SALEM MUNICIPALITYversusP. KUMAR & ORS.

                       [2018] 13 S.C.R. 1223                             1223


                     SALEM MUNICIPALITY                                  A
                                  v.
                        P. KUMAR & ORS.
                  (Civil Appeal Nos. 9-11 of 2014)
                       NOVEMBER 15, 2018                                 B
         [ARUN MISHRA AND VINEET SARAN, JJ.]
      Land Laws and Agricultural Tenancy:
        Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
Act, 1948: ss. 3, 11, 14-A and 64 – Lands in which ryot is entitled to
ryotwari patta – On facts, various leases granted in favour of           C
predecessor in title of plaintiff by the erstwhile Zamindar – Lease
deed area formed part of Tank Bund Side-Waste dry and Tank Bund-
Upper dry – Lease granted from the month of November to June
next year, to expire before the commencement of rains in July as the
land used to be submerged – Plaintiff ’s case that his predecessor in    D
title, continued in possession of the land when the 1948 Act came
into force – Pursuant thereto, entire village, which included the
plaintiff’s land taken over by the State Government – Applications
filed by predecessor in title as also original plaintiff for grant of
Ryotwari Patta u/s. 11 – Rejection of, on the ground that land was
not ryoti land – Meanwhile, the State Government handed over             E
certain land including the plaintiff ’s land, to the appellant for
construction of new bus stand – Suits for declaration of title and
permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff in respect of their land
against the State Government and the transport corporation as also
the appellant – Suits decreed by the trial court, however set aside
                                                                         F
by the first appellate court – Second appeals, filed there against
allowed by the High Court restoring the order of the trial court –
On appeal, held: It is apparent from the leases that area in the lease
deeds formed part of the tank – As per the definition of ryoti land
in s. 3(16), the area was clearly not a ryoti land as such, the
predecessor in interest or plaintiff could not be said to be ‘ryot’      G
holding ‘ryoti’ land – In the absence of grant of ryotwari patta and
in view of the fact that land formed part of tank reserved for common
use, no right accrued to the plaintiff to claim ryotwari patta as his
predecessor was not ‘ryot’ and the disputed land was not ‘ryoti
Land’ – Furthermore, the vendor of the plaintiff did not hold land
                                                                         H
                              1223
1224            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A     for 12 continuous years – Finding recorded by the High Court as
       to possession is clearly perverse – There is no evidence on record
       in the form of revenue record that the plaintiff ’s vendor was in
       possession on the date of abolition and thereafter plaintiff remained
       in possession at any point of time – Thus, no right, title or interest
       accrued to the vendor of the plaintiff or to the plaintiff to obtain
 B
       any ryotwari patta or for obtaining decree in the suit – Furthermore,
       s. 64 whereby right of the owner, occupier not to be affected by
       temporary dispossession/discontinuance of possession renders no
       help to plaintiff – Also only part of the land has been given to the
       Municipality could not have been made the basis by the High Court
 C     to derive a conclusion in favour of the plaintiff so as to buttress the
       title – Approach employed by the High Court is wholly impermissible,
       unsustainable, perverse and illegal – Thus, the judgment passed by
       the High Court is set aside and that of the first appellate court is
       restored – As there was multiplication of various proceedings, the
       cost of Rupees One Lakh imposed upon the plaintiff to be deposited
 D
       with the Welfare Fund of Supreme Court Advocate-on-Record
       Association – Tamil Nadu Estates Land Act, 1908 – s. 3(15), (16) –
       Evidence Act, 1872 – s. 114 – Costs.
             State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam
             (1985) 4 SCC 10 ; Dokiseela Ramulu v. Sri
 E           Sangameswara Swamy Varu & Ors. (2017) 2 SCC 69 ;
             Beohar Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. and others 1970
             RN 16 (Supreme Court) ; Sir Bhimeshwara Swami Varu
             Temple v. Pedapudi Krishna Murthi and Ors. AIR 1973
             SC 1299 – referred to.
 F                            Case Law Reference
       (2017) 2 SCC 69                 referred to              Para 23
       1970 RN 16 (Supreme Court) referred to                   Para 41
       AIR 1973 SC 1299                referred to              Para 44
 G     (1985) 4 SCC 10                 referred to              Para 21
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 9-11
       of 2014.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 08.12.2010 of the High
       Court of Judicature at Madras in Second Appeal Nos. 1025, 1027 &
 H     1028 of 2004
          SALEM MUNICIPALITY v. P. KUMAR & ORS.                                   1225


