SADHNA CHAUDHARYversusSTATE OF U.P. & ANR.

                         [2020] 4 S.C.R. 887                            887


                    SADHNA CHAUDHARY                                    A
                                 v.
                     STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 2077 of 2020)
                                                                        B
                         MARCH 06, 2020
  [S. A. BOBDE, CJI, B. R. GAVAI AND SURYA KANT, JJ.]
       Service Law: Judicial service – Allegation against appellant
judicial officer that while posted as ADJ, she had decided the land
acquisition reference illegally and against all judicial norms and      C
propriety awarding to the claimants the amount of compensation
at an unduly high rate which led to inference that she was actuated
by extraneous considerations and thereby failed to maintain
absolute integrity and complete devotion of duty and committed
misconduct under U.P. Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1956
– Enquiry Committee held that the charges were proved for, the          D
errors were apparent in both cases which were such shocking
blunders that they could not be attributed to mere misjudgment and
consequently were proved to be deliberate – Accordingly, order of
dismissal from service passed – Appellant unsuccessfully
challenged the order of dismissal before High Court – On appeal,        E
held: It is the decision making process of delinquent officer and
not the end result of the judicial process which could be subjected
to disciplinary action – It is a matter of record that at the time
when the High Court was seized of this matter, writ petitions against
both of the appellant’s land acquisition judgments were dismissed
by its coordinate benches – High Court nevertheless, rightly            F
observed that dismissal of writ petitions against the appellant’s
orders did not serve as vindication or confirmation of her orders
– Indeed, as correctly noted by the High Court, the scope of
judicial review under Art.226 is limited – The standards to be met
prior to interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction are very high,
and there needs to be gross substantive injustice through the           G
conclusion, glaring irregularities in procedure or the need to
resolve important questions of law for a writ court to overturn the
Reference Court’s order – Hence, dismissal of writ petition merely
signifies the failure to demonstrate any of these high standards,
in a particular case, and not the endorsement of the orders passed      H
                                887
888            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     by a subordinate authority – However, the facts of the instant case
      are distinct – This Court, in fact, entered into the merits of one of
      the allegedly erroneous orders – Not only was the judgment
      affirmed, but rather the compensation was further enhanced – It,
      therefore, can no longer be stated that the appellant’s order was
      wrong in conclusion – This fact is significant as it establishes that
B     the increase in compensation by the appellant was not abhorrent
      – There is no explicit mention of any extraneous consideration
      being actually received or of unbecoming conduct on the part of
      the appellant – Instead, the very basis of the finding of
      ‘misbehaviour’ is the end result itself, which as per the High Court
C     was so shocking that it gave rise to a natural suspicion as to the
      integrity and honesty of the appellant – Although this might be right
      in a vacuum, however, given how the end result itself has been
      untouched by superior courts and instead in one of the two cases,
      the compensation only increased, no such inference can be made
      – Thus, case against the appellant not made out – Order of
D     dismissal set aside – Constitution of India – Art.226 – Judicial
      service.
            Judicial Officers: Judicial officers must aspire and adhere
      to a higher standard of honesty, integrity and probity – Also mere
      suspicion cannot constitute ‘misconduct’ – Any ‘probability’ of
E     misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary
      material, even though the standard of proof would obviously not
      be at par with that in a criminal trial.
            Allowing the appeal, the Court
             HELD: 1. It is a principle since the nineteenth century that
F     judges cannot be held responsible for the end result or the effect
      of their decisions. This is necessary to both uphold the rule of
      law, and insulate judicial reasoning from extraneous factors. It
      is courts, which uphold the law and ensure its enforcement. They
      instil trust of the constitutional order in people, and ensure the
G     majesty of law and adherence to its principles. Courts hence
      prevent people from resorting to their animalistic instincts, and
      instead provide them with a gentler and more-civilised
      alternative of resolving disputes. In getting people to obey their
      dicta, Courts do not make use of guns or other (dis)incentives,
      but instead rely on the strength of their reasoning and a certain
H     trust and respect in the minds of the general populace. Hence,
      SADHNA CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                        889


it is necessary that any corruption or deviation from judicial        A
propriety by the guardians of law themselves, be dealt with
sternly and swiftly. [Paras 18, 19] [897-B-E]
       2. The judicial officers must aspire and adhere to a higher
standard of honesty, integrity and probity. Also mere suspicion
cannot constitute ‘misconduct’. Any ‘probability’ of misconduct       B
needs to be supported with oral or documentary material, even
though the standard of proof would obviously not be at par with
that in a criminal trial. While applying these yardsticks, the High
Court is expected to consider the existence of differing standards
and approaches amongst different judges. [Paras 20, 21] [897-
F; 899-G-H; 900-A]                                                    C

      Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra
      (2019) 9 SCC 144 – referred to.
      3. It is a matter of record that at the time when the High
Court was seized of this matter, writ petitions against both of       D
the appellant’s land acquisition judgments had been dismissed
by its coordinate benches. The High Court nevertheless, rightly
observed that dismissal of writ petitions against the appellant’s
orders did not serve as vindication or confirmation of her orders.
Indeed, as correctly noted by the High Court, the scope of
judicial review under Article 226 is limited. The standards to be     E
met prior to interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction are very
high, and there needs to be gross substantive injustice through
the conclusion, glaring irregularities in procedure or the need
to resolve important questions of law for a writ court to overturn
the Reference Court’s order. Hence, dismissal of writ petition
merely signifies the failure to demonstrate any of these high         F
standards, in a particular case, and not the endorsement of the
orders passed by a subordinate authority. However, the facts of
the present case are distinct. This Court, in fact, entered into
the merits of one of the allegedly erroneous orders. Not only
was the judgment affirmed, but rather the compensation was            G
further enhanced. It hence can no longer be stated that the
appellant’s order was wrong in conclusion. This fact is significant
as it establishes that the increase in compensation by the
appellant was not abhorrent. Had the charge been specific that
the decision-making process was effectuated by extraneous
considerations, then the correctness of the appellant’s               H
890            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     conclusions probably would not have mattered as much.
      However, a perusal of the charges would make it evident that
      the exclusive cause of enquiry, inference of dishonesty as well
      as imposition of penalty was only on the basis of the conclusion
      of enhancement of compensation. Given how the challenge to
      one of those two orders had been turned down at the High Court
B     stage, and the order was both affirmed and furthered in principle
      by this Court, the very foundation of the charges no longer
      survives. [Paras 24-26] [900-E-H; 901-A-C]
            4. There is no fault in the proposition that the end result
      of adjudication does not matter, and only whether the delinquent
C     officer had taken illegal gratification (monetary or otherwise) or
      had been swayed by extraneous considerations while conducting
      the process is of relevance. There is no explicit mention of any
      extraneous consideration being actually received or of
      unbecoming conduct on the part of the appellant. Instead, the
      very basis of the finding of ‘misbehaviour’ is the end result itself,
D
      which as per the High Court was so shocking that it gave rise
      to a natural suspicion as to the integrity and honesty of the
      appellant. Although this might be right in a vacuum, however,
      given how the end result itself has been untouched by superior
      courts and instead in one of the two cases, the compensation
E     only increased, no such inference can be made. Thus, the entire
      case against the appellant collapses like a house of cards. The
      order of dismissal is set aside. [Paras 27-29] [901-D-F-H; 902-
      A-B]
            Lile Singh v. State Land Acquisition Reference No. 193
F           of 2006 delivered on 10.02.2003 ; Umesh Chandra
            v. State Land Acquisition Reference No. 91 of 2001
            delivered on 07.11.2003 ; PC Joshi v. State of UP
            (2001) 6 SCC 491 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 369 ; Union
            of India v. J Ahmed AIR 1979 SC 1022 : [1979] 3
            SCR 504 ; Agra Development Authority v. State of UP
G           2004 All LJ 1853 – referred to.
                            Case Law Reference
      [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 369           referred to          Para 11
      [1979] 3 SCR 504                  referred to          Para 14
H     (2019) 9 SCC 144                  referred to          Para 20
         SADHNA CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                           891


