Holding

A review petition is not maintainable unless it falls within the specific grounds of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC; successive review petitions without fresh material or a patent error are impermissible.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined two successive review petitions filed by the respondents seeking to overturn a High Court judgment that upheld the surrender of protected tenancy rights in 1967. The Court held that the respondents had ample opportunities to produce the certified revenue records earlier and failed to demonstrate any new or important evidence, nor any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. Consequently, the second set of review petitions did not satisfy any of the grounds under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC and amounted to an abuse of process. The Court set aside the High Court order allowing the review and restored the earlier judgment dated 9 July 2013. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The maintainability of a second review petition when the alleged new documents were already available earlier.
Whether successive review petitions against the same order are permissible under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.
Interpretation of ‘error apparent on the face of the record’ and ‘any other sufficient reason’ for review.
Whether the High Court erred in treating the review petitions as independent appeals.

Legislation cited

Subjects

review jurisdictionOrder XLVII Rule 1error apparent on the face of the recordsuccessive review petitionsCivil Procedure Codenew evidenceappellate vs reviewprotected tenancyland ceiling

Judgment

42 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 11 S.C.R. 42 [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY
v.
V. NARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeals No. 5503-04 of 2022)
B AUGUST 18, 2022
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI, KRISHNA MURARI AND
HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]
Civil procedure Code, 1908 – S.114 r/w Or XLVII – Review
Application – Maintainability of – Held: s.114 r/w Or XLVII makes
C
it clear that a review application would be maintainable on (i)
discovery of new and important matters or evidence which, after
exercise of due diligence, were not within the knowledge of the
applicant or could not be produced by him when the decree was
passed or the order made; (ii) on account of some mistake or error
D apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient
reason – The error must be apparent on the face of the record and
not one which has to be searched out – The power of review is not
to be confused with the appellate power which enables the Superior
Court to correct errors committed by a subordinate Court – Under
the review, the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the
E
view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking
two views in a matter – There is a clear distinction between an
erroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of the
record – An erroneous decision can be corrected by the Superior
Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record can
F only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction – In the present
case, nothing have prevented the respondents from filing the certified
copies of the revenue records even earlier, but they elected to file
only photocopies of the very same surrender proceedings – At no
stage a plea was taken by the respondents with regard to the
discovery of new documents which could have been produced by
G
them after due diligence – Several opportunities were available to
the respondents to file authenticated copies of the revenue records,
firstly, when respondents challenged ex-parte order of Appellate
authority , secondly, when Appellate authority reconsidered the
appeals, thirdly, when respondent preferred a second set of revision
H petition, fourthly, when respondent filed two review petitions, and
42
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 43
OTHERS

lastly, when respondent preferred Special Leave Petition before A
Supreme Court – Moreover, no averments were made by the
respondents in the second set of review to the effect that they could
not trace the documents in question earlier – Therefore, non-
production of the relevant documents on the part of the respondents
at the appropriate stage cannot be a ground for seeking review of
B
the judgment when five opportunities were available to them for
production of the said documents – Even otherwise, recourse to
successive review petitions against the same order is impermissible
when the respondents have miserably failed to draw the attention
of the Court to any circumstances that would entitle them to invoke
review jurisdiction – Thus, Second set of review petition ought to C
be rejected by High Court.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. It has been consistently held by this Court in
several judicial pronouncements that the Court’s jurisdiction of
review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A judgment can be D
open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the
face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a
process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent
on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of
review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising
E
powers of review, the Court can correct a mistake but not
substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a
possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment may also
be open to review when any new or important matter of evidence
has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to the
condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of F
the party seeking review or could not be produced by it when the
order was made despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence.
There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as
against an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous
decision can be corrected by the Superior Court, however an
G
error apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected by
exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referred
to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment has been
described as “for any other sufficient reason”. The said phrase
has been explained to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at
least analogous to those specified in the rule” [Para 26][65-G-H; H
66-A-D]
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A 2. The Single Judge of the High Court has taken great pains
to discuss the three circumstances available under Order XLVII
CPC for maintaining a review application and observed that in
the instant case, the respondents had stated before this Court
that they had in their possession, genuine documents relating to
surrender of the protected tenancy rights in respect of the subject
B
land and in view of the said submission, the petitions for Special
Leave to Appeal were disposed of with an observation that if the
respondents were able to obtain such documents, it would be
open to them to file a review petition before the High Court.
What is relevant is that this Court had even then declined to
C interfere with the findings on merits returned by the High Court
vide Judgment dated 09th July, 2013; nor was the review order
dated 20th February, 2014, interfered with. Under the garb of the
liberty granted to them to approach the High Court again, all that
the respondents have done is to obtain certified copies of the
revenue records in respect of the subject land and enclosed them
D
with the second set of review petitions. This is so when
photocopies of the said documents had been filed by them earlier.
[Para 27][66-E-H]
3. Nothing prevented the respondents from filing the
certified copies of the revenue records even earlier, but they
E elected to file only photocopies of the very same surrender
proceedings along with the revision petitions that were ultimately
dismissed by the High Court vide common judgment dated 9th
July, 2013. The above chronology of events gains significance as
it goes to amply demonstrate that several opportunities were
F available to the respondents if they really wished to file
authenticated copies of the revenue records relating to the
purported surrender proceedings before the Tehsildar which they
did not avail of, for reasons best known to them. The first
opportunity arose when the respondents challenged the ex parte
order dated 2nd April, 2005 passed by the Appellate Authority
G when they filed two Civil Revision Petitions which were allowed
and the matter was remanded back to the Appellate Authority for
fresh consideration; the second opportunity arose when the
Appellate Authority re-considered the appeals remitted by the
High Court and passed an order dated 23rd March, 2013, in favour
H of the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant; the third
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 45
OTHERS