                                    With                                          A
       Civil Appeal Nos. 12-14 of 2014.
       R. Venkataramani, Rakesh Dwivedi, Gurukrishna Kumar, Rajiv
Dutta, V. Giri, Advs., Vinodh Kanna B., A. Sriram, Siddartha Iyer, Yashraj
Bundela, Praveen Vignesh, Ms. Purbitra Mitra, K.V. Vijayakumar, G.
Sivabalamurugan, Vasantha Kumar, R. Chandrachud, R. Ayyam Perumal,                B
Ms. C. Rubavathi, Advs. for the appearing parties.
       The following Order of the Court was passed:
                                ORDER
       1. The Salem Municipality and State of Tamil Nadu and others
                                                                                  C
are in appeals aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Madras on 8.12.2010 thereby deciding three
Second Appeals by the common judgment and order reversing the
judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court of dismissal of
the suits and restoring that of the Trial Court.
       2. It was claimed by the plaintiff that initially, the lease was granted   D
in favour of S. Vijayaranga Mudaliar on 19.11.1940 by the erstwhile
Zamindar – Ms.Gnanambal. It was from the month of November 1940
to the month of June 1941.
      3. Similar leases had been granted on 19.11.1942 in 1943 and
1946. In the lease deed area was described as “Chinneri Tank Bund                 E
Side -Waste dry” and “Chinneri Tank Bund Upper-dry”.
      4. It is significant that each of lease had been granted for eight
months, each year continued from November to June next year, to expire
before the commencement of rains in July as the land used to be
submerged as it was situated in Chinneri Bund side.                               F
       5. It was claimed by the plaintiff that his predecessor in title,
continued in possession of the land when the Act called the Tamil Nadu
Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (in short
“the Act of 1948”) came into force. The Act was published on 19.4.1949.
Sections 1,2,4,5,7,8 58-A,62,67 68 came into force on 19.4.1949, as               G
provided under Section 1(4) of the Act of 1948. The State Government
enforced the other Sections on the appointed date i.e. 19.12.1950.
Thereafter, the entire Pallapatti village vested in the State as notified
under the Act of 1948. Pursuant thereto, the possession of the entire
village was taken over by the Government, which included the disputed
land also, vide possession receipt dated 12.1.1951.                               H
1226            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A            6. The original plaintiff –late P.C. Pachiappan purchased 4.91
       acres of land from S. Vijayaranga Mudaliar. The suits are with respect
       to said land.
              7. It transpires that late Vijayaranga Mudaliar had applied for a
       grant of Ryotwari Patta under section 11 of the Act of 1948. The prayer
 B     was rejected on the ground that land was not ryoti land and it was
       recorded as community land. Thereafter, settlement in the area was
       undertaken and was finally notified in the Gazette dated 21.12.1963.
       Thereafter, P.C. Pachiappan applied under section 11 of the Act of 1948
       for grant of Ryotwari patta of the newly carved out Survey No.163
       corresponding to old survey No. 779. Prayer for grant of Ryotwari
 C     patta of the disputed land was rejected vide order 5.11.1968 passed in
       DOS 739/68 (F-2) by Assistant Settlement Officers KDIS No. 737/
       1968. As recorded in the survey land register, Exhibit B-2, prepared in
       the survey and settlement in 1959, the total area of the land 163 = 779
       was 24.62 acres, recorded as Achuvan Eri (lake). Hence, it could not
 D     have been allotted.
              8. A second application for ryotwari patta moved by Pachiappan
       was rejected as per government Order dated 11.5.1971. Review
       application was filed by Pachiappan. It was also rejected vide order
       dated 7.5.1973 on the ground that records of rights made it apparent that
       disputed land formed part of ‘Achuvaneri’ which is IV class irrigation
 E
       source with wet ayacut registered under it and that it is retained as the
       tank in the interest of ayacutdars under it. It was also observed that the
       entire area comes into submergence and the land in question forms part
       of the irrigation tank.
             9. Unfettered by the previous two rejections, Pachiappan again
 F     for the third time applied for issuance of patta on 21.6.1982. That
       application was ultimately rejected vide Ex. P-5 on 9.5.1984.
             10. On 23.2.1984, by virtue of the Office Memorandum 255, the
       Transport Department of the State Government handed over Survey
       No.163 admeasuring 24.62 acres to Salem Municipality for construction
 G     of a new bus stand.
               11. Pachiappan had filed a civil suit on 20.12.1984 registered as
       O.S.34 of 1985 in the Court of District Munsiff of Salem against the
       State of Tamil Nadu and M/s. Anna Transport Corporation for declaration
       of title and permanent injunction in respect of 4.91 acres of the land, out
 H     of survey No.163.
         SALEM MUNICIPALITY v. P. KUMAR & ORS.                                1227


