Holding

Executive instructions fixing a minimum interview cut‑off cannot override the statutory Manipur Judicial Service Rules, and the petitioner’s legitimate expectation was frustrated, warranting his declaration as successful.

Summary

The petitioner, a Scheduled Caste candidate, applied for the post of District Judge under the Manipur Judicial Service Rules, 2005 and cleared the written examination with the required 50% marks. Before the viva‑voce interview, the Full Court of the Manipur High Court issued a resolution fixing a 40% cut‑off for the interview, a requirement that was not part of the unamended Rules and was not communicated to the petitioner. The petitioner scored 18.8 out of 50 in the interview, falling short of the imposed cut‑off, and was declared unsuccessful. The Supreme Court examined whether such executive instructions could override statutory rules and whether the petitioner’s legitimate expectation of selection based on aggregate marks was frustrated. Relying on the unamended Rules, prior case law and the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the Court held that the resolution could not supersede the statutory scheme and that the petitioner was entitled to be declared successful. Accordingly, the Court ordered his appointment with notional seniority and disposed of the petition.

Issues considered

Can executive instructions in the form of a Full Court resolution prescribing minimum interview marks override statutory rules made under Article 234/309?
Does the High Court's decision frustrate the petitioner’s substantive legitimate expectation?
Whether the imposition of a cut‑off for viva‑voce without prior notice violates principles of procedural fairness and Article 14.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 234, s. Article 309
Manipur Judicial Service Rules, 2005

Subjects

Judicial ServiceMinimum marks for interviewExecutive instructionFull Court ResolutionOverriding statutory rulesLegitimate expectationViva voce examination

Judgment

[2024] 8 S.C.R. 885 : 2024 INSC 647

Salam Samarjeet Singh
v.
The High Court of Manipur at Imphal & Anr
(Writ Petition (Civil) No.294/2015)
22 August 2024
[Hrishikesh Roy, Sudhanshu Dhulia and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Can the executive instructions in form of a resolution of the Full Court
(High Court) by prescribing minimum marks for interview, override
statutory rules made under Article 234/309; whether the High Court’s
decision frustrates the legitimate expectation of the petitioner.

Headnotes†
Judicial Service – Manipur Judicial Service Rules, 2005 – Just
before the interview test, the Full Court of the High Court on
12.01.2015 decided to fix 40% as the cut-off for the viva-voce
examination and the petitioner’s case is that this decision was
never intimated to him – The petitioner who had secured 18.8
marks out of the total 50 marks in the interview segment, was
held to be unsuccessful for not having the secured minimum
prescribed benchmark of 40% – Correctness:
Held: The unamended Schedule ‘B’ of MJS Rules 2005 prescribes
the mode of evaluating and grading the performance in the written
and viva-voce examination – Those who secured below 40% are
classified in the ‘F’ category with zero grade value – However, Sub
clause (iv) clearly indicates that the final selection list will be readied
by combining the cumulative grade value obtained in the written
examination and viva-voce examination – The MJS Rules 2005
came to be amended on 09.03.2016, after conclusion of the present
recruitment process whereby, 40% minimum qualifying marks in the
viva-voce segment were prescribed – This would also indicate that
the Rules as unamended, did not have the requirement of minimum
40% in the viva-voce segment and such qualifying marks came to
be incorporated only vide Resolution adopted by the Full Court on
12.01.2015 – If the evaluation and selection of the petitioner would
have been carried out on the basis of the unamended Rules, the
petitioner having cumulatively secured 50.65% by combining both
the written and the interview segment – The petitioner cannot be
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placed in the category of failed candidates – In application of the
MJS Rules 2005, it is quite certain that there was no cut-off marks or
pass marks prescribed for the viva-voce examination in the present
process when the recruitment advertisement was published – The
subsequent amendment to the Rules with effect from 09.03.2016,
cannot be applied to the present recruitment process where the
petitioner participated – Moreover, the unamended Rules explicitly
provided that the cut-off in the written test for SC/ST Candidates
would be 50% – Even though prescribing minimum marks for
interview may not be manifestly arbitrary, the present case is on the
failure to make the selection, in accordance with the unamended
MJS Rules, based on aggregate marks secured by the petitioner
in the written examination and the viva-voce test – It is essential
to note that while the intention for introducing a minimum cut-off
through the High Court Resolution may be bona fide, in the present
case, it is not grounded in legality as it cannot override the statutory
rules – The minimum marks for interview was prescribed through
a High Court Resolution without amending the rules – Therefore,
the executive instructions cannot override statutory Rules where
the method of final selection by combining the cumulative grade
value obtained in the written and the viva voce examinations is
specified categorically – In the present case, no notice was given
to the petitioner regarding the imposition of minimum 40% marks
for interview – Prescribing minimum marks for viva voce segment
may be justified for the holistic assessment of a candidate, but in
the present case such a requirement was introduced only after
commencement of the recruitment process and in violation of the
statutory rules – The decision of the Full Court to depart from the
expected exercise of preparing the merit list as per the unamended
Rules is clearly violative of the substantive legitimate expectation of
the petitioners – It also fails the tests of fairness, consistency, and
predictability and hence is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. [Paras 14, 15, 16, 18, 25, 26, 31]

