Holding

The Court held that a delay in lodging the FIR, when satisfactorily explained, does not invalidate the prosecution, and the evidence sufficiently proved cruelty and abetment of suicide, so the convictions under Sections 498‑A and 306 IPC stand.

Summary

Sahebrao and Bhausaheb, husband and brother-in-law of Sangita, repeatedly demanded additional dowry (Rs 10,000 and a tape recorder) after her marriage, subjecting her to mental and physical cruelty. Within four months of marriage Sangita complained of harassment, was beaten, and eventually committed suicide. Her father discovered the body and lodged the FIR a day later, citing shock. The trial court convicted the accused under IPC 306 (abetment of suicide) and 498‑A (cruelty), a decision affirmed by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the one‑day delay in filing the FIR was satisfactorily explained and did not vitiate the prosecution case, and that the evidence established cruelty and the requisite nexus for abetment of suicide, thereby upholding the convictions.

Issues considered

The delay in filing the First Information Report (FIR) and whether it defeats the prosecution case.
Whether the conduct of the husband and his brother amounts to cruelty under Section 498‑A of the IPC.
Whether the conviction under Section 306 IPC, based on the presumption of abetment of suicide under Section 113‑A of the Evidence Act, is justified.
Whether the evidence on record is sufficient to sustain the convictions.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113-A
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304-B, s. 306, s. 498-A

Subjects

dowry harassmentcrueltysuicideabetment of suicideFIR delaySection 498-ASection 306 IPCSection 113-A Evidence ActIndian Penal CodeEvidence Act

Judgment

SAHEBRAO AND ANR. A
v.
ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA

MAY 3, 2006

[S.B. SINHA AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860:

Section 498-A-Cruelty-Married woman subjected to cruelty-By
husband and other relatives-Soon after the marriage of the accused with C
the deceased, the husband and his elder brother demanded additional dowry
amount and a tape recorder-At her matrimonial home, deceased was
constantly nagged for non-payment of additional amount by her father-
Ultimately deceased committed suicide-Trial convicted accused under S.
498-A-High Court affirmed conviction-Correctness of-Held: The facts D
clearly establish that the husband and his elder brother subjected the deceased
to cruelty-Hence, their conviction under S. 498-A was based on cogent and
reliable evidence.

Evidence Act, 1872:

Section 113-A-Abetment to suicide-Suicide committed within a span E
offour months after marriage-Soon after the marriage of the accused with
the deceased, the husband and his elder brother demanded additional dowry
amount and a tape recorder-At her matrimonial home, deceased was
.•-
constantly nagged for non-payment of additional amount by her father-
U/timately deceased commilted suicide-Trial Court convicted accused under F
S. 306 lPC with the aid of presumption under S. 113-A-High Court affirmed
conviction-Correctness of-Held: The cruel treatment meted out to the
deceased was of such a nature that it has driven the married woman to
commit suicide-Hence, conviction under S. 306 !PC with the aid of S. 113-
A upheld-Penal Code, 1860, S. 306.

Criminal Trial: G

First Information Report (FIR)-Delay in lodging of-Whether fatal to
the prosecution case-PW-I saw his married daughter dead in her matrimonial
home-As his mental condition was not good, PW-1 lodged the FIR the next

737 H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A day giving the detailed narration offacts-Held: The delay in filing FIR by
itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case and discard it-After
finding her newly wedded daughter's dead body in her matrimonial home, it
was very natural for a father to lose his tranquility of mind-Therefore, it was
not unnatural or unusual to lodge the FIR the next day-Hence, delay in
B lodging the FIR not fatal to the prosecution case-Code of Criminal Procedure,
I973, S. 154.

Words & Phrases:

"Cruelty"-Meaning of-In the context of Section 498-A of the Penal
C Code, I860.

The appellant-accused A-2 was married to the deceased and soon after
the marriage, the elder brother of A-2, appellant-accused A-1, dema'?ded
additional dowry amount of Rs. 10,000/- and A-2 insisted for a tape remder.
...
After 5-6 days, PW-3 and PW-4 went to the matrimonial home of the deceased,
D gave the tape recorder to the accused persons and took the deceased to her
parents' home. The younger brother of A-2 came to the house of PW-I, the
father of the deceased, to take the deceased back to her matrimoniaf home
and he informed PW-I that the deceased would not accompany him unless
the amount was given. When the deceased came to her parents' home after a
month, she requested her father not to send her back to her matrimonial home.
E However, in the hope that the situation would improve, PW-I left his reluctant
daughter at her matrimonial home. That time also A-2 told him that since the
amount was not given PW-I should take back his daughter.