      12. Yet another civil suit came to be filed by the same plaintiff as    A
against Salem Municipality alone for declaration and injunction on
22.12.1989.
       13. Thereafter, the fourth application was filed for obtaining
ryotwari patta by Pachiappan on 26.3.1992. He had filed yet another
writ petition No.3932/1992 for restraining the respondents from disturbing    B
peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property.
      14. In Writ Petition No.5642/1992 he prayed that respondent may
be directed to consider an application for grant of ryotwari patta.
However, both the writ petitions were dismissed as withdrawn. Earlier
writ petition filed in 1984 was also dismissed with liberty to file a civil   C
suit.
        15. Third suit O.S.No.342/1996 (348/95) (renumbered as 2066/
96) was filed as against Salem Municipality, Anna Transport Corporation
and State of Tamil Nadu. He has prayed for the same relief in the third
civil suit.
                                                                              D
       16. By virtue of the various leases granted to S.Vijayaranga
Mudaliar, he became entitled to obtain ryotwari patta under Section 11
of the Act of 1948. Plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase the
suit property in 1951 which culminated into a sale on 29.9.1952. The suit
property never formed part of the communal land of Achuvan Eri or its
tank bund. Further, the extent of the Achuvan Eri as per the records is       E
only 15.00 acres. The Plaintiff had remained in actual possession and
enjoyment of suit property. In the year 1982, Forest Department
attempted to commit a trespass in the suit property and put up a nursery.
The plaintiff objected and obtained the stay orders from the Government
of Tamil Nadu against trespass. The Forest Department withdrew and            F
was restrained from further work. The plaintiff also filed applications
for grant of ryotwari patta in his favour and his predecessor in interest
since 1940 onwards had prescribed his title by virtue of adverse possession
also.
       17. Earlier suit No. OS.34/1985 was dismissed in default, in the
                                                                              G
absence of both the parties. The application No.I.A. 583/94 for its
restoration was pending. The cause of action arose in the year 1940,
thereafter in 1952, when the sale deed was executed and again in the
year 1984. Besides declaration and injunction, prayer was also made for
demarcation of the property in question.
                                                                              H
1228            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A              18. After the restoration of the suit of 1985, three suits were
       decided vide common judgment and decree dated 27.4.2000 passed by
       the Trial Court, Additional District Munsif of Salem. The suit was decreed
       on 27.4.2000. The appeals were allowed by the First Appellate Court
       i.e., First Additional District Court, Salem vide judgment and decree dated
       30.1.2004. Aggrieved thereby, three-second appeals, which were
 B
       preferred have been allowed by the impugned judgment and decree
       thereby restoring that of the Trial Court.
               19. The High Court has given the finding that there is nothing to
       doubt the various leases granted to S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar. Sale deed
       has also been relied upon, the documents A-1 to A-4 have been relied
 C     upon by the High Court. The High Court has drawn adverse inferences
       against the appellants for not producing record pertaining to the aforesaid
       documents A-1 to A-4. High Court has disbelieved documents B-9 of
       taking possession on 12.1.1951. Finding of possession has been arrived
       at in favour of the plaintiff. The High Court has also doubted the action
 D     of Salem Municipality of handing over only 19.64 acres area to the
       Transport Corporation for bus stand, whereas the entire land 24.62 acres
       has been given to the Salem Municipality by the Tamil Nadu Government.
       High Court has further stated that there is no estoppel created against
       the plaintiff by virtue of the facts mentioned in lease deeds. It has also
       not been explained by the defendants that how the area of 15 acres of
 E     water tank increased to 24 acres. Consequently, the High Court has set
       aside the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court and restored
       the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.
              20. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, Shri R.Venkataramani and Shri
       Gurukrishna Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
 F     appellants urged that High Court has failed to consider the various
       provisions of the Act of 1908 as well as the Act of 1948. No right could
       have been created in the water tanks by virtue of the provisions contained
       in the said Acts. They have relied upon the definition of Ryot and Ryoti
       land in Section 3(15) and 3 (16) of the Act of 1908.
 G            21. The ryoti land as defined in section 3(16) of the said Act
       specifically excludes beds and bunds of tanks. It was also urged that
       High Court has also failed to consider the impact of dismissal of the
       proceedings for obtaining ‘Ryot Patta’ under Section 11 of the Act, filed
       by the Predecessor in interest S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar and by the original
       plaintiff. The prayer of S. Vijayranga Mudaliar for grant of ryotwari
 H     patta has been rejected vide order dated 20.7.1953. Other four prayers
          SALEM MUNICIPALITY v. P. KUMAR & ORS.                                  1229


