S.P. GOELversusCOLLECTOR OF STAMPS

A                                   S.P. GOEL
                                          v.
                           COLLECTOR OF STAMPS

                               DECEMBER 8, 1995

B              [KULDIP SINGH AND S. SAGHIR AHMAD, JJ.)

           Consumer Protection Act 1986-Sections 2(1) (d), 2(1) (o), 2(1)
    (g)-Stamp Act 1899-Sections 35, 33(1), 2(14), 2(10), 3, 40, Entry 23 of
    Schedule I-Registration Act 1908-Document presented for registra-
C   lion-Sub-Registrar, holding that it was not a will but a deed of conveyance,
    impounding it as not being duly stamped, and sending it to the Collector of
    Stamps-Collector deciding after hearing that document was conveyance
    deed-Whether appellant consumer within the meaning of Consumer Protec-
    tion Act 1986-Whether District Fornm or State Commission has jurisdiction
D   to entertain claim-Held, executant of instrnment is not 'consumer' entitled
    to 'service ' within the Consumer Protection Act-Concept of Consumer
    Protection Act is different from scope, object and purpose of Registration Act
    and Stamp Act-Latter Acts deal with state revenue-Further, there is no
    element of commercialism involved in process of registration of instrnments
E   and payment of stamp duty-Officers implementing these two Acts only per-
    form statutory duties, some of which are judicial or quasi-judicial, to raise
    and collect state revenue which is within sovereign power of state-Sovereign
    function.

           Stamp Act 1899-Section 2(9)-Registration Act 1908-Section
F   86-Judicial Officers (Protection) Act 1850--Section I-Claim against Col-
    lector for negligence and delay in peiformance of duties, whether can be .
    entertained-Held, immunity from legal action contemplated under Judicial
    Officers (Protection) Act 1850 available to Col/ecto1-Held further, Register-
    ing Officer also protected for things done bona fide-No plea or finding that
G   refusal of Registering Officer or inaction of Collector malicious, motivated or
    malafide-'Judges (Protection) Act 1985.

        The appellant sought registration of a 'Will'. The Sub-Registrar
  before whom it was presented for registration impounded it as he was
H of the opinion that it was not a Will but a deed of conveyance which
                                   340
                 S.P. GOEL v. COLLECTOR OF STAMPS                     341

was not duly stamped. The Collector of Stamps to whom he sent the           A
document for action under Section 40 of the Stamp Act 1899 issued
several notices to the appellant, and when the appellant appeared before
him, the Collector required that, since the document was not a will but
a deed of conveyance, the appellant should furnish valuation report,
receipts etc. so that the document may be properly stamped and              B
registered.

      While the matter was pending before the Collector, the appellant
approached the J)istrict Fotum under the Consumer Protection Act 1986
for reliefs including registration of the 'will' and compensation for
harassment. The District Forum allowed the claim and awarded com-           C
pensation and costs of litigation holding that the appellant having paid
the registration charges shall be treated to have hired the services of
the Sub-Registrar and the Collector of Stamps. On appeal, the State
Commission upheld the decision of the District Forum and also en-
hanced the amount of compensation. The National Commission, in              D
revision, held that the District Forum as also the State Commission had
no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the claim of the
applicant particularly as he was not a 'consumer' within the meaning of
the Consumer Protection Act.
                                                                            E
      Dismissing the appeal, this Court

       HELD : 1. The Registration Act as also the Stamp Act are meant
primarily to augment the State revenue. Payment of registration fee or
registration charges constitute a component of State revenue. The person
                                                                             F
who presents a document for registration and pays the stamp duty on
it or the registration fee does not become a consumer nor do the officers
appointed to implement the provisions of the two Acts render any service
within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act. They only perform
their statutory duties, some of which are judicial or, at least, quasi-judi-
cial in nature, to raise and collect State revenue which is a part of the G
sovereign power of the State. [353-E·H]