Case Law Cited
Sivanandan C.T. & Ors v. High Court of Kerala & Ors [2017] 13
SCR 226 – followed.
Dr.(Major) Meeta Sahai v. Union of India [2019] 15 SCR 273 –
relied on.
Kavita Kamboj v. High Court of P&H [2024] 2 SCR 1136 –
distinguished.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 887

Salam Samarjeet Singh v.
The High Court of Manipur at Imphal & Anr

Abhimeet Sinha v. High Court of Patna [2024] 6 SCR 530; All India
Judges Assn. v Union of India [2002] 2 SCR 712 – referred to.

List of Acts
Manipur Judicial Service Rules, 2005; Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Judicial Service; Minimum marks for interview; Executive instruction
in form of Full Court Resolution; Overriding statutory rules;
Legitimate expectation; Viva voce examination.

Case Arising From
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No. 294 of 2015
(Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)
Appearances for Parties
Rana Mukherjee, Ahanthem Romen Singh, Ms. Oindriala Sen, Mohan
Singh, Aniket Rajput, Ms. Khoisnam Nirmala Devi, Rajiv Mehta,
Advs. for the Petitioner.
Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Adv., Maibam Nabaghanashyam Singh, Ms. Kavya
Jhawar, Ms. Nandini Rai, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
1. Heard Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the petitioner. The respondents – High Court of Manipur and the
Registrar General are represented by Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned
Senior Counsel.
2. While deciding this writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India, there was a difference of opinion and having regard to
the conflicting judgments rendered by the two learned Judges on
7.10.2016, the matter was directed to be placed before a three-
judge Bench. Thereafter, when a similar question of law was found
pending before the Constitution Bench i.e., in Tej Prakash Pathak and
Others vs. Rajasthan High Court and Others1 (for short “Tej Prakash

1 Tej Prakash Pathak And Ors. v. Rajasthan High Court And Ors. C.A. No. 2634/2013 & batch
888 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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Pathak”), this case was tagged with the said case. On 12.07.2023,
however submission was made before the Constitution Bench by
the learned counsel for the parties that reference to the Constitution
Bench along the lines in Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) is unnecessary
and therefore the difference of opinion between the two Judges in
the present case should be resolved by a three-Judge Bench.
3. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the parties, this case
can be segregated and the Court should, inter alia, consider the
following aspects :-
“I. Can executive instructions in the form of a resolution
of the Full Court override statutory rules made under
Article 234/309?
II. Can the criteria of cut-off marks be introduced by
a Full-Court Resolution without amending the rules
after the written test is over without informing the
candidate?
III. Whether such a course of action amounts to
procedural fairness/unfairness?”
4. Thereafter, an order was passed by the Constitution Bench on
12.07.2023 to place the present matter for hearing before a three-
Judge Bench and that is how we are posted with this case.
RELEVANT FACTS
5. The petitioner, who was an aspirant for the post of District Judge
(Entry Level) in the Manipur Judicial Service Grade-I, responded
to the advertisement dated 15.05.2013. The petitioner belonged
to the Scheduled Caste category and he appeared in the written
examination conducted in July 2013 for all the applicants. The High
Court of Manipur then issued a Notification on 17.10.2013 declaring
that none of the candidates had secured the minimum qualifying
marks in the written examination. A grievance was then raised by
the petitioner and eventually a corrigendum came to be issued on
07.02.2014 declaring the petitioner to have been successful in the
written examination having scored 52.8% marks which satisfied the
required benchmark of 50% for the Scheduled Caste category.
6. Just before the interview test, the Full Court of the Manipur High
Court on 12.01.2015 decided to fix 40% as the cut-off for the viva-
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 889

