Holding

The transfer of land in scheduled areas to non-tribals is prohibited under the Fifth Schedule and the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation, 1959, but transfer to government instrumentalities for public purposes is not prohibited.

Summary

The case concerned the validity of mining leases granted by the State of Andhra Pradesh to non-tribal persons in scheduled areas, including reserved forests. The appellant, a society, challenged these leases as violating the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation, 1959, the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, and the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. The Supreme Court held that the word 'person' in Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation includes the State Government, thereby prohibiting transfer of land in scheduled areas to non-tribals, including by way of mining leases. However, transfers to government instrumentalities for public purposes are not prohibited. The Court also held that Section 11(5) of the MMRD Act prohibits such leases, and that prior approval of the Central Government is required under the Forest (Conservation) Act for non-forest use of forest land. The Court directed that mining operations in scheduled areas by non-tribals must stop, except for state undertakings, and required lessees to spend at least 20% of net profits for tribal welfare and ecology maintenance.

Issues considered

Whether the word 'person' in Section 3(1)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 includes the State Government.
Whether the grant of mining leases in scheduled areas to non-tribals is valid under the Regulation and the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution.
Whether Section 11(5) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 prohibits grant of mining leases in scheduled areas to non-tribals.
Whether the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 requires prior approval of the Central Government for mining activities in forest areas.
Whether the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 is violated by the mining operations.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation, 1959s. 3(1)(a), s. 3(4)
Constitution of Indias. 14, s. 162, s. 17, s. 21, s. 23, s. 244, s. 245, s. 298, s. 38, s. 39, s. 46, s. Fifth Schedule
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986
Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980s. 2
Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957s. 11(5)
Transfer of Property Act, 1872s. 105

Subjects

Scheduled TribesMining leasesFifth ScheduleLand transfer regulationForest conservationEnvironment protectionPublic interest litigationTribal welfareConstitutional law

Judgment

SAMATHA A
- v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.

JULY 11, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD B
AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950: A1ticles 14, 17, 21, 23, 38, 39, 46, 162, 244,
245, 298 Fifth Schedule-Para 5.

Rese1ved Forest Area--Grant of mining leases by Govemment to 11011-
c
t1ibals-Pennissibility of-Object of Fifth Schedule discussed-'Reg11latio11'
includes 'Prohibition '-Executive power under Alticle 298 and legislative
power under Arlicle 245-Power to dispose ·Govemment property is subject to
Fifth Schedule--legislative and constitutional history of protection to
Scheduled TTibes discussed. D
Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Tramfer Regulation, 1959 :
Section 3(1)(a), 3(4).

Schedrtled Tribe-Immovable property situated in agency
tract~~Prohibition for transfer infavour of 1wn-tTibals-Word 'person' in first E
paTt of clause (a) includes State Govemment and its instiumentalities-Word ·
'Person' used elsewhere refers to only natural persons-Grallt of mining lease
in rese1ved forest infavour of non-t1ibals held void-Transfer of Governmellt
land in favour of public corporation for public pu1pose held not
prohibited-Transferee should conllibute for social, economic and education- F
al development of scheduled TTibes-Scope a11d power of Government to
dispose prope1ty i11 Scheduled area-Constitutional limitation 011 such proper-
ties.

Scheduled Tribe-Right to life and economic .empowennent.
G
Mi11es a11d 111i11erals (Regulation and Develop111e11t) Act, 1957: Section
11(5) (As ame11ded in 1991)

Scheduled Area-Mining leases in:-Grant to non- tlibals-Validity of

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. H
305
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Rese1ved Fores~ining leases in--Orant and renewal by State in
._
favour of 11on-t1ibals-Effect and validity of

Forest (Conservation) Act, 198(}-Section 2-11 Reserved forests-Ap-
plicability of Act to.

B Transfer of Property Act, 1872-Section 105

Leas-Definition of

Words and Phrases :

C 'Person '-Meaning of-In the context of A.P. Schedule Area Land
Transfer Regulation, 1959.

'Peace and Good Govemment'-Meaning and scope of-In the context
of Para 5(2) of Fifth Schedule to•Constitution of India 'Forest and Forest
Land'-Meaning of-'Socialism'-Meaning of-In the context of Preamble to
D the Constitution of India.

State of Andhra Pradesh granted mining leases to several non-tribal
persons in the reserved forest area of Anantagiri Manda! of Visakhapat-
nam District-The appellant-Society, claiming to protect the interests
E and life of the Scheduled Tribes in the area, filed two Writ Petitions in
public interest before the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the
power of the Government to grant mining leases in favour of non-tribals
in the scheduled area. It sought issue of mandamus to terminate the
mining leases which had been granted and/or renewed in favouir of the
private respondents inter alia on the grounds that (i) the said leases
F contravened the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land
Transfer Regulation, 1959 (As amended in 1970) as well as the provisions
of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980; (ii) Such leases were prohibited
under Section 11(5) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Develop·
ment) Act, 1957 (As amended by 1991 Act).
G A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions
holding that (i) the word 'Person' in Section 3(1) of the Regulation does
not include the Government and as such the Government was not
prohibited from transferring the Government land in favour ofnon-tribals
within the scheduled area; (ii) The Regulation does not prohibit transfer
H of the Government land by way of lease to the non-tribals; (iii) in order to
SAMATHA v. STATE 307

- prohibit grant of mining lease in favour of the non-tribals within the A
scheduled area Section 11 (5) of the MMRD Act was introduced in the year
1991. But the said provision was prospective in nature and would not apply
to the existing leases; (iv) Prior approval of the Central Government under
Section 2 of the Forest ((:onservation) Act was not required where the land
in question has already been broken; (v) Forest (Conservation) Act applies B
to the reserved forest and since it was not established as to the extent of
the land covered by the mining leases which form a part of the reserved
forest and since the joi;1t survey conducted indicated that there was no
lessee who was occupying the reserved forest area, except in one case where
to an extent of two thousand metres of the mining lease forms a part of
the reserved forest, the validity on account of the ·non-compliance of the C
Conservation Act cannot be gone into.

Against the Judgment of the High Court the appellant preferred
appeals before this Court.

In the connected appeal, the appellant M/s. Hyderabad Abrasives and D
Minerals, was granted mining leases for 20 years in 1974 in the Ped-
damaredumilli reserved forest area in East Godavari District of Andhra
Pradesh. Some other persons were also granted mining leases in East
Godavari District. M/s. Sakti, a voluntary social organisation, filed a writ
petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court challenging the grant of E
leases by the Government. Another Division Bench of the High Court took
a contrary view holding that (i) grant of mining leases was illegal; (ii) the
word 'person' used in Section 3 of the Regulatfon includes Government; (iii)
any lease to the non-tribals even of a Government land situated in
scheduled area was in violation of Section 3 and therefore void; (iv) a
mining lease in a forest area for non-forest purpose of renewal thereof, F
without prior approval of the Central Government was in violation of
Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act; Accordingly,- the DivisiOn Bench
directed the Governmtnt to prohibit mining operations in scheduled area
except that the mines stacked on the surface be permitted to be removed
after obtaining proper permits. G·
Against the decision of the High Court an appeal was preferred before
this Court, contending that :

(i) It is permissible to give a different meaning to the same word used
in the same statute depending upon the object sought to be achieved by the H
-
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A statue and, therefore, it would be within the principles of interpretation to
interpret the word 'person' occuring in the First Part of Section 3(1)(a) to
include the State Government whereas the same wor~ 'person' used in the
latter part of Section 3(1)(a) may be interpreted to mean'an individual'; (ii)
The word 'Regulation' in para 5(2)(b) of the Fifth Schedule requires to be
interpreted broadly to preserve not only the tribal autonomy but also to
B subserve distributive justice in favour of the tribals in the matter of assign-
ment of the land belonging to the Government in their favour; This Clause
prohibits the allotment of land to non-tribals; (iii) The term 'peace aud
Good Government' in para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule should be given wide
interpretation; (iv) The expression 'Regulate the allotment of Land to
C members of Scheduled Tribes in such area; in Para 5(2)(b) of the Schedule
should be construed to mean that the Governor should frame Regulation
ensuring that laud does not pass out from tribals and the land allotments
are made exclusively to tribals and the distribution of land amongst them
inter se can be regulated; (v) Under the amended Section 3(1) of the Andhra
D Pradesh Scheduled Area land Transfer Regulations, 1959 transfer of im-
movable, property situated in the scheduled area to non-tribal is prohibited.
The object of amendment of regulation was to prohibit totally transfer of
any land in favour of a non-tribal member within the agency tracts; (vi) In
view of Section 11 (5) of the Mines and l'v'i11erals (Regulation and Develop-
ment) Act, 1957, no mining lease can be granted in favour of any person who
E is not a member of Scheduled Tribe; (vii) Grant of mining leases was in
violation of Environment Protection Act, because the mining activities were
not only polluting the tribal atmosphere and natural flora and fauna but
were also becoming hazardous to human life; and (viii) In view of the
embargo contained hi Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act prior
F permission of Central Government not having been obtained the mining
activities within the forest area cannot be permitted to be continued.

Disposing the appeals, this Court

HELD:
G
By the Court

1. The word 'person' in section 3(1)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh
Scheduled Area land transfer Regulation, 1959 includes the State Govern-
ment. Consequently, the transfer of land in the scheduled area by way of
H lease, for mining purposes in favour of non-tribals stands prohibited under
SAMATHA v. STATE 309

- the Fifth Schedule read with Section 3 of the Regulation.

2. However, transfer of the government land in favour of its in-
strumentalities for public purpose stand excluded from the prohibition
A

under Para 5(2)(b)_ of the Fifth Schedule and Section 3(1)(a) of the
Regulation. The leasee or licensee should incur atleast 20% of the net profit
for social and economic empowerment of tribals as well as for maintenance B
of ecology.

3. In the light of the provision contained in clause (a) of sub-para
(2) of Para 5 of the Fifth Schedule, there is implied prohibition on the
State's power of allotment of its land to non-tribals in the scheduled areas. C
4. The Executive power of the State to dispose of its property under
Article 298 is subject to the provisions in the Fifth Schedule as an integral
scheme of the Constitution. The legislative power of the State under Article
245 is also subject to Fifth Schedule to regulate allotment of the Govern-
ment land in the scheduled areas. D
5. Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act,1980 prohibits de-reser-
vation of forest or use .of any forest land for any non-forest purpose of
assignment by way of lease or otherwise of any portion of land to any
private person other than government controlled agency. It is, therefore,
'necessary for the State Government to obtain prior permission of the E
Central Government for (i) de-reservation of forest; and (ii) the use of the
forest land for non-forest purpose.

6. Section 11(5) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Develop-
ment) Act, 1957 prohibits grant of mining lease in scheduled areas in F
favour of non-tribals.

7. The meaning of the expression 'forest land' requires extended
meaning given so as to protect forest land from deforestation to maintain
ecology and to prevent environmental degradation and hazardous effects
on Right to life and flora' and fauna. G
Per Ramaswamy, J.

1. Right from the inception of the Colonial administration, the
agency areas were treated distinctly from other areas. Tribals were
protected from exploitation; their rights and title to enjoy the lands in their H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (l.997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A occupation and their autonomy, culture and ecology were prest:rved; in-
filtration of the non-tribals area was prohibited. Sugalis, i.e.
Khanabadosh, non-tribals, by migration became in due course, tribals.
Even those migrant non-tribals were prohibited to purchase the lands in
-
agency areas from the tribals except with the prior sanction of the officer
appointed by the Government in that behalf. [360-E-F]
B
2. It is clear from the legislative history that from the beginning of the
British rule in India, the Legislature has adopted the policy to exclude some
areas totally and some partially from the governance through the Executive
·: Council and given power to the Governor of the Province and the Governor
C General/Viceroy to administer them with their special responsibilities. The
partially excluded areas had the dual control by the Executive with primacy
given to the Governor of the Province to apply or to exclude the application
of the laws made by the legislature or the Executive Council to the partially
excluded schedule areas. In either event the object was to prevent the tribals
to get into the wiles of the money- lenders and preservation of their property
D and customs and to allow the tribals autonomy of their living in accordance
with their customs and culture. [365-D; E; F]

3. Agriculture is the only source of livelihood for Schedule Tribes,
apart from collection and sale of minor forest produce to supplement their
E income. Land is their most important natural and valuable asset and
imperishable endowment from which the tribals derive their sustenance,
social status, economic and social equality, permanent place of abode and
work and living. It is a security and source for economic empowerment.
Therefore, the tribes too have great emotional attachment to their lands.
The land on· which they live and till, assures them equality of status and
F dignity of person and means of economic and social justice and potent
weapon of economic empowerment in social democracy. [354-F; G]

4. A survey of various statutes imposing restrictions on alienation of
lands allotted to Scheduled Tribes discloses enormity of the yawn:ing gap
G between making of the various Acts and their proper enforcement. The
magnitude of the problem is of national importance which need to be
tackled and solved by Parliamentary law and effective enforcement.
[36S-C; D]
5. As a part of on-going industrial advancement, large industries or
H projects are being set up or constructed in the Scheduled areas displacing
SAMATHA v. STATE 311

the Tribals and rendering them impoverished landless labourers. When A
their lands are acquired for public purpose, the Government should give
alternative lands for rehabilitation and easy loans for reclamation. Law
relating to prohibition of alienation and restoration of lands to tribes
must be simple, less cumbersome and result-oriented. The machinery
must be speedy and the officers must have compassion and sense of B
dedication and direction to ameliorate the economic status of the tribes
to assimilate them into national main-stream. (374-D, EJ

Prof. C.V.F. Haimendrof," Tribes of India· The Strnggle for Survival";
D1: P. V. Ramesh, "Land Refonns Land Transfer in Scheduled Area: publish-
ed byA.P. Judicial Academy as "Scheduled Tribal and Social Justice" page
c
178; S.N. Dubey and Ratna Murdia, "La11d Alie11atio11 and Restoratio11 in
Tribal Communities in India" (Himalaya Publishing House); Dr. G.P.
Reddy "Politics of T1ibal Exploitatio11" pages 66-67; Dr. Ramakant Nath,
B.M. Boal and N. Soreng, "The Khonds a11d Jau11gs in A11dhra Pradesh Hand
Book for Development" The Reports of the Commissioner of SCs, and STs, D
1980-81 and 1984-85; B.L Maharda, IAS "History and Culture of Giriasias",
referred to.

6. The Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation,
1959 came into force on March 4, 1959 in Andhra area and in Telangana E
ar~a with effect from December 1, 1963. The definition of transfer under
Section 2(g) is a com11rchensively wide definition except testamentary
disposition by a tribal to another tribal so as to effectuate the prohibition
of transfer of immovable property to any person other than a Scheduled
Tribe or a cooperative society composed solely of members of the F
Scheduled Tribes. Section 3 prohibits transfer of immovable property by
a member of the Scheduled Tribes to· a non-Scheduled Tribe. The burden
is on the non-tribal to prove that the land in his possession was not
acquired by transfer from a tribal; in other words, the land belongs to
tribal and the non-tribal possesses it in contravention of law. In case of G
any transfer made in contravention of sub-section (1) of Section 3, the
agent, the Agency Division Officer, or any other prescribed officer, may on
an application by any one interested, or on information given in writing by
a public servant or suo motu, issue decree of ejectment against any person
in possessi<m of the property claiming under the transfer. This should be
done after due notice to such person. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Section 3 provides that if a transferer or his heirs are not willing to_ take
back the property or where whereabouts of the transferer are not known
the said officer may by order assign or sell the property to another member
of the Scheduled Tribe or a Co-operative Society. Sub-section 3(4) provides
that for the purpose of Section 3(4), the expression 'transfer' includes sale
B in execution of a decree and also a benami transfer made by a member of
a Scheduled Tribe in favour of any other member of the Scheduled Tribes
but does not includ.e a partition or a devolution by succession.
[369-F; 370-B-C; 372-A; D; 372-G-H:; 373-A·B]

7. It is settled law that the transfer of immovable property between
C a member of the Scheduled Tribe to a non-scheduled Tribe in the Agency
tracts is null and void. The non·tribals transferee acquires no right, title
and interest in that behalf in furtherance of such sale. [373-E)

Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Kamataka & Ors., [1984) 3 SCC 301;
Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., [1985) 1 SCC
D 479; P. Rami Reddy & Ors. v. State ofAndhra Pradesh & Ors., [1988) 3 SCC
433 and Waman Rao v. Union of India, [1981) 2 SCR 1, relied on.

8. The Regulation was extended to Telangana region w.e.f. December
1, 1963. Prior thereto, law in Telangana area was in operation 11rohibiting
any transfer of agricultural lands without prior permission of the officers
E and 1950 Regulation draws rebuttable presumption that all the acquisi·
tions of immovable property situated in Scheduled Areas ar1~ acquired
through a transfer from tribals. The non-tribals shall be presumed to have
acquired title from tribals unless they are able to prove to the rontrary
that their possession of properties in the Agency tracts was lawfully
F acquired. [375-A, B, CJ

9. Establishment of the egalitarian social order through rule of law
is the basic structure of t!1e Constitution. The Fundamental Rights and
the Directive Principles are the means, as two wheels of the chariot, to
G achieve the above object of democratic socialism. The word "socialist" used
in the Preamble must be read from the goals Articles 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23,
38, 39, 46 and all other cognate Articles seek to establish, i.e., to reduce
inequalities in income and status and to provide equality of opportunity
and facilities. Social justice enjoins the Court to uphold government's
endeavour to remove ecanomic inequalities, to provide decent standard of
H living to the poor and to protect the interest of the weaker sections of the
SAMATHA v. STATE 313

society so as to assimilate all the sections of the society in a secular A
integrated socialist Bharat with dignity of person and equality of status to
;ill. [396-G-H; 397-A]

Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR 206;
D.S. Nakara & Ors. v. UOI, [1983] 2 SCR 165; Excel Wear Etc. v. Union of
India & Ors., [1979] 1 SCR 1009; State of Kamataka v. Shri Ranganatha B
Reddy &Anr. Etc., [1978] 1 SCR641; Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Company v.Bharat
Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr., [1983] 1 SCR 1000; State of Tamil Nadu Etc. Etc.
v. L. Abu Kayur Bai & Ors. Etc., [1984] 1 SCR 725; Madhusudan Singh &
Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1984] 2 SCC 381, referred to.
c
Prof. Friedlander, "Introduction of Social Welfare" page 6; B. Shiva
Rao, 'The Framing of India's Constitution: Selection Documents' Vol. IV p.
944; Dias, ''Jurispmdence" (5th Edn.) on 'distributive justice'; Justice P.B.
Sawant, "Socialism under the Indian Constitution"; Mahatma Gandhiji, the
father of the nation, Harijans' dated October 9, 1937; Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao, D
''Indian Socialism Retrospect and Prospect'~ pages 46-47; Mr. G.D.H. Cole,
"The Growth of Socialism" published in 'Law and Opinion in England in the
20th Century" (Morris Ginsberg, Editor) page 79-80, referred to.

10. The Constitution envisions to establish an egalitarian social order
rendering to every citizen, social, economic and political justice. Chapter· E
VI, Part X of the Constitution deals with "Scheduled Tribes and Tribal
Area". Article 244 provides that the provision of the Fifth Schedule shall
apply to the administration and control of the Scheduled Areas and
Scheduled Tribes in any State other than the States of Assam, Maghalaya,
Tripura and Mizoram. The Fifth Schedule makes the provisions as to the F
administration and control of Scheduled Area and Scheduled Tribes.
[387-H; 388-A; 368-D-E]
11. Fifth Schedule would manifest the animation of the founding
fathers that lands in the Scheduled area covered by the Fifth Schedule
require to be preserved by prohibiting transfers between tribals and non- G
tribals and providing for allotment ofland to the members of the Scheduled
Tribes in such area and regulating the carrying on of the business by
money-lenders in such area. [368-B-C]

12. The predominant object of para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the
Constitution and the Regulation is to impose total prohibition of transfer H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A of immovable property to any person other than a tribal for pc~ace and
proven good management of tribal area to protect possession, right, title
and interest of the members of the Scheduled Tribes held in th1: land at
one time by the tribals. The non-tribals, at no point of time, have any legal
or valid title to immovable property in agency tracts unless acquired with
B prior sanction of the Government and saved by any law made consistent
with the Fifth Schedule. With the passage of time, when person other than
tribals gained unlawful title to and possession of the lands in agency tracts,
their acquisition and holding of the immovable property, unless proved
otherwise, have always been null and void. The Regulation, as its predeces-
sor law, did prohibit transfer by a tribal to any other person and even
C benami purchaser in the name of a tribal for the benefit of a non-tribal
also is null and void. Non-tribal thereon, acquires no right, title and
interest in the land situated in Scheduled area. Indisputably, any transfer
inter vivas between tribals or non-tribals or inter se between non-tribals
except testamentary disposition to a tribal, has been totally prohibited.
D The only exception engrafted is the transfer to Co-operative Societies
composed solely of tribals or mortgage of the land to a Co-operative Land
Mortgage Bank registered as an instrumentality of the State or any
Government approved lending agency to improve the agricultural lands or
sale to an agent to the Government etc. A non-tribal person who is unable
to find a tribal buyer is not totally prohibited to transfer it. He should
E offer it to the named or nominated Government agent etc. who would
purchase it in the prescribed manner under the Regulation and assign it
on to a tribal. [375-D-H, 376-AJ

13. It is indisputable that apart from the patta lands or other lands
F held by the tribals, the State holds vast tracts of land in scheduled area,
in some areas with rich mineral deposits. Paragraph 5(2) of Fifth Schedule
enjoins the Governor to make regulations for the peace and good gover-
nance in a Scheduled area. Without prejudice to the general power, sub-
sequent clauses amplify particular powers. Clause (a) empowers him to
prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among members of the tribals
G and non-tribals in such area. Clause (b) regulates the allotment of land
only to members of the Scheduled Tribes in the area. The object of the
founding father of the Constitution in empowering the Governor, on the
basis of his personal satisfaction, is to regulate by law the administration
or control of the Scheduled area for peace and good governance of the
H scheduled Tribes in the area. [377-E; FJ
SAMATHA v. STATE 315

14. The Fifth and Sixth Schedules form an integral scheme of the A
Constitution with direction, philosophy and anxiety to protect the tribals
from exploitation and to pre~erve valuable endowment of their land for
their economic empowerment to elongate social and economic democracy
with liberty, equality, fraternity and dignity of their person in our political
Bharat. [391,E; Fl
B
B. Shiva Rao, "In the Framing of the India's Constitution, Vol. II; Vol.
9 CA.D., p.p. 965-1001, referred to.

15. The purpose of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules to the Constitution
is to prevent exploitation of truthful inarticulate and innocent tribals and C
to empower them socially, educationally, economically and politically to
bring them into the mainstream of national life. The founding fathers of the
Constituti.on were conscious of and cognizant to the problem of the exploita-
tion of the tribals. They were anxious to preserve the tribal culture and their
holdings. At the same time, they intended to provide and create oppor-
tunities and facilities, by affirmative action, in the light of the Directive D
Principles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 46 and cognate
provisions to prevent exploitation of the tribals by ensuring positively that

-
the land is a valuable endowment and a source of economic empowerment,
social status and dignity of persons. The Constitution intends that the land
always should remain with the tribals. Even the government land should E
increasingly get allotted to them individually and collectively through
registered Cooperative Societies or agricultural/farming co-operative
Societies composed solely of the tribals and would be managed by them
alone with the facilities and opportunities provided to them by the Union of
India through their Annual Budgetary allocation spent through the ap-
propriate State Government as its instrumentalities or local body in a F
planned development so as to make them fit for self- governance. The words
"piece and good government" used in the Fifth Schedule require widest
possible interpretation. [406-G-H; 407-A-D]

T.M. Kanniyan v. Income-tax Office1; Pondicheny & Anr., [1968] 2 G
SCR 103 and Queen v. Russell, [1882] 7 AC 829, referred to.

16. The object of Fifth and Sixth Schedules to the Constitution, is not
only to prevent acquisition, holding or disposal of the land in Scheduled
Areas by the non-tribals from the tribals or alienation of such land among
non-tribals inter se but also to ensure that the tribals remain in possession H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S:C.R.
A and enjoyment of the lands in Scheduled areas for their economic empower-
ment, social status and dignity of their person. Equally exploitation of
mineral resources being national wealth undoubtedly, is for the develop-
ment of the nation. The competing rights of tribals and the Sltate are
required to be adjusted without defeating rights of either. The Governor is
B empowered, as a constitutional duty, by legislative and executive action, to
prohibit acquiring, holding and disposing of the land by non-tribals in the
Scheduled Areas. The Cabinet, while exercising its power under Article 298
should equally be cognizant to the constitutional duty to protect and em-
power the tribals. Therefore, the Court is required to give effed to the
constitutional mandate and legislative policy of total prohibition on the
C transfer of the land in Scheduled area to non-tribals. [420-E, F, G]

17. In the absence of any total prohibition, undoubtedly Article 298
empowers the Governor being the head of the Executive to sanction trans-
fer of its lands. Since the Executive is enjoined to protect social, economic
and educational interest of the tribals and when the State leases out the
- D lands in Scheduled Areas to the non-tribals for exploitation of mineral >
resources, it transmits the correlative above constitutional duties and
obligation to those who undertake to exploit the natural resources should
r
also to improve social, economic and educational empowermf:nt of the
tribals. As a part of the administration of the project, the license•~ or lessee
E should incur the expenditure for;
(a) re-forestation and maintenance of ecology in the Scheduled
Areas;

(b) maintenance of roads and communication facilities in the
F Scheduled Areas where operation of the industry has the impact;

(c) supply of potable water to the tribals;

(d) establishment of schools for imparting free education at
primary and secondary level and providing vocational training
G to the tribals to enable them to be qualified, competent and
confident in pursuit of employment;

(e) providing employment to the tribals according to their qualifica-
tions in their establishment/factory;

H (t) maintenance of sanitation;
SAMATHA v. STATE 317
(g) construction of houses for tribals in the Sciisduled Areas as A
enclosures; the expenditure for the above projects should be part
of his/its Annual Budget of the industry establishment or busi-
ness advocation/venture. [421-C-H; 422-A-B]

18. In this behalf, at least 20 per cent of the net profit should be set B
apart as a permanent fund as a part of industrial/business activity for
establishment and maintenance of water resources, schools, hospitals,
sanitation and transport facilities by laying roads etc. This 20% allocation
would not include the expenditure for reforestation and maintenance of
ecology. It is needless to mention that necessary sanction for exemption of
said amount from income-tax liability, may be obtained; and the Centre C
should ensure grant of such exemption and see that these activities are
undertaken, carried on and maintained systematically and continuously.
The above obligations and ifuties, should be undertaken and discharged
by each and every person/industry/licensee/lessee concerned so that the
constitutional objectives of social, economic and human resource em- D
powerment of the tribals could be achieved and peace and good governance
is achieved in Scheduled Areas. [422-C; D; E]

19. The executive power of the State to dispose of its property under
Article 298 is subject to the provisions in the Fifth Schedule as an integral
scheme of the Constitution. The legislative power of the State under Article E
245 is also subject to the Fifth Schedule, to regulate the allotment of the
Government land in the Scheduled Areas. Therefore, the State Legislature
of Andhra Pradesh has imposed total prohibition under Mines Act to
transfer its lands to the non-tribals. Doubtless that under Article 298, the
State exercises its power of disposal for public purpose. When two com- F
peting public purposes claim preferential policy decision, option to the
State should normally be to elongate and achieve constitutional goal.
Secondly, the constitutional priority yields place to private purpose,
though it is hedged by executive policy. As a facet of interpretation, the
Court too adopt purposive interpretation tool to effectuate the goals set
down in the Constitution. Equally, the executive Government iii its policy G
options requires to keep them in the backdrop and .regulate disposal of
their land-property in accordance with the constitutional policy, executive
decision backed by public policy and, at the same time, preserve
paramount Tribal interest in the scheduled area. No abstract principle
could be laid in that behalf. Each case requires examination in the back- H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A drop of the legislative/executive action, its effect on the constitutional
objectives and the consequential result yields therefrom. [401-E-H; 402-A)

20. It is true, that the Constitution has demarcated legislative,
executive and judicial powers and entrusted them to the three wings of the
B State; in particular the President/Governor of the State is to exercise the
executive power in their individual discretion. It is not subject to legislative
limitations to be done in accordance with rules of business. In particular,
the President/Governor is entrusted with the executive power co-extensive
with the legislative power enumerated in the' Seventh Schedule read with
Article 245 of the Constitution. The executive power especially conferred
C by the Constitution like the pleasure tenure or the power of pardoning a
convict are not apposite to the issue. The power of the executivt' Govern-
ment in that behalf has wisely been devised in the Constitution, is not
subject to any restriction except in accordance with the Constitution and
the law made under Article 245 read with the relevant Entry in the Seventh
D Schedule to the Constitution is subject to Fifth Schedule when it is applied
to Scheduled area. The power of the Government to acquire, hold and
dispose of the property and the .making of contracts for any purpose
confer~ed by Article 298 of the Constitution equally is co-extensive with the
legislative power of the Union/State. However, Article 244(1) itself specifies
that provisions of the Fifth Schedule shall apply to the administrntion and
E control of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in any State except
the excluded areas specified therein. The legislative power in Clause (1) of
Article 245 equally is "subject to the provisions of the Constitution i.e. Fifth
Schedule. Clause (1) of para 5 of part B of the Fifth Schedule applicable
to Scheduled areas, adumbrates with a uon-obstante clause that "Not-
F withstanding anything in tile Constitution, in other words, despite the
power, under Article 298, the Governor may, by public notification, direct
that any particular Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State shall
not apply to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State or shall
apply to a scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State, subject to such
G exceptions and modifications as he may specify in the notification and any
direction given under clause (1) of para 5, may be given so as to have
retrospective effect". The executive power of the State is, therefore, subject
to the legislative power under Clause 5 (1) of the Fifth Scheduh~. Similarly
sub-para (2) thereof empowers the Governor to make regulation for the
peace and good government of any area in a State which is for the time
H being a Scheduled Area. In particular and without prejudice to the
SAMATHA v. STATE 319

generality of the foregoing power, such regulation may regulate the. allot· A
ment of land to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area or may
prohibit or restrict the transfer of land under Clause (a) by/or among the
members of the Scheduled Tribes in such areas. In other words sub-para
5(2) combines both legislative as well as executive power, clause 5(2)(a)
and (c) legislative power and clause (b) combines both legislative as well B
as executive power. The word 'regulation' in para 5(2)(b) is thus of wide
import. [398-H; 399-A-H; 400-A; BJ

Marn Ram Etc. Etc. v. Union of India &Anr., [1981) 1SCR1196; Lois
P. Myers v. United States,. 272 US 160; 71 Led 11 and The State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961) 2 SCR 679, referred to. C

William H. Rehnquist "The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Texas
Law Review 693, referred to.

21. While interpreting Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, this Court D
has consistently held that the term 'regulation' would include total prohibi·
tion. Therefore, the word 'regulate" the allotment of land to members of
Scheduled Tribes in Scheduled area in the Fifth Schedule by Clause
5(2)(b) must be read as a whole to ensure regulation of the land only to
_, and among the members of the Scheduled Tribes in the Scheduled area.
In the light of the provisions contained in clause (a) of sub-para (2) of E
para 5, there is implied prohibition on the State's power of allotment of
its land to non-tribals in ~e Scheduled Areas. When so read there is no
incompatibility and inco istency between the power of the executive
Government and the Cons itution and conjoint operation would elongate
the good government of the Scheduled Areas. So, while prohibiting transfer F
of land between natural persons, i.e. tribes and non-tribals and preventing
non·tribals to purchase from or transfer to another non-tribal, his right,
title or interest in the land in the Scheduled Area, at the same breathe
would not be permissible for the Government to transfer their land to a
non-tribal except for equally competing pubic purpose. The answer ob·
viously should be that it is permissible to the Gol'ernment to transfer its G
land to the non· tribals. This -negative answer leads to effectuate the
constitutional objective to preserve the land in the scheduled area to the
tribals, prohibits the Government from allotting their land to the non·
tribals; prohibit infiltration of the non·tribals into the scheduled area and
prevents exploitation of the tribals by non·tribals in any form. This pur· H '
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [~997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A posive interpretation would ensure distributive justice among tlile tribals
in this behalf and elongates the constitutional commitment. Any other
interpretation would sow the seed beds to disintegrate the tribal amtonomy,
their tribal culture and frustrate empowerment of them socially, economi·
cally and politically, to live a life of equality, dignity of person and equality
B of status. [400-C; G; H; 40l·A·D]

Narendra Kumar v. Union of llldia, [1960) 2 SCR 372; Fatehchand
Himmatlal v. State of Maharashtra, [1977) 2 SCC 670; State of U.P. & Ors.
v. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. & Ors., [1979) '3 SCC 229; K Ramanathan
v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1985} 2 SCC 116 and Air India Statutory
C Corporation Etc. v. United Labour Union & Ors. Etc., (1996) 9 SCALE 70,
referred to.

22. The word 'person' in the interplay of juristic thought is either
natural or artificial. Natural persons are human beings while artificial
D persons are Corporations. Corporations are either Corporation agg_regate
or Corporation sole. The question whether or not the word 'pt:rson' used
in a statute would include the State has to be determined with reference
to the provisions of the Act, the aim and its object and the purpose the Act
seeks to subserve. There is no reason to consider the word 'person' in a
narrow sense. It must be construed in a broader perspectivity,, unless the
E statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, exempt the State from
the operation of the Act as against the State and would include "State
Government." [384-E; F, G]

23. The maxim "reddendo singula singulis" will apply to the' interpreta·
F tion of the word "person" so that the general meaning of the word "person"
in its generic sense with its width may not be cut down by the specific
qualification of one species, i.e., natural "person" when it is capable to
encompass, in its ambit, natural persons, juristic persons and constitu·
tional mechanism and governance in a democratic set up. The State, by
G Cabinet form of Gover~ment, is a persona ficta, a Corporate sole Constitu·
tion empowers the State to acquire, hold and dispose of thdr property.
The governor in his personal responsibility is empowered to maintain
peace and good government in scheduled area. The Fifth Schedule to the
Constitution empowers him to regulate allotment of the land by para
5(2)(b) read with Section 3 of the Regulation of the land be it between
H natural persons, i.e. tribals and non-tribals; it imposes total prohibition
SAMATHA v. STATE 321
.~ on transfer of the land in scheduled area. The object of the Fifth Schedule A
and the Regulation is to preserve tribal autonomy, their culture and
economic empowerment to ensure social, economic and political justice
for preservation of peace and good government in the Scheduled Area.
Therefore, all relevant clauses In the Schedule and the Regulation should
harmoniously and widely be read so as to elongate the aforesaid constltu· B
tional objective and dignity of person to the Scheduled Tribes, preserving.
the integrity of the Scheduled Areas and ensuring distributive justice as
an integral scheme thereof. Clauses (a) and (c) of sub-para (2) or para S
of the Fifth Schedule prohibits transfers inter vivas between tribals and
non-tribal natural persons and prevents money-lenders to exploit the
tribals. Clause (b) intends to regulate allotment of land not only among C
tribals but also prohibits allotment of the land belonging to the govern·
ment to the non-tribals. In that behalf, wider interpretation of "regulation"
would include "prohibition" which should be read into that clause. If so
read, it subserves the constitutional objective of regulating the allotment
of the land in Scheduled Areas exclusively to the Scheduled Tribes. Clause D
5(2) (b) ensures distributive justice of socio-economic empowerment which
yields meaningful results in reality. If purposive construction, in this
backdrop is adopted, no internal or external contradiction would emerge.
The word "person" would include both natural person as well as juristic
person and constitutional government. This Ifberal and wider interpreta-
tion would maximise allotment of Government land in scheduled area to E
the tribals to make socio-economic justice assured in the Preamble and
Articles 38, 39 and 46, a reality to the tribals. The restricted interpretation
would defeat the objective of the Constitution. The wo.rd "person" would
be so interpreted as to include State or juristic person corporate sole or
persona ficta. Transfer of land by the juristic persons or allotment of land F
by the State to the non-tribals would stand prohibited, achieving the object
of para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Re~lation. If the word 'person' is interpreted to mean only natural
persons, it tends to defeat the object of the Constitution, the genus and
the Regulation, its species. As a corollary, by omission in the final draft
of the Fifth Schedule of the power of the State Government to transfer its G
•
land to the non-tribals with the sanction of a competent authorised officer
or authority would, by interpretation brought into effect and the object of
the Constitution would easily be defeated. Therefore, the word 'person'
includes the State Government. The State Government also stands
prohibited to transfer by way of lease or any other form known to law, the H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. .

A Government land in scheduled area to non-tribal person, be it natural or
juristic person except to its instrumentality or a Co-operative Society
composed solely of tribes as is specified in the second part of Section
3(1)(a). Any other interpretation would easily defeat the purpose of ex-
clusive power entrusted by the Fifth Schedule to the Governor. If the
B Cabinet form of Government would transfer the land of the Government
to non-tribals, peace would get disturbed, good governance in scheduled
area would slip into the bands of the non-tribals who would drive out the
tribals from scheduled area and create monopoly to the well devf!loped and
sophisticated non-tribals; and slowly and imperceptible, but surely, the
land in the scheduled area would pass into the lands of the non-tribals.
c The Jetter. of law would be an empty content and by play of words deflect
the course of justice to the tribals and denude them of the socio-economic
empowerment and dignity of their person. [407-H; 408-A-H; 401~-A-E]

24. '11Ie word 'person' in Section 3(1)(a) would, therefore, be con-
D strued to include not merely the natural persons, in the context of tribal and
non-tribal who deal with the land in Scheduled Area by transfer inter vivos
but all juristic person in the generic sense, including the Corporation,
aggregate or Corporation sole, State, Corporation, partnership firm, a
company, any person with corporate veil or persons of all hues, either as
transferer or transferee so that the word "regulate" in para 5(2)(b) of the
E . Fifth Scheduled in relation to the land in Schedule Areas would be ap-
plicable to them either as transferer or transferee of land in a Scheduled
Area. It, thus, manifests the constitutional and legislative intention that
tribals and a Cooperative Society consisting solely of tribal members alone
should be in possession and enjoyment of the land in the scheduled area as
F dealt with in various enactments starting from Gunjam and Vizianagaram
Act, 1839 to the present regulation. [409-F; G; H; 410-A]

Ke1111eth Smith a11d De11is Kee11an, "English Law" (Seventh Edition)
page 127; P.J. Fitzgeral "Salmond 011 Jurispmdence" (Twelfth Edition) page
66; R.W.M. Dias "Jurispmdence" (Fifth Edn.) page 265; Keeton "Eleme11tary
G Principles of Jurispmdence" (1949 Edn.); America11 Jurisp1ude11ce 2nd Series,
•
Vol. 72 p. 407; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edn. p. 675; B. Shiva Rao, "In
the making of the Constitution, referred to.

State of West Bengal v. U11io11 of India, [1964] 1 SCR 371; Rese1ve
H Bank of India v. Peerless General Fi11a11ce & Investme11t Co. Ltd. & Ors.,
SAMATHA v. STATE 323

[1987] 1 SCC 424; Superintendent & Legal Remembrancer, State of West A
Bengal v. CorpOJation of Calcutta, [1967] 2SCR170; State Tradi11g Corpora-
tion of I11dia Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer& Ors., AIR (1963) SC 1811
and U11io11 of I11dia v. Jubbi, AIR (1968) SC 360, referred to.

Madras Electric Corporation v. Boarla11d, (1955) 1 All ER 753; T.R.
Commissio11er v. Whiteworth Coal Co. Ltd., (1968) 2 All ER 91; Edgar B. B
Sims v. United States of America 359 US 108; 3 L ed 2nd 66; States of Ohio
v. Guy T. Helveri11g, 292 US 360; 78 Led 1307; State of Georgia v. Hiram W.
Evans, 316 US 159; Led 1346; United States of America v. Cooper Corpora-
tion et al 312 US 600: 8?, Led 1071; United State~ v. I.C.C., (1949) 337 U.S.
426; Birkdale District Supply Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of Southpait, (1926) AC C
355; Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitdte v. The King, (1921) 3 KB 500 and
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company et al. v. Charles Sairyer, 343 US 579 at
6321 : 96 L ed 1153, referred to.

The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, [1957] SCR 874;
lshwar Singh Bindra & Ors. v. The State of UP, [1969] 1 SCR 219; Redurimilli D
Ja11ardhana Reddy v. Progressive Democratic Students' Union & Ors., [1994]
6 SCC 506; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Ors. v.Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer
• & Ors., [1994] 2 SCC 434; Pushpa Devi & Ors. v. Milkhi Ram (dead) by his
Lrs., [1990] 2 SCC 134; Commissioner of Income-Tax Bangalore v. J.H.
Gotta Yadagiri, [1985) 4 SCC 343 1md Dr. Ismali Fantqui & Ors. v. UOI & E
Ors., (1994] 6 SCC 360, referred t9.

25. There is no internal and ~ernal contradiction in this process of
harmonious and purposive interpretation of para 5(2)(a) of the Fifth
Schedule which regulates transfer between natural persons; Para 5(2)(b)
encompasses within its ambit, the transfer by the Government of its land F
to a non-tribal and.clause (c) or the relevant clauses in Sections 3 and 4
of the Regulation. The Regulation prevents exploitation of the tribals
through the State Government; from the other end, it does not allow
· parting with of their land and prevents induction of non-tribals into the
scheduled area by allotment of the land or by regulating allotment of the G
land, be it private or private corporate aggregate. The interpretation per
se, therefore, is public law interpretation to subserve the constitutional
purpose without recourse to private law principles. [410-C; DJ

P. Rami Reddy & Ors. Etc. v. State of A.P. & Anr. Etc., [1968] Supp.
1 SCR 443; Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra & H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2S.C.R.
A Anr., [1985) 1 SCC 479 and Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Kamataka & •-
Ors., [1984) 3 SCC 301, relied on.

26. Under the Constitution, in all ordinary matters of administra·
tlon, the Ministers take full responsibility subject to the contrnl by the
Legislature. The bureaucracy gives shape to the decisions taken by the
B Council or Ministers at the Cabinet meeting or by the individual Ministers
by working out the details and they are applied in the given set of facts. In
the exercise or their functions relating to land under any enactment, every
Minister and government must have regard to the desirability of conserv·
ing the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside. [387-C; D; G]
c
Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain, [1997) 1
SCC 35; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR
(1991) SC 101; Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab &Anr., [1974) 2 SCC 831
and R.K. Jain v. Union of India, [1995) 4 SCC 119, referred to.

