Supreme Court of India
S. LOGANATHANversusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 803
- Decided
- 16 November 2011
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
The Inquiry Officer’s findings were valid and the Chief Judge, as the appointing authority, was competent to impose dismissal; the appellant’s right of departmental appeal remained unaffected.
Summary
The appellant, a Junior Clerk, was charged under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and faced a departmental inquiry that initially proceeded ex‑parte. After the appellant objected, the inquiry was recalled and conducted de novo with his full participation, leading to a finding of guilt on several charges and his dismissal by the Chief Judge, who was also his appointing authority. The appellant challenged the dismissal in a writ petition, arguing that (i) the Inquiry Officer improperly relied on evidence from the ex‑parte proceedings and (ii) the Chief Judge, as an appellate authority, could not impose punishment without depriving him of a departmental right of appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Inquiry Officer’s findings were based on evidence recorded in the de novo inquiry and were therefore valid, and that the Chief Judge was competent to impose the penalty under the applicable notification, leaving the appellant’s right of departmental appeal intact. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- The validity of the Inquiry Officer’s findings when evidence from an ex‑parte proceeding was considered.
- Whether the Chief Judge, acting as an appellate authority, could impose disciplinary punishment, thereby violating the appellant’s statutory right of departmental appeal.
- Whether the appellant’s right of appeal was extinguished by the dismissal order.
Legislation cited
- Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965s. Rule 11, s. Rule 14
Subjects
disciplinary proceedingsdepartmental inquiryex‑parte proceedingsappellate authorityright of appealCentral Civil Services Rulesdismissaldepartmental appeal
Judgment
[2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1081
S. LOGANATHAN A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 9829 of 2011)
NOVEMBER 16, 2011
B
[R.M. LODHA AND H.L. GOKHALE, JJ.]
Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings - Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 -
Rule 14 - Departmental Inquiry against appellant, a Junior C
Clerk in the Subordinate Court - Appellant filed response by
way of defence, but after some time, did not participate in the
inquiry - Departmental inquiry continued ex-parte -
Subsequently, on objection of appellant that he had not been
provided adequate opportunity, ex-parte departmental inquiry D
was re-called and the inquiry started de novo - After full
participation by the appellant thereafter in the departmental
inquiry, some of the charges were found fully proved while
some were held-partiall-ypro1rea oy the mqwfy Officer:_ The
Chief Judge on consideration of the report submitted by the E
Inquiry Officer, awarded to the appellant penalty of dismissal
from the service - Appellant challenged that order before the
High Court by filing a Writ Petition - Writ Petition was
dismissed - Two fold contentions raised by appellant- 1) that
the findings of Inquiry Officer were vitiated inasmuch as the F
Inquiry Officer took into consideration the evidence recorded
in the ex-parte proceedings and 2) that the Chief Judge was
an appellate authority and, therefore, he could not have
imposed the order of punishment as that resulted in depriving
·the appellant of his valuable right of departmental appeal G
against the order of punishment - Held: The first contention
is mis-placed - The Inquiry Officer did not base his findings
· on the evidence recorded ex-parte but referred to that only for
, purposes of appreciation of the evidence of the witnesses
1081 H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A examined by the department in de novo inquiry wherein the·
appellant fully participated - The findings were based on
.evidence recorded subsequently in presence of the appellant
- The consideration of the evidence recorded in the course
of the inquiry by the Inquiry Officer in the presence of the
B appellant and the findings recorded by him did not suffer from
any legal infirmity justifying any interference by Supreme
Court - As regards the other contention, ordinarily in a case
of infliction of punishment by the higher authority acting as a
disciplinary authority, if delinquent is denied his right of
c departmental appeal or right of review, such order of
punishment may be rendered bad in law but much would
depend on the relevant rules - In the instant case, the Chief
Judge was the appointing authority of the appellant - In that
event, the argument of the appellant that the appellate
authority inflicted punishment upon him is devoid of any
0
substance - The challenge to the competence of the Chief
Judge in passing the order of punishment was rightly rejected
by the High Court - By virtue of the second proviso in the
Notification dated November 17, 1982, the appellant's right
of departmental appeal was not taken away and he could have
E challenged that order in the departmental appeal to the higher
authority - The appellant did not avail of that opportunity and
instead challenged the order in a Writ Petition before the High
Court - The appellant's right of appeal not affected by the
order passed by the Chief Judge.