      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2077                  A
of 2020.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.2018 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Writ Petition No.
170 (S/B) of 2006.
                                                                            B
     Dhusyant Dave, Sr. Adv., Ms. Shirin Khajuria, Ms. Roopali
Lakhotia, Ms. Radhika Maharwal, Ms. Asavari Jain and Ms. Geetanjali
Vishwanathan, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Ashok K. Srivastava, Sr. Adv., Sunny Choudhary, Lalit Sankhla,
Adarsh Upadhyay and Amol Chitravanshi, Advs. for the Respondents.
                                                                            C
         The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
                                 JUDGMENT
         1. Leave Granted.
      2. This appeal has been preferred by Sadhana Chaudhary, being         D
aggrieved, against an order dated 12.12.2018 passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad by which her writ petition, seeking judicial
review of her dismissal from the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Services
by Respondent No. 1, had been rejected.
         FACTUAL MATRIX                                                     E
      3. The appellant was recruited into the Uttar Pradesh Judicial
Services on 05.06.1975 and was posted as Additional Munsif, Dehradun.
She was subsequently promoted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate Cadre
in 1981, and again to the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Services on
21.03.1987.                                                                 F
      4. A Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
while seized of the first appeal against a Land Acquisition Reference,
made certain observations on 05.03.2004 with regard to the manner in
which some other land acquisition cases of similar nature were being
adjudicated by subordinate judicial officers in the state of Uttar
                                                                            G
Pradesh.1 A copy of the judgment was placed by the Registrar before
the Administrative Committee of High Court for appropriate action. The
Administrative Committee constituted a committee comprising of two
Judges to probe into complaints of collusion in land acquisition matters.
1
    Agra Development Authority v. State of UP, 2004 All LJ 1853.            H
892            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     This enquiry committee after visiting numerous districts of western
      Uttar Pradesh (UP) and examination of many judgments, submitted a
      report on 19.09.2004 recommending initiation of disciplinary action
      against certain judicial officers, including the appellant.
             5. Accordingly, a Charge Sheet was served upon the appellant
B     with regard to two judicial orders delivered by her during her stint as
      Additional District Judge at Ghaziabad. Following were the charges
      attributed to the appellant:
            “Charge No.1 - That you on 10.02.2003 while posted as IInd
            Additional District Judge Ghaziabad decided Land Acquisition
C           Reference No.193/1996 Lile Singh Vs. State of U.P. and 35
            others illegally and against all judicial norms and propriety
            awarding to the claimants solatium, additional amount and interest
            over and above the rate at which two other claimants had entered
            into compromise which was inclusive of such other benefits at
D           an enhanced rate of Rs. 265/- per sq. yard as against Rs. 74.40
            determined by the S.L.A.O. for land area 276 Bighas 12 Biswas
            and 15 Biswansi, unduly awarded an additional amount of
            Rs. 47,73,39,903.86 which leads to an inference that you were
            actuated by extraneous considerations and you thereby failed to
            maintain absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty and you
E
            thus committed misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of UP
            Govt. Servants Conduct rules 1956.
            Charge No.2 - That you on 7.11.2003 posted as Additional
            District Judge, Court No.1, Ghaziabad, while deciding Land
F           Acquisition Reference No.91 of 2001 Umesh Chandra Vs. State
            of UP and 66 other cases enhanced the rate of compensation
            from Rs.100/- per square yard determined by the S.L.A.O to
            Rs.160/- per square yard, illegally disregarding the exemplars filed
            by the defendants including your own award in Land Acquisition
            Reference No.1 of 1992, Surendra Vs State of UP decided on
G           24.03.1993, for land acquired in the same year, in the same area
            and under the same scheme in order to award an additional
            amount of Rs. 28,53,24,896.80 to the claimants for land area
            483 Bighas, 14 Biswas and 8 Biswansis leading to inference that
            you were actuated by extraneous considerations and you thereby
H           failed to maintain absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty,
          SADHNA CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                             893