     2. It is apparent from Sections 35 and 33(1) of the Stamp Act that
a document which is not duly stamped will not be registered and the
Sub-Registrar before whom the document is presented may refuse its          H
    342                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A registration and may, even, impound the document in the course or
    performance of his statutory duties. [350-C]

        3. The concept of the Consumer Protection .Act is different from
  the scope and object of the Registration Act and the Stamp Act.
B Registration of documents is regulated by the provisions of the Registra-
  tion Act whereas payment or stamp duty on documents presented for
  registration is regulated by the Stamp Act. Both the Acts deal with State
  revenue. [348-A·B]

          Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K Gupta, AIR (1994) SC 787        =
C   [1994] 1 SCC 243 and Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, [1994]
    4 sec 225, distinguished.

           It cannot be held that there is an element of commercialism involved
    in the whole process of registration of instruments or payment of stamp
    duty and that the executant of an instrument, at the time of its presenta-
D   tion for registration, becomes a 'consumer' entitled to 'service' within the
    ambit of the Consumer Protection Act. [353-D]

         4. Under the Registration Act as also under the Stamp Act, the
  officers, apart from performing administrative duties,"."' .... , at times, per-
E form quasi-judicial functions. The courts are also involved at some stage
  in the matter of determination of stamp duty. The courts and the officers
  are thus component of one and the same set up under these Acts. The
  Presiding Officers of the courts are protected under the Judicial Officers
  (Protection) Act 1850 read with the Judges (Protection) Act 1985. Section
  1 of the 1850 Act contains the common law rule of immunity of judges
F which is based on the principle that a person holding a judicial office
  should be in a position to discharge his functions with complete inde-
  pendence and rear of consequences. [355-A-C and F]

          Anowar Hussain v. Ajay Kumar Mukherjee, AIR (1965) SC 1651 and
G Teyen v. Ram Lal, (1890) ILR 12 All 115, referred to.
         The position of Judges, Judicial Officers and Magistrates has been
    made more secure by the enactment or the Judges (Protection) Act 1985.
    Since 'Collector' has been specifically mentioned along with Judges,
    Magistrates and Justices of the Peace in the 1850 Act, it is obvious that
H   immunity from legal action contemplated by this Act will also be available
        S.P. GOEL v. COLLECTOR OF STAMPS [S. SAGHIRAHMAD, J.]           343

to him. [355-G, 356-C]                                                         A
        Lucknow Development Autholity v. M.K Gupta, AIR (1994) SC 787 =
[1994] 1 sec 243, distinguished.

      5. Apart from this, Section 86 or the Registration Act provides
complete protection to the Registering Officer for things done bona fide by    B
him under the Act. Its obvious that action which is not bona fide or which
is malicious will not be protected. [356-D-E]

      6. It is undoubtedly true that a government officer may be held liable
in tort if, in the discharge or his official administrative duties he acts     C
maliciously or with oblique motive or ma/a fide. In the instant case neither
was it pleaded nor was there a finding that the refusal of the Registering
Officer or the inaction of the Collector of Stamps was malicious, motivated
or ma/a fide. [354-G-H, 355-F]

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11603 of                D
1995.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 18.5.95 of the National Con·
sumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in Revision No. 472 of
1994.
                                                                               E
        Debasis Misra for the Appellant.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J. Special leave granted.
                                                                               F
      Built up property No. C-33, Okhla Industrial Area Phase-I, New
Delhi 110 020, constitutes the basis of dispute between the parties in the
present appeal which is directed against the judgment and order dated May
18, 1995, passed by the National Consumer Redressal Commission. New
Delhi, where by the complaint of the appellant under the Consumer
Protection Act. 1986 was dismissed on the ground that the District Con·        G
sumer Forum as also the State Commission had no jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate upon the claim petition filed by the appellant to the effect that there
was "deficiency of Service" on the part of the respondent in not registering
the document or issuing certified copy thereof in spite of full registration
charges having been paid.                                                      H
    344                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPJ>. 6 S.C.R.