Salam Samarjeet Singh v.
The High Court of Manipur at Imphal & Anr

voce examination and the petitioner’s case is that this decision was
never intimated to him. The Full Court Resolution reflected that the
40% minimum qualifying marks for passing the interview was fixed
by resorting to sub-Rule (3) of Schedule ‘B’ of the Manipur Judicial
Service Rules, 2005 (for short “MJS Rules,2005”), which reads as
under:-
“All necessary steps not provided for in these rules for
recruitment under these rules shall be decided by the
recruiting authority.”
7. The petitioner who had secured 18.8 marks out of the total 50 marks
in the interview segment, was held to be unsuccessful for not having
the secured minimum prescribed benchmark of 40%. At this stage, it
may be noted that the total marks allocated for the written examination
for the three papers were 300 and for the interview segment, a total
of 50 marks were prescribed. In his written examination, the petitioner
had secured 158.50 marks and 18.8 marks in the interview, his total
aggregate score in the written examination plus viva-voce was 177.3
marks, out of the total possible 350 marks. Thus, the percentage of
marks scored by the petitioner cumulatively stands at 50.6 percent.
It is also pertinent to note that the Manipur High Court subsequently
on 9.3.2016 amended Schedule-B, Sub-rule(3) to prescribe 40%
minimum cut-off for the viva voce.
8. In the split judgment, Justice Banumathi upheld the rejection of the
petitioner for failing to secure minimum 40% in the viva voce. It was
observed that the fixation of 40% minimum cut off for viva voce is
in consonance with the MJS Rules, 2005 as per Clause 1(3) of the
General Instructions provided in Schedule-B. Under the Mode of
Evaluation table, securing less than 40% marks has been graded as
‘F’, which carries a grade value of ‘0’. In Justice Banumathi’s opinion,
it was therefore implicit that for a ‘pass’ in exam, a minimum of 40%
marks must be obtained. It was also noted that after participating in
the viva voce, the petitioner cannot turn around and challenge the
selection process.
9. On the other hand, Justice Shiva Kirti Singh, held that the rejection in
viva voce test is wrongful as it violated the statutory mandate which
provided for selection based on the cumulative grade value obtained
in the written exam and viva voce. It was noted that Grade ‘F’ for
marks below 40% as provided in the evaluation table, corresponds
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to securing ‘0’ marks and nothing beyond that. Grade ‘F’ is not an
indicator of failure in the examination.
ARGUMENTS
10. Before this Court, Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel for
the writ petitioner would argue that when no minimum marks were
prescribed in the viva-voce segment at the time when the recruitment
commenced through the advertisement dated 15.05.2013, the Full
Court could not have fixed minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce
since the unamended MJS Rules, 2005 never envisaged minimum
marks in the viva-voce segment. According to the counsel, this is
a case of midway change of rules of the game and therefore it is
argued that the opinion expressed by Justice Shiva Kirti Singh should
be accepted by this larger Bench. It was contended that the present
case is covered by the decision of the five-judge Constitution Bench
of this Court in Sivanandan C.T. & Ors vs High Court of Kerala &
Ors2 (for short “Sivanandan CT”).
11.1 On the other hand, Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel
would refer to the General Instructions contained in Schedule ‘B’
to the MJS Rules, 2005 to say that the petitioner was required to
obtain 50% marks in the written examination to be eligible for the
viva-voce segment which he did. The counsel however contends
that those scoring below 40% in the interview, as per the mode of
evaluation, should be considered in the ‘Fail’ category and here since
the petitioner had secured less than 40% in the viva-voce segment,
he was rightly held to be unsuccessful.
11.2 According to the counsel, the decision in Sivanandan C.T.(supra),
can have no application in the present facts as in that case, the
Rules were amended after the interview was over but in the present
case, the requirement of minimum 40% in the interview segment
was decided before the interview commenced.
11.3 Mr. Hansaria also drew our attention to the subsequent decisions of
this Court in Kavita Kamboj v. High Court of P&H3 (for short “Kavita
Khamboj”) and Abhimeet Sinha v High Court of Patna4(for short

2 [2017] 13 SCR 226 : (2023) SCC OnLine SC 994
3 [2024] 2 SCR 1136 : (2024) 7 SCC 103
4 [2024] 6 SCR 530 : (2024) 7 SCC 262
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 891