D
27. In a democratic policy governed by the rule oflaw, the administra·
tion is run through constitutional mechanism i.e., Cabinet form of Govt. by
a council of Ministers headed by the Chief Ministers. They aid, and advise
the Governor, the executive head of the State. The bureaucracy an arm of
the political executive-assists as an integral part of administrative
E mechanism. Their actions or the acts, individually or collectively, are
directed to elongate and fulfil the socio-economic goals set down in the
Constitution to establish the egalitarian social order in which social·
economic justice is secured to the poor and weaker sections of the society
including the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, in particular, as
F enjoined in Article 46 of the Constitution, to promote their socio-economic
interest and protect them from social injustice and all form:i of exploita·
tions. The State is, therefore, a "person" within the constitutional
mechanismpersonaficta Is enjoined to elongate the objects of the Constitu-
tion. [390-C; D; El

G 28. It is well established rule of interpretation that the words of width
Issued In the Constitution requires wide interpretation to effectuate the
goals of establishing an egalitarian social order supplying flesh and blood
to the glorious contents and context of those words and to enable the citizen
to enjoy the rights enshrined in the Constitution from generation to genera·
H tion. [406-D; El
SAMATHA v. STATE 325

Asl10k Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., JT (1997) 2 SC 251, referred to. A

29. It is an established rule of interpretation that to establish
Socialist Secular Democratic Republic the basic structure under the rule
of faw, pragmatic broad and wide interpretation of the Constitution makes
social and economic democracy with liberty, equality of opportunity B
equality of status and fraternity a reality to "we, the people of India", who
would include the Scheduled Tribes. All State actions should be to reach
the above goal with this march under rule of law. The interpretation of the
words 'person' 'regulation' and 'distribution' require to be broached
broadly to elongate socio-economic justice to the tribals. The word
'regulates' In para 5(2)(b) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution and C
the title of the Regulation would not only control allotment ()f land to the
Tribes in Scheduled area but also prohibits transfer of private or
Government's land in such areas to the non-tribals. While later clause (a)
achieves the object of prohibl_tlng transfers inter vivos by tribals to the
non·tribuals or non trlbals inter se, the first clause Includes the State D
Government or being a juristic person in the integral scheme of para 5(2)
of Schedule. The Regulation seeks to further achieve the object of declaring
with a presumptive evidence that the .land in the Scheduled Areas belongs
to the Scheduled Tribes and any transfer made to a non-tribal shall always
he deemed to have been made by tribal unless the transferee establishes
the contra. It also prohibits transfer of the land in any form known to law E
and declared such transfer as void except by way of testamentary disposi·
tion by a tribal to his kith and kin/tribal or by partition among them. The
regulation am!. its predecessor law in operation in the respective areas
. regulate transfer between a tribal and non-tribal with prior permission of
the designated officer as a condition precedent to prevent exploitation of F
the tribals. If a tribal is unwilling to purchase land from a non-tribal, the
State Government is enjoined to purchase the land from a non-tribal as
per the principles set down in the regnlatlons and to distribute the same
to a tribal or a cooperative society composed solely of trlbals.
[417·D·H; 418·A; BJ G

30. Justice is an attribute of human conduct. Law, as a social
engineering, is to remedy existing imbalances, as a vehicle to establish an
egalitarian social order. Social and economic democracy is the foundation
on which political democracy would be a way of life in the Indian polity.
Law as a social engineering is to create just social order removing ine· H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A qualities in social and economic life, socio-economic disabilities with which
poor people are languishing by providing positive opportunities and
facilities to individuals and groups of people. (391-G; 394-C-D]

31. Declaration of "Right to Development Convention" adopted by the
B United Nations and ratified by India, by Article 1 "Right to development"
became part of an inalienable human right. By virtue thereof, every human
person and all people are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy
economic, social, cultural and political development, in .which all human
rights and fundamental freedoms would be fully realised. All human rights
are derived from the dignity of the person and his inherent worth. Fun-
C damental Rights and Directive Principles of the Constitution have fused in
them as fundamental human rights as indivisible and inter-dependent. The
Constitution has charged the State to provide facilities and opportunities
among the people and groups of people to remove social and economic
inequality and to improve equality of status. Article 39(b) enjoins the State
D to direct its policy towards securing distribution of the ownership and
control of the material resources of the community as best to subserved the
common good. The founding fathers with hind sight, engrafted with prog-
nosis, not only inalienable human rights as part of the Constitution but also
charged the State as its policy to remove obstacles, disabilities and ine-
qualities for human development and positive actions to provide oppor-
E tunities and facilities to develop human dignity and equality of status and
of opportunity for social and economic democracy. Economic and social
equality is a facet of liberty without which meaningful life would be hollow
and mirage. (392-E-F; 392-B; C; D]

F 32. India being an active participant in the successful declaration of
the Convention on Right to Development and a party signatory thereto, it
is its duty to formulate its policies, legislative or executive, accord equal
attention to the promotion of, and to protect the right to social,economic,
civil and cultural rights of the people, in particular, the poor, the Dalits
G and Tribes as enjoined in Article 46 read with Articles 38, 39 and all other
related Articles read with right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. By that constant endeavour and interaction, right
to life would become meaningful so as to realise its full potentiality of
"person" as inalienable human right and to raise the standard of living,
improve excellence and to live with dignity of person and of equal status
H with social and economic justice liberty, equality and fraternity, the trinity
SAMATHA v. STATE 327

are pillars to establish the egalitarian social order in Socialist Secular A
Democratic Bharat Republic. (393-G-H; 394-A; BJ

33. The core constitutional objective of "social and economic
democracy'' in other words, just'social order, cannot be established without
removing the inequalities in income and making endeavour to eliminate
inequalities in status through the rule of law. The mandate for social and B
economic retransformation requires that the material resources or their
ownership and control should be S!J distributed as to subserve the common
good. A new social order, thereby, would emerge, out of the old unequal or
hierarchical social order. The legislative or executive measures therefore,
should be necessary for the reconstruction of the unequal social order by C
corrective and distributive justice through the rule of law. [39S-B; CJ

34. Article 21 of the Constitytion reinforces "right to life'!.--a fun-
damental right-which is an inalienable human right declared by the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the sequential Conventions
to which India is a signatory. [39S-D] D
3S. The tribals, have fundamental right to social and economic
empowerment. As a part of right to development to enjoy full freedom,
democracy offered to them through the States regulated power of good
• Government that the lands in Scheduled areas are preserved for social E
economic empowerment of the tribals. (396-E]

Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984] 3 SCC 161; Subhash
Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR (1991) SC 420; Olga Tellis v. Bombay
Municipal Corporation, AIR (1986) SC 180; C.E.S.C. Ltd. & Ors. v. S.C. Bose
& Ors., (1992] 1 SCC 441; Consumer Education and Research Centre v. F
Union of India, [199S] 3 SCC 42; Life Insurance Corporation v. Consumer
Education and Research Centre, [199S] S SCC 482; Dalmia Cement Bharat
Ltd. &Anr. Etc. v. UOI & Ors. Etc., JT (1996) 4 SC SSS; P.G. Gupta v. State
-. of Gujarat & Ors., [199S] Supp. 2 SCC 182; Mis. Shantistar Builders v.
Narayan Khim/al Totame & Ors., [1990] l SCC S20; Chameli Singh & Ors.
v. State of U.P. & Anr., (1996] 2 SCC S49; Ahmedabad Municipal Corpora- G
tion v. Nawab Khan Guiab Khan & Ors., JT (1996) 10 SC 48S; Maharashtra
State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. KS. Gandhi,
(1991] 2 SCC; J.P. Unnikrishnan v. State of A.P., (1993] 1 SCC 64S and
State of Kamataka v. Appa Batu Ingale & Ors., [199S] Supp. 4 SCC 469,
referred to. H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 36. The constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992 amended Part IX
of the Constitution. The principle of self-government based on democratic
principles at Gram Panchayat Level and upwards was introduced through
Articles 343 to 343 ZG. As an integral scheme thereof the Andhra Pradesh
(Provision of the Panchayats Extension to Schedule Areas) Act, 1966 came
B to be made. The scheme of the Act would Indicate that the tribal autonomy
of management of their resources including the prevention of the allena·
tion of the land in the Scheduled Areas and taking of appropriation in that
behalf for restoration of the same to the tribals, is entrusted to the Gram
Panchayats. [407-D; E; G]

C 37. A lease creates a right or an interest in enjoyment of the demised
property on terms and conditions contained therein to remain In posses·
slon thereof for the duration of the period of lease unless it is determined
in accordance with the contract or the statute. It is an encumbrance on the
right to be In possession, use and enjoyment of the land by the transferee.
D Lease is the outcome of separation of ownership and possession. It may
be either rightful or wrongful. If it is rightful, it is an encumbrance on the
owner's title but if It is wrongful the transferee acquires no lawful right to
enjoy the interest therein. Section 11(5) of the Mines and Minerals

E
(Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 brought by State Amendment Act
prohibits grant of mining lease in Scheduled Areas in favour of the
non·tribals. [418-D; E; F] -
38. Section 11 (5) brings out and effectuates public policy envisaged
In the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and the Regulation. Undoubtedly,
it is prospective but the underlying principle would permeate the purpose
p of interpretation that the State Government, being a person Is regulated
under Section 3 of the Regulation prohibit transfer of their land situated
in the Scheduled Areas in which mines are discovered or for any other
purpose. G.O. Ms. No. 971/Rev. B. of 1969 provides thj\t Government land
should not be given to non-tribals. The contention that the Government
G being empowered to operate the Regulation, by implication, the Regulation
does not apply to Government land per force, is untenable in vieW of the
above unambiguous constitutional legislative and executive policy. The
contention that there is no need for its Incorporation and that the Govern·
ment would be prohibited from transferring for public 'purpose, is un·
tenable. They do not detract from legal reasoning and purposive
H interpretation. The transfer of such land for a public purpose, viz. to
SAMATHA v. STATE 329
construct a hospital or to set up a bank by the Government or its in· A
strumentalities and for any public purpose etc. is not prohibited for two
reasons, namely, (i) there is no transfer of interest in the Government land
.. in favour of a non-tribal; (ii) there is no transfer of its land in law to itself•
The contention, therefore, that· the Regulation prohibits transfer of
Government land for its public purpose is unsustainable. The contention
B
that even philonthrophic persons imbued with social zeal and spirit to
ameliorate the social status and economic position of the tribals, would
also be prevented to serve them . is untenable. What the Regulation
prohibits is the transfer of right, title and Interest in the immovable
property In scheduled area in favour of non-tribals. There Is no prohibition
on non-tribal philonthrophist to organise through tribals and a Coopera· c
tive society composed solely of tribals, actions to ameliorate socio·
economic status of the tribals in the Scheduled Area. [419-C-H]

The contention that the rich mineral wealth being a national asset
cannot be kept unexploited which is detrimental to the national develop·
ment, is devoid of force. Instead of getting the mineral exploited through D
non-tribals, by exploiting of tribals, the mineral could be exploited through
an appropriate scheme, without disturbing ecology and forest by the tribals
themselves, either individually or through Cooperative societies composed
solely of the tribes with the financial assistance of the State or its in·
strumentalities. it would itself be an opportunity to the tribals to improve E
their social and economic status and a source of their economic endowment
and empowerment and would give them dignity of person, social and
economic status and an opportunity to improve their excellence.
[420-A; B; C]
39. In the light of the conclusion that the word 'person' would include F
the State Government, the necessary corrolary would be that the transfer
of the land in Scheduled Area by way of lease, for mining purpose in favour
of non-tribals stands prohibited by para 5 (2) (b) of the Fifth Schedule read
-- with Section 3 of the Regulation. It is on record that the non-tribal
individuals have transferred their lease hold interest in the mining leases
G
In favour of some of the respondent-companies. The Government stands
"· prohibited to transfer the mining lease to Corporation aggregate etc.
except to its instrumentality. [422-G·H]

40. The lease being a transfer of an interest in the land or a right to
enjoy such property during subsistence of lease, its transfer stands H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A prohibited. It is well settled position of law that renewal of lease is in."reality
a fresh grant of lease, though it is called a renewal because it postulates the
existence of a prior lease. It has been brought out from record that some
of the respondents-companies have got transfer of mining lease in their
favour from the individual lessees. Therefore, the transfer of lease or
B renewal of mining lease in favour of some of the respondents is void as it
defeats the constitutional and statutory objectives. [423-A; B; CJ

State of M.P. & Ors. v. Krishnadas Tikararn, [1995] Supp. 1 SCC 587;
Ta1Un Bharat Sangh, Alwar v. Union of India & Ors., [1993] Supp. 3 SCC
115; State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi & Ors., [1985) Supp. SCR 354; Mis.
C Victoria Granites (P) Ltd. v. P. Rama Rao & Ors., JT (1996) 9 SCC 303 and
Arnbika Quany Works &Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1987) 1SCR562,
referred to.

41. Transfer of the Government land in favour of its instrumen-
talities, in the eye of law, is not a transfer but one of entrustment of its
D property for public purpose. Since, admittedly, a public Corporation acts
in public interest and n1Jt for private gain, such transfer stands excluded
from the prohibition under para 5(2) (b) of the Fifth Schedule and Section
3(l)(a) of the Regulation. Such transfer of lease, therefore, stands upheld.
But a transfer of mining leases to non-tribal natural persons or company,
E corporation aggregate or partnership firm etc. is unconstitutional, void
and inoperative. [423-D; E; FJ

42. The State Government is directed to ensure that all concerned
industrialists, be they natural or juristic person stop forthwith mining
operations within the scheduled area, except where the lease has been
F granted to the State Under-taking, i.e. A.P.S.M.D. Corporation; they
should report compliance of this order to the Registry of this Court within
six months of the receipt of this judgment. [431-D-E]

43. Prior to the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967, the Madras Forest
G Act 1882 was in force. For declaration of reserved forest for the purpose
of the Central Forest Act or a State Act, the set scheme has been devised,
namely, publication in the State Gazette constituting any land as a
reserved forest specifying its situation, its limit and a declaration con-
stituting such land as reserved forest. The words 'Forest Land' have not
been defined in the Andhra Pradesh Act or the Central Forest Act. 'Forest'
H bears extended meaning of a tract of land covered with trees, shrubs,
SAMATHA v. STATE 331

vegetation and undergrowth inter-mingled with trees with pastures, be it A
/ '
of natural growth or man-made forestation. The F.C. Act, as amended by
1988 Act was enacted to check deforestation and cqnservation of forest.

- Section 2, therefore, prohibits de-reservation of the forest or use of any
forest land for any non-forest purpose of assignment by way of lease or
otherwise of any portion of land to a11y private person other than Govern-
B
ment controlled or owned, organised or managed by the State Government
agency; it prohibits clearance of trees or natural growth in the forest land
or any portion thereof to use if for reforestation except for preservation.
Breaking up or clearance of fQrest land or a portion thereof is amplified
to be of non-forest purpose. The object of the F.C. Act is to prevent any
further deforestation which causes ecological imbalance and leads to c
environmental degradation.· It is, therefore, necessary for the State
Government to obtain prior permission of the Central Government for (1)
dereservation of forest; and (2) the use of forest land for non-forest
purpose. The prior approval of the Central Government, therefore, is a
condition precedent for such permission. The State Governments are
D
enjoined by Forest Conservation Act with power coupled with duty, to
obtain prior approval of the Central Government.
[424-E; 425-B; G; 426-D-F]
Collins English Dictionary, (1979) Edn.; Shorter Oxford English Die-
tionary; Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edn.) page 495; E
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Fifth Edu.) Vol. 2 page 1014 and Black's Law
Dictiona1y (6th Edu.) page 649, referred to.

44. The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 was enacted to protect
and improve environment and prevention of hazards to human beings, other
living creatures, lands and property. Section 3 of the Act enjoins the Central F
Government that it should take such measures as it deems necessary or
expedient for the purpose of protecting and improving the quality of the
environment and preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollu·
tion. Thus, the meaning of the expression 'forest land' in the respective Acts
requires extended meaning given so as to preserve forest land from
G

- 'deforestation' to maintain ecology and to prevent environmental degrada-
tion and hazardous effects on right to life. [426-G-H; 427·A-BJ

Virender Gaur & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., [1995) 2 SCC 577;
Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangarsh Samiti v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1990)
4 SCC 449; Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1991) 1 SCC 598; H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, [1987) 2 SCC 295; State of
Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Ors., [1988) 4 SCC 655; M.C. Mehta v. Union·
of India & Ors., [1992) 1 SCC 358; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action
v. Union of India & Ors., [1995) 3 SCC 77; Rural Litigation and Entitlement
Kendra v. State of U.P., [1989) Supp. 1 SCC 504; Tarnn Bharat Sangh, A/war
I
B v. Union of India & Ors., [1992] Supp. 2 SCC 448; Ve/lore Citizens' Welfare
Fornm v. Union of India & Ors., [1996] 5 SCC 647; Rural Litigation and
Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1989] Supp. 1 SCC 537; Siate
of H.P. & Ors. v. Ganesh Wood Products & Ors., [1995) 6 SCC 363; Mis.
Colorock Pvt. Ltd., Vijayawada v. The Directbr of Mines & Geology, Govern-
ment ofAndhra Pradesh, [1983] 3 ALT 59; M.S. Anupama Minerals v. Union
C of India & Ors .. AIR (1986) AP 225; M/s. Y~hwant Stone Wolks v. State of
U.P., AIR (1988) All. 121; Upendra !ha v. State of Bihar, AIR (1988) Pat.
263 andAmbala Manibhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, [1986] 27 2 Guj.
L.R. 1073, relied on.

D 45. Mining operations, though detrimental to forest growth, are part
of layout of the industry; provision should be made for investment or
infrastructural planning to reforest the area; and to protect environment
and regenerate forest. The Ministry of Environment and Forests and all
Secretaries of all the State Governments holding charge of Forest Depart-
ments, have a duty to prevent mining operations affecting the forest.
E Whether mining operations are carried on within the reserved forest or
other forest area, it is their duty to ensure that the industry or enterprise
does not denude the forest to become a menace to human consistence nor
a source to destroy flora and founa and biodiversity. The provisions of the
Forest Conservation Act get attracted to ensure preservation of forest. It
F is well settled law that mining operation is a non-forest purpose. It would,
therefore, be mandatory that even renewal of miniilg leases without prior
approval of the Central Government, is void. [428-G-H; 429-A; E; HJ

46. In respect of the lands leased to the 19th respondent, it has been
averred that (i) a sum of Rs. 350 crores has been invested for manufac-
G turing of "High Purity Sea Water" magnified by using 100% imported high
technology. The said product saves large foreign ·exchange for the country;
. and (ii) mining operations are carried on in plain area only and thereby
forest area is not affected. Since these averments have been made for the
first time in the written submissions, after Court reserved its decision, this
H Court was deprived of the advantage of having the response of the State
SAMATHA v. STATE 333

Government, which in fact, has not taken any active interest in this A
litigation. Therefore, it is necessary that the Chi~f Secretary of the Andhra
Pradesh State should constitute a committee consisting of himself,
Secretary (Industry), Secretary (Forest), Secretary (Tribal Welfare/Social
Welfare) to have the factual information collected and consider whether It
is feasible to permit the Industry to carry on mining operations. If the B
Committee so opines, the matter may be placed before a Cabinet Sub-Com·
mittee consisting of Chief Minister, Minister for Industries, Minister for
Forests and Minister of Tribal Welfare to examine the issue whether
licences could be allowed to continue until they expire by effiux of time or
whether it is expedient to prohibit further mining operations in the light
of Section 11 (5) of the Mining Act, to take appropriate action in that behalf C
·and submit report to this Court oil the Action so taken. [430-C-G]

47. In cases, where the similar Acts in other States do not totally
prohibit grant of mining leases of the lands in the Scheduled Area, similar
Committee of Secretaries and State Cabinet Sub-Committees should be
constituted and decision taken thereafter. However before granting leases, D
it would be obligatory for the State Government to obtain concurrence of
the Central Government which would, for this purpose, constitute a Sub-
committee consisting of the Prime Minister of India, Union Minister for
Welfare, Union Minister for Environment so that the State's policy would
be consistent with the policy of the nation as a whole. [430-H; 431-A-B] E
48. It would also be open to the appropriate legislature, preferably
after a thorough debate/conference of all the Chief Ministers, Ministers
holding the concerned Ministry and the Prime Minister and the Central
Ministers concerned, to take a policy decision so as to bring about a
suitable enactment in the light of the guidelines laid down above so that F
there would emerge a consistent scheme throughout the country in respect
of the tribal lands under which national wealth in the form of minerals, is
located. [431-C]

Per Saghir Ahmad, J. (Concurring)
G
1. The legislative history relating to the administration and control
of scheduled Areas indicates that from the very beginning, at least from
the 19th Century, Scheduled Areas inhabited by aborigingals and tribals
have been administered exclusively under .the control of the Central
Government through the Governor of the State by providing special H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A statutory measures. From the earliest time till the making of the Constitu·
tion, it was all along felt that the transfer of land in the Scheduled Areas
by a tribal to a person who was not a member of the Scheduled Tribe be
totally prohibited and if such a transfer was made, it was to be treated as
null and void. Government land in the Scheduled Areas could also not be
B allotted to persons who are not the members of the Scheduled Tribes. If
such land was proposed to be allotted to them, it could be done only under
the regulations made by the Governor. The basic concept was that the land
of the Scheduled Tribes should be protected and should not be frittered
away by transfer nor should any non-tribal be allowed to infiltrate in the
Scheduled Area by getting an allotment of land made in his favour. In case
C of a transfer of land which was void, the power to restore land to a tribal
or his heirs after evicting the non-tribal is also vested in the Government.
[455-D-G]

B. Shiva Rao The Framing of India's Constitution, referred to.

D 2. Constituent Assembly Debates indicate the mood of the repre·
sentatives of the people and the urgency they felt in protecting the land of the
tribals and need for prohibiting transfer of land in the Scheduled Areas to
non-tribals by the State Government. In the Draft Constitution, prepared by
the Drafting Committee, there was a clear prohibition on the allotment of
E Government land to non-tribals except in accordance with the rules made by
the Governor. In the Constituent Assembly when the Draft Fifth Schedule
was considered, no Member raised any objection that the Government
should be free to allot its land to the non-tribals in the Scheduled Areas as
all the Members were conscious of the fact that the special privileges and
special status enjoyed by the tribals should not be disturbed by allowing
F non-tribals to enter into that area. [454-D; 455-H; 456-A; B]

3. The protective measures adopted through legislation for the preser-
vation of tribal life, for the prevention of exploitation of tribals by non·
tribals and money-lenders and to seal infilteration of non-tribals in the
Agency tracts or Scheduled Areas rested on three main planks :
G
(a) Prohibition of transfer of land by tribal to a non-tribal with the
stipulation that such transfer will be null and void.

(b) Prohibiting Government from allotting land vested in it to
H non-tribal.
SAMATIIA v. STATE 335

(c) Power of Government to evict non-tribal from the tribal's land A
coming into his possession through a void sale-deed and restor~
ing the same to the tribal or his heirs. [456-B·D]

4. Under Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule, the Governor has been
given the power to make Regulations for the "Peace and Good Government" B
of the Scheduled Area. The power to make Regulations also includes that
power to repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or of the State Legislature
or any existing law which may, for the time being, be applicable to the
Scheduled Area. The power to make Regulations is undoubtedly legislative
in character. The power.to issue directions under Para 5(1) of the Fifth
Schedule as to the applicability ofan Act of Parliament or State Legisla- C
tore with such exceptions and modifications as the Governor may direct,
is also legislative in character. (457-A; D·F]

Chatturam & Ors. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar, (1947) FCR
116 = (1~47) FLJ 92 and Jatindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar & D
Ors., (1949) FLJ 225, referred to.

5. The Governor has been given the legislative power to make Regula·
tions for the "PEACE AND GOOD GOVERNMENT' of any area in a State
which is a Scheduled Area. The weirds "PEACE AND GOOD GOVERN·
MENT' are words of very wide import and give wide discretion to the E
Government to make laws for such purpose. (457-H; 458-A]

King Emperor v. Benari Lal Shanna, (1944) L.R. 72 I.A. 57; Raja
Jogenmdra Narayan Deb v. Debendra Narayan Roy & Ors., (1942) L.R. 69
I.A. 76; Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal, (1927) I.L.R. 54 Cal.
727 and T.M. Kanniya11 v.Income Tax Officer, Pondicheny andAnr., [1968) F
2 SCR 103, referred to.

Attorney-General for Saskatchewan v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., (1953)
AC 594; Riel v. The Queen, (1885) 10 AC 675 and Chenard & Co. & Ors. v.
Joachim Arissol, (1949) AC 127, referred to. G
6. In exe}'cise of the power conferred by Para 5(2) of the Fifth
Schedule, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh Promulgated Andhra Pradesh
Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959. These regulations were
amended by Regulation I of 1970, again by Regulation I of 1971 and by
Regulation I of 1978. These Rei;:utations have been made to give effect to the. H

J
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A power of Governor und~r clauses (a) and (b) of Para 5(2) of the Fifth
Schedule for "Peace and Good Government" in the Agency Tracts. These
Regulations also aim at ushering in an era of social equality where the most
backWard and isolated people who constitute the Scheduled Tribes may be
rehabilitated effectively in the nation's main-steam. The prohibition to sell
the land· to non-tribals and the further requirement that if the property
B comes to be vested in the Government or it becomes property at the dis-
posal of the Government, it will be sold, assigned or distributed only to the
tribals also is a measure nay, a strong measure, in that direction to give
effect to the philosophy of"Distributive Justice". These Regulations indicate
a departure from the normal laws relating to immovable property. Normal-
C Iy, an owner of an immovable property is free to transfer his property to ...
anyone he likes. But if he possesses property in the Agency Tracts or the
Scheduled Areas, his right to transfer the property is restricted as he can
transfer it only to a member of the Scheduled Tribe or to a Co-operative
Society comprising solely of the members of the Scheduled Tribes. So also,
under the usufructuary mortgage, possession has necessarily to be trans-
D ferred to the mortgagee but these Regulations prescribe that in no case
shall possession be delivered to the mortgagee.
[458-G; 463-H; 464-A-B; 461-B-C]
P. Rami Reddy& Ors. v.State ofAndhra Pradesh &Anr., [1988) 3 SCC
433, referred to.
E
7. At least in two circumstances, the property of a member of the
Scheduled Tribe or any other person in the Scheduled Area becomes the
property of the State Government:-

(1) lfa person is notable to sell his property either because a member
F of the Scheduled Tribe is not willing to purchase the property or is not
willing to purchase the property on the terms at which it proposed to be
sold, then the Agent, or the Agency Divisional Officer or any Prescribed
Officer can, by order, acquire the property on payment of compensation.
The property loses its original character and becomes the property of the
G State Government.

(2) If on a decree for ejectment being passed against a person in
occupation of the property belonging to a Scheduled Tribe under a sale
deed which is void, the property is sought to be restored to the transferor
or his heirs but they are not willing to take back the property or their
H whereabouts are not known, it would be open to the Government to assign
SAMATHA v. STATE 337

or transfer j:he property to any. other member of the Scheduled Tribe or A
· otherWise d/spose it of as if it was the property, at the disposal of the State
Governmei:lt. [461-D-G]

8. In these circµmstances, when the property either co~es to vest in
the State Government or becomes a property at the disposal of the State B
Government, the Government cannot transfer the property to a "person"
of its own choice but has to transfer, assign or sell to a member of the
Scheduled Tribe or a Co-operative Society of the Scheduled Tribes. The
possibility of the Government disposing it of to a person who is not a
member of the Scheduled Tri~e is totally ruled out by the Regulation.s by
providing that it shall be sol~, assigned or transferred only to tribals or C
their co-operative Society. If this applies to properties which become the
Government properties, how the properties which are already the Govern-
ment properties could be excluded from the applicability of these Regula-
tions? The Government has to be bound down to the Constitutional
scheme sought t!) be enforced through Regulations made by the Governor D
under Para 5(2) of the Finh Schedule and cannot be permitted to transfer
its own properties in favour of non-tribals so as to allow their infiltration
into the Scheduled Area. The prohibition contained in Para 3(1)(a) that
no person, whether he is a member of the Scheduled Tribe or not, shall
transfer his immovable property to a non-tribal must, therefore, in its E
scope, cover the Government, as well, which if it possesses land in the
Agency Tracts, cannot transfer it either by sale, allotment, lease or other-
wise to a non-tribal. To this limited extent, it has to be treated as a "person"
within the meaning of Clause 3(l)(a) of the Regulations. [461-H; 462-A-D]

F
9. The contention that the expression "or in such other manner and
subject to such conditions as may be prescribed" occurring in Para 3(l)(c)
indicate that the Government is not bound to sell the property to a niember
of the Scheduled Tribe or the Co-operative Society of the Scheduled Tribe,
cannot be accepted. The words "or in such other manner and subject to
such conditions as may b!! prescribed" occurring in Para 3(l)(c) and the G
words "or otherwise dispose it of as if it was a property at the disposal of
the State Government" have to be read, not in isolation, but in the context
of the other words used in those provisions. The emphasis throughout in
these Regulations has been that the property would be sold or transferred
only to a member of the Scheduled Tribe or their Co-operative Societies. H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The Constitutional scheme which is sought to be enforced through Regula-
tions is that the property of the Scheduled Tribe or · the immovable
property situated in Agency Tracts may be protected and be not frittered
' '
away and further that they may retain their original character and may
continue to belong to members of the Scheduled Tribe or their. Co-opera-
B tive Societies, or that if the property belongs to a non-tribal, it may not be
transferred to a non-tribal and may be trasnferred to a tribal alone. The
words ''.or in any other manner" in Para 3(1)(c) or the words "otherwise
dispose it of as it was a property at the disposal of the State Government"
occurring in Para 3 (2)(b) have to be read in that context with the result
that even ifthe Government intended to deal with such immovable proper-
c ties "in any other manner" it could deal only in a manner which would
ultimately benefit a member of ,the Scheduled Tribe or their Co-operative
Societies. The Fifth Schedule including Para 5 thereof as also the Regula•
· tions made thereunder by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh clearly seek to
implement the national policy that the· custom, culture, life-style and
D properties of the Scheduled Tribes in .the Agency Tracts and other immov-
able properties situated therein shall be protected. The Government being
under a legal constraint to deal with the property situated iii the Agency
Tracts only in the manner indicated above, cannot itself act beyond the
scope of the Regulations by saying that it is free to dispose of its own
E properties in any manner it likes. If the Government was ,allowed to
transfer or dispose of its own land in favour of non-tribals it would
completely destroy the legal and constitutional fabric made to protect the
Scheduled.Tribes. The prohibition, so to say, disqualifies non-tribal.s as a
class from acquiring or getting property on transfer. On account of this
p disqualification, the Government cannot, even if it is not a "person" within
the meaning of Para 3(1)(a), transfer, let out or allot its land or other
immov.able property to a non-tribal. [462-F; G; 463-A-G]

10. The scheme set out in the Fifth Schednle and Regulations made
by the Governor in exercise of the power under Para 5(2) of the Schedule,
G is to sell, distribute, assign or let out the Government bmd only to
members of Scheduled Tribes. Section 11(5) introduced in the Mines and
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 only seeks to give effect
to what was already contained in the Fifth Schedule and the Regulations
made thereunder. In order to set at rest the above controversy raised at
H various levels that the Government land could also be allotted to non-
.'
SAMATHA v. STATE 339
tribals, tlie Amendm~nt was brought about in the Mines and Minerals A
(Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 so as to make it sure that it was
'
never the intention that the Government land could be allotted to non·
tribals. The Amendment only reitrates the existing position. [464-E; F; G]

Per Pattanaik, !. (Partly dissenting)
B
1. Under the British rule though steps had been taken to ·make
provision for special administration of the tribal areas but there had been
no prohibition for transfer of government land in favour of a non-tribal
within the scheduled area. Under different laws and regulations operating
in different tribal areas prior to coming into force of the Constitution there C
was restriction in relation to transfer of lands belonging to the tribals in
favour of a non-tribal within the scheduled area but not such restriction
was there so far as governmentland was concerned. [502-E; Fl

B. Shiv Rao "The Framing of India's Constitution'~ refe1red to. D

2. The legislative history and the debates in the Constituent Assemb·
ly culminating in engrafting of Schedule V of the Constitution conferring
power on the Governor to make regulation for administration of tribal
area were all aimed to prevent the tribals from exploitation of non-tribals
and the prohibition/restrictions were all in relation to the transfer of lands E
belonging to the tribals in favour of non-trib::ls and it never intended to
have any such prohibition in relation to government land. The Draft
Constitution had put two restrictions, namely, a member of a Scheduled
tribe was not entitled to transfer land within the scheduled area to a
member of non-Scheduled tribe, and so far as the land vested in the State F
is concerned, the prohibition was that the said land belonging to the State
should not be allotted or settled in favour of a non-scheduled tribe except
in · accordance with the Rules made in that behalf by the Governor in
consultation with .the Tribes' Advisory Council. To the aforesaid Draft ·
several amendments were proposed by several speakers. So far as para- G
graph 6 of Schedule V of the Draft Constitution is concerned, the proposal
in the draft that land belonging to the State should not be allotted to or
settled with any person who is not a member of Scheduled Tribe was
rejected and, therefore, in the final form in Schedule V there is no such
indication that even the government land within the Scheduled area should
not be allotted to a non-Scheduled Tribe person. It was not the intention H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A of the Constitution Makers to prohibit alienation of the land vested in the
State within the scheduled area in favour of a non-scheduled Tribe person.
On the other hand, though it was in paragraph 6(2) of the Draft Constitu-
tion of Schedule V but it stood deleted while bringing the Vth Schedule in
its final form. (502-G-H; 476-E-G; 477-C; DJ

B 3. Vast track of lands lie within the Tribal area which is rich in
mineral resources and the entire mineral resources of the country lie
within the scheduled area of different States. In interpreting the provisions
of the Regulation and the Constitutional mandate engrafted in Fifth
Schedule of the Constitution as well as different other Articles of the ..
C Constitution, it must be borne in mind that the interpretation should
subserve the main object, namely the development of the scheduled area
and the protection of the tribal people from exploitation of the non-tribal
people. It is in this perspective Articles 46 and 37 (b) of the Constitution
have to be looked into. [477-F•G-H]
D
4. Article 46 embodies the concept of 'distributive justice' which
connotes the removal of economic inequalities and rectifying the injustice
resulting from dealings on transactions between unequals in society. It
means those who have been deprived of their properties by unconscionable
E bargaining should be restored to their property.

Similarly, when Article 39(b) of the Constitution enjoins upon the
State to have its policy towards securing that the ownership and control
of the material resources of the community are so distributive as best to
F subserve the common good, what, it connotes is a duty on the State for
building of a welfare State and an egalitarian social order. The object is
that the basic need of a common man must be fulfilled and the State should
endeavour to change the structure of the society. The aforesaid provision,
no doubt, may support a case of nationalisation of material resources but
by no stretch of imagination it can be said that it enjoins upon the State
G to exploit the mineral resources within the Scheduled area by itself or
through the Scheduled Tribes alone. The declaration of 'Right to
Development' adopted by the United Nations and notified by India casts a
responsibility on the State to promote and protect social and economic
order for development of all people and it has become States' respon·
H sibility to create conditions favourable~ the realisation of the right to
SAMATHA v. STATE 341

development. There possibly cannot be any dispute with the proposition A
that the State should formulate its policies and laws so that the neglected
tribals within the Scheduled areas get equal opportunity with their
counter-parts in the other sophisticated parts of the State and State
should be empowered to make laws for protection of these tribals from
being exploited by the non-tribals. State should take all effective steps so B
·as to eradicate inequalities. However, this scheme of the Constituiion does
not in any manner suggest that alienation of Government land within the
scheduled area was intended to be prohibited in favour of a non-tribal
person. [478-B-H; 479-A]

5. A combined reading of Article 244 and Schedule V of the Constitu- C
tion would indicate that there is no constitutional obligation on the Gover-
nor to make regulation prohibiting transfer of government land in favour
ofa non-tribal within the scheduled area. The history oflegislation treating
the tribal areas different from the other areas is basically intended to save
the tribal people from being exploited by the non-tribals. It is with that D
objective Article 244 of the Constitution made the Fifth Schedule ap-
plicable to administer scheduled area and tribal area, and the Fifth
Schedule of the Constitution, in turn, conferred power on the Governor to
notify the laws made by Parliament or by the legislature of the State to
apply or not to apply and further Governor has been conferred power to E
make regulation for the peace and good government of any area within a
. Sta.le. Such wide power has been conferred upon the Governor which is
plenary in nature so that Governor can by regulation prevent exploitation
of the tribals from the non-tribals, When such legislations made by Gover-
nor in exercise of power has been challenged Courts have upheld the
validity of the same on the ground that it is intended to save the tribals F
from the other non-tribals in the area who usually take advantage of the
simplicity and ignorance of the tribal people. But it is difficult to accept
the contention that the Constitutional scheme intended total prohibition
of transfer of even the government land in favour of the non-tribal.
[503-A; 485~E-H; 486-A] G
6. The Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area land Transfer Regulation
1959 has been framed by the Governor in exercise of power conferred upon
him under Paragraph 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. This
original Regulation was subsequently amended in 1970. A plain reading of
the regulation as it stood prior to its amendment in 1970 clearly indicates H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A that the Governor has framed the regulation as a regulatory measure
putting some embargo on the power of transfer of a member belonging to
Scheduled Tribe in respect of his immovable property. The said embargo
enabled a· member of a Scheduled Tribe to transfer the immovable proper-
ty only in favour of another member of a Scheduled Tribe or in favour of
B a Co-operative Society composed solely of members of a Scheduled Tribe.
If the transfer was intended to be made·in favour of a non-Scheduled Tribe
member then it could be so made but only with previous sanction of the
State Government or with the previous consent in writing of the agent or
any prescribed officer subject to the rules made in that behalf. Thus
immovable property belonging to a Scheduled Tribe could be lawfully
C transferred in favour of a non-Scheduled Tribe member but only with
previous sanction of the State Government. Under the pre-amended
provisions, therefore, question of any fetter on the powers of the State
Government in transferring government land in favour of a non-tribal did
not arise at all. [480-C-D; 482-H; 483-A-C]
D 7. The changes brought about by the amended Regulation of 1970
were essentially intended to facilitate effective enforcement of 1959 Regula-
tion and the object of the amended Regulation cannot be held to be total
prohibition of alienation of all land including a government land within
the scheduled area in favour of a non-tribal. [486-G]
E
8. It is a cardinal rule of construction of statute that the statute must
be read as a whole and construction should be put to all the parts together
and not of anyone part only by itself. Every clause of a statute is required
to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act
p so that so far as possible the meaning of the enactment of the whole statute
would be consistent. When legislature uses the same word in different
parts of the same Section on statute, there is a presumption that the word
is used in the same sense throughout. But the aforesaid presumption can
easily be displaced by the context in which the particular word is used. A
G word which is used more than once in sub-section of a section may connote
and denote divergent things depending upon the context.
'
[487-G-H; 488-A-B-; G]

Suresh Chand v. Gu/am Chisti, [1990] 1 SCR 186; Mohd. Shafi v.
Seventh Additional District & Sessions Judge, Allahabad & Ors., [1977] 2
H SCR 464; Reghubans Narain Singh v. The Uttar Pradesh Govemment through
SAMAIBA v. STATE 343

Collector of Bijnor, [1967] 1 SCR 489; Shamrao Vishnu Parnlekar v. District A
Magistrate, Thana, [1956] SCR 644 and Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P. &
Ors., [1977] 1SCR1072, referred to.

Fa"el v. Alexender, (1976]. 2 All ER 721 and.Madras Electric Supply
Corporation Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Boarland (ll!spector of Taxes), All ER B
(1955] 1 753, referred to.

9. The word 'person' used in Section 3(1) (a) of the Andhra Pradesh
Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation as amended in 1970 has to be
construed to convey the same meaning throughout the Section and the said
expression does not include the State Government. Neither the legislative C
history nor the object with which special power has been conferred on the
Governor under Fifth Schedule to the Constitution make it necessary to
construe the word 'person' in the first part of Section 3(1)(a) differently
from the rest part of the Section so as to include State Government within
the said expression. (503-B; CJ
D
10. In the constitutional scheme under which the Regulation has
been framed and the object and purpose for which the regulation has been
framed by the Governor it is not warranted that a different meaning be
given to the same word 'person' in' different part of the regulation. The
normal rule is that general words in a statute must receive a general E
construction unless there is something in the Act itself such as subject
matter with which the Act is dealing or the context in which the words are
used to show the intention of the legislature that they must be given a
restrictive or wider meaning. But on examining the provisions of Section
3(1)(a) of the Regulation after its amendment, the word 'person' used in F
Section 3(1)(a) of the regulation cannot be interpreted differently because
neither the contexi in which the word has been used calls for such an
interpretation nor the interpretation of giving a literal meaning to the
word would lead to any absurdity or unintended result nor even it can be
said to be promoting larger national purpose. (488-H; 489-A-B; 490-D]
G
11. The constitutional scheme embodied in Article 15(4) and Article
46 as well as the power conferred upon the Governor of a State under
Schedule V of the Constitution are intended to preserve and protect the
interest of the tribal in the tribal area. It cannot be said by any stretch of
imagination that all lands within the tribal area vest in the tribal people. H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.}l.

A State is the paramount owner of lands and in the garb of preventing the
exploitation of tribals from the non-tribals so far as the lands belonging
to the tribals are concerned the State cannot be denuded of its power to
exploit resources which vest with the State. Judged from this angle there
is no justification for interpreting the word 'person' in the first part of
B Section 3(1)(a) of the regulation to include State and, therefore, the
prohibition and restrictions. contained in the regulation would not apply
to the lands belonging to the State. [491-D; E; F]

12. If the word 'person' used in Section 3(1)(a) is interpreted to
mean to include the State then the expression whether or not such a
C person is a member of a Scheduled Tribe becomes meaningless as the
State can never be a member of the Scheduled Tribe. If a literal meaning
to the word 'person' is given in Section 3(1)(a) of the regulation then the
prohibitions or restrictions contained therein would apply with full force
to inter se transfer ofland between the Scheduled Tribe and non-Scheduled
D Tribe and such an interpretation would subserve the main object of the
legislation, namely, to save the tribal people from being exploited upon by
the non-tribal people. If the constitutional scheme embodied in Articles
15(4) and 244 as well as in the Fifth Schedule is intended to save the tribal

E
people from being exploited upon by the non-tribal both in relation to_
their lands as well as in the matter of taking loans from the moneylenders,
there is no obligation to construe the word 'person' to include the State
.
in the first part of Section 3(1) (a) of the regulation. In view of the history
of the legislation, it is crystal clear that the prohibitions and restrictions
never intended for the lands belonging to the Government and the
provisions both prior to the Constitution and under the Constitution are
F intended to deal with the tribal people separately so that better attention
can be bestowed for their social and economical upliftment ..It is with this
objective, Fifth Schedule of the Constitution conferred power on the
Governor not only to indicate which laws made by the Parliament and the
State Legislature would apply within the Scheduled area and which laws
would not apply, but further to make regulation for administration of the
G tribal areas for peace and good government in respect of a scheduled area.
The matters indicated in Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of V Schedule of the
Constitution as well as the general power of the Governor to frame
regulation contained in sub-section (1) of Section 5 ofV Schedule, neither
expressly nor by necessary implication prohibit transfer of government
H land in favour of a non-tribal within the Scheduled Area nor there is any
SAMATHA v. STATE 345

mandate embodied in Article 15(4) or in Article 244 prohibiting the A
transfer of government land in favour of a non-scheduled tiibe person
within the scheduled area. Thus the expression 'person' used in Section
3(l)(a) of the Regulation should have its natural meaning throughout the
Section to mean 'natural' person' and it does not include the State; In other
words, the State is not denuded of its power in the matter of exploiting its B
mineral resources within the scheduled area by grant or renewal of lease
even in favour of non-tribal persons and the restriction§ and embargo
contained in regulation 3(1)(a) is not applicable to the State in dealing
with the land belonging to the State. Therefore, provisions of the Regula-
tion have not been contravened by granting mining leases in favour of the
Non· Scheduled Tribe person within the Scheduled Area. C
[492-G-H; 493-A-H]

State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964) 1 SCR 371; Printers
(Mysore) Ltd. &Anr. v.Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer& Ors., [1994) 2 SCC
434; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore v. J.H. Gotia Vadagir, [1985)
4 SCC 3434; Dr. M. Ismal Faruqui & Ors. Etc. v. Union of India & Ors. Etc. D
Etc., [1994) 6 SCC 360; P. Rami Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh
& Anr. Etc., [1988) Supp. 1 SCR 443; Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State
of Maharashtra & Anr. Etc., [1985) 1 SCC 479; Manchegowda and Ors. v.
State of Kamataka & Ors., [1984) 3 SCC 301 and Union of India v. Jubbi
and Dunia Etc., [1968) 1SCR44, referred to. E

Appin v. Race Relations Board, [1974] 2 All ER 73, referred to.

13. Notwithstanding the conclusion that the word 'person' occurring
in Section 3 (1) of the Regulation does not include 'State' and as such the F
mining leases granted in favour of different persons do not contravene the
provisions of the Regulation, the lessees should be required to spend a
part of the profit for the upliftment of the tribals and for maintaining the
ecology in the scheduled areas. Notwithstanding the constitutional obliga-
tion of the Governor to make special provision for ameliorating the
economic status of the tribal people so as to assimilate them into the G
national main stream, nothing tangible appears to have been achieved in
this regard evenafter 50 years of independence. The tribal people who
constitute a substantial majority of the Indian population still spend their
time in jungles and other inaccessible areas and sufficient legislative and
executive measure has not been taken for improving the living conditions H
346 ·SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C,R.

A of these tribals people. Since the mining activities are being carried out·
mostly within the scheduled areas it is the duty of the State to see that a
part of the profits earned by the lessees should be spent for ameliorating
the living conditions ·of the tribals by the lessees themselves. The said
objective has to be achieved by appropriate legislation making it compul-
B sory for the lessees within the tribal area to spend a portion of the income
arising out of the mining business for the general upliftment of the living
conditions of the tribal people. This should be in addition to· the royalty
and other cess under different legislations. The State may also consider
the question of incorporating some provisions in the leases itself for
achieving the aforesaid objectives. [499-A-G]
c
14. The conclusion of the High Court in the impugned judgment that
the Conservation Act applies only to a reserved forest cannot be sustained.
The said conclusion is therefore set aside. Consequently no mining ac-
tivities can continue on any forest land unless prior approval of the
D Central Government is obtained as required under Section 2 of the Con-
servation Act. The forest land in Section 2 of the Conservation Act would
receive an extended meaning to include within its sweep an extensive track
of land covered with trees, shrubs, vegetation and undergrowth inter-
mingled with trees with pastures, be it of natural growth or men made
forestation, yet unless and until it is so determined by the State Govern-
E ment that the mining activities of the respondents are being carried on
over forest land it will not be possible to state that the provisions of Section
2 of the Conservation Act gets attracted. Consequently, the only possible
direction which this Court can issue in the facts and circumstances of the
present case is that the State of Andbra Pradesh through its officers of the
F Forest Department, should immediately inspect the mining areas of the
private respondents and find· out whether the lands covered under the
mining leases in question form a part of the forest land and if it comes to
the conclusion that it is apart and parcel of the forest land and no prior
approval of the Central Government bas been obtained for carrying out
the mining activities then immediate direction should be issued to the
G respondents to stop the mining activities. This direction is necessary in
the case in hand as on the b.asis materials produce~ by the parties, it bas
not been possible to come to the conclusion affirmately that the land in
question formed a part and parcel of the forest land. [497-D; E; 498-8-F]

H T.N. Godavaraman 17iintmulkpad v. Union of llldia & Ors., [1997] 2
. SAMATHA v. STATE 347

SCC 267; [1998] 2 SCC 59; Supreme Court Monotoring Committee v. A
Mussorie Dehradun Dev. Aty. & Ors., WP (Civil) No. 749 of 1995; Divisional
Forest Officer & Ors. v. S. Nageswaramma, [1996] 6 SCC 442 and State of .
Bihar v. Banshi Ram, Ambica Quany Works v. State of Gujarat, [1987] 1
sec 213, referred to.
15. The petitioner has.not been able to make out any case of violation B
of .the provisions of the Environment Protection Act in the case in hand.
· The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 was enacted by the Parliament as
· it was thought necessary to protect and improve the environment and to
prevent hazards to human beings, other living creatures , plants, and
property. A combined reading of the provisions of the Act indicate that C
there must be necessary particulars to find out whether there has been any
emission of the environment pollutant in excess of the standard fixed
under the rules and it is only then the question of complaining before a
court and taking cognizance of the same arises. In this case there is not
an iota of material to come to the conclusion that on account of the mining D
operations. conducted by the respondents there has been any emission of
environmental pollutant in excess of the standard prescribed under the
Rules, nor it is possible to hold that there has been any environmental
pollution on account of carrying on the mining operations. On the facts
b alleged it is not possible to embark upon the enquiry as to whether the E
grant of leases within the tribal area are in violation of the provisions of
Environment Protection Act nor the leases can be annulled on that score.
[503-G; 498-H; 499-A; 501-B; C; DI
Tarnn Bharat Sangh, A/war v. UOI & Ors., [1992] Supp. 2 SCC 448
and Subhash Kumar v. State of Bil!ar & Ors., [1991] 1 SCC 598, referred F
to.

16. Section 11(5) of the MMRD Act being prospective in nature will
have no application to the existing mining leases and, therefore, the leases
of the respondents' can't be annulled on that score. After coming into force G
of Section 11 (5) no mining leases can be granted or renewed within the
Scheduled area to any person who is not a member of Scheduled Tribe
within the State of Andhra Pradesh. The only exception being as contained
in the proviso, namely, an undertaking owned or controlled by the State
or Central Government or a society registered or deemed to be registered
under Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act which is composed of H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A members of Scheduled Tribes are excluded from the rigour of sub-section
(5) of section 11. But section 11 (5) does not affect the subsisting leases
and, therefore, the ieases in favour of the respondents cannot be said to
be invalid on the ground of infraction of section 11(5) of the MMRD Act.
This provision is prospective in operation and would be applicable to any
lease or renewal of a lease subsequent to the enactment of section 11(5) of
B the MMRD Act. The leases of the respondents being prior to the aforesaid
enactment are not hit by the said provision. [503-G; 501-H; 502-A-D]

In CA. No. 4603 of 1997

C 17. In view of the conclusions in the connected appeals to the effect
that the word 'person' used in Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation does not
include the State Government, and therefore, the prohibitions contained
in the said Regulation with regard to transfer of land in favour of a
non-tribal will not apply to the transfer of land made by the Government
for the purpose of mining lease, the conclusion of the High Court on this
D score is erroneous. [505-G-H; 506-A]
18. So far as the question of applicability of the Conservation Act is
concerned the conclusion of the High Court in the impugned judgment has
to be sustained. In view of the inquiry report and the stand taken by the
E State Officials the land over which the appellant was permitted to carry
on mining activities is a forest land and before grant of lease in favour of
the appellant no approval of the Central Government has b!'en taken.
Though the Conservation Act came into force much later than the grant
of mining lease in favour of the appellant, but in view of the general
directions issued by this Court in T.N. Godavanna11's case the mining
F activities being a user of the forest land for non-forest purpose has to be
stopped and in case it is intended to continue the mining activities the
same can ·be done only after referring the matter to the appropriate
authority of the Central Government and getting the permission for the
same. Therefore, the conclusion of the High Court in the impugnedjudg-
G ment so far as violation of Conservation Act is concerned is unexcep-
tionable. Necessarily, therefore, the ultimate direction given by the High
Court remains unaffected. [506-A-E]

T.N. Godavam1a11 171immulkpod v. UOI, [1997] 2 SCC 267; [1998] 2
SCC 59; Ambika Quany Works v. State of Gujarat, [1987] 1 SCC 213 and
H State of Bihar v. Ba11shi Ram, [1995] 3 SCC 643, referred to.
SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 349

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 4601-02 A
and 4603/97 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.4.95 and 27.8.93 of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. Nos. 9513/93 and 7725 of 1994 and
3734/93.
B
Rajiv Dhawan, Sudhir Chandra, P.A. Chaudhary, Dr. Roxna S.
Swamy, R.N. Keshwani, D.N. Mishra, P. Niroop, Nandini Gore, Mrs. Sona
Khan, A.V. Rangam, B. Parthasarathy, T. Anil Kumar, L.N. Rao, S.U.K.
Sagar, Vimal Dave, J.P. Pathak, A.C. Mahimkar, (E.C. Agrawala and K.R.
Chowdhary) (NP), T.V. Ratnam, L.N. Rao and V. Sridhar Reddy, for the C
appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. RAMASWAMY, J. Leave granted.
D
These appeals are directed to resolve mutually inconsistent law
adumbrated by two Division Benches of Andhra Pradesh High Court. The
appeals arising from SLP(C) No. 17080-81/95 are filed against the judg-
ment passed on April 28, 1995 in Writ Petition Nos. 9513/93 and 7725/94
in which the Division Bench has held that the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled E
Area Land Transfer Regulation (1of1959), as amended by Regulation II
of 1970 (for short, the 'Regulation') and the Mining Act (67 of 1957) do
not prohibit grant of mining leases of Government· land in the scheduled
area to the non-tribals. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 (for short, the
'FC Act') does not apply to the renewals. The Andhra Pradesh Forest Act,
1967 also does not apply to tht; renewal of the leases. It, accordingly F
dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellant challenging the power of
the Government to transfer the Government land situated in the tribal area .
to the non-tribals for mining purpose.

In the appeal arising from SLP(C) No. 21457 of 1993 filed by
Hyderabad Abrasives and Minerals, another Division Bench, earlier had G
taken dramatically the opposite view and held that mining leases are illegal.
The word 'person' used in Section 3 of the Regulation includes Govern-
' ment. Any lease to the non-tribals even of the Government land situated
1 in scheduled area is in violation of Section 3 and so is void. Equally, it held
that. a mining lease in a forest area for non-forest purpose or renewal H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A thereof, without prior approval of the Central Government, is in violation
of Section ·2 of the FC Act. Accordingly, the Division Bench directed the
Government to prohibit mining operations in scheduled area except that
the mines stacked on the surface be permitted to be removed after obtain-
ing proper permits. This decision, though earlier in point of time, was not
brought to the notice of later Bench mentioned above.
B
The admitted facts are that Borra reserved forest area along with its
environs consisting of 14 villages, is the notified scheduled area in Anan-
thagiri Manda! of Visakhapatnam District of Andhra Pradesh. The State
Government granted mining leases in this area to several non-tribal per-
C · sons. K. Appa Rao, respondent No. 13, was granted mining lease in that
·reserved forest area. Most of the area granted to Mis. Perclase India Ltd.,
respondent No. 7 falls in reserved forest area. M/s. Unirock Minerals Pvt.
Ltd., respondent No. 8 had 125.30 acres in the reserved forest area and
45.70 acres in the non-reserved forest area. M/s. Kalyani Minerals, respon-
D dent No. 10 had 48:00 acres in the reserved forest area and 32 acres in
non-reserved forest area. One M. Seetharama Swamy was granted mining
lease of an extent of 300 acres in Borra reserved forest area. Sri. R.K. Deo
is also having mining lease in that area. Respondent No. 9 is said to be the
legal heir of M. Seetharama Swamy. These facts are admitted in the
counter-affidavit filed by the Government.
E
It is also an admitted fact that Ananthagiri Manda! in which the
mining areas are situated, is within the scheduled area. The tribal people
from tribal groups are inhabiting therein. Two mining leases were granted
to one Chalpati Rao, respondent No. 11 for graphite to an extent of 50
F acres in Nandkote Reserve Forest for a period of 20 years on August 26,
1971. The lease deed was executed on January 24~ 1972 and expired on
January 23, 1992; it is stated that thereafter mining operations are not being
carried on. Similarly, mining lease for an extent of 111 acres of land
situated in Chimidipalli and Saripalli villages of Ananthagiri Manda!, was
granted on August 29, 1974. The lease was executed on December 20, 1974
G for a period of 20 years which expired on December 19, 1994. Mining lease
for Andhra Phosphates (P) Ltd. was granted to an extent of 271.544
hectares in Y. Seetharampuram, Veduruvada Reserved Forest on March
23, 1957 for 20 years. The lease deed was executed on June 10, 1957 which
was renewed for 20 years on May 2, 1978. The renewed deed was executed
H on the even date which would continue upto June 9, 1997. As stated earlier,
SAMATIIA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 351

K. Apparao, respondent No. 13, was granted mining lease for 20 years on A
July 20, 1978 which was executed on January 24, 1979. It is due to expire
on July 23, 1999. But, it is stated that at present he is not working out the
mining operations. Respondent No. 14, M. Venkatapathi Raju was granted
mining lease for 13.84 acres for yellow Ochra in unserveyed revenue
poramboke, in Konap~ram, Ananthagiri Manda! for a period of 20 years B
on April 4, 1980. The lease deed was executed on April 26, 1981 and is to
expire on April 25, 2001. It is claimed that the lease is not being worked
out and it is said to have lapsed. The lease granted to M/s. Visaka Mines
& Minerals, respondent No. 15, is said to be in non-surveyed area in
Mandaparti village of Ananthagiri Manda! on July 20, 1978 for a period of
20 years. The lease deed was executed on December 18, 1978 and it would C
expire on December 17, 1998. They are working out their mines. Another
lease was granted for 130 acres in reserved forest area of Sivalingam village
of Ananthagiri Manda! on September 20, 1977 for a period of 20 years
which expires on December 30, 1997. It is stated that the lease had lapsed
since it was not being worked out, w.e.f. February 9, 1988 as per G.O.Ms. D
No. 295 dated June 6, 1989. Associated Mica Exports, respondent No. 16
holds to leases for 50 acres in bumbriguda village of Ananthagiri Manda)
of a period of 20 years granted on March 13, 1986. The lease was executed
on September 11, 1986 and it is to expire on September 10, 2006. It is stated
that lease is not being worked out at present. They had another lease for E
10 acres in Borra group of villages for 20 years granted on October 20,
1983 and the lease deed was executed on November 21, 1983. The lease is
to expire on November 20, 2003. It is stated that the mining is not being
worked out at present. Respondent No. 17, N. Madan Mohan Reddy had
a lease in Mallagumuru village of Ananthagiri Manda!. The extent of the
land has not been mentioned but the lease was granted on July 4, 1984.
F
The lease was executed on September 5, 1984 and it is to expire on
September 4, _2004. It is stated that the mine is not being worked out at
present. M/s. Trowall Cements Ltd. obviously got it transferred from
N. Madan Mohan Reddy to whom lease was granted for 20 years in
G.O.Ms. No. 303, Industries and Commerce on July 9, 1984 for a period G
of 20 years. The lease deed was executed by Madan Mohan Reddy on
January 7, 1985 and is due to expire on January 6, 2005. It is stated that
the mining is not being worked out and steps are being taken to declare it
as a lapsed lease. It is the case of the appellant that the above lease was
sub-leased to l\1/s. Indian Rayon Industries Ltd., respondent No. 19 but in H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the affidavit filed by the Government, it is said that no steps are taken to
win over the mine from the leased area. On the other hand, in the
counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 19, it i~ admitted that
the mines are being worked out and that high purity calcite with minimum
silica content is their product. Calcite mine is available in Visakhapatnam
B District at a short distance of 100 kms. from their factory situated in
Visakhapatnam. One M. Laxminarayana was the lessee of an extent of
21.56 acres of land in Nimmalapadu village in Ananthagiri Manda! which
is valid upto May 31, 2005. Another lease of 37.895 hectares in Ananthagiri
Manda! was granted ior a period of 10 years. The lease is valid upto July
C 3, 1996. Respondent No. 19 had transfer of the said lease in its favour in
G.O.Ms. No. 4, Industry and Commerce dated January 5, 1993 and they
are working out the mines. M/s. Birla Periclase is a subsidiary of respon-
dent No. 19. It is stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government
that 21.56 acres of land containing mica, calcite, quartz and yellow ochra
in Nimmalapadu village which is the subject matter of the original lease
D dated November 17, 1984 for a period of 20 years had by M. Lax-
minarayana, was transferred to respondent No. 19. It was stated that the
same has further been transferred in favour of M/s. A.P. Mineral Develop-
ment Corporation Ltd. on December 20, 1994 by G.0.Ms. No. 456 dated
December 7, 1994. The latter is a State Government Undertaking but that
E is not so stated in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent
No. 19. It is sought to be justified that M. Laxminarayana, Respondent
No. 20, has a legal right to assign the lease in favour of Respondent No.
19. It is also admitted in the Government's counter-affidavit that by
operation of Section 11(5) of the Mine and Mineral (Regulation and
F Development) Act, 1957 (for short, the 'Mining Act'), as amended by
State Act, on and from August 14, 1991, no mining leases in the
scheduled area should be granted in favour of non-tribals. It is also
admitted that tribals have their patta lands in five enclosures and have
their right to cultivate those lands. It is the case of the appellant that
G after re-survey, the entire area was identified as reserved forest area or
at any rate is a forest area in scheduled area.

On this factual matrix, the appellant-Society claiming to protect the
interests and life of the scheduled tribes in the area, filed the writ petitions
questioning the power of the Government to grant mining leases in favour
H of non-tribals in the scheduled area, in violation of the Regulation which
SAMATHA V. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 353

prohibits transfer of any land in scheduled area to a non-tribal. The A
Division Bench of the High Court has, held that the Regulation does not
prohibit transfer of the Government land by way of lease to the non-tribals.
The word 'person' in Section 3 of the Regulation is applicable to natural
persons, namely, tribals and non-tribals. The Regulation prohibits transfer
of the land in scheduled area by a tribal to a non-tribal natural persons. B
The leases granted in accordance with the provisions of the Mining Act to
non-tribals are valid. The FC Act was not violated by grant of leases or
renewal thereof. Therefore, the writ, as sought for, was not available.
Resultantly, the writ petitions were dismissed.

In the appeal of M/s. Hyderabad Abrasives and Minerals, the ad- C
mitted facts are that the appellant was granted mining lease for 20 years
in 1974 for mining leatarite situated in Peddamaredumilli Reserved Forest
Area in East Godavari District. The total extent of the land leased was 318
acres out of which it was carrying on mining operation in 42 acres.
Similarly, other persons were also granted mining leases in the reserved D
forest area in East Godavari District. Consequently, M/s. Shakti, the
voluntary organisation filed, the writ petition in the High Court questioning
the. power of the Government to grant mining leases in violation of Section
3 of the Regulation and the FC Act. The lease expired in 1994. The
Division Bench held that by operation of the prohibition contained in
Section 3 of the Regulation and Section 2 of the FC Act, the appellant is E
not entitled to mining operations. However, since he had already broken
up the mining, the excavate.cl mine on the surface may be removed on
obtaining permission from the appropriate authorities. Feeling aggrieved,
the appellant has filed the above appeal.

The primary questions in these cases are : wliether the Regulation
F
would .<tpply to transfer of Government land to a non-tribal?; whether the
Government can grant mining lease of the lands situated in scheduled area
to a non-tribal?; whether the leases are in violation of Section 2 of the FC
Act?; and whether the leases are in violation of Environment Protection
Act, 1986 (for short, the 'EP Act')? It is stated in paragraph 3(c) of the G
Petition of Samatha that the Borra Reserve Forest area was part of the
domain of the Rajah of Jeypore and from time immemorial, it was a tribal
area occupied by tribal village5. They have pattas in their favour and do
cultivation. In 1967, 14 villages were declared as Borra Reserved Forest.
About 250 tribal families settled in 14 villages have in their occupation, 436 H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A acres of land in five enclosures. They are situated in Ananthagiri Manda!.
In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 10, M/s. Kalyani
Minerals, it is admitted that Borra caves may be as old as million of years.
It is admitted that the "entire area around Borra caves is thickly forested."
In the counter-affidavit filed by the District Forest Officer, respondent No.
B 4, it is admitted that Ananthagiri Manda! is a scheduled area and the tribals
belong to diverse denominations. It is also one of the important hill regions
of the eastern ghats and is known not only for the diversity of its flora and
fauna but also for the richness of mineral deposits. It is also rich in forest
wealth and the minerals. It is their contention that the forest wealth in this
area is the national asset.
c
Agriculture • a means of livelihood, succor for social justice and base for
dignity of person.

Agriculture is the main pmt of the economy and source of livelihood
D to the rural Indians and a source and succor for social status and a base
for dignity of person. Land is a tangible product and sustaining asset to the
agriculturists. In Waman Rao v. Union of India, [1981] 2 SCR 1 a Constitu-
tion Bench had observed that India being a predominantly agricultural
society, there is a "strong linkage between the land and the person's status
in social system". The strip of land on which they till and live assures them
E equal justice and "dignity of their person by providing to them a near
decent means of livelihood". Agricultural land is the foundation for a sense
of security and freedom from fear. Assured possession is a lasting source
for peace and prosperity.

F Agriculture is the only source of livelihood for Scheduled Tribes,
apart from collection and sale of minor forest produce to supplement their
income. Land is their most important natural and valuable asset and
imperishable endowment from which the tribals derive their sustenance,
social status, economic and social equality, permanent place of abode and
work and living. It is a security and source for economic empowerment.
G Therefore, the tribes too have great emotional attachment to their lands.
The land on which they live and till, assures them equality of status and
dignity of person and means to economic and social justice and potent
weapon of economic empowerment in social democracy.
-
H Ninety per cent of the Scheduled Tribes predominantly live in forest
SAMATIIA v. STATE [KRAMASWAMY,J.] 355

areas and intractable terrains 95 per cent of them are below poverty line A
and totally depend upon agriculture or agriculture based activities. and
some of them turn out as migrant construction labour due to their displace-
ment from hearth and home for the so-called exploitation of minerals and
construction of ptojects. As per 1991 Census, in Andhra Pradesh the
population of the Tribes was 41.99 lakhs. They adopted traditional shifting
B
cultivation (Podu or Jhoom), since they are poor and illiterate and away
from winds of modern agricultural technology and economy. Such cultiva-
tion is predominantly prevalent in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, North-eastern States and some
parts of Uttar Pradesh. According to this practice an area covered with
vegetation is burnt out to serve as manure. Cultivation is done for a year C
or two and then the area is abandoned. Another area is cleared in a similar
manner and again abandoned. Vegetation regenerates in the abandoned
area and after a lapse of 8 to 10 years, the area is again cleared and burnt
and, thus, shifting cultivation is carried on. This cycle repeatedly goes on.
Due to pressure on land this shifting cultivation has now been abandoned D
and the Tribes are settling to cultivate crops in fixed holdings.

Plight of the Tribes.

Detailed study in this behalf and of their exploitation has been
conducted by sociologists and anthropologists, the foremost notable of E
them being Prof. C.V.F. Haimendrof and Arher. Many others equally have
evinced keen interest and investigated into living conditions of the tribes,
their culture and customs, etc. which establishes that initially the tribals
had held large tracts of lands as masters and had their own rich culture
with economic status and cohesiveness as compact groups. The policy F
adopted by the rulers encouraged non-tribals to immigrate in large number
and settle down in tribal areas. Governments compelled tribal Chieftains
to permit non-tribals to take hold of revenue administration, which led to
the slippfug of lands from the hold of the tribes to the non-tribals. In the
"Tribes of India - The Struggle for Survival", Prof. Haimendrof has graphi- G
cally explained diverse methods by which the tribals were deprived of their
lands. Numerous methods adopted to exploit them having become un-
bearable, they rebelled against their exploitation. Inderelli (Andhra
Pradesh) police firing in which hundreds of innocent tribals were killed, is
one of the latest events which would depict the enormity of their exploita-
tion. By laying the railway tracks and roads as means of communication by H
356 SUPREME COU~T REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the British rulers, the tribal areas became accessible to the non-tribal
immigrants who, with limited means, came in large number in search of
livelihood and settled down in the agency areas and acquired large holdings
by exploitation of the tribals. Dr. P.V. Ramesh, IAS, Director, Tribal
Welfare in his article "Land Reforms Land Transfer in Scheduled Area" in
B a seminar organised by A.P. Judicial Academy and published by it as
"Scheduled Tribal and Social Justice" page 178 at 202 has stated that in
Utnoor Division of Adilabad District a tribal in whose name, 148 acres was
recorded as owner, was declared as surplus land-holder under the Land
Reforms Act and the only 5 acres of land in his actual possession and
enjoyment was taken by the Government as surplus land. In contract,
C Izaradars surrendered Government land as they entered their names in
revenue records as owners and claimed compensation under the Land
Acquisition Act for 742 acres.

The tribal economy was simple but with the gradual contact with the
D non-tribals they started taking loans. The wiles money-lenders and traders
exploited their innocence. Honest, truthful and hard working tribals
become pry for the greed and exploitation by non-tribals. They charged
maximum rate of interest etc. for fringe money or gains or goods lent to
them. Tribals had to repay disproportionately in three or four fold in kind.
E Exorbitant rate of interest was charged and repayment collected in kind,
i.e., the produce in three or four-fold. In the "Land Alienation and
Restoration in Tribal Communities in India" edited by S.N. Dubey and
Ratna Murdia, (Himalaya Publishing House), compilation of articles
presented and read out at a Seminar organised by Tata Institute of Social
Science in which bureaucrats and social scientists participated. B. Danam,
F IAS, then Project Officer, ITDA Khammam, had highlighted in his paper
about diverse modes of exploitation by money-lenders of the tribals in
Andhra Pradesh. They were : short-term loan at an exorbitant rate of
interest (Kandagutha), the repayment of which was made in ltind, i.e.,
harvest produced from a particular extent of land; the medium-term loan
G on the security of the immovable property, repayable with compound
interest at yearly or half-yearly rests. Third mode was lease of land against
a loan for a fixed number of years (Tirumanam) during which period the
tribals have to cultivate their land, raise the crop and deliver the entire
produce to the money-lender; by usufructuary mortgage, the money-lender
H remains in possession and enjoys the produce from the land for a fixed
SAMATHA v. STATE [KRAMASWAMY,J.] 357

number of years or till the principal sum is repaid; by advancing cash and A
kind loans (Namu) and lending commodities like foodgrains mostly for
sustenance during the lean months or for seedlings, on the condition that
the same would be repaid in full along with flat rate of interest at the time
of harvest and in default payment should be with compound interest; in
case of further default, the accumulated arrears get merged with the B
principal, i.e., by way of compound interest. The other types of
money-lending extend to petty loans or selling clothes on credit to the
tribals during the lean months on the condition that it would be paid in full
at the time of harvest and in default the money-lender would take over the
land by threat of physical force.
c
Legislative inteivention - Enforcement ineffectiveness.

The Ganjam and Vizagapatnam Act of 1839 declared the Agency
Areas of the Madras Presidency, comprising parts of southern Orissa and D
seven present Andhra Pradesh districts for special administration. In 1874,
the Scheduled Districts Act XIV (Central Act) was passed. Thereunder,
Scheduled districts were defined to mean the territories mentioned in the
First Schedule and parts thereof; they also include any other territory to
which the Secretary of State for India by resolution in Council, may declare.
Subsequently, the Act was extended to the Taluk of then Badrachalam in E
East Godavari District which is now a part of Khamman District together
with the districts covered under 1839 Act. The provincial Government
issued rules prescribing the procedure to be followed by the officers
appointed thereunder to administer Agency Tracts. Later on, the Agency
Tracts and Land Transfer Act 1 of 1917 came to be passed. Thereunder, F
to mitigate the hardships of the tribals from the wiles of money-lenders and
other migrants from plain area, provision was made so that rate of interest
would not exceeding 24% per annum and compound interest would not be
charged nor any collateral advantage would be taken by the money-lenders.
The total interest allowed or decreed should not to exceed the principal G
amount. The "Scheduled Districts" defined in 1874 Act were reconfirmed
in 1917 Act. Section 4 thereof prohibited transfer of land in the Agency
Tracts which read as under :

"4. Transfer of Immovable prope1ty by a member of ti hill tribe. H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A (1) Notwithstanding any rule of law or enactment to the contrary,
any transfer of immovable property situated within the Agency
. Tracts by the member of a hill tribe shall be absolutely null and
void unless made in favour of another member of a hill tribe, or
with the previous consent in writing of the Agent or of any other
prescribed officer.
B
(2) Where a transfer of property is made in contravention of
sub-section (1), the Agent or any other prescribed Officer may on
application by any one interested, decree ejectment against any
person in possession of the property claiming under the transfer
and may restore it to the transferor or his heirs.

(3) Subject to such conditions as may be prescribed an appeal
-
against a decree or order under sub-section (2) if made by the
Agent shall lie to the Governor in Council and if made by any
other officer shall lie to the Assistant Agent or to the Agent as
D may be prescribed. "Montague and Chaonsford Report, 1918 brief-
ly touched the administration of tribal areas and political reform
and excluded them from the reformed provincial Governments.
Govt. of India Act, 1919 divided the area into two parts "wholly
excluded and partially excluded areas for reform". The former were
E small and the latter were given joint responsibility of the Governor
and the Government General in Council."

Montague Chaonsford Report of 1918 suggested that the backward
area where primitive (tribal) live should be excluded from proposed politi-
cal reform and administration was entrusted to the Governors of the
F Provinces.

Pursuant to Simon Commission Report, the Government of India
Act, 1935 dealt with excluded and partially excluded areas as per Order
1936 issued under Section 91 of Government of India Act, 1935. Simon's
Report is worth-extracting here and reads thus :
·a
"There were two dangers to which subjection to normal laws would
have specially exposed these peoples, and both arose out of the
fact that they were primitive people, simple, unsophisticated and
frequently improvident. There was a risk of their agricultural land
H passing to the more civilized section of the population, and the
SAMATIIA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 359

ow1pation of the tribals was for the most part agricultural : and, A
secondly, they were likely to get into the "wiles of the
moneylenders". The primary aim of Government policy then was
to protect them from these two dangers and preserve their tribal
customs; and this was achieved by prescribing special procedures
applicable to these backward areas."
B
Therein also, "Scheduled Districts" defined in 1874 Act were treated
as excluded and partially excluded areas. The administration thereof was
exclusively vested in the Governor of the Province under Section 92 of
Government of India Act, 1935 sub-sections (1) and (2) which are relevant
for our purpose read as under : c
"92. (1) The executive authority of a Province extends to excluded
and partially excluded therein, but, notwithstanding anything in this
Act, no Act of the Federal Legislature or of the Provincial Legis-
lature shall apply to an excluded area or a partially excluded area, D
unless the Governor by public notification so directs, and the
Governor in giving such a direction with respect to any Act may
direct that the Act shall in its appli~ation to the area, or to any
specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions or

-- modifications as he thinks fit.

(2) The Governor may make regulations for the peace and good
E

government of any area in a Province which is for the time being
an excluded area·, or a partially excluded area, and any regulations
so made may repeal or amend any Act of the Federal Legislature,
or of the Provincial Legislature or any existing Indian Law, which F
is for the time being applicable to the area in question. Regulations
made under this sub-section shall be submitted forthwith to the
Governor General and until assented to by him in his discretion
shall have no effect, and the provisions of this Part of this Act with
respect to the power of His Majesty to disallow Acts shall apply G
in relation to any such regulations assented to by the Governor
General as they apply in relation to Acts of a Provincial Legislature
assented to by him."

The Government of India (Adoption of Indian Laws) Order, 1937 H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A repealed 1874 Act and brought excluded and partially excluded areas
directly under the governance of the Governor under Section 92 of the
Government of India Act, 1935. Thus they became the Scheduled Areas by
virtue of the Scheduled Areas (Part 'A' States) Order, 1950 issued by the
President of India. After the Advent of the Constitution, Fifth and Sixth
B Schedules were engrafted as part of the scheme of the Constitution by the
founding fathers. Fifth Schedule empowers the President of India who
thereunder issued Scheduled Areas (Part 'A' States) Order, 1950 declaring
specified areas therein to be Scheduled Areas within the States specified
in Part 'A' of the First Scheduled to the Constitution of India. Therein also
East Godavari, West Godavari and Visakhapatnam Agencies (Vizianagram
C and Srikakulam Districts are part of it) were declared to be Scheduled
Areas in Madras Province. Equally, by Scheduled Areas (Part 'B' States)
Order, 1950 which became effective from December 7, 1950, the President
exercised the power declaring certain specified areas as Scheduled Areas
in Part 'B' States including the State of Hyderabad (Adilabad, Karimnagar,
D Nizamabad, Warangal, Khammam, Mehboob Nagar Districts).

It would, thus, be clear that right from the inception of the Colonial
administration, the agency areas were treated distinctly from other areas.
Tribals were protected from exploitation; their rights and title to enjoy the
E lands in their occupation and their autonomy, culture and ecology were
preserved; infiltration of the non-tribals into tribals area was prohibited.
Sugalis, i.e., Khanabadosh, non-tribals, by migration became in due course,
tribals. Even those migrant non-tribals were prohibited to purchase the
lands in agency areas from the tribals except with the prior sanction of the
F officer appointed by the Government in that behalf. However, with the
connivance and fabrication of revenue records, non-tribals got hold of the
lands and exploited the tribals.

Prof. Haimendrof has explained how notoriously the migrants
G swelled in number in the agency areas in Telangana of Andhra Pradesh
and dispossessed the tribals from their holdings with impnnity and
prevented them from enjoying right over their lands or unlawfully dispos-
sessed them in collusion with the Patwaris, Deshmukhs or Deshpandes, the
lower level loc:al officials. He has given the comparison of population at
H page 57 thus :
SAMATIIA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 361

"Despite all such. obstacles the allocation of land to the tribals of A
Adilabad which began in 1944 made good progress. By 1945 a total
of 45, 417 acres of land had been granted to 3, 144 tribals, and by
1949 the amount of land assigned on patta to tribals had risen to
160,000 acres and the number of beneficiaries to 11,198. The work
continued until about 85 per cent of the tribal householders .of B
Adilabad adequate holdings of cultivable land."

At page 59, he has stated that :

"Visual impressions of the process of ethnic and cultural change
are supported by demographic figures. While in 1951 the popula- C
tion of Utnur Taluk was only 34,404, the majority of whom were
tribals, by 1961 it had risen to 55,099 and by 1971 to 93,823. No
official census figures are available for later years, but according
to a malaria survey of 1977 the population of the taluk had then
reached a total 112,000. This phenomenal increase is cl~arly due
to immigration, and all the new comers are non-tribals. The change D
in the composition of the population is reflected in the figures for
tribals in individual circles. Thus in the Marlavai Circle, which in
1941 was almost totally tribal, the percentage of tribals in 1961 was

- still 90.38 per cent, but by 1971 it had dropped to 65.52 per cent,
a figure which undoubtedly has diminished since then."

Narrating the event (after his revisit), he has stated at pages 59-60
E

thus:

"On 7 December 1976, Kumra Boju of Kerimeri came to see me
in Kanchanpalli and told me the following story : F

My father Somu owned fifteen acres of patta land, but for the
last thirteen years Rama Gaudu of Asifabad (a man of toddy-tap-
ping caste) has been cultivating this land. When my father died I
was a small child, and Rama Gaudu occupied our land. Some time G
ago I applied to M. Narayan, the Special Dy. Collector, for res-
toration of my father's land. The Dy. Collector decided the case
in my favour and restored the land to me. I was very happy and
ploughed the land in preparation for sowing jawari. But when I
was ready to sow Rama Gaudu, supported by some villagers of
Keslaguda, stopped my cultivating. Theri the Tahsildar, the H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A revenue inspector, and the Patel came to the village and told me
that my father's land was mine by right. But at the same time they
advised me not to cultivate that land, but to occupy instead of
adjoining field which belongs to a Muslim. How could I do this?
Then Rama Gaudu brought some men and sowed on my land.
Moreover Rama Gaudu had reported to the police that I had
B
illegally ploughed his land. So the Sub-inspector of police came to
my house with some constables and wanted to arrest me. But in
the end they did not take me to Asifabad. Rama Gaudu has
occupied also the patta land of three other Gonds, who are my
mother's brothers. They all died but they have sons who have a
c claim to their land. Now none of us has any land of our own
because Rama Gadu has all of it taken away."

This is· only a tiny iceberg of several instances. He has highlighted
the gross injustice done to the tribals. The book contains full details which
need no recounting here to avoid needless burden.
D
Dr. G.P. Reddy 2.t pages 66-67 of his book "Politics of Tribal Ex-
ploitation" has stated thus :

"These non-tribal cultivator immigrants enjoyed liberal conces-
E sions. They were assigned land just for asking even waiving land
revenue. Many of them were also conferred with right of Patel and
Patwari. They were encouraged not only to establish now villages
but also to settle in already well- established Goa villages. In this
process the aboriginals gained nothing but became mute witnesses
to the process set In by the rules which ultimately pauparised the
F tribals, turning them from land owners to agricultural proletariat."

Writing about the non-tribals acquiring interest in the land in the
tribal areas of Adilabad, Sethumadhava Rao has stated that :

"Where land outside the forest was vacant it was readily granted
G Patta to the non-tribals. The Gonds too had an opportunity of
acquiring Patta rights in the land but they were slow to understand
that they would suffer if they did not take advantage of these
concessions. The new Watandars made a subtle use of their offi~e
as village headmen to evict the original possessors or take lands
H vacated by them for themselves."
SAMAIBA v. STATE [KRAMASWAMY,J.] 363

Another modus operandi for evicting the tribals who were cultivating A
the lands was by treating them as Sivaijamabandi, i.e., treating as un-
authorised occupants. A cultivator who held land under Sivaijamabandi
tenure is liable to eviction at any time. The tribals who were owners under
the law were treated as unauthorised occupants by manipulation of revenue
records. The tribals who could not understand the meaning of Patta rights B
could not be expected to understand the meaning of Sivaijamabandi. In
many cases, though tribals had been cultivating the lands for several
decades and generations, they were purposefully categorised as
Sivaijamabandi, and were evicted. Their lands were assigned to non-tribals.
It is ridiculous even to classify the lands held by tribals as Sivaijamabandi
just because these people lacked knowledge of the nature of their rights C
over their lands.

Traditionally, the tribals of the area acquired absolute right over the
land for cultivation the day they started clearing new patches of forest.
Prof. Haimendrof has narrated hundreds of such cases wherein the poor D
tribals had complained to him as to how they had lost their lands because
of wrong and false entries made in the land records by the Patwaris. Even
till recently, the records were not maintained properly. This gave scope for
the manipulation both by the Patwaris as well as by the petty revenue
officials. This manipulation of records took place mainly due to corrupt
practices. E

Dubey's compilation gives first-hand account given by I.AS. officers
on the field representing Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra
represented then by K. Padmanabhaiah, the present Home Secretary, Govt.
of India, Orissa, M.P., Rajasthan and West Bengal and they had given
graphic first hand account of the magnitude of the problems of land F
alienations, causes of exploitation. They pointed out urgent need for res-
toration of the lands to the tribals. Dr. G. Prakash Reddy from ICSSR
surveyed the problems once again and has graphieally explained it in his
"Politics of Tribal Exploitation" (Mittal Publication). "The Khonds and
Jaungs in Andhra Pradesh, Hand Book for Development" by Dr. Ramakant G
Nath, B.M. Boal and N. Soreng tells the plight of, and the need for
restitution of the land to and rehabilitation of, Orissa tribes. The Reports
of the Commissioner of SCs. and STs., 1980-81 and 1984-85 also emphasise
the urgency of the problem. As in the year 1995, in Andhra Pradesh, the
non-tribals are in possession of 7,51,435.66 acres in scheduled areas of A.P.
State (Vide page 192 of Scheduled Tribes and Social Justice). H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Like in Madras province, in Bihar, the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act,
1908 prohibited transfer of lands by sale etc. except with the previous
sanction of the Deputy Commissioner. The Bombay Province Land
Revenue Code, 1879 also prohibited transfer of land from a tribal to a
non-tribal without the permission of the District Collector. Similarly, the
B Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplemen-
tary Provisions) Act, 1959 and the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulations 1969
also prohibit the alienation of land of the tribals. These regulations also
provide for restoration of alienated land to the tribals or when converted
for urban use, to give them equivalent lands. As early as in 1901, in Gujarat,
some measures of protection were provided (when it formed part of the
C Bombay Province) by amendment of Sections 73-A and 79-A in the Bom-
bay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and imposed ban on transfer of land of
tribes in those scheduled villages in which survey and settlement had not
been introduced without previous permission of the Collector. The
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and Tenancy Laws (Amendment) Act,
D 1974 and the Maharashtra (Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes) Act,
1974 also prohibit alienation and ensure restoration of alienated lands to
the tribes. Dr. B.L. Maharda, IAS, a bureaucrat of Rajasthan Cadre, in his
"History and Culture of Giriasias" of State of Rajasthan, has narrated the
similar problems of tribals.

E
The Regulation prohibits absolutely the transfer of land in scheduled
areas of Andhra Pradesh between tribals and non-tribals or non-tribals
inter se. In 1971, an amendment was made to exempt hypothecation of lands
by tribes to the Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks and other financial
institutions approved by the Government, subject to certain conditions. In
F Assam, the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation Act, 1964 was enacted.
In Himachal Pradesh, the H.P. Transfer of Land (Regulation) Act, 1968
was made. In Karnataka, the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1948 was made applicable in Bombay region of the Karnataka State. The
Mysore Land Revenue (Amendnient) Rule, 1960 was suitably amended
G imposing restriction or alienation of the lands allotted to the Scheduled
Tribes and Scheduled Castes without prior permission of the Government.
In Kerala, the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 contains similar provision.
The Kerala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction of Transfer of Land and Res-
toration of Alienation Lands) Act, 1975 was enacted for the same object
which has recently been amended by a bill, details whereof are not avail-
H able. Madhya Pradesh, the M.P.L.P. Code, 1959, under Sections 165(6) and
SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 365

168(1), prohibits alienation of land and remedy of restoration thereof is A
provided. In Manipur, the Manipur Land Reforms and Land Revenue Act,
1970 was made. Similarly, the Orissa Scheduled Areas (Transfer of Immov-
able Property) Regulation and also Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960 were
made for the same purpose. The Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, as amended
iii 1956, prohibits such transfer of lands. In Sikkim, Sikkim Revenue Order,
1977 and Sikkim Agricultural Land Ceiling and Reforms Act, 1977 are B
enforced. Equally, the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955
provides the same relief. In Tripura, Tripura Land Revenue and Land
Reforms Act, 1960 imposes similar restrictions. In Uttar Pradesh, the U.P.
Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1982 was made though its implementation
was stayed by the High Court. C

The above bird's eye survey discloses the enormity of the yawning
gap between making of the Acts and their proper enforcement. The
magnitude of the problem is of national importance which needs to be
tackled and solved by Parliamentary law and effective enforcement.
D
As we have seen from the legislative history, from the beginning of
the British rule in India, the Legislature has adopted the policy to exclude
some areas totally and some partially from the governance through the
Executive Council and given power to the Governor of the Province and
the Governor General/Viceroy to administer them with their special E
responsibilities. The partially excluded areas had the dual control by the
Executive with primacy given to the Governor of the Province to apply or
to exclude the application of the laws made by the legislature or the
Executive Council to the partially excluded scheduled areas. In either event
the object was to prevent the tribals to get into the wiles of the money-
lenders and preservation of their property and customs and to allow the F
tribals autonomy of their living in accordance with their customs and
culture. Until the Simon Commission, the legislative protection was not
available in that behalf. The Simon Commission found it necessary to bring
the tribals to the main-stream of national life. In consequence, tribal area
was to be brought under the direct administration of the elected govern- G
ments by encouraging education, self-reliance and the provincial Govern-
ment were to devote special attention for their upliftment. But the scheme
was not given effect to in the Constitution of India Act 1935. As is seen
Sections 91 and 92 of the Government of India Act and the Cabinet
Mission Statement of May 16, 1946 emphasised the special attention on the
tribal areas. H

•
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A From this perspective, we are required to consider the debate in the
Constituent Assembly and the draft statements by the two Committees, one .
for the North-east area now called Sixth Schedule and the rest of the areas "
covered under Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. The Draft Constitution
on Fifth Schedule, presented by Dr. Ambedkar related to Draft Articles
B 215A and 215B making provision for the administration and control of
scheduled areas and Scheduled Tribes. Emphasis was laid therein on the
creation of the Tribal Advisory Council to assist the Governor or the Ruler
of each State having scheduled area therein, who are required to submit
annual report to Government of India regarding the administration of
scheduled area in that State, so that the executive power of the Union shall
C extend to that area to give directions to the State as to the administration
of the said area. Draft Part II, clause 5 relates to law applicable to
scheduled area and clause (a) of sub-clause (2) of Clause 5 postulated,
prohibition or restriction on the transfer of land by or among members of
the Scheduled Tribes in such area; clause (b) regulate the allotment of the
land to members of the Scheduled Tribe in such area and clause (c)
D regulate by person who lend money to members of the Scheduled Tribes
in such area. Sub-clause (3) of Clause 5 gives power to the Governor or
Ruler to amend any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State
or any existing law which is for the time being applicable to the area in
question. The draft report contained provision for allotment of the lands
E to the non-tribals. The report dated August 18, 1947 indicates that areas
like the Madras and Orissa agency still need to be of simplified type which
does not expose them to the complicated machinery of ordinary law course
vide Shiv Rao's study. It is provided at pp. 755-56 thus : As regards the
allotment of new land for cultivation or residence, however, "we are of the
view that the interest of the tribal need to be safeguarded in view of the
F increasing pressure on land everywhere. We have proceeded accordingly
that the allotment of vacant land belonging to the State in scheduled area
should not be made except in accordance with special regulation made by
the Government on the advice of the Tribal Advisory Council". In the joint
report on the partially excluded areas other then Assam and North-east
G frontier dated August 25, 1947 the above finds place. As per the minutes
of the advisory committee dated December 7, 1947 it was felt that the
amendment should be made after discussion in the Constituent Assembly.
In the revision of Articles qua allotment of land to non-tribals was retained.
However, after authorisation given by the Constituent Assembly to make
necessary restructuring to the Fifth Schedule as explained by Dr. Ambed-
H kar, the Draft was amended excluding all references to the allocation of

.
SAMATHA v. STATE [KRAMASWAMY,J.] 367

land of tribals to the non-tribals with no amendment proposed by any A
member vide Vol. 9 C.A.D., pp. 965-1001.

It would, therefore, be seen that before the Draft Constitution be-
came paramount law and the Fifth Schedule as its integral part, the
members of the Constituent Assembly deliberated to protect land, the
precious asset to the tribals, for their economic empowerment, economic B
justice, social status and dignity of their person by retention of the land
with the tribals not only belonging to them but also allotment of the
Government land. The proposal for allotment of the Government land to
the non-tribals though was initially proposed but was ultimately dropped.
After re-structuring Fifth Schedule, as presently found, the specific C
provision in the draft report to allot land to non-tribals was omitted which
was accepted by the members of the Constituent Assembly without any
demur or discussion.

The draft Constitution 1948, Clause (6) as originally proposed reads
as under : "(1) alienation of allotment of land to non-tribals in Scheduled D
Areas, it shall not be lav,ful for a member of Scheduled Tribes to transfer
any land in person who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes; (ii) no
land in scheduled area vested in the State within such area shall be allotted
to person who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes except in accord-
ance with the rules made in that behalf by the Governor in conEultation E
·with the Tribal Advisory Council for the State." The text ultimately ap-
proved by the Constituent Assembly as part of the Constitution reads as
under:

"(1) The Governor may make regulations for the peace and good
government of any area in the State which is for the time being F
a scheduled area.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing powers, such regulations may : -

(a) prohibit or restrict the transfer of a land by or among G
members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area;

(b) regulate the allotment of land to members of the
Scheduled Tribes in such area;

(c) regulate the carrying on of business as money- lenders by H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A person who lend money to members of the Scheduled Tribes
in such area."

It would, therefore, be clear from the narration of the Debates in the
Constituent Assembly that various drafts were placed before the Con-
stituent Assembly. Suggestions and ultimate approval of the Fifth Schedule,
B as extracted hereinbefore, would manifest the animation of the founding
fathers that land in the scheduled area covered by the Fifth Schedule
requires to be preserved by prohibiting transfers between tribals and
non-tribals and providing for allotment of land to the members of the
Scheduled Tribes in such area and regulating the carrying on of the
C business by money-landers in such area.

Constitutional Scheme to protect the T1ibes

Chapter VI, Part X of the Constitution deals with "Scheduled Tribes
D and Tribal Areas". Article 244 provides that the provision of the Fifth
Schedule shall apply to the administration and control of the Scheduled
Areas and Scheduled Tribes in any State other than the State of Assam,
Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. The provision of Clause (2) of Article
244-A are not relevant for the purpose of this case; hence omitted. The
Fifth Schedule makes the provisions as to the administration and control
E of Scheduled Area and Scheduled Tribes. Para (1) envisages that unless
the context otherwise requires, the expression "State" defined in the
Schedule does not include the State of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and
Mizoram. Part V of the Schedule gets attracted to its administration and
control. Para (2) envisaged that subject to the provisions of the Scheduled,
·F the executive power of a State extends to the Scheduled Areas enumerated
therein. Special duty has been entrusted to the Governor to report to the
President of the administration of scheduled area. It enjoins that the
Governor of each State, having Scheduled Areas therein, shall annually, or
whenever so required by the President, make a report to the President
regarding the administration of the Scheduled Areas in that State and the
G executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of directions to the
State as to the administration of the said area. Para 5(2) provides that the
Governor may make regulations for the peace and good government of any
area in a State which is for the time being a Scheduled Area. Without
prejudice to the above general power, special power has been conferred
H under clause (a) to prohibit or to restrict the transfer of land by or among
SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 369

members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area and under Clause (b) to A
regulate the allotment of land to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such
area; under clause (c) regulates money-lending to the tribals in the
Scheduled Area.

In the Constitution, the expression 'Scheduled Areas' has been
defined to mean such area as the President may by order declare to be B
Scheduled Areas. Clause (2) of para 6 provides that the President may at
any time by order (a) direct that the whole or any specified part of a
Scheduled Area shall cease to be a Scheduled Area or a part of such an
area; (aa) increase the area. of any Scheduled Area in a State, after
consultation with the Governor of that State; (b) alter, but only by way of C
rectification of boundaries, any Scheduled Area; (c) on any alteration of
the boundaries of a State or on the admission into the Union or the
establishment of a new State, declare any territory not previously included
in any State to be, or to form part of, a Scheduled Area, Clause (d) deals
with the rescission of any order under para 6. Such order may contain such
incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be D
necessary and proper, but save as aforesaid, the order made under sub-
paragraph (1) of that paragraph shall not be varied by any subsequent
order. Part D, para 7 empowers the Parliament to amend the Schedule by
way of addition, variation or repeal of any of the provisions of the Fifth
Schedule. Such a varied or modified Schedule shall be referred to such
amended Schedule. The other details are not material for the purpose of E
this case. Hence they are omitted.

Scope and Sweep of the Regulation 1970.

As has been stated, the Regulation came into force on March 4, 1959
in Andhra area and in Telangana area with effect from December 1, 1963. F
The prior order in operation in Telangana area will be dealt with a little
later. The material provisions relevant for the purpose are dealt with
hereunder.

Section 2(a) defines 'Agency tracts' to mean the areas in the districts G
of East Godavari, West Godavari, Visakhapatnam, Srikakulam,Vi.zianagar,
Adilabad, Nizamabad, Warangal, Khammam and Mahaboobnagar
declared from time to time as Scheduled areas by the President under
sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution.
'Scheduled Tribe' has been defined in Section 2(f) to mean any tribe or
tribal community or part of or groups within any tribe or tribal community H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A resident in the Agency tracts and specified as such by a public notification
by the President under Clause (1) of Article 342 of the Constitution.
Section 2(g) defines 'transfer' to mean mortgage with or without posses-
sion, leas~, sa!e, gift, exchange or "any other dealing" with immovable
property, not being a testamentary disposition and includes a charge on
such property or a contract relating to such property in respect of such
B mortgage, lease, sale, gift, exchange or other dealing. The definition of
transfer is a comprehensively vide definition except testamentary disposi-
tion by a tribal to another tribal so as to effectuate the prohibition of
transfer of immovable property to any person other than a Scheduled Tribe
or a Cooperative Society composed solely of members of the Scheduled
C Tribes.
.,
Section 3(1) reads as under :

"3. Transfer of immovable property by a member of a Scheduled
Tribe -
D
(l)(a) Notwithstanding anything in any enactment, rule or law in
force in the Agency tracts any transfer of immovable property
situated in the Agency tracts by a person. Whether or not such
person is a member of a Scheduled Tribe,. shall be absolutely null
and void, unless such transfer is made in favour of person, who is
E a member of a Scheduled Tribe or a Society, Andhra Pradesh
Co-operative Societies Act 1964 (Act 7of1964) which is composed ..
solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes.

(b) Until the contrary is proved, any immovable property situated
F in the Agency tracts and in the possession of a person who is not
a member of Scheduled Tribe, shall be presumed to have been
acquired by person or his predecessor in possession through a
transfer, made to him by a member of a Scheduled Tribes.

( c) Where a person intending to sell his land is not able to effect
G such sale, by reason of the fact that no member of a scheduled
Tribe is willing to purchase the land or is willing to purchase the
land on the terms offered by such person, then such person may
apply to the Agent, the Agency Divisional Officer or any other
prescribed officer for the acquisition of such land by the State
H Government, and the Agent. Agency Divisional Officer or the
SAMATHA v. STATE [K RAMASWAMY,J.] 371

prescribed officer as the case may be may by order, take over such A
land on payment of compensation in accordance with the prin-
ciples specified in Section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on
Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961 (Act X of 1961) and such land
shall thereupon vest in the State Government free from all en-
cumbrances and shall be disposed of in favour of members of the B
Scheduled Tribes or a society registered or deemed to be
registered under the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act,
1964 (Act 7 of 1964) composed solely of members or in such other
manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed."

.... Section 2 reads as under : c
"2(a) Where a transfer of immovable property is made in con-
travention of sub-st:ction (i), the Agent, the Agency Divisional
Officer or any other prescribed Officer may, on application by any
one interested, or on information given in writing by a public
servant, or suo motu decree ejectment against any person in D
possession of the property claiming under the transfer, after due
notice to him in the manner prescribed and may restore it to the
transfer of his heirs.

(b) If the transferor or his heirs are not willing to take back the E
property or where their whereabouts are not known, the Agency,
the Agency Divisional Officer or prescribed officer, as the case
may be may order the assignment or sale of the property to any
other member of a Scheduled Tribe (or a society registered or
deemed to be registered under any law relating to co-operative
societies for the time being in force in the State) composed solely F
of members of the Scheduled Tribes, or otherwise dispose of it, as
if it was a property at the disposal of State Government."

Section 4 reads as under :

"(4) For the purposes of this section, the expression 'transfer' G
includes a sale in execution of a decree and also a transfer made
by a member of Scheduled Tribe in favour of any other member
of a Scheduled Tribe benami for the benefit of a person who is
not a member of a Scheduled Tribe; but does not include a
partition or a devolution by succession." H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Section 3, therefore, prohibits transfer of immovable property by a
member of the Scheduled Tribes to a non-Scheduled Tribe. Sub- section
(l)(a) envisages, with a non obstante clause, that notwithstanding anything
contained in any enactment, rule or law in force in the Agency tracts, any
transfer of immovable property situated in the Agency tracts by a person,
B whether or not such person is a member of a Schedule Tribe, shall be
absolutely null and void, unless such transfer is made in favour of a
Scheduled Tribe or a society registered or deemed to be registered under
the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 and composed solely
of members of the Scheduled Tribes. Clause (b) provides rule of evidence
C by way of presumption that until the contrary is proved, any immovable
property situated in the Agency tracts and in the possession of a
non-Scheduled Tribe, shall be presumed to have been acquired by such
person or his predecessor in possession, through a transfer made to him by a
member of a Scheduled Tribe (emphasis supplied). The burden would
always be on the non-tribal to prove that the Land in his possession was
D not acquired by transfer from a tribal; in other words, the land belongs to
tribal and the non-tribal possesses it in contravention of law.

Clause (c) of Section 3 provides that if a non-schedule tribe, though
intending to sell, is unable to sell his land on account of either unwillingness
E of other tribal to purchase the land or the terms offered by him to a tribe,
are inaccessible to a tribal, he may apply to the agent named or other
prescribed officer who would acquire the land and take over possession of
such land on payment of compensation in accordance with the principles
laid down in Section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural
F Holdings Act, 1961, as amended in 1972. Such land shall thereupon vest in
the State Government free from all encumbrances and shall be disposed
of in favour of members of the Scheduled Tribes or a Co-operative Society
composed solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes or in such other
manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.

G In case of any transfer made in contravention of sub-section (1) of
Section 3, the agent, the Agency Division Officer, or any other prescribed
officer, may, on an application by any one interested, or on information
given in writing by a public servant or suo nwtu, issue decree of ejectment
against an1 person in possession of the property claiming under the
H transfer. This should be done after due notice to such person. Clause (b)
SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 373

of sub-section (2) of Section 3 provides that if a transferer or his heirs are A
not willing to take back the property or where whereabouts of the
transferer are not known, the said officer may by order assign or sell the
property to another member of the Schedule Tribe or a Co-operative Society.
Sub- section 3(4) provides that for the purpose of Section 3(4), the
expression 'transfer' includes sale in execution of a decree and also a B
benami transfer made by a member of a Scheduled Tribes in favour of any
other member of the Scheduled Tribes but does not include a Partition or
a devolution by succession.

Section 3-A makes special provision relating to mortgages without
possession; the details thereof are not material. Section 4 provides for the C
remedy of suit to be instituted in the Agency Courts against the member
of the Scheduled Tribe; the details thereof are not material. Section 5
provides for attachment and sale of immovable property. Section 6 gives
revisional power to the State Government. Section 6-A provides for penal-
ties for contravention of the provisions of the Regulation. Section 7 D
prescribes limitation for purpose of initiating proceedings under the
Regulation. Section 8 gives power to the State Government to make rules.
Section 9 provides for repeal of repugnant provisions of the Madras Act 1
of 1917. Section 10 provides for baving of certain transfers and rights.

It is settled law that the transfer of immovable property between a E
member of the Scheduled Tribe to a Non-scheduled Tribe in the Agency
tracts is null and void. The non-tribal transferee acquires no right, title and
interest in that behalf in furtherance of such sale. This Court in
Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1984) 3 SCC 301 had
declared such sales to be voidable. In Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State F
of Maharashtra & Anr., [1985] 1 SCC 479 this Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of similar provisions of Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to
Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974.

When the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Regulation was im-
pugned as violative of Articles 19(1)(t) and 14 of the Constitution, this G
Court, in P. Rami Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., [1988)
3 SCC 433 upheld its validity holdings that the Regulation aims to restore
the lands to the tribals which originally belonged to them but passed into
the hands of non-tribals. It would be unjust, unfair and highly unreasonable
merely to freeze the situation, instead of reversing the injustice and restor- H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ing the status quo ante. The non-tribal economic exploiters would get no
immunity and not be accorded a privileged treatment by permitting them
to transfer the lands and structures, if any, raised on such lands to non-
tribals and to make profits at the cost of the tribals. Section 3, though it
causes hardship to the non-tribals, equally, alleviates hardship of the
B tribals. The Court must keep in mind the larger perspective of the interest
of the tribal community in its entirety; the restrictions cannot be con-
demned as unreasonable. The presumption embodied in Section 3(1)(b) is
a rule of evidence. The non-tribals could be reasonably expected to disclose
their title to the properties. The tribals due to handicaps and ignorance are
unable to prove their right to land. The burden to prove title, therefore,
C was shifted to the non- tribals. The presumption was upheld as reasonable.

As a part of on-going industrial advancement, large industries or
projects are being set up or constructed in the scheduled areas displacing
D the tribals and rendering them impoverished landless labourers. When
their lands are acquired for public purpose, the Government should give
alternative lands for rehabilitation and easy loans for reclamation. Law
relating to prohibition of alienation and restoration of lands to tribes must
be simple, less cumbersome and result-oriented. The machinery must be
speedy and the officers must have compassion and sense of dedication and
E direction to ameliorate the economic status of the tribes to assimilate them
into national main-stream.

In Telangana area of the State of Andhra Pradesh, prior to the
F Regulation and pursuant to Part B State Regulation in Fifth Schedule, the
AP Tribal Area Regulation, III of 1359F promulgated by Raj Pramukh of
Hyderabad was in vogue. Section 46 of Agricultural Land and Tenancy
Act, 1950 prohibits transfer of agricultural land without sanction of the
competent authority. Section 3 of the Tribal Area Regulation excludes the
application of any Act, Regnlation or Rules by a notification published in
G the official Gazette. Section 4 gives power to the Government to make
Rules. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 prohibits eviction of tribals from the
lands in their possession or occupied by them. Clause (t) prohibits grant of
patta rights over any land in notified area to a non-tribal; the agent is
empowered to cancel such trans[er or revise any title of land granted to a
H non-tribal in any notified tribal area. Clause (g) prohibits sale in execution
SAMATIIA v. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 375

of a decree or whenever made, cancellation of sales not finally confirmed A
before corning into force of the regulation etc. As stated earlier, the
Regulation was extended to Telangana region w.e.f. December 1, 1963.
Prior thereto, law in Telangana area was in operation prohibiting any
transfer of agricultural lands without prior permission of the officers and
1950 Regulation referred to earlier draws rebuttable presumption that all B
the acquisitions of immovable property situated in Scheduled Areas are
acquired through a transfer from tribals. The non-tribals shall be presumed
to have acquired title from tribals unless they are able to prove to the
contrary that their possession of properties in the Agency tracts was
lawfully acquired.
c
Scope of Fifth Schedule - Interplay with Regulation.

The predominant object of Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the
Constitution and the Regulation is to impose total prohibition of transfer
of immovable property to any person other than a tribal for peace and D
proven good management of tribal area; to protect possession, right, title
and interest of the members of the Scheduled Tribes held in the land at
one time by the tribals. The non-tribals, at no point of time, have any legal
or valid title to immovable pruperty in Agency tracts unless acquired with
prior sanction of the Government and saved by any law made consistant E
with the Fifth Sche'dule. With the passage of time, when persons other than
tribals gained unlawful title to and possession of the lands in agency tracts,
their acquisition and holding of the immovable property, unless proved
otherwise, have always been null and void. The Regulation, as its
predecessor law, did prohibits transfer by a tribal to any other person and
. even benami purchaser in the name of a tribal for the benefit of a non-tribal
F
also is null and void. Non-tribal thereon, acquires no right, title and interest
in the land situated in scheduled area .. Indisputably, any transfer inter vivos
between tribals or non-tribals or inter se between non-tribals except
testamentary disposition to a tribal, has been totally prohibited. The only
exception engrafted is the transfer to Co- operative Societies composed G
solely of tribals or mortgage of the land to a Co-operative Land Mortgage
Bank registered as an instrumentality of the State or any Government
approved lending agency to improve the agricultural lands or sale to an
agent to the Government etc. A non-tribal person who is unable to find a
tribal buyer is not totally prohibited to transfer it. He should offer it to H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the named or nominated Government agent etc. who would purchase it in
the prescribed manner under the Regulation and assign it on to a tribal.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court had held that the transfer of land in
Scheduled Area by a tribal given to either a Scheduled Caste or a
Backward Class settled in Agency tracts as void.
B
In P. Rami Reddy's case, this Court had observed thus :

"Within the scheduled areas of both Telangana and Andhra regions
the land was entirely in occupation of different tribal communities.
The area was an inaccessible tract of land covered by forests and
c hills. These tribal communities were in occupation of lands and
lived by shifting cultivation and gathering whatever produce that
was available.

The non-tribals who arrived in these areas late in the 19th
D Century in certain areas and the early 20th Century in certain other
areas found the tribals who were in occupation of these lands an
easy pray for the schemes of exploitation. The non-tribals were
lending money to the tribal communities and taking the land
belonging to them as security though nothing was taken in writing
from a tribal. The rates of interest charged ranged between 25 to
E 50 per cent and in certain cases even 100 per cent. The tribals who
were traditionally honest and who were simple in their thought and
habits fell an easy prey to the schemes of the non-tribals. It was
observed by several committees that the non-tribals were able to
find ways and means to circumvent the provisions of Regulation 1
F of 1959 by entering into benami transactions and other clandestine
transactions with unsophisticated tribals. It is absolutely necessary
to create conditions for peace and maintain peace and prevent the
new non- tribals from settling down in the scheduled area. If the
alienations are permitted to the non-tribals there is a danger of
large-scale exploitation by the new non-tribals again with the result
G peace will be disturbed in that area.

Unless new enterants into the scheduled areas are prevented from
settling down in the scheduled areas by purchasing properties
either from tribals or non-tribals, it is not possible to prevent the
H exploitation of the unsophisticated tribals. It is only with a view to
SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 377

enforce tlie valid provisions of Regulation I of 1959, the Regulation A
viz., Regulation I of 1970 was made. It is in the interests of the
tribals and for their protection Regulation I of 1970 was passed,
because without restricting or prohibiting the alienation of lands
in the possession of non- tribals to non-tribals the objectives cannot
be achieved.
B
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

True, transfer by 'non-tribals' to non-tribals' would not diminish
the pool. It would maintain status quo. But is it sufficient or fair
enough to freeze the exploitative deprivation of the 'tribals' and C
thereby legalize and perpetuate the past-wrong instead of effecting
the same. As matter of fact, it would be unjust, unfair and highly
unreasonable merely to refreese the situation instead of reversing
the injustice and restoring the status quo ante."

In this Constitutional perception and statutory operation, the crucial D
question that aries for consideration is : whether the transfer of its land in
a scheduled area, by the Government is valid in law?

It is indisputable that apart from the patta lands or· other lands held
by the tribals, the State holds vast tracts of land in scheduled area, in some
areas with rich mineral deposits. The questions are; whether the State E
Government is exempt from the Regulation?; whether the State Govern-
ment stands above the law?; whether the meaning of the word "person" in
Section 3(i)(a) of the Regulation would include the State Government?
Article 244(1) read with the Fifth Schedule, Part I, while defining "State"
excepts certain States as enumerated therein. It bears repetition that F
paragraph 5(2) of Fifth Schedule enjoins the Governor to make regulations
f~r the peace and good governance in a Scheduled area. Without prejudice
to the general power, subsequent clauses amplify particular powers. Clause
(a) empowers him to prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among
members of the tribals and non-tribals in such area. Clause (b) regulates G
the allotment of land only (added to emphasise) to members of the
Scheduled Tribes in the area. The question, therefore, is : while regulating
allotment of land under trus clause, can the Government exclude itself from
the power to allot land to a non-tribal when the object of Article 244(1)
read with the Fifth Schedule is to control and maintain peace and good
governance of the Scheduled area for the social and economic advance- H

/
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ment of Scheduled Tribes? Would it be permissible to construe that the
land belonging to the Government is outside such control or prohibition
or restriction; whether the State Government could allot its land to non-
tribals in violation of the Constitution and the law? Answer to these crucial
questions bears paramount significance and impact since the object of the
founding fathers of the Constitution in empowering the Governor, on the
B basis of his personal satisfaction, is to regulate by law the administration
or control of the Scheduled area for peace and good governance of the
Scheduled Tribes in the area. The question is : whether any contra inter-
pretation would subserve the Constitutional animation or would it frustrate
the constitutional objective? The Division Bench of the High Court in
C Samatha's case relied upon the dictionary meaning of the word 'person'
and the prohibition on transfer of land inter vivas between natural persons
of Schednled Tribes and non-tribes in Agency tracts ; it came to conclude
that the Regulation does not apply to the land owned by the State Govern-
ment since the State Government is not a natural person. The earlier
D Division Bench had taken contra view. The question, therefore, is : which
of the two views subserves the constitutional purpose and is correct in Jaw?

Meanings of the word 'Person' - whether Government is persona ficta?

From this perspective, the next question that arises is : whether the
E State Government is a person within the meaning of Section 3 of the
Regulation aud whether its transfer of land to non- tribals or company is
valid in law?

The word 'person' in the interplay of juristic thought is either natural
F or artificial. Natural persons are human beings while artificial persons are
Corporations. Corporations are either Corporation aggregate or Corpora-
tion sole. In "English Law'' by Kenneth Smith and Denis Keenan (Seventh
Edition) at page 127, it is stated that "(L)egal personality is not restricted
to human beings. In fact various bodies and associations of persons can, by
forming a corporation to carry out their functions, create an organisation
G with a range of rights and duties not dissimilar to many of those possessed
by human beings. In English law such corporations are formed either by
charter, statute or registration under the Companies Acts; there is also the
common law concept of the Corporation Sole". At page 163, it is further
stated that "(T)he Crown is the executive head in the United Kingdom and
H Commonwealth, and government departments and civil servants act on
SAMA'IlIA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 379

behalf of the Crown". In "Salmond on Jurisprudence" by P.J. Fitzgeral"d A
(Twelfth Edition), at page 66, it is stated that "(A) legal person is any
subject-matter other than a human being to which the law attributes
personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the concep-
tion of personality beyond the class of human beings is one of the most
noteworthy feats of the legal imagination.... ". At page 72, it is further B
amplified that "(T)he King himself, however, is in law no mere mortal man.
He has a double capacity, being not only a natural person, but a body
politic, that is to say, a corporation sole. The visible wearnr of the crown
is merely the living representative and agent for the time being of this
invisible and underlying persona ficta, in whom by law the powers and
prerogatives of the government of this realm are vested". In "Jurisprudence" C
by R.W.M. Dias (Fifth Edition), at page 265, it is stated that" .... the value
of personifying group activities is further reduced by the fact that courts
have evolved ways of dealing with such activities without resorting to the
device of persona".
D
In Madras Electric Corporation v. Boar/and, (1955) 1 All ER 753,
relied upon by Shri Dhawan, it has been held that the word 'person' in its
ordinary and natural sense includes crown. The same view was reiterated
in l.R. Commissioner v. Whiteworth Coal Co. Ltd., (1968) 2 All ER 91 at
108. On the concept of "legal personality" and the concept of "person", in
"Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence" by Keeton (1949 Edition) relied E
on by Shri Rajeev Dhawan, in Chapter XIII at page 150, it is stated that
in modern law, this personification by law is confined to certain definite
limits, although this restriction is based, not upon principle, but upon
convenience. In law, however, we are concerned with legal persons,
whther they are natural, i.e., human beings capable of sustaining rights F
and duties, or artificial or juristic, i.e., grnups or things to which the law
attributes the capacity to bear rights and duties. Legal personality is itself
· nothing but a fiction, in so far as it is intended to imply no more than that
a legal person is simply a complex of legal rights and duties. At page 151,
it is stated that juristic persons may be defined as those persons or groups G
of persons which the law deems capable of holding rights and duties, with
a few exceptions. At page 152, he has amplified that corporation sole is a
juristic person and it succinctly describes the position in modern English
law. The conception of separate personality attaching to the successive
occupants of a particular office is as valid juristically as the conception of
incorporation of the members of a group. The Law of Property Act, 1925, H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Section 180 contents itself with addition briefly, that a corporation sole may
now hold personal property with rights and duties. At page 154, it is stated
that principles applying to corporation aggregate are not fully applicable
to corporation sole. "Court regarded the corporation sole not as a person,
but as a device for the transmission of rights from one natural person to
another". He quotes Blackstone : that "corporation sole consists of one
B person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are incor-
porated by law, in order to give them legal capacities and advantages, in
particular that of perpetuity, which in the natural persons could not have
had. In this sense the King is a corporation sole". At page 155, it is further
stated that the law, therefore, has wisely ordained, that the person, qua
C tenus. person, shall never· die, any more than the King; by making him and
his successors a corporation sole. By which means all the original rights of
a personage are preserved entirely to the successors. At page 169, it is
stated that the reason for King personality, a corporate sole, is that
corporate personality is a technical device, applied for a multitude of very
D diverse aggregations, institutions and transactions, whereas each of many
theories has been conceived for a particular type of juristic personality.
None of them foresaw the extent to which the device of incorporation
would be used in modern business, or we may add, to cloak the activities
of some branch of Government.

E Thus, in Great Britain, Crown has been regarded as a Corporation
sole, persona ficta so that it has never been considered necessary to
personify the State. The Crown in its political represents the State in
England and can sue in the English courts as a person. In Madras Electric
Corporation case, the same view was reiterated but when liability was
F sought to be imposed upon a person, it was held that the general principle
of person, does not include the Crown, unless the statute is binding on the
Crown, by express provision or by necessary implication. As held in l.R.
Commissioner v. Whiteworth Coal Co. Ltd., (1968) 2 All ER 91 at 108, in a
taxing statute it was held that there was no objection to interpret the word
'person' to include the Crown in any provision other than those which seek
G to impose a burden.

In the American Jurisprudence 2nd Series, Vol. 72, page 407, it is
stated that a State, in the ordinary sense of the Federal Constitution, is a
political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined
H boundaries, and organised under a government sanctioned and limited by
SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 381
a written constitution, and established by the consent of the governed. A
While the municipal corporation is organised under the authority of a state
legislature and draws its public character from the law of the state creating
it, it is endowed with a public character by virtue of having been invested
by the legislature with subordinate legislative powers to administer local
and internal affairs of the community, as well as by having been created as B
a branch of the state government to assist it in the civil government of the
State. A public corporation, with capacity to sue and be sued, under
modern statutory provisions, is a legal person. So also, for purposes of
convenience, certain Departments of Government or the board of
managers of a public institution are sometimes incorporated, but the C
corporations thus created, although public, are not municipal corporations.
In Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, Page 675, the word "Government"
has been defined thus :

"From the Latin gubernaculum, signifies the instrument, the helm,
whereby the ship to which the state was compared, was guided on D
course by the "gubernator" or helmsman, and in that view, the
government is but an agency of the state, distinguished as it must
be in accurate thought from its scheme and machinery of govern-
ment.
E
In the United States, government consists of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches in addition to administrative agen-
cies. In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all
its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city
and township governments.
F
The system of polity in a state, that form of fundamental rules
and principles by which a nation or state is governed, or by which
individual members of a body politic are to regulate their social
actions. A constitution, either written or unwritten, by which the
rights and duties of citizens and public officers are prescribed and G
defined, as a monarchical government, a republican government,
etc. The sovereign of supreme power in a state or nation. The
machinery by which the sovereign power in a state expresses its
will and exercises its functions, or the framework of political
institutions, departments, and officers, by means of which the H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A executive, judicial, legislative, and administrative business of the
state is carried on."

In Edgar B. Sims. v. United States of America, (359 US 108 : 3 L ed
2d 66), Federal tax authorities issued notices of levy of tax for assessment
on unpaid income of employees of the State of West Virginia, and had the
B notice served on the defendant. The State auditor, seized the accrued
salaries of the taxpayers pursuant to Sections 6331 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. The defendant-State refused to honour the levy and instead,
delivered payroll warrants to the taxpayers for their, then accrued salaries.
Thereafter, the Government brought the action in the District Court for
C the Southern District of West Virginia to recover from defendant the
amount of salaries he had so paid to the taxpayer in disobedience to the
Government's levies. The District Court upheld the Government's order.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, affirmed it. On a writ of certiorari, it was
held by the Supreme Court of USA that the levy of tax made under Section
D 6331 was authoriser:\ levy and that defendant under Section 6332 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as 'person' was liable to pay the same.

In State of Ohio v. Guy T. Helvering, (292 US 360 : 78 L ed 1307 at
1310) the question was whether "the State'', when it was selling liquor
through its agency and sources, "was a person" within the meaning of
E U.S.C. title 26, Section 205 (Section 3244, as amended)? It was held at page
1310 that the tax is levied upon every person who sells liquor etc. The word
'person' as used in the title, should be broadly construed as to mean and
include a partnership, association, company or corporation, as well as a
natural person. Whether the word 'person' or 'corporation' includes a State
F or the United States depends upon the connection in which the word is
found. In South Carolina case, the United States Court disposed of the
question by holding that since the State was not exempt from the tax, the
statute reached the individual sellers who acted as dispensers for the State.
While not rejecting that view, the Court preferred to place on the word
'person' the broader ground that when the State itself becomes a dealer in
G intoxicating liquors, it falls within the reach of the tax either as a 'person'
under the statutory extension of that word to include a corporation, or as
a 'person' without regard to such extension.

In State of Georgia v. Hiram W Evans, (316 US 159 : 86 L ed 1346)
H the same view was reiterated by the U.S.A. Supreme Court and it was held
SAMA1HA v. STATE [KRAMASWAMY,J.) 383

that if the word 'person' is to include a State as plaintiff, it must equally A
include a State as a defendant or else the language used would be
meaningless.

In United States of America v. Cooper Corporation et al., (312 US 600:
85 L ed 1071) relied on by Sri Sudhir Chandra, considering the word B
'person' used in Sections 7, 85 and 178 of the Sherman Anti Trust Act, it
was held that although the term "person", as used in a statute, is not
ordinarily construed to include the sovereign, this is not a hard and fast
rule of exclusion, but may be negatived by resort to aids to construction
indicating a contrary intent. On the facts, it was held that State was not a
person. In that context it was held that in the absence of any indication to C
the contrary, the term 'person', when used in different sections of a statute,
was employed throughout the statute, in the same, and not different sense.
But the said decision was reversed in State of Georgia case. In United States
v. l.C.C., (1949) 337 U.S. 426 it was held that when relief is sought against
State itself, the word 'person' would include the State and be construed· D
accordingly.

In Superintendent & Legal Remembrancer, Staie of West Bengal v.
Corporation Calcutta, [1967] 2 SCR 170 a Bench of nine Judges of this
,, Court was to consider whether the State of West Bengal, when it was
carrying on trade, as owner and occupier of the market at Calcutta, without E
obtaining the licence, was bound by the Calcutta Municipality Act or, by
necessary implication, was exempted to obtain licence. A complaint against
the State, for its failure to obtain licence was filed by the Municipal
Corporation. It was contended that the State is not a person under Section
218 of the said Act. Per majority, it was held that the Common Law rule F
of construction that the Crown is not, unless expressly named or clearly
intended, bound to be a State, was held to be not acceptable as a rule of
construction. It was held that the archaic rule based on prerogative and
protection of the Crown has no relevance to a democratic republic. It is
inconsistent with the rule of law based on the doctrine of .equality and
introduces conflicts and anomalies. The normal construction, viz., that an G
enactment applies to citizens as well as to the State, unless it expressly or
by necessary implication exempts the State from its operation, steers clear
of all the anomalies and is consistent with the philosophy of equality
enshrined in the Constitution. Under the Act there is a distinction between
fine imposed under Section 537 and under Section 541 of the Act, the fines H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP.2S.C.R.

A under Section 537 are in respect of offences enumerated therein they
certainly go to the coffers of the States. In respect of such offences it may
be contended that, as the fines paid reach the State itself, there is an
implication that the State was not bound by the Sections enumerated
therein, for a person who receives the fine, cannot be the same person who
B pays it. This incongruity may lead to the said necessary implication.
Another Bench of nine Judges in State Trading Corporation of India Ltd.
v. The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., AIR (1963) SC 1811 at 1817 per
majority interpreted the word 'citizen' in a broader perspective. In Union
of India v. Jubbi, AIR (1968) SC 360 at 362 a three-Judge Bench had held
that a statute applies to State as much it does to a citizen, unless, it
C expressly or by necessary implication, exempts the State from its opera-
tions. If the Legislature intended to exclude the applicability of the Act to
the State, it could have easily stated in Section 11 itself or by a separate
provision that the Act was not to be applied to the Union or to the lands
held by it. In the absence of such a provision, in a constitutional set up like
I) the one we have in this country, and of which the overriding basis is the
broad concept of equality, free from any arbitrary discrimination, the
presumption would be that a law of which the avowed object is to free the
tenant of landlordism and to ensure to him security of tenure would bind
all landlords irrespective of whether such a landlord is an ordinary_ in-
dividual or the Union. In that case., it was contended that Abolition of Big
E Landed Estates and'land Reforms Act, 1953 and Section 11 thereof does
~ not apply to the land held by the Government. This Court rejected that
contention. It would, therefore, be settled law that the question whether or
not the word 'person' used in a statute would include the State has to be
determined with reference to the provisions of the Act, the aim and its
F object and the purpose the Act seeks to subserve. There is no reason to
consider the word 'person' in a narrow sense. It must be construed in a
broader perspectivity, unless the statute, either expressly or by necessary
implication, exempts the State from the operation of the Act as against the
State and would include "State Government".

G Property of the State - how dealt with under the Constitution.

Part I of the Constitution of India deals with Union and its territories.
Article 1 declares that India, that is Bharat shall be a Union of States. The
States and the territories thereof have been specified in the First Schedule
H to the Constitution. The territory of India shall comprise of - (a) the
SAMATIIA v. S}ATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 385
'
territory of States; (b) the Union territories specified in the First Schedule; A
and (c) such other territories as may be acquired. Articles 2 to 4 deal with
· the power of the Parliament to admit into the Union, by law, any State, or
establish new States on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. Formation
of the new States and alteration of areas, boundaries and names of the
existing States are regiµated by law made by Parliament. It also gives power B
to the Parliament to amend the First and the Fourth Schedules and to
provide for supplemental, incidental and consequential matters. The First
Schedule enumerates the States and the first in the alphabetical order is
Andhra Pradesh with territories specified thereunder.

Under Part VI of the Constitution titled "The States", Article 152 C
defines "State". For the Interpretation of the Constitution, by operation of
Article 367, unless the context otherwise requires or modifies, the General
Clauses Act shall apply. Section 3(23) thereof defines'"Government to
include both the Central Government and State Government. Section 3(8)
defines "Central Government" and Section 3(60) defines "State D
Government" as regards anything done and or to be done, shall mean the
Governor. The Governor of each State is its Executive Head and the
executive power of the State shall be exercised by the Governor either
directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with· the
Constitution as envisagec\. under Article 154. The executive power of the E
State, subject to the provl~ons of the Constitution, by operation of Section
162, shall extend to the ~atters with respect to which the Legislature of
the State has power to make laws. The proviso thereto is not relevant for
the purpose of this case.

The executive power, therefore, of the State is co-extensive with that
F
of the legislative power of the State. The Governor shall appoint the Chief
Minister and on his advise, he appoints the Council of Ministers, who shall
aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his function except, in so
far as he is, by or under the Constitution, reqilired to exercise his functions
or any of them, in his discretion. The Council of Ministers, headed by the G
Chief Minister, shall be collectively and individually responsible to the
Legislature and the people in the matter of the governance of the State.
AH· executive actions of the Government of a State, shall be expressed to
be taken in the name of the Governor and the business of the Government
is conducted in accordance with Article 166 and the Business Rules made, H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A by the Governor, by clause (3) thereof.

Under Chapter III of Part XII, Article 294 vests in the union and
the corresponding State all property and assets which immediately before
the commencement of the Constitution were vested in His Majesty for the
B Purposes of the Government of Dominion of India or of each Governor's
Province, whether arising out of any contract or otherwise; similarly all
rights, liabilities and obligations, respectively of the Government of the
Dominion of India and of the Government of each corresponding State,
shall belong to the Government of India and the Government of each
corresponding State. Article 295 provides for succession to the property,
C assets, rights, liabilities and obligations in other cases. Article 298 provides
that the executive power of the Union and of each State shall extend to the
carrying on of any trade or business, and to the acquisition, holding and
disposal of property and the making of contracts for any purpose co-extensive
with legislative power. The Union of India and each State under Article
D 300 may sue or be sued, with all rights and liabilities as a constituent power
of the State under the Constitution. Article 299 empowers Union of India
and the Government of each State to enter into contract, in the exercise
of the executive power, to be expressed in the name of the president or the
Governor, as the case may be. All assurances of property made in the
E exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the
Governor, by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or
otherwise. However, the President or the Governor shall not be personally
liable therefor. Article 300 is of material importance. As stated earlier, the
Government of India or a State may sue or be sued, by the name of the
F State and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the law enacted
and by virtue of the power conferred by the Constitution, it can sue and
be sued in relation to their respective affairs in the like cases.

The members of the Legislature are elected by the people
periodically at the end of every five years. The political party or group of
G political parties who secure majority in the Legislative Assembly of the
State elects the leader who would be called upon by the Governor to form
the Govt. and on his appointment as the Chief Minister. On his advise, the
Governor appoints his Council of Ministers who act in collective
responsibility to aid and advise the Governor in the governance of the State
H during the tenure of their office.
SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 387
Pennanent bureaucracy acts as an ann of the Government. A
Articles 309 to 312A in Chapter I of Part XIV under the heading
"Services under the Union and the States" regulate the recruitment and
conditions of service and appointments to the public services and posts in
connection with the affairs of the Union or the States, subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and acts of the appropriate Legislature. B
Details thereof are not material for the purpose of this case; suffice it to
state that Constitution has created permanent bureaucracy consisting of
diverse all India services allotted to various States and State Services
created thereunder, to assist the political executive and to implement the
provisions of the Constitution, the laws and the executive policy of the C
appropriate Government. Under the Constitution, in all ordinary matters
of administration, the Ministers take full responsibility, subject to the
control by the Legislature. The bureaucracy gives shape to the decisions
taken .by the council of Ministers at the Cabinet meeting or by the in-
dividual Ministers by working out the details and they are applied in the
given set of facts. In Halsbury's Laws of England {4th Edn.) Vol. 8 in D
paragraph 1152 at page 711, it is stated that the Government offices and
departments through which the general executive administration of the
country is carried on owe their establishment and organisation, together
with the powers they possess and duties they perform, partly to the royal
prerogative and partly to the Parliament. They derive almost all their E
powers directly or indirectly from Parliament, which alone can provide
them with the supplies of money, necessary for their operations. Their
internal arrangements, on the other hand, are hardly ever organised or
directly interfered with by Parliament, but have been a matter for the royal
prerogative. This principle proprio vigore applies to Cabinet form of
functioning under our Constitution. In paragraphs 1155 at page 713, it is F
further stated that where functions entrusted to a minister or to a depart-
ment are performed by an official employed in the ministry or department
there is in law no delegation because constitutionally the acts or decisions
of the officials are that of the Minister. In the exercise of their functions
relating to land under any enactment, every Minister and government G
department must have regard to the desirability of conserving the natural
beauty and amenity of the countryside.

Ministerial Responsibility.

As stated hereinbefore, the Constitution envisions to establish an H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A egalitarian social order rendering to every citizen, social, economic and
political justice in a social and economic democracy of that Bharat
Republic. Article 261(1) of the Constitution provides that full faith and
credit shall be given, throughout the territory of India, to public acts,
record and judicial decisions of the Union and of every State. In Secretary,
B Jaipur Development Authority v. Dau/at Mal Jain, [1997] 1 SCC 35, a Bench
of this Court had held thus ;

"The Governor runs the Executive Government of a State with the
aid and advice of the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers
which exercise the powers and performs its duties by the individual
c Ministers as public officers with the assistance of the bureaucracy
working in various Departments and Corporate sectors etc.
Though they are expressed in the name of the Governor, each
Minister is personally and collectively responsible for the actions,
acts and policies. They are accountable and answerable to the
people. Their powers and duties are regulated by the law and the
D
rules. The legal and moral responsibility or liability for the acts
done or omissions, duties performed and policy laid down rest
solely on the Minister of the Department. Therefore, they are
indictable for their conduct or omission, or misconduct or misap-
propriation. The Council of Ministers are jointly and severally
E responsible to the Legislature. He/they, is/are also publicly ac-
countable for the acts or conducts in the performance of duties.

The Minister holds public office though he gets constitutional
status and performs functions under Constitution, law or executive
F policy. The acts done and duties performed are public acts or
duties as holder of the public office. Therefore, he owes certain
accountability for the acts done or duties performed. In a
democratic society governed by rule of law, power is conferred on
the holder of the public office or the concerned authority by the
Constitution by virtue of appointment. The holder of the office,
G therefore, gets opportunity to abuse or misuse of the office. The
politician who holds public office must perform public duties with
the sense of purpose, and a sense of direction, under rules or sense
of priorities. The purpose must be genuine in a free democratic
society governed by the rule of law to further socio-economic
H democracy. The executive Government should frame its policies
SAMA1HA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 389

to maintain the social order, stability, progress and morality. All A
actions of the Government are performed through/by individual
persons in collective or joint or individual capacity. Therefore, they..
should morally be responsible for their actions.

When a Government in office misuses its powers, figuratively, B
we refer to the individual Minister/Council of Ministers who are
constituents of the Government. The Government acts through its
bureaucrats, who shapes its social, economic and administrative
policies to further the social stability and progress socially,
economically and politically. Actions of the Government, should
-- be accounted for social morality. Therefore, the actions of the C
individuals would reflect on the actions of the Government. The
actions are intended to further the goals set down in the Constitu-
tion, the laws or administrative policy. The action would, therefore,
bear necessary integral connection between the 'purpose' and the
end object of public welfare and not personal gain. The action D
cannot be divorced from that of the individual actor. The end is
something aimed at and only individuals can have and shape the
aims to further the social, economic and political goals. The
ministerial responsibility thereat comes into consideration. The
Minister is responsible not only for his actions but also for the job
of the bureaucrats who work or have worked under him. He owes E
the responsibility to the ekctors for all his actions taken in the
name of the Governor in relation to the Department of which he
is the head."

In Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., [1974] 2 SCC 831, a F
Bench of seven Judges of this Court had held that under the Cabinet
System of Government as embodied in our Constitution, the Governor is
the Formal head of the State. He exercises all his powers and functions
conferred on him by or under the Constitution, on the aid and advice of
his Council of Ministers, save in spheres where the Governor is required G
by or under the Constitution to exercise his function in his discretion. The
satisfaction of the Governor for the exercise of any power or function,
. required by the Constitution, is not the personal satisfaction of the Gover-
nor but is the satisfaction in the constitutional sense under the Cabinet
System of Government. The executive is to act subject to the control of the
legislature. The executive power of the State is vested in the Governor as H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A head of the Executive. The real executive power is vested in the Ministers
of the Cabinet. The Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers with the
Chief Minister as its head aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of
his executive functions. The same principle was reiterated by a Bench of
· three Judges in R.K. Jain v. Union of India, [1995] 4 SCC 119. Therein, it
was held that in a democracy governed by rule of law, State is treated on
B par with a person by Article 19(6) in c<immercial/industrial activities.
It would thus be clear that in a democratic polity governed by the
rule of law, the administration is run through constitutional mechanism i.e.,
Cabinet form of Govt. by a Council of Ministers headed by the Chief
C Minister. They aid and advise the Governor, the executive head of the
State. The bureaucracy - an arm of the political executive - assists as an
--
integral part of administrative mechanism. Their actions or the acts,
individually or collectively, are directed to elongate and fulfil the sociO-
economic goals set down in the Constitution to establish the egalitarian
D social order in which socio-economic justice is secured to the poor and
we~er sections of the society including the Schedule Castes and Scheduled
Tribes, in particular, as enjoined in Article 46 of the Constitution, to
promote their socio-economic interest and protect them from social
injustice and all forms of exploitation. The State is, therefore, a "person"
within the constitutional mechanism persona ficta is enjoined to elongate
E the objects of the Constitution.

Scope of the power of the Govt. in disposal of its property in Scheduled area
and constitutional duty and limitation of the State.

F In "In the Framing of the India's Constitution", a study by B. Shiva
Rao, (Volume II) in Chapter 20 on the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution
on the Tribal Area, the author has surveyed the historical background for
integration of Scheduled Tribes into the national mainstream. The histori-
cal survey and legislative development do assure us that throughout... ... A
system of modified exclusion of law was applied to the Scheduled areas.
G The power was with the Governor. He exercises the executive and legisla-
tive power to apply, or to refrain from applying any law made by Parliament
or State Legislature to the Agency tracts. The object of Government policy
is to protect the tribals or their land, .... by securing to them protection
from exploitation. The principal duty of the administration is to protect
H them from exploitation. Considering the past experience and the exploita-
SAMA1HA v. STATE (K. RAMASWAMY,J.) 391
tion of the tribals' simplicity and truthfulness by the non-tribals, it became A
imperative by statutory safeguards to preserve the land which is their
natural endowment and mainstay for their economic empowerment. No
laws affecting social matters, occupation of land including tenancy laws
allotment of land and setting apart of land for village purposes and village ·
management, including the establishment of village panchayats, would B
apply, unless they are suitable to the conditions. Shiva Rao has stated at
page 579 thus :

"The transfer of land in a Scheduled Area from a tribal to a
non-tribal was forbidden; and the State Government was also
prohibited from allotting State land in a Scheduled Area to non- C
tribals except in accordance with rules made after consulting the
Tribes Advisory Council. Likewise, if advised by the council, the
Governor was obliged to license money-lending, prescribing such
conditions as were considered necessary; and the breach of these
conditions would be an offence. In order that public attention must D
be focussed on the development work carried out in these areas,
the State Government was required to show separately in its annual
financial statement the revenues and expenditure pertaining to
these areas."

Thus, the Fifth and Sixth Schedules an integral scheme of the Con- E
stitution with direction, philosophy and anxiety is to protect the tribals from
exploitation and to preserve valuable endowment of their land for their
economic empowerment to elongate social and economic democracy with
liberty, equality, fraternity and dignity of their person in our political
Bharat.
F
Egalitarian Social Order - Scope and Content.

Justice is an attribute of human conduct. Law, as a social engineer-
ing, is to remedy existing imbalances, as a vehicle to establish an egalitarian
social order in a Socialist Secular Bharat Republic. The Upanishad says G
that, "let all be happy and healthy, Jet all be blessed with happiness and let
non be unhappy". Bhagwatgeeta preaches through Yudhishtra that, "I do
not Jong for kingdom, heaven or rebirth, but I wish to alleviate the suffer-
ings of the unfortunate'. Prof. Friedlander in his "Introduction of Social
Welfare" at page 6 states that social welfare is the organised system of
social service and institutions are designed to aid individuals and groups H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A to attain specified standard of life and health and personal and social
relationship which permit them to develop their full capacities and to
promote their well-being in harmony with the needs of their families and
the community. Welfare State is a rubicon between unbridled individualism
and communism. All human rights are derived from the dignity of the
B person and his inherent worth. Fundamental Rights and Directive Prin-
ciples of the Constitution have fus~d in them as fundamental human rights
as indivisible and inter- dependent. The Constitution has charged the State
to provide facilities and opportunities among the people and groups of
people to remove social and economic inequality and to improve equality
of status. Article 39(b) enjoins the State to direct its policy towards
C securing distribution of the ownership and control of the material resources
of the community as best to subserve the common good. The founding
fathers with hind sight, engrafted with prognosis, not only inalienable
human rights as part of the Constitution but also charged the State as its
policy to remove obstacles, disabilities and inequalities for human develop-
D ment and positive actions to provide opportunities and facilities to develop
human dignity and equality of status and of opportunity for social and
economic democracy. Economic and social equality is a facet of liberty
without which meaningful life would be hollow and mirage.

Right to development - a fundamental right.
E
Declaration of "Right to Development Convention" adopted by the
United Nations and ratified by India, by Article 1 "right to development"
became part of an inalienable human right. By virtue thereof, every human
person and all people are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy
F economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human
rights and fundamental freedoms would be fully realised (emphasis sup-
plied). Clause (2) thereof provides that "the human right to development
also implies the full realisation of the right of the people to improve their
natural wealth and resources". Article 2(1) provides that "the human person
G is the central subject of development and should be and active participant
and beneficiary of the right to development". Clause (2) says that all human
beings have a responsibility for development, individually and collectively,
taking into account the need for full resp~ for their human rights and
fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community, which
alone can ensure free and complete fulfilment of the human being and they
-
H should, therefore, promote and protect an appropriate political, social and
SAMATHA v. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 393

economic order for development". Clause {3) thereof provides that the A
State have "the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national
development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-
being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their
active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair
distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom".
B
Article 3(1) recognises and enjoins that it is the State's primary
responsibility to create conditions favourable to the realisation of the right
to development. Under clause (3) thereof, it reminds the State of its duty
to cooperate with each other and of "ensuring development and eliminating
obstacles to development". Article 6(2) reassures that "human rights and C
fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; equal att.ention
and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion
and protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights (em-
phasis supplied) and clause (3) thereof enjoins that "the States should take
steps to eliminate obstacles to development. Article 8 enjoins that "the D
State should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the
realisation of the right to development and shall ensure inter alia equality
of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health
services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income". it
also provides that "an appropriate economic and social reform should be
canied out with a view to eradicating all social injustice". Article 9 gives a E
right declaring that "all the aspects of the right to development set forth in
the present declaration are indivisible and interdependent and each of them
should be considered in the context of the whole" and Article 10 concludes
and reminds the State of its duty "to take steps to ensure them the full
exercise and progressive enhancement of the right to development, including F
the formulation, adoption and implementation of policy, legisl_ative and
other measures at the national levels". The directive principles in Part IV
of the Constitution are fore-runners to the Convention (Emphasis sup-
plied).

India being an active participant in the successful declaration of the G
Convention on Right to Development and a party signatory thereto, it is
its duty to formulate its policies, legislative or executive, accord equal
attention to the promotion of, and to protect the right to social, economic,
civil and cultural rights of the people, in particular, the poor, the Dalits
and Tribes as enjoined in Article 46 read with Articles 38, 39 and all other H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A related Articles read with right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. By that constant, endeavour and interaction, right to
life would become meaningful so as to realise its full potentiality of "person"
as inalienable human right and to raise the standard of living, improve
excellence and to live with dignity of person and of equal status with social
B and economic justice, liberty, equality and fraternity, the trinity are pillars
to establish the egalitarian social order in Socialist Secular Democratic
Bharat Republic.

Social and economic democracy is the foundation on which political
democracy would be a way of life in the Indian polity. Law as a social
C engineering is to create just social order removing inequalities in social and
economic life, socio-economic disabilities with which poor people are
languishing by providing positive opportunities and facilities to individuals
and groups of people. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, in his closing speech in the
Constituent Assembly on November 25, 1949, had lucidly elucidated thus :
D
"What does social democracy mean? It means way of life which
recognises liberty, equality and fraternity as the principles of life.
These principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are not to be
treated as separate items in a trinity. They form a union of trinity
E in the sense that to divorce one from the other is to defeat the very
purpose of democracy. Liberty cannot be divorced from equality,
equality cannot be divorced from liberty. Nor can liberty and
equality be divorced from fraternity. Without equality, liberty
would produce the supremacy of the few over the many. Equality
F without liberty, would kill individual initiative - we have in India a
society based on the principle of graded inequality which means
elevation for some and degradation for oth~rs. On the economic
plan, we have a society in which there are some who have immense
wealth as against many who live in abject poverty". We cannot
afford to have equality in politic:tl life and inequality in economic
G life. How long shall we continue to live this life of contradiction?
How long shall we continue to deny equality in our social and
economic life? We must remeve this contradiction at the earliest
possible moment or else those who suffered from inequality will
blow up the structure of politiccil democracy which this Assembly
H has laboriously built up."
SAMATifA v. STAIB [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 395

(Vide B. Shiva Rao's, 'The Framing of India's Constitution : Select A
Documents', Vol. IV, p. 944.)
.~
The core constitutional objective of "social and economic democracy"
in other words, just social order, cannot be established without removing
the inequalities in income and niaking endeavour to eliminate inequalities B
in status through the rule of law. The mandate for social and economic
retransformation requires that the material resources or their oWnership
and control should be so distributed as to subserve the common good. A
new social order, therefore, would emerge, out of the old unequal or
hierarchical social order. The legislative or executive measures, therefore,
should be necessary for the reconstruction of the unequal social order by C
corrective and distributive justice through the rule of Jaw.

Right to life - Scope and Content.

Article 21 of the Constitution reinforces "right to life" - a fundamental D
right - which is an inalienable human right declared by the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights and the sequential Conventions to which
India is a signatory. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C Mazdoor
Congress, AIR (1991) SC 101at173 in paragraph 223, this Court had held
that right to life would include right to continue in permanent employment
which is not a bounty of the employer nor can its survival be at the volition E
or mercy of the employer. Income is the foundation to enjoy many fun-
damental rights and when work is the source of income, the right to work
would become as much a fundamental right. Fundamental rights can
ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined premises and uncertain
application. That will be a mockery of them. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. F
Union of India, [1984] 3 SCC 161 at 183-84, this Court had held that right
to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath
from the Directive Principles of State Policy and that opportunities and
facilities should be provided to the children to develop in a healthy manner
and in conditions of freedom and dignity. Adequate facilities, just and
humane conditions of work etc. are the minimum requirements which must G
exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and the State
has to take every action. In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR {1991)
SC 420, this Court had held that the right to life includes the right to
enjoyment of pollution free water and air for full enjoyment of life. In Olga
Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR (1986) SC 180, this Court had H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A held that right to livelihood is an important facet of the right to life. In
C.E.S.C. Ltd. & Ors. v. S.C. Bose & Ors., [1992] 1 SCC 441 at 462-63, para
30, it was held that right to social and economic justice is a fundamental
right. Right to health of a worker is a fundamental right. Therefore, right
to life enshrined in Article 21 means something more than mere survival
B of animal existence. The right to live with human dignity with minimum
sustenance and shelter and all those rights and aspects of life which would
go to m~e a man's life complete and worth living, would form part of the
right to life. Enjoyment of life and its attainment - social, cultural and
intellectual - without which life cannot be meaningful, would embrace the
protection and preservation of life guaranteed by Article 21. Right to
C health and social justice was held to be fundamental right to workers in
Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India, [1995] 3 SCC
42 and Life Insurance Corporation v. Consumer Education and Research
Centre, [1995] 5 SCC 482. Right to economic equality is held to be fun-
damental right in Dalmia Cement Bharat Ltd. & Anr. Etc. v. Union of India
D & Ors. Etc., IT (1996) 4 SC 555. Right to shelter is held to be a fundamental
human right in P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1995] Supp. 2 SCC
182, M/s. Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khim/al Totame & Ors., [1990) 1
SCC 520, Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr. [1996) 2 SCC 549
andAhmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Guiab Khan & Ors.,
JT (1996) 10 SC 485. The tribals, therefore, have fundamental right to
E social and economic empowerment. As a part of right to development to
enjoy full freedom, democracy offered to them through the States regulated
power of good Government that the lands in Scheduled areas are preserved
for social economic empowerment of the tribals.

p Meaning of Socialist Democratic Republic.

It is necessary to consider at this juncture the meaning of the
"socialism" envisaged in the Preamble of the Constitution. Establishment of
the egalitarian social order through rule of law is the basic structure of the
Constitution. The Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles are the
G means, as two wheels of the chariot, to achieve the above object of
democratic socialism. The word "socialist" used in the Preamble must be
read from the goals Articles 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 38, 39, 46 and all other
cognate Articles seek to establish, i.e., to reduce inequalities in income and
status and to provide equality of opportunity and facilities. Social justice
H enjoins the Court to uphold government's endeavour to remove economic
SA.1v1ATIIA v. STATE [K RAMASWAMY, J.] 397

inequalities, to provide decent standard of living to the poor and to protect A
the interest of the weaker sections of the society so as to assimilate all the
sections of the society in the secular integrated socialist Bharat with dignity
of person and equality of status to all.

Shri P.A. Choudhary, learned senior counsel for the 13th respondent, B
contended that the word 'person' in Section 3(1) of the Regulation does
not cover the executive Government of the State nor does it prohibit the
Government from transferring its land. According to him, such an inter-
pretation would get the Regulation exposed itself to be ultra vires of Article
298 of the Constitution which should be avoided. The premise of his
contention is founded on the principle that the Constitution empowers the C
Executive to acquire, hold and dispose of the property and the Governor,
as sovereign head of the Executive, gets no power under the Fifth Schedufe
to prohibit the State Government to transfer its property to non-tribals. On
the other hand, the Constitution has full faith in the Executive to implement
the directives contained in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution to D
promote the welfare of the Tribes. The Constitution has built up a balance
structure distributing powers and functions to each of the three branches
of the State. The Fifth Schedule read with Article 244 of Chapter X of the
Constitution, with a non-obstante clause, has conferred only the legislative
power on the µovernor, referable to Article 245 to enact the law relating E
to scheduled areas. The power to acquire, hold and dispose of the property
of the State was wisely left untouched in that behalf. The prohibition
contained in Fifth Schedule, therefore, does not effect the power of the
State under Article 298 to dispose of its property situated in Scheduled
area in the manner it deems appropriate. To buttress his contention, the
learned counsel cited a.passage froni Walter Bagehot - The English Con- F
stitution at page 283 that the queen, without consulting the Parliament, can
by law disband the Army, engage or dismiss the officers from General
Commanding-in-Chief doWnwards. She could sell all her war ships and all
novel stores etc. He also cited "Governmental Law" by Hartley and Griffith,
paie-~289 in that behalf. He further cited Lord Birkeenhead's dictum in G
Efrkdale District Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Corporation of Southport,
(1926) AC 355 at 364, wherein it was held that power entrusted to a person
or public body by the Legislature was to effectuate public purpose. They
cannot divest themselves of those powers and duties. Nor can they do any
action incompatible with due exercise of their powers or the discharge of H
their duties.
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A In Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King, [1921] 3 KB 500, cited
by the learned counsel, the Government had given an undertaking to the
owners and permitted the neutal warships to carry a particular class of
cargo to a British colony in which event the said ships will be released from
detention On the faith of it the owners of the ships carried the cargo and
requested for their release from detention. When clearance was refused,
B action was laid in the court for damage for breach of contract. It was held
that such an undertaking by the Government was not enforceable in a
Court of law, as it was not being within the competence of the Crown to
make a contract which would have the effect of limiting its power of
executive action in the future.
c
He also cited Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company et al. v. Charles
Sa"'.Yer, 343 US 579 at 632: 96 L ed 1153 at 1198 for the proposition that
the President has executive inherent power to seize private property to
meet an emergency subject to the legislation confronting him of the power.
He also cited Lois P. Myers v. United States, 272 US 160 : 71 ~ ed 11
D wherein it was held that th!'! President has the executive power to appoint
and remove executive subordinates.

In the State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961] 2
SCR 679, cited by Shri Choudhary, it was held that the pleasure doctrine
E of the President under Article 310 of the Constitution is qualified by Article
311 and is not subject to any law made by the Parliament or the Legislature
of the State. In other words, according to the learned counsel, the ratio
therein reiterates that the executive power of the President/Governor
granted under the Constitution is not subject to any limitations but is
co-extensive with the exercise of the legislative power.
F
Marn Ram Etc. Etc. v. Union of India &Anr., [1981] 1SCR1196 was
cited for the proposition that the power, of the President under Article 72
and of the Governor under Article 162, are not subject to legislative
control. The power of Legislature imposing minimum sentence of im-
G prisonment under Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not
subject to, nor can nullify wholly or partly, the executive power of the
President or the Governor to pardon or to reduce the life imprisonment
of a convict.

It is true, as contended by Shri Chowdhary, that the Constitution has
H demarcated legislative, executive and judicial powers and entrusted them
SAMATIIA v. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 399

to the three wings of the;State; in particular the PresidenUGovernor of the A
State is to exercise the executive power in their individual discretion. It is
not subject to legislative limitations to be done in accordance with rules of
business. In particular, the PresidenUGovernor is entrusted with the execu-
tive power co-extensive with the legislative power enumerated in the
j Seventh Schedule read with Article 245 of the Constitution. The executive
B
power especially conferred by the Constitution like the pleasure tenure or
the power of pardoning a convict are in our view, not apposite to the issue.
The power of the executive Government in that behalf has wisely been
devised in the Constitution is not subject to any restriction except in
accordance with the Constitution and the law made under Article 245 read
with the relevant Entry in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is c
subject to Fifth Schedule when it is applied to Scheduled area. The power
of the Government to acquire, hold and dispose of the property and the
making of contracts for any purpose conferred by Article 298 of the
Constitution equally is co-extensive with the legislative power of the
Union/State. However, Article 244 (1) itself specifies that provisions of the D
Fifth Schedule shall apply to the administration and control of the
Scheduled areas and Scheduled Tribes in any State except the excluded
areas specified therein. The legislative power in Clause (1) of Article 245
equally is "subject to the provisions of the Constitution" i.e. fifth Schedule.
Clause (1) of para 5 of Part B of the Fifth Schedule applicable to E
Scheduled areas, adumbrates with a non obstante clause that "Not-
-!
withstanding anything in the · Constitution, in other words, despite the
power, under Article 298, the Governor may, by public notification, direct
that any particular Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State shall
not apply to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State or shall apply
to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State, subject to such
F
exceptions and modifications as he may specify in the notification and any
direction given under clause (1) of para 5, may be given so as to have
retrospective effect". The executive power of the State is, therefore, subject
to the legislative power under clause 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule. Similarly
sub-para (2) thereof empowers the Governor to make regulation for the G
peace and good government of any area in a State which is for the time
being a Scheduled Area. In particular and without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing power, such regulation may regulate the allot-
ment of land to members of the Scheduled ·Tribes in such area or may
prohibit or restrict the transfer of land under clause (a) by or among the H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A members of the Scheduled Tribes in such areas. In other words sub-para
5(2) combines both legislative as well as executive power, clause 5(2)(a)
and (c) legislative power and clause (b) combines both legislative as well
as executive power. The word 'regulation' in para 5(2)(b) is thus of wide
import.

B Meaning of the word 'Regulation' in the title of the Regulation, para 5(2) of
the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution.

The question then is: whether the word "regulate" in para 5 clause
(2)(b) would .include prohibition to transfer the Government land? It
C requires no elaborate discussion in this behalf. While interpreting Article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution, this Court has consistently being held that the
term 'regulation' would include total prohibition vide Narendra Kumar v.
Union of India, [1960] 2 SCR 372; Fatehchand Himmatla/ v. State of
Maharashtra, [1977] 2 SCC 670; State of U.P. & Ors. v. Hindustan
D Aluminium Corpn. and Ors., [1979] 3 SCC 229; K. Ramanathan v. State of
Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1985) 2 SCC 116. This Court consider the meaning of
the word "regulation" in Air India Statutory Corporation Etc. v. United
Labour Union & Ors. Etc., 1996 9 SCALE 70 paragrapl). 56 at 104-05.
Therein, the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 came
for consideration. The question was whether the word "regulation" would
E include regularisation of the contract labour in the establishment in which
contract labour system was abolished, though it was not expressly provided.
A Bench of three Judges had held that the word "regulation", in the
absence of restrictive words, must be regarded as plenary in the larger
public interest. By necessary implication it includes to do everything which
F is indispensable for the purpose of carrying out the purposes in view.
Accordingly, it was held that though no express provision was made in the
Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition Act to regularise the services
of the contract labour, working in an establishment after the abolition of
contract labour, by necessary implication, the word 'regulation' includes
the power to regularise their services as permanent employees in the
G establishment. Therefore, the word "regulate" the allotment of land to
· members of Scheduled Tribes in scheduled area in the Fifth Schedule by
Clause 5(2)(b) must be read as a whole to ensure regulation of the land
only to and among the members of the Scheduled Tribes in the Scheduled
area. In the light of the provisions contained in clause (a) of sub-para (2)
H of para 5, there is implied prohibition on the State's power of allotment of
SAMATIIA v. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 401
its land to non-tribals in the Scheduled Areas. When so read there is no A
incompatibility and inconsistency between the power of the executive
Government and the Constitution and conjoint operation would elongate
the good governance of the Scqeduled Areas. So, while prohibiting transfer
of land between natural persons, i.e., tribles and non-tribals and preventing
non-tribals to purchase from or transfer to another non-tribal, his right, B
title of interest in the land in the scheduled area, at the same breathe would
not be permissible for the Government to transfer their land to a non-tribal
except for equally competing public purpose. The answer obviously should
be that it is permissible' to the Government to transfer its lands to the
non-tribals. This negatii~ answers leads to effectuate the constitutional
objective to preserve the land in the scheduled area to the tribals, prohibits C
the Government from allotting their land to the non- tribals; prohibit
infiltration of the non-tribals into the scheduled area and prevents exploita-
tion of the tribals by non- tribals in any form. This purposive interpretation
would ensure distributive justice among the tribals in this behalf and
elongates the constitutional commitment. Any other interpretation would D
sow the seed beds to disintegrate the tribal autonomy, their tribal culture
and frustrate empowerment of them, socially, economically and politically,
to live a life of equality, dignity of person and equality of status.

It would, therefore, be clear that the executive power of the State to
dispose of its property under Article 298 is subject to the provisions in the E
Fifth Schedule as an integral scheme. of the Constitution. The legisJative
power of the State under Article 245 is also subject to the Fifth Schedule,
to regulate the allotment of the Government land in the Scheduled Areas.
Obviously, therefore; the State legislature of Andhra Pradesh has now
imposed total prohibition under Mines Act to transfer its lands to the F
non-tribals. Doubtless that under Article 298, the State exercises its power
of disposal for public purpose. When two competing public purposes claim
preferential policy decision, option to the State should normally be to
elongate a,nd achieve constitutional goal. Secondly, the constitutional
priority yields place to private purpose, though it is hedged by executive
policy. As a facet of interpretation, the Court too adopts purposive inter- G
pretation tool to effectuate the goals set down in the Constitution. Equally,
the executive Government in its policy options requires to keep them in
the backdrop and regulate disposal of their land-property in accordance
with the constitutional policy, executive decision backed by Public policy
and, at the same time, preserve paramount Tribal interest in the scheduled H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A area. No abstract principle could be laid in that behalf. Each case requires
examination in the backdrop of the legislative/executive action,its effect on
the constitutional objectives and the consequential result yields therefrom.
The law relating to the power of the President under the Constitution of
U.S.A. as has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of U.S.A. or the
B executive power of the Queen under the scheme in English unwritten
Constitution transformed by Convention does not assist us much in this
behalf. Shri Chowdhary also cited an article "The Notion of a Living
Constitution" written by William H. Rehnquist, the present Chief Justice
of Supreme Court of USA [Texas Law Review Vol. 54, 693) emphasising
that the Executive should have full freedom in exercising its executive
C power and the Court cannot limit the executive power by interpretation of
a statute or regulation. This also is of no assistance since the Constitution
oUndia conferred express power of judicial review on the constitutional
Courts, i.e., Supreme Court of India and High Courts under Article 32 and
226 of the Constitution respectively. From the aforestated constitutional
D perspective and the interpretation of the words 'person' and 'regulation'
put up in the earlier parts of the judgment, the question arises: whether
the word 'person' under Section 3(1) of the Regulation would include the
State Government.

Shri Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, con-
E tended that the word 'person' in Section 3(1)(a) requires interpretation,
keeping in view the contextual -constitutional history of prohibition on
transfer of the land by a tribal to a non-tribal including that of the
Government land, differently depending upon the context in which it has
occurred ·in the first part of Section 3(2)(a) the word 'person' may be
F considered in a generic sense and in the second part thereof to mean a
natural person. Prohibition on the transfer of the land by a tribal to a
non-tribal visualises transfer between natural persons. The factum of mem-
bership of the person as a tribe does not necessarily cut down the width
of the word 'person', namely, legal person taken alongside the natural
person. The word 'person' requires interpretation in the natural sense of
G the Context in which it is used. Legal person may be natural, artificial or
statutory person. The words "whether or not" in clause 3(2) (a) are in the
nature of clarification and it would not cut down the contextual meaning.
The words "such person" in the first part of Section 3(1)(a) must be
interpretated to mean transferor, namely, artificial or statutory person
H apart from natural person. The objection of Section 3(1)(a) would be
SAMATIIA v. STATE[KRAMASWAMY,J.) 403

rendered nugatory if the meaning of the word 'person' is confined or A
restricted to natural person in Section 3(2)(a). Generic person may be a
co-operative society, a shareholder of a company and equally a Govern-
ment constitutionally capable to hold, acquire and dispose of the property.
Therefore, the word 'person' used in the first part of Section 3(2)(a) is of
wider import in the context of ownership of the land transfer of which is B
prohibited within the scheduled area to a non-tribal. The word 'person' in
the second clause was used in the context of natural persons, i.e., the
transfer between the tribes and non-tribes. In that context, the word
'person' was used in a restricted sense. So in the context of the artificial or
juriuical or statutory person, the word 'person' is of wider import. Any C
other interpretation would defeat the object of the Fifth Schedule and the
Regulation. Similarly, Section 3(2)(b) regulates the reverse effect. The land
in Scheduled area is presumed to belong to the tribals treating them as a
class. The meaning of the word 'person' does not detract from the meaning
of the word 'person' in Section 3(2)(a). Similarly, in Section 3(2)(c) if a
non-tribal intends to sell the land to a tribal and if the latter is not willing D
to purchase the same, the government may purchase the land from the
non-tribal person and distribute it to the tribal (in such manner .as may be
prescribed). The words "manner of disposal" would indicate that it should
be only in favour of the Scheduled Tribes since the sole object of the Fifth
Schedule and its species, .the regulation, is that the land in Scheduled area E
requires preservation among the tribals by allotment and their enjoyment
by the tribals along. Section 3(2)(b) reinforces that the assignment or sale
of the property should only be in favour of the Scheduled Tribes or ·a
Society composed solely of the members of the Scheduled Tribes. The
entire property in Scheduled area is treated to be the property, be it taken F
from the non- tribals or is of the Government and at the disposal of the
State Government. In that context, the learned counsel has drawn our
attention to the word 'regulation' in the Fifth Schedule, para 5(2)(b). He
also contends that the word 'regulation' requires to be interpreted broadly
to preserve not only the tribal autonomy but also to subserve distributive
justice in favour of the tribals in· the matter of assignment of the land G
belonging to the Government in their favour. Conversely, there is implied
prohibition on the transfer of Government land in favour of the non-tribal.
The words "peace and good government" used in para 5(2) also requires
to be tinderstood in a wider sense. Good Government must, of necessity,
be in accordance with the Constitution and dispensation of socio-economic H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A justice to the tribals including regulation of the land, distribution between
the tribals and prohibition on the non-tribals to entrench into scheduled
·-
area, to acquire, hold and deal with the lands in scheduled area. It would
defeat the object of the Constitution envisaged in the Fifth Schedule
thereof because the non-tribals get the Government land transferred in
their favour and manoeuvre to have the tribals deprived of their land by
B other illegal means. The word 'State', therefore, would include within the
concept of the word 'person' in Section 3 of the Act. In support thereof,
Shri Rajeev Dhavan cited State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964] 1
SCR 371 and Madras Electric Corporation case. He has also drawn our
attention to construe the provisions in the context of the whole statute
C relying upon Rese1ve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Invest-
ment Co. Ltd. & Ors., [1987] 1 SCC 424 para 33 at page 450-51 and
C.E.S.C. Ltd. & Ors. v. Subhash Chandra Bose & Ors., [1992] 1 SCC 441 at
464. He further contends that in view of the object, the word may be read
broadly, in the light of public purpose and social and economic justice
D which the Regulation seeks to serve. He cited, in support of his contention,
the following decisions viz. The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamar-
baugawaia, [1957] SCR 874 at 892-95; Ishwar Singh Bindra & Ors. v. The
State of U.P., [1969] 1 SCR 219 at 225; Nedurimilli Janardhana Reddy v.
Progressive Democratic Students' Union & Ors., [1994] 6 SCC 506 para 6. A
word may be read in different contexts in a different way. He cited that
E the word 'sale' used in the context of freedom of speech and expression
was given different meaning in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Ors. v. Asstt.
Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., [1994] 2 SCC 434 at 445; Pushpa Devi &
Ors. v. Milkhi Ram (dead) by his Lrs., [1990] 2 SCC 134 and Commissioner
of Income-tax, Bangalore v.J.H. Got/a Yadagiri, [1985] 4 SCC 343. The word
p 'vest' was interpreted with a different meaning in Dr. M. Ismail Farnqui &
Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1994] 6 SCC 360 at pp. 393, 404-05 and 423.
He therefore, contends that different meaning is required to be given to
the word 'person' as used in Section 3(1)(a), 3(1)(b) and 3(1)(c) of the
Act. We find force in his contention.

G M/s. Sudhir Chandra, L. Nageshwara Rao, A.V. Rangam and their
companion learned advocates, contended that in Section 3 of the Regula-
tion read with the Fifth Schedule, para 5 sub-clauses 2(b), the word
"person" would be understood in its natural and contextual perspective
which would indicate that the word 'person' would be applicable only to
H natural persons. The learned counsel laid great emphasis on the Statement
SAMATHA v. STAIB(KRAMASWAMY,J.] 405

of Objects and Reasons for amendment of the Regulation in 1970. Accord- A
ing to the learned counsel, the golden rule of interpretation is that the
legislative intent is to be effectuated by giving natural and grammatical
meaning to the word used in a statute. Only when the court finds ambiguity
of the expression used by the statute, principles of interpretation would be
applicable. In this case, there is no such ambiguity. The word 'person' is B
simple and plain, connoting prohibition on transfer of land between natural
persons, namely, tribals and non-tribals. That is made manifest by the
Statement of Objects and reasons of the amended Regulation which en-
visages that the Regulation was brought on statute to prohibit alienation of
the lands in the scheduled area by tribal in favour of a non-tribal. By
necessary implication the Government is not intended to be included in the C
word 'person'. Shri P.A. Chowdhary, learned Senior Counsel, further
elaborated, stating that Section 3(2)(b) amplifies that the land is purchased
from a non-tribal by the Government or where the heirs of a tribal
transferor are not willing to take back the property, assignment or disposal
of the said property in favour of another tribal as "a property at the disposal D
of the State Government" and prosecution for violation of the Regulation
under Section 6A by way of penalty, are not intended to be applied to the
Government when the transfer is made in violation of the provisions of the
Regulation; and, therefore, the word 'person' should be given restricted
meaning applicable only to natural person.
E
Sri Sudhir Chandra further contended that Clause 2(a) of para 5 of
the Fifth Schedule restricts transfer of land by or among members of the
Scheduled Tribes; Clause (b) regulates the allotment of land to members
of the Scheduled Tribes in such areas; and clause (c) regulates money-lend-
ing business by non-tribals to members of the Scheduled Tribes in F
scheduled area and para 5(3) gives power to the Governor to regulate by
law or to repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of
the State or any existing law in relation to that area. The purpose. thereby,
is to prevent exploitation of tribals by non-tribals. The State Government
is not expected to exploit the tribals. The Fifth Schedule does not prevent G
establishment of any factory or an industry or any scheme for development
of the tribal area by non-tribals. Exploitation of valuable minerals by the
·non-tribals is not intended to be prevented by Fifth Schedule to the
Constitution. In particular, they laid emphasis on para 5, clause 2(b) of the
Fifth Schedule, which does not prohibit the .allotment of the land to the
non- tribals. It is contended that the word "regulate" used therein does not H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A necessarily imply prohibition. If such a construction is adopted, it would ..
hinder the progress of the tribal areas. It introduces mutually internal and
external contradictions. Harmonious interpretation, therefore, has to be
adopted to make the Regulation and the Fifth Schedule work as a consis-
tent whole, regulating prohibition on transfer of land in the tribal areas to
B the non-tribal natural persons only. Thereby, the word 'person' should be
understood in that perspective. The government and juristic persons are
outside the purview of paras 5(2) and 5(3) of the Fifth Schedule and
Section 3 of the Regulation.

The respective contentions give rise to the question: whether the
C regulation prohibits the State Government transferring its lands to non-
tribals?

The historical evidence collected and culled out from B. Shiva Rao's
"In the making of the Constitution' and the scheme of the representative
D form of Government furnishes background material for interpretation of
the word "person". It is well established rule of interpretation that the
words of width issued in the Constitution requires wide interpretation to
effectuate the goals of establishing an egalitarian social order supplying
flesh and blood to the glorious contents and context of those words and to
E . enable the citizen to enjoy the rights enshrined in the Constitution from
generation to generation. InAshok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., JT (1997)
4 SC 251, this Bench has applied the rule of wide interpretation of the
Constitution. It bears no reiteration; reasons given therein mutatis mutandis
would proprio vigore apply to the fact situation. From the above perspective,
having given our deep and anxious consideration to the respective
F contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered
view that the interpretation put up by Shri Rajeev Dhavan merits
acceptance. It is seen and bears recapitulation that the purpose of the Fifth
and Sixth Schedules to the Constitution is to prevent exploitation of
truthful, inarticulate and innocent tribals and to empower them socially,
0

G educationally, economically and politically to bring them into the
mainstream of national life. The founding fathers of the Constitution were
conscious of and cognizant to the problem of the exploitation of the
Tribals. They were anxious to preserve the tribal culture and their holdings.
At the same time, they intended to provide and create opportunities and
H facilities, by affirmative action, in the light of the Directive Principles in
SAMATifA v. STATE[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 407
part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 46 and cognate provisions to prevent A
exploitation of the tribals by ensuring positively that the land is a valuable
endowment and a source of economic empowerment, social status and
dignity of persons. The Constitution intends that the land always should
remain with the tribals. Even the government land should increasingly get
allotted to them individually and collectively through registered B
Cooperative Societies or agricultural/farming Cooperative Societies
composed solely of the tribals and would be managed by them alone with
the facilities and opportunities provided to them by the Union of India
through their Annual Budgetary allocation spent through the appropriate
State Government as its instrumentalities. or local body in a planned C
development so as to make them fit for self-governance. The words "peace
and good government" used in the Fifth Schedule require widest possible
interpretation recognised and applied by this Court in T.M. Kanniayn v.
Incqme-tax Officer, Pondicheny & Anr., (1968) 2 SCR 103 at 107-08 and
Queen v. Russell, (1882) 7 AC 829.
D
By the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992 amended Part IX
of the Constitution, the principle of self-government based on democratic
principles at Gram Panchayat :md level upwards was introduced through
Articles 343 to 343ZG. As an integral scheme thereof, the Andhra Pradesh
(Provision of the Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act; 1966 E
came to be made. Section 4(d) of that Act provides that "(N)otwithstanding
anything contained under Part IX of the Constitution, every Gram Sabha
shall be competent to safeguard and preserve •.. community resources".
Clause G) of Section 4 provides that planning and management of minor
water bodies in the Scheduled Areas shall be entrusted to the Panchayats
at the appropriate level. Under clause (m) (iii) the power to prevent F
alienation of land in the Scheduled Areas and to take appropriate action
to restore any unlawful alienation of land of a Scheduled Tribe and under
clause (iv) the power to manage village markets, by whatever name called,
aie entrusted to the Gram Panchayats. It would .indicate that the tribal
autonomy of management of their resources including the prevention of G
the alienation of the land in the Scheduled Areas and taking of appropriate
action in that behalf for restoration of the same to the tribals, is entrusted
to the Gram Panchayats.

The maxim "reddendo singula singulis" will apply to the interpretation H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of the word 'person" so that the general meaning of the word "person" in
its generic sense with its width would not be cut down by the specific
qualification of one species, i.e., natural "person" when it is capable to
encompass, in its ambit, natural persons, juristic persons and constitutional
mechanism of governance in a democratic set up. It has already been held,
B and bears no repetition, that the State, by Cabinet form of Government, is
a persona ficta a Corporate sole. Constitution empowers the State to
acquire, hold and dispose of their property. The Governor in his personal
responsibility is empowered to maintain peace and good government in
scheduled area. The Fifth Schedule to the Constitution empowers him to
regulate allotment of the land by para 5(2)(b) read with Section 3 of the
C Regulation of the land be it between natural persons, i.e., tribals and
non-tribals; it imposes total prohibition on transfer of the land in scheduled
area. The object of the Fifth Schedule and the Regulation is to preserve
tribal autonomy, their culture and economic empowerment. to ensure
social, economic and political justice for preservation of peace and good
D government in the Scheduled Area. Therefore, all relevant clauses in the
Schedule and the Regulation should harmoniously and widely be read so
as to elongate the aforesaid constitutional objectives and dignity of person
to the. Scheduled Tribes, preserving the integrity of the Scheduled Areas
and ensuring distributive justice as an integral scheme thereof. Clauses (a)
and (c) of sub para (2) of para 5 of the Fifth Schedule prohibits transfers
E Inter vivos between tribals and non-tribal natural persons and prevents
money-lenders to exploit the tribals. Clause (b) intends to regulate allot-
ment of land not only among tribals but also prohibits allotment of the
land belonging to the government to the non-tribals. In that behalf, wider
interpretation of "regulation" would include "prohibition" which should be
p read into that clause. If so read, it subserves the constitutional objective of
regulating the allotment of the land in Scheduled Areas exclusively to the
Scheduled Tribes. Clause 5(2)(b) ensures distributive justice of socio-
economic empowerment which yields meaningful results in reality . If
purposive construction, in this backdrop is adopted, no internal or external
contradiction would emerge. The word "person" would include both
G natural persons as well as juristic person and constitutional Government.
This liberal and wider interpretation would maximise allotment of Govern-
ment land in scheduled area to the tribals to make socio- economic justice
assured in the Preamble and Articles 38, 39 and 46, a reality to the tribals.
The restricted interpretation would defeat the objective of the Constitu-
H tion. The word "person" would be so interpreted as to include State or
SAMATHA v. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 409

juristic person Corporate sole or persona ficta. Transfer of land by the A
juristic persons or allotment of land by the State to the non- tribals would
stand prohibited, achieving the object of para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of
the Constitution and Section 3 of the Regulation. If the word 'person' is
1
interpreted to mean only natural persons, it tends to defeat the object of
the Constitution, the genus and the Regulation, its species. As a corollary, B
by omission in the final draft of the Fifth Schedule of the power of the
State Government to transfer its land to the non-tribals with the sanction
of a competent authorised officer or authority would, by interpretation
brought into effect and the object of the Constitution would easily be
defeated. We are, therefore, inclined to take the view that the word
'person' includes the State Government. The State Government also stands C
·prohibited to transfer by way of lease or any other form known to law, the
Government land in scheduled area to non-tribal person, be it natural or
juristic person except to its instrumentality or a Co-operative Society
composed solely of tribes as is specified in the second part of Section
3(1)(a). Any other interpretation would easily defeat the purpose exclusive D
power entrusted by the Fifth Schedule to the Governor. If the Cabinet form
of Government would transfer the land of the Government to non-tribals
peace would get disturbed, good governance in scheduled area would slip
into the hands of the non-tribals who would drive out the tribals from
scheduled area and create monopoly to the well developed and sophisti-
cated non-tribals; and slowly, and imperceptible, but surely, the land in the E
scheduled area would pass into the lands of the non-tribals. The letter of
law would be an empty content and by play of words deflect the course of
justice to the tribals and denude them of the socio-economic empowerment
and dignity of their person.
F
The word "person" in Section 3(l)(a) would, therefore, be construed
to include not merely the natural persons, in the context of tribal and non
tribal who deal with the land in Scheduled Areas by transfer inter vivos but
all juristic persons in the generic sense, including the Corporation ag-
gregate or Corporation sole, State, Corporation, partnership firm, a com- G
pany, any person with corporate veil or persons of all hues, either as
transferor or transferee so that the word 'regulate in para 5(2)(b) of the
Fifth Schedule in relation to the land in Scheduled Areas would be ap-
plicable to them either as transferor or transferee of land in a Scheduled
Area. It, thus, manifests the constitutional and legislative intention that
tribals and a Cooperative Society consisting solely of tribal members alone H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A should be in possession and enjoyment of the land in the scheduled area
as dealt with in various enactments starting from Gunjam and •
Vizianagaram Act, 1839 to the present regulation.

This interpretation of ours is consistent with the constitutionality of
B the Regulation as was upheld by this Court in P. Rami Reddy & Ors. Etc.
v. State of A.P. & Anr. Etc., [1988) Supp. 1 SCR 443; Lingappa Pochanna
Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., [1985) 1 SCC 479 and
Manchegowda and Ors. v. State of Kamataka and Ors., [1984) 3 SCC 301.
There is no internal and external contradiction in this process of har-
monious and purposive interpretation of para 5(2)(a) of the Fifth Schedule
C which regulates transfers between natural persons; Para 5(2)(b) encompas-
ses within its ambit, the transfer by the Government of its land to a
non-tribal and clause (c) or the relevant clauses in Sections 3 and 4 of the
Regulation. The Regulation prevents exploitation of the tribals through the
State Government; from the other end, it does not allow parting with of
D their land and prevents induction of non-tribals into the scheduled area by
allotment of the land or by regulating allotment of the land, be it private
or private corporate aggregate. This interpretation per se, therefore, is
public law interpretation to subserve the constitutional purpose without
recourse to private law principles.

E In Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [198111 SCR
206, the Constitution Bench had held that the edifice of our Constitution
is built upon the concept crystalised in the Preamble. We "the People"
resolved to constitute ourselves a socialist State which carries with it the
obligation to secure to the people, justice · social, economic and political.
F We, therefore, put Part IV into our Constitution containing Directive
Principles of State Policy which specifies the socialistic role to be achieved.
In D.S. Nakara & Ors. v. Union of India, [1983) 2 SCR 165 at 187F to 189H,
another Constitution Bench had dealt with the object to amend the
Preamble by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act and pointed out that
the concept of Socialist Republic was to achieve socio- economic revolution
G to end poverty, ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity. It was
pointed out that socialism is a much misunderstood word. Values deter-
mine contemporary socialism · pure and simple. The principal aim of
socialist State is to eliminate inequality in income and status and standards
of life. The basic framework of socialism is to provide a decent standard
H of life to the working people especially to provide security from cradle to
SAMATIIA v. STATE(K.RAMASWAMY,J.] 411

grave. The less equipped person shall be assured a decent minimum A
standard of life and exploitation in any form shall be prohibited. There will
be equitable distribution of national cake and the worst off shall be treated
in such a manner as to push them up the ladder. The Preamble directs the
centers of power, Legislature, Executive and Judiciary - to strive to set up
from a wholly feudal exploited slave society to a vibrant, throbbing socialist B
welfare society under rule of law though it is a long march, but during the
journey to the fulfilment of goal every State action including interpretation
whenever taken, must be directed and must be so interpreted as to take
, the society towards establishing egalitarian socialist State, the goal. It was,
therefore, held that "it, therefore, appears to be well established that while
interpreting or examining the constitutional validity of legislative/ad- C
ministrative action, the touchstone of Directive Principles of State Policy
in the light of the Preamble will provide a reliable yardstick to hold one
way or the other."

Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, while participating in the discussion on the D
Constitution (First Amendment) Bill, had stated that the Directive Prin-
ciples are intended to bring about a socio-economic revolution and to
create a new socio-economic order where there will be social and economic
justice for all and for everyone, not only to fortunate few but also the
teeming millions of Indians who would be able to participate in the fruits
of freedom and development and exercise the fundamental rights. E

Dr. Ambedkar, while introducing the Preamble of the Constitution
for discussion by the Constituent Assembly, had stated that the purpose of
the Preamble is to constitute "a new society in India based on justice, liberty
and equality". The Constituent Assembly debates of November 1948 at F
pages 230 to 357 do indicate that the Directive Principles intended to
provide life blood to social, economic and political justice to all people.
Some of the members like Mahavir Tyagi, Professor K.T. Shah, Dr. Saxena
Etc. pleaded for incorporation of socialism as part of the Preamble but Dr.
Ambedkar the father of the Constitution, while rejecting the amendment,
made it clear that the socio-economic justice provided in the Directive G
Principles and the Fundamental Rights given in Chapter III would meet
the above objective without expressly declaring India as a socialist State in
the Constitution. Alladi Krishnaswaniy Ayyer supported Dr. Ambedkar
and had stated that "the constitution, while it does not commit the country
to any particular form of economic structure of social adjustment, gives H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP.2S.C.R.

A ample scope for the future legislature and the future Parliament to evolve
any economic order and undertake any legislation they choose in public
interest". Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in his speech also emphasised the need ..
to enter into a new social order in which "there would be valid growth in
the standard of living of all the people of India with equitable distribution
B of wealth and equality of opportunity and status of all". Dias, in his
"Jurisprudence" (5th Edn.) on 'distributive justice' in Chapter 4 at page 66,
has stated that justice is not synonymous with equality; equality is one
aspect of it. Justice is not something which can be captured in a formula
once and for all. It is a process, a complex and shifting balance between
many factors including equality. Justice is never given, it is always a task to
C be achieved. Justice is just allocation of advantages and disadvantages,
preventing the abuse of power, preventing the abuse of liberty by providing
facilities and opportunities to the poor and disadvantaged and deprived
social segments for a just decision of disputes adapting to change.

D Justice P.B. Sawant, former Judge of this Court, in his "Socialism
under the Indian Constitution" had stated at page 2 that today socialism
has come to be associated with certain social and economic arrangements
and a way of life in a socialist economy that the resources of the society
are owned by the State as a whole and are used for the benefit of all,. for
ensuring all basic human rights to every member of the society and not for
E the profit of a few. By human rights is meant - all economic, political, social
and cultural rights which are necessary for an individual to realise his full
potential. In a socialist society, social, political and economic inequalitie~
disappear and none is allowed to possess economic power to the extent
that he is in a position to exploit or dominate others. It is only such society
F which can guarantee human dignity, stability, peace and progress.

Mahatma Gandhiji, the father of the nation, in 'Harijans' dated
October 9, 1937 had stated that "true economics never militates against the
highest ethical standard, just as all true ethics to be worth its name must
at the same time be also good economics. An economies that inculcates
G Mammon worship, and enables the strong to amass wealth at the expense
of the weak, is a false and dismal science. It spells death. True economics,
on the other hand, stands for social justice, it promotes the good of all
equally, including the weakest, and is indispensable for decent life."Dr.
V.K.R.V. Rao, one of the eminent economists of India, in his "Indian
H Socialism Retrospect and prospect" has stated at page 46-47 that a socialist
SAMA1HA v. STATE[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 413

society has not only to bring about equitable distribution but also to A
maximise production. It has to solve problems of unemployment, low
income and mass poverty and bring about a significant improvement in the
national standards of living. At page 47, he has stated that socialism,
therefore, requires deliberate and purposive action on the part of the State
in regard to both production and distribution and the fields covered are B
not only savings, investment, human skills and use of science and technol-
ogy, but also changes in property relations, taxation, public expenditure,
education and the social services. A socialist society is not just a give-away
society nor is it only concerned with distribution of income. H must bring
about full employment as also an increase in productivity.
c
A socialistic society involves a planned economy which takes note of
time and space considerations in the distribution and pricing of output. It
would be necessary for both the efficient working of socialist enterprises
and the prevention of unplanned and anarchical expansion of private
enterprises. The Indian conception of socialism with democracy with ))
human dignity is by creation of opportunities for the development of each
individual and not the destruction of the individual. It is not for the merging
of the individual in the society. The Indian socialist society wants the
development of each individual but requires this development to be such
··. that it leads to the upliftment of the society as a whole. Fundamental duties
in Chapter VI-A of the Constitution to bear meaningful content, facilities E
and opportunity on equal footing is the fundamental condition of a socialist
society. The more the talent from backward classes and areas get recogni-
tion and support, the more socialist will be the society. Public sector and
private sector should harmoniously work. The Indian approach to socialism
would be derived from Indian spiritual traditions. Buddhism, Jainism, F
Vedantic and Bhakti Hinduism, Sikhism, Islam and Christianity have all
contributed to this heritage rooted to respect for human dignity and human
equality. While imposing restrictions on the right to private property even
to the extent of abolishing it where necessary in the social and public
interest, it permits private enterprise in economic activity and makes for a G
mixed economy rather than a completely socialised economy. It abhors
violence and class war and heirarchical class structure and pins its faith on
non-violence, sacrifice, and dedication to the service of the poor and as a
natural consequence, its implementation is envisaged through Parliamen-
tary democracy planned economy and the rule of law rather than through
a violent revolution or a dictatorship in any form. Indian socialism, there- H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A fore, is different from Marxist or scientific socialism.

To achieve the goal set down in the Preamble, the Directive Prin-
ciples and fundamental rights, the Constitution envisaged planned
economy. The Planning Commission has been given the constitutional
B status for the above purpose. The Third Five Year Plan document extracts
the basic features of the socialist pattern of society thus :

11
Essentially, this means that the basic criterian for determining
.....

lines of advance must not be private profit, but social gain, and
that the pattern of development and the structure of socio-
c economic relations should be so planned that they result not only
in appreciable increase in national income and employment but
also in greater equality in incomes and wealth........ The benefits of
economic development must accrue more and more to the rela-
tively less privileged classes of society, and there should be progres-
sive reduction of the concentration of incomes, wealth and
D
economic power ....... The socialist pattern of society is not to be
regarded as some fixed or rigid pattern. It is not rooted in any
doctrine or dogma ....... It is neither necessary nor desirable that

E
the economy should become a monolithic type of organisation
offering little play for experimentation either as to forms or as to
modes of functioning. Nor should expansion of the public sector
mean centralization of decision-making and of exercise of
authority........... The accent of the socialist pattern of society is on
-
the attainment of positive goals, the raising of living standards, the
enlargement of opportunities for all, the promotion of enterprise
among the disadvantaged classes and the creation of a sense of
F
partnership among all sections of the community. These positive
goals provide the criteria for basic decisions. The directive prin-
(
ciples of State policy in the Constitution have indicated the ap-
proach in broad terms; the socialist pattern of society is a more
concretised expression of this approach. Economic policy and
G institutional changes have to be planned in a manner that would
secure economic advance along democratic and egalitarian
lines......"

Mr. G.D.H. Cole, one of the leading socialist of U.K., in his speech
H "The Growth of Socialism" published in 'Law and Opinion in England in
SAMATIIA v. STATE (K RAMASWAMY, J.] 415
the 20th Century' (Morris Ginsberg, Editor) at page 79-80, has stated that A
socialism is a movement aiming at greater social and economic equality
and using extended State action as one of its methods, perhaps the most
distinctive but certainly not the only one needed to be taken into account.
The affairs of the community shall be so administered as to further the
cornn{on interests of ordinary men and women by giving to everyone, as far B
as possible, an equal opportunity to live a satisfactory and contended
existence, coupled with a belief that such opportunity is incompatible with
the essentially unequal private ownership of the means of production. It
requires not merely collective control of the uses to which these are to be
put, but also their collective ownership and disinterested administration for
the common benefit. This basic idea of socialism involves not only the C
socialisation of the essential instruments of production, in the widest sem.e,
but also the abolition of private incomes which allow some men to live
without rendering or having rendered any kind of useful service to their
fellowmen and also the sweeping away of forms of educational preference
and monopoly which divide men into social classes. It involves, in effect D
whatever is needful for the establishment of what socialists call a 'classless
society' and in pursuance of this aim its votaries necessarily look for
support primarily, though not exclusively, to the working classes, who form
the main body of the less privileged under the existing social order.
Socialists seek to reduce economic and social inequalities not only in order
to remove unearned sources of superior position and influence, but also in E
order to narrow the gaps between men to such as are compatible with all
men being near enough together in ways of living to be in substance equals
in their mutual intercourse.

In Excel Wear Etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1979] 1 SCR 1009, the F
Constitution Bench had held at pages 1030-31 that the concept of socialism
or socialist state has undergone changes from time to time from country to
country and from thinker to thinker. But some basic concept still holds the
field. The doctrinaire approach to the problem of socialism be eschewed
and the pragmatic one should be adapted. So long as the private ownership G
of an industry is recognised and governs an overwhelmingly large propor-
tions of an economic structure, it is not possible to say that principles of
socialism and social justice can be pushed to such an extreme so as to
ignore completely or to a very large extent the interest of another section
of the public, namely, the private ownership of the undertaking. In othei:
words, the object of intermediation should be co-existence and flourishing H
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of mixed ~~<momy. In State of Karnataka v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy & Anr.
Etc., (1978] 1,SCR 641, a Bench of nine Judges of this Court considered
nationalisation of the contract carriages. In that behalf, it was held that one
of the principal aims of socialism is the distribution of the material resour-
ces of the community in such a way as to subserve the common good. This
B principle is embodied under Article 39(b) of the Constitution as one of the
essential directive principles of State polity. Therein, this Court laid stress
on the word 'distribute' as used in Article 39(b) being a key-word of the
provision emphasising that "The key word is distribution and the genius of
the Article, if we may say so, cannot but be given full play as it fulfils the
basic purpose of restructuring the economic order.. Each word in this
C Article has a strategic role and the whole Article is a social mission. It
embraces the entire material resources of the community. Its task is to
distribute such resources, its goal is to undertake distribution as best to
subserve the common good. It reorganises by such distribution the owner-
ship and control."
D
In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.
& Anr., (1983] 1 SCR 1000 another Constitution Bench reiterated the above
view; while considering Article 39(b) of the Constitution, at page 1020, this
Court had held that the broad egalitarian principle of economic justice
was implicit in every directive principle and, therefore, a law designed to
E promote a directive principle, even if it came into conflict with the
formalistic and doctrinaire view of equality before the law, would most
certainly advance the broader egalitarian principle and desirable
constitutional goal of social and economic justice for all. If the law was
aimed at the broader egalitarianism of the Directive Principles, Article 31C
F protected the law from needless, unending and rancorous debate on the
question whether the law contravened Article 14's concept of the equality
before the law. The law seeking the immunity afforded by Article 31C must
be a law directing the policy of the State towards ·securing a Directive
Principle and the connection with the Directive Principle must not be some
G remote or tenuous connection. The object of the nationalisation of the coal
mine is to distribute nations resources. It was held at page 1023 that though
the word 'socialist' was introduced in the Preamble by late amendment of
the Constitution, that socialism has always been the goal is evident from
the Directive principles of the State policy. The amendment was only to
H emphasise the urgency. Ownership, control and distribution of national
SAMATIIA v. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 417

productive wealth for the benefit and use of the community and the A
rejection of a system of misuse of its resources for selfish ends is what
socialism is about and the words and thought of Article 39(b) but echo the
familiar language and philosophy of socialism as expounded generally by
all socialist writers. Socialism is, first of all, a protest against the material
and cultural poverty inflicted by capitalism on the mass of the people. B
Nationalisation of coal mine for distribution was upheld as a step towards
socialism. In State of Tamil Nadu Etc. Etc. v. L. Abu Kavur Bai & Ors. Etc.,
[1984] 1 SCR 725, the same extended meaning of distribution of material
resources ·in Article 39(b) was given by another constitution Bench to
uphold Tamil Nadu State Carriages and Contract Carriages (Acquisition) C
Act. Similar view was reiterated by a three Judge Bench in Madhusudan
Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1984) 2 SCC 381. In Air India case
the concept of socialism was elaborated and applied to fill in the gaps of
the Act to regularise the services of the contract labourers in the
establishments of Air India. D
It is an established rule of interpretation that to establish Socialist
Secular Democratic Republic, the basic structure under the rule of law,
pragmatic broad and wide interpretation of the Constitution makes social
and economic democracy with liberty, equality of opportunity, equality of
status and fraternity a reality to "we, the people of india", who would E
include the Scheduled Tribes. All State actions should be to reach the
above goal with this march under rule of law. The interpretation of the
words 'person' 'regulation' and 'distribution' require to be broached
broadly to elongate socio-economic justice to the tribals. The word
'regulates' in para (2)(b) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution and the F
title of the Regulation would not only control allotment of land to the
Tribes in Scheduled area but also prohibits transfer of private or
Government's land in such areas to the non-tribals. While later clause (a)
achieves the object of prohibiting transfer inter vivos by tribals to the
non-tribals or non-tribals inter se, the first clauses includes the State G
Government or being an juristic person integral scheme of para 5(2) of
Schedule. The Regulation seeks to further achieve the object of declaring
with a presumptive evidence that the land in the Scheduled Areas belongs
to the Scheduled Tribes and any transfer made to a non.. tribal shall always
be deemed to have been made by a tribal unless the transferee establish H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the contra. It also prohibits transfer of the land in any form known to law
and declared such transfer as void except by way of testamentary
·-
disposition by a tribal to his kith and kin/tribal or by partition among them.
The regulation and its predecessor law in operation in the respective areas
regulate transfer between a tribal and non-tribal with prior permission of
B the designated officer as a condition precedent to prevent exploitation of
the tribals. If a tribal is unwilling to purchase land from a non-tribal, the
State Government is enjoined to purchase the land from a non-tribal as
per the principles set down in the regulations and to distribute the same
to a tribal or a cooperative society composed solely of tribals.

C Whether lease is a transfer.
Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines 'lease' as a
transfer of right to enjoy immovable property made by the transferor to the
transferee for a certain period, express or implied, for consideration of
D price paid or promised etc. to the transferor by the transferee who,accepts
the transfer on such terms. Thereby the lease creates a right or an interest
in enjoyment of the demised property on terms and conditions contained
therein to remain in possession thereof for the duration of the period of
lease unless it is determined in accordance with the contract or the statute.
It is an encumbrance on the right to be in possession; use and enjoyment
E of the land by the transferee. Lease is the outcome of separation of
ownership and possession. It may be either rightful or wrongful. If it is
rightful, it is an encumbrance on the owner's title but if it is wrongful the r
transferee acquires no lawful right to enjoy the interest therein. Section
11(5) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957
F brought by State Amendment Act prohibits grant of mining lease in
Scheduled Areas in favour of the non-tribals. It reads as under :

"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act no prospecting
licence or mining lease shall be granted in the Scheduled areas to
any person who is not a member of the Scheduled tribes :
G
Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to an undertaking
owned or controlled by the State or Central Government or to a
society registered or deemed to be registered under the Andhra
Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 which is composed solely
H of members of Scheduled Tribes.
SAMATHA v. STATE[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 419

Explanation: For the purpose of this sub-section; A

(a) the expression "Scheduled Areas" shall have the same mean-
ing assigned to it in clause (25) of article 366 of the Constitution
of India; and
B
(b) the expression "Scheduled Areas" shall have the same
meaning assigned to it in paragraph 6 of the Fifth Schedule to the
Constitution of India."

It brings out and effectuates public policy envisaged in the Fifth
Schedule of the Constitution and the Regnlation. Undoubtedly, it is C
prospective but the underlying principle would permeate the purpose of
interpretation that the State Government, being a person is regulated
under Section 3 of the Regulation prohibit transfer of their land situated
in the Scheduled Areas in which mines are discovered or for any other
purpose. G.O. Ms. No. 971/Rev. B of 1969 provides that Government land D
should not be given to non-tribals. The contention of Shri Sudhir Chandra
that the Government being empowered to operate the Regulation, by
implication, the Regulation does not apply to Government land per force,
is untenable in view of the above unambiguous constitutional, legislative
and executive policy. The further contention that there is no need for its
incorporation and that the Government would be prohibited from trans- E
ferring for public purpose, is untenable. They do not detract from legal
reasoning and purposive interpretation. The transfer of such land for a
public purpose, viz., to construct a hospital or to set up a bank by the
Government or its instrumentalities and for any public purpose etc., is not
prohibited for two reasons, namely, (i) there is no transfer of interest· in F
the Government land in favour of a non-tribal; (ii) there is no transfer of
its land in law to ~tself. The contention, therefore, that the Regulation
prohibits transfer of Government land for its public purpose is unsus-
tainable. The further contention that even philonthrophic persons imbued
with social zeal and spirit to ameliorate the social status and economic G
position of the tribals, would also be preventei:l to serve them is untenable.
What the Regulation prohibits is the transfer of right, title and interest in
the immovable property in scheduled area in favour of non-tribals. There
is no prohibition cin non-tribals philonthrophist to organise, though tribals
and a Cooperative Society composed solely of tribals, actions to ameliorate
socio-economic status of the tribals in the Scheduled Area. The further H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A contention that the rich mineral wealth being a national asset cannot be
kept unexploited which is detrimental ·to the national development, is
devoid of force. Instead of getting the minerals it exploited through non-
tribals, by exploitation of tribals, the minerals could be exploited through
an appropriate scheme, without disturbing ecology and forest, by the
B tribals themselves, either individually or through Cooperative Societies
composed solely of the tribes with the financial assistance of the State or
its instrumentalities. It would itself would be an opportunity to the tribals
to improve their social and economic status and a source of their economic
endowment and empowerment and would give them dignity of person,
social and economic status and an opportunity to improve their excellence.
C In the Constituent Assembly, a demand was made for allotment of mining
areas in North-Eastern States to the autonomous bodies; the Constituent
Assembly instead approved payment of royalty. At many a place, the
minerals deposits may be situated in tribal area. In the light of the language
used in Section 3 of the Regulation and Section 11(5) of Mining Act, we
D have examined the question taking aid of the source thereof, i.e., para
5(2)(a) and (b) of the Fifth Schedule and interpreted the word 'person' to
include State Government.

The object of Fifth and Sixth Schedules to the Constitution, as seen
earlier, is not only to prevent acquisition, holding or disposal of the land
E in Scheduled Areas by the non-tribals from the tribals or alienation of such
land among non-tribals inter se but also to ensure that the tribals remain
in possession and enjoyment of the lands in Scheduled areas for their
economic empowerment, social status and dignity of their person. Equally
exploitation of mineral resources national wealth undoubtedly, is for the
F development of the nation. The competing rights of tribals and the State
are required to be adjusted without defeating rights of either. The Gover-
nor is empowered, as a constitutional duty, by legislative and executive
action, to prohibit acquiring, holding and disposing of the land by non-
tribals in the Scheduled Areas. The Cabinet, while exercising its power
under Article 298, should equally be cognizant to the constitutional duty
G to protect and empower the tribals. Therefore, the Court is required to
give effect to the constitutional mandate and legislative policy of total
prohibition on the transfer of the land in Scheduled area to non- tribals.

Right to health has been declared to be a fundamental right ht CERC
H case; right to education is a fundamental right under Article 46 as held by
SAMATIIA v. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 421

this Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary A
Education v. K.S. Gandhi, (1991] 2 SCC and J.P. Unni Krishnan v. State of
A.P., (1993] 1 SCC 645; right to pollution-free atmosphere has been held
to be .a part of right to live under Article 21 as held by this Court in
Subhash v. State of Bihar, AIR (1991) SC 420; right to portable water is a
fundamental right as held by this Court in State of Kamataka v. Appa Balu B
Ingale & Ors., [1995] Supp. 4 SCC 469; right to shelter has been held to be
a fundamental right in catena of .decisions of this Court starting with Olga
Tellis case. These are all basic human rights declared under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and integral part of right to life under Article
21 and other fundamental right provided in Part III of the Constitution.
c
In the absence of any total prohibition, undoubtedly Article 298
empowers the Governor being the head of the. Executive to sanction
transfer of its lands. Since the Executive is enjoined to protect social,
economic and educational interest of the tribals and when the State leases
out the lands iii the Scheduled Areas to the non-/tribals for exploitation of
mineral resources, it transmits the corelative above constitutional duties D
and obligation to those who undertake to exploit the natural resources
should also to improve social, economic and educational empowerment of
the tribals. As a part of the administration of the project, the licensee or
lessee should incur the expenditure for:
E
(a) re-forestation and maintenance of ecology in the Scheduled
Areas;

(b) maintenance of roads and communication facilities in the
Scheduled Areas where operation of the industry has the
impact; F
(c) supply of portable water to the tribals;

(d) establishment of schools for imparting free education at
primary and secondary level and providing vocational training
to the tribals to enable them to be qualified, competent and G
confident in pursuit of employment;

(e) providing employment to the tribals according to their
qualifications in their establishment/ factory;

(t) establishment of hospitals and camps.for providing free medi- H
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A cal-aid and treatment to the tribals in the Scheduled Areas;

(g) maintenance of sanitation;

(h) construction of houses for tribals in the Scheduled Areas as
enclosures; The expenditure for the above projects should be
B part of his/its Annual Budget of the industry establishment or
business avocation/venture.

In this behalf, at least 20 per cent of the net profits should be set
apart as a permanent fund as a part of industrial/business activity for
C establishment and maintenance of water resources, schools, hospitals,
sanitation and transport facilities by laying roads etc. This 20% allocation
would not include the expenditure for re-forestation and maintenance of
ecology. It is needless to mention that necessary sanction for exemption of
said amount from income-tax liability, may be obtained; and the Centre
D should ensure grant of such exemption and see that these activities are
undertaken, carried on and maintained systematically and continuously.
The above obligations and duties, should be undertaken and discharged by
each and every person/industry/licensee/Jessee concerned so that the con-
stitutional objectives of social, economic and human resource empower-
ment of the tribals could be achieved and peace and good government is
E achieved in Scheduled Areas. We have not examined the other Acts in
detail but as and when such need arises, they may be examined in the light
of the language used therein and the law.

Mining lease of Government land is whether outside the Regulation.
F
The question then is whether grant of mining leases lands in the
Scheduled Areas belonging to the Government is outside the purview of
the Regulation? In the light of the aforestated discussion and the con-
clusion that the word 'person' would include the State Government, the
necessary corollary would be that the transfer of the land in Scheduled
G Area by way of lease, for mining purpose in favour of non-tribals stands
prohibited by para 5(2)(b) of the Fifth Schedule read with Section 3 of the
Regulation. It is on record that the non-tribals individuals have transferred
their lease hold interest in the mining leases in favour of some of the '
respondent-companies. The Government stands prohibited to transfer the
H mining leases to Corporation aggregate etc. except to its instrumentality.
SAMATifA v. STATE[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 423

The lease being a transfer of an interest in the land or a right to enjoy A
such property during subsistence of lease, its transfer stands prohibited. It
is well settled position of law, by catena of decisions of this Court, that
renewal of lease is in reality a fresh grant of lease, though it is called a
renewal because it postulates the existence of a prior lease. It has been
brought out from record that some of the respondents-companies have got B
transfer of mining lease in their favour from the individual lessees. This
Court in Mis. Victoria Granites (P) Ltd. v. P. Rama Rao & Ors., IT (1996)
9 SC 303 has held that the transfer of mining leases by an individual in
favour of a company is void and in effect, would defeat the object of Article
39(b) of the Constitution and would nullify the object of distributive justice
of the largess of the State to accord economic justice to individuals to C
improve socio-economic status and to secure dignity of persons. Therefore,
the transfer of lease or renewal of mining lease in favour of some of the
respondents is void as it defeats the constitutional and statutory objectives.

It is seen that in one case, the transfer was claimed to have been
made in favour of the State instrumentalities, i.e., A.P.S.M.D. Corporation D
Ltd. It has already been held that transfer of the Government land in favour
of its instrumentalities, in the eye of law, is not a transfer but one of

-
entrustment of its property for public purpose. Since, admittedly, a public
Corporation acts in public interest and not for private gain, such transfer
stands excluded from the prohibition under para 5(2)(b) of the Fifth E
Schedule and Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation. Such transfer or lease,
therefore, stands upheld. But a transfer of mining leases to non-tribal
natural persons or company, corporation aggregate or partnership firm etc.
is unconstitutional, void and inoperative.

The A.P.S.M.D. is required to exploit minerals in conformity with F
law, namely, Forest Conservation Act, 1980, E.P. Act etc.

ENCLOSURES - WHETHER GOVERNMENT CAN LEASE THE
LANDS TO MINING OPERATION

It is an admitted position that five enclosures comprise of 426 acres G
of land occupied by the tribals in those villages. Re- survey started in 1990
jointly by Revenue, Forest and Mining Departments and was completed
and the report was made on August 2, 1990. Though 14 villages with five
enclosures were notified as Borra reserved forest in GOMs No. 2997 F &
A dated October 31, 1966, they stood excluded from reserved forest area. H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Therefore, the lands in the enclosures being cultivated by the tribals ate
their patta lands and are entitled to get pattas by the concerned officers.
It is conceded on behalf of the respondents that the Government have no
power to grant mining leases for these lands situated within the enclosures.

WHETHER LEASES ARE IN VIOLATION OF F.C. ACT OR E.P. ACT
B
In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Government, it is
conceded that major part of the lands to which mining leases were granted
are situated in reserved forest. It has already been held that transfer of
lands situated within scheduled area to non- tribals is void. It is stated that
C a part of the land covered by some mining leases is outside the reserved
forest. The question, therefore, arises: whether these areas are forest? A
controversy has been raised by the respondents that unless the lands are
declared either as a reserved forest or forest under the Andhra Pradesh
Forest Act, 1967, the F.C. Act has no application. Thereby, there is no
D prohibition to grant mining lease or renewal thereof by the State Govern-
ment. The need for prior approval of the Central Government is not,
therefore, necessary. Prior to the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967, the
Madras Forest Act, 1882 was in force. For declaration of reserved forest
for the purpose of the Central Forest Act or a State act, the set scheme
has been devised, namely, publication in the State Gazette constituting any
E 1and as a reserved forest specifying its situation, its limits and a declaration
constituting such land as reserved forest. A Forest Settlement Officer gets
appointed to consider the objections, if any, from the persons claiming any
right, title and interest in any land covered by the notification. Pending
consideration thereof, provisions exist in the respective Acts prohibiting
F clearance of the forest or deforestation of the forest or depletion of forest
wealth and resultant consequences. After consideration of objections, if
any, and rejection of the objections and claims, subject to preserving the
easmentary right of way, water course or use of water or right to pastures
or right to forest produce, the Forest Settlement Officer would determine
the right of parties and would direct the concerned department to pay
G compensation determined on the basis of the principles laid in the Act with
a right of appeal thereon. Thereafter, a declaration would duly be publish-
ed in the Gazette with fixed boundaries that the "aforesaid area are a
reserve forest". Similar is the provision and procedure in the Wild Life
Sanctuary under Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. Therein too, provisions
H have been made declaring them as sanctuary for preservation and protec-
SAMATIIA v. STATE[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 425

tion of wild life etc. However, the right to residence and right to collect A
forest produce, forest goods or agriculture etc. to the tribals is regulated
under the appropriate provisions. ·

The words 'forest' or 'forest land' have not been defined in the A.P.
Act or the Central Forest Act. In collins English Dictionary (1979 Edn.) B
the word 'forest' has been defined as page 568 as "a large wooded area
having a thick growth of trees and plants, the trees of such an area,
something resembling a large wooded area especially in density". Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary defines 'forest' as "an extensive tract of land
covered with trees and undergrowth, sometimes intermingled with pasture".
In Webster's comprehensive Dictionary (International Edn.) at page 495, C
'forest' has been defined as "a large tract of land covered.with a natural
growth of trees and underbrush, in English Law wild land generally belong-
ing to the crown and kept for the protection of game, Of, pertaining to, or
inhabiting woods or forest. To overspread or plant with trees; make a forest
ot''. The 'forest cover' means "The sum total of vegetation in a forest; more D
especi<.illy, herbs, shrubs and the litter of leaves, branches". 'Forest reserve'
for the different manners 'a tract of forest land set aside by Government
order for protection and cultivation". According to Stroud's Judicial Dic-
tionary (fifth ed.), Vol. 2, at page 1014 'forest' means "a place privileged
by royal authority or by prescription for the peaceable abiding and nourish-
ment of the beats or birds of the forest, for resort of the King; a subject E
may hold a forest by grant from the crown; by the grant of a forest in a
man's own ground, not only the privilege but the land itself passes; within
the bounds and within the regard". Black's law Dictionary (6th Edn.)
defines 'forest' at page 649 as 'A tract of land covered with trees and one
usually of considerable extent". Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary p
defines the expression forest at page 415 as 'a large uncultivated tract of
land covered with trees and underwood: woody ground and rude pasture"

It would thus be seen that 'forest' bears extended meaning of a tract
of land covered with trees, shrubs, vegetation and undergrowth inter- G
mingled with trees with pastures, be it of natural growth or manmade
forestation. The FC Act, as amended by 1988 Act was enacted to check
deforestation and conservation of forest. Sub-section (2) with a non-
obstante clause on deforestation of forest or use of forest land for non-
forest purposes; regulates the forest and provides that notwithstanding any
other law for the time being in force in the State, no State Government or H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A other authority shall make, except with prior approval of the Central
Government, (i) any order directing that any reserved forest or any portion
thereof shall cease to be a reserved forest, (ii) that any forest land or
portion thereof may be used for any non-forest purpose; (iii) that any forest
land or any portion thereof may be assigned, by way of lease or otherwise,
B to any private person or to any authority or corporation, agency or any
other organisation, not owned, managed or controlled hy the Government,
(iv) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be cleared or trees
which have grown natural in the land or portion for the purpose of using
it for reforestation. Clauses (iii) and (iv) were added by Amendment Act
69 of 1988 w.e.f. December 19, 1988. The explanation thereto of non-forest
C purpose was defined to mean the breaking up or clearing of any forest land
or portion thereof for the cultivation of ....... but does not include any work
relating to ancillary to conservation development and management of forest
and wild life, namely, establishment of check-posts, fire lines ...... or other
like purposes. Section2, therefore, prohibits de-reservation of the forest or
D use of any forest land for any non-forest purpose or assignment by way of
lease or otherwise of any portion of land to any private person other than
Government controlled or owned, organised or managed by the State
Government agency; it prohibits clearance of trees or natural growth in the
forest land or any portion thereof to use it for reforestation, except for
preservation. Breaking up or clearance of forest land or a portion thereof
E is amplified to be of non-forest purpose. The object of the F.C. Act is to
prevent any further deforestation which causes ecological imbalance and
leads to environmental degradation. It is, therefore, necessary for the State
Government to obtain prior permission of the Central Government for (1)
dereservation of forest; and (2) the use of forest land for non-forest
F purpose. The prior approval of the Central Government, therefore, is a
condition precedent for such permission. The State Governments are
enjoined by FC Act, with power coupled with duty, to obtain prior approval
of the Central Government. The leases/renewal or leases otherwise are
good.

· G The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (for short, the 'EP Act') was
enacted to protect and improve environment and prevention of hazards to
human beings, other living creatures, lands and property. Section 3 of EP
Act enjoins the Central Government that it should take such measures as
it deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of protecting and improv-
H ing the quality of the environment and preventing, controlling and abating
SAMATHA v. STA1E[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 427

environmental pollution. It would, therefore, be clear that the meaning of A
the expression 'forest land' in the respective Acts requires extended mean-
ing given so as to preserve forest land from deforestatiori to maintain
ecology and to prevent environmental degradation and hazardous effects
on right to life. In Virender Gaur & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1995]
2 SCC 577 this Court in paragraph 7 at pages 580-81 has held that B
environmental, ecological, air, water pollution, etc. should be regarded as
amounting to violation of right to life assured by Article 21. Hygienic and
environment are an integral facet of right to healthy life and it would be
impossible to live with human dignity without a humane and healthy ·
environment. Environmental protection, therefore, has now become a mat-
ter of grave concern for human existence. Promotion of environmental C
protection implies maintenance of eco-friendly environment as a whole
comprising of man-made and the natural environment. It is, therefore, the
duty of every citizen and industry to conserve, and if it becomes inevitable
to disturb its existence, it is concomitant duty to reforest and restore
forestation; duty of the State to coordinate with all concerned and should D
ensure adquate measures to promote, protect and improve both man-
made, natural environment floura and founa as well as bio-diversity.

In Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., [1989]
Supp. 1 sec 504 in paragraph 14, this Court had observed that conscious- E
ness regarding environmental upkeep and cognizance of ecological impor-
tance had in recent times entered into governmental activities. The EP Act
protects to upkeep forest land or reserved forest, prevents deforestation,
encourages forestation and takes steps as are necessary to preserve ecol-
ogy. In paragraph 23, it was held that mining activity was held uncongenial
to ecology and environment. Trees are friends of mankind and forests are F
inevitable necessity for human existence, healthy living and the civilisation
to thrive and flourish. The need of protection and preservation of forests
is fundamental duty of every citizen and all persons in comprehensive
sense, i.e., juristic as well. The problem of forest preservation and protec-
tion was no more to be separated from the life style of tribals. The G
approach required is shift from the dependence on law and executive
implementation to dependence on the conscious and voluntary participa-
tion of all persons. Maintenance of ecology is the primary duty of the State
to prevent any further degradation of the ecology and environment and
equally is the duty of every citizen. All persons conjointly should allow H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. (1997) SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A regeneration of forest as an t:ssentlal step for healthy life. This Court in
Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangarsh Samiti v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1990)
4 SCC 449 and Subhash Kumar v. Stat~ of Bihar & Ors., [1991) 1 SCC 598,
had held that the protection to environment is the duty of the State. In
Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, [1987) 2 SCC 295, it was held
B that it is the fundamental duty of every citizen under Article 51A(g) and
Article 48A of the Constitution to protect the forest and environment. The
same view was reiterated in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Ors., [1988)
4 SCC 655 and M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors., [1992) 1 SCC 358. On
the positive obligation to protect environment, this Court had emphasised
C it in M.C. Melita's case (supra) and Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action
v. Union of India & Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 77. Industries which created
environment inimicalto the human existence, were directed to be disclosed
in Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., [1989) Supp. 1
SCC 504; Tanm Bharat Singh Alwar v. Union of India & Ors., (1992) Supp.
2 SCC 448; Ve/lore Citizens' Welfare Fornm v. Union of India & Ors., [1996)
D 5 SCC 647 and Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action case (supra). In
Partirnlar, in Ve/lore Citizens case, •his court had pointed out that the
sustainable development consists in preservation of the person without
compromising the ability of the future generation to meet their needs.
Sustainable development is a balancing concept between ecological
E development and industrialisation. Therefore, with a view to improve the
quality of human life, while living within the carrying capacity of the
subordinate ecology system, sustainable development should be maintained
by the industry and the State should ensure environmental protection and
prevent degradation thereof. As a facet thereof, as the principle of "the
F polluter pays", this Court awarded damages for causing deforestation and 1
directed development of eco-friendly environment. 1. \

Mining operations, though detrimental to forest growth, are part of
layout of the industry; provision should be made for investment or in-
frastructural planning to reforest the area; and to protect environment and
G regenerate forest. The Ministry of Environment and Forest and all
Secretaries of all the State Governments holding charge of Forest Depart-
ments, have a duty to prevent mining operations affecting the forest. It is
significant to note that, whether mining operations are carried on within
the reserved forest or other forest area. It is their duty to ensure that the
H industry or enterprise does not denude the forest to become a menace to
SAMATIIA v. STATE [K RAMASWAMY, J.) 429

human consistence nor a source to destroy flora and fauna and biodiversity. A
' The provisions of the FC Act get attracted to ensure preservation of forest.
In Garwal case, this Court, prohibited mining operations. In Rural Litiga-
tion and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1989] Supp. 1 SCC 537
and State of H.P. & Ors. v. Ganesh Wood Products & Ors., [1995] 6 SCC
363 it expressed anxiety to ensure eco-friendl~ environment. In the later B
case, two Judges Bench applied provisions of EC Act and EP Act and held
that the application of sustainable development requires that appropriate
assessment should be made of the forest wealth and the establishment· of
industries based on forest produce; other working should also be
monitored closely to maintain the required ecological balance. No distinc-
tion can be made between the Government forests and private forests in C
the matter of forest wealth of the nation and in the matter of environment
and ecology. The same view was taken by Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Mis. Colorock Pvt. Ltd. Vijayawada v. The Director of Mines & Geology,
Government of A.P., (1983) 3 ALT 39; Mis. Anupama Minerals v. Union of
India & Ors., AIR (1986) AP 225; Mis. Yashwallt Stone Works v. State of D
U.P., AIR (1988) All 121; Upendra Iha v. State of Bihar, AIR (1988) Patna
263 and Ambalal Manibhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, (1986) 27(2)
Guj. LR 1073.

- It is well settled law that mining operation is a non-forest purpose.
In Ambika Quany Works & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., (1987] 1 SCR E
562, a Bench of three Judges of this Court had held that the renewal of a
mining lease, without prior approval of the Central Government was in
violation of Section 2 of the FC Act. The same view was reiterated in State
of M.P. & Ors. v. Krishnadas Tikaram, [1995] Supp. 1 SCC 587 and Tarun
Bharat Sangh, A/war v. UniOll of India & Ors., [1993] Supp. 3 SCC 115. In F
Tarun Bharat Sangh's case, it was, however, held that even for mining
operations outside the Tiger Reserved Forest declared as protected area,
prior permission of the Central Government was necessary. State of Bihar
v. Bansi Ram Modi & Ors., [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 345, strongly relied on by
the Division Bench in Samatha's case and learned counsel for the respon- G
dents, was over-ruled by this Court in Ambika Quany Work's case. There-
fore, the decision no longer operates as a ratio decidendi. The same view
was taken by the High Courts in the above judgments. It would, therefore,
be mandatory that even renewal of mining leases without prior approval of
the Central Government, is void. In Mis. Victorian Granites case, sub-lease
of the mining leases, even with prior approval and grant by the State H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Government, was held to be illegal.

. It is seen from the evidence that the mining leases were granted by
the State Government or were transferred and retransferred with the
sanction of the State Government from private individuals to juristic per-
sons, the partnership firms or companies. The lands with mining area are
B situated either in the reserved forest or forest land or within the Scheduled
Area. Therefore, all the mining leases or renewals thereof are in violation
of the Fifth Schedule. Equally, mining leases/renewals of mining leases by
the State Government are in violation of the Regulation 3(1)(a) read with
Section 3(2) of the Regulation and F.C. Act. Therefore, they are all void.
c
Shri Sudhir Chandra in his written submissions has stated that in
respect of the lands leased to the 19th respondent, a sum of Rs. 350 crores
has been invested for manufacturing of "High Purity Sea Water" magnified
by using 100% import high technology. The said product saves annually 70
D crores of foreign exchange. It is essential for modernisation of steel in-
dustry. The product also has wide application for major core industry
saving large foreign exchange for the country. He has also stated that the
mining operations are carried on in plain area only and thereby forest area

-
is not affected. However, since these averments have been made for the
first time in the written submissions, after Court reserved its decision, we
E are deprived of the advantage of having the response of the State Govern-
ment, which in fact, has not taken any active interest in this litigation. We,
therefore, feel it necessary that the Chief Secretary of the Andhra Pradesh
State should constitute a committee consisting of himself, Secretary (In-
dustry), Secretary (Forest), Secretary (Tribal Welfare/Social Welfare) to
F have the factual information collected and consider whether it is feasible
to permit the industry to carry on mining operations. If the Committee so
opines, the matter may be placed before a: Cabinet sub-Committee consist-
ing of Minister, Minister for Industries, Minister for Forests and Minister
of Tribal Welfare to examine the issue whether licences could be allowed
to continue until they expire by efflux of time or whether is expedient to
G prohibit further mining operations in the light of Section 11 (5) of the
Mining Act, to take appropriate action in that behalf and submit report to
this Court on the actions so taken.

In cases where the similar Acts in other States do not totally prohibit
H grant of mining leases of the lands in the Scheduled Area, similar Commit-
SAMATHA v. STATE[KRAMASWAMY,J.) 431

tee of Secretaries and State Cabinet sub- Committees should be constituted A
and decision taken thereafter.

Before granting leases, it would be obligatory for the State Government
to obtain concurrence of the Central Government which would, for this
purpose, constitute a sub-Committee consisting of the Prime Minister of India, B.
Union Minister for Welfare, Union Minister for Environment so that the
States Policy would be consist~nt with the policy of the nation as a whole.

It would also be open to the appropriate legislature, preferably after
a thorough debate/conference of all the Chief Ministers, Ministers holding
the concerned Ministry and the Prime Minister and the Central Ministers C
concerned, to take a policy decision so as to bring about a suitable
enactment in the light of the guidelines laid down above so that there would
emerge a consistent scheme throughout the country, in respect of the tribal
lands under which national wealth in the form of minerals, is located.

The State Government, therefore, is directed to ensure that all D
concerned industrialists, be they natural or juristic person stop forthwith
mining operations within the scheduled area, except where the lease has
been granted to the State Undertaking, i.e., A.P.S.M.D. Corporation; they
should report compliance of this order to the Registry of this Court within
six months of the receipt of this judgment. The lessees of mining leases are E
directed not to break fresh mines; however, in the meanwhile, they are
entitled to remove the minerals already extracted and stocked in the
reserved forest area within four months time from today. All concerned
authorities are directed to ensure compliance thereof. Even the State
Undertaking carrying the mining operations, would be subject to the
regulations under the FC Act and EP Act. It would be open to the State F
Government to organise Co-operative Societies composed solely of the
Scheduled Tribes to exploit mining operations within the Scheduled area
subject to the compliance of the FC Act and EP Act.

The appeals of Samatha are accordingly allowed. The Judgment of G
the High Court stands set aside and directions are issued accordingly.

The appeal of Hyderabad Abrasives and Minerals (P) Ltd. stands
dismissed since their licence has already expired by efflux of time and grant
of renewal is prohibited under F.C. Act and Section 11(5) of the Mining
Act. No costs. H
432 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS (1997)SUPP.2S.C.R.

A S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J. Leave granted.

I have the advantage of going through the Judgments prepared -
separately by Esteemed Brothers Ramaswamy and Pattanaik. I am inclined.
to agree with Brother Ramaswamy, for the reasons which I am presently
setting out hereinbelow.
B
Tribals were the first settlers in this country but they were gradually
pushed back to the forests and hills by subsequent settlers who were
non-tribals. _The forests and hills provided a natural barrier and isolated
the tribals from people living on the plains. On account of their isolation,
C they remained illiterate, uneducated, unsophisticated, poor and destitute
and developed their own society where they allowed themselves to be
governed by their own primitive and customary laws and rituals.

2. Successive governments who ruled India from medieval times to
modem times (British Period) allowed these tribals and aboriginals to live
D in complete isolation and allowed them to follow their own traditional
culture, social customs and animistic tribal faiths. There were many
dangers in subjecting them to normal laws and they were, therefore,
governed by special laws.

E 3. The Tribal Areas or Agency Areas of the Madras Presidency were
governed by Gunjam and Vizagapatnam Act of 1839. Then came the
Scheduled Districts Act 14 of 1874 which was followed by the Agency
Tracts and Land Transfer Act, 1of1917. Section 4(1) and (2) of this Act
provided as under :
F "4(1). Notwithstanding any rule of law or enactment to the con-
trary, any transfer of immovable property situated within the agen-
cy Tracts by a. member of a hill tribes shall be absolutely null and
void unless made in favour of another members of a hill tribe, or
with the previous consent in writing of the Agent or of any other
G prescribed officer.

(2) Where a transfer of property is made in contravention of
sub-section (1), the Agent or any other prescribed Officer may on
application by any one interested, decree ejectment against any
H person in possession of the property claiming under the transfer
SAMATIIA v. STATE[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 433

and may restore it to the transferor or his heirs." A
4. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the administration of
the Scheduled Districts was exclusively vested in the Governor of the
Province. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 92 of the Government of India
Act, 1935 providt;d as under :
B
"92. (1) The executive authority of a Province extends to excluded
and partially excluded areas therein, but, notwithstanding anything
in this Act, ~o Act of the Dominion Legislature or of the Provincial
Legislature shall apply to an excluded area or a partially excluded
area, unless the Governor by public notification so directs, and the C
Governor in giving such a direction with respect to any Act may
direct that the Act shall in its application to the area, or to any
specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions or
modifications as he thinks fit.

(2) The Governor may make regulations for the peace· and good D
government of any area in a Province which is for the time being
an excluded area, or a partially excluded area, and any regulations
so made may repeal or amend any Act of the Dominion Legisla-
ture, or of the Provincial Legislature, or any existing Indian Law,
which is for the time being applicable to the area in question. E
Regulations made under this sub-section shall be submitted
forthwith to the Governor-General and until assented to by him
shall have no effect."

5. In B. Shiva Rao's Study Volume of "The Framing of India's
Constitution" it is stated as under : F

"There were two dangers to whi~h subjection to normal laws
would have specially exposed these peoples, and both arose out of
the fact that they were primitive people, simple, unsophisticated
and frequently improvident. There was a risk of their agricultural
land passing to the more civilized section of the population, and G
the occupation of the tribals was for the most part agricultural :
and, secondly, they were likely to get into the "wiles of the
moneylender". the primary aim of government policy then was to
protect them from these two d~ngers and preserve their tribal
customs; and this was achieved by prescribing special procedures H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A applicable to these backward areas. At first individual laws were
enacted, applicable to particular areas, which, among other things,
prescribed simple and elastic forms of judicial administrative pro-
cedures. The Scheduled Districts Act, enacted in 1874, appears to
have been the first measure adopted to deal with these areas as a
class. That Act enabled the executive to extend any enactment in
B force in any part of Birtish India to a "scheduled district" with such
modifications as might be considered necessary. In other words,
the executive had power to execlude these areas from the normal
operation of ordinary law and give them such protection as they
might need.
c
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 contained a brief
reference to these areas : it suggested that the political reforms
contemplated for the rest of India could not apply to these back-
ward areas where the people were primitive and "there was no
material on which to found political institutions". The typically
D backward tracts were therefore to be excluded from the jurisdic-
tion of the reformed Provincial Governments and administered
personally by the heads of the Provinces. In the Government of
India Act of 1919 these tracts were divided into two categories.
Some areas were considered so backward that they were wholly
excluded from the scope of the reforms. The effect of this was that
E
neither the Central nor the Provincial Legislature had power to
make laws applicable to these areas and the power of legislation
was vested in the Governor acting with his Executive Council, the
Ministers being excluded from having any share in the respon-
sibility for the administration of these areas. Proposals for expen-
F diture in these tracts were not required to be submitted to the vote
of the Legislative Assembly; and no question could be asked and
no subject relating to any of these tracts could be discussed in the
Assembly without the Governor's sanction."

6. It is further stated as under :
G
"The object of Government policy in relation to these areas,
inhabited by bac}cward, tribal and aboriginal populations, was
clearly visualized' by the Simon Commission. Until then the aim
had primarily been to give the primitive inhabitants of these areas
H- security of land tenure, freedom in the pursuit of their traditional
SAMATHA v. STATE[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 435
... means of livelihood, and a reasonable exercise of their ancestral A
customs : not self- determination or rapid political advance, but
experienced and sympathetic handling and protection from
economic subjugation by their neighbours. The Commission real-
ized that perpetual isolation from the main currents of progress
would not be a satisfactory long-term solution : and that it would B
be necessary to educate these people ultimately to become self-
reliant. In this direction practically nothing had been achieved. The
Commission observed :

The responsibility of Parliament for the backward tracts will
not be discharged merely by securing to them protection C
from exploitation and by preventing those outbreaks which
have from time to time occurred within their borders. The
principle duty of the administration is to educate these
people to stand on their own feet, and this is a process which
has scarcely begun.
D
The Commission recognized this problem to be one of consid-
erable magnitude and complexity. On the one hand it was too large
a task to be left to the efforts of missionary societies and individual
officials, since coordination of activity and adequate funds were
required. On the other hand the typically backward tract was E
deficit area and "no provincial legislature (was) likely to possess
either the will or the means to devote special attention to its
particular requirements". In these circumstances the Commission
recommended that the responsibility for the backward classes
would be adequately discharged only if it was entrusted to the
Centre. It was recognized that it would not be a practicable F
arrangement if centralization of administrative authority in these
areas led to a situation in which these areas would be separated
from the Provinces of which they were an integral part : and in
order to meet this difficulty the Commission suggested that even
though there would be a central responsibility, the backward tracts G
should not be separated from the Provinces but that the Central
Government should use the Governors as degree of backwardness,
it could be laid down by rules how far the degree of backwardness,
it could be laid down by rules how far the Governor would act in
consultation with his Ministers in the discharge of these agency
duties. H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The proposal for centralizing the administration of these areas
was however not adopted in the constitutional reforms of 1935.
Under the Government of India Act of 1935, these backward areas
were classified as excluded areas and partially excluded areas. A
small number of excluded areas-the total extent of these was about
18,600 square miles in Assam and 10,000 square miles in the rest
B of India-in the Provinces of Madras, Bengal, the North-West
Frontier Province, the Punjab and Assam, were placed under the
personal rule of the Governor acting in this discretion : and while
partially excluded areas were within the field of ministerial respon-
sibility, the Governors exercised a special responsibility in respect
c of the administration of these areas; and they had the power in
their individual judgment to overrule their Ministers if they thought
fit to do so. No Act of the Federal or Provincial Legislature would
apply to any of these areas : but the Governors had the authority
to apply such Acts with such modifications as they considered
necessary.
D
In addition to these excluded and partially excluded areas,
there were in the territory of India certain ;•tribial areas", which
were defined in the Government of India Act, 1935, as "areas along
the frontiers of India or in Baluchistan which are not part of British
E India or of Burma or of any Indian State or of any foreign State''.
The position of these areas was even more peculiar. In terms of
the definition they did not form part of the territory of British India
and neither the Parliament of Britain nor the Legislatures of British
India claimed or exercised any direct legislative powers over these
F years. The powers exercisable in these areas were described as
arising out of "treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise" and
the Act of 1935 contained a specific authorization enabling these
powers to be exercised as part of the executive authority of the
Central Government, by the Governor-General acting in his dis-
cretion, and therefore outside the area of responsibility of the
G Ministry."

7. It is furth~r stated as under :

"The Cabinet Mission's statement of May 16, 1946, mentioned
H the excluded and partially excluded areas and the tribal areas as
SAMATHA v. STATE(S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 437

requiring the special attention of the Constituent Assembly. The A
Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minorities, to be
set up at the preliminary meeting of the Assembly, was to contain
due representation of all the interests affected; and one of its
functions was to report to the Constituep.t Assembly on a scheme
for the administration of tribal and excluded areas at its meeting B
on February 27, 1947, the Advisory Committee set up three sub-
committees - one to consider the tribal and excluded and partially
excluded areas in Assam : one to consider the tribal areas in the
North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan : and the third

- sub-committee to consider the position of excluded and partially
excluded areas in the Provinces other than A~sam."

8. The Sub-Committee on Assam submitted its report on 28th July,
C

1947 while the other Sub-Committee on the Excluded and Partially Ex-
cluded Areas other than Assam submitted its interim report on 18.8.1947
and final report in September, 1947. The Joint meeting of the two Sub- D
Committees was held in August, 1947. The Joint meeting summed up the
problems as under :

"The areas inhabited by the tribes, whether in Assam or else-
where, are difficult of access, highly malarial and infested also in
some cases by other diseases like yaws and venereal disease and E
lacking in such civilizing facilities as roads, schools, dispensaries
and water suppiy. The tribes themselves are for the most part
extremely simple people who can be and are exploited with ease
by plainsfolk, resulting in the passage of land formerly cultivated
by them to money-lenders and other erstwhile non-agriculturists. F
While a good number of superstitions and even harmful practices
are prevalent among them, the tribes have their own customs and
way of life with institutions like tribal and village panchayats or
councils which are very effective in smoothing village administra-
tion. The sudden disruption of the tribals' customs and ways by G
exposure to the impact of a more complicated and sophisticated
manner of life is capable of doing great harm. Considering past
experience and the strong temptation to take advantage of the
tribals' simplicity and weaknesses; it is essential to provide
statutory safeguards for the protection of the land which is the
mainstay of the aboriginal's economic life and for his customs and H
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A institutions which, apart from being his own, contain elements of
value".

9. It would be useful at this stage to reproduce further the two
passages from Shri Rao's Book relating to_ the recommendations :

B "From the beginning the objectives of the Government's policy
in regard to the tribes and tribal areas were primarily directed to
the preservation of their social customs from sudden erosion and
to safeguarding their traditional vocations without the danger of
their being pauperized by exploitation by the more sophisticated
c elements of the population. At the same time it was recognized
that this stage of isolation could not last indefinitely : a second and
major objective was therefore laid down, that their educational
level and standard of living should be raised in order that they
might in course of time be assimilated with the rest of the popula-
tion. From this point of view the sub-committee was of the opinion
D
that the policy of exclusion and partial exclusion had not yielded
much tangible result in the progress of the aboriginal areas towards
the removal of their backward condition or in their economic and
educational betterment. The sub-cominittee did not therefore find
it advisable to abolish the administrative distinction between the
E backward areas and the rest of the country; and it recommended
that while certain areas like Sambalpur in Bihar and Angul in
Orissa need no longer be treated differently from the regularly
administered areas, there were other areas which needed a
simplified type of administration to protect the aboriginal people
F from exposure to the complicated machinery of the ordinary law
courts and save them from the clutches of the moneylender who
took advantage of their simplicity and illiteracy, deprived them of
their agricultural land, reduced them to a state of virtual serfdom.
The general position, according to the sub-committee, was that the
areas predominantly inhabited by tribal people should be known
G as "Scheduled Areas" (the intention being that these areas should
figure in a schedule to a notification) and special administrative
arrangements made in regard to them.

At the same, time having found the treatment of exclusion and
H partial exclusion to have proved a failure, the sub-committee
SAMATHA v. STATE[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.) 439

recommended that the responsibility for the betterment and wel- A
fare of these areas should be squarely that of the Provincial
Governments and that accordingly the Governors should not have
any special reserved or discretionary powers in regard to these
areas. But the ultimate responsibility was to be that of the Centre,
both for drawing up plans for the betterment of these areas and B
for providing .the necessary fmances. In order to ensure that the
requirements of these areas were given full consideration, the
sub-committee recommended that the Constitution should provide
for the setting up in each Province of a body which would keep
the Provincial Government constantly in touch with the needs of
the aboriginal tracts in particular and with the welfare of the tribes C
in general. This body was to be known as a Tribes Advisory
Council, which it was proposed should have a strong repre-
sentation of the tribal element.

The Tribes Advisory Council would primarily advise the D
government in regard to the application of laws to the Scheduled
Area : no laws affecting the following matters would apply if the
Tribal Advisory Council considered such a law unsuitable :

• (1) Social matters; (2) occupation of land, including tenancy
laws, allotment of land and setting apart of land for village pnr- E
poses; (3) village management, including the establishment of
village panchayats.

The provisions for the other States were more detailed. In their
case, the advisory body was known as the Tribes Advisory Council. F
The membership of the Tribes Advisory Council in each of the
States was to be between ten and twenty- five, of whom three-
fourths were to be elected representatives of the Scheduled Tribes
in the Legislative Assembly of the State as in the case of the Punjab
and the United Provinces; it was !aid down as the duty of the Tribes G
Advisory Council generally to advise the Government on all mat-
ters pertaining to the administration of the Scheduled Areas and
the welfare of the tribes. The State Government was statutorily
enjoined to give effect to the advice of the council if it considered
that an Act, whether of Parliament or of the State Legislature,
relating to the following matters, was unsuitable for, or required H
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A modification in, its application to a Scheduled Areas :

(a) marriage; (b) inheritance of property; (c) social customs of
tribes; ( d) land, including rights of tenants, allotment of land and
reservation for any purpose; (e) village administration and village
panchayats.
B
It was made obligatory that the Governor should act according
to the advice of the Tribes Advisory Council on the application of
Acts relating to these matters. He was not bound to accept the
advice of the council on laws relating to other matters. The State
Government was also empowered to make regulations applicable
c to a Scheduled Area after consulting the council. As in the case
of East Punjab and the United Provinces, such regulations would
inake provision for the trial of offences other than those punishable
with death, transportation for life or imprisonment for five years
or more; such regulations could also provide for the trial of
D disputes "other than those arising out of any such laws as may be
defined in such regulations".

The transfer of land in a Scheduled Area from a tribal to a
non-tribal was forbidden; and the State Government was also
prohibited from allotting State land in a Scheduled Area to non-
E tribals except in accordance with rules made after consulting the
Tribes Advisory Council Likewise, if advised by the council, the
Governor was obliged to license moneylending, prescribing such
conditions as were considered necessary; and the breach of these
conditions would be an offence. In order that public attention
F might be focussed on the development work carried out in these
areas, the State Government was required to show separately in
its financial statement the revenues and expenditure pertaining to
these areas.

G 10. The Sub-Committee in its report with regard to the land in Tribal
(Scheduled) Area, provided as un~er :

"25. Land : The importance of protection for the land of the
tribals has been emphasised earlier. All tenancy legislation which
has been passed hitherto with a view to protecting the aboriginal
H has tended to prohibit the alienation of the tribal's land to non-
SAMATifA v. STATEIS.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.) 441
tribals. Alienation of any kind, even to other tribals, may have to A
, be prohibited or severely restricted according to the different
stages of advancement. We find however that provincial Govern-
ments are generally alive to this question and that protective laws
exist. We assume that these will continue to apply and as we have
made special provision to see that land laws are not altered to the B
disadvantage of the tribal in future, we do not consider additional
restrictions necessary. As regards the allotment of new land for
cultivation or residence, however, we are of the view that the
interests of the tribal need, to be safeguarded in view of the
increasing pressure on land everywhere. We have provided accord- C
ingly that the allotment of vacant land, belonging to the State in
Scheduled Areas should not be made except in accordance with
special regulations made by the Government on the advice of the
Tribes Advisory Council."

11. In Part-II of Appendix C to this report, it was indicated as D
under:

"Vacant land in a Scheduled Area which is the property of the
State shall not be allotted to a non-tribal except in accordance with
rules made by the Provincial Government in consultation with the E
Tribes Advisory Council."

12. The recommendations of the two Sub-Committees were not
considered by the Constituent Assembly in its Session in July, 1947, when
the broad principles of the Constitution were settled since, as explained by
Dr. Ambedkar, they were received too late. The Drafting Committee F
however, considered these proposals at the stage of drafting and suitable
provisions including Schedule V & VI were included in the Draft Constitu-
tion of February, 1948 in which it was indicated that the transfer of land
in Scheduled Area From Tribal to non-Tribal was forbidden; and the State
Government was also prohibited from allotting the State land in the G
Scheduled Area to Non-Tribal except in accordance with the Rules which
,. may be made by the Governor after consulting the Tribes Advisory Coun-
cil.

13. The Draft Fifth Schedule prepared by the Drafting Committee
with regard to Article 189(a) and 190(1) which related to the administra- H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A tion and control of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes consisted of
several parts. Part I contained the general provision that the executive
power of the State specified in Part I of the First Schedule shall extend to
the Scheduled Areas therein. It further provided that the Governor of each
State having Scheduled Areas therein shall annually, or whenever so re-
B quired by the Government of India, may report to the Government regard-
ing the administration of the Scheduled Areas and the executive power of
the Union shall extend to the giving of directions to the State as to the
administration of the said areas.

14. Part II applied to the States of Madras, Bombay, West Bengal,
C Bihar, the Central Provinces and Berar, and Orissa. Clause 5 specified the
laws applicable to Scheduled Areas in those states. It provided as under :

"5. Law applicable to scheduled areas : (1) The Governor may, if
so advised by the Tribes Advisory Council for the state, by public
notification direct that any particular Act of Parliament or of the
D legislature of the State shall not apply to a scheduled area or any
part thereof in the State subject to such exceptions and modifica-
tions as he may with the approval of the said Council specify in
the notification.

E Provided that where such Act relates to any of the following
subjects, that is to say-

(a) marriage;
(b) inheritance of property;
(c) social customs of the tribes;
F (d) land, other than lands which are reserved forest under the
Indian Forest Act, 1927 or urider any other law for the time being
in force in the area in question, including rights of tenants, allot-
ment of land and reservation of land for any purpose;
(e) any matter relating to village administration including the
G establishment of village panchayats;

the Governor shall issue such direction when so advised by the
Tribes Advisory Council.

(2) The Governor may, after consultation with the Tribes Advisory
H Council for the State, make regulations for any scheduled area in
SAMATIIA v. STATE[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 443

the State with respect to any matter not provided for by any law A
for the time being in force in such area.

(3) The Governor may also make regulations for any scheduled
area in the State with respect to the trial of cases relating to
offences other than those which are punishable with death,
transportation for life or imprisonment for five years or upwards B
or relating to disputes other than those arising out of any such laws
as may be defined in such regulations, and may by such regulations
empower the headmen or panchayats in any such area to try such
cases.

(4) Any regulations made under this paragraph when promulgated
c
by the Governor shall have the same force and effect as any Act of the
appropriate Legislature which applies to such area and has been enacted
by virtue of the powers conferred on that legislature by this Constitution."

15. Clause 6 which dealt with the alienation and allotment of land to D
Non-Tribals in Scheduled Areas provides as under :

"6. Alienation and allotment of lands to non-tribals in scheduled
areas; (1) it shall not be lawful for a member of the Scheduled
Tribes to transfer any land in a scheduled area to any person who
is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes; E
(2) No land in a scheduled area vested in the State within such
area is situate shall be allotted to, or settled with, any person who
is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes except in accordance
with rules made in that behalf by the Governor in consultation with
F
the Tribes Advisory Council for the State."

16. Part III was applicable to the State of United Provinces (now
known as Uttar Pradesh). Para 12 provided as under:

"(2) The Governor may also make regulations so as to prohibit G
the transfer or any land in a scheduled area in the State by a
member of the Scheduled Tribes to any person who is not a
member of the Scheduled Tribes.

(3) Any regulations made under this paragraph when promul-
gated by the Governor shall have the same force and effect as any H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Act of the appropriate Legislature which applies to such area and
has been enacted by virtue of the powers conferred on that Legis-
lature by this Constitution."

17. Part IV related to the State of East Punjab Clause 17 provided
as under:-
B
"(2) The Governor may also make regulations so as to prohibit
the transfer of any land in a scheduled area in the State by a
member of the Scheduled Tribes to any person who is not a
member of the Scheduled Tribes.
c (3) Any regulations made under this paragraph when promul-
gated by the Governor shall have the same force and effect as any
Act of the appropriate Legislature which applies to such area and
has been enacted by virtue of the powers conferred on that Legis-
lature by this Constitution."
D
18. The important provision to be noticed is that although in respect
of States of Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, Bihar, the Central Provinces
and Berar, and Orissa, a total ban was placed on the transfer of land by a
member of the Scheduled Tribe to a person who is not a member of the
E Scheduled Tribe, it was provided, so far as allotment of Government land
was concerned, that no land in a Scheduled Area could be allotted to or
settled with a Non-Tribal except in accordance with the rules made in that
behalf by the Governor after consulting the Tribes Advisory Council. This
indicated that if a rule was made by the the Governor in that regard, land
in a Scheduled Area which was vested in the Government, could be allotted
F to the Non-Tribal. It is obvious that the powers of allotment could not be
exercised so long as the rules were not made.

19. No provision, so far as allotment of Government land was con-
cerned, was made for the State of United Provinces and West Bengal for
G which the only provision made was that the Governor may make regula-
tions so as to prohibit the transfer of land in a Scheduled Area by a
member of the Scheduled Tribe to any person who is not a member of the
Scheduled Tribe.

20. It also requires to be poticed that the Regulations made by the
H Governor for all these States to which Schedule Fifth was ,applicable were
SAMATIIA v. STATE[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 445
to have the same force and effect as an Act of the appropriate Legislature. A
But this was not stated in respect of rules which could be made by the
Governor under Clause 6(2) of the Fifth Schedule applicable to State of
Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, Bihar, the Central Provinces and Berar,
and Orissa.

21. The comments and suggestions made on the Draft Constitution B
including the Fifth Schedule prepared by the the Drafting Committee, so
far as relevant paras, namely, Para 5, Para 6, Para 12 and Para 17 of the
Fifth Schedule, are concerned, and the decision of the Drafting Committee
thereon are quoted below :-

"PARAGRAPH 5
c
The Government of Orissa has questioned the propriety of the
provisions contained in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 5 in Part
II of the Fifth Schedule and has made the following comments :
D
Under Section 92(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935
no Act of the Federal or Pwvincial Legislature applies to a
partially excluded area unless the appropriate Provincial
Government so directs by a notification. The plan followed
in the Draft Constitution of India is, however, fundamentally
different. The idea underlying paragraph 5(1) of Part II of E
the Fifth Schedule to the Draft Constitution is that as soon
as an Act of the Federal or the Provincial Legislature is
passed, it will apply automatically to all Scheduled Areas
unless the Governor on the advice of the Tribes Advisory
Council directs, in respect of any particular legislation, either F
that it shall not apply to any specified Scheduled Areas or
that it shall apply to such areas, subject to specified excep-
tions and modifications. Although on the whole the Govern-
ment of Orissa prefer the plan indicated in para 5(1) of Part
II of the Fifth Schedule to the Draft Constitution to the G
provision of section 92(1) of the Government of India Act,
1935, they apprehend that difficulties, mainly of an ad-
ministrative nature, might arise out of the inevitable time lag
between the passing of an Act by either the Dominion or the
State Legislature and the decision of the Governor either that
the Act shall not apply to any Scheduled Area or that in its H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A application to such an area, it shall be subject to certain
modifications and exceptions. Since the position will be that
as soon as an Act is passed by a Legislature it will apply in
all Scheduled Areas, certain rights and obligations will be
created or modified by virtue of the Act. The accrual of such
rights and obligations in the interim period might give rise to
B an awkward situation if it is decided subsequently (and a
direction is made to that effect) either that the Act shall not
apply to Scheduled Areas or that it shall apply to such areas
subject to certain specified exceptions and modifications. It
is of course possible to give retrospective effect to the direc-
c tions made under para 5 (1) in order to secure that the
exceptions and modifications subject to which the Act is
applied to Scheduled Areas will have effect therein from the
date of the passing of the Act. If that is done, consequential
provisions will have to be inserted by way of 'modifications'
in order to regularize anything done under the Act during the
D
interim period. Even so, however, it is likely that the rights
of several parties might be seriously affected and there might
be much confusion. The Provincial Government, however,
see no easy solution of such difficulties if the plan envisaged
in para 5(1) of Part II of the Fifth Schedule is adhered to.
E
Note : The provisions of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 5 of the
Fifth Schedule are based on the recommendation of the Sub-Com-
mittee on Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (Other than
Assam) as adopted by the Advisory Committee. Attention is in-
F vited in this connection to paragraphs 10 and 11 of Volume I
(Report of the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (Other than
Assam) Sub-Committee). It will appear from the said report that
the present system under which the Governor in his discretion
applies the legislation did not appeal to the committee as this
principle would be regarded as undemocratic even though the
G Governor in future might be an elected functionary. The criticism
offered by the Government of Orissa to the provision set out in
sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 5 will also apply if the present
provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, under which no
Act of the Central or a Provincial Legislature applies to an ex-
H cluded or a partially excluded area unless the Governor by a public
SAMATIIA v. STATE[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 447

~ notification so directs, is adopted; for, if in such case it is essential A
that an Act of the Central or a Provincial legislature should apply
to any such area along with other areas on the date when it

- becomes law after it has been assented to, there is bound to be
some time lag between the passing of the Act and the decision of
the Governor that the Act shall apply to such or that in its
B
application to such area it shall be subject to certain modifications
and exceptions as in the present case. A decision will have to be
arrived at in either case as to the application or non-application
of the Act when the Bill is passing through the Legislature and a
notification will have to be kept ready for issue on the date the
'·
Bill on being assented to becomes law. c
Decision of the Drafting Committee, October, 1948 : The Drafting
Committee decided to recast the proviso to sub-paragraph (1) of
paragraph 5 of Part II of the Fifth Schedule as follows : Provided
' that where such Act relates to any of the following subjects, that
is to say : D

(a) marriage, inheritance or property for social customs of the
Scheduled Tribes :

(b) and (c) (Omit);
E
(d) land, other than lands which are reserved forests under the
Indian Forest Act, 1927, or under any other law for the time being
in force in the area in question, including rights for tenants,
allotment of land and reservation of land for any purpose;

(e) any matter relating to village administration including the F
establishment of village panchayats.

the Governor shall issue such direction when so advised by the
Tribes Advisory Council,

The Government of Orissa has also made the following comments G
with regard to sub-paragraph (2) of Paragraph 5 of Part II of the
Fifth Schedule :

With reference to the Governor's power to make regulations
under paragraph 5(2) of Part II of the Fifth Schedule, the
question has been raised whether the power is as plenary as H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A the power at present conferred by section 92(2) of the
Government of India Act, 1935. A regulation made under
Section 92(2) may deal with any subject irrespective of
whether it is included in the Central, Provincial or Concur-
rent List; it may even amend a Central Act. Since, however
sub-paragraph {4) of paragraph 5 of Part II of the Fifth
B
Schedule does not specifically refer to the Dominion Parlia-
ment, the Provincial Government are doubtful if the power
to make regulations conferred by sub-paragraph (2) of para-
graph 5 will be equally plenary or will be restricted to matters
on which the State Legislature will be competent to legislate.
c Although the term "appropriate legislature" used in sub-para-
graph (4) of paragraph 5 would etymologically include the
"Dominion Parliament" as well as "the State Legislature, it
appears from a perusal of the Draft Constitution that the
draftsman made a distinction between "Parliament" on the
one hand and "State Legislature" on the other. It may, therec
D
fore, be the intention of the Draft Constitution that the
Governor's power to make regulations under sub-paragraph
(2) of paragraph 5 will not extend to matters included in the
Central List. If that is the Plan, the Provincial Government
beg to differ from it, as they feel that the Provincial
E Governor's power to make regulations for the good govern-
ment of Scheduled Areas should continue to be as plenary as
it is at present.

Note : The power to make regulations conferred by sub- paragraph
F (2) of paragraph 5 is not restricted only to matters on which the
State Legislature will be competent to legislate. The expression
"with respect to any matter not provided for by any law for the
time being in force in such area"in sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph
5 and the use of the expression "appropriate legislature" in sub-
paragraph (4) of that paragraph make it clear that the power to
G make regulations under sub-paragraph (2) of that paragraph is not
restricted only to matters with respect to which the Legislature of
the State is competent to legislate. Any further clarification is
hardly necessary. However, to make intention clearer the following
amendment may be made in paragraph 5 of Part II of the Fifth
H Schedule:
SAMATHA v. STATE[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.) 449

In sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 5 of the Fifth Schedule, A
the following be added at the end :

and any regulations so made may repeal or amend any
Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State or
·-
any existing law which is for the time being applicable
to such area. B
Decision of the Drafting Committee, October, 1948 : The Drafting
Committee decided to substitute the following for sub- paragraph
(2) of paragraph 5 of Part II of the Fifth Schedule :

(2) The Governor may, after consultation with the Tribes C
Advisory council for the State, make regulations for any
Scheduled Area in the State with respect to any matter not
provided for by any law for the time being in force in such
area, and any regulations so made may repeal or amend any
Act of parliament or of the Legislature of the State or any D
existing law which is for the time being applicable to such
area:

Provided that any regulations so made with respect to any
matter enumerated. in the Union List shall be submitted
forthwith to the President and, until assented to by him, shall E
have no effect."

PARAGRAPH 6

K Santhanam : That in paragraph 6(1) of Part ii of the Fifth F
Schedule, the following be added at the end :

except in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the
Governor in consultation with the Tribes Advisory Council;

Note : sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 of the Fifth Schedule G
follows the recommendation of the Excluded Areas Sub- Commit-
tee as adopted by the Advisory Committee. But, primafacie, there
should be no objection to the amendment : of the wording of
sub-paragraph (2).

L.N. Sahu: That a suitable proviso be added to paragraph 6(1) of H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the Fifth Schedule to permit the making of regulations by the
Provincial Government in order to prohibit the transfer of lands
by members of a particular Scheduled Tribe to members of any
other Scheduled Tribe.

Note : Paragraph 6 of Part II of the Fifth Schedule follows the
B recommendation or of the Sub-committee on Excluded Area as
adopted by the Advisory Committee. This amendment involves a
question of policy. If it is accepted, then it should be redrafted as
follows:

After sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 5 of the Part II af the
c Fifth Schedule, the following sub-paragraph be inserted :

(3-a) The Governor may also make regulations so as to
prohibit the tra,nsfer of any land in a Scheduled Area
in the State by 'a member of any Scheduled Tribe to a
member of any other Scheduled Tribe.
D
Decision of the Drafting Committee, October 1948 : The Drafting
Committee decided to recast sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 of
Part II of the Fifth Schedule as follows :

(1) It shall not be lawful for a member of the Scheduled
E Tribes to transfer any person who is not a member of the
Scheduled Tribes except in accordance with rules made in
that behalf by the Governor in consultation with the Tribes
Advisory Council.

F PARAGRAPH 12

K Santhanam : That in paragraph 12(2) of Part III of the Fifth
Schedule, after the words "so as to prohibit" the words "or regulate"
be inserted.

G Note : Sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 12 follows the recommen-
dation of the Excluded Areas Sub-Committee as adopted by the
Advisory Committee. This amendment may, however, be accepted.

Decision of the Drafting Committee, October, 1948 : The Drafting
Committee decided to recast sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 12
H of part III of the Fifth Schedule as follows :
SAMATHA v. STATE(S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 451

(2) The Governor may also make regulations so as to control A
or prohibit the transfer of any land in a Scheduled Area in
the State by a member of the Scheduled Tribes to any person
who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes.

PARAGRAPH 17"
B
K Santhanam : That in paragraph 17(2) of Part IV of the Fifth
Schedule after the words "so as to prohibit" the words "or regulate"
be inserted.

Note : The remarks on the amendment to paragraph 12 above C
would also apply to this amendment. This amendment may be
accepted.

Decision of the Drafting Committee, October, 1948 : The Drafting
Committee decided to recast sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 17
of Part IV of the Fifth Schedule as follows : D
(2) The Governor may also make regulations so as to control or
prohibit the transfer of any land in a Scheduled Area in the State
by a member of the Scheduled Tribes to any person who is not a
member of the Scheduled Tribes."
E
22. When the Constituent Assembly took up the Fifth Schedule for
consideration on 5th September, 1949, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar moved another
Draft Fifth Schedule in place of the original Fifth Schedule. This Schedule
was simpler in form and uniformly applied to all the Scheduled Areas. Para
5 of new Draft is quoted below :
F
"5. Law Applicable to scheduled areas - (1) Notwithstanding any-
thing contained in this Constitution the Governor or Ruler, as the
case may be, may by public notification direct that any particular
Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State shall not apply
to a scheduled area or any part thereof in the State or shall apply G
to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State subject to
such exceptions and modifications as he may specify in the notifica-
tion.
··:.
(2) The Governor or Ruler, as the case may be, may make
regulations for the peace and good government of any area in a H
A
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

State which is for the time being a Scheduled Area.

In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
l
foregoing power, such regulations may -

(a) prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among members
B of the Scheduled Tribes in any such area;

(b) regulate the allotment of land to members of the Scheduled
Tribes in such areas;

( c) regulate the carrying on of business as money- lender by
c persons who lend money to members of the Scheduled Tribes in
such areas.

(3) In making any regulation as is referred to in sub-paragraph
(2) of this paragraph, the Governor or Ruler may repeal or amend
any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State or any
D existing law which is for the time being applicable to the area in
question.

( 4) All regulations made under this paragraph shall be sub-
mitted to the President and until assented to by him shall have no
E effect.

(5) No regulation shall be made under this paragraph unless
the Governor or the Ruler making the regulation has, in the case
where there is a Tribes Advisory Council for the State, consulted
such Council."
F
23. Before the Fifth Schedule was finally adopted by the Constituent
Assembly, there was debate in the Assembly on every Clause of the
Schedule. It will be useful, at this stage, to reproduce some passages from
the Constituent Assembly Debate as under :
G "(Shri Yudhisthir Mishra)

The special purpose for moving this amendment is that there
are areas in Orissa and the C.P. States which may not be specified
as scheduled areas but there are certain Scheduled Tribes among
H which certain kinds of land laws are prevalent. For example, in
SAMATIIA v. STATE(S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 453
C.P. and Orissa States, it is not permissible on the part of a A
non-aboriginal to acquire the lands of an aboriginal without the
sanction of the Government. Now, Sir, in that case, supposing
according to paragraph 5, the Governor or the Ruler of a State
does not make any regulation and retains the same provisions
applicable to non-aboriginals with respect to the transfer of lands; B
then I shall submit that there will be no use in saying that the
Government is prepared to safeguard the interests of the tribal
people."

24. Shri Brajeshwar Prasad suggested as under :
c
"............The provinces being weak in economic resources are not
in a position to shoulder the responsibility. Hence I plead that the
Centre should take command of the tribal areas. The Government
of India has no right to exist if it cannot undertake to guarantee
means of livelihood and free educational and medical facilities
even for such a small number of people ....
D

I want, Sir, that no land in the scheduled areas belonging to an
Adibasi should be allowed to be sold or mortgaged even to tribals
without the permission of the Deputy Commissioner. Such a
provision exists in Santhal Pargana. I am not at all in favour of E
dispossessing those non-tribals who have got lands or property in
the scheduled areas, but no further lands should be given to
non-tribals. This protection is needed in the interests of the tribals.
It is also in consonance with the demands of the tribal leaders.
This concession will generate a feeling of loyalty in the hearts of F
the tribal people........"

25. Shri Jadubans Sahay forcefully argued :

"........So far as land is concerned, it is not our intention, nor of the
provincial Governments where the tribals have provincial Govern- G
ments have made laws to see that land should not pass out of the
hands of the tribal people; in our province, the Chota Nagpur
Tenancy Act was modified and altered long long before 1937 in
order to see that no land should pass out of the hands of the tribal
people. But, there were various difficulties in the original schedule H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A that land should not be settled by the Government to any one
except the tribal people. In the Scheduled areas, there are not only •
the tribal people; there are Harijans also; there are other ~astes
also who are equally backward, if not otherwise, at least economi-
cally, at the tribal people. Is it, then, Sir, our wish that in those
B areas where the Harijans and other backward people remain, land
should not be settled by the Government to them also? Of course,
the tribal people should have the preference as well as the Harijans
living in those areas. If these things are made elastic, we should
have nothing to say on this point. But, the Government should see
c and in the future we also should see that preference is given to the
tribal people and if they have no land, the landless tribal people
should have the first priority.....•......"

26. The above portions have been extracted from the Constituent
Assembly Debates to indicate the mood of the representatives of the
D people and the urgency they felt in protecting the land of the tribals and
need for prohibiting transfer of land in the Scheduled Areas to non-tribals
by the State Government.

27. Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule, as finally adopted and engrafted
E in the Constitution, provided as under :

"5(2). The Governor or Rajpramukh, as the case may be, may make
regulations for the peace and good government of any area in a
state which is for the time being a Scheduled Area.

F In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the forego-
ing power, such regulations may -

(a) prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among
members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area;

G (b) regulate the allotment of land to members of the
scheduled tribes in such area;

( c) regulate the carrying on of business as money- lender by
persons who lend money to members of the scheduled tribes
'H in such areas.
SAMAlHA v. STATE(S.SAGHIRAHMAD).J 455

(3) In making any such regulation as is referred to in sub-paragraph A
(2) of this paragraph, the Governor or Ruler may repeal or amend
any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State or any
existing law which is for the time being applicable to the area in
question.

(4) All regulations made under this paragraph shall be submitted B
forthwith to the President and until assented to by him shall have
no effect.

(5) No regulation shall be made under this paragraph unless the
Governor or the Ruler making the regulation has, in the case where C
there is ·a Tribes Advisory Council for the State, consulted such
0
Council."

28. The word "Rajpramukh" was subsequently deleted by the Con-
stitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956.
D
29. The above legislative history indicates that from the very begin-
ning, at least from the 19th Century, Scheduled Areas inhabited by
aboriginals and tribals have been administered exclusively under the con-
trol of the Central Government through the Governor of the State by
.. providing special statut.ory measures. It 1s obvious that from the earliest
time till the making of the Constitution, it was all along felt that the transfer E
of land in the Scheduled Areas by a tribal to a person who was not a
member of the scheduled Tribe be totally prohibited and if sucli a transfer
was made, it was to be treated as null and void. Government land in the
Scheduled Areas could also not be allotted to persons who were not the
members of the Scheduled Tribes. If such land was proposed to be allotted F
to them, it could be done only under the regulations made by the Governor.
The basic concept was that the· land of the Sclieduled Tribes should be
protected and should not be frittered away by transfer nor should any
non-tribal be allowed to infiltrate in the Scheduled Area by getting an
allotment of land made in his .favour. In case of a transfer of land which
was void, the power to restore land to a tribal or his heirs after evicting G
the non-tribal was also vested in the Government.

30. It has already been seen above that in the Draft Constitution,
prepared by the Drafting Committee, there was a clear prohibition on the
allotment of Government land to non-tribals except in accordance with the
rules made by the Governor. H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 31. In the Constituent Assembly when the Draft Fifth Schedule was
,
considered, no Member raised any objection that the Government should
be free to allot its land to the non-tribals in the Scheduled Areas as all the
Members were conscious of the fact that the special privileges and special
status enjoyed by the tribals should not be disturbed by allowing non-tribals
to enter into that Area.
B
32. The protective measures adopted through Legislation for the
preservation of tribal life, for the prevention of exploitation of tribals by
non-tribals and money-lenders and to seal infiltration of non-tribals in the
Agency tracts or Scheduled Areas rested on three main planks :
c (a) Prohibition of transfer of land by tribal to a non-tribal with the
stipulation that such transfer will be null and void. ..
(b) Prohibiting Government from allotting land vested in it to non- c
tribal.
D
(c) Power of Government to evict non-tribal from the tribal' s land
coming into his possession through a void sale-deed and restoring the same
to the tribal or his heirs.

E
33. The question is whether this position is still reflected in the Fifth
Schedule read with Articles 15(4), 46 and 244 of the Constitution. ..
34. The Fifth Schedule as finally brought on the pages of the Con-
stitution does not contain any specific prohibition.

35. After specifying that the executive power of the State extends to
p the Scheduled Areas therein and that the Governor shall report annually
to the President regarding the administration of those areas and that the
executive power of the Union extends to the giving of direction to the
States about the administration of the Scheduled Areas and further that
there shall be a Tribes Advisory Council to advise on such matters pertain-
ing to the welfare and advancement of the Scheduled Tribes as may be
G referred to them by the Governor, the Fifth Schedule, in Para 5 thereof,
proceeds to speak about the applicability of laws to the Scheduled Areas
by saying that the Governor may, by Notification, direct that an Act of
Parliament or Legislature of the State shall not apply to the Scheduled
Area or that it shall apply with such exceptions and modifications as may
H be specified in the Notification. These directions may also be issued with
.
t

SAMATHA v. STATE[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 457

retrospective effect. A
36. Under Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule, the Governor has also
been given the power to make Regulations for the "Peace and Good
Government" of the Scheduled Area.

37. Apart from this power which is in very vide and General terms, B
Regulations could also be made by the Governor to :

(a) prohibit or I\estrict the transfer of land by or among member
of the Scheduled Tribes in such area;

(b) regulate the allotment of land to members of the Scheduled C
Tribes in such area;

(c) regulate the carrying on of business as money-lender by
persons who lend money to members of the Scheduled Tribes in
such area.
D
38. The power to make Regulations also includes the power to repel
or amend any Act of Parliament or of the State Legislature or any existing
law which may, for the time being, be applicable to the Scheduled Area .
. 39. The power to make Regulations is undoubtedly legislative in E
character. The power to issue directions under Para 5(1) of the Fifth
Schedule as to the applicability of an Act of Parliament or State Legislature
with such exceptions and modifications as the Governor may direct, is also
legislative in character. In Chatturam & Ors. v. Commissioner of Income
Tax, Bihar, (1947) FCR 116 = (1947) FLJ 92, it was laid down with
reference to Section 92(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 that when F
the Governor issues a Notification under Section 92(1) by which Federal
Laws are applied to Excluded and Partially Excluded areas (Scheduled
Areas), he exercised a legislative power. So also when the Governor makes
Regulations in exercise or power under Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule,
which is equivalent to Section 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and G
repeals or amends any Act of parliament or State Legislature, he exercises
legislative power as the principle laid down in Chhall.tram's case (supra)
which was followed in Jatindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar &
Ors.,(1949) FLJ 225, would be applicable to this situation also. •

40. The Governor has also been given the legislative power to make H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Regulations for the "PEACE AND GOOD GOVERNMENT" of any area
in a State which is a Scheduled Area. The words "PEACE AND GOOD
·-
GOVERNMENT" are the words of very wide import and give wide dis-
cretion to the Governor to make laws for such purpose. In King Emperor
v. Benoari Lal Sharma, (1944) L.R. 72 IA. 57 and in Attorney-General for
B Saskatchewan v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., (1953) AC. 594, it was held that
the words "PEACE, ORDER AND GOOD GOVERNMENT" are the
words of very wide import giving wide power to the authority to pass laws
for such purposes. In Raja Jogendra Narayan Deb v. Debendra Narayan Roy
& Ors., (1942) L.R. 69 IA. 76, it was explained that these words, namely,
"PEACE, ORDER AND GOOD GOVERNMENT" have reference to the
C scope and not to the merits of the legislation. It was again explained in
Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pa~ (1927) I.L.R. 54 Cal. 727 that
these words are words of the widest significance and it is not open to the
Court to consider whether any legislation made by the Governor would
conduce to peace and good Government.
D 41. The words "PEACE, PROGRESS AND GOOD GOVERN-
MENT" ha\·e also been used in Article 240 of the Constitution which
empowers the President to make Regulations for certain Union Territories.
This Court had an occasion to consider the significance of these words in
T.M. Kanniyan v. Income-Tax Officer, Pondicheny and Anr., (1968] 2 SCR
E 103 and relying upon the above decisions as also those rendered in Riel .v
The Queen, (1885) 10 AC. 675 and Chenard and Co. & Ors. v. Joachim
Arissol, (1949) AC. 127, it was held that the power of the President to
make Regulations under Article 240 was very wide and the President could
make Regulations with respect to a Union Territory occupying the same
F field on which Parliament could also make laws. ·

42. In exercise of the power conferred by Para 5(2) of the Fifth
Schedule, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh promulgated Andhra Pradesh
Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959.

G 43. These Regulations were amended by Regulation I of 1970, again
by Regulation I of 1971 and by Regulation I of 1978.

44. The constitutional validity of these Regulations was challenged in
P. Rami Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (1988] 3 SCC
H 433 and upheld by this Court.
SAMATIIA v. STATE(S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] · 459

45. Para 3(1)(a) of the Regulation which opens with a non- obstante A
clause provides that a transfer of immovable property situate in the Agency
Tracts by a person, whether or not such a person is a member of the
Scheduled Tribe, shall be absolutely null and void. This puts a complete
ban on the transfer of immovable properties in the Agency Tracts by any
person whatsoever, whether he is a member of the Scheduled Tribe or not.
There is, however, one exception to this rule as it is provided that such B
transfer shall not be null and void if the transfer is made in favour of a
person who is a member of the Scheduled Tribe or is a Society registered
or deemed to be registered under the Andhra. Pradesh Co-operative
Societies Act, 1964, which is composed solely of members of the
Scheduled Tribes.
c
46. Para 3(1)(c) provides that if a person "who intends to sell his land,
is not able to sell that land either because the member belonging to the
Scheduled Tribe is not willing to purchase the land or is not willing to
· purchase the land on the terms offered to him, such person may apply to D
the Agent or the Agency Divisional Officer or any other Prescribed Officer
(who are defined iii Para 2(b) and (c) of the Regulations) for the acquisi-
tion of such land by the State Government. The Agent or the Agency
Divisional Officer or the Prescribed Officer, as the case may be, shali then

- take over the land on payment of compensation in accordance with the
principles specified in Section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh (Ceiling on
Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1961. The land shall then vest, free from all
E

encumberances, in the State Government which shall dispose of the land
in the favour of member of the Scheduled Tribe or a Co-operative Society
composed solely of the members of the Scheduled Tribe or "in such other
manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed." There cannot
also be a "Benami" transaction under the Regulations and a member of the F
Scheduled Tribe cannot hold property in his name for the benefit of a
non-tribal.

47. Para 3(2)(a) provides that if a transfer of immovable property has G
been made in contravention of Para 3(1)(a), the Agent, the Agency
Divisional Officer or any other Prescribed Officer suo motu or on the
application of anyone interested or on the information of a public servant,
decree ejectment of the person in possession of that property claiming
under such transfer. The property shall then be restored to the transferor
or his heirs. H
J•

460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 48. Para 3(2)(b) provides that if a transferor or his heirs are not
willing to take back the property or their whereabouts are not known, the
property shall be. assigned or sold to any other member of the Scheduled
Tribe or a Co-operative Society composed solely of the members of the
Scheduled Tribe. The Agent or the Agency Divisional Offi_cer or the
B Prescribed Officer shall have a power to "otherwise" dispose it of as if it
was the property at the disposal of the State Government.

49. It may be mentioned here that Para 3(1)(b) contains a rule of
presumption that if any immovable property situated in the Agency Tracts
is in possession of a person who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribe,
C it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the property has
been acquired by that person through a transfer made to him by member
of the Scheduled Tribe.

50. Para 3A of the Regulation places two restrictions on a person
intending to mortgage his property. The first restriction is that it can be
D mortgaged only in favour of a person who is a member of the Scheduled
Tribe or to a Co-operative Society or a Land Mortgage Bank or any other
bank or financial institution approved by the State Government. The
Explanation appended to Para 3A(1) defines a "Bank". The other restric-
tion is that while mortgaging the property, it would not be open to that
E person to deliver possession to the mortgagee. Clause 2 of Para 3A provide
that in case the immovable property which was mortgaged is brought to
sale on account of default in payment of the mortgage money or the interest
payable thereon, the said property shall be sold only to a member of the
Scheduled Tribe or to a Co-operative Society composed solely of members
of the Scheduled Tribe. Explanation appended to this Clause specifies as
F to what would be treated as Co-operative Societies. It provides that if the
Government is a member of any Co-operative Society, it, namely, the said
Society, shall also be deemed to be a Society registered or deemed to be
registered under the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964.

G 51. Clause 5 provides that no immovable property situate in the
Agency Tracts and owned by a member of the Scheduled Tribes shall be
liable to be attached and Sold in the execution of money decree.

52. Clause 6 creates certain offences and prescribes the penalties
therefor. For example, if a person acquires any immovable property in
H contravention of any provision of the Regulations or continues in posses-
SAMATIIA v. STATE[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 461

sion of such property after a decree for ejectment is passed, he will be A
prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment for a term which may extend
to one year.

53. These Regulations indicated a departure from the normal laws
relating to immovable property. Normally, an owner of the immovable
property is free to transfer his property to anyone he likes. But if he B
possesses property in the Agency Tracts or the Scheduled Area, his right
to transfer the property is restricted as he can transfer it only to a member
of the Scheduled Tribe or to a Co-operative Society comprising solely of
the members of the Scheduled Tribes. So also, under the usufructuary
mortgage, possession has necessarily to be transferred to the mortgagee C
but these Regulations prescribe that in no case ·shall possession be
delivered to the mortgagee.

54. It will be seen from the above that at least in two circumstances,
the property of the member of the Scheduled Tribe or any other person in
the Scheduled Area becomes the property of the State Government : D

(1) If a person is not able to sell his property either because a
member of the Scheduled Tribe is not willing to purchase the
property or is not willing to purchase the property on the terms at
which it proposed to be sold, then the Agent, or the Agency E
Divisional Officer or any Prescribed Officer can, by order, acquire
the property on payment of compensation. The property loses its
original character and becomes the property of the State Govern-
ment.

(2) If on a decree for ejectment being passed against a person in F
occupation of the property belonging to a Scheduled Tribe under
sale deed which is void, the property is sought to be restored to
the transferor or his heirs but they are not willing to take the
property or their whereabouts are not known, it would be open to
the Government to assign or transfer the property to any other G
member of the Scheduled Tribe or otherwise dispose it of as if it
was the property, at the disposal of the State Government.

55. In all these circumstances, when the property either comes to vest
in the State Government or becomes a property at the disposal of the State
Government, the Government cannot, in view of the above, transfer the H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A property fo a "person" of its own choice but has to transfer, assign or sell
to a member of the Scheduled Tribe or a Co-operative Society of the
Scheduled Tribes.

56. The possibility of the Government disposing it of to a person who
is not a member of the Scheduled Tribe is totally ruled out by the Regula-
B tions by providing that it, shall be sold, assigned or transferred only to
tribals or their Co-operative Society. If this applies to properties which
become the Government properties, how the properties which are already
the Government properties could be excluded from the applicability of
these Regulations? The Government has to be bound down to the Con-
C stitutional scheme sought to be enforced through Regulations made by the
Governor under Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule and cannot be permitted
to transfer its own properties in favour of non-tribals so as to allow their
infiltration into the Scheduled Area. The prohibition contained in Para
3(1)(a) that no parson, whether he is a member of the Scheduled Tribe or
D not, shall transfer his immovable property to a non-tribal must, therefore,
in its scope cover the Government, as well, which, if it possesses land in
the Agency Tracts, cannot transfer it either by sale, allotment, lease or
otherwise to a non-tribal. To this limited extent, it has to be treated as a
"person" within the meaning of Clause 3(1)(a) of the Regulations.

E 57. It is contended by the learned council for the respondent that
where the property is acquired by the Government on payment of compen-
sation or it becomes the property at the disposal of the Government, such
property, undoubtedly, has to be disposed of in favour of the member of
the Scheduled Tribe or a Co-operative Society of the Scheduled Tribes but
F the Government also retains the power and choice to dispose it of in such
other manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. It is
contended on the basis of the words "or in such other manner and subject
to such conditions as may be prescribed" occurring in Para 3(1)(c) that the
Government is not bound to sell the property to a member of the
G Scheduled Tribe or the Co-operative Society of the Scheduled Tribes. It is
contended that almost similar words have been used in Para 3(2)(b) where
the property, if it is not taken back by the transferor who is a member of
the Scheduled Tribe or his heirs; becomes the property at the disposal of
the State Government and the State Government has the choice either to
assign or sell the property to any member of the Scheduled Tribe or a
H Co-operative Society of the Schedule Tribes or "otherwise dispose it of as
SAMATHA v. STATE[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.) 463

if it was a property at the disposal of the Government". This interpretation A
cannot be accepted. The words "or in such other manner and subject to
such conditions as may be prescribed" occurring in Para 3(1)(c) and the
words "or otherwise dispose it of as if it was a property at the disposal of
the state Government" have to be read, not in isolation, but in the context
of other words used in those provisions. The emphasis throughout in these B
Regulations has been that the property would be sold or transferred only
to a member of the Scheduled Tribe or their Co-operative Societies. The
Constitutional scheme which is sought to be enforced through Regulations
is that the property of the Scheduled Tribe or the immovable property
situated in Agency Tracts may be protected and be not frittered away and
further that they may retain their original character and may continue to C
' I belong to members of the Scheduled Tribe or their Co-operative Societies,
or that if the property belongs to a non-tribal, it may not be transferred to
a non-tribal and may be transferred to a tribal alone. The words "or in any
other manner" in Para 3(1)(c) or the words "otherwise dispose it of as if it
was a property at the disposal of the State Government" occurring in Para D
3(2)(b) have to be read in that context with the result that even if the
Government intended to deal with such immovable properties "in any other
manner" it could deal only in a manner which would ultimately benefit a
member of the Scheduled Tribe or their Co-operative Societies. The Fifth
Schedule including Para 5 thereof as also the Regulations made thereunder
by the Governor of Andhra Pr<!.desh clearly seek to implement the national E
policy that the custom, culture, life-style and properties of the Scheduled
Tribes in the Agency Tracts and other immovable properties situate therein
shall be protected. The Government being under a legal constraint to deal
with the property situated in the Agency Tracts only in the manner indi-
cated above, cannot itself act beyond the scope of the Regulations by saying F.
that it is free to dispose of its own properties in any manner it likes. If the
Government was allowed to transfer or dispose of its own land in favour
of non-tribals, it would completely destroy the legal and constitutional
fabric made to protect the Scheduled Tribes. The prohibition, so to say,
disqualifies non-tribals as a class from acquiring or getting property on
transfer. On account of this disqualification, the Govern~ent cannot, even G
if it is not a "person" within the meaning of Para 3(1)(a), transfer, let out
or allot its land or other immovable property to a non- tribal.

58. These Regulations have been made to give effect to the power of
the Governor under Clauses (a) and (b) of Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A for "Peace and Good Government" in the Agency Tracts. These Regula-
tions also aim at ushering in an era of social equality where the most
backward and isolated people who constitute the Schedule Tribes may be
rehabilitated effectively in the nation's main-stream. The prohibition to sell
the land to non-tribals and the further requirement that if the property
B comes to be vested in the Government or it becomes property at the
disposal of the Government, it will be sold, assigned or distributed only to
the tribals also is a measure, nay, a strong measure, in that direction to give
effect to the philosophy of "Distributive Justice".

59. The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,
C 1957 has already been amended by insertion of Section 11(5) at the State
level which provides that the Government land shall not be allotted for the
purpose of mining to non-tribals. A lot of argument was raised on both
sides whether this Amendment was retrospective or prospective. While it
is contended on behalf of the respondents that the leases which had already
D been executed or renewed prior to the Amendment or introduction of
Section 11(5), would not be affected the appellants in C.A. arising out of
SLP(C) Nos. 17080-81of1995 argued that such leases, including renewed
leases cannot be operated.

60. We have already held that the present scheme, set out in the Fifth
E Schedule and Regulations made by the Governor in exercise of the power
under Para 5(2) of the Schedule, is to sell, distribute, assign or let out the
Government land only to members of Scheduled Tribes. Section 11(5)
introduced in the Act only seeks to give effect to what was already
contained in the Fifth Schedule and the Regulations made thereunder. In
F order to set at rest the above controversy raised at various levels that the
Government land could also be allotted to non-tr:bals, the Amendment was
brought about in the Mines and minerals (Regulation and Development)
Act, 1957 so as to make it sure that it was never the intention that the
Government land could be allotted to non-tribals. The Amendment only
retrates the existing position.
G
61. I am short of time as Brother Ramaswamy is retiring tomorrow.
It is not possible for me to write out in detail on other points involved in
the case. Since I am agreeing with Brother Ramaswamy on the findings
recorded by him on other issues involved in the case, specially those
H relating to forests and Conservation of Forests Act and the environmental
SAMATIIA v. STATE(PATIANAIK,J.] 465

questions, I conclude by saying that I am in respectful agreement with him. A
I also agree with the ultimate directions issued in the Judgment.

62. In view of the above, I am also of the opinion that the appeals of
Samatha arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 17080-81of1995 deserve to be allowed
,and are hereby allowed while the other appeal arising out of SLP(C)
No.21457 of 1993 is dismissed. B
C.A. No. 4601-4602/97.

PATTANAIK, J. Leave granted.

These two appeals by special leave are directed against the judg- C
ment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 28.4.95 dismissing the two
Writ Petitions filed by the present appellant which were registered as Writ
Petition Nos. 9513 of 1993 and 7725 of 1994, by a common judgment. The
appellant, a Rural Development Society of Peda Mallapuram,
Sankhavaram Mandap in the State of Andhra Pradesh filed the two Writ D
Petitions as Public Interest Litigation seeking issuance of writ of mandamus
to terminate the mining leases in Borra Gram Panchayat area of Anantagiri
Manda! which had been granted and/or renewed in favour of the private
respondents inter alia on the grounds that the said leases contravened the
provisions of Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation
of 1959, as amended in 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Regulation'), E
the leases violate the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980
(hereinafier referred to as the 'Conservation Act'), and such leases are
prohibited under Section 11(5) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
Development) Act 1957 as amended by Act of 1991 (hereinafter referred
to as 'The MMRD Act'). The appellant, who was the petitioner before the .F
High Court advanced the contention that under the Regulation transfer of
all lands in the schedule area to a non-tribal is prohibited and the said
prohibition equally applied to the government land and as such the mining
leases in favour of the private respondents who are non-tribals are void. In
elaborating this c.:intention it was contended that the word 'person' in G
Section 3(1) of the Regulation as amended in 1970 would include the
Government. Further contention of the appellant was that in view of
Section 2 of the Conservation Act no forest land could be utilised for non
forest purpose without the consent of the Central Government and the
lease holds favour of the private respondents being the forest land and
there being no consent of the Central Government the leases are invalid. H
L

466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A Lastly it was contended that in view of Section 11(5) of the MMRD Act
the leases in favour of the private respondent who are non tribals must be
declared to be void.

The Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Andhra Pradesh
B who was respondent No. 2 before the High Court filed a counter-affidavit
taking the stand that the leases in question in favour of the private respon-
dents were prior to the Conservation Act coming into force and, therefore,
the question of taking previous consent of the Central Government did not
arise. On the question of alleged violation of the provisions of the Regula-
tion it was stated that the prohibitions and restrictions in the Regulation
C are not intended to apply to the Government land and there was no bar
under the Regulation for the Government to grant mining leases in favour
of the non-tribals. On the question of applicability of Section 11(5) of the
MMRD Act it was contended that the said provision is prospective in
nature and no mining lease has been granted after enforcement of Section
D 11(5) of the MMRD Act in favour of any non-tribal. Respondent No. 4,
the Forest Officer filed the Counter affidavit stating that the Borra forest
black was notified as reserve forest and some of the respondents have
encroached into the reserved forest area and to that extent their operations
are illegal. The private respondent No. 13 before the High Court also filed
a counter-affidavit adopting the stand taken by respondent No. 2. The said
E respondent No. 13 was a transferee from the original lessee. The other
lessee-respondents also filed affidavits adopting the stand taken by respon-
dent No. 13.

The High Court by the impugned judgment came to the conclusion
F that the word 'person' in Section 3(1) of the Regulation does not include
the Government and as such the government is not prohibited from
transferring the government land in favour of non-tribals within the
scheduled area. According to the High Court this conclusion is irresistible
from the fact that in order to prohibit grant of mining lease in favour of
G the non-tribals within the scheduled area Section 11(5) of the MMRD Act
was introduced in the year 1991. But the said provisions is prospective in
nature and would not apply to the existing leases. So far as the contention
of applicability of the Conservation Act the High Court came to the
conclusion that the said Act applies to the reserved forest and since it is
H not established as to the extent of the land covered by the mining leases
SAMA'IHN v. STATE [PATIANAIK, J.) 467

which form a part of the reserved forest and since the joint survey A
conducted indicate that there is no lessee who is occupying the reserved
forest area, except in one case where to an extent of two thousand metres
of the mining lease forms a part of the reserved forest, the validity on
account of the non-compliance of the Conservation Act cannot be gone
into. The High ·Court in the impugned judgment has also come to the B
conclusion that prior approval of the Central Government under Section
2 of the Forest Conservation Act is not required where the land in question
has already broken in pursuance of a lease and in support of this
conclusion reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in State

- of Bihar v. Banshi Ram, (1985] 3 SCC 643. The aforesaid view in Banshi
Modi's case appears to have not been approved by the Court in the later
cases : Ambika Quany Works v. State Of Gujarat, (1987] 1 SCC 213. Further
c
in view of the decisions of this Court in S. Nageswaramma's case, Supreme
Court Monitoring Committee's case and Godavannan's case, the High
Court committed error in relying upon the ratio of Bakshi Ram Modi's
case. The· High Court, therefore, observed that the Writ Petitions may D
approach the Competent Authority in that regard seeking necessary relief
and on such petitions being filed the appropriate authority would pass
appropriate order bearing in mind the provisions of Section 2 of the
Conservation Act. With these. conclusions the Writ Petitions having been
dismissed the present appeals by special leave have been preferred. E
Though the contentions before the High Court were limited to the
aforesaid extent as indicated but before this Court the horizon was
expanded and Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, learned senior council appearing for the
appellant raised several contentions in assailing the validity of the
continuance of the mining leases which according to the learned counsel F
are situated within the scheduled area. These two appeals initially had been
heard by a Bench of two judges but later on in view of the question of law
raised as well as in view of certain divergence of views, has been placed
before a three Judge Bench and the matter had been re-argued.

It has been averred before this Court that the appellant Society was G
started in the year 1990 at the request of the local tribes of Peda Mal-
lapuram area and the main objects of the society are implementation of
various welfare schemes of the Government and creating awareness among
tribal people of their rights and duties and protection of ecological balance
and imparting of environmental education in the tribal area. The society H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A operates in the Borra reserved forest area which was a part of the domain
of Raja of Jaipur before independence. Within the forest area the tribal
villagers occupy the land for cultivation and there are about 230 families
settled in 14 villages occupying 436 acres within the enclosures which are
-
threatened of eviction by the mining operators. It may be noticed that this
assertion was not there in the Writ Petition filed before Andhra Pradesh
B High Court. The further assertion of facts in this Court is that within
Anantgiri Manda! there are 230 families of tribals and they occupy roughly
800 acres and yet they are also threatened to be evicted by mining
Op11fators. The appellant further asserts that the Borra forest area is a
scheduled area in Vishakhapatnam District of Andhra Pradesh and it lies
C in Anantgiri hills. The Borra caves are of unique occurrence and the entire
area is rich in mineral wealth, particularly mica and calcite. It is averred
that the mining activity in the said area has started since 1946 and the said
mining operations are being carried on in the reserved forest area, not-
withstanding the prohibitions contained in different laws as already stated,
D and the State of Andhra Pradesh has not taken any initiative in stopping
the mining activities which has resulted human hazards to the peaceful
living of the tribal people and which affects the ecology and environment
of the area and, therefore the same should be prohibited by issuance of
mandamus. In the grounds taken before this Court in these Special Leave
Petitions it has been urged that under the amended Section 3(1) of the
E Regulations transfer of immovable property situated in the schedule area
to non-tribal is prohibited and the word 'person' used in Section 3(1)
includes the government and as such the leases contravened Section 3(1)
of the Regulation. The further ground taken is that under Section 2 of the
Conservation Act without the prior approval of the Central Government
F the State Government could not have granted mining leases within the
forest area as mining obviously is a non-forest purpose. The private respon-
dent No. 12, who is the Managing Director of the Company, filed the
counter-affidavit taking the positive stand that the mining leases held by
them do not form part of the scheduled area and further the leases have
G been granted much prior to the amended provisions of the Regulation as
well as much prior to the coming into force of the Conservation Act and,
therefore, are not hit by any prohibitions and restrictions contained in
those provisions. Respondent No. 19 has filed the counter-affidavit taking
the stand that the lease has been granted in favour of Shri M. Laxini
Narainan on 17.11.1984 and certain other leases had been granted in
H Anantgiri Mandal to said Shri M. Laxini Narainan on 24.1.1986. The
SAMA1HA v. STAIB[PAITANAIK,J.] 469

transfer of mining leases from the original lessee was granted by the A
appropriate authority under the provisions of the MMRD Act and the
Mineral Concession Rules framed thereunder and there has been no
violation of any Act or Regulation in allowing such mining activities. It has
also been stated that the mining activity does not encroach upon any forest
area or reserved forest area and nowhere has the petitioner provided any B
factual foundation for allegation to demonstrate that any part of the land
held by respondent No. 19 is within any forest land. And in the absence of
such factual metrix it is not possible to hold that there has been violation
of Section 2 of the Conservation Act. It has also been averred by the
respondent that the leases do not .destroy the ecological balance and do

- not disturb the flora and fauna and the Government has granted the mining C
leases only after complying with the statutory requirements. On the ques-
tion of interpretation of the provisions of the Regulation it has been stated
that the word 'person' in Section 3(1) does not include the Government
and therefore, the provisions of the Regulation have no application to the
Government land. In paragraph 20 of the counter-affidavit it has been D
reiterated :

''There is no averment by the petitioner that this respondent has
been in possession of any forest area or the area earmarked for
the reserve forest. Therefore the statutory ban in Section 2 of
Forest (Conservation) Act is not applicable to the leases granted E
to this respondent company." ·

The said assertion has also been repeated in paragraph 25 of the
Counter-affidavit. Several private respondents have also filed counter-af-
fidavit in this Court more or less taking similar stand and it is therefore,
not necessary to repeat the same. But it would be appropriate to notice F
the stand taken by the State of Andhra pradesh and its officials who have
been arrayed as respondent Nos. 1 to 4. The State in its affidavit have
indicated that the mining leases which are in dispute had been much prior
to the coming into force of the Conservation Act of 1980 and, therefore,
there has been no infraction of the aforesaid Act. On the question of G
applicability of the provisions of the Regulation it has been stated that the
Government is not 'person' within the meaning of Section 3(1)(a) of the
Regulation and the Government being the sole owner of the land has the
right to transfer the same to any individual/company. With regard to the
activities of the appellant-society it has been averred that the society is
working for its selfish ends and is mis-guiding the tribals who are peacefully H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A living and tribals are unnecessarily dragged into litigation. It has also been
stated that the areas which are under occupation of the tribals have been
surveyed and the said areas have been deleted from the mining leases and,
therefore, the assertion that the tribals are being threatened by the mining
operators from being dispossessed is not correct. It has also been averred
that the mining activities are on the exposed mineral deposit and no
B extensive mining has been taken in the area damaging the forest. With
regard to the benefits obtained by the State on account of such mining
activities, it has been stated that not only it has provided employment
opportunity to the local tribals but also encourages mineral based in-
dustries in the district which provides good opportunity to the educated
C unemployed. The State in its affidavit has also averred that all the mining
leases were granted in accordance with the prescribed law and there is no
possibility of endangering the Borra caves by the alleged mining activities.
-
The State has further stated that after coming into force of Section 11(5)
of the MMRD Act no mining leases within the scheduled area has been
granted in favour of any non-tribal in contravention of the aforesaid
·D provisions of the MMRD Act. It has also been stated that every care has
been taken by the Government to protect the interest of the tribals and to
ensure that there is no blasting in the mining area to rehabilitate the
affected people. The State in its affidavit has also indicated as to which
mine continues to be operative and which is not operative as on the date
of the affidavit.
E
Dr. Dhawan, the learned seruor counsel appearing for the appellant
contended that the history of the tribal areas traced from the administra-
tion under the British rule to the inclusion of Schedule V in the Constitu-
tion conferring a special power on the Governor to frame Regulation for
F peace and good government in the area would clearly indicate that there
should not be any allotment of land to the non-tribals within the tribal area,
be it the government land or land belonging to the tribals, which in turn
would accord responsibility to the tribals for the economic development of
the area. According to the learned senior counsel one of the purposes for
which Schedule V was engrafted in the Constitution conferring power on
G the Governor and not on the respective legislatures of the States for the
administration of the tribal area is to ensure distributive justice, especially
of land and that purpose will be frustrated if government land within the
tribal area is allocated in favour of non-tribals, whether it is for the
purposes of mining or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, urged that
H this purpose should be borne in mind in. interpreting Regulation framed by
'

SAMATIIA v. STATE[PATTANAIK,J.] 471

the Governor in exercise of power conferred upon him under Schedule V A
to the Constitution. The learned senior counsel urged that the term 'peace
and good government' should be given a wide interpretation and the
expression 'regulate the allotment of land to members of Schedule-Tribes
in such area' in Schedule V(2)(b) should be construed to mean that the
Governor should frame regulation ensuring that land does not pass out B
from tribals and the land allotments are made exclusively to tribals and the
distribution of land amongst them inter se can be regulated. The learned
senior counsel further urged that the provisions of the Constitution itself
mandate an obligation on the Governor to frame regulation prohibiting
transfer of land of all category within the schedule area in favour of a
non-tribal. According to Dr. Dhawan, if the expression 'person' used in C
first part of Regulation 3(1)(a) is interpreted to include the State, thereby
connoting that the government land also within the scheduled area cannot
be transferred in favour of a non-tribal then the very purpose of conferring
power on the Governor for administration of tribal area could be achieved
and such an interpretation would not only prevent the exploitation of D
tribals from non-tribals but would also advance the interest of the tribals
and would secure substantive distributive justice for the tribals. According
to the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant the regulations
and statutes affecting the tribal regime must be given a purposive inter-
pretation so that the raison d'etre of the regime is not defeated. So far as
the Conservation Act is concerned, the counsel argued that in view of the E
embargo contained in Section 2 of the Conservation Act prier permission
of Central Government not having been obtained the mining activities
within the forest area cannot be permitted to be continued. In relation to
the provisions of the Environment Protection Act, the learned senior
.counsel contended that the Central Government is under a statutory duty F
to protect the environment and co-ordinate the activities of the State
Government under the Environment Protection Act of 1986 and such
statutory obligation not having been discharged by the Central Government
and the mining activities within the schedule are a being hazardous to
human health this Court should compel the Union Government to perform
its statutory obligation. So far as the prohibition under Section 11(5) of G
MMRD Act is concerned, it is contended by Dr. Dhawan, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant that Section 11(5) in the MMRD Act is
merely in the nature of clarification to the provisions of Section 3(1)(a) of the
Regulation and in view of such provision the mining activities after coming
into force of the aforesaid provision cannot be permitted to be continued. Let H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A me now examine the contentions raised to find out, how many of them
would be sustainable. Administration of Tribal areas under the British Rule
and the debates in the Constituent Assembly in relation to Atfministration of
Tribal Area, leading to engraftment of Schedule Vin the Constitution -

The Indian Statutory (Simon) Commission in its report in 1930
B indicated that these tribal areas covered 1,20,000 square miles with a
population of about eleven million. These areas are located mostly in Bihar,
Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bengal and Assam. Even
During the British rule, because of the social and economical conditions
of these tribal people special laws were made applicable in those areas. In
C the book "THE FRAMING OF INDIA's CONSTITUTION" - A study by
B. Shiva Rao, it has been stated that there were two dangers to which
subjection to normal. laws would have specially exposed these tribal people,
and both arose out of the fact that they were primitive, simple, unsophis-
c
ticated and frequently improvident. There was also a risk of their agricul-
tural land passing to the more civilised section of the population, and the
D occupation of the tribals was for the most part agricultural and secondly
they were likely.to get into the "wiles of the moneylender". It was thus the
primary aim of the government policy then to protect these people from
these two dangers and preserve their tribal customs and this was achieved
by prescribing special procedures applicable to these backward areas. The
E Scheduled Districts Act, enacted in 1874 was the first measure adopted to
deal with these areas and the said Act enabled the executive to extend any
enactment in force in any part of the British India to a "Scheduled district"
with such modifications as might be considered necessary. Thus, the execu-
tive had the power to exclude these areas from the normal operation of
ordinary law and give such protection as they might need. Even in Mon-
F tagu-Chelmsford
I
Report of 1918 it was suggested that the political reforms
contemplat~d for the rest of India could not apply to these backward areas
where the people were primitive and thus these backward tracts were to
be excluded'from the jurisdiction of the reformed Provincial Governments
and administered personally by the heads of the Provinces. In the Govern-
G ment of India Act 1919 these tracts were divided into two categories and
some of the areas were wholly excluded from the scope of the reforms.
Therefore, neither the Central nor the Provincial Legislature had the
power to make laws applicable to these areas and the power of legislation
was vested in the Governor acting with his Executive Council, the Ministers
being excluded from having any share in the responsibility for the ad-
H ministration of these areas. Until the Simon Commission's report, the
.J
SAMATIIA v. STATE[PATIANAIK,J.] 473
primary object and the policy of the government in relation to the tribal A
areas was to give the inhabitants of the tribal areas security of land tenure,
freedom in the pursuit of their traditional means of livelihood, and a
reasonable exercise of their ancestral customs. The Simon Commission,
however, realised that isolation of these people from the main currents of
progress would not be a satisfactory long term solution and, therefore, it
would be nece~sary to educate these people to become self-reliant. As the B
Provincial Government was not inclined to devote special attention for the
upliftment of these tribal people mostly because of the fact that backward
tract was a deficit area and in view of the magnitude and complexity of
problem the Commission had recommended that the responsibility for the
backward classes would be adequately discharged only if it was entrusted C
to the Centre. But at the same time, it was also recognised that it would
not be a practicable arrangement if centralisation of administrative
authority in these areas led to a situation in which these areas would be
separated from the Provinces of which they were an integral part. The
Commission, therefore had suggested that the Central Government should
use the Governors for administration of these areas and it could be laid D
down by rules how far the Governor would act in consultation with his
Ministers in the discharge of these agency duties. This proposal, however,
was not adopted in the constitutional reforms of 1935. Under the Gov,ern-
ment of India Act of 1935, these backward areas· were classified as
excluded areas and partially excluded areas. The excluded areas in Assam,
Madras, Bengal, North-West Frontier Province were placed under the E
personal rule of the Government acting in his discretion and while the
partially excluded areas were within the field of ministerial responsibility
and the Governors exercised a special responsibility in respect of the
administration of these areas and they had the power in their individual
judgment to overrule their Ministers if they thought it to do so. No Act of F
the Federal or Provincial Legislature would apply to any of these areas
but Governors had the authority to apply such Acts with such modification
as they considered necessary, as is apparent from Sections 91 and 92 of
the Government of India Act 1935. The Cabinet Mission's statement of
May 16, 1946 mentioned about the requirement of the special attention of
the Constituent Assembly in respt:ct of these tribal areas. G
Vth Schedule of the Constitution as well as paragraph 5 of the said
Schedule which confers power on the Governor to make Regulations for
the peace and good government in any area in the State which is a
schedule area nowhere indicates that there should be no alienation of any
land in favour of a non-tribal within the said area. The aforesaid provision H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. ••
A is an enabling provision conferring power on the Governor to frame
Regulation for peace and good government and the Regulation in question
may provide for prohibiting or restricting transfer of land by or among the
members of the Scheduled Tribes, regulate the allotment of land to mem-
bers of the Scheduled Tribes and regulate the carrying on business as
money-lender by persons who lend money to the Scheduled Tribes. It has,
B therefore, become necessary to find out from the Debates in the Con-
stituent Assembly as to whether the Constitution makers at all intended to
prohibit alienation of any land in favour of a non-tribal within the tribal
area. In course of arguments while placing the Debates in the Constituent
Assembly Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, learned senior counsel at one point of time
C had advanced an extreme argument that all lands within the tribal area
belong to the tribals and only during the Bricish regime the ttibals were
denied of their rights over the lands and, therefore, this Court \.ould be
justified in holding that the lands within the entire tribal area belohg only
to them and the State has no authority or power in respect of the said land.
In support of the said contention the learned senior counsel placed reliance
D on a decision of the Australian Court in the case of Mabo and Others v.
The State of Queensland, reported in Commonwealth Law Reports Vol.
175 (1992) at page 1. The learned senior counsel had argued that what has
been held by the High Court of Australia in the aforesaid case, namely,
Aborigines had the ·title to the land and it never got extinguished by
E annexation by Crown or by the application of common law in Australia,
should apply to the lands within the tribal area in India. But, however, at
later point of time the learned counsel did not persue the said contention
and, therefore, we have to examine and find out the correctness of the
submission as to whether under the Constitutional Scheme there has been
a prohibition for alienation of any land within the tribal area in favour of
F a non-Scheduled Tribes. On going through the Constituent Assembly
Debates and the book "The Framing of India's Constitution - A study by
B. Shiva Rao as well as b. Shiva Rao's The Framing of India's Constitution
Volume III, it appears that on account of the Study already made by the
Britishers and several reports obtained prior to Independence, the ques-
tion of administration of tribal areas did engage the attention of the
G Constitution Assembly for a considerable period. The Constituent Assemb-
ly had formed two committees, one for the tribal people of Assam and
other for the excluded and partially excluded areas in Provinces other than
Assam. We are really concerned with the second Committee which had
examined the problems of the tribal people in all other parts of the country
H excepting Assam. The Committee in fact had suggested that the solution
SAMATHA v. STATE(PATIANAIK,J.] 475

to the problem of backward areas lies in developing the area and not in A
isolating the same. The Committee had also suggested that it should be the
responsibility of the Centre to draw up the schemes for the development
of these areas and ensure that such schemes were duly implemented by the
States. But the said report could not be considered by the Constituent
Assembly having been received at a late stage. The Drafting Committee of B
the Constitution, however, considered the suggestion of the Advisory Com-
mittee and drafted the Vth Schedule of the Constitution. We are in the
present case really concerned with Clause 6 dealing with alienation and
allotment of lands which is extracted hereinbelow :

6. Alie11ation and allotment of lands to non-tribals in scheduled C
areas: (1) It shall not be lawful for a member of the Scheduled
•Tribes to transfer any land in a scheduled area to any person who
is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes;

(2) No land in a scheduled area vested in the State within which
such area is situate shall be allotted to, or settls:d with, any person D
who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes except in accordance
with rules made in that behalf by the Governor in consultation with
the Tribes Advisory Council for the State.