made by Pachiappan also stood rejected in the years 1968,1971, 1984              A
and 1994. In the absence of a grant of ryotwari patta and even otherwise,
the land remained vested in the State Government. The finding as to
possession of plaintiff recorded by the High Court is also perverse and is
contrary to the revenue entries, the documents of settlement and other
record of rights w.e.f. 1948 till 1995. The revenue records have been
                                                                                 B
placed on record and in none of them, there is an entry of possession of
Pachiappan. On the strength of sale deed executed in 1952, the name of
Pachiappan had never been mutated. Since Predecessor S. Vijayaranga
Mudaliar had no title, late Pachiappan could not have derived any right,
title or interest from him. Having failed to prove the title of S. Vijayaranga
Mudaliar and also his own title, the plaintiff was not entitled to obtain the    C
decree in his favour. Apart from that, it was also urged that though such
a suit was barred under the provisions of 1948 Act. Even if it is held to
be maintainable for establishing of the rights of Ryot, plaintiff has
miserably failed to prove right, title or interest so as to seek declaration
and injunction prayed for. The suits were rightly dismissed by the First
                                                                                 D
Appellate court. Learned counsel have also referred to the decision in
State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam (1985) 4 SCC
10. Even if the documents A-1 to A-4 are taken to be proved, plaintiff
did not derive any sustenance from them for proving of right, title or
interest over the land. The High Court has proceeded merely on the
basis of adverse inference so as to confer a title in favour of the plaintiff    E
whereas the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove his own case. They
have also relied on Section 14A of the 1948 Act.
       22. Shri Rajiv Dutta and Shri V.Giri, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the plaintiff contended that once documents A-1
to A-4 are found to be proved, right, title and interest stands proved not       F
only of the predecessor-in- interest but that of the plaintiffs also. Finding
of fact as to possession of plaintiff has been rightly recorded by the
Trial Court. The decision of the First Appellate Court has been rightly
reversed by the High Court. The entitlement to obtain ryotwari patta has
been proved. The claim for conferral of ryotwari patta has not been
properly adjudicated by the concerned authorities. Civil suits were              G
maintainable and have been rightly decreed.
      23. It was also contended on behalf of plaintiff that difference in
the area of the tank has not been properly explained and the area in
question is not part of the tank, it was at the periphery of the tank. Thus,
there was no bar under the Act of 1908 to give the same on lease to              H
1230            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A     S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar and, as right, title and interest for obtaining of
       ryotwari patta had accrued to him, he could have alienated the property
       in the year 1952. Finding as to possession is also the question of fact and
       has been rightly arrived at by the Trial Court which has rightly been
       restored by the High Court. No case for interference is made out. For
       maintainability of the civil suit, they have relied upon the decision in
 B
       Dokiseela Ramulu vs. Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu & Ors. (2017)
       2 SCC 69. Lastly, they contended that the adverse inference has rightly
       been drawn by the High Court.
              24. First, we take up the determination of question as to the nature
       of the land as the accrual of right, title and interest depends on that
 C     under both the Acts of 1908 and 1948. It is apparent from the lease deed
       placed on record by the plaintiff (Exh. A-2) dated 15.11.1940 that the
       land formed part of the Chinneri Tank Bund Side -Waste dry Chinneri
       Tank Bed Upper-dry Chinneri Tank Bund Side -Waste dry Chinneri Tank
       Bed Upper-dry and the lease was granted in Fasli 1350 corresponding
 D     to Gregorian calendar year of 1940 w.e.f. the month of November
       1940 to June 1941. Similar other leases collectively marked A-2 are
       dated 19.11.1942, 1943 and 1946 w.e.f. the month of November to June.
       The leases were granted in the exercise of the powers under Section 51
       of the Act of 1908. It is apparent from the leases that area in question is
       specifically depicted in the aforesaid lease deeds to form part of the
 E     tank.
              25. Besides that, there are a plethora of revenue entries placed
       on record indicating that the entire area 24.62 acres had been recorded
       as tank continuously right from 1950 till 1995.
             26. The lease had been granted for eight months in the year 1940.
 F     The grant of lease for the aforesaid period excluding rainy season from
       July to October and evidence indicates that land formed part of the
       tank. Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting the submission to the
       contrary raised on behalf of the plaintiff- respondent to the effect that
       land did not form part of the tank.
 G           27. Now, we come to the question whether any right can be
       acquired on such a land. When we consider the relevant provisions
       contained in the Act of 1908 and definition as defined Ryot under Section
       3(15) and Ryoti Land under 3(16). The same is extracted hereunder:
             “Section 3 (15) - “Ryot” means a person who holds for the purpose
 H           of agriculture ryoti land in an an estate on condition of paying to
          SALEM MUNICIPALITY v. P. KUMAR & ORS.                                1231