         and you thus committed misconduct within the meaning of Rule          A
         3 of UP Government Servants Conduct Rules 1956. ”
                                                          (Emphasis applied)
       6. The appellant submitted detailed reply to the chargesheet, as
well as additional written arguments. Subsequently, an enquiry was
conducted and the Enquiry Committee through its report dated                   B
09.09.2005 held that both the charges had been proved for these were
errors apparent in both cases which were such ‘shocking blunders’ that
they could not be attributed to mere misjudgment, and consequently were
proved to be ‘deliberate’. The said report was placed before the
Administrative Committee which accepted the same vide resolution               C
dated 29.11.2005, and referred the matter to the Full Court for
determination of quantum of punishment. The Full Court resolved to
dismiss the appellant from service and consequently forwarded its
recommendation to the State (Respondent No. 1), which through an
office memorandum issued by its Appointments Department on
17.01.2006, dismissed the appellant from service with immediate effect.        D
The appellant challenged the order of dismissal before the High Court
on judicial side invoking the writ jurisdiction.
       7. The Division Bench of the HC took note of the two land
acquisition references which had been decided by the appellant. With
regards to the first case of Lile Singh v. State2 it held that the appellant   E
had wrongly relied upon a compromise deed of two other claimants to
enhance compensation from Rs. 74.40/sq yd (as determined by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer) to Rs. 264/sq yd. Additionally, she
had awarded solatium and interest over and above the said determined
rate, which led to a steep escalation to Rs. 720/sq yd. Holding such           F
reliance on compromise deeds as being incomprehensible owing to the
statutory bar of Section 11(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the
escalation was deemed disproportionate and against judicial propriety.
       8. With regard to the second reference in Umesh Chandra v.
State3, the Court observed that the appellant as a judge illegally             G
disregarded exemplars filed by the State-respondents, particularly, an
award of Rs. 108/sq yd passed only a few months ago by her in a similar
case. Notwithstanding such evidence, the appellant was said to have
2
    Land Acquisition Reference No. 193 of 2006, delivered on 10.02.2003.
3
    Land Acquisition Reference No. 91 of 2001, delivered on 07.11.2003.        H
894               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     increased the compensation from Rs. 100/sq yd to Rs. 160/sq yd, in
      contravention of all judicial norms.
             9. The Bench opined that it was settled law that although the
      final decision made by a judicial officer was of no relevance for purposes
      of disciplinary enquiry, however, the legality and correctness of the
B     decision-making process as well as the conduct of the officers in
      discharge of their duties ought to be considered. The High Court
      accordingly endorsed the Respondent’s plea that the decision-making
      process of the appellant while deciding the aforementioned two land
      acquisition references was bereft of judicial propriety, settled judicial
C     norms and was actuated by extraneous considerations. Additionally, the
      High Court placed emphasis on the windfall gain made available to the
      claimants as being evidence of the deliberate lapses made by the
      appellant in response to extraneous considerations, and not merely errors
      of judgment. This, the High Court noted, amounted to misconduct as
      opined by the Enquiry Committee.
D
             10. Furthermore, the Court noted that, even otherwise, strict rules
      of evidence were inapplicable to departmental enquiries, and the scope
      of judicial review in such matters also being very limited, findings of
      the disciplinary enquiry could be interfered with only in the complete
      absence of material, which was not the case at hand.
E
               CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES
             11. Counsel for the appellant made a spirited argument that
      although the High Court undoubtedly expounded the correct law,
      however it failed to appropriately apply it to the facts of the present
F     case. He argued that the chargesheet made no allegation of the
      ‘decision-making process’ being illegal, and the same could not be made
      a ground for the appellant’s dismissal later. Taking the Court through
      the charge sheet on record, it was highlighted that no allegation of receipt
      of any illegal gratification or being swayed by any specific extraneous
      factor was even levelled against her, let alone being proved. No
G     witnesses or material to cast doubts upon the decision-making process
      were adduced, except for merely the two land acquisition reference
      orders. This, as per PC Joshi v. State of UP 4 , was clearly
      impermissible. Even otherwise, determining appropriateness of the

      4
H         (2001) 6 SCC 491.
         SADHNA CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                            895