Subsequently, the father of the deceased was informed that his daughter
was ill. PW-I went to the house of the accused persons and there he saw his
F daughter dead and no one from the family of the accused persons was present
in the house. The police made inquiry from PW-I but he told them that his
mental condition was not good and that he would lodge the complaint
afterwards. PW-I lodged the complaint against the appellants-accused the next
day giving the detailed narration of facts.
G The trial court convicted the accused persons under Sections 306 and
49S-A of the Penal Code, 1860. The High Court affirmed the conviction. Hence
the appeal.

On behalf of the accused persons, it was contended that the delay in
H filing the First Information Report (FIR) was fatal to the case of the
SAHEBRAO v. ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA 739
prosecution. A
Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I.I. The settled principle oflaw is that the delay in filing FIR by
itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case and discard it. The
delay in lodging the FIR would put the Court on its guard to search if any B
plausible explanation has been offered and if offered whether it is satisfactory.
(743-Bj

State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gian Chand, (200116 SCC 71, Ravinder
Kumar v. State of Punjab, (20011 7 SCC 690 and Amar Singh v. Ba/winder
Singh, (2003] 2 SCC 518, relied on. C
Zahoor v. State of U.P., (19911 Supp. I SCC 372, Tara Singh v. State of
Punjab, 119911 Supp. I SCC 536 and Jamna v. State of U.P., 119941 Supp. I
sec 185, cited.
1.2. It has come in evidence that when the father of the deceased reached D
her matrimonial home he found his daughter dead and nobody was present in
the house. When the police came and made inquiries he said that he was
shocked and was not mentally fit to lodge the complaint and would do so later
on. After finding her newly wedded daughter's dead body in her matrimonial
home where he had left he just before a day of the incident, it was very natural
for a father to lose his tranquility of mind. Hence, if such grief-stricken father E
had told the police that he would give the complaint afterwards, it was not
unnatural or unusual. (745-8-Cj .

2.1. There does not appear to be any reason to falsely implicate the
accused-appellants into the commission of crime. There is no allegation made F
in the complaint that the daughter of PW-I was done to death by the appellants.
The complaint contains the narration of facts and harassment during the
period of marriage and death of his daughter from which an inference can be
drawn for the commission of the offence by the accused-appellants who were
allegedly consistently pestering for bringing money. (745-D-E)
G
2.2. In the circumstances, simply because the FIR was lodged with some
delay it does not mean that the allegations in the FIR are unworthy of credence
or that PW-I has falsely implicated the accused-appellants in the commission
of the crime. (745-F)

3. The evidence clearly establishes that the deceased was harassed at H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20061 SUPP. I S.C.R.

A her matrimonial home and her staying there had become miserable. The
deceased on several occasions, within a short span of four months of her
marriage, informed her father that she was being troubled by her husband
and his elder brother. They also insulted and taunted her father in her
presence and asked PW-1 to take her back to his home for his inability to
fulfill their unlawful demand. The reluctance shown by the deceased to go to
B her matrimonial home within a short period of her marriage is indicative of
the fact of the treatment given to her. At her matrimonial home, she was
harassed and constantly nagged for non-payment of additional amount by her
father. The facts clearly establish that the husband and his elder brother
subjected the deceased to cruelty and their conviction under Section 498-A
C of the Penal Code, 1860 is based on cogent and reliable evidence. 1747-D-FI

Pawan Kumar v. State ofHaryana, 1199813 SCC 309, Gananth Pattnaik
v. State ofOrissa, 1200212 SCC 619 and Mohd. Hoshan v. State ofA.P., 12002(
7 sec 414, relied on.

D 4. The appellants were also convicted under Section 306 IPC with the
aid of the presumption as to the abetment of suicide by a married woman under
Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, 1872. It is proved by the prosecution that
the deceased committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date
of her marriage and that her husband and his elder brother subjected her to
cruelty. On the basis of the evidence, it can be said that the cruel treatment
E meted out to the deceased was of such a nature that it has driven the lady to
commit suicide. (747-F-Hl

Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (200119 SCC 618 and Hans
Raj v. State of Haryana, (2004112 SCC 257, relied on.

