Holding

Forcible dispossession is unlawful and a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act must be decreed for restoration of possession; the High Court's order to remand the case is set aside.

Summary

The appellant, a long‑time tenant, was forcibly evicted by the respondent landlord while an eviction suit was pending. The appellant filed a criminal complaint and, within six months, instituted a suit for restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The trial court dismissed the suit; the High Court allowed a revision petition but remanded the matter for fresh consideration, which the Supreme Court held defeated the summary nature of Section 6 proceedings. The Court affirmed that Section 6 is intended to prevent self‑help and unlawful forcible dispossession, and that the landlord’s act was illegal. Consequently, the suit was decreed for restoration of possession, the High Court’s remand order was set aside, and the respondent was ordered to hand over possession and pay costs.

Issues considered

Whether a tenant forcibly dispossessed during pendency of an eviction suit is entitled to relief under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Whether the High Court could remand a Section 6 suit for fresh consideration after a long delay.
Whether forcible possession by a landlord is lawful under the law.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 143, s. 147, s. 149, s. 323, s. 341, s. 352, s. 380, s. 441
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 6

Subjects

Specific Relief ActSection 6summary suitforcible dispossessionlandlord‑tenantself‑helprestoration of possessionillegal evictioncivil procedure

Judgment

S.R. EJAZ A
v.
y
TAMIL NADU HANDLOOM WEAVERS CO-OPERATIVE
SOCIETY LTD.

FEBRUARY 26, 2002
B
[M.B. SHAH AND B.N. AGRAWAL, JJ.]

Specific Relief Act, 1963: Section 6.

Object of-Held: ls to prevent self-help and to discourage people to c
adopt any foul means to dispossess a person-Dispossession of a tenant should
be in accordance with law.

Restoration ofpossession-Landlord forcibly dispossessed tenant during
pendency of suit for eviction-Tenant filed suit for restoration ofpossession-
D
Trial Court dismissed suit-High Court allowed revision petition but remanded
the matter to trial court for fresh consideration-Correctness of-Held, The
object of S.6 is to prevent self help and to discourage unlawful and forcible
dispossession of a person-If matter is remanded for consideration after a
long period of time the purpose of summary suit would be frustrated-Hence,
suit decreed-High handed ·action of landlord in taking forcible possession E
depricated.

The appellant was doing business in tenanted premises, Subsequently,
... the respondent purchased the said premises and the appellant was paying rent
to it regularly.
F
The respondent filed a civil suit for getting the suit property vacated
by the appellant. During the pendency of the suit the respondent forcibly took
over possession of the tenanted premises from the appellant. The appellant
had lodged a criminal complaint on the same day but no action was taken.

-I
G
Subsequently, within a period of six months from the date of
dispossession the appellant filed a civil suit for restoration of possession under
Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which was dismissed. The High Court
allowed the Civil Revision Petition filed by the appellant but remanded the
matter to the trial court for fresh consideration of the evidence and proper
31
H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A disposal. Hence this appeal.

On behalf of the respondent it was contended that the appellant had
informed the respondent that he had vacated the premises and, therefore, it
was open to the respondent to take possession of the tenanted premises.

B Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. The procedure under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 is summary and its object is to prevent self-help and to discourage people
to adopt any foul means to dispossess a person. Dispossession of a tenant
C should be in accordance with law. (33-E]

2. If the matter is remanded for reconsideration after a long time, the
whole purpose of summary suit under Section 6 of the Act for taking
possession would be frustrated. The facts were eloquent and no further
evidence was necessary nor anything was required to be re-appreciated.
D Admittedly there is no document to indicate that the appellant willingly
handed over the possession of the suit premises. If the appellant was prepared
to hand over possession of the suit premises willingly a consent decree would
be have been obtained in a pending suit In any case, there was no necessity
of taking possession by use of force. If the appellant had willingly handed over
possession, he would not have immediately lodged the criminal complaint and
E made representation to the higher authorities for appropriate directions.
(35-D-E)

3. If actions by the mighty or powerful are condoned in a democratic
country, nobody would be sllfe nor the citizens can protect their properties.
F Law frowns upon such conduct. The Court accords legitimacy and legality
only to possession taken in due course of law.. If such actions are condoned,
the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution oflndia or the legal
rights would be given a go by either by the authority or by rich and influential
persons or by musclemen.' Law of jungle will prevail and 'might would be
right' instead of 'right being might'. [35-FJ
G
State of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, [19891 2 SCC 505,
relied on.

4. The suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant for restoration of possession
of the suit property is decreed. Further, the high handed action taken by the
H respondent in taking forcible possession from a tenant is deprecated.(36-B)
S.R. EJAZ '·TAMIL NADU HANDLOOM WEAVERS CO-OP SOCIETY LTD. [SHAH, !.) 33

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1671 of A
2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.5.200 I of the Madras High
Court in C.R.P. No. 1818 of 1995.

R. Sundravardan, Ram Lal Roy and R.N. Keshwani for the Appellant. B

K. Ramamoonhy, Hari Shankar K. and G.D. Gupta, for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
SHAH, J. Leave granted.

The appellant who was forcibly and illegally dispossessed since May
1986 from the tenanted premises by his landlord is moving from pillar to post
for getting justice. Unfortunately, after considering all the relevant facts which
were brought on record, the High Coun remanded the proceedings under D
Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Act") for reconsideration by the trial court. It is apparent that the whole
purpose of proceedings under Section 6 of the Act is frustrated by such order.
The procedure under Section 6 of the Act is summary and its object is to
prevent self help and to discourage people to adopt any foul means to E
dispossess a person. Dispossession of a tenant should be in accordance with
law.

It is the submission of the appellant that as Proprietor of India Watch
House, he was doing business in tenanted premises situated at 843, Anna
Salai Madras for more than 35 years. Subsequently, the respondent the F
Tamilnadu Handloom Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd., Madras purchased
the said premises and, therefore, the appellant was paying rent regularly to
it.

In 1978, respondent filed Civil Suit for getting the premises vacated G
--' from the appellant. During the pendency of the proceedings, appellant gave
a power of attorney to one Muralidhar Balani to run business of India Watch
House, hence Balani was getting the said shop re-modelled. However, on
20th May, 1986 at about 7.30 p.m., while the work of re-modelling of shop
was going on, one Mr. Anakaputhur Ramalingam and about 20 Co-Optex
Workers with the help of police forcibly trespassed into the tenanted premises. H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A They took forcible possession despite the fact their Civil Suit for eviction
was pending in the court.

On the same day, appellant filed a complaint but the police did not
take any action on it. On 21st May, 1986, the complaint was sent to the
Commissioner of Police, Chennai for immediate action against the trespassers.
B On 31st May, 1986 telegraphic complaints were sent to the Director General
of Police and the Inspector General of Police. The~eafter, on 16th June, 1986,
appellant filed Writ Petition No. 5382 of 1986 for a direction to the police
to take appropriate action on the complaint filed by the appellant. That writ
petition was allowed by the High Court on 3rd May, 1988 and the Court
C directed the CB CID to investigate the complaint of the appellant. On such
direction, CB CID registered the offence punishable under Sections 143, 147,
149, 323, 341 and 441 of IPC. The main accused Anakaputhur Ramalingam
was arrested on 19th July, 1988. Thereafter, on 18.6.1991, the Government
of Tamilnadu accorded sanction to prosecute the case against the accused.
Hence, the CB CID police filed the charge sheet against all the accused for
D the offence punishable under sections 147, 149, 441, 352, 380 and 341 of
IPC in the Court of Addi. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai.
It is alleged by the appellant that accused succeeded in pressurizing and
influencing the Government to withdraw the prosecution against all accused
and thereafter public prosecutor filed an application for withdrawal of the
E prosecution. P.ermission to withdraw the prosecution case was granted by the
ACMM on 15th October, 1993.

In the meantime, within a period of six months from the date of
dispossession, on 25.9.1986, appellant filed OS No. 6998 of 1986 for
restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Aet. Respondent filed written
F statement and pleaded that appellant had informed them that he has vacated
the premises and it was open to the respondent to take the possession either
on 19th or 20th May, 1986. Therefore, possession was taken in presence of
the police constables. The trial court dismissed the suit. Against the said
judgment and order, appellant preferred C.R.P. No. 1818 of 1996 before the
G High Court of Madras. Considering the facts stated above, the High Court
allowed the petition. However, the High Court held that in the interest of _._
justice the matter requires to be remanded to the trial court for fresh
consideration of the evidence and proper disposal. That order is challenged
in this appeal.

H. From the facts narrated above, it is apparent that pending suit filed by
S.R. EJAZ '· TAMIL NADU HAND LOOM WEAVERS CO-OP SOCIETY LTD. (SHAH, J.) 35

the respondent for evicting the appellant, the respondent took forcible A
'possession of the tenanted premises, for that purpose appellant had lodged
criminal complaint on the same day and as no action was taken, he had
informed various authorities immediately. Despite the representation made to
the higher authorities as police had not taken any action, appellant preferred
Writ Petition before the High Court and the High Court directed the CB CID B
to investigate the case. Thereafter the charge sheet was submitted; Government
granted sanction; however, for the reasons best known to it, the Government
withdrew the criminal proceedings. This would clearly establish that appellant
was in possession of the premises and pending suit, he was forcibly
dispossessed. Hence, in such circumstances if matter is remanded for
reconsideration after lapse of 15 years, the whole purpose of summary suit C
under Section 6 of the Act for taking possession would be frustrated. The
facts were eloquent and no further evidence was necessary nor anything was
required to be re-appreciated. It is to be stated that admittedly there is no
document to indicate that appellant willingly handed over the possession of
the suit premises. If appellant was prepared to hand over the possession of
the suit premises willingly a consent decree would have been obtained in a D
pending suit which was filed in 1978. In any case, there was no necessity of
taking possession by use of force in presence of police. If the appellant had
willingly handed over possession, he would not have immediately lodged the
criminal complaint and made representation to the higher authorities for taking
action nor he would have filed a writ petition for appropriate directions. E
Hence, this contention does not deserve to be accepted by any process of
reasoning.

In our view, if such actions by the mighty or powerful are condoned
in a democratic country, nobody would be safe nor the citizens can protect
their properties. Law frowns upon such conduct. The Court accords legitimacy F
and legality only to possession taken in due course of law. If such actions are
condoned, the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India
or the legal rights would be given go bye either by the authority or by rich
and influential persons or by musclemen. Law of jungle will prevail and
'might would be right' instead of 'right being might'. This Court in State of G
UP. and Ors. v. Maharoja Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors., (1989) 2
SCC 505 dealt with the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and observed
that a lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-
judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier
termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. Under law, the possession
of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession H
36 'suPREME COURT' REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A and forcible· dispossession is prohibited. The Court also held that there is no·
question of Government withdrawing o~ appropriating to it an extra judicial
right' of re-entry and the possession of the property can be resumed by the
Government ?nly in a manner known to or recognized by law.

In' this view of the·matter, this ·appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment ·
B and order passed by the High Court is set aside. The suit filed by the plaintiff-
appellant for restoration of·j:>ossession of the 'suit property is decreed. The '
respondent is directed to hand over the possession of the premises within one
month to the appellant~ Further, we strongly deprecate the high handed·action ·
taken by the respondent in taking forcibfe possession from a tenant and direct"
the respondent to ·pay Rs: 50,000 as costs to the appellant.

v.s.s. Appeal allowed;

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