A          The document of which the registration was sought by the appellant
    is a .,Will" dated 24th July, 1987 executed in his favour, as also in favour of
    his wife, Smt. Shanti Rani Goel, by one Shri P.N. Mishra which was
    presented for registration on 24th August, 1987 before the Sub-Registrar-
    III, New Delhi who, instead of registering the document, impounded it as
    he was of the opinion that it was not a "Will" but a Deed of Conveyance
B   which was not duly stamped. He, therefore, sent the document in original
    to the collector of Stamps for action under Section 40 of the Stamps Act
    with the suggestion that the instrument was chargeable with 3% of the
    amount of consideration as Stamp Duty and 5% as Transfer Duty. The
    Collector of Stamps, New Delhi issued several notices to the appellant and
C   ultimately in response to one such notice, the appellant appeared before
    the Collector and was appri<ed of the fact that the document presented by
    him for registration was not a "Will" but a conveyance deed and, therefore,
    he was required to furnish the Valuation Report, Receipts, General Power
    of Attorney etc. so that the document may be required to be properly
D   stamped and registered.

           While the matter was pending before the Collector, the appellant
    filed a complaint on 6th September, 1991 before the District Forum, Delhi
    constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 fnr various reliefs,
    including registration of the 'Will" as also for the supply of certified copy
E   thereof besides compensation for harassment since 1987. The District
    Forum, Delhi, by order dated 12th May, 1993, allowed the claim with the
    finding that the Collector of Stamps had not taken any decision as to the
    nature of document for about six years and was, therefore, liable to pay
    Rs. 700 as compensation and Rs. 500 as costs of litigation particnlarly as
F   the appellant having paid the registration charges shall be treated to have
    hired the services of the Sub- Registrar and the Collector of Stamps within
    the meaning of Consumer Protection Act.

          Two separate appeals, one by the complainant (appellant) and the
    other by the respondent, were filed against the above order of the District
G   Forum-I, Delhi, before the State Commission which by its order dated 11th
    April, 1994 not only upheld the decision of the District Forum but also
    enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs. 5,000.

       The respondent, thereafter, filed a revision before, the National
H Forum .which, by the impugned jndgment, allowed the revision with the
    S.P. GOEL v. COLLECTOR OF STAMPS [S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J.]               345

finding that the District Forum as also the State Commission had no A
jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the claim of the appellant
                                11        11
particularly, as he was not a consumer within the meaning of Consumer
Protection Act, 1986.

     "Consumer" has been defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act as under:
                                                                                B
       "2(1)(d). "consumer" means any person who-

       (i)   buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or
             promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any
             system of deferred payment and includes any user of such
             goods other than the person who buys such goods for con- C
             sideration paicj or promised or partly paid or partly promised,
             or under any system of deferred payment when such use is
             made with the approval of such person, but does not include
             a person who obtains such r,oods for resale or for any com-
             mercial purpose; or                                             D
       (ii) (hires or avails ot) any services for a consideration which has
            been or paid promised or partly paid and partly promised, or
            under any system of deferred payment and includes any
            beneficiary of such services other than the person who [hires
            or avails of] the services for consideration paid or promised,      E
            or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of
            deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the
            approval of the first mentioned person;

       [Explanation- For the purpose of sub-clause (i), "commercial pur-
       pose" does not Include use by a consumer of goods bought and             F
       used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood,
       by means of self-employment;]"

     "Service" has been defined in Section 2(1)(o) as under:

       "2(1)(o).   '
                       1
                       service 11 means services of any description which_ is
                                                                                G
                   made available to potential users and includes the
                   provision of facilities in connection with banking,
                   financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of
                   electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both,
                   [housing construction) entertairunent, amusement or H
    346                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A                       the purveying of news or other information, but does
                        not include the rendering of any service free of charge
                        or under a contract of personal service;"

          "Deficiency" has been defined in Section 2(1)(g) as under :