F
Surjit Ghose v. Chairman & Managing Director, United
Commercial Bank and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 474 and
Electronics Corporation of India v. G. Muralidhar (2001) 10
sec 43 - distinguished.
G
Case Law Reference:
(1995) 2 sec 474 distinguished Para 5
(2001) 10 sec 43 distinguished Para 5
H
S. LOGANATHAN v. UNION OF INDIA ANDORS. 1083 .
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. A
9829 of 2011.
From the Judgment & Order dated 11.06.2007 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in W.P. No. 3141 of 2002.
V. Kanagaraj. Promila, S. Thananjayan for the Appellant. B
R. Venkataramani, V.G. Pragasam, S.J. Aristotle,
Praburamasubramanian for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered
c
-- ORDER
1. Leave granted.
- -
2. The appellant, who was working as a Junior Clerk in the D
Subordinate Court at Yanam (Pondicherry}, was dismissed
from the service on conciusion of disciplinary proceedings by
the Chief Judge, Pondicherry (for short "Chief Judgej vide order
dated November 8, 2000. The appellant challenged that order
before the High Court of judicature at Madras by filing a Writ
Petition. His Writ Petition came to be dismissed on June 11, E
2007. It is from this order that the present appeal, by special
leave, arises.
a
3. On April 28, 1999, the appellant was issued Charge
Memo setting out therein that he was liable to be proceeded F
with the disciplinary action under Rule 14 of the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal} Rules, 1965 (for
short "CCS Rules"}. Along with the Charge-Memo, Article of
Charges was sent to the appellant. The Article of Charges
contained ten articles. An Inquiry Officer was appointed and G
I inquiry proceeded against the appellant. The appellant filed his
response by way of defence to the Charge Memo and Article
of Charges and denied the allegations levelled against him. The
appellant, after some time, did not participate in the
departmental inquiry. As a result of which: the depa~mental H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A inquiry continued ex-parte. Subsequently, on his objection that
he had not been provided adequate opportunity, ex-parte
departmental inquiry was re-called and the inquiry started de
novo. After full participation by the appellant thereafter in the
departmental inquiry, some of the .charges were found fully
B proved while some were held partially proved by the Inquiry
Officer. The Disciplinary Authority (Chief Judge), on
consideration of the report submitted by the Inquiry Officer,
agreed with the findings recorded in the inquiry report and
awarded to the appellant penalty of dismissal from the service.
c 4. The dismissal order dated November 8, 2000, as noted
above, was challenged by the appellant before the High Court
of Madras by way of filing a Writ Petition but without any
success.
D 5. Mr. V. Kanagaraj, learned senior counsel for the
appellant raised two-fold contention before us. Firstly, he
contended that the Chief Judge was an appellate authority and,
therefore, he could not have imposed the order of punishment
as that has resulted in depriving the appellant of his valuable
E right of departmental appeal against the order of punishment.
In support of this contention, Mr. Kangaraj placed reliance on
the two decisions of this court; (i) Surjit Ghose vs. Chairman
& Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others 1
and (ii) Electronics Corporation of India vs. G. Muralidhar.
F 6. The second contention of Mr. Kangaraj is that the
findings of the Inquiry Officer are vitiated inasmuch as the Inquiry
Officer had taken into consideration the evidence that was
recorded in the ex-parte proceedings.
G 7. Insofar as the second contention is concerned, it may
be stated immediately that the said contention is mis-placed.
The Inquiry Officer has not based his findings on the evidence
that was recorded ex-parte but has referred to that only for the
· 1. (1995)2SCC474.
H 2. (2010) 10 sec 43.
S. LOGANATHAN v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1085
purposes of appreciation of the evidence of the witnesses A
examined by the department in de novo inquiry wherein the
appellant fully participated. The findings are based on the
evidence that was recorded subsequently i.n the presence of
the appellant. It is true that the witnesses PW2 to PW11
examined by the department did not support the department B
fully but besides the evidence of PW2 to PW11, there is a
evidence of PW1. The Inquiry Officer considered his evidence
and relied upon the same.
8. In our considered view, the i;onsideration Of the C
evidence recorded in the course of the inquiry by the Inquiry
Officer in the presence of the appellant and the findings
recorded by him do not suffer from any legal infirmity justifying
any interference by us.