Salam Samarjeet Singh v.
The High Court of Manipur at Imphal & Anr

“Abhimeet Sinha”) to buttress his submission that the minimum
marks for interview can be prescribed by the High Court and is not
violative of the recommendations of the Shetty Commission and the
decision of this Court in All India Judges Assn. v Union of India5 (for
short “All India Judges(2002))”.
12. Going by the above submissions, the following issues arise for our
consideration:
A. Can the executive instructions in form of a resolution of the
Full Court by prescribing minimum marks for interview, override
statutory rules made under Article 234/309?
B. Whether the High Court’s decision frustrates the legitimate
expectation of the petitioner?
Issue A
13. To answer the issue, a reference to the unamended Schedule ‘B’ of
MJS Rules 2005 is necessary:
“Schedule B to the MJS Rules of 2005
Clause 1:
Competitive Examination/Limited Departmental Examination
(i) Written examination of 3 papers for 100 marks each
(ii) Interview : Viva-voce of 50 marks
Clause 3:
General Instructions:
(i) All candidates who obtained 60% or more marks or
corresponding grade in the written examination shall
be eligible for viva-voce examination, provided that
SC/ST candidates who obtained 50% or more marks
or corresponding grade in the written examination
shall be eligible for viva-voce examination.
(ii) Selection of candidate shall be made on the basis of
cumulative grade value obtained in the written and
viva-voce examination.

5 [2002] 2 SCR 712 : (2002) 4 SCC 247
892 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

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(iii) All necessary steps not provided for in these rules
for recruitment under these rules shall be decided
by the recruiting authority.
(iv) Mode of evaluating the performance of Grading in
the written and viva-voce examination shall as below:

Percentage of Grade Grade Value
marks
70% & above O 7
65% to 69% A+ 6
60% to 64% A 5
55% to 59% B+ 4
50% to 54% B 3
45% to 49% C+ 2
40% to 44% C 1
Below 40% F 0
Numerical marks obtained for each question in written
examination are to be graded as per the above chart and
thereafter all the grade values are to be added up and
divided by total number of questions, thereby arriving at
a Cumulative Grade value Average (CGVA), which inturn
is to be again graded as per the above chart.
(v) The same vigorous and objective grade value exercise
is also recommended for the viva-voce examination
as well.
(vi) Final selection list will be readied by combining
the cumulative grade value obtained in the written
examination and viva-voce examination.”
14. The unamended Schedule ‘B’ of MJS Rules 2005 prescribes the mode
of evaluating and grading the performance in the written and viva-voce
examination. Those who secured below 40% are classified in the
‘F’ category with zero grade value. However, Sub clause (iv) clearly
indicates that the “final selection list will be readied by combining
the cumulative grade value obtained in the written examination and
viva-voce examination.”
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 893