      the landholder the rent which is legally due upon it.”                   A
      Explanation:
      A person who has occupied ryoti land for a continuous period of
      twelve years shall be deemed to be a ryot for all the purposes of
      this Act.
      Section 3 (16)- “Ryoti land” means cultivable land in an estate          B
      other than private land but does not include;
      (a) beds and bunds of tanks and of supply, drainage, surplus or
      irrigation channels:
      (b) threshing floor, cattle-stands, village-sites and other lands
                                                                               C
      situated in any estate which are set apart for the common use of
      the villagers.
      (c) lands granted on service tenure either free of rent or on
      favourable rates or rent if granted before the passing this act or
      free of rent if granted after that date, so longs as the service
      tenure subsists.”                                                        D
       28. It is apparent from the definition of ‘ryot’ as defined under
Section 3(15), means a person who holds the land for the purpose of
agriculture. It is necessary for such a ‘ryot’ to hold ‘ryoti Land’ in an
estate. Ryoti land has been defined in Section 3(16) as cultivable land in
an estate other than private land but does not include beds and bunds of       E
tanks and of supply, drainage, surplus or irrigation channels. Thus, as the
area in question formed part of the tank was clearly not ryoti land as per
the said definition in Section 3(16). As such, the predecessor in interest
- S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar or plaintiff could not be said to be ‘ryot’ holding
‘ryoti’ land.
                                                                               F
       29. The provisions contained in the 1948 Act have been enacted
to bring about agrarian reforms and to abolish the intermediaries,
zamindars, and Jagirdars etc. As a matter of fact, a lot of agrarian reforms
have taken place by the enactment of Abolition Act, as mandated by
Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution. By virtue of the provisions
contained in Section 3 of the Act, on issuance of notifications with effect    G
from the notified date certain consequences ensues automatically. It is
provided in Section 3(b) that entire estate including with all communal
lands; porambokes, other then ryoti lands; rivers and streams; tanks and
ooranies (including private tanks and ooranies and irrigation works] etc.,
shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them, free of all        H
encumbrances.
1232          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A     Section 3 is extracted hereunder: “Section 3: With effect on and
       from the notified date and save as otherwise expressly provided
       in this Act:
              (a) the Tamil Nadu Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act,
                  1947 Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1947 [in so far as it relates
 B                to] matters other than the reduction rents and the
                  collection of arrears of rent and the Tamil Nadu Permanent
                  Settlement Regulation, 1802 Tamil Nadu Regulation XXV
                  of 1802, the Tamil Nadu Estates Land Act, 1908 Tamil
                  Nadu Act 1 of 1908, and all other enactments applicable
                  to the estate as such shall be deemed to have been
 C                repealed in their application to the estate]
              (b) the entire estate including all communal lands;
                  porambokes; other nonryoti lands; wastelands; pasture
                  lands; Lanka lands; forests; mines and minerals; quarries;
                  rivers and streams; tanks and ooranies (including private
 D                tanks and ooranies and irrigation works] fisheries and
                  ferries, shall stand transferred to the Government and vest
                  in them, free of all encumbrances and the Tamil Nadu
                  Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, the Tamil Nadu Irrigation
                  Cess Act, 1965, and all other enactments applicable to
                  ryotwari areas shall apply to the estate;
 E
              (c) all rights and interests created in or over the estate before
                  the notified date by the principal or any other landholder,
                  shall as against the Government cease and determine;
              (d) the Government may, after removing any obstruction that
 F                may be offered forthwith take possession of the estate,
                  and all accounts, registers, pattas muchilikas, maps, plans
                  and other documents relating to the estate which the
                  Government may require for the administration thereof;
       Provided that the Government shall not dispossess any person of
       any land in the estate in respect of which they consider that he is
 G
       prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta-
       (i)       if such person is a ryot, pending the decision of the
                 Settlement Officer as to whether he is actually entitled to
                 such patta;
       (ii)      if such person is a landholder pending the decision of the
 H
         SALEM MUNICIPALITY v. P. KUMAR & ORS.                                1233


             Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal, if any, to it,    A
             as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta;
          (e) the principal or any other landholder and any other person,
              whose rights stand transferred under clause (b) or cease
              and determine under clause (c), shall be entitled only to
              such rights and privileges as are recognized or conferred       B
              on him by or under this Act]
          (f) the relationship of landholder and ryot, shall, as between
              them, be extinguished;
          (g) any rights and privileges which may have accrued in the
              estate to any person before the notified date, against the      C
              principal or any other landholder thereof, shall cease and
              determine, and shall not be enforceable against the
              Government or such landholder and every such person
              shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges as are
              recognized or conferred on him by or under this Act.]”
                                                                              D
      30. It is also provided in Section 3(c) that all rights and interests
created in or over the estate before the notified date by the principal or
any other landholder, shall against the Government cease and determine.
       31. It is apparent that under Section 3 of the Act of 1948 vesting
is automatic by virtue of the statutory provisions and government is
                                                                              E
empowered to take possession as provided under Section 3 (a) only
saving in the proviso to section 3(d) is that in case any person is prima
facie entitled to ryotwari patta and during pendency of his application,
for the settlement, was not to be dispossessed. In the case of the
landholder, it is provided that if the decision is pending before the
Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal, the State before taking        F
possession has to prima facie consider whether landholder is entitled to
ryot patta. Another consequence of vesting as clearly provided in Section
3(f) of Act of 1948 is that the relationship between the landholder and
Ryot shall stand extinguished.
       32. Section 3(g) of the Act of 1948 specifically provides that right   G
which may have accrued in the estate to any person before the notified
date shall not be enforceable against the government and such person
shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges as are recognised or
conferred on him as provided under the Act of 1948.
      33. Section 11 deals with rights of a ryot in an estate to apply for
                                                                              H
1234            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A     a ryotwari patta in respect of ryoti land which was properly included or
       ought to have been properly included in his holding.
             34. Section 11 is extracted hereunder:
             “Lands in which ryot in entitled to ryotwari patta:
             “11. Every ryot in an estate shall, with effect on and from the
 B           notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of ;
             (a) all ryoti lands which, immediately before the notified date, were
             properly included or ought to have been properly included in his
             holding and which are not either Lanka lands or lands in respect
             of which a landholder or some other person is entitled to a ryotwari
 C
             patta under any other provision of this act; and
             (b) all Lanka lands in his occupation immediately before the notified
             date, such land having been in his occupation or in that of his
             predecessors-in-title continuously from the 1st day of July 1939.