F 5. Neither any evidence was led by the defence nor from the evidence
placed on record by the prosecution, one can draw a plausible, reasonable and
trustworthy explanation to rebut the presumption under Section 113-A of the
Evidence Act. The prosecution has sufficiently proved by cogent evidence that
the accused-appellants by a series of acts and conduct created such a difficult
G and hostile environment for the deceased that she was compelled to commit
suicide. There is a direct and reasonable nexus with the commission of suicide
by the deceased with the act of cruelty under Section 498-A IPC to which the
deceased was subjected by the accused-appellants. (748-G-H; 749-AI

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1507 of
H 2005.
SAHEBRAOv. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [P.P. NAOLEKAR, J.] 741

From the Judgment/Order dated 3.1.2005 of the High Court of Bombay, A
Bench at Aurangabad in Criminal Appeal No. 180 of 1992.

Sudhanshu Choudhary and Naresh Kumar for the Appellants.

V.N. Raghupathy for the Respondent.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

P.P. NAOLEKAR, J. The accused appellants Sahebrao (A-1) and
Bhausaheb (A-2) were tried along with their mother Shanti Bai (A-3) for
committing offences under Sections 304-B and 493-A of the Indian Penal
Code (!PC). The judgment dated 06-06-1992 by the Additional Sessions Judge, C
. Aurangabad found A-1 and A-2 guilty under Sections 306 and 498-A, !PC and
sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine of
Rs. 500/- each, in default, rigorous imprisonment for three months under
Section 306 IPC. No separate sentence was passed under Section 498-A, IPC.
A-3 was acquitted. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Court, the
accused appellants filed an appeal before Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay D
High Court. The High Court by its order dated 31-01-2005 dismissed the
appeal and confirmed the sentence passed by the trial Court. That is how the
appellants are before us in this appeal.

The relevant facts deduced from the evidence are that the marriage of E
accused-appellant A-2, resident of Village Babulkheda, and deceased-Sangita,
daughter of the complainant-Ramrao Laxman Darekar (PW-1), took place on
13-05-1990 at Village Pathri. The distance between Village Pathri and Babulkheda
was 15 Kms. Just after the marriage, A-2 insisted for a tape recorder. PW-I
persuaded that the tape recorder would be given to him in due course of time.
Three days after the marriage, the elder son of PW-I, Sudam (PW-3) along F
with his maternal uncle, Karbhari Vithal Jadavh (PW-4) went to village
Babulkheda to take the deceased back to Village Pathri. On return, PW-3 told
his father PW- I that elder brother of A-2, accused - appellant Sahebrao - (A-
l) was demanding additional dowry amount of Rs. 10,000/- as the dowry paid
at the time of marriage was not as per their status and A-2 was insisting for G
a tape recorder. The deceased stayed with her father for 5-6 days and thereafter,
Ambadas-brother of A-2, took her to Village Babulkheda. Ambadas on return
told PW-I that A-I was demanding Rs.10,000/- and A-2 was insisting for a
tape recorder. About 2-3 days later, PW-I went to his daughter's matrimonial
home. She told him that A-I and A-2 were troubling her for an amount of
Rs. I 0,000/- and a tape recorder. PW- I though expressed his inability to pay H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A the amount, sent PW-3 to Aurangabad for purchasing the tape recorder. After
5-6 days, PW-3 and PW-4 went to the matrimonial home ofSangita, gave the
tape recorder to the accused persons and took her to her parent's place at
Village Pathari. After a week, Mansub-younger brother of A-2, came to the
house of PW-I to take her back to Village Babulkheda and informed him that
A- I had demanded an amount of Rs. 10,000/- and the deceased would not
B accompany him unless the amount is given. He also informed PW- I that A-
I would get angry if the amount was not paid. PW-I somehow managed to
send the deceased to her matrimonial home along with Mansub. In the month
of 'Jaistha', when PW- I went to see his daughter, accused persons started
questioning him as to why he had not paid the amount and asked him to take
C his daughter back. The deceased was taken back by PW-I and she stayed
at her maiden home for a month. Mansub, once again, came to take her back
to the matrimonial home. This time also, Mansub, demanded the additional
dowry of Rs. 10,000/-. In September 1990 the deceased came back to her
father's place and on reaching there she started weeping loudly and told PW-
1 and her mother that she was beaten by the accused persons and pointed
D out the marks of beating on her back and requested PW-I not to send her
back to Village Babulkheda. However, in the hope that situation would improve,
PW-I left his reluctant daughter to the matrimonial home on 06-09-1990. That
time also A-2 told him that since the amount was not given PW- I should take
back his daughter. While returning back to his village on 07-09-1990, the
E deceased daughter met him on the way and told him that it would be very
difficult for her to stay and also that he might not see her again.