Salam Samarjeet Singh v.
The High Court of Manipur at Imphal & Anr

15. Interestingly, the MJS Rules 2005 came to be amended on 09.03.2016,
after conclusion of the present recruitment process whereby, 40%
minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce segment were prescribed.
This would also indicate that the Rules as unamended, did not have
the requirement of minimum 40% in the viva-voce segment and
such qualifying marks came to be incorporated only vide Resolution
adopted by the Full Court on 12.01.2015.
16. If the evaluation and selection of the petitioner would have been
carried out on the basis of the unamended Rules, the petitioner
having cumulatively secured 50.65% by combining both the written
and the interview segment and would have been awarded ‘B’ Grade
as per the mode of evaluation prescribed under sub-Clause (iv)
of Clause 3 under Schedule ‘B’ of the MJS Rules 2005. With ‘B’
Grade, the petitioner cannot logically be placed in the category of
failed candidates.
17. As was noticed earlier, the relevant advertisement for filling up the
vacancy in the entry-level post of District Judge was initiated through
the advertisement published on 15.05.2013 which reflected that the
recruitment shall be governed by the MJS Rules 2005. The duly
filled application was presented by the petitioner and he secured the
minimum benchmark of 50% marks as a Scheduled Caste category
candidate, in the written examination. If the unamended Rules
were to be made the basis for evaluation of the performance, the
petitioner with his 18.8 marks in the interview out of the maximum
permissible 50 marks would have qualified, as his cumulative score
(written 158.50 and viva 18.8) would have been 177.3 out of total
350 marks. His percentage in aggregate will then be 50.6% and this
would have ensured his success as per the unamended MJS Rules.
18. In application of the MJS Rules 2005, we are quite certain that there
was no cut-off marks or pass marks prescribed for the viva-voce
examination in the present process when the recruitment advertisement
was published. The subsequent amendment to the Rules with effect
from 09.03.2016, cannot be applied to the present recruitment
process where the petitioner participated. Moreover, the unamended
Rules explicitly provided that the cut-off in the written test for SC/ST
Candidates would be 50% and the final list would be calculated by
combining the cumulative grade value in both written and viva voce.
19. During the course of arguments, Mr. Hansaria, Learned Senior
Counsel for the High Court relied on the decisions of this Court in
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Kavita Khamboj(supra) and Abhimeet Sinha(supra) to emphasize
the importance of interview for selection in the higher judiciary. In
this regard, we must observe that it is well-settled that prescribing
minimum marks for interview is not violative of the Shetty Commission
report and the judgment of this Court in All India Judges(2002)
(supra). This Court in a recent judgment in Abhimeet Sinha(supra)
examined the following aspects:-
“34.1. ((i) Whether the prescription of minimum marks for
viva voce is in contravention of the law laid down by this
Court in All India Judges (2002) [All India Judges Assn.
(3) v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 : 2002 SCC (L&S)
508] which accepted certain recommendations of the
Shetty Commission?
34.2. (ii) Whether the prescription of minimum marks
for viva voce is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India?”
20. It was opined in the above judgment that the prescription of minimum
marks for the viva voce is not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. Discussing the recommendations of Shetty Commission
and the precedents of this Court, it was held that All India Judges
(2002) is sub-silentio on the aspect of minimum marks for interview
and cannot be said to have authoritatively pronounced on doing
away with minimum marks for interview.
21. However, in our view, even though prescribing minimum marks for
interview may not be manifestly arbitrary, the present case is on the
failure to make the selection, in accordance with the unamended
MJS Rules, based on aggregate marks secured by the petitioner
in the written examination and the viva-voce test. This aspect was
also discussed in Abhimeet Sinha (supra):
“68. The implications of the split judgment in Salam
Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur [Salam
Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur, (2016) 10 SCC
484 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 147] will next bear consideration.
Banumathi, J. in her judgment noticed that All India Judges
(2002) [All India Judges Assn. (3) v. Union of India, (2002)
4 SCC 247 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 508] is sub silentio on the
aspect of minimum cut-off marks for the viva voce test.
In his dissenting judgment, Shiva Kirti Singh, J. had not
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 895