opportunity arose when the respondents preferred a second set A
of Civil Revision Petitions assailing the order dated 23rd March,
2013 that culminated in the common judgment and order dated
9th July, 2013 passed by the High Court; the fourth opportunity
arose when the respondents filed two review applications for
seeking review of the common judgment and order dated 9th
B
July, 2013, that came to be dismissed vide order dated 20th
February, 2014; and the fifth opportunity arose when the
respondents preferred petitions for special leave to appeal before
this Court being aggrieved by the common judgment and orders
dated 9th July, 2013 and the review order dated 20th February,
2014 passed by the High Court. [Paras 28 and 31][67-B; 69-F-H; C
70-A-B]
4. Nothing has been stated on affidavit to substantiate the
plea taken by the respondents at such a belated stage that the
documents sought to be filed by them with the second set of
review petitions had come to light after passing of the judgment D
and order dated 9th July, 2013. Under the garb of the liberty
granted to them, the respondents have tried to fill in the glaring
loopholes and introduce evidence in the review proceedings that
was all along in their power and possession and ought to have
seen the light of the day much earlier. In fact, it appears that the
Civil Revision Petitions were originally argued to the hilt on E
several other grounds, not limited just to the revenue record,
which were all considered and turned down as meritless.
Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that non-production
of the relevant documents on the part of the respondents at the
appropriate stage cannot be a ground for seeking review of the F
judgment and order dated 9th July, 2013 particularly, when five
opportunities enumerated in para 31 above, were available to
them for production of the said documents, which were all frittered
away, one by one. [Para 34][71-E-G]
5. Even otherwise, recourse to successive review petitions G
against the same order is impermissible more so, when the
respondents have miserably failed to draw the attention of this
Court to any circumstances that would entitle them to invoke
review jurisdiction within the ambit of the Rules. Under the rules,
the respondents were not required to produce “genuine”
H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A documents but new documents/evidence that was not within their
knowledge and could not have been so even after exercise of
due diligence, which could have turned the tables in their favour.
Nor has any error apparent on the face of the record been brought
out by them. [Para 35][72-A-B]
B Babboo Alias Kalyandas and Others v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (1979) 4 SCC 74; Sakuru v. Tanaji (1985) 3
SCC 590 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 109; Dharappa v.
Bijapur Coop. Milk Products Societies Union Limited
(2007) 9 SCC 109 : [2007] 5 SCR 729 – referred to.
C Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others
(1980) Supp SCC 562; Parsion Devi and Others v.
Sumitri Devi and Others (1997) 8 SCC 715 : [1997] 4
Suppl. SCR 470; Lilly Thomas and Others v. Union of
India and Others (2000) 6 SCC 224 : [2000] 3 SCR
1081; Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hitech
D Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and Others (2005)
6 SCC 651 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 517; Jain Studios
Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd.(2006) 5 SCC 501
: [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 409; Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati
and Others (2013) 8 SCC 320 : [2013] 11 SCR 25;
E Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma
(1979) 4 SCC 389; State of West Bengal and Others v.
Kamal Sengupta and Another (2008) 8 SCC 612 :
[2008] 10 SCR 4; S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of
Karnataka and Another (1993) 4 Supp SCC 595 :
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 1; Patel Narshi Thakershi and
F Others v. Shri Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji (1971)
3 SCC 844; Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others
v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and Others (2020) SCC Online
SC 896; Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram and Moran Mar
Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose
G Athanasius and Others – relied on.
Case Law Reference
[2000] 3 SCR 1081 relied on Para 4
[1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 109 relied on Para 7
H [2007] 5 SCR 729 referred to Para 7
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 47
OTHERS

