F]
(11) In regard to the grant of contract for building the City Centre and
payment of mobilisation advance, the correspondence that passed was bet-
G ween the Government of India and the New Delhi Municipal Committee
and not between the Delhi Adrhinistration and the New Delhi MnnicipaT
Committee. The authority competent to take action under section 238(1) of
the Punjab Municipal Act was the Delhi Administration and not the Govern-
ment of India. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Delhi Administration
ever gave any opportunity to the New Delhi Municipal Committee to make
any representation in regard to this ground. [760D-F]
H (12) With regard to the reemployment of a retired official against wnom
vigilance case was recommended, the letter from the Delhi Administration
s. L. KAPOOR v. JAGMOHAN (Chinnappa Reddy, 1.) 749

to the New Delhi Municipal Committee cannot be construed as a notice to A
the New Delhi Municipal Committee to come forward with its explanation.
:rile letter was peremptory and final and there was nothing to indicate that
any other action was contemplated and that the Municipal Committee ·could
offer its explanation if so minded, [760H-76!C]
(13) The charge that the Municipal Committee created a number of posts
and made appointments indicated that though the Delhi Administration, objec- B
ted to tliese irregular appointments, the correspondence does not reveal that
any action was proposed against the Municipal Committee. [761D; G]
(14) The New Delhi Municipal Committee was never put on notice of
any action proposed to be taken under section 238 of the Punjab Municipal

~·.
Act and no opportunity was given to the Municipal Committee to explain any
fact or circumstance on the basis that action was proposed. If there was any
correspondence between the New Delhi Municipal Committee and any other c
auth0,rity about the subject matter of any of *e allegations, if information
was given and gathered it was for entirely different purposes. [761H; 762A)
(15) Every wrong action of a Municipal Committee need not necessarily
lead to the inference of incompetence on the part of the Committee or amount
to an abuse of the powers of the Committee. It is a matter to be decided by
the State Government on the facts of each case. A Committee may admit D
ltbat what it has done is wrong and yet may plead that its action does not
reveal incompetence or an abuse of its powers. It may plead some mis-
apprehension about the state of facts or state of the law, it may plead that
in any event the drastic action contemplated by section 238(1) is not called
for and it should not be invoked., [7660-H; 767 A]

C1vrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1516 of E
~980 .

...- Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
<lated 9-5-1980 of the J)elhi Hi~ Court in C.W. No. 404/80.

Soli !. Sorabjee, V. M. Tarkunde and P. N. Lekhi for the
F
Appellant.

Lal Narain Sinha, Att. Genl. R. N. Tandon and Miss A.
Subhashini for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.
G
CHJNNAPPA REDDY, J.-In exercise of the powers conferred
by Sec. 12 of the Punjab Municipal Act 1911, as applicable to New
Delhi, the Lt. Governor of the Union Territory of Delhi, by a noti-
fication dated September 29, 1979, ·appointed nine non-official
members and four ex-officio members to the New Delhi Municipal
Committee to hold office for a period of one year with effect from H
October 4, 1979. However, well before the expiry of the term for
which the members were appointed, on February 27, 1980, the Lt.
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A. Governor, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec•.238(1),
superseded the New Delhi Municipal Committee with immediate effect
and appointed Shri P. N. Bhel as the person who may exercise and
perform all powers and duties of the New Delhi Muni:cipal Committee·
until the said Committee was reconstituted.

B' The preamble to the order of supersession recited that the Com-.
mittee was incompetent to perform and had made persistent default·
in the performance of the duties imposed on it under the law had
further abused its powers, resulting in wm,tage of Municipal funds.
Four instances or grounds were menti:oned. The first ground was
that a clause for the payment of a mobilisation advance of Rs. fifteen
c lakhs was included in the contract awarded to M/s. Tarapore & Co.
flor the construction or City Centre though such a clause did not
find a place in the original contract with M/s. Mohinder Singh & Co..
The contract we may mention here, had been awarded to M/s·. Tara-
pore & Co. on the failure of M/s. Mohinder Singh & Co . .to complete
the work. It was alleged that the contract was awarded to Tarapore
D & Co., at an enhanced cost without the prior approval of the Lt.
Governor. The inclusion of the clause relating to payment of mobi•
lisation advance was also without the approval ·of the Lt. Governor.
The second ground was that one B. K. Mittal was re-employed by
the New Delhi Municipal Committee notwithstanding the advi:ce of
the Central Vigilance Commission that 'major penalty proceedings•
E should be initiated against him. The thi:rd ground was that although
the Central Vigilance Commission advised the removal from service
of V. P. Sangal, the Municipal Committee resolved to impose the
minor penalty of stoppage oI a few increments. The fourth ground
was that the Municipal Committee created a number of posts including
that of Director of Horticulture and appointed Shri Sharma to that
F post inspite of the directive of the Lt. Governor not to create posts
unless the staffing pattern was studied by the Admini:strative Reforms
Department.
Two of the non-official members of the ~uperseded New Delhi
Municipal Committee, Shri S. L. Kapoor and another, filed Civil Writ
G Petitions in the Delhi High Court to quash the order of supersessi:on .
dated February 27, 1980. The Writ Petitions were heard by a Full
Bench of five judges and were dismissed on May 9, 1980. S. L.
Kapoor has preferred this appeal after obtaining Special Leave of this
Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
H Before the High Court, as before us, the principal submission of
the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant was that the order of
supersession was passed in complete violation of the principles of
s. L. KAPOOR v. JAGMOHAN (Chi.nnappa Reddy, !.)