Salam Samarjeet Singh v.
The High Court of Manipur at Imphal & Anr

expressed any disagreement on the said sub silentio
observation but left it open for determination in a future
case. There again, the dissent of Singh, J. was based on
the fact that minimum cut-off was not prescribed in the
recruitment rules and were brought in midway through the
recruitment process, just prior to the stage of interview,
by resolution of the Court. Here however the prescription
of minimum cut-off in the recruitment process was
notified for information of the candidates well before the
commencement of the selection process under the Patna
High Court and also under the Gujarat High Court and
this distinguishing feature will have to be borne in mind.”
22. The judgment in Abhimeet Sinha (supra) reiterated the following
position in case of inconsistency between the recommendations of
Shetty Commission and the rules framed by the High Court as per
the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India:
“(i) In case of inconsistency between the recommendations
and the Rules, primacy should be given to the existing
statutory rules.
(ii) In the absence of existing Rules, the High Court
should follow the directions of this Court.
60. For the sake of completeness, we may however clarify
that even though the statutory rules can be supplemented
to fill in gaps as held in Kavita Kamboj v. High Court of
P&H [Kavita Kamboj v. High Court of P&H, (2024) 7 SCC
103] , the High Court cannot act contrary to the Rules
[Sivanandan C.T. v. High Court of Kerala, (2024) 3 SCC
799 : (2024) 1 SCC (L&S) 67].”
[emphasis supplied]
23. Applying the above legal proposition, it is seen that in this matter,
the mode of evaluation was provided for in the Rules. This is not a
case where the Rules were silent. Mr. Hansaria, placed considerable
reliance on the decision of this Court in Kavita Khamboj(supra),
where a three-judge bench of this Court while upholding the
prescription of minimum 50% marks in interview for promotion as
District Judges, observed that the rules can be supplemented to
fill in the gaps. However, it particularly distinguishes the instances
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where the Rules specifically provide for the mode of evaluation. In
this regard, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court speaking through
DY Chandrachud CJI, itself notes that the matter would have been
entirely different if the Rules specifically provided that the final merit
list would be on the basis of aggregate marks:
“52. Moreover, the Rules in the present case are entirely
silent in regard to the prescription of a minimum eligibility for
clearing a competitive test, on the one hand, and the viva
voce, on the other hand. If the Rules were to specifically
provide in a given case that the criterion for eligibility would
be on the combined marks of both the written test and the
viva voce, the matter would have been entirely different.
[P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC
141, para 44 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214] Rule 6(1)(a) and Rule
8 being silent as regards the manner in which merit and
suitability would be determined, administrative instructions
can supplement the Rules in that regard. This is not a
case where the Rules have made a specific provision
in which event the administrative instructions cannot
transgress a rule which is being made in pursuance of the
power conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution. For
instance, if the Rules were to provide that there would be
a minimum eligibility requirement only in the written test,
conceivably, it may not be open to prescribe a minimum
eligibility requirement in the viva voce by an administrative
instruction. Similarly, if the Rules were to provide that
the eligibility cut-off would be taken on the basis of the
overall marks which are obtained in both the written test
and the viva voce, conceivably, it would not be open
to the administrative instructions to modify the terms.”
[emphasis supplied]
24. In the present case, the Resolution (12.1.2015) prescribing qualifying
marks for viva voce is not a case of supplementing the rules but
appears to us as a case where the Rules pertaining to the final
selection of candidates, have been substituted. Therefore, the decision
in Kavita Khamboj(supra) is clearly distinguishable.
25. On the other hand, the decision in Sivanandan C.T. (supra), is
squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case, the
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 897

Salam Samarjeet Singh v.
The High Court of Manipur at Imphal & Anr

Court held that the Kerala High Court erred in fixing the minimum
cut-off contrary to Rule 2(c)(iii) of Kerala State Higher Judicial
Service Special Rules,1961 which provided that the aggregate of
the written test and the viva voce would be taken into consideration
for appointment. There also, the Rules were subsequently amended
in 2017 to prescribe minimum cut-off of 35% in the viva voce. It is
essential to note that while the intention for introducing a minimum
cut-off through the High Court Resolution may be bona fide, in the
present case, it is not grounded in legality as it cannot override the
statutory rules. The minimum marks for interview was prescribed
through a High Court Resolution without amending the rules.
26. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the executive instructions
cannot override statutory Rules where the method of final selection
by combining the cumulative grade value obtained in the written
and the viva voce examinations is specified categorically. Issue A
is answered accordingly.
Issue B
27. The second issue that falls for our consideration is whether the High
Court’s decision frustrates the substantive legitimate expectation
of the petitioner. In Sivanandan CT (supra), a constitution bench
of five judges of this Court speaking through Chandrachud DYC J.
succinctly explained the principle as under:
“40. The principle of fairness in action requires that public
authorities be held accountable for their representations,
since the State has a profound impact on the lives of
citizens. Good administration requires public authorities
to act in a predicable manner and honour the promises
made or practices established unless there is a good
reason not to do so. In Nadarajah [R. (Nadarajah) v.
Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., 2005 EWCA Civ
1363] , Laws, L.J. held that the public authority should
objectively justify that there is an overriding public interest
in denying a legitimate expectation. We are of the opinion
that for a public authority to frustrate a claim of legitimate
expectation, it must objectively demonstrate by placing
relevant material before the court that its decision was
in the public interest. This standard is consistent with the
principles of good administration which require that State
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actions must be held to scrupulous standards to prevent
misuse of public power and ensure fairness to citizens.
“45. The underlying basis for the application of the doctrine
of legitimate expectation has expanded and evolved to
include the principles of good administration. Since citizens
repose their trust in the State, the actions and policies of
the State give rise to legitimate expectations that the State
will adhere to its assurance or past practice by acting in
a consistent, transparent, and predictable manner. The
principles of good administration require that the decisions
of public authorities must withstand the test of consistency,
transparency, and predictability to avoid being regarded
as arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14.”
28. The Court therein observed that an individual who claims a benefit
or entitlement based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation has
to establish : (i) the legitimacy of the expectation; and (ii) that the
denial of the legitimate expectation led to a violation of Article 14.
29. Let us now apply the above principle to the present case. The
unamended MJS Rules, 2005 generated a legitimate expectation
in the candidate that the merit list would be drawn based on the
aggregate of the total marks secured both in the written examination
and the viva voce examination. Moreover, the petitioner had no
notice about the minimum cut-off for the viva-voce segment which
was introduced just on the eve of the viva-voce test, well after the
conclusion of written examination. If the candidate had been informed
in advance, he could have prepared accordingly, ensuring a fair and
predictable process.
30. The petitioner in this case, is on a similar footing as the petitioners
in Sivandandan CT (supra) where it was noted as under:
“13. In the above backdrop, it is evident that when the
process of selection commenced, all the candidates were
put on a notice of the fact that : (i) the merit list would be
drawn up on the basis of the aggregate marks obtained
in the written examination and viva voce; (ii) candidates
whose marks were at least at the prescribed minimum in
the written examination would qualify for the viva voce;
and (iii) there was no cut-off applicable in respect of the
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 899