[1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 470 relied on Para 15 A
[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 517 relied on Para 17
[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 409 relied on Para 18
[2013] 11 SCR 25 relied on Para 19
[2008] 10 SCR 4 relied on Para 21 B
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 1 relied on Para 23
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 5503-
5504 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.04.2022 of the High Court C
for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in IA No.2 of 2014 (Rev. CRMP
No.6377 of 2014) and CRP No. 2786 of 2013.
With
Civil Appeal No. 5505 of 2022.
D
Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, V. K. Shukla, Sr. Advs., Achut Reddy,
Somanadri Goud Katam, Nidhi Ram Sharma, Ganesh Bhardwaj, Siraj
Malik, Advs. for the Appellant.
Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv., Giridhar Rao, Sridhar Potaraju, Arjun
Singh, Ms. Shiwani Tushir, Rajat Srivastav, Gaichangpou Gangmei, Advs. E
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HIMA KOHLI, J.
1. Leave granted.
F
2. The present appeals are directed against a common judgment
and order dated 29th April, 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of
the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad, allowing the
review petitions filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 herein (IA No.2 of
2014 in Revision CRPMP No. 6377 of 2014 moved in and Civil Revision
Petition No.2786 of 2013 and IA No.1 of 2014 in Revision CRMP No.4997 G
/2014 moved in and Civil Revision Petition No.2787 /2013). As a result
of allowing the review petitions, the common judgment and order dated
09th July, 2013 passed by the predecessor Bench upholding the common
order dated 23rd March, 2013 in Cases No. F1/3/2005 and F1/4/2005
passed by the Joint Collector, Mahabubnagar, has been set aside and as H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A a sequel thereto, the orders dated 31st March, 1967 passed by the
Tahsildar, Shadnagar, accepting the surrender of protected tenancy rights
by the ancestors of the appellant have been confirmed.
3. The appeals have a chequered history that dates back to the
year 1967. The facts relevant for deciding the present appeals are as
B follows:-
3.1 Late Shri Chandra Reddy and late Shri Chenna Reddy, both
sons of Buchi Reddy, were protected tenants in respect of separate
parcels of land situated in different survey numbers of Kammadanam
Village, Shadnagar Mandal, Mahabubnagar District1. The recorded
C landlord of the protected tenants was late Venkat Anantha Reddy, who
was the Karta of a joint family comprising of himself and his brother,
late Laxma Reddy. On the basis of an oral partition of the land that took
place between the two brothers, the subject land fell to the share of late
L. Harshavardhan Reddy (respondent No.6), son of late Laxma Reddy.
Pertinently, L. Harshavardhan Reddy expired during the pendency of
D the review petitions and L. Sameera Reddy was brought on record as
his legal heir. As per the respondents, late Shri Chandra Reddy, who
was a protected tenant in respect of the subject land measuring 57 acres
and 16 guntas, had surrendered his protected tenancy rights on submitting
a written application dated 6th August, 1966 to the Tehsildar. A similar
E application was submitted by the three legal heirs of Late Chenna Reddy
(Ram Reddy, Chandra Reddy and Laxma Reddy) in respect of land
measuring 98 acres 18 guntas. The respondents claim that on receiving
the said applications, the Tehsildar, Shadnagar, recorded the statements
of the applicants and after confirming the identity of the parties, issued a
public notice and thereafter, accepted the surrender on satisfying the
F requirements prescribed in the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 19502. After accepting the surrender applications,
the names of the protected tenants were struck off from the final records
of tenancy, vide order dated 31st March, 1967.
3.2 It is also the version of the respondents that the protected
G tenants had surrendered their tenancy rights in favour of late Venkat
Anantha Reddy pursuant to an understanding that the latter would not
oppose the 38-B Certificate issued by the Tenancy Tribunal in favour of
Chandra Reddy and the sons of late Chenna Reddy in respect of the
1
Hereinafter referred to as ‘subject land’
2
H For short ‘Act’
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 49
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]

parcel of land measuring 85 acres 23 guntas situated in Kammadanam A
Village. In other words, there was a reciprocity between the protected
tenants and the landlord based on which, the landlord relinquished his
rights in respect of land measuring 85 acrs 23 guntas in exchange of the
surrender of the subject land by Chandra Reddy and the legal heirs of
late Chenna Reddy.
B
3.3 On the other hand, the appellant, who is the legal heir of the
original tenants, claims that his ancestors were dispossessed from the
subject land in the year 1975 when they were trying to obtain 38-E
Certificate from the authorities. Only in the year 2001 when the legal
heirs of the protected tenants had applied for the final record of tenancy,
did they discover that the names of the protected tenants had been struck C
off on the basis of the purported surrender proceedings conducted by
the Tehsildar in the year 1967. Challenging the said surrender proceedings,
the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant being the protected tenants,
preferred appeals before the Joint Collector in February, 2002 along
with an application seeking condonation of delay. The said appeals were D
allowed by the Joint Collector, Mahabubnagar, being the Appellate
Authority, vide order dated 2nd April, 2005. Aggrieved by the said order,
the respondents approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh 3 raising
a plea that it was an ex-parte order and filed two Civil Revision Petitions
(CRP No. 4620/2005 and CRP No. 4988/2005), which were allowed,
vide order dated 19th September, 2006 and the matters were remanded E
back for fresh disposal. On a re-hearing, the Appellate Authority passed
an order on 23rd March, 2013 whereby, the order dated 31st March, 1967
passed by the Tehsildar, Shadnagar accepting the surrender of the
protected tenancy rights by the ancestors of the appellant, was set aside
and the original entries in respect of the land in the final record of tenancy F
as existing prior to 1967, were restored.
3.4 Dissatisfied by the order dated 23 rd March, 2013, the
respondents once again approached the High Court by filing two Civil
Revision Petitions (CRP No.2786/2013 and CRP No.2787/2013), which
came to be dismissed by a common judgment and order dated 09th July, G
2013. The review petitions subsequently filed by the respondents for
seeking review of the aforesaid judgment (Rev. CRMP No.5443/2013
in Civil Revision Petition No. 2786/2013 and Rev. CRMP No. 5432/
2013 in Civil Revision Petition No. 2787/2013) were also dismissed, vide
3
For short ‘High Court’ H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A order dated 20th February, 2014. The common judgment and order dated
9th July, 2013 and the order dated 20th February, 2014 were assailed by
the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 through Special Leave Petitions (C) CC No.
8209- 8210/ 2014 that were disposed of with the following order passed
on 4th July, 2014:
B “Delay condoned.
The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that he would be
in a position to file genuine documents to show that there was
surrender of tenancy. If he will be able to obtain such documents,
it is open to him to file a review before the High Court. The special
C leave petitions are disposed of accordingly.”
3.5 Armed with the above order, the respondents No. 1 to 6 again
approached the High Court and filed a second round of review applications
seeking review of the common order and judgment dated 9th July, 2013
which have been allowed by the impugned order. The learned Single
D Judge has upheld the surrender order dated 31st March, 1967 passed by
the Tehsildar, Shadnagar whereby the names of the protected tenants
(predecessors-in-interest of the appellants) were deleted from the final
records of tenancy.
4. Arguing for the appellant, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned
E Senior Advocate has contended that the review petitions filed by the
respondents No. 1 to 6 are not maintainable as they do not satisfy any of
the conditions for review provided in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 19084. He submitted that the grounds taken in the second
set of review petitions were akin to those taken in the first set of review
petitions and once the first set of review petitions were dismissed by the
F High Court, vide order dated 20th February, 2014 and no new grounds
were taken by the respondents No.1 to 6 subsequently, there was no
occasion to allow the second set of review petitions; that the respondents
No. 1 to 6 did not take a plea that the documents subsequently filed by
them, were not in their knowledge when they had filed the civil revision
G petitions and the first set of review petitions before the High Court for
attracting the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Stating that the
scope of review is very limited and a review application can only be
entertained if there is any error apparent on the face of the record,
which the respondents No. 1 to 6 have failed to point out in the instant