 D           Provided that no person who has been admitted into possession
             of any land by as landholder on or after the 1st day of July 1945
             shall, except where the Government, after an examination of all
             the circumstances otherwise direct, be entitled to a ryotwari patta
             in respect of such land.
             Explanation: No lessee of any Lanka land and no person to whom
 E           a right to collect the rent of any land has been leased before the
             notified date, including an ijaradar or a farmer of rent, shall be
             entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of such land under this
             section.”
              35. Section 12 deals with the right of the landholder in zamindari
 F     estate and Section 13 deals with the landholder of Inam estate with
       which we are not concerned in the present case. Plaintiff has claimed
       the right, title and interest as ryot, not as landholder.
             36. Section 14-A was inserted by amendment Act 49 of 1974.
       The provisions contained in Section 14-A is extracted hereunder;
 G           “Ryotwari patta not to be granted in respect of private tank or
             oorani:
             14-A.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no
             ryotwari patta shall be granted in respect of any private tank or
             oorani.
 H
          SALEM MUNICIPALITY v. P. KUMAR & ORS.                                   1235


       (2) Any ryotwari patta granted in respect of any private tank or           A
       oorani under this Act before the date of the publication of the
       Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
       Amendment Act, 1974, in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette,
       shall stand cancelled, and for purposes of compensation under
       this Act the private tank or oorani shall be deemed to be land in
                                                                                  B
       respect of which neither the landholder nor any other person is
       entitled to ryotwari patta under this Act.”
       37. Section 14-A(1) makes it clear that Notwithstanding anything
contained in this Act, no ryotwari patta shall be granted in respect of any
private tank or ooranies. Even if any patta has been granted the same
shall stand cancelled and the land of the private tank or oorani shall be         C
deemed to be land of neither the landholder nor any other person is
entitled to ryotwari patta under the Act.
       38. It is apparent from the conjoint reading of the provisions
contained in Sections 3(15) and 3 (16) of the Act of 1908 and the
provisions contained in Section 3, 11 and 14-A of the Act of 1948 that            D
the land of the tank is not ‘ryoti land’ as such no rights of ‘ryot’ could
accrue in the person by holding the land on temporary arrangement of
lease granted for 8 months in a year when water was not there in the
tanks. Such bodies are protected by virtue of the aforesaid provisions
carved out under the Acts of 1908 and 1948. The amendment made in
                                                                                  E
1974 in Section 14-A makes it clear that even if any ryot patta has been
granted to any incumbent even with respect to private tank or ooranies
that shall be inoperative and stand cancelled.
        39. In the instant case, it is apparent that not only S.Vijayaranga
Mudaliar the vendor of plaintiff had applied for a grant of patta under
the provisions of Section 11 of the Act of 1948, but the same very prayer         F
had been unsuccessfully made four times by the original plaintiff. All
such prayers made in 1953, 1968, 1971, 1982 and 1994 had been rejected.
It is not in dispute that ryotwari patta had not been granted. In the order
passed rejecting review in 1973, there is categorical finding that land is
comprised in the tank and area was liable for submergence and formed              G
part of the irrigation tank. Once the claim of the original plaintiff had
been rejected, it was incumbent upon him to file a suit for establishing
his rights, if any. He could not have waited till 1984, after initial rejection
of the prayer in 1953. Again, could not have waited till December 1984
after the rejection order was passed in 1968 and again on 11.5.1971 and
review had been dismissed on 7.5.1973. In the absence of grant of                 H
1236             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A     ryotwari patta and even otherwise in view of the fact that land formed
       part of tank reserved for common use, no right accrued to the plaintiff to
       claim ryotwari patta as his predecessor was not ‘ryot’ and the disputed
       land was not ‘ryoti Land’. Apart from that, vendor of the plaintiff did not
       hold land for 12 continuous years, as such no right, title or interest accrued
       to the vendor of the plaintiff or to the plaintiff. The Trial Court, as well
 B
       as the High Court, have committed patent illegality in ignoring the aforesaid
       prohibition contained in the provisions of the Act of 1908 as well as of
       the Act of 1948.
              40. Coming to the question of possession, the High Court has
       discarded B-9 proceedings taking possession on 12.1.1951. Though, there
 C     was absolutely nothing to doubt factum of taking over the possession. It
       is also apparent that the land formed part of tank which used to go in
       submergence during the rains from the month of July to October, it was
       not capable of being possessed continuously. No patta was granted to
       the vendor of the plaintiff for a complete year at any point of time, it was
 D     from November to June. The four lease deeds for the period of four
       years are for 32 months i.e. 8 months each year, have been placed on
       record of 1940, 1942, 1943 and 1946, no other lease has been produced
       indicating that he was holding land for 12 years or any lease of the land
       as on the date when the Act of 1948 came into force or on the appointed
       day. Even the vendor was not in possession of the land as the entire
 E     estate of the village stood vested in the state, as per the notification
       issued on 12.1.1951, possession had been taken. Thus, there was
       absolutely nothing to hold that possession continued with the vendor of
       the plaintiff. After the purchase was made by Pachiappan in 1952 there
       is not even single revenue entry placed on record indicating that he ever
 F     remained in possession at any point of time or cultivated the land. On the
       other hand, various documents to the contrary have been placed on record
       by the appellant.
              41. Firstly, there are copies of settlement register indicating the
       land comprised in new survey No. 163 corresponds to 779 old and same
       is recorded as Poramboke (common land) for common use. Entire area
 G
       24.62 acre had been recorded as Poramboke. There is yet another
       settlement entry of 1959 which records that Survey No.163 had been
       carved out of 779 in an area 24.62 acre and area has been recorded as
       Achuveri i.e., lake and also Porampoke i.e., for the common use. The
       document records the fact that Pachiappan’s application for grant of
 H     ryotwari patta has been rejected on 5.11.1968. Survey Map of the village
          SALEM MUNICIPALITY v. P. KUMAR & ORS.                                   1237