natural justice and total disregard of farr~play. It was pointed out A
that no notice to show cause against supersession was ever issued '
to the Committee, there was not the slightest hint until the order
was made that there was any proposal to supersede the Committee
and the Committee never had any opportunity either before or after
the order of supersession was passed to offer tlieir expfanati:on
against the allegations made in the order of supersession. The Full B,
Bench upheld the claim of the petitioners that it was necessary to
hear the Committee before an order under Sec. 238 ( 1) of the Punjab
Municipal Act was passed. But, held, the High Court, the Com-
mittee was made aware of the allegatrons and had been given oppor-
tunity to state its case or version in the case of atleast three out of
the four grounds and therefore, there was no failure to observe the
c
principles• of natural justice. Even otherwise, the High Court
expressed the view that undisputed facts were there and they spoke
for themselves and no purpose would have been served by giving
formal notice to the Committee of the allegations and the proposal to
take action to supersede tlie Committee since the result would have
D
been thesame. In the view of the High Court there was no prejudice
to the Committee by the failure to observe natural justice. Shri ,Soli
Sorabjee, learned counsel for the appellant, questioned the conclusion
of the High Court .that the Committee had the opportunity to offer
their explanation in regard to the allegations on which the order of
supersession was passed. He also canvassed the view that the failure E
to observe the principles of natural justice did not vitrate the order
of supersession since the observance of natural justice would have,

* on the undisputed facts, led to the same result.
The learned Attorney General who appeared for the Lt. Gover-
nor contended that Sec. 238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act did not
F
contemplate and did not require, as a matter of. interpretation, that
any opportunity should be given to the Committee before an order
of supersession was ·passed. It was submitted that although much of
the distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act had
vanished, there was still a thin but discernible line between the two
and that in the case of an administrative act some positive beneficial G
interest must be established before natural justice could be insisted
upon. It was said that neither the Committee nor its members had
any beneficial interest in the continuance of the Committee and there-
fore, the supersession of the Committee did not involve any Civil
consequences such as would give rise to a right to be heard. The
argument was initially pushed further and it was submitted that, in II
any ,case, an individual member of the Committee, none of whose
individual rights h~d been infringed, had no locus standi to maintain
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A" the petition. The submission about locus standi was however, with-
drawn by the learned Attorney General at a later ~tage and it is
unnecessary for us to conside:r that question.

First, the question whether the rule of Audi Alteram Partem is
attracted : Sec. 11 of the ·Punjab Municipal Act provides that there
B shall be established for each Municipality a Committee having autho-
rity over the Municipality consisting of such number of members as
the State Government may fix in that behalf. Sec. 12 provides that
every such Committee shall consist of members appointed by . the
State Government either by name or by office, or of members selected
from among inhabitants in accordance with rules made under the Act.
c Sec. 13 empowers the State Government to stipulate the term of
office for which members of the Committee shall be appointed and
elected. Sec. 18 makes every Committee a body Corporate having
perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire- and
hold property to contract etc. etc. Every member of the Committee
is deemed to· be a public servant by Sec. 19. Sec. 56 vests in the·
D Committee the various kinds of property specified therein. Sec. 6 l
empowers the Committee to impose varied . taxes. There are
innumerable other provisions of the Act which prescribe the powers
and duties of the· Committee. Sec. 16 empowers the State Govern~
tnent to remove any member of the Committee if he comes to suffer
any of the specified disqualifii~ations but only after the State Govern-
E ment communicates to the member concerned the reasons for his
proposed ·removal and gives him an opportunity of tendering an
explanation in wrtting. Sec. 232 empowers the Commissioner or
Deputy Commissioner to suspend the execution of any reso1ution or
order of the Committee or prohibit the doing of any act which is
about to be done or is being done in pursuance of or under the cover
F of the Act or in pursuance of any sanction or permission granted by
the Committee if in his opinion the resolution, order or act is in
excess of the powers conferred ·by law or contrary to the public
interest or likely to cause waste or damage to Municipal funds or
property. Sec. 233 authorises the Deputy Commissioner,in case of
emergency to provide for the execution of any work or the doing of
G
any act if the immediate execution of the work or the doing of the
Act is necessary" for the service or the safety of the public. Sec.-234
enables the Commissioner to provide for the performance of any duty
to the Committee if the Committee makes default in performing such
duty after being required to perform it. Sec. 236 empowers the State
Government to require that the proceedings of the Committee shall
be in conformity ·With law and .vests .in the Gciverninent ·neces5ary
powers to annul or modify any proceedings which it may consider
s. L. KAPOOR v. JAGMOHAN (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 753

not to be in conformity with law. Sec. 238 is what we are directly A
concerned with and it reads as follows :

"238(1) Should a Committee be incompetent to perform or
persistently make default in the performance of, the duties
imposed on' it by or under this or any other Act, or exceed or
abuse its powers, the State Government may by notification, in B
·which the reasons for so doing shall be stated, declare the
Committee to be 5uperseded :
(2) When a committee is so superseded, the following
consequences shall ensue :
(a) all members of the committee shall, from the date c
. of the notification, vacate their seats;
(b) all powers and duties of the committee may, until
the committee is reconstituted, be exercised and performed
by such persons· as the State Government may appoint in
that behalf; ·
D
(c) all prop~rty vested in the committee shall, until the
committeee is reconstituted, vest in the State Government;
(3) The State Government may, if it shall think fit, at any
time constitute another committee in the place of any committee
superseded under this section". E· ·
The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative
act has withered away and we have been liberated from the psittacine
incantation of 'administrative action'. Now, from the time of the
decision of. this Court in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani
Devi & Ors. (1) "even an administrative order which involves civil
consequences .... must be made consistently with the rules of natural
i,ustice". What are civil consequences? The question was po5ed
and answered by this Court in Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The
Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors.( 2 ) Krishna Iyer J.,
speaking for the Constitution Bench said (at p. 308-309) :
"But what is a civil consequence, let us ask ourselves, by
passing verbal booby-traps? 'Civil consequence' undoubtedly
cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of
civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages.
In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citi~
zen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence".
H
{I) (1967] 2 SCR 625.
1(2) (19.78] 2 SCR 272 @ 308, 309.

\
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R..

A. The learn!'!d Judge then proceeded to quote from Black's Legat
Dictionary and to consider the interest of a candidate at a·.·
Parliamentary election. He finally said :
"The appellant has a right to have the election conducted'
not according to humour or hubris but according to Jaw and
B justice. And so natural justice cannot be stumped out on this
score. In the region of public law locus standi and person
aggrieved, right and interest have a broader import".

In Schmidt and Another v. Secretary of State for Home Afjairs(1}
Lord Denning M.R., observed : "The speeches in Ridge v. Baldwin
c [1964] AC 40, show that an administrative body may, in a proper-
case, be bound to give a person who is affected by their decision an
opportunity of making representations. It all depends on whether he·
has some right or interest or, I would add, some legitimate expecta-
- tion, of which it would not be fair to deprive him". It was held in·
that case that a foreign alien had no righ!t to enter the country except
D by leave, but, if he was given leave to come for a limited period and'
his· permit was sought to be revoked before the expiry of the time·
limit, he ought to be given an opportunity of making representation,
for he had a legitimate expectation of berng allowed to stay for the·
permitted time.

E In Alfred Thangarajah Durayappah v. W. !. Fernando & Ors.( 2 )'
the Municipal Council of Jaffna was dissolved and superseded by the·
Governor-General on the ground that it appeared to him that the
Council was not competent to perform the duties imposed upon it.
The Mayor sought to question the drssolution and supersession of the
Council in the Supreme Court of Ceylon, on the ground that there
F was a failure to observe the principles of natural justice. One of the
questions which arose for consideration was whether, as a matter of·
interpretation, natural justice ·was not excluded from action under
Sec.· 277 of the Municrpal Ordinance under which provision tlie dis-
solution and supersession had been made. The argument was that
words such as "where it appe:ars to ...... " or "if it appears to the
G satisfaction of ...... " or "if the . . . . . . . . . . considers it expedient
that ........ " or " if the . . . . . . . . . . . . is satisfied that ........ "
stood by themselves without other words or crrcumstances or qualifica-
tions, a duty to act judicially was excluded, and so, was natural
justice. The argument was accepted by the Supreme Court of Ceylon
but the Privy Council disagreed with the approach. They observed
R
(!) [1969] 2 Chancery Divn. 149.
(2) [1967] 2 A.C. 337.

I
s. L. KAPOOR v. JAGMOHAN (Chi.nnappa .Reddy, J.)

that there were three matters which should always be borne in mind A,'t
when considering whether the principle Audi Alteram Partem should
be applied or not. The three matters were :
"first, what is the nature of the property, the office held,
status enjoyed or services to be performed by the complainant of
injustice. Secondly, in what circumstances or upon what occa- B ..
sions· i:s the person claiming to be entitled to exercise the measure
of control entitled to intervene. Thirdly, when a right to inter-
vene is proved, what sanctions in fact is the latter entitled to
impose upon the other. It is only upon a consideration of all
these matters that the question of the application of the principle
can properly be determined".
The Privy Council then proceeded to examine the facts of the case
upon those considerations and said :
'As to the first matter it ·cannot be doubted that the Council
of Jaffna was by statute a public corporation entrusted like all
other municipal councils with the administration of a large area D:
and the ·discharge of important duties. No one would consider
that its activities should be lightly interfered with ...... , .... .
The legislature has enacted a statute setting up municipal autho-
rities with a considerable measure of independence from the
central government within defined local areas and fields of gov-
ernment. No Minister should have the right to dissolve such an
authority without allowing it the right to be heard upon that
matter unle>s the statute rs . so clear that it is' plain it has no
right of self defence.
Upon the second matter it is clear that the Minister can.
dissolve the council on one of the three grounds : that it (a) is F
hot competent to perform any duty or duties imposed upon· it·
(for brevity their Lordships will refer to this head as
incompetency); or (b) persistently makes defau~t in the perfor-
mance of any duty or duties imposed upon it; or (c) persistently
refuses or neglects to comply with any provision of law ...... It
seems clear to their Lordships that it is a most serious -charge . G.
to allege that the council; entrusted with these very important
duties, persistently makes default i:n the performance of any duty
or duties imposed upon it. No authority is required to support
the view that in such circumstances it is plain and obvious that
the priniciple audi alteram partem must apply.
H.
Equally it is clear that if a council is alleged persistently to.
refuse or neglect to comply with a provision of law it must be_
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A entitled (as· a matter of the most elementary justice) to be heard·
in its defence. Again thrs proposition i:equires no authority te
support it. If, therefore, it is clear that in two of the three-cases,
the Minister must act judicially, then it seems to their Lordships,
looking at the section as a whole, that it is not possible to
. single out for different treatment the third case, namely,
B incompetence ..... .

The third matter can be dealt with quite shortly. · The
sanction which the Minister can impose and indeed, if he is
satisfied of the. necessary premise, must impose upon the erring
council is as complete as could be imagined; it involves the
dissolution of the council and therefore the confiscation of all
its properties. It was at one moment faintly argued that the
council was a trustee and that it was not therefore being deprived
of any of its property but this argument (soon abandoned)
depended upon a complete misconception of the law of
corporations ...... For the purposes of the application of the
principle it seems to their Lordships that this must apply
equally to a statutory body having statutory powers, authorities
and duties just as it does to an individual. Accordingly on this
ground too the Minister should have observed the principle.

(
For these reasons their Lordships have no doubt that in
'£' the circumstances of this case the Minister should have observed
the principle audi alteram partem: Sugathadasa v. Jayasinghe
[1958] 59 N.L.R. ( 457) was wrongly decided".
Narrow as were the considerations applied by the Privy Council to
determine whether the principle audi alteram partem applied or not,
Alfred Thangarajah, Durayappah v. W. J. Fernando & Ors. (Supra)
appears to us· furnish a complete answer to the submission of the
learned Attorney General that, as a matter of interpretation, Sec. 238
of the Punjab Municipal Act did not contemplate and did not require
that an opportunity should be given to the Committee before an order
of supersession was passed. We may notrce here that the la11guage of
Sec. 238(1) ·of the Punjab Municipal Act is very nearly the same as·
the language of Sec. 277(1) of the Municipal Ordinance which was
interpreted by the Privy Council in Alfred Thangarajah Durayappah
v; W. J. Fernando & Ors. (Supra) We have already referred to some
of the relevant provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act to indicate
some of the rights and duties of the Committee under that Act. A
fl' Cqmmittee so soon as it is constituted, at once, assumes a certain
office and status, is endowed with certain rights and burdened with
certain responsibilities, all of a nature commanding respectful regard
s. L. KAPOOR v. JAGMOHAN (Chinnappa Reddy, ].) . 7,$1

from the public. To be stripped of the office and status, to be
deprived of the rights, to be removed from the responsibiliti:es, in an
unceremonious way as to suffer in public esteem, is certainly to visit
the Committee with civil consequences. In our opinion the status and
office and the rights and responsibilities to which we have referred
and the expectation of the Committee to serve its full term of office
·would certainly create sufficient interest in the Municipal Committee B
and their loss, if superseded, would entail civil consequences so as
to justify an insistence up9n the observance of the principles· of natural
justice before an order of supersession is passed.
One of the submissi:ons of the learned Attorney General was
that when the question was one of disqualification of an individual c
member, Sec. 16 of the Punjab Municipal Act expressly provided for
an opportunity being given to the member concerned whereas
Sec. 238(1) did not provide for such an opportunity and, so, by
necessary implication, it must be considered that the principle Audi
Alteram Partem was excluded. We are unable to agree with the sub-
mission of the learned Attorney General. It is not always a necessary D
.. inference that if opportunity i:s expressly provided in one provision
and not so provided in another, opportunity is to be considered as
excluded from that other provision. It may be a weighty consideration
to be taken into account but the weightier considerati:on is whether
the administrative aCtion entails civil consequences. This was also
the view taken in Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election'
Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. ( 1 ) where it was observed (at p.
316) :
"We have been told that wherever the Parliament has
intended a hearing it has said so in the Act and the rules and
inferentially where it has not specified it is otiose. There is no
such sequitur. The silence of a statute has no exclusionary
effect except where it flows from necessary implication. Art. 324
vests a wide power and where some direct consequence on candi:-
dates emanates from its exercise we must read this functional
obligation".
Another submission of the learned Attorney General was that G
Sec. 238(1) also contemplated emergent situations where swift action
might be necessary to avert disaster and that in such situations if the
demands of natural justice were to be met, the very object of the pro-
vision would be frustrated. It is difficult to visualise the sudden and
calamitos situations gloomily foreboded by the learned Attorney
General where there would not be enough breathing time to observe H
natural justi:ce, at least in a rudimentary way. A Municipal Committee
(1) [1978] 2 SCR p. 272 @ 316.
~?58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 1 S.C.R.

under the Punjab Municipal Act is a public body consisting of both
officials· and non-officials and one cannot imagine anything momentous
. being done in a matter of minutes and seconds. And, natural justice
may always be tailored to the. situation. Minimal natural justice, the
barest notice and the 'littlest' opportunity, in the shortest time, may
serve. The authority acting under Sec. 238 (1) is the master of its
B own procedure. There need be no oral hearing. It is not necessary
to put every detail of the case to the Committee : broad grounds
sufficient to indicate the substance of the allegations may be given.
We do not think that even minimal natural justice is excluded when
alleged grave situations arise under Sec. 238. If indeed such grave situ-
ations arise, the public interest can be sufficiently protected by appro-
.priate prohibitory and mandatory action under the other relevant
·provisions of the statute in Sections 232 to 235 of the Act. We guard
ourselves against being understood as laying down any proposition of
· universal application. Other statutes providing for speedy action to
· meet emergent situations may well be construed as excluding the
:n principle audi alteram ijartem. All that we say is that Sec. 238 (1) of
the Punjab Munrcipal Act does not.
The next question for consideration is weather the Committee
·was given an opportunity to make its representations against the alle-
gations upon which the order of supersession was ultimately founded.
We have already mentioned that the first allegation was about the
agreement to pay 'mobilisation advance' to M/s. Tarapore & Co.
It appears that the work of wnstruction of New Delhi City Centre
was initially awarded to Mohinder Singh & Co. in October, 1976 but
on account of their inability to complete the work within the stipulated
time it was decided to invite "restricted tenders" from other contractors.
F That was done and the contract was awarded to Tarapore & Co. One
·of the conditions of the contract which was accepted by the Committee
. was that the contractor should be paid 7t% of the value of the tender
as.. 'rnobilis~tion advance': On December 31, 1979, the New Delhi
Municipal Committee addressed a letter to the Secretary (Local Self
.Government), Delhi Administration requesting the sanction of the Lt.
Governor for payment of 'mobilisation advance' to the contractors.
It was mentioned in the lett,er that the contractors had offered to pay
interest at the rate of 9% per annum and to give a bank guarantee to
cover the advance as well as the interest. While the question of the
, grant of approval by the Lt. Governor was under consideration, Mohin-
der Singh, the original contractor appears to have submitted a repre-
11 sentation to the Govt. of India about the award of the contract to
Tarapore & Co. On February 11, 1980, the Deputy Secretary,
Ministry of Works & Housing, Government of India, forwarded a
s. L. KAPOOR v. JAGMOHAN (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) - 759

copy of _the representation to Shri S.C. Chhabra, President, New Delhi A
'Municipal Committee and requested him "(a) to send a factual report
-on the subject, and (b) not to make further payments, commitments
--Or arrangements or to do anything irrevocable till the New Delhi Mu-
nicipal Committee hears from this Ministry". The President of the
New Delhi Municipal Committee submitted the factual report on
February 13, 1980, and on February 19, 1980 wrote a letter to B
Shrr M. K.. Mukherjee, Secretary, Ministry of Works & Housing,
pointing out that a serious situation and stale-mate had been created
-because of the direction contained in· the Deputy Secretary's 1

letter dated February 11, 1980 not to make further payments to the
-contractors until they again heard from the Government of India.
The circumstances under which the contract had been awarded to c
'Tarapore & Co. were explained and the Government of India requested
·to communicate their decision at an early date. A copy of the letter
was also sent to the Lt. Governor and to the Secretary, Local Self
Government, Delhi Administration. On February 10, 1980 the Deputy
'Secretary, Ministry of Works & Housing, Government of India wrote to
. -Shri Shaiza, Secretary, Local Self Government, Delhi Administration D
·pointing to the letter from him (the Deputy Secretary, Government of
Indra) to the President, New Delhi Municipal Committee, a copy of
which had been sent to Shri Shaiza and referring to a subsequent
telephonic conversation between the two of them, and mentionilig
that a report had since been received from the New Delhr Municipal
•Committee. The Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Works & Housing also
~- reminded Shri Shaiza that he had given him to understand that the
Lt. Governor had not agreed to the grant of mobilisation advance of
'Rs·. 15 lakhs by the New Delhi Municipal Committee to M/s. Tara-
pore & Co. He requested Shri Shaiza to expedite the views of the
Delhi Administration on Mohinder Smgh & Co's representation and F
the modalities of the grant of the contract for the remainder of the
work to M/s. Tarapore &" Co. It is to be noted here that though
according to this letter Shri Shaiza had already informed the Deputy
Secretary, Government of India, that the Lt. Governor had not agreed
to the grant of the mobilisation advance, the New Delhi Municipal
Committee themselves had not been so informed by the Delhi G
Administration until then, nor even later. What is even more curious
is the circumstance that after receiving Shri Shaiza's• °"'letter, the
Deputy Secretary, Government of India, on February 22, 1980, wrote
-to the President, New Delhi Municipal Committee informing him that
the Ministry of Works & Housing had considered the position and
·that the New Delhi Municipal Committee might deal with the matter -H
according to law and that the request made in sub-para (b) of his
!>.O. letter of even number dated February, 11, 1980, addressed to
·. 760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A the President, New Delhi: Municipal Committee might be treated as.
withdrawn. This was to be without prejudice to any action that the
Ministry of Home Affairs' and/or the Delhi Administri1;tion might
like to take in the matter. This was how the matter stood when the·
impugned order was passed on February 27, 1980, by the Lt. Gover-
nor. The order was signed by Shri Shaiza, Secretary, Local Self
B Government, Delhi Administration. It appears that Shri Shaiza had
made a notice on the file on February 12, 1980, apparently for the
consideration of the Lt. Gov1~rnor. However, that was entirely an
mteni.al matter about which the New Delhi Municipal Committee
could have had no knowledge. This is' the entire material placed
before us in support of the claim made by the learned Attorney Gene-
c ral on behalf of the Delhi Administration that the Committee had'
· the opportunity of making its' representation in regard to the first of
the allegatrons made in the impugned order. It is difficult to sustain
the claim of the learned Attorney General even in a remote way. In
the first .place the correspondence that passed was between the Gov-
ernment of India and the New Delhi Municipal Committee and not
D between the Delhi Administration and the New Delhi Municipal Com-
mittee. The authority competent to take action under Sec. 238(1)
of the Punjab Municipal Act was the Delhi Administration and not
the Government of India. It cannot, therefore, he contended that
the Delhi Administration ever gave any opportunity to the New Delhi
Municipal Committee to make any representation about this matter.
E
In the second place the com~spondence that passed between the
Government of India and the New Delhi Municipal Committee was in
regard to the representation of Mohinder Singh' & Co. about tbc
· award of the contract to Tara.pore & Co.; The letter dated February
11, 1980, from the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Works & Housing
F to the President, New Delhi Municipal Committee does not even
mention tl1e mobilisation advance. In the third place, throughout
the correspondence, there is not a hint or whisper about any proposal
to take action under Sec. 238. On the material before us we find it
impossible to hold that the New Delhi Municipal Committee was
ever put on notice of any proposed action by the Delhi Administra·
G tion in regard to first of the allegations made in the impugned order.
If any information was sought from the New Delhi Municipal Com-
mittee and if any information was given by the Committee such
information was furnished and gathered in the course of an explora-
tory or fact finding expedition and was never intended to be an
answer to an actron-inspired notice.
H
The second of the charges or allegations in the notice was that
one B. K. Mittal had been re-employed despite the advice of the
s. L. KAPOOR v. JAGMOHAN (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 761

Central Vigilance Commission that proceedings for the imposition of A
a major penalty should be initiated against him. Our att~ntion ,w,as
invited to a letter dated November 20, 1979, from the Delhi Adm1rus-
tration to the New Delhi· Municipal Committee in which the J:?elhi
Administration took to task and reprimanded the New Delhi Municipal
Committee for re-employing R K. Mittal. This letter cannot be con-
strued as a notice to the New Delhi Municipal Committee to come B
forward ·with its explanation. The letter was peremptory and final
and the indication was that the chapter was closed with the reprimand.
Here again, there was nothing to indicate that any other action was
contemplated against the Municipal Committee and that the Municipal
Committee could offer its explanati:on if' so minded.
c
In regard to the third of the allegations in the impugned order ·
the High Court found that the Municipal Committee had no oppor-
tunity to meet t):ie same. It is, tlierefore, unnecessary for us to consi-
der the matter.
The fourth charge or allegation was that the Municipal D
Committee created a number of posts i:ncluding that of a Director
(Horticulture) and also appointed one Sharma to that post, notwith-
standing the directive of the Lt. Governor that no post should be
created until the staffing pattern was studied by the Administrative
Reforms Department. The Municipal Committee sought the sanction
of the Lt. Governor for its budget esti:mates. The Delhi Administra- E
tion in its comments addressed to the President. New Delhi Municipal
Committee pointed out that there was an ad-hoc provision for addi-
tional staff amounting to Rs. 33 lakhs without indicating the details
of posts. A directive was issued that until the Administrative Reforms
Department made a study of the staffing pattern the ad-hoc provision
of .Rs. 33 lakhs should not be utilised. Correspondence ensued F
between the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Delhi Adminis-
tration, the former requesting the latter to withdraw the directive and
the latter insisting upon the directive. Shri Sharma was however,
appointed as Director (Horticulture), by the New Delhi Munic!pal
Committee inspite of the directive. Though the Delhi Administration
objected to the irregular appointments made by the Municrpail Com- G
mittee the correspondence does not reveal that any action was pro-
posed against the Municipal Committee.

Thus on a consideration of the entire material placed before us
we do not have any doubt that the New Delhi MJ,Inicipal Committee
was never put on notice of any action proposed to be taken under H
Sec. 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act and no opportunity was given
to the Municipal Committee to explain any fact or circumstance on
7-645 S. C. India/80
·762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A the basis that action was proposed. If there was any correspondence
between the New Delhi Municipal Committee and any other autho-
rity about the subject matter of any of the allegations, i:f information
. was given and gathered it was for entirely different purposes. In our
view, the requirements of natural justice are met only if opportunity
to represent is given in view of proposed action. The demands of
B natural justice are not met even if the very person proceeded against
has furnished the information on which the action is based, if it is
furnished in a casual way or for some other purpose. We do not
suggest that the opportunity need be a 'double opportunity' that is;
one opportunity on the factual allegations and another on the pro-
posed penalty. Both may be rolled i:nto one. But the person
c proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the
allegations which might lead to· a certain action being taken against
him. If that is made known the requirements are met. We disagree
with the finding of the Hi:gh Court that the Committee had the oppor-
tunity to meet the allegations contained in the order of supersession.
D Linked with this question is the question whether the failure to
observe natural justice does at all matter if the observance of natural
justice would have made no difference, the admitted or indisputable
facts speaking for themselves. Where on the admitted or indisputable
facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one
penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the
E· observance of natural justice,, not because it approves the · non-
observance of natural justice but because Courts do not i:ssue futile
writs. But it will be a .pernicious principle to apply in other sit11ations
where conclusions are controversial, however, slightly, and penalties
are discretionary.
F In Ridge v. Baldwin & Ors(l), one of the arguments was that
even if the appellant had been heard by the watch committee nothing
that he could have said could have made any difference. The House
,of Lords observe.d (at p. 68) :
"It may be convenient at this point to deal with an argu-
ment that, even if as a general rule a watch committee must hear
G
a constable in his own defence before dismissing him, this case
· was so clear that nothing that the appellant could have said
could have made any difference. It is· at least very doubtful
whether that could be accepted as an excuse. But, even if it
could, the respondents would, in my view, fail on the facts. It may
H
well be that no reasonable body of men could have reinstated the
appellant. But as between the other two courses open to the
(l) [1964] AC 40 @ 68.
: . s. L. KAPOOR v. JAGMOHAN (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 763

watch committee the case is not so clear. Certainly on the facts, A
as· we know them, the watch committee could 'reasonably have
decided to forfeit the appellant's pension rights, but I could not
hold that they would have acted wrongly or wholly unreasonably
if they had in the exercise of their discretion decided to take a
more lenient course".
B
Megarry J. discussed the question in John v. Rees & Ors.(1)
He said (at p. 402) :

~·. "It may be that there are some who would decry the
importance which the courts attach to the observance of the rules
of natural justice. 'When something is obvious', they may say,
'why force everybody to go through the tiresome waste of time c
.J
involved in framing charges and giving an opportunity to be
heard? The result is obvious from the start'. Those who take
.this view do not, I think, do themselves justice. As everybody
who has anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the
law is strewn with examples of open and shut cases which,
somehow, were not; of unanswerable charges which, in the event, D
were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was
fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by
discussion, suffered a change. Nor are those with any know-
ledge of human nature who pause to think for a moment likely
to underestimate the feelings of resentment of those who find that
a decision against them has been made without their being affor- E
ded any opportunity to influence the course of events".
In Annamunthodo v. Oilfields Workers' Trade Union( 2 ), Lord

l. Denning, in his speech said (at p. 625) :
"Counsel for the respondent union did suggest that a man
could not complain of a failure of natural justice unless he could F
show that he had been prejudiced by it. Their Lordships cannot
accept this suggestion. If a domestic tribunal fails to act in
accordance with natural justice, the person affected by their
decision can always seek redress in the courts. It is a preju-
dice to any man to be denied justice". ·
G
In Margarita Fuentes" et al., v. Tobert L. Shevin(3), it was said
(at p. 574) :
"But even assuming that the appellants had fallen behind
in their instalment payments, and that they had no other valid
(I) [1970] 1 Chancery p. 345 @ 402. H
(2) {1961] 3 All E.R. 621 (H.L.) @ p. 1525.
(3) 32 L.Ed. 2d 556 @ 574.
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A defenses, that is immaterial here. The right to be heard does
not depend upon an advance showing that one will surely
prevail at the hearing. 'To one who protest against the talcing
of his property without due process of law, it is no answer t<>
say that in his particular case due proce~s of law would have
led to the same result because he had no adequate defense upon
B the merits'".
In Chintepalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Cooperative Society
Ltd., etc. v. Secretary (Food & Agriculture) Govt. of AndhrG'
Pradesh etc. (1), there was a non-compliance with sec. 77 (2) of the
Cooperative Societies Act which provided that no order prejudicial
c to any person shall be passe:d unless such person had· been given an
opportunity of making his representation. The argument was that
since the facts were clear the non-compliance did not matter. It was
also said that the appellant had of his own motion made some repre-
sentation in the matter. This Court rejected the arguments observing
(at p. 567, 569-570) :
D "It i:s submitted that the Government did not afford any
opportunity to the appellant for making representation before
it. The High Court rejected this• plea on the ground that from
a perusal of the voluntary applications filed by the appellant it
was clear that the appellant had any how met with the points.
urged by the respondents in their revision petition before the
E Government. We are, however, unable to accept the view of
the High Court as correct".
** ** **
"As mentioned earlier in the judgment the Government did.
not give any notice communicating to the appellant about enter-
tainment of the application in revision preferred by the respon-
F dents. 'Even though the appellant had filed some repre-
sentations in respect of the matter, it would not absolve
the Government from giving notice to the appellant to make
the representation against the claim of the respondents.
The minimal requirement under section 77(2) is a notice i:nform-
ing the opponent about the application and affording him an
G
opportunity to make his' representation against whatever has
been alleged in hi:s petition. It is true that a personal hearing
is not obligatory but the mini!nal requirement of the principleS
of natural justice which are ingrained in section 77 (2) is that the
party whose rights are going to be affected and against whom .
H some allegations are made and some prejudicial orders ar0'
claimed should have a w;ritten notice of the proceedings from
(l) [1978] I SCR 563 @ 567, 569·70.
s. L. KAPOOR v. JAGMOHAN (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 765

the authority disclosing grounds of complaint or other objection A
preferably by furnishing a copy of the petition on which action
is contemplated in order that a proper and effective represen-
tation may be made. This minimal requirement can on no
account be dispensed with by relying upon the principle of
absence of prejudice or imputation of certain knowledge to the
B
party against whom action is sought for.
It is admitted that no notice whatever had been given by the
Government to the appellant. There is, therefore, clear violation
of section 77(2) which is a mandatory provision. We do not
agree with the High Court that this provision can by-passed by
resort to delving into correspondence between the appellant and c
the Government. Such non-compliance with a mandatory pro-
vision gives rise to unnecessary litigation which must be avoided
at all costs".
The observations of this Court in Chintapalli Agency Taluk
Arrack Sales Cooperative Society v. Secretary (Supra) are clearly
D
against the submissions of the learned Attorney General.
The matter has also been treated as an application of the
-general ·principle that justice should not only be done but should be
seen to be done. Jackson's Natµral Justice (1980 Edn.) contains a
very interesti:ng discussion of the subject. He says :
"The distinction between justice being done and being seen E
to be done has been emphasised in many' cases.
The requirement that justice should be seen to be done may
be regarded as a general principle which in some cases can be
satisfied only by the observance of the rules of natural justice or
as itself forming one of those rules. Both explanations of the
significance of the maxim are found in Lord Widgery C.J's
F
judgment in R. V. Home Secretary, Ex. P. Hosenball (1977)
1 W.L.R. 766, 772, whereafter saying that "the 'principles of
natural justice are those fundamental rules, the breach of which
will prevent justice from being seen to be done" he went on to
<lescribe the maxim as "one of the rules generally accepted in G
the bundle of the rules making up natural justice".
It is the recogni:tion of the importance of the requirement
that justice is seen to be done that justifies the giving of a
remedy to a litigant even when it may be claimed that a decision
alleged to be vitia:ted by a breach of nMural justice would still
have been reached had a fair hearing been given by an impartial H
tribunal. The maxim is applicable precisely when the Court is
concerned not with a case of actual injustice but with the
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R..

A appearance of injustice, or possible injustice. In Altco Ud. v.
Sutherland (1971) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 515 Donaldson J said that the
court, in deciding whether to interfere where an arbitrator bad
not given a party a full hearing was not concerned with whether
a further hearing would produce a different or the same result.
It was important that the parties should not only be given
B justice, but, as reasonable men, know that they had had justice
or "to use the time hallowed phrase" that justi:ce should not only
be done but be seen to be done. In R. V. Thames Magistrates'_
Court, ex.p. Polemis (1974)1 W.L.R. 1371, the applicant ob-
tained an order of certiorari to quash his conviction by a stipen-
diary magistrate on the ground that he had not had sufficient
c time to prepare bis defence. The Divisional Court rejected the
argument that, in its descretion, it ought to refuse relief because
the applicant had no defence to the charge.
"It is again absolutely basic to our system that justice must
not only be done but must manifestly be seen ito be done. If justice
D was so clearly not seen to be done, as on the afternoon in
question here, it seems to me that it is no answer to the applicant
to say : 'Well, even if the case had been properly conducted,
the result would have been the same'. That is mixing up doing
justice with seeing that justiceis done (per Lord Widgery C.J.
at p. 1375)".
E In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary
rule dependent on whether it would . have made any difference if
natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural
justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice indepen-
dently of proof of denial of natural ·justice is unnecessary. It
will! comes from a person who has denied justice that the person
F
who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where
on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible
and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not
issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because
it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do
G not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken
by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal.
Every wrong action of a Municipal Committee need not nece-
ssarily lead to the inference of incompetence on the part of the
Committee or amount to an abuse of the powers of the Committee.
That is- a matter to be decided by the State Government on the facts
H of each case. A Committee may admit that what it has done is wrong
and yet may plead that its action does not reveal incompetence or
an abuse of its· powers. It may plead an honest error judgment;
s. L. KAPOOR v. JAGMOHAN (Chi.nnappa Reddy, J.) 767
it may plead some misapprehension about the state of facts or state A
of the law; it may plead that in any event the drastic action contem-
plated by Sec. 238(1) is l).Ot cal1ed for. Therefore, mearly because
facts are admitted or are indisputable it does not follow that natural
justice need not be observed. In fact in the present case one of the
complai:nts of the appellant is that relevant fact~ were not considered
by the Lt. Governor. Neither the impugned order nor the note of B
Shri Shaiza shows that in regard to the first allegation two vital cir-
cumstances were considered : (a) The contractor had agreed to pay
interest at the rate of 9% on the mobilisation advance; (b) the
contractor had agreed to offer bank guarantee to cover the mobilisa-
tion advance as well as the interest. It was argued that had these
facts been brought to the notice of the Lt. Governor he might not
c
have made the impugned order. If notice had been given to the Com-
mittee, the Committee would have certainly brought these facts to the
notice of the Lt. Governor.
In the light of the discussion we have no option Fut to hold
that the order dated February 27, 1980, of the Lt. Governor super- D
seding the New Delhi Municipal Committee is viti:ated by the failure
to observe the principle Audi Alteram. Partem. The question is
what relief should be given to the appellant ? The ·term of the Com-
mittee is due to expi:re on October 3, 1980 which means tnat just a
few days more are left for the term to run out. ·If now the order is
quashed and the Committee is directed to be. reinstated with liberty E
to the Lt. Governor to proceed according to law- this should be our
order ordinarily--, it may lead to confusion and even chaos i:n
the affairs of the Municipality. Shri Sorabji, learned Counsel for the
appellant, had relieved us of our anxiety by stating "in view of the
fact that the term expires on October 3, 1980, and as the appellant is
anxious to have the stigma cast on him by the notification removed, the F
appellant does not ·press either for reinstatement in office or for
striking down the notification so long as there is a just determination
of the invalidity of the notification". We have held that the noti-
fication is vitiated by the failure to observe the principles of natural
justice 'lind we let the matter rest there. We neither quash the noti-
fication nor reinstate the Committee. Nor are we to be understood as· G
having expressed any opinion on the merits of the supersession. We
alJow the appeal in the manner indicated. The appellant is entitled
to hi:s costs.

N.V.K. Appeal allowed. H