SALES TAX OFFICER KANPUR AND ORS.versusUNION OF INDIA AND ANR
- Citation
- 1994 INSC 527
- Decided
- 21 November 1994
Holding
A writ court may not disturb a factual finding of an administrative authority unless it is perverse or unsupported by evidence; the High Court’s interference was therefore improper.
Summary
Twenty-six packages of utensils were seized by a Uttar Pradesh sales tax officer because they were being transported without the required documents. The railway argued that the goods were moving from a railway godown to a city booking agency, which it claimed was part of the "Railway" under the Railways Act and therefore exempt from the documentation requirement. The Deputy Commissioner rejected this claim, found the railway's story implausible, and ordered seizure. The Allahabad High Court, on a writ petition, set aside the Deputy Commissioner’s order, but the Supreme Court held that a writ court cannot disturb a factual finding of an administrative authority unless it is perverse or unsupported by evidence. Consequently, the High Court’s interference was improper, and the question of whether city booking agencies fall within the definition of "Railway" required material not before the Court, warranting remand. The Supreme Court allowed both civil appeals, set aside the High Court judgments, and remitted the matters to the High Court for fresh determination.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the factual finding of the Deputy Commissioner under the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act.
- Whether city booking agencies constitute part of the "Railway" as defined in the Railways Act, 1890/1989.
Legislation cited
- General Clauses Act, 1898s. 8
- Indian Railways Act, 1890s. 3(4)
- Railways Act, 1989s. 2(31)
- Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Acts. 13(A)(6), s. 28-A(1), s. 28-A(3), s. 28-A(8)
Subjects
Judgment
SALES TAX OFFICER KANPUR AND ORS. A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR
NOVEMBER 21, 1994
[B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, N.P. SINGH AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.] B
Constitution ofIndia-Articles 226 and 227-Writ petition-Finding of
fact-Whether Writ Court can interfere with a finding of fact-Held, No,
unless the finding is based on no evidence or is perverse.
Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act-Section 13(A) (6) Railways Act, 1989- C
Transporting good$ from railway godown to booking agencies claimed to
be part of ''Railways' '-Relevant material not placed before- Court for
determining thz question-Matter remitted to High Court.
Twenty six packages of utensils were being transported in a 'Thela' D
from the parcel godown of the Central Railway Station. The goods
being transported were not accompanied by the requisite documents.
The 'Thela' was checked by the Sales Tax Officer. The goods were
seized and proceeding were taken u/s 13 (A) (6) of the Uttar Pradesh
Sales Tax Act. Railways officials applied for release of goods
contending that in as much as the goods were being transported from E
Railway godown to the city booking agency, which according to them
was indeed a part and parcel of the "Railway" as defined in the
Railway Act, the seizure of the goods was unlawful. The Deputy
Commissioner rejected the plea under an elaborate order. A finding
was recorded that the story of transport of the said seized goods to the
city booking agency is untrue, for the reasons recorded in the order. F
The Deputy Commissioner was of the opinion that the goods were
really being taken to some other place and since they were not
accompanied by the requisite documents/forms, they were liable to be
seized.
G
Against the order of the Deputy Commissioner, the Railway filed
the writ petition. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the
petition holding the order of the Deputy Commissioner erroneous.
Civil Appeal has been filed against the judgment of the High
Court. H
593
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R
A It has been submitted by the Railways that the city booking
agencies were really part and parcel of the 'Railway' and, therefbre,
for transporting the goods from the Railways godown to the city
booking agency, the goods need not be accompanied by documents/
forms prescribed by the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act and the Rules
made thereunder.
B
The question raised are:
(i) Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the
finding of the fact recorded by the Deputy Commissioner in this case?
(ii) Whether the Railway booking agencies do or do not form ·part
c of the 'railway'?