substance of the judicial orders was said to be the domain of appellate      A
courts and not the enquiry committees.
       12. Even on merits, it was contended that the High Court erred
in holding that the appellant had illegally relied upon compromise deeds
while authoring the order in Liley Singh, for the supposed bar under
Section 11(3) of the LA Act was applicable only to awards by                 B
Collectors. Reference Courts were guided by distinct legal provisions
under Sections 23 and 24, per which compromise deeds were not
excluded. The escalations were also shown as not being arbitrary, but
rather founded upon the Compromise Policy of the New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority, which was tweaked to grant statutory dues of          C
solatium and interest instead of the additional 10% developed land being
granted by the State authorities. Hence, it was pleaded, that if anything,
the net compensation of Rs. 720/sq yd was effectively lower in cost to
the State than the Rs. 1120/sq yd being borne under their own policy.
       13. Qua Umesh Chand, it was submitted that the deviation from         D
the appellant’s very own judgment rendered five months ago, was a
result of the substantial development and increase in prices which took
place in the interregnum. This was duly backed up by documentary
evidence produced by the vigilant claimants, and hence compensation
was enhanced by a factor of 60% to Rs. 160/sq yd. Glaringly, this very
compensation, which was found as being a shocking blunder by the             E
enquiry committee, was further enhanced by the Apex Court in an SLP
filed by some other claimants to Rs. 297/sq yd., and appeals filed by
the Local Development Authority had been dismissed. Thus, the very
basis of the inference of misconduct was claimed as not having
survived.                                                                    F
      14. Reiterating the position of law expounded by the High Court,
the appellant argued that it was the conduct of a judicial officer in
discharge of her duties, and not the legality/correctness of her decision,
could be subjected to disciplinary action. Given the detailed reasons in
both references by the appellant, there was no ‘reckless discharge of        G
duties’ either. Even if there were to be such omission in duty, in the
absence of any charge of illegal gratification, it would amount to
‘negligence’ and not ‘misconduct’ as per this Court’s order in Union
of India v. J Ahmed5. The charges were said to be based merely upon
5
    AIR 1979 SC 1022.                                                        H
896            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     unfounded suspicion, and any possible errors in the judicial orders were
      contended not to be grounds for action, owing to long-settled principles
      of judicial immunity tracing back to the Judicial Officers Protection Act,
      1850.
             15. The enquiry itself was stated to be roving in nature, without
B     any rational basis for selecting those two cases only. The order of the
      High Court in Agra Development Authority (supra) was to be
      applicable only to instances where complaints of judicial impropriety or
      allegations of collusion in land acquisition reference cases were made
      against judicial officers, which was not the present case.
C     Notwithstanding guilt, the appellant urged that the quantum of
      punishment was unfair. Having rendered almost thirty years of
      unblemished service, dismissing her on the strength of abovestated
      charges, was prayed as being disproportionate.
             16. On the other hand, Learned Counsel for the High Court
D     (Respondent No. 2) contended that judicial officers are not ordinary
      government servants, and that they must adhere to a higher standard
      of probity and ought to be above suspicion. Persons occupying such
      high posts should have high integrity, honesty, moral vigour, fairness and
      must be impervious to corrupt or venial influences. The limited scope
      of interference in matters of domestic enquiry where the allegations
E
      founded upon specific facts have been proved, was also highlighted.
              17. The scope of the present proceedings, thus was sought to
      be restricted, by drawing attention to constitutional provisions which
      bestowed exclusive control of the High Court over the subordinate
F     judges, with the aim of preserving independence of judiciary. Given the
      fact that opportunities of being heard and placing on record written
      submissions were duly accorded to the appellant, and her detailed replies
      had been considered and rejected, it was not open for her to seek
      re-determination of her case through this Court. Both the enquiry
      committee and the Full Court were contended to have applied their minds
G     and passed reasoned orders wherein it was unequivocally found that
      the appellant had utterly failed to justify her conduct and had acted in
      a most reckless and arbitrary manner, which was bereft of all judicial
      propriety. This was pleaded to undoubtedly amount to ‘gravest
      misconduct’, justifying the dismissal of services for preserving public
H     trust in the judiciary.
           SADHNA CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                              897