Salam Samarjeet Singh v.
The High Court of Manipur at Imphal & Anr

marks to be obtained in the viva voce while drawing up
the merit list in the aggregate.”
31. In the present case, no notice was given to the petitioner regarding
the imposition of minimum 40% marks for interview. Prescribing
minimum marks for viva voce segment may be justified for the
holistic assessment of a candidate, but in the present case such
a requirement was introduced only after commencement of the
recruitment process and in violation of the statutory rules. The decision
of the Full Court to depart from the expected exercise of preparing
the merit list as per the unamended Rules is clearly violative of the
substantive legitimate expectation of the petitioners. It also fails the
tests of fairness, consistency, and predictability and hence is violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
32. Before we conclude, we may also advert to the contention that after
participating in the recruitment process, the unsuccessful candidates
cannot turn around and challenge the recruitment process.6 We are
of the view that it is equally well-settled that the principle of estoppel
cannot override the law.7 Such legal principle was reiterated by the
Supreme Court in Dr.(Major) Meeta Sahai Vs. Union of India8 where
it was observed as under:
“17. However, we must differentiate from this principle
insofar as the candidate by agreeing to participate in the
selection process only accepts the prescribed procedure
and not the illegality in it. In a situation where a candidate
alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating
consequences arising therefrom, the same cannot be
condoned merely because a candidate has partaken in it.
The constitutional scheme is sacrosanct and its violation
in any manner is impermissible. In fact, a candidate
may not have locus to assail the incurable illegality or
derogation of the provisions of the Constitution, unless
he/she participates in the selection process.”

6 Madan Lal v. State of J&K (1995) 3 SCC 486; Dhananjay Malik v. State of Uttaranchal (2008) 4 SCC 171;
Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi (2013) 11 SCC 309 ; Anupal Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh (2020)
2 SCC 173
7 Krishna Rai v Banaras Hindu University (2022) 8 SCC 713
8 [2019] 15 SCR 273 : (2019) 20 SCC 17
900 [2024] 8 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

33. In light of the above discussion, the opinion of Justice Shiva Kirti
Singh is upheld. This Court is not in agreement with the opinion
rendered by Justice Banumathi.
34. The petitioner, is therefore, entitled to be declared successful in the
recruitment test. It is also noteworthy that despite getting more than
50% marks in the written exam, he was only called for the interview
round after he filed a Right to Information (RTI) Application to know
his marks. A corrigendum was later issued by the High Court in this
regard.
35. It would be unjustified to deny the sole SC candidate, who successfully
qualified both the written exam and the interview, in accordance with
the then existing rules.
36. Following the above conclusion and to avoid disturbing the seniority
of those who are already serving in the same cadre vis-à-vis the
petitioner who is found entitled to recruitment, the following order
is passed:
I. The High Court should declare the petitioner to be successful by
virtue of his scoring 50.6% in aggregate marks in the recruitment
tests. He be issued appointment order. However, the appointed
petitioner will be entitled to seniority only from the date of his
appointment. The petitioner shall not be entitled to any actual
monetary benefits for any period prior to his appointment.
II. The appointee should be given notional seniority from the
year 2015 when the interview was conducted. It is however
made clear that this notional seniority is only for the purpose
of superannuation benefits.
III. The above directions be implemented within four weeks from
today.
37. The matter stands disposed of and answered on the above terms.
Parties to bear their own cost.

Result of the case: Matter disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan