Holding

The shed is part of City Survey No. 56 and liable to acquisition; the principles of natural justice were complied with, and the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

The appellant, Sam Hiring Co., a tenant occupying a shed in City Survey No. 56, challenged the acquisition of its premises under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, arguing that the structure was an independent, non‑cess‑payable building and therefore exempt from demolition. It also contended that the Land Acquisition Officer had violated natural justice by not granting a further hearing or cross‑examining the Executive Engineer’s report. The High Court held that, under Section 2(7) of the Act, the definition of "building" includes tenements, sheds and other structures, making the appellant’s premises part of the survey and liable to acquisition. The Court further observed that the officer, as an administrative authority, had given the appellant an opportunity to be heard and considered the engineer’s report, satisfying the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the shed occupied by the appellant is a "building" within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 and thus part of City Survey No. 56.
Whether a building that is non‑cess‑payable under Section 2(9) and valued below the prescribed limit is exempt from acquisition.
Whether the failure to provide a further hearing or to cross‑examine the Executive Engineer breaches the principles of natural justice.
Whether the Land Acquisition Officer is a judicial or quasi‑judicial authority required to elaborate on each objection before making a proposal.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976s. 2(7), s. 2(9), s. 5-A

Subjects

land acquisitionbuilding definitioncess payablenatural justiceadministrative authoritytenant rightsdemolitionMaharashtra Housing and Area Development Act

Judgment

SAM HIRING CO. A
v.
A.R. BHUJBAL AND ORS .
.. JANUARY 12, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] B
Land Acquisition Act, I 894 :

Sections 2(7), 2(9), 5-A-Notice under S.5-A---Plea that the tenement in
ivhich business was carried on was not part o.f the survey No. which was
• )
acquired-Independent.from that and a 11on-cess payable buildi11g-Ther4ore
c
11ot liable to be demolished for acquisition-Was only a tenant and the shed
part ~f the building--Held, it being .finding of fact no interference called
for-Need to give.further opportunity a.fter Executive Engineer's report--Does
not arise-No need to call the Executive Engineer.for cross-examination--Land
Acquisition Officer not a judic;ial ,or quasi-judicial authority-Hence not re-
quired to elaborately deal with each of the objectio11s and submit his D
report-Since opportunity of hearing given, principle of natural justice com-
plied with.
'
., CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2503 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 3.2.94 of the Bombay High Court E
in W.P. No. 2745 of 1987.

S.K. Dholakia, Mr. Manoj Wad, Ms. Usha Reddy and Ms. J.S. Wad for
the Appellant.

M.L. Verma, D.N. Mishra and Sukumaran, for the Respondent No. 10.
F
M.N. Shroff, Sanjay Parikh, Ms. Anita Shenoi and D.M. Nargolkar for
the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.
G
We have heard the learned counsel on both sides. This appeal arises
from the order of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court made in
Appeal No. 893/92. The facts lying in short compass are stated as under:

The appellant is the tenant of the land which is a part of City Survey
No. 56, which was sought to be acquired under the Maharashtra House & Area H
475
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1996] 1 S.C.R.
A Development Act. 1976, (for short, 'Act'). The superstructure in City Survey
No. 56 was in a dilapidated condition. Therefore, the Bombay Housing and
Area Development Board had examined the position and decided that a
scheme was required to be framed under the Act for reconstruction and
thereafter for allotment to the persons in occupation. When the acquisition
proceedings were initiated after finalisation of the scheme, notices were given
B
.under Section 5-A to the interested persons including the appellant. The
appellant had raised the contention that the tenement in which it was carrying
on the business was not part of the City Survey No. 56. It is an independent
building and, therefore, it is not liable to be demolished for acquisition. Based
upon that objection, a report was called for from the Executive Engineer who
c submitted the report thereon to the Land Acquisition Officer. After considering
the report, he submitted a proposal for proceeding with the acquisition. It is
not in dispute that except this structure, all other structures have been
demolished in 1981 and the construction is yet to start. Ever since all others
are, unfortunately, in transit camp.
D Shri S.K. Dholakia, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, has
contended that by operation of the provisions of Section 2(7) read with Section
2(9), the building in occupation of the appellant is non-cess payable building.
Consequently, the building which is in exclusive possession in Chapter VIII,
is not liable to be proceeded with, if the value of the reconstruction is Rs. 500
per sq. mt. or below. Since a certificate in that behalf has already been issued
E in support thereof the action taken for demolition and acquisition is not
according to law. After the report submitted by the Executive Engineer, the
Land Acquisition Officer had not given any independent hearing nor called the
Executive Engineer for cross-examination. Therefore, it is violative of the
principles of natural justice. The third contention raised is that the Land
F Acquisition Officer should have considered all the objections and given
finding on each of the objections before submitting his proposal for further
action. Shri M.L. Verma, the learned senior counsel resisted all these conten-
tions.
Having given consideration to the respective contentions, the question
G arises whether the structure on which the appellant is tenant is an independent
building in City Survey No. 56? Before the Division Bench of the High Court,
the counter-part of Shri S.K. Dholakia, had conceded that the principal
contention raised was that the shed only "is not liable to be acquired even
though the shed is a part of the plot, City Survey No. 56." The gravamen of
the complaint is that the Board can move the Government only to acquire the
H building for the purpose of reconstruction exercising power under Section
)
SAM HIRING CO. v. AR. BHUJBAL 477
76(d) of the Act. The Division Bench has held that plain reading of Section A
2(7) of the definition of 'building' makes it clear that it includes a tenement
let or intended to be let or occupied separately and a house, out-house, stable,
shed, hut and every other such structure. On account of that finding, it was
held that the structure in which the appellant has been carrying on the business
is part of City Survey No. 56 as has been conceded by the learned counsel who
appeared for the appellant in the High Court and as such is liable to be B
acquired. Once it is concluded that he is a tenant or that his shed is part of
the building, the question whether the tenant is independently paying cess
under the Act as defined under Section 2(9) is not of much relevance. It must,
therefore, be concluded that the structure in which the appellant is carrying his
business is part of the City Survey No. 56. The finding of the authorities
cannot be disputed that the structures are in dilapidated condition and require
c
demolition for reconstruction. It being a finding of fact, the necessary
conclusion is that restructure requires to be done in accordance with law.
The question then is : whether the appellant is entitled to the further
hearing? After the report was submitted by the Executive Engineer with regard
D
to the objections raised by the appellant, the Division Bench of the High Court
has pointed out that the Land Acquisition Officer had considered the objec-
tions after hearing him and with a view to satisfy himself whether the
objections raised by the appellant were tenable, he required factual material
and so he c3lled for the report from the Executive Engineer. The Executive
Engineer's report was submitted clearing the position and the finding is not E
adverse to the appellant but beneficial to him. Therefore, the need to give
further opportunity does not arise nor is there any need to call the Executive
Engineer for cross-examination. Accordingly, the principle of natural justice
' has not been violated.

The Land Acquisition Officer is not a judicial authority or a quasi- F
judicial authority. He exercist;d the power under Section 5-A, as an adminis-
trative authority. But the Act requires that he should consider the objections
and, if asked, to give an opportunity of hearing. In this case, opportunity of
hearing was given and the objections raised were considered. The principle of
natural justice has been complied with. He was not required to elaborately deal
with each of the objections and submit the report. Considered from this G
perspective, we do not think that there is any error of law warranting
interference.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

G.N. Appeal dismissed.