On 08-09-1990, the cousin brother of A-2 informed PW- I that his
daughter was ill. PW- I along with others, went to the house of the accused
persons at about 1.00 P.M. There he saw his daughter dead and no one from
F the family of her in-laws was present in the house. On receipt of the information
of the incident, the police registered a case of accidental death. The police
made inquiry from PW- I but he told them that his mental condition is not
good and that he would lodge the complaint afterwards. PW- I lodged the
complaint against the accused-appellants on 09-09-1990 at 7.30 P.M., giving
the detailed narration of facts .
G
Dr. Milind Kulkarni, who conducted post-mortem over the dead body
of the deceased, opined that the cause of death was "cardio respiratory failure
due to Endosalphan poisoning".

Learned counsel for the appellants has urged that the delay in filing the
H First Information Report (FIR) is fatal to the case of prosecution. PW- I came
SAHEBRAO v. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA [P.P. NAOLEKAR, J.] 743

to know about the death at about 1.00 P.M. on 08-09-1990, yet the complaint A
was made on 09-09-1990 at 7.30 P.M. It indicates false implication of the
accused-appellants.

The settled principle of law of this Court is that delay in filing FIR by
itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case and discard it. The
delay in lodging the FIR would put the Court on its guard to search if any B
plausible explanation has been offered and if offered whether it is satisfactory.

At this juncture, we would like to quote the following passage from
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gian Chand, (200 I] 6 SCC 71, wherein this
Court observed:
c
"Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula
for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on
the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay has
the effect of putting the court on its guard to search if any plausible
explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it D
is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain
the delay and there is a possibility of embellishment in the prosecution
version on account of such delay, the delay would be fatal to the
prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of
the court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and
discarding the entire prosecution case ...." E
In Ravinder Kumar and Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2001] 7 SCC 690, this Court
observed:

"When there is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case was
delayed the court has to look at the reason why there was such a p
delay. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgment to
get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing
the police of a crime without any lapse of time. This kind of
unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also.
They might not immediately think of going to the police station.
Another possibility is due to lack to adequate transport facilities for G
the informers to reach the police station. The third, which is a quite
common bearing, is that the kith and kin of the deceased might take
some appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquillity of mind
or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police station for the
purpose of furnishing the requisite information. Yet another cause is, H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A the persons who are supposed to give such infonnation themselves
could be so physically impaired that the police had to reach them on
getting some nebulous information about the incident.

We are not providing an exhausting catalogue of instances which
could cause delay in lodging the FIR. Our effort is to try to point out
B that the stale demand made in the criminal courts to treat the FIR
vitiated merely on the ground of delay in its lodgment cannot be
approved as a legal corollary. In any case, where there is delay in
making the FIR the court is to look at the cause for it and if such
causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version no
consequence shall be attached to the mere delay in lodging the FIR.
c [Vide Zahoor v. State of UP., [1991] Supp. I SCC 372; Tara Singh v.
State of Punjab, [ 1991] Supp. I SCC 536 and Jamna v. State of UP.,
[1994] Supp. 1 SCC 185]. In Tara Singh, the Court made the following
observations: (SCC p.541, para 4)

"4. It is well settled that the delay in giving the FIR by itself
D cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case. Knowing the
Indian conditions as they are we cannot expect these villagers to
rush to the police station immediately after the occurrence. Human
nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence
cannot be expected to act mechanically with all the promptitude
E in giving the report to the police. At times being grief-stricken
because of the calamity it may not immediately occur to them that
they should give a report. After all it is but natural in these
circumstances for them to take some time to go to the police
station for giving the report.

f "In Amar Singh v. Ba/winder Singh & Ors., [2003] 2 SCC 518, this Court held
that:

" ... There is no hard and fast rule that any delay in lodging the FIR
would automatically render the prosecution case doubtful. It necessarily
depends upon facts and circumstances of each case whether there
G has been any such delay in lodging the FIR which may cast doubt
about the veracity of the prosecution case and for this a host of
circumstances like the condition of the first infonnant, the nature of
injuries sustained, the number of victims, the efforts made to provide
medical aid to them, the distance of the hospital and the police
station, etc. have to be taken into consideration. There is no
H
SAHEBRAO v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [P.P. NAOLEKAR, J.] 745