B           "2(1)(g).   "deficiency" means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming
                        or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of
                        performance which is required to be maintained by or
                        under any law for the time being in force or has been
                        undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance
C                       of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service;"

           The meaning of two important definitions, namely, "consumer" and
    "service" have since been considered by this Court in Lucknow Development
    Authority v. M.K Gupta, AIR (1994) SC 787 = [1994] l SCC 243, in which
    this Court (regarding "consumer") observed as under :
D
                "It is in two parts. The first deals with goods and the other with
            services. Both parts first declare the meaning of goods and services
            by use of wide expressions. Their ambit is further enlarged by use
            of inclusive clause. For instance, it is not only purchaser of goods
            or hirer of services but even those who use the goods or who are
E
            beneficiaries of services with approval of the person who pur-
            chased the goods or who hired services are included in it."

          Regarding "service'. the Court ooserved as under :

F               "It is in three parts. The main part is followed by inclusive clause
            and ends by exclusionary clause. The main clause itself is very wide.
            It applies to any service made available to potential users. The
            words 'any' and 'potential' are significant. Both are of wide
            amplitude. The word 'any' dictionarily means 'one or same or all'.
            In Black's Law Dictionary it is explained thus, 'word 'any' has a
G           diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate 'all' or
            'every' as well as 'same' or 'one' and its meaning in a given statute
            depends upon the context and subject-matter of the statute". The
            use of the word 'any' in the context it has been used in clause (o)
            indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one
H           to all. The other word 'potential' is again very wide. In Oxford
     S.P .. GOEL v. COLLECTOROFSTAMPS(S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.]                        347

         Dictionary it is defined as 'capable of coming into being, A
         possibility'. In Black's Law Dictionary it is defined as 'extending in
         possibility but not in act. Naturally and probably expected to come
         into existence at some future time, though not now existing; for
         example, the future product of grain or trees already planted, or
         the successive future installments or payments on a contract or
                                                                                B
         engagement, already made.' In other words service which is not
         only extended to actual users but those who are capable of using
         it are covered in the definition. The clause is thus very wide and
         extends to any or all actual or potential users. But the legislature
         did not stop there. It expanded the meaning of the word further
         in modern sense by extending it to even such facilities as are               c
         available to a consumer in connection with banking, financing etc.
         Each of these are wide ranging activities in day to day life. They
         are discharged both by statutory and private bodies. In absence of
         any indication, express or implied there is no reason to hold that
         authorities created by the statute are beyond purview of the Act." D

     "Consumer" has also been explained by this Court in Morgan Stanley
Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, [1994] 4 SCC 225, as under :

             "The consumer as the term implies is one who consumes. As
         per the definition, consumer is the one who purchases goods for E
         private use of consumption. The meaning of the word 'consumer'
         is broadly stated in the above definition so as to include anyone
         who consumes goods or services at the end of the chain of produc-
         tion. The comprehensive definition aims at covering every man who
         pays money as the price or cost of goods and services. The p
         consumer deserves to get what he pays for in real quantity and
         true quality. In every society, consumer remains the centre of
         gravity of all business and industrial activity. He needs protection
         from the manufacturer, producer, supplier wholesaler and
         retailer.n
                                                                                     G
      Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in view of these
decisions, the matter involved in the present appeal does not require any
further probe as the questions relating to the interpretation of the defini-
tions of 11 consumer11 or 11 services", or, for that matter, 11 Deficiency in Service"
stand conclusively decided.                                                            H
    348                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A         We have carefully considered the aforesaid decisions but we are
    strongly of the view that they are not applicable to the present case as the
    concept of the Consumer Protection Act is different than the scope and
    object, or, for that matter, purpose of the two other Acts, namely, the
    Registration Act and the Stamp Act.

B         Registration of documents is regulated by the provisions of Registra-
    tion Act, 1908 whereas payment of Stamp Duty on documents presented
    for registration is regulated by the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Both the Acts
    deal with the State Revenue.

       Under the Registration Act, the State Government appoints an
C Inspector General of Registration and of number of Registrars and Sub-
  Registrars for "Districts" and "Sub' Districts" who functions under Inspector
  General and perform such duties as are assigned to them under law.

        Section 17 of the Registration Act enumerates the documents of
D which registration is compulsory while Section 18 contains the list of those
  documents of which registration is optional. Documents presented for
  registration have to be properly stamped irrespective of their being either
  compulsory or optionally registerable, unless they are not chargeable with
  any stamp duty under the stamp Act.

E         What is the stamp duty which is to be paid on a document depends
    upon the nature of the document. The Stamp Act contains a Schedule
    appended to it in which various categories of documents and the stamp
    duty payable on those documents hov~ ~e•n specified.

          In the instant case, we are concerned with an "Instrument of Con-
F veyance". "Instrument" as defined in Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act in-
    cludes every document by which any right or liability purports to be,
    created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. Section
    2(10) of the Stamp Act defines "Conveyance" as under :

             "2( 10).   Conveyance-"Conveyance" includes a conveyance on
G                       sale and every instrument by which property, whether
                        movable or immov~ble, is transferred inter vivos and
                        which is not otherwise specifically provided for by
                        Schedule I"

H         This definition has to be read along with Section 3 which provides as
         S.P. GOEL v. COLLECTOR OF STAMPS [S. SAGHIRAHMAD, J.]                349

    under:                                                                           A
             ".I Instruments chargeable with duty - Subject to the provisions of
             thls Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I, the following
             instrumenis shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated
             in that Schedule as the proper duty therefore, respectively, that is
             to say -                                                                B

             (a) every instrument mentioned in that Schedule which, not
                 having been previously executed by any person, is executed
                 in India on or after the first day of July, 1899;

             (b) every bill of exchange payable otherwise than on demand, or         C
                  promissory note drawn or made out of India on or after that
                  day and accepted or paid, or presented for acceptance or
                  payment, or endorsed, transferred or otherwise negotiated,
                  in India; and
                                                                                     D
             (c) every instrument (other than a bill of exchange or promissory
                  note) mentioned in that Schedule, which, not having been
                  previously executed by any person, is executed out of India
                  on or after that day, relates to any property situate, or to any
                  matter or thing done or to be done, in India and is received
                  in India:                                                          E
             Provided that no duty shall chargeable in respect of -

                 (i) any instrument executed by, or on behalf of, or in favour of,
             the Government in cases where, but for this exemption, the
             Government would be liable to pay the duty chargeable in respect        F
             of such instrument;                                      ·
1
                 (2) any instrument for the sale, transfer or other disposition,
             either absolutely or by way of mortgage or otherwise, of any ship
             or vessel registered under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, or          G
             under Act 19 of 1838, or the Indian Registration of Ships Act, 1841
             (57 and 58 Viet, Section 60, 10of1841), as amended by subsequent
             Acts."

           The relevant entry relating to "Conveyance" is Entry 23 of Schedule
    I of the Stamp Act in which the amount of stamp duty has been indicated H
    350                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A with reference to the amount of consideration involved in the transaction
    mentioned in the Deed of Conveyance. It is specifically provided in Section
    35 of the Stamp Act that :

                ''No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in
            evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent
B           of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon,
            registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public
            officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped."

          It is, thus, apparent that a document or instrument which is not duly
C stamped will not be registered and the Sub-Registrar before whom the
    document is presented may well refuse its registration and may, even,
    impound the document in the course of performance of his statutory duties
    under Section 33(1) of the Stamp Act which provides as under :

            "33(1).    Every person having by law or consent of parties
D                      authority to receive evidence, and every person in
                       charge of a public office, except an officer of police,
                       before whom any instrument, chargeable, in his opinion,
                       with duty, is produced or comes in the performance of
                       his functions, shall if it appears to him that such instru-
E                      ment is not duly stamped, impound the same."

           Under this Section, every instrument which is not duly stamped is
    liable to be impounded.

          After impounding the instrument, the Sub-Registrar has to send the
F document in original to the Collector as required by Section 38(2) of the
    Stamp Act. What the Collector would do on receipt of an instrument
    impounded under Section 33 and send to him under Section 38(2) 1s
    indicated in Section 40 which provides as under :

            "40. Collector's power to stamp instrnments impounded -
G
            (1) When the Collector impounds any instrument under Section
            33, or receives any instrument sent to him under Section 38;
            sub-section (2), not being an instrument chargeable [with a duty
            not exceeding ten naya paise] only or a bill of exchange or promis-
H           sory note, he shall adopt the following procedure :
     S.P. GOEL v. COLLECTOR OF STAMPS [S. SAGHIRAHMAD, J.]               351

        (a) if he is of opinion that such instrument is duly stamped, or is     A
            not chargeable with duty, he shall certify by endorsement
            thereon that it is duly stamped, or that it is not so chargeable,
            as the case may be :

        (b) If he is of opinion that such instrument is chargeable with         B
            duty and is not duly stamped, he shall require the payment
            of the proper duty or the amount required to make up the
            same, together with a penalty of the five rupees; or, if he
            thinks fit, an amount not exceeding ten times the amount of
            the proper duty or of the deficient portion thereof, whether
            such amount exceeds or falls short of five rupees;                  C

        Provided that, when such instrument has been impounded only
        because it has been written in contravention of Section 13 or
        Section 14, the Collector may, if he thinks fit, remit the whole
        penalty prescribed by this section.
                                                                                D
        (2) Every certificate under clause (a) of sub-section (1), shall, for
        the purpose of this Act, be conclusive evidence of the matters
        stated therein.

        (3) Where an instrument has been sent to the Collector under            E
        Section 38, sub-section (2), the Collector shall, when he has dealt
        with it as provided by this section, return it to the impounding
        officer."

      The procedure indicated in this Section contemplates that the Col-
lector shall form an opinion as to the (i) chargeability of the instrument F
with stamp duty and (ii) the amount of duty payable on that instrument
and thereafter he shall require the payment of the proper duty or the
amount required to make up the said duty together with a penalty which
will be either five rupees or an amount not exceeding ten times the amount
of the proper duty or the deficient portion thereof.                       G

      Since the Collector has to take a decision 'vith regard to the nature
of the instrument as also with regard to the amount of stamp duty payable
on the instrument, it is implicit that he has to act in accordance with the
principles of Natural Justice and give an opportunity to the person liable
under law to pay the stamp duty to enable him to show that the instrument H
    352                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A was either not chargeable with any stamp duty or that it was properly and
    duly stamped. He may also in the process show or indicate that the penalty
    was not liable to be imposed upon him.

          The decision of the Collector is not final as it is provided by Section
    45 of the Act that the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority may, upon an
B   application made in writing within three months of the order of the
    Collector, refund the amount if it is of the opinion that the stamp duty in
    excess of the amount which was legally chargeable, has been charged and
    paid under Section 40 of the Act. The exercise of power by the Collector
    is always subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority
    under Section 56 of the Act. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority may
C   also refer a case to the High Court for its opinion as provided by Section
    57 of the Act.

          Under Section 33 of the Stamp Act, power to impound a document
    or instrument which is not duly stamped, is also available to the courts
D   including a High Court. Unless properly stamped, instruments will not be
    admitted in evidence nor shall they be acted upon. The courts. like the
    Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, have also the power to refer a case
    to the High Court under Section 60 for its decision as to the sufficiency of
    the stamp duty payable on the instrument filed or produced before it
    during the course of trial of a civil suit or criminal or revenue case. If the
E   Court itself decides that" the instrument was duly stamped and was, there-
    fore, admissible in evidence or admits the instrument in evidence on
    payment of duty and penalty, its decisions would be revisable under Section
    61 by the Court to which an appeal would lie from the decree or order
    passed by that court.