H 4
For short ‘CPC’
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 51
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]

case, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the High Court ought to A
have dismissed the same outright. It was argued that by virtue of the
impugned order, the High Court has virtually treated the review petitions
filed by the respondents No. 1 to 6 as independent appeals, which is
impermissible. To buttress the aforesaid submissions made on the limited
ambit and scope of a review petition and the bar on filing successive
B
review petitions, the decisions of this Court in Babboo Alias Kalyandas
and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh5 and Lilly Thomas and Others
v. Union of India and Others6 have been cited.
5. Another plea sought to be taken on behalf of the appellant is
that the name of the father of the protected tenants, Chandra Reddy and
Chenna Reddy has been stated to be Papi Reddy in the surrender C
proceedings whereas, his correct name is Buchi Reddy which goes to
show that the surrender proceedings conducted by the Tehsildar were
fabricated and the fact of the matter is that neither the appellant, nor his
ancestors had ever surrendered the tenancy rights in favour of the
respondents/their ancestors/ predecessors- in-interest. It was contended D
that this fact is borne out from the declaration made by the landlord in
the ceiling proceedings where he had admitted that 38-E Certificate
was granted in respect of the subject land and the tenants were in
possession thereof. It was canvassed that the High Court has failed to
appreciate that had surrender of lands by the protected tenants in favour
of the landlord actually taken place in the year 1967, as alleged, there E
was no occasion for the landlord to have later on claimed exemption of
these lands for being computed as part of his holdings under the Andhra
Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 7.
6. The aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the appellant
have been vehemently contested by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior F
Advocate appearing for the respondents. It was submitted that the
surrender proceedings had attained finality in the year 1967 and after
maintaining silence for almost 35 years, the legal heirs of the protected
tenants, had filed a misconceived appeal under Section 90(1) of the Land
Ceiling Act. Pertinently, the respondents being the purchasers of the G
subject land, were not made parties in the said proceedings and the
Appellate Authority had proceeded to pass an order dated 2nd April,

5
(1979) 4 SCC 74
6
(2000) 6 SCC 224
7
For short ‘the Land Ceiling Act’ H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A 2005 allowing the said appeals behind their back. Aggrieved by the said
ex parte order, when the respondents approached the High Court, the
matters were remanded back to the Appellate Authority for fresh
adjudication. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeals, once again
compelling the respondents to approach the High Court by filing fresh
appeals which were knocked off vide order dated 09th July, 2013 and
B
their review petitions were also dismissed on 20th February, 2014. Against
the said dismissal orders, the respondents had to approach this Court.
The petitions for special leave to appeal preferred by them were disposed
of vide order dated 4th July, 2014 that has been extracted in para 5
hereinabove.
C 7. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that in the light of the
permission granted by this Court, the respondents had filed review petitions
in the Civil Revision Petitions before the High Court after obtaining
certified copies of the relevant documents forming a part of the revenue
records. Only after considering the said documents did the learned Single
D Judge allow the review petitions for cogent and valid reasons that do not
deserve any interference. It has been canvassed on behalf of the
respondents that the legal heirs of the protected tenant had knowledge
about the surrender of the subject land right from the year 1967 to 2001
and they were also aware of the fact that the names of their ancestors
were not reflected in the protected tenants register. The real position is
E that the ancestors of the appellant were never in possession of the subject
land after 1967. Despite that, they had approached the Appellate Authority
challenging the surrender proceedings after a passage of 35 years.
Contending that said appeals were highly belated and deserved to be
thrown out on the ground of limitation alone without going into the merits,
F the decisions in Sakuru v. Tanaji8 and Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop.
Milk Products Societies Union Limited9 have been cited. It has been
urged that the appeals preferred by the ancestors of the appellant were
not maintainable, being patently barred by limitation which aspect has
been gone into by the High Court while passing the impugned judgment
allowing the review petitions filed by the respondents.
G
8. As for the mis-description of the predecessor-in-interest of the
appellant, it was submitted that Buchi Reddy was also known Papi Reddy
in the village which fact is reflected from the revenue records, namely,
8
(1985) 3 SCC 590
9
H (2007) 9 SCC 109
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 53
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]

Faisal Patti record of the village, as recorded by the Patwari. Counsel A
for the respondents also sought to negate the ground taken by the other
side with reference to the landlord claiming exemption under the land
ceiling proceedings on the ground that Land Reforms Tribunal did not
accept such a plea of exemption. It was thus submitted that surrender of
the tenancy rights had attained finality in the year 1967 itself and the
B
appellant and his ancestors have reopened settled issues after passage
of 35 years reckoned from the date of surrender only for the reason that
the price of the subject land, which is situated close to the International
Airport at Shamshabad, have escalated and he wants to encash the
same.
9. This Court has carefully perused the impugned judgment and C
the orders preceding the impugned judgment, gone through the records
and given its thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by
learned counsel for the parties. The only point that arises for consideration
in these appeals is whether the respondents/review petitioners had made
out a case for reviewing the judgment and order dated 23rd March, 2013 D
by satisfying the criteria for entertaining a second set of review petitions,
having failed to succeed in the first set of review petitions.
10. The core argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that
the High Court ought not to have entertained successive review petitions
filed by the respondents when they could not demonstrate emergence of E
any new facts or point out any error apparent on the face of the record,
for allowing the review applications, must be put to test by examining
the relevant provisions of law that governs review jurisdiction.
11. Section 114 of the CPC which is the substantive provision,
deals with the scope of review and states as follows: F
“Review:- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself
aggrieved:-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this
Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred;
G
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this
Code; or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the
decree or made the order, and the court may make such order
thereon as it thinks fit.” H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A 12. The grounds available for filing a review application against a
judgment have been set out in Order XLVII of the CPC in the following
words:
“1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieved -
B (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but
from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or
order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a
reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after
C the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or
could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was
passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient
reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order
made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the
D Court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or Order may
apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of
an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such
appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when,
E being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case
on which he applies for the review.
1[Explanation-The fact that the decision on a question of law on
which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or
modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any
F other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.]’’
13. A glance at the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that a
review application would be maintainable on (i) discovery of new and
important matters or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence,
were not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced
G by him when the decree was passed or the order made; (ii) on account
of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for
any other sufficient reason.
14. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others10,
this Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done
H 10
1980 Supp SCC 562
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 55
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]

unless the court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on A
the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine
its soundness. The observations made are as under:
“12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to
hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has
been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier B
order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of
the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of
justice. In Sow Chandra Kante and Another v. Sheikh Habib11
this Court observed :
‘A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant C
resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or
patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier
by judicial fallibility. … The present stage is not a virgin
ground but review of an earlier order which has the
normal feature of finality.’ ’’
D
(emphasis added)
15. In Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others12,
stating that an error that is not self- evident and the one thathas to be
detected by the process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error
apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise the powers E
of review, this Court held as under:
“7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly
confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In
Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. 13 this Court
opined: F
‘11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether
the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case
did not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘error
apparent on the face of the record’. The fact that on the
earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts
G
that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be
conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous.
Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not
11
(1975) 1 SCC 674
12
(1997) 8 SCC 715
13
1964 SCR (5) 174 H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the
record’, for there is a distinction which is real, though it
might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere
erroneous decision and a decision which could be
characterized as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is
by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
B
erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies
only for patent error.’
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury 14
while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar
Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma15 this Court once again held
C that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to
be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1
CPC.
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to
review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent
D on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident
and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly
be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record
justifying the court to exercise its power of review under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of this jurisdiction under
E Order 47 rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous
decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. A review petition,
it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot
be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’”.
[emphasis added]
F 16. The error referred to under the Rule, must be apparent on the
face of the record and not one which has to be searched out. While
discussing the scope and ambit of Article 137 that empowers theSupreme
Court to review its judgments and in the course of discussing the contours
of review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC in Lily
G Thomas (supra), this Court held as under :
“54. Article 137 empowers this court to review its judgments
subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any
rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme
14
(1995) 1 SCC 170
15
(1979) 4 SCC 389
H
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 57
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]

Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of A
the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of
the grounds specified in Order 47 rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provides:
“1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieved - B
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but
from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, C
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not
within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the
time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account
of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, D
or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of
the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a
review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or
made the order.’
Under Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review
E
lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the
record in criminal cases. Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme Court
Rules provides that after an application for review has been
disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same
matter.
F
XXX XXX XXX
56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be
exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute
a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of
the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review
cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere G
possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for
review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further
petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of
following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches
and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised.
However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article
136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that
the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental
rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can
take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.
B
XXX XXX XXX
58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order XL of
the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil
Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed
C before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the
judgment in Sarla Mudgal case 16. It is not the case of the
petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter
which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their
knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at
the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us
D were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before
the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the
judgment in Sarla Mudgal16 case. We have also not found any
mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a
review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such
E which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error
which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error
of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the
judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment
interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the
F fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for
reviewing the judgment. The words “any-other sufficient
reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC” must mean “a
reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those
specified in the rule” as was held in Chajju Ram v. Neki
G Ram17 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius 18. Error
apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is
16
(1995) 3 SCC 635, Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and Others v. Union of India and
Others
17
AIR 1922 PC 112
H 18
1955 SCR 520
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 59
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]

based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of A
law. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa 19 this Court held that
such error is an error which is a patent error and not a
mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad20, it
was held:
“It is essential that it should be something more than a B
mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on
the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to
this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the
principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case.
When does an error, cease to be mere error and become an
error apparent on the face of the record? Learned Counsel on C
either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which
the boundary between the two classes of errors could be
demarcated.
Mr. Pathak for the first respondent contended on the
strength of certain observations of Chagla, CJ in – ‘Batuk K D
Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality’21, that no error could
be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not
self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to
establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision
in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which E
even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also
differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as
self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact
is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record
cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being
an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, F
and it must be left to be determined judicially on the
facts of each case.
Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have not
made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with
Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1 G
CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case16.

19
1955 SCR 250
20
AIR 1955 SC 233
21
ILR 1953 Bom 191 H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A The petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance.”
(emphasis added)
17. It is also settled law that in exercise of review jurisdiction, the
Court cannot reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion
even if two views are possible in a matter. In Kerala State Electricity
B Board v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and Others 22,
this Court observed as follows:
“10. ....In a review petition it is not open to this Court to
reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion,
even if that is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at best
C sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between
the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court.
We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be
advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence
on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court.
If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court
D records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that
conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it
is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the
record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been
contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face
E of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a
question of appreciation of evidence would amount to
converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise.”
(emphasis added)
18. Under the garb of filing a review petition, a party cannot be
F permitted to repeat old and overruled arguments for reopening the
conclusions arrived at in a judgment. The power of review is not to be
confused with the appellate power which enables the Superior Court to
correct errors committed by a subordinate Court. This point has been
elucidated in Jain Studios Ltd. V. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd.23 where
G it was held thus:
“11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned,
the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that

22
(2005) 6 SCC 651
23
H (2006) 5 SCC 501
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 61
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]

virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought A
at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived.
Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would
lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is
settled law that the power of review cannot be confused
with appellate power which enables a superior court to
B
correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is
not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and
overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded
adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with
extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in
exceptional cases. C
12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein
had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard
and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect
method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion,
is in the nature of ‘second innings’ which is impermissible D
and unwarranted and cannot be granted.”
(emphasis added)
19. After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in
Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others24, this Court observed that
review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit E
of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in
the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties
are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an
alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review
jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below: F
“20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review
are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,
G
after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of
the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

24
(2013) 8 SCC 320 H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A (iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in
Chajju Ram vs. Neki17, and approved by this Court in Moran
Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose
Athanasius & Ors.18 to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at
B least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles
have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese
& Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors.25,.
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: -
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to
C reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original
hearing of the case.
D (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest
on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in
miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent
E error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a
ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the
record should not be an error which has to be fished out and
searched.
F (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the
domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced
in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at
the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”
G
20. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma 15,
this Court was examining an order passed by the Judicial Commissioner
who was reviewing an earlier judgment that went in favour of the
appellant, while deciding a review application filed by the respondents

H 25
(2013) 8 SCC 337
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 63
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]

therein who took a ground that the predecessor Court had overlooked A
two important documents that showed that the respondents were in
possession of the sites through which the appellant had sought
easementary rights to access his home-stead. The said appeal was allowed
by this Court with the following observations:
“3 …It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh and B
Others v. State of Punjab26 there is nothing in Article 226 of the
Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power
of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to
prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and pulpable
errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise
of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised C
on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within
the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could
not be produced by him at the time when the order was
made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error D
apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be
exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be
exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous
on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal.
A power of review is not to be confused with appellate
power which may enable an appellate court to correct all E
manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.”
(emphasis added)
21. In State of West Bengal and Others v. Kamal Sengupta
and Another27, this Court emphasized the requirement of the review F
petitioner who approaches a Court on the ground of discovery of a new
matter or evidence, to demonstrate that the same was not within his
knowledge and held thus:
“21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is
sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, G
such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a
character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered
the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or
26
(1979) 4 SCC 389
27
(2008) 8 SCC 612
H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for
review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking
review has also to show that such additional matter or
evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the
exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced
before the court earlier.”
B
(emphasis added)
22. In the captioned judgment, the term ‘mistake or error apparent’
has been discussed in the following words:
“22. The term ‘mistake or error apparent’ by its very
C connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from
the record of the case and does not require detailed
examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or
the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection
thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot
D be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the
purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act.
To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot
be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on
the ground that a different view could have been taken by
the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while
E exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned
cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision”.
(emphasis added)
23. In S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Karnataka and
F Another28, this Court explained as to when a review jurisdiction could
be treated as statutory or inherent and held thus :
“18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the
rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way.
The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of
stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in
G
Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before
justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the
higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the court
finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would

28
H 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 65
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]

not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous A
assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration
shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any
principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake
is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference
lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification,
B
depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which
the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either
statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the
mistake is of the Court”.
(emphasis added)
C
24. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others v. Shri Pradyuman
Singhji Arjunsinghji29, this Court held as follows:
“4….. It is well settled that the power to review is not an
inherent power. It must be conferred by law either
specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the D
Act was brought to notice from which it could be gathered that
the Government had power to review its own order. If the
Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious
that its delegate could not have reviewed its order.……”
(emphasis added) E
25. In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others v. Vinod
Kumar Rawat and Others30, citing previous decisions and expounding
on the scope and ambit of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1,
this Court has observed that Section 114 CPC does not lay any conditions
precedent for exercising the power of review; and nor does the Section F
prohibit the Court from exercising its power to review a decision.
However, an order can be reviewed by the Court only on the grounds
prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The said power cannot be
exercised as an inherent power and nor can appellate power be exercised
in the guise of exercising the power of review.
G
26. As can be seen from the above exposition of law, it has been
consistently held by this Court in several judicial pronouncements that
the Court’s jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A
judgment can be open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent
29
(1971) 3 SCC 844
30
(2020) SCC Online SC 896 H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A on the face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a
process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the
face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review under
Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising powers of review,
the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier
merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. A
B
judgment may also be open to review when any new or important matter
of evidence has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to the
condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of the party
seeking review or could not be produced by it when the order was made
despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence. There is a clear
C distinction between an erroneous decision as against an error apparent
on the face of the record. An erroneous decision can be corrected by
the Superior Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record
can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another
circumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment
has been described as “for any other sufficient reason”. The said phrase
D
has been explained to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at least
analogous to those specified in the rule” (Refer: Chajju Ram v.
Neki Ram17 and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most
Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Others18).
27. In the light of the legal position crystalized above, let us now
E examine the grievance raised by the appellant. The learned Single Judge
of the High Court has taken great pains to discuss the three circumstances
available under Order XLVII CPC for maintaining a review application
and observed that in the instant case, the respondents had stated before
this Court that they had in their possession, genuine documents relating
F to surrender of the protected tenancy rights in respect of the subject
land and in view of the said submission, the petitions for Special Leave
to Appeal were disposed of with an observation that if the respondents
were able to obtain such documents, it would be open to them to file a
review petition before the High Court. What is relevant is that this Court
had even then declined to interfere with the findings on merits returned
G by the High Court vide Judgment dated 09th July, 2013; nor was the
review order dated 20th February, 2014, interfered with. Under the garb
of the liberty granted to them to approach the High Court again, all that
the respondents have done is to obtain certified copies of the revenue
records in respect of the subject land and enclosed them with the second
H
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 67
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]

set of review petitions. This is so when photocopies of the said documents A
had been filed by them earlier.
28. Nothing prevented the respondents from filing the certified
copies of the revenue records even earlier, but they elected to file only
photocopies of the very same surrender proceedings along with the revision
petitions that were ultimately dismissed by the High Court vide common B
judgment dated 9th July, 2013. The High Court refused to accept the
version of the respondents that the protected tenants had surrendered
the subject lands in favour of the landlord. The discussion in the judgment
regarding the purported surrender proceedings of protected rights by
the tenants before the Tehsildar in the year 1967 is revealing and extracted
hereinbelow for ready reference :- C

“2. …………The legal representatives of the protected tenants
were not parties to the alleged surrender proceedings before the
then Tahsildar in the year 1967. There is nothing on record to
show that they were ever dispossessed from the lands, so that
they can take necessary steps under relevant provisions of the D
Act before the authorities concerned. After coming to know about
earlier proceedings which are stated to be in the year 1967, they
rushed to the Joint Collector with the present appeals. There is
nothing on record to impute knowledge of the proceedings of the
year 1967 to them at any time prior to filing of the appeals before E
the Joint Collector.
3. Though the alleged surrender of protected tenancy rights by
one protected tenant and three legal representatives of the other
protected tenant was stated to be in the year 1967, it is pointed
out by the Joint Collector in the impugned order that the original F
land holder/landlord sought for exemption from computing these
lands in his holding under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms
(Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. If really the alleged
surrender of lands by the protected tenants in favour of the landlord
was in the year 1967, the landlord would not have claimed
exemption for these lands from being computed in his holding under G
the Ceiling Act. No doubt, the Land Reforms Tribunal rejected
the plea of exemption put forward by the landlord on the ground
that he did not produce proper evidence of granting certificates
under Section 38-E of the Act in favour of the protected tenants
for these lands. Therefore, these lands were computed in the H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A holding of the landlord not on the ground of the protected tenants
surrendering their protected tenancy rights, but on the ground that
the landholder could not produce relevant documents for exemption.
Therefore, the Joint Collector rightly came to the conclusion that
file relating to surrender of lands by the protected tenants in the
year 1967 was manipulated by ante dating the same after the land
B
ceiling case was finalized by the Land Ceiling Tribunal.
4. Further, the Joint Collector rightly disbelieved the alleged
surrender of protected tenancy rights in the year 1967 on the ground
that if the surrender in the year 1967 was correct, the question of
again terminating protected tenancy rights for Ac.36.34 guntas
C by order dated 16.06.2008 does not arise.
5. Record of the then Tahsildar in the year 1967 discloses that
one protected tenant and legal heirs of other protected tenant
intended to surrender protected tenancy rights in favour of the
landlord as the landlord intended to cultivate these lands personally.
D Further, the Joint Collector came to the conclusion that the alleged
surrender in the year 1967 was without knowledge of the protected
tenant and legal heirs of another protested tenant inasmuch as the
landholder pleaded before the Land Ceilings Tribunal in his land
celling declaration that these lands are in possession of the
E protected tenants. From the above circumstances, it can be safely
concluded that record of the then Tahsildar, Shamshadnagar by
way of surrender of protected tenancy rights under Section 19 of
the Act was not only ante dated but also cooked up. Hence, find
no reason to come to a different conclusion from that of the Joint
Collector in this revision petition. The common order passed by
F the Joint Collector is proper, legal and regular.”
29. In the first round of the review proceedings filed by the
respondents for seeking review of the order and judgment dated 9 th July,
2013, they had sought to raise, amongst others, the plea of limitation, the
purported error on the part of the Appellate Authority in calling for the
G records from the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer for deciding
the case and the alleged misconstruction of the ceiling proceedings
conducted by the Land Reforms Tribunal, all of which were earlier argued
and did not find favour with the High Court. But, at no stage was a plea
taken by the respondents with regard to the discovery of new documents
H which could not have been produced by them after undertaking due
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 69
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]

diligence before the order dated 9th July, 2013 came to be passed. When A
the first set of review petitions were dismissed by the learned Single
Judge by a detailed order dated 20th February, 2014, it was specifically
observed in para 2 that the respondents did not plead that any new facts
had come to light for the consideration of the Court. In fact, a perusal of
the said order shows that the respondents only sought to reargue the
B
points that had already been taken by them and were rejected outrightly,
vide judgment dated 9th July, 2013.
30. The sequence of events narrated in the order dated
th
20 February, 2014, passed by the High Court while dismissing the first
set of review applications brings to the fore the fact that the respondents
had approached the High Court twice by filing Civil Revision Petitions. C
In the first round, two Revision Petitions [CRPs No. 4620 and 4988 of
2005] filed by the respondents against the order dated 2 nd April, 2005,
passed by the Appellate Authority, were allowed by the High Court vide
order dated 19th September, 2006 on the ground that the proceedings
initiated by the legal heirs of the protected tenants went uncontested D
before the Appellate Authority. Accordingly, the appeals were remitted
back to the Appellate Authority for fresh consideration. On remand, the
said appeals were disposed of by the Appellate Authority on merits vide
order dated 23rd March, 2013. The second set of Revision Petitions filed
by the respondents questioning the said decision, were turned down on
merits by the common order dated 9th July, 2013, review whereof was E
also dismissed vide order dated 20th February, 2014.
31. The above chronology of events gains significance as it goes
to amply demonstrate that several opportunities were available to the
respondents if they really wished to file authenticated copies of the
revenue records relating to the purported surrender proceedings before F
the Tehsildar which they did not avail of, for reasons best known to
them. The first opportunity arose when the respondents challenged the
ex parte order dated 2nd April, 2005 passed by the Appellate Authority
when they filed two Civil Revision Petitions which were allowed and the
matter was remanded back to the Appellate Authority for fresh G
consideration; the second opportunity arose when the Appellate Authority
re-considered the appeals remitted by the High Court and passed an
order dated 23rd March, 2013, in favour of the predecessors-in-interest
of the appellant; the third opportunity arose when the respondents
preferred a second set of Civil Revision Petitions assailing the order
H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A dated 23rd March, 2013 that culminated in the common judgment and
order dated 9th July, 2013 passed by the High Court; the fourth opportunity
arose when the respondents filed two review applications for seeking
review of the common judgment and order dated 9th July, 2013, that
came to be dismissed vide order dated 20th February, 2014; and the fifth
opportunity arose when the respondents preferred petitions for special
B
leave to appeal before this Court being aggrieved by the common
judgment and orders dated 9th July, 2013 and the review order dated 20th
February, 2014 passed by the High Court.
32. Pertinently, this Court had declined to entertain the said petitions
preferred by the respondents but having regard to the submission made
C on their behalf that they would be in a position to file documents to show
that there was surrender of tenancy on the part of the protected tenants
and their legal heirs, it was left open to the respondents to file a review
petition before the High Court. It was only thereafter that the respondents
woke up to filing certified copies of those documents, xerox copies
D whereof had already been filed by them in the second round of revision
petitions preferred before the High Court. That being the position, the
respondents cannot be heard to state that the documents in question
were not to their knowledge or that the certified copies of the revenue
record could not be produced by them before the High Court passed the
common judgment and order dated 09th July, 2013. At the time of filing
E the second set of review petitions, the respondents raised a plea that the
learned Single Judge did not consider the relevant record produced by
them regarding the surrender proceedings and had erroneously returned
a finding that the file relating to surrender of the land by the protected
tenants in the year 1967, was manipulated by ante-dating the same after
F the land ceiling was finalized by the Land Ceiling Tribunal. However,
apart from the bald averment by the respondents that the documents
were not considered, which averment has been replicated in the impugned
order, a perusal of the earlier judgment of the High Court does not suggest
any such non-consideration. Rather, it appears that the High Court
considered the records available before it, which included the copies of
G the revenue records as admitted by the parties and passed certain
observations.”
33. A perusal of the averments made in the second set of review
petitions shows that there is no explanation offered regarding discovery
of new material in the form of the documents sought to be filed. When it
H
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND 71
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]

is the case of the respondents themselves that the relevant documents A
were all along available in the revenue records and they had already
filed xerox copies thereof during the second revision proceedings, they
can hardly be heard to state that the said documents were unknown to
them and were unavailable for being produced before the learned Single
Judge prior to passing of the common judgment and order dated 9 th July,
B
2013. It is evident from the above that the respondents had not discovered
any new material for them to have moved a second set of review petitions.
In order to satisfy the requirements prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1
CPC, it is imperative for a party to establish that discovery of the new
material or evidence was neither within its knowledge when the decree
was passed, nor could the party have laid its hands on such documents/ C
evidence after having exercised due diligence, prior to passing of the
order. What to speak of conclusive proof of having undertaken an exercise
of due diligence for accessing the relevant documents, there is not an
averment made by the respondents in the second set of review petitions
to the effect that they could not trace the documents in question earlier
D
or that they had made sincere efforts to obtain certified copies thereof
before the common order dated 9th July, 2013 was passed, but could not
do so for some cogent and valid reasons.
34. In other words, nothing has been stated on affidavit to
substantiate the plea taken by the respondents at such a belated stage
that the documents sought to be filed by them with the second set of E
review petitions had come to light after passing of the judgment and
order dated 9th July, 2013. Under the garb of the liberty granted to them,
the respondents have tried to fill in the glaring loopholes and introduce
evidence in the review proceedings that was all along in their power and
possession and ought to have seen the light of the day much earlier. In F
fact, it appears that the Civil Revision Petitions were originally argued to
the hilt on several other grounds, not limited just to the revenue record,
which were all considered and turned down as meritless. Therefore, we
have no hesitation in holding that non-production of the relevant
documents on the part of the respondents at the appropriate stage cannot
be a ground for seeking review of the judgment and order dated 9th July, G
2013 particularly, when five opportunities enumerated in para 31 above,
were available to them for production of the said documents, which
were all frittered away, one by one.
35. In our opinion, even otherwise, recourse to successive review
petitions against the same order is impermissible more so, when the H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 11 S.C.R.

A respondents have miserably failed to draw the attention of this Court to
any circumstances that would entitle them to invoke review jurisdiction
within the ambit of the Rules. Under the rules, the respondents were not
required to produce “genuine” documents but new documents/evidence
that was not within their knowledge and could not have been so even
after exercise of due diligence, which could have turned the tables in
B
their favour. Nor has any error apparent on the face of the record been
brought out by them.
36. Given the above facts and circumstances, we are of the firm
view that the second set of review petitions were nothing short of an
abuse of the process of the court and ought to have been rejected by the
C High Court as not maintainable, without having gone into the merits of
the matter. In the result, the present appeals are allowed. The impugned
judgment dated 29th April, 2022, is set aside and the common judgment
and order dated 9th July, 2013 passed in CRP No.2786/2013 and CRP
No. 2787 of 2013, is restored.
D 37. Parties are left to bear their own expenses.

Ankit Gyan Appeals allowed.
(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

E

F

G

H