A
mathematical formula by which an inference may be drawn either way
merely on account of delay in lodging of the FIR.... "

It has come in evidence that when the father reached Village Babulkheda
at about 1.00 P.M. on 08-09-1990 he found his daughter dead and nobody was
present in the house. When the police came and made inquiries he said that B
he was shocked and was not mentally fit to lodge the complaint and would
do so later on. After finding her newly wedded daughter's dead body in her
matrimonial home where he had left her just before a day of incident, it was
very natural for a father to lose his tranquility of mind. Hence if such grief-
stricken father had told the police that he would give the complaint afterwards,
it was not unnatural or unusual. PW-6, who was posted at Shivoor Police C
Station, had also deposed about the fact that when the father was asked
about the intident he had stated that he would lodge the complaint later on
as he was disturbed. Two courts below have found the explanation given by
the prosecution to be satisfactory and sufficient for a delay in complaint.
D
There does not appear to be any reason to falsely implicate the accused-
appellants into the commission of crime. There is no allegation made in the
·complaint that her daughter was done to death by the appellants. The complaint
contains the narration of facts and harassment during the period of marriage
which took place on 13-05-1990 and death of his daughter which took place
on 08-09-1990, from which an inference can be drawn for the commission of E
the offence by the accused-appellants who were allegedly consistently
pestering for bringing money.

In the circumstances, we do not find that sirnply because the FIR was
lodged with some delay, the allegations in the FIR are unworthy of credence
or that PW-I has falsely implicated the accused appellants in the commission F
of crime.

It is then submitted by Shri Sudhanshu Choudhary, learned counsel for
the appellants that the prosecution witnesses have only made general
allegations against the accused and there are no specification as to what kind G
of ill-treatment or trouble was meted out to the deceased which led her to
commit suicide. It would also be submitted that there can be no question of
cruelty towards the deceased in the period of four months of her married life
as she was in her in-laws place hardly for about two months only, and further,
conviction cannot be based solely on the basis of the evidence of the
H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A interested witnesses.
In Pawan Kumar and Ors. v. State of Haryana, [1998] 3 SCC 309, this
Court observed:

" ... cruelty or harassment need not be physical. Even mental torture
B in a given case would be a case of cruelty and harassment within the
meaning of Sections 304-B and 498-A !PC. Explanation (a) to Section
498-A itself refers to both mental and physical cruelty ..... Again wiiful
conduct means, conduct wilfully done; this may be inferred by direct
or indirect evidence which could be construed to be such ..... A girl
dreams of great days ahead with hope and aspiration when entering
c into a marriage, and if from the very next day the husband starts
taunting her for not bringing dowry and calling her ugly, there cannot
be greater mental torture, harassment or cruelty for bride ..... "

In Gananath Puunaik v. State of Orissa. [2002] 2 SCC 619, this Court
0 specifically mentioned:

"The concept of cruelty and its effect varies from individual to
individual. also depending upon the social and economic status to
which such person belongs. "Cruelty" for the purposes of constituting
the offence under the aforesaid section need not be physical. Even
E mental torture or abnormal behavior may amount to cruelty and
harassment in a given case."

In Mohd. Hoshan and Anr. v. State of A.P.. [2002] 7 SCC 414, it was pointed
out that:

F "... The impact of complaints, accusations or taunts on a person
amounting to cruelty depends on various factors like the sensitivity
of the individual victim concerned, the social background, the
environment, education etc. Further mental cruelty varies from person
to person depending on the intensity of sensitivity and the degree of
courage or endurance to withstand such mental cruelty ..... .
G
The complainant (PW-I) has deposed that soon after the perfonnance
of marriage, A-2 demanded a tape recorder. This statement is corroborated by
PW-3 and PW-4. PW-3 has deposed that when PW-4 along with him went to
Village Babulkheda 2-3 days after marriage of his sister, A-I demanded an
additional amount of Rs.10,000/- and A-2 demanded a tape-recorder. This
G found support from the statements of PW-I and PW-4 without any variation.
SAHEBRAO v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [P.P. NAOLEKAR, J .] 747
Further PW- I in his evidence has specifically said that deceased had told him A
that the accused persons on account of the non-fulfillment of their demands,
troubled her. There is evidence on record of PW-I that when his daughter
came back to his place she started weeping and told the complainant about
the harassment inflicted upon her on account of non-payment of Rs. I 0,000/
- This found support in the statements of PW-3 and PW-4. The evidence B
shows that even the demand was made through the younger brother Mansub
when he went to the place of the complainant. PW- I has further mentioned
that in the end of jaishth month, he went to village Babulkheda to see his
daughter and was insulted by the accused persons for not fulfilling their
demand and they asked him to take her back to village Pathri. It is said by
PW- I that just 8 days before the incident when the deceased last visited her C
maiden home she told him that she was beaten and also showed marks of
beating on her body. She was weeping and requested him not to send her
back to village Babulkheda without satisfying the demand of the accused
persons. The evidence clearly establishes that the accused persons were
consistent in their demand regarding additional amount of Rs. I 0,000/- even
after their initial demand of tape recorder was fulfilled. The evidence clearly D
establishes that the deceased was harassed at her matrimonial home and her
staying there had become miserable. The deceased on several occasions,
within a short span of four months of her marriage, informed her father that
she was being troubled by her husband and his elder brother. They also
insulted and taunted her father in her presence and asked PW-I to take her E
back to his home for his inability to fulfill their unlawful demand. The reluctance
shown by the deceased to go to her matrimonial home within a short period
of her marriage is indicative of the fact of the treatment given to her. At her
matrimonial home, she was harassed and constantly nagged for non-payment
of additional amount by her father. The facts clearly establish that husband
and his elder brother subjected the deceased to cruelty and their conviction F
under Section 498-A, !PC is based on cogent and reliable evidence.

The appellants were also convicted under Section 306 IPC with the aid
of the presumption as to the abetment of suicide by a married woman under
Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It is proved by the prosecution G
that Sangita committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date
of her marriage and that her husband and his elder brother subjected her to
cruelty. On the basis of the evidence, it can be said that the cruel treatment
meted out to the deceased was of such a nature that it has driven the lady
to commit suicide.
H
•
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A In Ramesh Kumarv. State of Chhattisgarh [200 I] 9 SCC 618 (para 22),
this Court held as under:

"Sections 498-A and 306 !PC are independent and constitute
different offences. Though, depending on the facts and circumstances
of an individual case, subjecting a woman to cruelty may amount to
B an offence under Section 498-A and may also, if a course of conduct
amounting to cruelty is established leaving no other option for the
woman except to commit suicide, amount to abetment to commit
suicide .... "

Similarly, in Hans Raj v. State of Haryana, (2004] 12 SCC 257 (in para 13), this
C Court opined that :
" ... Under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, the prosecution
has first to establish that the woman concerned co:nmitted suicide
within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that
her husband (in this case) had subjected her to cruelty. Even if these
D facts are established the court is not bound to presume that the
suicide had been abetted by her husband. Section 113-A gives
discretion to the court to raise such a presumption, having regard to
all the other circumstances of the case, which means that where the
allegation is of cruelty it must consider the nature of cruelty to which
E the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of the word
"cruelty" in Section 498-A IPC. The mere fact that a woman committed
suicide within seven years of her marriage and that she had been
subjected to cruelty by her husband, does not automatically give rise
to the presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband.
The court is required to look into all the other circumstances of the
F case. One of the circumstances which has to be considered by the
court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such nature as \'/as likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or
danger to life, limb or health of the woman ...... "

G Neither any evidence was led by the defence nor from the evidence
placed on record by the prosecution, we can draw a plausible, reasonable and
trustworthy explanation to rebut the presumption under Section 113-A of the
Evidence Act. The prosecution has sufficiently proved by cogent evidence
that the accused-appellants by series of acts and conduct created such a
difficult and hostile environment for the deceased that she was compelled to
H commit suicide. In the light of the discussion in regard to the cruelty committed
SAHEBRAOv. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [P.P. NAOLEKAR, J.] 749

by the accused persons to the deceased under Section 498-A, IPC, there is A
a direct and reasonable nexus with the commission of suicide by the deceased
with the act of cruelty to which the deceased was subjected to by the
accused-appellants.

For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the High Court has
rightly upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants under Section 306 B
and Section 498-A, IPC and we do not find any good or sufficient reason to
take a different view of the matter. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

v.s.s. Appeal dismissed.