F         Thus, in the matter of determination of stamp duty, the courts,
    including the High Court, apart from Collector and the Chief Controlling
    Revenue Authority, are involved either at the stage of registration and
    determination of Stamp Duty or admissibility of the instrument (document)
    in evidence in a pending case.

G         The hierarchy under the Registration Act has already been indicated
    above but it will be useful to point out here that every Sub-Registrar
    performs the duties of his office under the superintendence and control of
    the Registrar of the district while the Inspector General exercises general
    superintendence over all the registration offices in the State. (See : Sections
H   68 and 69)
     S.P. GOEL v. COLLECTOR OF STAMPS [S. SAGH!R AHMAD,J.)              353

        It is also provided in the Act that if the Sub-Registrar refuses to   A
register a document, he has to record his reasons in the order which is
appealable before the Registrar under Section 72 of the Registration Act.
If, however, the registration is refused even by the Registrar, then the
person claiming under the document of which registration was sought, may
as provided by Section 77, file a suit for a decree directing the document    B
to be registered.

      Undoubtedly, proceedings before the Court are judicial proceedings
while the proceedings before the Registrar in an appeal filed against the
order of the Sub-Registrar will be quasi-judicial in nature and will be
regulated by principles of Natural justice.                                   C

       Running through the twin Acts, namely, the Registration Act and the
Stamp Act, we ::ould not, at any stage, reconcile ourselves to the idea
spoused by the appellant's counse~ that there is an element of commer-
cialism involved in the whole process of registration of instruments or       D
payment of Stamp Duty and that. the executant of an instrument, at the
time of its presentation for registration, becomes a "consumer" entitled to
"service" within the ambit of Consumer Protection Act. The reasons are
many.

      The registration Act as also the Stamp Act are meant primarily to       E
augment the state revenue by prescribing the stamp duty on various
categories of instruments or documents and the procedure for collection
of stamp duty through distress or other means including criminal prosecu-
tion as non-payment of stamp duty has been constituted as an offence.
Payment of registration fee or registration charges including charges for     F
issuing certified copies of the registered documents or fee for the inspec-
tion of various registers or documents kept in the Registrars or Sub-
Registrars office etc. constitute another component of State revenue.

      In this situation, therefore, the person who presents for registration G
and pays the stamp duty on it or the registration fee, does not become a
consumer nor do the officers appointed to implement the provisions of the
two Acts render any service within the meaning of Consumer Protection
Act. They only perform their statutory duties (some of which, as earlier
indicated, are judicial or, at least, quasi-judicial in nature) to raise and
collect the State revenue which is a part of the sovereign power of the State. H
    354                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A         Learned counsel for the appellant again invited our attention to the
    decision of this Court in Lucknow Development Authority's case (supra)
    and contended that in view of the following observations :

             "Today the issue thus is not only of award of compensation but
             who should bear the brunt. The concept of authority and power
B            exercised by public functionaries has many dimensions. It has
             undergone tremendous change with passage of time and change
             in socio-economic outlook. The authority empowered to function
             under a Statute while exercising power discharges public duty. It
             has to act to subserve general welfare and common good. In
c            discharging this duty honestly and bona fide loss may accrue to any
             person. And he may claim compensation which may in circumstan-
             ces be payable. But where the duty is performed capriciously or
             the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then the
             responsibility to pay the loss determined should be whose ? In a
             modern society no authority can arrogate to itself the power to act
D            in a manner which is arbitrary. It is unfortunate that matters which
             require immediate attention linger on and the man in the street is
             made to run from one end to other with no result. The culture of
             window clearance appears to be totally dead. Even in ordinary
             matters a common man who has neither the political backing nor
             the financial strength to match the inaction in public oriented
E             departments gets frustrated and it erodes the credibility in the
             system. 11

    The claim preferred by the appellant under the Consumer Protection Act
    was positively entertainable as the officers under both the Acts had been
F   negligent in the performance of their duties in as inuch as the Collector
    had not determined the nature of the document or the amount of stamp
    duty payable on that document for 5 or 6 years and had thus kept the
    appellant in a state of suspense causing, to say the least, great mental agony
    and annoyance. This argument again, in our opinion, is fallacious.

G        The observations of this Court extracted above on which strong
  reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for appellant are undoub-
  tedly true and we also reiterate that a Government officer may be held
  liable in tort if, in the discharge of his official administrative duties, he acts
  maliciously or with oblique motive or ma/a-fide but the position in the
H instant case, is different in many vital respects.
     S.P. GOEL v. COLLECTOR OF STAMPS [S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J.]              355

        We have already indicated above that under the Registration Act as A
also under the Stamp Act, the officers, apart from performing administra-
tive duties, also, at times, perform quasi-judicial functions. The Courts are
also involved at some stage in the matter of determination of stamp duty.
The Courts and the officers are thus component of one and the same set
up under these Acts. The Presiding Officers of the Courts are protected
under the Judicial Officers (Protection) Act, 1850, read with the Judges B
(Protection) Act, 1985. But, so far the officers are concerned the position
is a little different.

      We are, however, in the instant case, concerned with the question of
protection of "Collector" and, therefore, we are not considering the ques-
tion of protection of 'other officers".                                        c
      Section 1 of the Judicial Officers (Protection) Act, 1850 provides,
inter alia, ?' under :

         ."l. No Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector, or other
         person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court D
         for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of
         his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction:

            Provided that he at the time, in good faith, believed himself to
         have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of.
                                                                               E


        This Section contains the common law rule of immunity of Judges
 which is based on the principle that a person holding a judicial office
 should be in a position to discharge his functions with complete inde-
 pendence and, what is more important, without there being, in his mind,       F
 fear of consequences. The scope and purpose of this Act has already been
 explained by this Court in Anowar Hussain v. Ajay Kumar Mukherjee and
 others., AIR (1965) SC1 1651, in which the old decision in Teyen v. Ram
 La~ (1890) !LR U Alld. 115 was approved. The position of Judges, Judicial
 Officers and Magistrates has since been made more secure by the enact-        G
.ment of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.

      In the instant case, Collector alone has been arrayed as respondent
and the claim under the Consumer Protection Act was filed only against
him. 'Collector" has been defined in Section 2(9) of the Stamp Act as
under:                                                                    H
    356                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A            "S.2(9) - Collector

             (a) means, within the limits of the towns of Calcutta, Madras and
                 Bombay, the Collector of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay,
                 respectively and without those limits, the Collector of a dis-
                 trict, and
B
             (b) includes a Deputy Commissioner and any officer whom the
                 State Government may, hy notification in the Official Gazette,
                 appoint in this behalf."

           Since "Collector" has been specifically mentioned along with judges,
C Magistrates and Justices of Peace in the Judicial Offi~ers (Protection) Act,
    1850, it is obvious that il)lmunity from legal action contemplated by this
    Act will also be available to him.

       Apart from the above, Section 86 of the Registration Act provides
D as under:
             "86 Registering officer not liable for thing bona fide done or refused
                 in his official capacity. - No registering officer shall be liable
                 to any suit, claim or demand by reason of any thing in good
                 faith done or refused in his official capacity."
E
           This Section provides complete protection to the Registering Officer
    for things done "bona fide" by him under the Act. It is obvions that action
    which is not bona fide or which is malicious will not be protected.

           These provisions were not noticed by this Court in Lucknow Develop-
F ment Authority's case obviously because this aspect of the matter was not
  involved therein. In the instant case, neither the appellant pleaded nor has
  the District or the State forum recorded any finding that the refusal of the
  Registering Officer or the inaction of the Collector of Stamps was mali-
  cious, motivated or ma/a-fide. We need not, therefore, further delve into
G the matter.
           The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed.

    U.R.                                                       Appeal dismissed.