Disposing of the matter, this Court
HELD: 1.1 The question whether ~he goods being transported from
the Railway godown were being in fact transported to city booking
D agency is ~•ways a question of fact. Mere claim to that effect is not
conclusive. The power of the sales tax authorities to stop and check the
goods being transported to satisfy themselves that they are being
validly transported is undoubted. If they are satisfied that the goods
being transported were imported into the State of Uttar Pradesh but
that they are not accompanied by the documents/forms required by the
E Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act and the Rules, they are entitled to seize
the goods and levy the tax and penalty as is provided by law. The said
power necessarily includes the power to decide the question whether
the goods in fact were being transported to city. booking agency or to
some other place. (598 H, 599 B) ·
F 1.2 In the present case, a finding was recorded by the Deputy
Commissioner that the story of transport of the said seized goods to the
city booking agency is untrue, for the several reasons recorded in his
order. He was of the opinion that the goods were really being taken to
some other place and since they were not accompanied by the requisite
G documents, they are liable to be seized. The said finding is one of fact
which could have been and ought to have been questioned'in an appeal
provided by the Act. (599 C, D)
...
1.3 The High Court which decided the matter, interfered with the
finding of fact without even referring to the several grounds on which it
H was based. The High Court has not even referred to all I
the reasons and
SALES TAX OFFICER. v. U. 0. I. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 595
grounds assigned by the Deputy Commissioner and yet set aside his A
finding. Moreover, a writ Court cannot interfere with a finding of fact
unless the finding is based on no evidence or perverse, i.e., a finding
which no reasonable person would have arrived at. (599 D, E, F)
1.4 On the ;arger question, viz., whether the Railway booking
agencies do or do not form part of the 'Railway', the relevant material B
is not placed before the Court for determining the said question and for
that reason, the matter requires to be remitted to the High Court.
(599 F, ~)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1635of1987
etc. etc.
c
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.9.86 of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 914of1986.
R.B. Misra, Mrs.Rani Chhabra, C.V.S. Rao, Ms. Abba Jain, P.K. Jain,
S.K. Jain, A.K. Srivastava and K.V. Sreekumar for the appearing parties.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. A common question arises in these matters.
Civil Appeal No. 1635 of 1987 is preferred against the judgment of
Allahabad High Court allowing Writ Petition (C) No. 914 of 1986 filed by
the Union Of India. Civil Appeal No. 5021 of 1989 is preferred against the E
judgment of the same High Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 2858 of 1987
(filed by the Northern Railway City Booking Agency and Anr.) allowing
the writ petition following the judgment in Writ Petition (C) No. 914 of
1986. The writ petitions were filed later saying that they raised the very
point involved in Civil Appeal No. 1635 of 1987. The matter arises under
the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act. It would be enough if we refer to the facts F
in Civil Appeal No. 1635 of 1987 and indicate how the common question
of law arises.
Writ Petition (C) No. 914 of 1986 was filed by (1) Union of India
through General Manager, Northern Railway and (2) City Booking Agency,
Bhoosa Toli, Kanpur, represented by Mis. Komal Prasad Ashok Kumar. G
The respondents to the writ petition were the sales tax officials of Uttar
Pradesh in addition to State of Uttar Pradesh. The Union of India asked for
quashing the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax, Kanpur dated
August 20, J 985 dismissing an application filed by the Union of India
represented by the railway officials for release of the goods seized by the
sales tax officials. A further direction in the nature of mandamus was also H
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. S S.C.R
A asked directing the sales tax authorities to release the goods seized (twenty
six packages ofutensils). The High Court allowed the writ petition.
On July 17, 1985 at about 5.10 P.M., twenty six packages of utensils
were being transported in a 'Thela' (hand ci:aft) drawn by one Matloob
Ahmad and oth.ers. They were being transported from the parcel godown
B situated at Platform No. I of the Kanpur Central Railway Station. The
'Thela' was checked by the sales tax officer (mobile unit) at the Station
Road, near the Police Station, Rail Bazar on the trijunction. The officer
found that. the goods being transported were not accompanied by the
requisite documents. It was claimed by persons accompanying the goods
that they were transporting the ~aid goods to the city booking agency at
c Bhoosa Toli. Accordingly, a show cause notice was issued to the said City
Booking Agency. On the next day, i.e., July 18, 1985, Shri Komal Prasad,
who holds the contract of the city booking agency, Bhoosa Toli appeared
in-person but he did not submit any reply to the show cause notice.
Accordingly, the officer submitted a seizure report on July 19, 1985 to the
Deputy Commissioner. In the said report, the officer stated that on July 18,
D 1985, he found on verification at the octroi post maintained by the
Municipal Corporation, Kanpur situated near Platform No. 1 fu. the Rail
Bazar area of the Kanpur Central Railway Station that the octroi with
respect to said goods was deposited by one Raj Kumar und::r Receipt No.
9953/77 dated July 17, 1985 at 5.10 P.M. in a sum of Rs. 308.25p and that
the payment of octroi by Sri Raj Kumar established that the said goods had
E been delivered to the said Raj Kumar at the Railway Station itself and
further that the story of said goods being transported from the Railway
parcel godown to Bhoo$3 Toli city booking agency of the Railways could
not be true. The report stated further that if the story of transport from the
railway godown to the city booking agency had been true, there was no
occasion or necessity for paying the octroi and that too by a strangler. On
F the basis of the said report, proceedings were taken by the Deputy
Commissioner (SIB), Sales Tax, Cennal Zone, Kanpur under Section 13(A)
(6) of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act. It is in these proceedings that the
railway officials appeared and applied for release of goods contending that
inasmuch as the goods were being transported from Railway godown to the
city booking agency, Bhoosa Toli, which according to them was indeed a
G part and parcel of the "Railway" as defined in the Railways Act, the seizure
of the goods was unlawful. The Deputy Commissioner considered the said
plea and rejected it, under an elaborate order dated August 20, 1985. The
Deputy Commissioner referred to the facts stated in the report of the
Seizing Officer and observed that "it is a well-known fact that the
H · responsibility of depositing the octroi tax with regard to any consignment
SALES TAX OFFICER. v. U. 0. I. [B.P. IEEVAN REDDY, J.] 597
by the consignee starts only after its being delivered to him by the transport A
agency and since the octroi in the instant case was paid by Sri Raj Kumar, it
is, therefore, established that ~he consignment-goods had been got released
from the Transport Agency oy Sri Raj Kumar". The Deputy Commissioner
furth~r observed that Shri Matloob Ahmad was neither an employee of the
Railway nor was he having a contract to transport the goods of Railway
alone. The Deputy Commissioner further pointed out that according to para B
(4) of the Agreement/Con<ract between the Railway and Mis Komal Prasad
Ashok Kumar, Contractor of Bhoosa Toli city booking agency, the goods t:
have to be transported between the Railway Station and the Agency through
a motor vehicle. In an emergency, however, they could be transported by
other means but before so transporting by other means, prior permis-
sion/approval from the Railway had to be obtained. The Deputy C
Commissioner referred to the statement of the representative of the Railway
to the effect that no such permission or approval was asked for or given by
the Railway administration for the said consignment. He also referred to the
statement of the Railway representative on August 7, 1985 that the said
representative "could not tell as to on. whose behalf Sri Matloob Ahmad
was transporting the goods/consignment under reference". The Deputy D
Commissioner also stated in his order that with a view to verify the gate
pass produced by the Railway, the statement of Sri Rajendra Prasad, a
senior research and development officer, Railway was recorded who stated
that the gate pass which was produced was not a copy of any gate pass
issued by the Railway but that it should be considered as a certificate and
that it was issued on the basis of the transfer register. The said official E
further stated that ordinarily "the goods/consignment which is made to
deliver by the Railway Parcel Office to the City Booking Agency is entered
in the Register and signatures in token of its having been received are
obtained by no such entry is made in the records of the Railways about the
fact that through what means of transport the goods/consignment was F
transported and by whom transported after it is released by the RiJilway
Booking Agency". On the above basis, the Deputy Commissioner
concluded that the gate pass produced does not establish that the said goods
were being transported to the Bhoosa Toli city booking agency. He also
referred to the fact that the Railway officials could neither produce the
consignee of the said goods nor the respective Railway receipts (Bilties). G
Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner rejected the application made by
the Railway officials.
Against the order of the Deputy Commissioner, the Railway did not
adopt the remedy of appeal provided by statute but entered into some
correspondence with the Commissioner of sales tax and not getting H
598 I SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R
A satisfaction, approached the Allahabad High Court by way of the writ
petition aforesaid. The Division Bench which heard and allowed the writ
petition found the order of the Deputy Commissioner erroneous. The
reasoning of the High Court is to be found in the following observations in
the judgment: "(T) he short controversy before him (Deputy Commissioner)
was whether the goods had been given possession of by the Railway to the
B consignee or not. In order to decide this controversy, the proper course
would have been to summon the paper from the railway administration and
to find out the fact. But, instead of doing so, the Deputy Commissioner
considered irrelevant materials and held wrongly that the possession had
been handed over by it to the consignee. To us it appears that as the
relevant papers had not been taken into account, the decision reached by the
c Deputy Commissioner was invalid". The Division Bench further observed
that "the circumstances, such as octroi was paid by Raj Kumar and goods
were being taken in a "Thela" driven by Matloob Ahmad and others, were
wholly irrelevant. The payment of octroi did not or could not establish that
the delivery of the goods had passed on from the Railway to the consignee.
Similarly, if services of Matloob ahmad had been utilized for taking the
D goods from Railway parcel office to the sub agency, the Deputy Commis-
sioner could have not held that the goods at the time of seizure belonged to
the consignee and its possession was not with the Railway department". On
the above reasoning, the order of the Deputy Commissioner was quashed.
The High Court also quashed a letter dated September 18, 1985 written by
the Commissioner, Sales tax, Uttar Pradesh 'to the Chief Commercial
E Superintendent, Northern Railway, Baroda House, New Delhi declining to
admit the application presented by the railway administration. -
The case of the Railways is that the city booking agencies (at the
I relevant time, there were four in number at Kanpur) were really part and
parcel of the "Railway" and, therefore, for transporting the goods from the
F Railway godown to the city booking agency, the goods need not be
accompanied by documents/forms prescribed by the Uttar Pradesh Sales
Tax Act and the Rules made thereunder. But before we consider the
provisions relevant to the above contention, it is necessary to clarity that the
question whether the goods being transported from the Railway godown
were being in fact transported in city booking agency (assuming for a
G moment that it is part of Railway) is always a question of fact. Mere claim
to that effect is not conclusive. In fact, the grievance of the sales tax
authorities is that a large scale evasion is going on under the cover of
transporting the goods from the Railway Station to the city booking
agencies. Their case is that goods are being transported to the premises of
dealers under the guise of and with the connivance of the said agencies and
H
SALES TAX OFFICER. v. U. 0. I. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 599
that this fraud is resulting in lose of crores of revenue to the State. We shall, A
therefore, first examine whether the High Court was justified in interfering
with the finding of fact recorded by the Deputy Commissioner in this case?
Now, the power of the sales tax authorities to stop and check the goods
being transported to satisfy themselves that they are being validly
transported is uqdoubted. If they are satisfied that the goods being
transported were imported into the State of Uttar Pradesh but that they are B
not accompanied by the documents/forms required by the Act and the
Rules, they are entitled to seize the goods and levy the tax and penalty as is
provided by law. The said power necessarily includes the power to decide
the question whether the goods in fact were being transported to city
booking agency or to some other place. In the present case, a finding was
recorded by the Deputy Commissioner that the story of transport of the said C
seized goods to the city booking agency. Bhoosa Toli is untrue, for the
several reasons recorded in his order. He was of the opinion that the goods
were really being taken to some other place and since they were not·
accompanied by the requisite documents/forms, they are liable to be seized.
The said finding is one of fact which could have been and ought to have
-
been questioned in an appeal provided by the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act. D
It was not done and the High Court was approached directly by way of a
writ petition. We must say, with due respect to the Division Bench of the
High Court, which decided the matter, that they interfered with the finding
of fact without even referring to the several grounds on which it was based.
We have set out herein before the several grounds on which the finding of E
the Deputy Commissioner is based and the reasons for which the said
finding was set aside by the High Court, which clearly establishes that the
High Court has not even referred to all the reasons and grounds assigned by
the Deputy Commissioner and yet set aside his finding. Moreover, a writ
court cannot interfere with a finding of fact unless the finding is based on
no evidence or is perverse, i.e., a finding which no reasonable person would F ·
have arrived at. This finding of ours should have concluded the civil appeal
but we were requested by both the parties to determine the larger question,
viz., whether the Railway booking agencies do or do not form part of the
"Railway"? While we agree that the said question should be decided, we
find that the relevant material is not placed before us for determining the
said question and for that reason, the matter requires to be remitted to the G
High Court. But before we do 'that, we shall briefly indicate the context.
Sub-section (1) of section 28-A of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act
requires that any person (referred to as importer) who intends to bring,
import or otherwise receive, into the state from any place without the state
any goods liable to tax under the Act in excess of the specified quantity H
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1994) SUPP. 5 S.C.R
A shall obtain the prescribed form of declaration upon payment of prescribed
fee from the assessing authority having jurisdiction over the area where his
principal place of business is situated or, in case there is no such place,
where he ordinarily resides. Sub-section (3) provides inter alia that where
such goods are consigned by railway the importer shall not after taking
delivery, carry the goods away or cause the goods to be carried away from
B the railway station unless a copy of the declaration duly endorsed by such
officer is carried with the goods. Violation of the said provisions renders
the goods concerned to be seized and the person concerned liable to the
consequences provided by law. Sub-section (8) of section 28-A, however,
says that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to impose any
obligation on any railway administration of railway servant of the post
c office or any officer of the post office, or to empower any search, detention
or seizure of any goods while on a railway as defined in the Indian
Railways Act, 1890 or in a Post office as defined in the Indian Post Office
Act, 1898".
The case of the Union of India represented by the railway officials is
D precisely based upon this sub-section. Their case is that the dty booking
agency is included within the definition "Railway" and hence the goods
being transported from Railway Station to city booking agency need not to
be accompanied by the documents/forms prescribed by tlie Uttar Pradesh
Act. For an appreciation of this plea, we must notice the definition of
'Railway' both in the Indian Railway Act, 1890 as also in the Railways Act,
E 1989 which has replaced the 1890 Act. The expression "Railway" was
defined by clause (4) of section 3 of the 1890 Act in the following words:
"(4) "Railway" means a railway, or any portion of a railway, for
the pub!ic carriage of passengers, animals or goods, and
includes-
F
(a) all land within the fences or other boundary-marks
indicating the limits of the land appurtenant to a railway;
(b) all lines of rails, sidings or branches worked over for the
purpose of, or in connection with, a railway;
G (c) all stations, offices, warehouses, wharves, workshops,
manufactories, fixed plant and machinery and other works
contracted for the purposes of, or in connection with, a
railway; and
(d) all ferries, ships, boats and rafts which are used on inland
H waters for the pl,lrpose of the traffic of a railway and belong
'l
SALES TAX OFFICER. v. U. 0. I. (B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.J 601
to or are hired or worked by the authority administering the A
railway."
The 1989 Act defines the said expression in clause (31) of Section 2,
which may also be set out:
"(31) "Railway" means a railway, or any portion of a railway, for B
the public carriage of passengers or goods, and includes-
(a) all lands within the fences or other boundary marks indicat-
ing the limits of the land appurtenant to a railway;
(b) All lines of rails, sidings, or yards, or branches used for the
purpose of, or in connection with, a railway;
c
(c) All electric traction equipments, power supply and distribu-
tion installations used for the purposes of, or in connection
with, a railway;
(d) All rolling stock, stations, offices, warehouses, wharves, D
workshops, manufactories, fixed plant and machinery, roads
and streets, running rooms, rest houses, institutes, hospitals,
water works and water supply installations, staff dwellings
and any other works constructed for the purpose of, or in
connection with, railway;
E
(e) All vehicles which are used on any road for the purposes of
traffic of a railway and owned, hired or worked by a
railway; and
(f) All ferries, ships, boats, and rafts, which are used on any
canal, river, lake, or other navigable inland waters for the F
purpose of the traffic of a railway and owned, hired or
worked by a railway administration,
but does not include -
(i) a tramway wholly with in a municipal area; and G
(ii) lines of rails built in any exhibition ground, fair, park, or
any other place solely for the purpose of recreation.'
(By virtue of S~stion 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1898, we must read
the reference to Indian Railways Act, 1890 in sub-section (8) of Section 28- H
002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. S S.C.R
A A of the Uttar Pradesh Act as a reference to the 1989 Act, after its
enactment.)
A perusal of the definitions in the previous and the present Railway
Acts shows that for a city booking agency to fall within the ambit of the
expression ."Railway" it should either be an office or a warehouse of the
B Railway. If it is an office or warehouse of another person though licensed
or pennitted by the Railways, it would not fall within the expression
"Railway". For coming within the purview of the said definition, it must be
the office or the warehouse of the Railways themselves. This question can
be detennined only if we look to the relevarit rules/orders/instructions
c which provide for establishment of such city booking agencies and to the
particular contract/agreement which is said to have been entered into
between the Railways and the holder of the said agencies. We are told that
the Indian Railway Commercial Manual, Volume-II, Chapter-26, provides
for appointment of city booking agencies but neither the said manual was
placed before us nor-more important- has the contract/agreement entered
D into between the Railways and Bhoosa Toli city booking agency (or for that
matter any other city booking agency at Kanpur) been placed before us. In
the absence of the said material, it is not possible for us to detennine the
question which the parties have asked us to detennine. We accordingly
allow Civil Appeal No. 1635 of 1987 and remit the matter to the High
Court to look into the relevant and detennine the question whether the city
E booking agencies established at Kanpur or for that matter anywhere else in
the State of Uttar Pradesh- this we are saying on the assumption that the
agreement/ contracts between the Railway and the city bo<;>king agencies
throughout Uttar Pradesh are unifonn; if they are not, the detennination
shall be contained to Kanpur only- fall within the expression '.'Railway" as
F defined in Section 3 (4) of the Railways Act, 1890 or Section 2 (31) of the
Railways Act, 1989.
It is made clear that if it is found that the city booking agencies do not
fall with in the expression "Railway", no further question would.arise and
the transport, if any, of goods/consignment from the Railway
G Station/Godown to the city booking agencies would not be entitled to the
exemption provided by sub-section (8) of Section 28-A of the Uttar Pradesh
Sales Tax Act. If, however, it is found that the city booking agencies fall
within the ambit of expression "Railway" as defined in the Railways Act,
such transport of goods/consignment from the Railway Station/Godown to
the city booking agency would be covered by the said sub-section (8).
H
SALES TAX OFFICER. v. U. 0. I. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 603
Even so, it does not follow that the sales tax authorities of the State A
have no power to check the transport of goods/consignment from the
Railway Station/Godown to the city booking agencies to satisfy themselves
that it is indeed a transport to the city booking agency. If they find it not to
be so, it shall be open to them to adopt such proceedings in that behalf as
are open to them in law.
B
So far as the particular consignment in Writ Petition (C) No. 914 of
1986 (Civil Appeal No. 1635 of 1987) is concerned, the Judgment of the
High Court under appeal quashing the order of the Deputy Commissioner is
set aside for the reason mentioned above and this question too is remitted to
the High Court for consideration afresh according to law. Civil Appeal No. C
1635of1987 is allowed in the above terms. No costs.
So far as Civil Appeal No. 5021 of 1989 is concerned, the city booking
agency approached the High Court as soon as the goods were seized and the
writ petition was allowed by the High Court following the Judgment in Writ
Petition (C) No. 914 of 1986. Since the question of fact has not been D
adjudicated in this matter, it shall now be determined by the appropriate
authorities under Section 13(A) (6) and oi:ders passed according to law.
Civil Appeal No. 5021 of 1989 is accordingly allowed and the judgment of
the High Court under appeal is set aside. No costs.
E
WRIT PETITION (C) NOS. 785188, 792188, 809186, 908188 AND 657189,
These writ petitions were entertained and directed to be tagged with
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 1575 of 1987 (numbered later as Civil
Appeal No. 1635 of 1987) evidently because they were said to raise the
very issue as is involved in Civil Appeal No. 1635of1987. There has been F
no adjudication of facts concerned in these writ petitions nor can it be done
in these writ petitions. Accordingly, it is directed that the question of fact
(i.e., whether the transport is really to the city booking agency from the
Railway Station/Godown or the said plea is only a cover for evading the
statutory obligation created by Section 28-A of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax
Act and the Rules made thereunder) shall be determined by the appropriate G
authorities under the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act. The writ petitions are
accordingly dismissed.
It is obvious that the determination made by the High Court pursuant to
the remand in Civil Appeal No. 1635 of 1987 will apply in the case of all H
604 SUPR,EME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 5 S.C.R
A the city booking agencies at Kanpur - or the who!e of State of Uttar
Pradesh, as the High Court may direct. (Of course, so far as the question of
fact concerned in Civil Appeal No. 1635of1987 is concerned, that shall be
contained to that case alone.) The, appellant in Civil Appeal No. 5021 of
1989 and the petitioners in writ petitions before us shall be heard on the
aforementioned legal question by the High Court, if they seek to be heard.
B
They may be treated as interveners.
The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs Advocates fee
Rs. 2,500 in each.
c A.G. Appeals and Petitions disposed of.
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