also records that the old survey number 779 has vested in the State.              A
When we consider Exh B-13, Fasli 1379 = 1969 year (Gregorian) the
land has been recorded as Chinneri (small lake). In the remarks column
possession of several persons is recorded as a trespasser, but not that of
the plaintiff - Pachiappan. Similar is the position in the entry of various
Fasli 1380 = 1970, 1381 = 1971, 1382 = 1972, 1383 = 1973, 1384 =
                                                                                  B
1974, 1386 = 1976, 1390 = 1980, 1391 = 1981 till 1405 = 1995. The
entries in remarks column shows neither ownership nor tenancy as
observed by this Court in Beohar Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. and
others,1970 RN 16 (Supreme Court).
       42. Other documents are also placed on record indicating that
area is Chinneri (lake) of common use. Thus, there was absolutely no              C
material or ground available to the High Court to set aside the finding of
possession recorded by the First Appellate Court and for discarding the
B-9 of taking possession in 1951 as that was supported by corresponding
revenue entries and statutory presumption of correctness is attached to
such entries though such presumption is rebuttable. However, there is             D
absolutely no evidence adduced on record by the plaintiff to rebut the
statutory presumption of correctness of document of record of rights.
Thus, trial court, as well as the High Court, has acted in a perverse
manner in discarding the overwhelming evidence merely on the ground
that document A-1 to A-4 stands proved. The High Court could not have
inferred in favour of the plaintiff, as no right accrued to the plaintiff or to   E
his predecessor-in-interest on the basis of the aforesaid document A-1
to A-4. The High Court has unnecessarily drawn adverse inference just
in order to give a finding of the genuineness of the document A-1 to A-
4. We take these documents as proved and proceed to deal with the
case on that basis.                                                               F
       43. When we consider the documents A1 to A-4, taken as proved,
not only they fail to advance the cause espoused by the plaintiff but
rather negates it. Ex.A-2 are the 4 pattas placed on record by the plaintiff
granted in favour of S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar as predecessor interest of
1940, 1942, 1943 and 1946. The lease deed itself records that land was
                                                                                  G
comprised in the tank and formed part of the tank. Thus, no right or title
or interest could have accrued to the plaintiff over the said land.
       44. Apart from that, when we consider sale deed A-1, executed
by S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar in favour of original plaintiff Pachiappa, the
recital in the sale deed is that though patta was granted in his name he
could neither cultivate nor able to look after the same, as such, he has          H
1238             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A     decided to sell the land. In Exh.A-3 rent register of Fasli 1369 = 1959. It
       only records the rent not the factum of lease or possession or cultivation
       by S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar. A-4 is document of the year 1949 that records
       the name of S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar but in that, no cultivation is recorded
       of S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar. It records only how much was the cess of
       land. No case is made out in favour of vendor of the plaintiff on the basis
 B
       of the entry of amount of land cess or land revenue of the year 1949.
       Merely recording the cess or revenue in the year 1949 or even assuming
       it was paid by the vendor in 1949, is not going to confer title in favour of
       vendor, particularly when the area was comprised in the tank. In case
       any lease had been granted for the period of 1947 to 1949 ought to have
 C     been placed on record but no such lease deeds except for four years
       have been placed on record. Thus, the finding recorded by the High
       Court as to possession is clearly perverse and contrary to the revenue
       records and the Gazette notification of vesting of land in State issued in
       1951.
 D            45. It is no doubt true that under Section 114 of the Evidence Act,
       there is a presumption of continuance of a state of affairs once shown to
       have prevailed. It is open to the court under Section 114 to presume the
       continuity of any fact once shown to have prevailed. Such presumption
       of continuity can be drawn not only forward but backward also. Court
       can presume that such state of affairs might have existed in past also
 E     unless discontinuity is proved. In the instant case, it is not shown by any
       affirmative evidence on record in the form of revenue record that the
       plaintiff’s vendor was in possession on the date of abolition and thereafter
       plaintiff remained in possession at any point of time. This Court has
       observed in Sir Bhimeshwara Swami Varu Temple v. Pedapudi Krishna
 F     Murthi and Ors., AIR 1973 SC 1299 that by stray entry no such
       presumption arises. On the other hand, the successive five attempts
       made by the plaintiff and his vendor failed to obtain ryotwari patta as no
       right in such land existed neither accrued. The plaintiff due to failure to
       obtain ryotwari patta and even otherwise as land formed part of tank
       has failed to prove entitlement to be treated as Ryot. No right, title or
 G     interest has accrued to the plaintiff to obtain any ryotwari patta or for
       obtaining decree in the suit.
             46. It was urged before us on behalf of the appellant that suit was
       barred by limitation by virtue of provisions contained in Article 58 of the
       Limitation Act 1963. The suit was required to be filed within three years.
 H     We need not go into the question. We have found on merits that absolutely
          SALEM MUNICIPALITY v. P. KUMAR & ORS.                                 1239