          ANALYSIS                                                               A
       18. Undoubtedly, the High Court is correct in its observation of
the applicable law. Indeed, the end result of the judicial process does
not matter, and what matters is only the decision-making process
employed by the delinquent officer. Clearly, it is a principle since the
nineteenth century that judges cannot be held responsible for the end            B
result or the effect of their decisions.6 This is necessary to both uphold
the rule of law, and insulate judicial reasoning from extraneous factors.
       19. Even furthermore, there are no two ways with the proposition
that Judges, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion. Judicial
officers do discharge a very sensitive and important constitutional role.        C
They not only keep in check excesses of the executive, safeguard
citizens’ rights and maintain law and order. Instead, they support the
very framework of civilised society. It is courts, which uphold the law
and ensure its enforcement. They instil trust of the constitutional order
in people, and ensure the majesty of law and adherence to its principles.
Courts hence prevent people from resorting to their animalistic instincts,       D
and instead provide them with a gentler and more-civilised alternative
of resolving disputes. In getting people to obey their dicta, Courts do
not make use of guns or other (dis)incentives, but instead rely on the
strength of their reasoning and a certain trust and respect in the minds
of the general populace. Hence, it is necessary that any corruption or           E
deviation from judicial propriety by the guardians of law themselves,
be dealt with sternly and swiftly.
      20. It has amply been reiterated by this Court that judicial officers
must aspire and adhere to a higher standard of honesty, integrity and
probity. Very recently in Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of                 F
Maharashtra7, a Division Bench of this Court very succinctly collated
these principles and reiterated that:
          “5. The first and foremost quality required in a Judge is integrity.
          The need of integrity in the judiciary is much higher than
          in other institutions. The judiciary is an institution whose           G
          foundations are based on honesty and integrity. It is,
          therefore, necessary that judicial officers should possess the
          sterling quality of integrity. This Court in Tarak Singh v. Jyoti
6
    See Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850.
7
    (2019) 9 SCC 144.                                                            H
898     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     Basu [Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu, (2005) 1 SCC 201] held as
      follows: (SCC p. 203)
         “Integrity is the hallmark of judicial discipline, apart from
         others. It is high time the judiciary took utmost care to
         see that the temple of justice does not crack from inside,
B        which will lead to a catastrophe in the justice-delivery
         system resulting in the failure of public confidence in the
         system. It must be remembered that woodpeckers inside
         pose a larger threat than the storm outside.”
      6. The behaviour of a Judge has to be of an exacting
C     standard, both inside and outside the court. This Court
      in Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad [Daya
      Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad, (1987) 3 SCC 1:1987
      SCC (L&S) 132] held thus: (SCC p.1)
         “Judicial officers cannot have two standards, one in the
D        court and another outside the court. They must have only
         one standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. They
         cannot act even remotely unworthy of the office they
         occupy.”
      7. Judges are also public servants. A Judge should always
E     remember that he is there to serve the public. A Judge is judged
      not only by his quality of judgments but also by the quality and
      purity of his character. Impeccable integrity should be
      reflected both in public and personal life of a Judge. One
      who stands in judgments over others should be
      incorruptible. That is the high standard which is expected of
F     Judges.
      8. Judges must remember that they are not merely employees
      but hold high public office. In R.C. Chandel v. High Court of
      M.P. [R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P., (2012) 8 SCC 58
      : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 343 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 782 : (2012)
G     2 SCC (L&S) 469] , this Court held that the standard of
      conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than that of
      an ordinary person. The following observations of this Court
      are relevant: (SCC p. 70, para 29)
         “29. Judicial service is not an ordinary government
H        service and the Judges are not employees as such. Judges
       SADHNA CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                           899