9. Coming to the first contention raised by Mr. Kanagaraj, D
suffice it to say that ordinarily in a case of infliction of
punishment by the higher authority acting as a disciplinary
authority, if delinquent is denied his right of departmental appeal
or right of review, such order of punishment may be rendered
bad in law but much would depend on the relevant rules. In the E
case of Surjit Singh1, while considering the provisions of United
Commercial Bank Officers (Discipline and Appeals)
Regulations, 1976, this Court held thus:
"It is tr_ue that when an authority higher than the disciplinary F
authority itself imposes the punishment, the order of
punishment suffers from no illegality when no appea~ is
provided to such authority. However, when an appeal is
provided to the higher authority concerned against the
order of the disciplinary authority or of a lower authority and
the higher authority passes an order of punishment, the G
employee concerned is deprived of the remedy of appeal
which is a substantive right given to him by the Rules/
Regulations. An employee cahnot be deprived of his
substantive right. What is further, when there is a provision
of appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority H
I
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A and when the appellate or the higher authority against
whose order there is no appeal, exercises the powers of
the disciplinary authority in a given case, it results in
discrimination against the employee concerned. This is
particularly so when there are no guidelines in the Rules/
B Regulations as to when the higher authority or the appellate
authority should exercise the powers of the disciplinal)•
authority. The higher or appellate authority may choose to
exercise the power of the disciplinary authority in some
cases while not doing so in other cases. In such _cases,
c the right of the employee depends upon the choice of the
higher/appellate authority which patently results in
discrimination between an employee and employee.
Surely, such a situation cannot savour of legality."
10. The above legal position has been reiterated by this
D Court in Electronics Corporation of lndia2. However, the present
case is little different. Vide Notification dated November 17,
1982 issued by the Government of Pondicherry, a provision has
been made that the appointing authority is competent to
impose all the penalties in Rule 11 of the CCS Rules and the
E appellate authority has to exercise the powers and perform the
functions of other authorities in respect of Group ·~ and Group
'D' posts in the offices mentioned against each other in column
(5) of the Table appended thereto. Second proviso that follows
the first proviso and the main body of the Notification provides
F that where the appointment of a delinquent has been made by
an authority higher than that specified in Column (2), then that
authority will constitute the disciplinary authority under Column
(3) of the Table in respect of major penalties and any appeal
~gainst the orders of such authority will lie to the next higher
G authority not below the rank of a Secretary to Government and
where the appeal is against the orders of the Lieutenant
Governor as the disciplinary authority, the appeal shall lie to the
President.
The relevant portion of the Table is as follows:
H
S. LOGANATHAN v: UNION OF INDIAAND ORS: 1087
I .
SL. Appointing Authority Appellate Office/ A
No. Authority competent to Authority officers relating
impose all to which the
penalties powers are to
specified in be exercised.
Rule 11. B
1 2 3 4 5
)()()( xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
c
Special Special Chief j~qge, District Court,
Officer, Officer, Pondicherry including the
Judicial Judicial Labour Court,
Department Departme11t Sales Tax
I Appellate D
Tribunal and
Office of the
Special
Officer.
E
11. The Chief Judge has recorded in his order dated
November 8, 2000 that in the case of the appellant, he was the
appointing;authority. This fact has not been disputed by showing
any material otherwise. We, therefore, have to accept the
position ~hat the Chief Judge was the appointing authority of F
the appellant. In that event, the argument advanced 011 behalf
of the ·appellant that the llppellate authority has inflicted
·punishment on him is devoid of any substance.
12. As a matter of fact, the second proviso in the
Notification dated November 17, 1992 takes care of such G·
situation. It provides that in cases where the appointment has
been made by an authority higher than that specified in Column
(2), then that authority will constitute the disciplinary authority
under Columl) (3) of the said Table in respect of major pe:ialties.
H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A. 13. The challenge to the competence of the Chief Judge
in passing the order of punishment is not meritorious and has,
rightly been rejected by the High Court. By virtue of the second
proviso in the Notification dated November 17, 1982, the
appellant's right of departmental appeal was not taken away
B and he could have challenged that order in the departmental
appeal to the higher authority. The appellant did not avail of that
opportunity and instead challenged the order in a Writ Petition
before the High Court.
14. Be that as it may, the appellant's right of appeal has
C not been affected by the Chief Judge in passing the order dated
November 8, 2000.
15. The appeal has no merit and is dismissed accordingly
with no order as to costs.
D
B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.
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