no case is made out in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, he was not at all         A
entitled for any relief.
       47. The High Court has considered another aspect of the difference
in area, it has opined that earlier it appeared that land was 15.00 acres
only later on how the area was increased to 24.62 acres has not been
explained by the defendants. The aforesaid reasoning recorded by the            B
High Court is totally based upon the ignorance of the material aspects
and evidence, as a matter of fact earlier dispute land was comprised in
survey no. 779 and which corresponding to new s.no. 163 in 24.67 acres,
said area has been continuously recorded in the revenue papers and
register of settlement, right from the beginning. After 1948 till 1995, no
cogent document indicating the disparity in the area has been filed by          C
the plaintiff. Even assuming that the finding recorded by the High Court
is correct, it passes comprehension how that helps the case of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff has to succeed only on the strength of his case and when
temporary leases had been granted to his vendor within the area of tank
as mentioned in the lease deeds which was reserved for the common               D
use, no right could have accrued. The High Court has ignored and
overlooked this material aspect. In case, the area has increased from
15 acres to 24.62 acres and has not been explained how the plaintiff can
claim any right in the land which formed part of water body is not
understandable as the case of the plaintiff is not at all or buttressed by
the aforesaid discrepancy even if it exists. Moreover, the entire area of       E
24.63 acres has been recorded as Chinneri (tank) and poramboke i.e.,
for common use.
       48. Now, we deal with last ground raised by learned senior
counsel on behalf of the plaintiff based on provisions contained in section
64 of the Act of 1948. Section 64 deals with the right of the owner,            F
occupier not to be affected by temporary dispossession/discontinuance
of possession. Section 64 is extracted hereunder:
      “Rights of owner or occupier not to be effected by temporary
      discontinuance of possession or occupation:
      64. Where a person-                                                       G
      (a) is entitled to the ownership of to the possession or occupation
      of any land or building immediately before the notified date, but
      has transferred his right to the possession or occupation thereof
      or has been temporarily dispossessed or deprived or his right to
      the occupation thereof; and                                               H
1240             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 13 S.C.R.


 A           (b) has not on that date lost his right to recover the possession or
             occupation of such land or building;
             He shall, for the purposes of this Act, and subject to the provisions
             thereof be deemed to be the owner, or to be in possession or
             occupation, of such land or building;
 B           Provided that any lawful transferee of the right to the title to such
             land of building shall be entitled to all the rights this Act of his
             transferor.
              49. Section 64 pre-supposes that a person is entitled to ownership
       or possession or occupancy of any land immediately before the notified
 C     date. In case of temporary dispossession or deprivation of his right to
       occupation hereafter and he has not lost the right to recover the possession
       of such a land or building shall for the purpose of the Act be deemed to
       be the owner or to be in possession or occupation of such land or building.
              50. There cannot be any dispute with respect to legal provisions
 D     in Section 64 of the Act of 1948. It is settled proposition of law that in
       case of wrongful dispossession or discontinuance of possession of owner,
       possession of person who has wrongfully taken it is deemed to be that of
       the true owner, but in the instant case, the provisions of Section 64 render
       no help to the plaintiff for the singular reason that his vendor is not
       proved to be the owner of the land nor has proved his occupation on the
 E     date of abolition or that it had been discontinued in illegal manner, no
       such right of vendor to remain in possession has been established.
       Plaintiff’s vendor was not having any right, title or interest after the
       lapse of temporary leases. Consequently, he did not possess any
       transferable right in the land. Hence, Pachiappan did not derive any
 F     right, title or interest from his predecessor in the land as he had none.
       Plaintiff was required to prove derivative title in which he has miserably
       failed. It was mentioned in recital in the sale deed by his vendor that he
       was not able to possess land nor could cultivate it. Apparently, the vendor
       of the plaintiff was not in occupation of land. Moreover, possession had
       been taken in 1951 of entire estate by the State Government as apparent
 G     from the Gazette notification, the land of the entire village stood vested
       in the State.
             51. The State Government has handed over the land to Salem
       Municipality and a major part of it has been given to the Anna Transport
       Corporation for the purpose of the bus stand. The High Court has
 H     observed why entire land was not given to Transport Corporation by
             SALEM MUNICIPALITY v. P. KUMAR & ORS.                             1241


Municipality and consequently inferred in favour of the plaintiff, only        A
part of the land has been given could not have been made the basis by
the High Court to derive a conclusion in favour of the plaintiff so as to
buttress the title. The High Court has gravely erred in recording such an
inferential finding. There was no scope to arrive at the same. The
approach employed by the High Court is wholly impermissible,
                                                                               B
unsustainable, perverse and illegal.
      52. Thus, we have no hesitation in setting aside the judgment and
decree passed by the High Court and restoring that of the First Appellate
Court. All the three suits stand dismissed. As there was multiplication of
various proceedings and three suits were filed, we impose cost of Rupees
One Lakh upon the plaintiff/respondent to be deposited with the Welfare        C
Fund of Supreme Court Advocate-on-Record Association within two
months and receipt be filed in the Registry.
        53. The appeals are allowed.

Nidhi Jain                                                  Appeals allowed.   D




                                                                               E




                                                                               F




                                                                               G




                                                                               H