         hold the public office; their function is one of the essential   A
         functions of the State. In discharge of their functions and
         duties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a
         Judge holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be
         a person of impeccable integrity and unimpeachable
         independence. He must be honest to the core with high
                                                                          B
         moral values. When a litigant enters the courtroom, he
         must feel secured that the Judge before whom his matter
         has come, would deliver justice impartially and
         uninfluenced by any consideration. The standard of
         conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than an
         ordinary man. This is no excuse that since the standards         C
         in the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from
         the society cannot be expected to have high standards and
         ethical firmness required of a Judge. A Judge, like
         Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion. The credibility of
         the judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who man
                                                                          D
         it. For a democracy to thrive and the rule of law to
         survive, justice system and the judicial process have to
         be strong and every Judge must discharge his judicial
         functions with integrity, impartiality and intellectual
         honesty.”
      9. There can be no manner of doubt that a Judge must decide         E
      the case only on the basis of the facts on record and the law
      applicable to the case. If a Judge decides a case for any
      extraneous reasons then he is not performing his duty in
      accordance with law.
      10. In our view the word “gratification” does not only mean         F
      monetary gratification. Gratification can be of various types.
      It can be gratification of money, gratification of power,
      gratification of lust etc., etc. ...”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)
                                                                          G
       21. We are also not oblivious to the fact that mere suspicion
cannot constitute ‘misconduct’. Any ‘probability’ of misconduct needs
to be supported with oral or documentary material, even though the
standard of proof would obviously not be at par with that in a criminal
trial. While applying these yardsticks, the High Court is expected to
consider the existence of differing standards and approaches amongst      H
900            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     different judges. There are innumerable instances of judicial officers
      who are liberal in granting bail, awarding compensation under MACT
      or for acquired land, backwages to workmen or mandatory
      compensation in other cases of tortious liabilities. Such relief-oriented
      judicial approaches cannot by themselves be grounds to cast aspersions
      on the honesty and integrity of an officer.
B
             22. Furthermore, one cannot overlook the reality of ours being a
      country wherein countless complainants are readily available without
      hesitation to tarnish the image of the judiciary, often for mere pennies
      or even cheap momentary popularity. Sometimes a few disgruntled
C     members of the Bar also join hands with them, and officers of the
      subordinate judiciary are usually the easiest target. It is, therefore, the
      duty of High Courts to extend their protective umbrella and ensure that
      upright and straightforward judicial officers are not subjected to
      unmerited onslaught.
D            23. It is evident in the case in hand that the High Court itself
      was cognizant of this settled proposition of law. Learned senior counsel
      for the appellant also finds no fault with these principles, and instead
      only seeks for their application to the facts of the present case.
             24. It is a matter of record that at the time when the High Court
E     was seized of this matter, writ petitions against both of the appellant’s
      land acquisition judgments had been dismissed by its coordinate benches.
      The High Court has, nevertheless, rightly observed that dismissal of writ
      petitions against the appellant’s orders did not serve as vindication or
      confirmation of her orders. Indeed, as correctly noted by the High
F     Court, the scope of judicial review under Article 226 is limited. The
      standards to be met prior to interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction
      are very high, and there needs to be gross substantive injustice through
      the conclusion, glaring irregularities in procedure or the need to resolve
      important questions of law for a writ court to overturn the Reference
G     Court’s order. Hence, dismissal of writ petition merely signifies the
      failure to demonstrate any of these high standards, in a particular case,
      and not the endorsement of the orders passed by a subordinate authority.
             25. However, the facts of the present case are distinct. This
      Court, in fact, entered into the merits of one of the allegedly erroneous
H     orders. Not only was the judgment affirmed, but rather the compensation
       SADHNA CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                              901


was further enhanced. It hence can no longer be stated that the              A
appellant’s order was wrong in conclusion. This fact is significant as it
establishes that the increase in compensation by the appellant was not
abhorrent.
       26. Had the charge been specific that the decision-making
process was effectuated by extraneous considerations, then the               B
correctness of the appellant’s conclusions probably would not have
mattered as much. However, a perusal of the charges extracted above
makes it evident that the exclusive cause of enquiry, inference of
dishonesty as well as imposition of penalty was only on the basis of
the conclusion of enhancement of compensation. Given how the                 C
challenge to one of those two orders had been turned down at the High
Court stage, and the other was both affirmed and furthered in principle
by this Court, the very foundation of the charges no longer survives.
       27. We can find no fault in the proposition that the end result of
adjudication does not matter, and only whether the delinquent officer        D
had taken illegal gratification (monetary or otherwise) or had been
swayed by extraneous considerations while conducting the process is
of relevance. Indeed, many-a-times it is possible that a judicial officer
can indulge in conduct unbecoming of his office whilst at the same time
giving an order, the result of which is legally sound. Such unbecoming       E
conduct can either be in the form of a judge taking a case out of turn,
delaying hearings through adjournments, seeking bribes to give parties
their legal dues etc. None of these necessarily need to affect the
outcome. However, importantly in the present case, a perusal of the
chargesheet shows that no such allegation of the process having been
vitiated has been made against the appellant.                                F

      28. There is no explicit mention of any extraneous consideration
being actually received or of unbecoming conduct on the part of the
appellant. Instead, the very basis of the finding of ‘misbehaviour’ is the
end result itself, which as per the High Court was so shocking that it
gave rise to a natural suspicion as to the integrity and honesty of the      G
appellant. Although this might be right in a vacuum, however, given how
the end result itself has been untouched by superior courts and instead
in one of the two cases, the compensation only increased, no such
inference can be made. Thus, the entire case against the appellant
collapses like a house of cards.                                             H
902              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A            CONCLUSION
             In light of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed. The
      judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by
      the appellant is allowed. The order of dismissal dated 17.01.2006 passed
      by Respondent No. 1 is set-aside, and the appellant’s prayers for
B     reinstatement with consequential benefits including retiral benefits, is
      accepted. No order as to costs.


      Devika Gujral                                              Appeal allowed.


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