Clause 7 of the Schedule V deals with money lending which is E
extracted hereunder :

"7. Regulatio11 of mo11ey - lending in scheduled areas : The Governor
may, and if so advised by the Tribes Advisory Council for the State
shall, by public notification direct that no person shall carry on
business as a money-lender in a scheduled area in the State except F
under or in accordance with the conditions of a licence with the
conditions of a licence issued by an officer authorised in this behalf
by the Government of the State and every such direction shall
provide that a breach of it shall be an offence, and shall specify
the penalty with which it shall be punishable."
G
Clause 9 of Schedule V deals with Governor's power in extending
the provision to other areas which is extracted hereunder :

"9. Application of Pait II to areas other than scheduled areas : (1)
The Governor may, at any time by public notification, direct that H
476 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS (1997)SUPP.2S.C.R.

A all or any of the provisions of this Part shall on and from such date
as may be specified in the notification apply in relation to any area
in the State inhabited by members of any Scheduled Tribe other
than a scheduled area as they apply in relation to a scheduled area
in the State, and the publication of such notification shall be
B conclusive evidence that such provisions have ·been duly applied
in relation to such other area. ·

(2) The Governor may by a like notification direct that all or any
of the provisions of this Part shall on and from such date as may
be specified in the notification cease to apply in relation to any
c area in the State in respect of which a notification may have been
issued under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph."

See the framing of India's Constitution by B. Shiva Rao Volume
(III).
D
We are really concerned with Clause 6 of the Draft Constitution
dealing with the alienation and allotment of lands to non-tribals in the
scheduled areas. The Draft Constitution, therefore, had put two restric-

E
tions, namely, a member of a Scheduled Tribe was not entitled to transfer
land within the scheduled area to a member of non-scheduled tribe, and
so far as the land vested in the State is concerned, the prohibition was that
-
the. said land belonging to the State should not be allotted or settled in
favour of a non-scheduled tribe except in accordance with the Rules made
in that behalf by the Governor in consultation with the Tribe's Advisory
Council. To the aforesaid Draft several amendments were proposed by
F several Speakers. So far as paragraph 6 of Schedule V of the Draft
Constitution is concerned, the proposal in the draft that the land belonging
to the State should not be allotted to or settled with any person who is not
a member of Scheduled Tribe was rejected and, therefore, in the final form
in Schedule V there is no such indication that even the government land
within the Scheduled area should not be allotted to a non-Scheduled Tribe
G person. B. Shiva Rao in his book "THE FRAMING OF INDIA'S CON-
STITUTION - A STUDY, dealing with the Scheduled and Tribal Areas
has stated that for nearly a century under British rule special laws were
applicable to what were called 'backward areas' and two dangers were
there to which subjection to normal laws would have specially exposed
H these people, and both arose out of the fact that they were primitive people,
SAMATHA v. STATE[PATIANAIK,J.] 477

simple unsophisticated and frequently improvident. There was a risk of A
their agricultural land passing to the more civilized section of the popula-
tion, and the occupation of the tribals was for the most part agricultural,
and, secondly, they were likely to get into the 'wiles of the moneylender".
The primary aim of government policy then was to protect them from these
two dangers and preserve their tribal customs : and this was achieved by B
prescribing special procedures applicable to these backward areas.

After going through the Constituent Assembly Debates, the Draft
Constitution in relation to Schedule V and the final Constitution as it
emerged, after amendments were brought about, it appears that it was not
the intention of the Constitution Makers to prohibit alienation of the land C
vested in the State within the scheduled area in favour of a non-Scheduled
Tribe person. On the other hand, though it was in paragraph (2) of the
Draft Constitution of Schedule V but it stood deleted while bringing the
Vth Schedule in its final form. In this view of the matter we are unable to
accept the contention of Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, learned senior counsel that the D
framers of the Constitution intended to prohibit alienation of the
government land in favour of non- Scheduled Tribe person within the
schedule area which has been engrafted in Vth Schedule of the
Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AS ENGRAFTED IN ARTICLE 46, E
ARTICLE 39(b) AS WELL AS THE DECLARATION 'RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT' ADOPTED BY UNITED NATIONS - IN RELATION
TO PROHIBITION OF ALIENATION OF GOVERNMENT LAND
WI.THIN THE TRIBAL AREA IN FAVOUR OF A NON-TRIBAL PER-
SON F
As indicated in the earlier part of this judgment vast track of land
lie within the tribal area which is rich in mineral resources and the entire
mineral resources of the country lie within the schedule area of different
States. In interpreting the provisions of the Regulation and the Constitu- G

- tional mandate engrafted in Fifth Schedule of the Constitution as well as
different other Articles of the Constitution, it must be borne in mind that
the interpretation should subserve the main object, namely the develop-
ment of the schedule area and the protection of the tribal people from
exploitation of the non-tribal people. It is in this prospective Article 46 and
37(b) of the Constitution have to be looked into. H
478 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1997]SUPP.2S.C.R.

A Article 46 of the Constitution no doubt mandates the State to
promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the
weaker sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes, and protect them from social injustice and all
forms of exploitation. The said Article embodies the concept of 'distribu-
B tive justice' which connotes the removal of economic inequalities and
rectifying the injustice .resulting from dealings or transactions between
unequals in society. It means those who have been deprived of their
properties by unconscionable bargaining should be restored to their
property. By taking recourse to this Article the law invalidating transfers
of land belonging to a member of the Scheduled Tribes and restoration of
C such land to the transferer was held constitutionally valid. Similarly, when (
Article 39(b) of the Constitution enjoins upon the State to have its policy
towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources
of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good,
what, it connotes is a duty on the State for building of a welfare State and
D an egalitarian social order. The object is that the basic need of a common
man must be fulfilled and the State should endeavour to change the
structure of the society. The aforesaid provision no doubt, may support a
case of nationalisation of material resources but by no stretch of imagina-
tion it can be said that it enjoins upon the State to exploit the mineral
(
resources within the Scheduled area by itself or through the Scheduled
E Tribes alone. The declaration of 'Right to Development' adopted by the
United Nations and ratified by India no doubt casts a responsibility on the
State to promote and protect social and economic order for development
of all people and it has become a States' responsibility to create conditions
favourable to the realisation of the right to development. In other words it
F is the State's responsibility to ensure development and eliminate the
obstacles to the State development. It is the States' responsibility to eradi-
cate social injustice. It is the State's responsibility to see the upliftment of
the tribals within the Scheduled areas. There possibly cannot P<: any
dispute with the proposition that the State should formulate its policies and
laws so that the neglected tribals within the Scheduled areas get equal
G opportunity with their counterparts in the other sophisticated parts of the
State and State should be empowered to make laws for protection of these
tribals from being exploited by the non-tribals. State should take all effec-
tive steps so as to eradicate inequalities.

H The aforesaid scheme of the Constitution in cur considered opinion
SAMA1HA v. STATE[PATIANAIK,J.] 479

does not in any manner suggest that alienation of Government land within A
the schedule area was intended to be prohibited in favour of a non-tribal
person.

ARTICLE 244AND FIFTH SCHEDULE OF THE CONSTITUTION:

B
Article 244( 1) of the Constitution makes the provisions of the Fifth
Schedule applicable to the Schedule areas and Scheduled Tribes in all
State other than Assam and Meghalaya. Article 244(1) of the Constitution
read with Fifth Schedule vests with the Governor of the State, the entire
governmental power i~ respect of the schedule areas within the State. The
framers of the Constitution found the necessity of vesting such power on C
the Governors of the State as the people of the Scheduled areas were
culturally backward and their social and other customs are different from
the rest of the country. Which area is the Scheduled area within the State
is determined by the President by an order. By virtue of the Fifth Schedule
of the Constitution the Governor is authorised to direct that any Act of D
Parliament or of the Legislature of a State shall not apply to a Scheduled
area or shall apply only subject to exceptions and modifications. The
Governor is also authorised to make regulations to prohibit or restrict
transfer of land by or amongst the members of the Scheduled Tribes,
regulate the allotment of land and regulate the business of moneylending
and all such regulations by the Governor have to be assented to by the E
President.

Section 5(2) of Schedule Vindicates the amplitude of the Governor's
power to make regulation for peace and good government in the Scheduled
area in a State. It also stipulates the field over which regulations can be F
framed by the Governor as contained in Clauses (a) to (c) thereof. The
Governor is the sole judge to decide as to what would be the regulation
which would be necessary for the peace and good government of the area
in question. The ambit of the power of Governor is not restricted to the
entries in the Vllth Schedule and the Governor is empowered even to
over-ride an act of Parliament or of a State Legislature so far as its G
applicability to the Scheduled area is concerned. Clauses (a) to (c) of
Section 5(2) of Schedule V indicate that the Governor may frame regula-
tion prohibiting or restricting the transfer of land by or among members
of the Scheduled Tribes within the Scheduled area, regulate the allotment
of lands to the members of the Scheduled Tribes in the area; and regulate H
'
\

I
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A the carrying on of business as money-lender by persons who lend money
to the members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area. It would thus appear, J
as the Britishers during the British rule, were really concerned to save the
tribals of the area from being exploited by the non-tribals, after coming
into force of the Constitution, smiliar power was conferred on the Gover-
B nor to make regulation for achieving the same object, namely, to save the
tribals belonging to the scheduled area from the exploitation of non- tribals.
Any Regulation framed by the Governor required to be interpretted bear-
ing in mind the aforesaid objective with which the Constitution conferred
power on the Governor under the Fifth Schedule.

C THE ANDHRA PRADESH SCHEDULE AREA LAND TRANSFER
REGULATION 1959 - WHETHER REGULATION 3(1) IS CON-
TRAVENED BY GRANT/RENEWAL OF MINING LEASES IN FAVOUR
OF NON-TRIBALS.

This Regulation has been framed by the Governor in exercise of
D power conferred upon him under Paragraph 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule to
the Constitution. The original Regulation is Regulation 1 of 1959 which was
subsequently amended in 1970. The original Regulation prior to its amend-
ment so far as transfer of immovable property by members of Scheduled
Tribes is concerned, as contained in Regulation 3 stood thus :
E
"3. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment,
rule or law in force in the Agency tracts, any transfer of immovable
property situated in the Agency tracts by a member of a Schedule
Tribe, shall be absolutely null and void unless made -

F (i) iii favour of any other member of a Scheduled Tribe or a
registered society as defined in clause (f) of Section 2 of the
Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932 (Madras Act VI of 1932),
composed solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes, or

(ii) with the previous sanction of the State Government, or
G subject to rules made in this behalf, with the previous consent in
writing of the Agent of any prescribed officer.

Explanation. - The expression "transfer" in this section includes
a sale in execution of a decree and also a transfer made by a
H member of a Scheduled Tribe in favour of any other member of a
SAMA1HA v. STATE[PATIANAIK,J.] 481

Scheduled Tri15e benami for the benefit of a person who is not a A
member of a Scheduled Tribe.

(2)(a) where a transfer of immovable property is made in
:::$. contravention of sub-section (1), the Agent, the Agency Divisional
Officer or any other prescribed officer may, on application by any
---....-. one interested, or on information given in writing by a public B
servant, or su,o moto decree ejectment against any person in
possession of the property claiming under the transfer, after due
notice to him in the manner prescribed and may restore it to the
transferor or his heirs.

I '
(b) If the transferor or his heirs are not willing to take back
c
the property or where their whereabouts are not known, the Agent,
the Agency Divisional Officer or prescribed officer, as the case
may be, may order the assignment or sale of the property to any
other member of a Scheduled Tribe or a registered society as
defined in clause (b) of section 2 of the Madras Co-operative D
Societies Act, 1932 (Madras Act VI of 1932), composed solely of
members of the Scheduled Tribes, or otherwise dispose of it, as if
it was a property at the disposal of the State Government.

(3)(a) Subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, an E
appeal against any decree or order under sub- section (2) shall lie
within such time as may be prescribed --

(i) if the decree or order was passed by the Agent, to the State
Government;
F
(ii) if the decree or order was passed by the Agency Divisional
Officer, to the Agent; and

(iii) if the decree or order was passed by any other officer, to
the agency Divisional officer or Agent, as may be prescribed.
G
(b) the appellate authority may entertain an appeal on sufficient
. ' cause being shown after the expiry on the time limit prescribed
""' thereof."

After the amendment in 1970 Section 3(1) reads thus : H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A "(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment, rule
or law in force in the Agency tracts, any transfer of immovable
property situated in the Agency tracts by a person, whether or not
.such person is a member of Scheduled Tribe, shall be absolutely
null and void, unless such transfer is made in favour of a person,
who is a member of Scheduled tribe or a society registered or
B deemed to be registered under the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative
Societies Act, 1964 (Act 7 of 1964), which is composed solely of
members of the Scheduled Tribes.

(b) Until the contrary is proved, any immovable property situated
c in the Agency tracts, and in the possession of a person who is not
a member of a Scheduled Tribe, shall be presumed to have been
acquired by such person or his predecessor in possession through
a transfer made to him by a member of a Scheduled Tribe.

D (c) Where a person intending to sell his land is not able to effect
such sale, by reason of the fact that no member of a Scheduled
Tribe is willing to purchase the land on the terms offered by such
person, then such person may apply to the Agent, the Agency
Divisional Officer or any other prescribed officer, for the acquisi-
tion of such land by the State Government, and the AE;ent, Agency
E
Divisional Officer or the prescribed officer, as the. case may be,
may, by order, take over such land on payment of compensation
in accordance with the principles specified in Section 10 of the
Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961 (Act
X of 1961), and such land shall thereupon vest in the State
Government free all encumbrances and shall be disposed of in
favour of members of the Scheduled Tribes or a society registered
or deemed to be registered under the Andhra Pradesh Co-opera-
tive Societies Act, 1964 (Act 7 of 1964) composed solely of mem-
bers of the Scheduled Tribes or in such other manner and subject
G to such conditions as may be prescribed."

So far as the regulation prior to its amendment in 1970 is concerned,
a plain reading thereof clearly indicates that the Governor has framed the
regulation as a regulatory measure putting some embargo on the power of
H transfer of a member belonging to Scheduled Tribe in respect of his
SAMAIBA v. STAIB[PAITANAIK,J.] 483

immovable property. The said embargo enabled a member of a Scheduled A
Tribe to transfer the immovable property only in favour of another member
of a Scheduled Tribe or in favour of a co-operative society composed solely
of members of a Scheduled Tribe. If the transfer was intended to be made
in favour of a non-Scheduled Tribe member then it could be so made but
only with previous sanction of the State Government or with the previous
B
~ consent in writing of the agent or any prescribed officer subject to the rllles
made in that behalf. Thus immovable property even belonging to a
Scheduled Tribe could be lawfully.transferred in favour of a non-Scheduled
Tribe member but only with previous sanction of the State Government.
-· Under the pre-amended provisions, therefore question of any felter on the
powers of the State Government in transferring government land in favour c
of a non-tribal did not arise at all. The question that arises for considera-
tion is whether there has been any change under the provisions of 1970 and
has there been a total prohibition of transfer of. any land in favour of a
non-Scheduled Tribe person in the Agency tracts.
D
Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, learned senior C-Ounsel appearing for the appel-
lant in this context advanced his argument that the entire object of the
Amendment Act of 1970 was to prohibit totally transfer of any land in
favour of a non-tribal member within the Agency tract and accordingly the
word 'person' in Section 3(1)(a) of the regulation after the. amendment
would bring within its sweep the State Government though ordinarily the E
expression 'person' may not bring within its sweep the State Government.
According to Mr. Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing for the ap-
pellant the word 'person' must be given the widest interpretation so as to
bring within its sweep the State Government which would be consistent
with the very object for which the amendment was bro~ght into force so F
that the integrity of the tribal regime is maintained. On being faced with
the difficulties in giving same interpretation to the word 'person' used in
Section 3(1)(a) throughout the learned counsel urged that it is permissible
to give a_ different meaning to the same word used in the same statute
depending upon the object sought to be achieved by the statute and,
therefore, it would be within the principles of interpretation to interpret G
"' the word 'person' occuring in First Part of Section 3(1)(a) to include the
State Government whereas the same word 'person' used in the latter part
of Section 3(1)(a) may be interpreted to mean 'an individual'. In support
of this contention the learned counsel relied upon the decisions of this
Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964) 1 SCR H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 371,Printers (Mysore) Ltd. &Anr. v.Asstt. Commercial Tox Officer& Others,
[1994] 2 SCC 434; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore v. J.H. Gotla
Vadagiri, [1985] 4 SCC 343 and Dr. M. Ismail Farnqui and Others Etc. Etc.
v. Union of India & Ors. Etc. Etc., [1994] 6 SCC 360. The learned counsel
also urged that this Court has accepted the principle that a wide interpreta-
B tion has to be given to the meaning of immovable property while interpret-
ing the provisions of the regulation in order to fulfil the purpose of the
tribal area regulation in the case of P. Rami Reddy & Ors. Etc. v. State of
Andhra Pradesh & Anr. Etc., [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 443, Lingappa Pochanna
Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. Etc., [1985] 1 SCC 479 and
Manchegowda and Others v. State of Kamataka and Others, [1984] 3 SCC
C 301, and therefore, the same rules of construction of giving a wider inter-
pretation to the expression 'person' used in Section 3(1)(a) of the regula-
tion should be adhered to.

Mr. Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent,
D on the other hand contended that the regulation in question prior to its
amendment does not prohibit transfer of land by any person in favour of
non-Scheduled Tribe person but merely postulates that such a transfer
must be with the consent of the competent authority. Thougli after the
amendment in 1970 a more stringent measure has been adopted but all the
restrictions are in relation to the land belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. A
E statutory presumption has been brought in so that whenever within the
Agency tract any immovable property is found to be in possession of a
non-Scheduled Tribe person then burden would be on the non-Scheduled
Tribe person to establish that he has not come in possession of the land
by way of a transfer from the Scheduled Tribe person. The aforesaid
p stringent provisions has obviously been made to achieve the main objective
to save the tribals from the exploitation of non-tribals. But by no stretch of
imagination the restrictions contained in regulation 3(1) even after its
amendment can be said to apply to the State Government in respect of the
government land. According to the learned counsel Mr. Sudhir Chandra if
interpretation as to the word 'person', as, contended by Dr. Rajiv Dhawan,
G learned senior counsel is accepted then it would lead to absurdity and the
provisions of Section 3(1)(a) would be meaningless. The learned counsel
further contended that there is intrinsic evidence in clause (a) itself to hold
that the word 'person' does not include State. Lastly, the learned counsel
urged. that bearing in mind the object with which the constitution has
H conferred power on the Governor to frame regulatic:m and the object with
SAMA1HA v. STATE[PATIANAIK,J.) 485

which the Governor has framed the regulation, there is no imperative to A
construe the word 'person' in Section 3(1)(a) of the regulation to include
the State Government. Such an interpretation according to the learned
counsel for the respondents would go against the concept of upliftment of
the tribals within the tribal area inasmuch as even the State Government
would be denuded of its power of transferring government land in favour B
of any non-Scheduled Tribe person or organisation even for the purpose
of setting up of a hospital or any other philanthropic purpose. When mines
and minerals lie in abundance mostly in the tribal areas and vest in the

-- . State Government, if the embargo contained in regulation 3{1)(a) applies
to the State Government by interpreting the word 'person' to include the
State Government then there cannot be any exploitation of mineral resour- C
ces in the country unless it is done either by the State itself or through the
Scheduled Tribe person and such interpretation would be grossly
detrimental to the general upliftrnent of the tribal people and, therefore,
the counsel suggests that such an interpretation would not be given to the
word 'person' in regulation 3(1)(a). D

In view of the rival submissions at the Bar the crucial question arises
for consideration is how the word 'person' in first part of regulation 3(1)(a)
is to be interpreted? In other words the very word 'person' used in
regulation 3(1)(a) itself whether should be interpreted differently and
whether such an interpretation is necessary to subserve the object for which E
the regulation has been brought forward. As has been stated earlier, the
history of legislation as discussed, treating the tribal areas different from
the other areas is basically intended to save the tribal people from being
exploited by the non-tribals. It is with that objective Article 244 of the
Constitution made the Fifth Schedule applicable to administer scheduled F
area and tribal area and the Fifth Schedule of. the Constitution, in turn,
conferred power on the Governor to notify the laws made by Parliament
or by the legislature of the State to apply or not to apply and further
Governor has been conferred power to make regulation for the peace and
good government of any area within a State. Such wide power has been
conferred upon the Governor which is plenary in nature so that Governor G
can by regulation prevent exploitation of the tribals from the non-tribals.
When such legislations made by Governor in exercise of power has been
challenged, Courts have upheld the validity of the same on the ground that
it is intended to save the tribals from the other non-tribals in the area who
usually take advantage of the simplicity and ignorance of the tribal people. H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A But it is difficult to accept the contention of Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellant, that the constitutional scheme
intended total prohibition of transfer of even the government land in favour
of the non-tribal. In P. Rama Reddy's case (supra) this Court after tracing
-
the history of the Regulation, namely, Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area
Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 (Regulation I of 1959) and the subsequent
'B amendment thereto in the amending Regulation of 1970 came to the
conclusion that 1959 Regulation was amended as difficulties were ex-
perienced by the Government in implementing the ejectment procedures
under the said Regulation, inasmuch as it was not always easy for the

C
concerned authority to ascertain the origin of the right under which the
non-tribal is claiming possession and whether the land under possession of
.-
a non-tribal was previously acquired from a tribal or not. According to the
learned judges the changes effected by the amended Regulation were :

(i) A rule of presumption was introduced to the effect that
unless the contrary is proved, where a non-tribal is in possession
D of land in the Scheduled areas, he or his predecessors-in-interest,
shall be deemed to have acquired it through transfer from a tribal;

(ii) Transfers of land in Scheduled Areas in favour of non- .
tribals shall be wholly prohibited in future; ·
E (iii) Non-tribals. holding lands in the Scheduled Areas shall be
prohibited from transferring their lands in favour of persons other
than tribals. Only partitions and devolution by succession of lands
held by them shall be permitted; and

F (iv) Where a tribal or non-tribal is unable to sell his land to a
tribal on reasonable terms, it shall be open to him to surrender
the land to Government who shall thereupon be obliged to acquire
it on payment of appropriate compensation."

Thus, the changes brought about by the amended Regulation of 1970
G were essentially intended to facilitate effective enforcement of 1959
Regulation and the object of the amended regulation cannot be held to be
total prohibition of alienation of all land including a government land
within the scheduled area in favour of a non-tribal. Bearing in mind the
aforesaid object of the amended regulation and the Constitutional scheme
H the word 'person' used.in regulation 3 (l)(a) has to be construed and while
SAMATIIA v. STATE[PATIANAIK,J.) 487

so construing certain principles of statutory interpretation have also to be A
borne in mind.

WHETHER THE WORD 'PERSON' IN THE REGULATION SHOULD
BE INTERPRETED DIFFERENTLY AND IN THE FIRST PART OF
REGULATION 3(1)(a) IT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE B
STATE WHEREAS IN THE OTHER PART II SHOULD BE INTER-
PRETED TO MEAN A NATURAL PERSON.

Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant contended that the word 'person' occurring in first part of
Section 3(a) of the Regulation should be construed to mean the 'State' so C
that the real object of prohibiting alienation of any land within the
scheduled area in favour of a non-tribal person can be achieved. According
to the learned counsel it is a permissible rule of construction of a statute
to construe the same words used in the same statute differently depending
upon the context in which it is used and the object sought to be achieved. D
Mr. Sudhir Chander, learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the
other hand contended that ordinarily a particular word used in a particular
statute should receive the same meaning unless and until it is necessary to
ascribe a different meaning to achieve any particular objective for which
the statute is intended. But according to the learned counsel it was not the
intention of the Constitution makers to prohibit alienation of any land E
within the scheduled area in favour of a non tribal person and on the other
hand the objective was to put restrictions on the tribal people from
transferring their land in favour of non-tribal person so that the tribal
people can be saved from being exploited by the sophisticated non-tribals
people. This being the objective, there is no necessity to construe the word F
'person' in first part of clause 3(1)(a) of the Regulation to include the State
Government also.

It is a cardinal rule of construction of statute that the statute must
be read as a whole and construction should be put to all the parts together G
and not of anyone part only by itself. Every clause of a statute is required
to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act
so that so far as possible the meaning of the enactment of the w~ole statute
would be consistent. When legislature uses the same word in different parts
of the same Section or statute, there is a presumption that the word is used
in the same sense throughout. It was so held by this Court in the following H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A cases : Suresh Chand v. Gu/am Chisti, [1990] 1 SCR 186; Mohd. Shafi v.
Seventh Additional District & Sessions Judge, Allahabad & Ors., (1977] 2
SCR 464; Raghubans Narain Singh v. The Uttar Pradesh Government
through Collector of Bijnor, [1967] 1 SCR 489. But the aforesaid presump-
tion can easily be displaced by the context in which tJ.e particular word is
B used. InFamll v.Alexander, [1976] 2 All England Report 721, it was stated
that where the draftsman uses the same word or phrase in similar context,
he must be presumed to intend it in each place to bear the same meaning.
Venkatarama AY.)lar, J. in the case of Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. District
Magistrate, 1hana, [1956] SCR 644 discussing the aforesaid rule has said
"The rule of construction contended for is well settled but that is only one
C element in deciding what the true import of enactment is to ascertain which
is necessary to have regard to the purpose being the particular provision
and its setting in the scheme of the statute."

In Madras Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. (in Liquidation) v.
D Board/and (Inspector of Taxes), All England Law Reports, [1955] 1 Page
753, Lord Macdermott pointed out "the presumption that the same word
is used in the same sense throughout the same enactment acknowledges
the virtues of an orderly and consistent use of language, but it must yield
to the requirements of the context and it is perhaps at its weakest when
the word in quefition is of the kind that readily draws its precise import,
E its range of meaning, from its immediate setting on the nature of the subject
with regard to which it is employed. But this Court has accepted the
principle that the same word used at different places in the same clause of
the same Section may not bear the same meaning at each place having
regard to the context of its use. In fact in the case of Maharaj Singh v. State
F of U.P. & Ors., [1977] 1 SCR 1072, the word 'vest' used in the same Section
of U.P. Jamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was interpreted to
mean although the vesting in the State was absolute but the vesting in the
Sabha was limited to possession and management. This case illustrates that
even a word which is used more than once in sub-section of a section may
connote and denote divergent things pending upon the context. Therefore,
G though on principle the contention of Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant that the word 'person' used in Section
3(1)(a) of the Regulation can be given different meaning in the first part
than the meaning to the same word given in the second part of regulation
may not be, taken exception, but the question arises whether in the con-
H stitutional scheme under which the regulation has been framed and the ·
SAMA1HA v. STATE(PATTANAIK,J.] 489

object and purpose for which the regulation has been framed by the A
Governor, does it warrant to give a different meaning to the same word
'person' in different part of the regulation. It may not be out of place to
bear in mind the normal rule that general words in a statute must receive
a general construction unless there is some thing in the act itself such as
subject matter with which the act is dealing or the context in which the B
words are used to show the intention of the legislature that they must be
given a restrictive or wider meaning.

Let us examine some · of the authorities cited at the Bar in this
regard. In Appiin v. Race Relations Board, [1974) 2 All ER 73, the word
'person' was defined to include a local authority in the context in which the C
word has been construed. In the case of Printers (Mysore) Ltd. and Anr. v.
Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. (supra) relied upon by Dr. Rajiv
Dhawan, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellant, the question
for consideration was whether the expression 'goods' occuring in Section
8(3)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act within the phrase 'for use by him in D
the manufacture or processing of goods for sale' does take within itself the
newspaper and this Court answered the question agreeing with the view
taken by the Madras and Kerala High Courts that the goods does include
newspaper. This Court relied upon the ratio in T.M. Kanias' case [1968] 2
• SCR 103 and Pushpa Devi's case [1990] 2 SCC 134 and held that it is well
settled where the context does not permit or where it would lead to absurd E
or unintended result, the definition of an expression need not be mechani-
cally applied. In Dr. M. Ismail Farnqui & Ors. Etc. Etc. v. Union of India
and Ors. Etc. Etc. [1994] 6 SCC 360, on which Dr. Rajiv Dhawan relied
very strongly, the majority view held the word 'vest' in Section 3 of the Act
has shades taking colour from the context in which it is used. It does not F
necessarily mean absolute vesting in every situation and is capable of
bearing the meaning of a limited vesting being limited in tittle as well as
duration. It was further held the meaning of the word 'vest' used in Section
3 has to be determined in the light of the text of the statute and the purpose
of its use. Ultimately the Court held while upholding the statue that the
vesting of the disputed area in the Central Govt. by virtue of Section 3 of G
the Act is limited as a statutory receiver, with the duty for its management
and administration according to Section 7 requiring maintenance of status
quo therein in Sub Section.(2) of Section 7 of the Act. Whereas the vesting
of the adjacent area other than the disputed area acquired by the Act in
the Central Government by virtue of Section 3 of the Act is absolute with H
490 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1997]SUPP.2S.C.R.

A the power of management and administration thereof in accordance with
sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act till its further vesting in any authority
or other body or trustees of any trust in accordance with Section 6 of the
Act. The minority view, however, construing Section 3 and 4(1) held that
the area includes the whole bundle movable and immovable property
under the area specified in the Schedule and all other rights and interests
B therein or arising thereof and the whole bundle of property and right vests
by reason of Section 4(2) in the Central Government free and discharged
from all encumbrances and held the Act to be unconstitutional as the
provisions of Section 3, 4 and 8 were held to be invalid. The majority view
of the Court expressed through Verma, J. held that a construction which
C a language of the statute can bear and promote larger national purpose
must be preferred to a strict literal construction tending to promote
factionalism and discord. But on examining the provisions. of Section
3(1)(a) of the Regulation after its amendment I am unable to persuade
myself to interpret the word 'person' used in Section 3(1)(a) of the regula-
D tion differently as in my view neither the context ·in which the word has
been used calls for such an interpretation nor the interpretation of giving
a literal meaning to the word would lead to any absurdity or unintended
result nor even it can be said to be promoting larger national purpose. In
P. Rami Reddy's case [1988) Supp. 1 SCR 443, the validity of Section 3(1)
of the amended regulation had been assailed and this Court tracing a short
..
E history of legislation came to hold that a legislation which in spirit sense
and substance aims at restoration of the tribal land which originally belong
to the tribals but which passed into the hands of non tribals cannot be
characterised as unreasonable. The Court sustained the legislation on the
ground that in the absence of protection economically stronger non tribals
F would in course of time devour of the available lands and wipe out the very
identity of the tribals who cannot survive in the absence of the only source
of livelihood they presently have. The Court also noticed the fact that
under the pre-amended provisions of the regulation (Regulation 1 of 1959)
transfer of immovable properties situated in the scheduled areas from a
member of a Scheduled Tribe to non tribals without previous sanction of
G the State Government was prohibited. The amendment in question in the
year 1970 was introduced to facilitate effective enforcement of the regula-
tions of 1959. In other words, transfer of land in scheduled area in favour
of non tribal became prohibited and non tribals holding land in the
scheduled area were prohibited from transferring the land in favour of
H persons other than tribals and further the statutory presumption was
SAMAIBA v. STATE [PATIANAIK, J.] 491

introduced in regulation 3(1)(b) casting burden on the non tribals when he A
is found to be in possession of a land within the scheduled area to establish
that he has not acquired the same from a scheduled trihe. In the aforesaid
case the Court did not accept the argument advanced on behalf of the
non-tribal that the expression 'land' has been used in its restricted sense in
paragraph 5(2)(a) of Schedule V of the Constitution.
B
In the aforesaid P.R. Reddy's case (supra) the Court also took note
of the earlier case in Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Kamataka & Ors.,
(1984] 3 sec 301 where constitutional validity of a similar provision in
respect of tribal area of Karnataka was under challenge and the Court
upheld the constitutionality with an eye to preserve and protect the tribals C
in the land in the tribal areas. But in none of the aforesaid cases the
question of power of the government to transfer the government land had
come up for consideration. The Constitutional scheme embodied in Article
15(4) and Article 46 as well as the power conferred upon the Governor of
the State under Schedule V of the Constitution are intended to preserve D
and protect the interest of the tribal in the tribal areas. It cannot be said
by any stretch of imagination that all lands within the tribal areas vest in
the tribal people. State is the paramount owner of lands and in the garb of
preventing the exploitation of tribals from the non-tribals so far as the lands
belonging to the tribals are concerned, the State cannot be denuded of its
power to exploit resources which vest with the State. Judged from this angle E
there is no justification for interpreting the word 'person' in the first part
of Section 3(1)(a) of the regulation to include S.tate and, th~refore, the
prohibitions and restrictions contained in the regulation would not apply
to the lands belonging to the State. The word 'person' used in the federal
statute imposing tax on persons selling liquor came up for consideration in F
the case of State of Ohio v. Guy T. Helvering, 85 U.S. Supreme Court
Reports 78 Law Edition 1307, it was held that the State engaging in the
selling spiritual liquors is not immune from the excise tax imposed by the
Federal Government on those engaging iii such business, since in doing it
is not performing any governmental function. It was also held that a State
is embraced within the meaning of the term 'person' as used in a statute G
imposing an excise tax on persons selling liquor and the word person shall
be construed to mean and include a partnership, association, company or
corporation, as well as a natural person. In the case of United States of
America v_. Cooper Corporation et. al, US Supreme Court Reports 85 Law
Edition 1071 the word 'person' used in Section 7 of the Sherman anti-trust H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Act came up for consideration and it was held that United States is not a
person entitled to maintain an action for treble damages withi11 the mean-
ing of Section 7 of the Act. It has been held in the aforesaid case that it
may be assumed, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, that the
term 'person' when used in different sections of a statute, was employed
B throughout the statute in the same, and not in different senses. It was also
held in the aforesaid case that it is not for the Courts to indulge in the
business of policy making in the field of Federal anti-trust legislation, but
their function ends with the endeavour to ascertain from the words used,
construed in the light of the relevant material, what was in fact the intent
of the Congress. In the case of Union of India v. Jubbi and Dunia Etc.,
C [1968) 1 SCR 447, the question that arose for consideration is whether
under the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates
and Land Reforms Act, 1953 whether tenants under the Union of India as
the land owner can acquire proprietary rights. Repelling the arguments
advanced by the Union of India that the Act is not intended to be
D applicable to the lands to the Union this Court held that the object of the
Act was to abolish big landed estate and illeviate the conditions of oc-
cupancy tenants by abolishing the proprietary rights of the land-owners in
them and vesting such rights in the tenants and that being the object of the
legislature it is hardly likely that it would make any discrimination between
the State and the Citizens in the matter of the application of the Act. The
E ratio of all the aforesaid cases can be summed up thus : though ordinarily
a particular word used in a statute should be given the same meaning but
it is permissible to construe the said word differently dependi11g upon the
object of the Act and the scheme of the Act and the purpose sought to be
achieved by Act.
F
Coming now to the core question of interpretation of the word
'person' in regulation 3(1)(a) under the Amended Act if word 'person'
used in Section 3(1)(a) is interpreted to mean to include the State then the
expression 'whether or not such a person is a member of a Scheduled Tribe
becomes meaningless as the State can never be a member of the Scheduled
G Tribe. If a literal meaning to the word 'person' is given in Section 3(1)(a)
of the regulation then the prohibitions on restrictions contained therein
would apply with full force to inter se transfer of land between the
Scheduled Tribe and non-Scheduled Tribe and such an interpretation
would subserve the main object of the legislation, namely, to save the tribal
-
H people from being exploited upon by the non-tribal people. If the constitu-
SAMATIIA v. STATE[PATIANAIK,J.) 493

tional scheme embodied in Articles 15(4) and 244 as well as in the Fifth A
Schedule is intended to save the tribal people from, being exploited upon
by the non-tribal both in relation to their lands as well as in the matter of
taking loans from the moneylenders, there is no obligation to construe the
word 'person' to include the State in the first part of Section 3(1)(a) of the
regulation. In view of the history of legislation already traced in the earlier B
part of this judgment, it is crystal clear that the prohibitions and restrictions
never intended for the lands belonging to the government and the
provisions both prior to the Constitution and under the Constitution are
intended to deal with the tribal people separately so that better attention
can be bestowed for their social and economical upliftment. It is with this
objective Fifth Schedule of the Constitution conferred power on the Gover- C
nor not only to indicate which laws made by the Parliament and the State
legislature would apply within the Scheduled area and which laws would
not apply, but further to make regulation for administration of the tribal
areas for peace and good government in respect of a scheduled area. The
matters indicated in Sub-Section (2) of Section 5 of V Schedule of the D
Constitution as well as the general power of the Governor to frame
regulation contained in Sub-Section (1) of Section 5 of V Schedule, neither
expressly nor by necessary implication prohibit transfer of government land
in favour of a non-tribal within the scheduled area nor there is any mandate
embodied in Article 15(4) or in Article 244 prohibiting the transfer of
government land in favour· of a non-Scheduled Tribe person within the E
scheduled area. In this perspective I do not find any force in the contention
of Dr. Rajiv Dhawan to interpret the word 'person' in the first part of
regulation 3(1)(a) to include the State and to interpret person in the second
part of said Section 3(1)(a) of the regulation to mean an ordinary in-
dividual. In my considered opinion the expression 'person' used in Section p
3(1)(a) of the regulation should have its natural meaning throughout the
Section to inean 'natural person' and it does not include the State. In other
words, the State 1is not denuded of its power in the matter of exploiting its
mineral resources within the scheduled area by a grant or renewal of lease
even in favour of non-tribal persons and the restrictions and embargo
contained in regulation 3(1)(a) is not applicable to the State in dealing with G
the land belonging to the State.

In this view of the matters, it must be held that the provisions of the
Regulation have not been contravened by granting mining leases in favour
of the Non-Scheduled Tribe person within the Schedule Area. H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Notwithstanding my conclusion that the word 'person' occuring in
Section 3(1) of the Regulation does not include 'State' a~d as such the
mining leases granted in favour of different. persons do not contravene the
provisions of the Regulation but I am inclined to agree with the observa-
tions made by Brother Ramaswamy, J. that the lessees should be required
B to spend a part of the p~ofit for the upliftment of the tribals and for
maintaining the ecology in the scheduled areas. Notwithstauding the con-
stitutional obligation of the Governor to make special provision for
ameliorating the economic status of the tribal people so as to assimilate
them into the national main stream, nothing tangible appears to have been
achieved in this regard even after 50 years of independence. The tribal
C people who constitute a substantial majority of the Indian population still
spend their time in jungles and other inexcessible areas ;and sufficient
legislative and executive measure has not been taken for improving the
living conditions of these tribal people. Since the mining activities are being
carried out mostly within the scheduled areas it is the duty of the State to
D see that a part of the profits earned by the lessees shoulcj. be spent for
ameliorating the living conditions of the tribals by the lessees themselves.
It is in this context brother Ramaswamy, J. has made some observations at
pages 141 and 142 of the judgment which have my general concurrence but
the said objective has to be achieved by appropriate legislation making it
compulsory for the lessees within the tribal area to spend a portion of the
E · income arising out of the mining business for tile general upliftment of the
living conditions of the tribal people. This should be in addition to the
royalty and other cess under different legislations. The State may also
consider the question of incorporating some provisions in the leases itself
for achieving the aforesaid objectives.
F
GRANT/RENEWAL OF MINING LEASES AND CONTINUANCE OF
THE MINING OPERATIONS WHETHER CONTRAVENES THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSERVATION ACT?
I

Mr. Dhavan, the learned senior counsel for appellant ~ontended that
G the Conservation Act has been enacted for conservation of forest and for.
matters connected therewith or ancillary or incidental therf1tO. Deforesta-
tion having caused ecological imbalance and having lead to ~nvironmental
deterioration, with a view to checking further deforestation,' the President
promulgated the Forest (Conservation) Ordinance, 1980 onj;25th October,
H 1980. The said Ordinance had made the prior approval f the Central

I
I
SAMATIIA v. STATP(PATIANAIK,J.) 495

government necessary for deforestation of reserved forests or for use of A
forest land for non-forest purposes. The aforesaid Ordinance was replaced
by the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (No. 69 of 1980). Under Section 2
of the said Act which being with a non-obstante. clause to the effect
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force in a State" no State Government except with the prior approval of B
the Central Government can direct that any forest land or any purposes.
Explanation to Section 2 provides the meaning of the expression 'non-
forest purpose'. Clause (b) of the said Explanation stipulates that any
purpose other than re- afforestation would be a non-forest purpose. This
being the position and mining activity being admittedly a non-forest pur-
pose, the land in question could not have been permitted to be used for C
such non-forest purpose without the prior approval of the Central Govern-
ment as required by Section 2 of the Conservation Act. The High Court
according to the learned counsel, committed serious error in coming to the
conclusion that the Conservation Act applies only to the reserved forests.
Dr. Dhawan contended that the word 'forest' must be given a wider D
meaning and should include all forests commonly known as forest and,
therefore, even if the area on which mining activities are carried on by the
respondent do not form a part of reserved forests in asmuchas no notifica-
tion under Section 20 of the Indian Forest Act has been issued but all the
same the provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act would become ap-
plicable. The Conservation Act was further amended by Act 69 of 1988 E
with Presidential assent on 17.10.1988 and was published in the Gazette of
India on 19.12.1988. By way of amendment Clause (3) was inserted to
Section (2) which reads thus :

(iii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be assigned F
by way of lease or otherwise to any private person or to any
authority, corporation, agency or any other organisation. not
owned, managed or controlled by Government;

Dr. Dhawan, the learned counsel contended that in view of the
aforesaid provision no lease could be granted or renewed after 19.12.1988 G
in favour of any authority without the prior approval of the Central Govern- .
ment. Consequently the impugned leases must be held to be invalid as
having contravened the provisions of Section 2 of the Conservation Act.
The High Court in the impugned judgment, however, proceeded on the
basis that the Conservation Act is applicable only to the reserved forests H
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2S.C.R.

A and do::s not apply to any other category of forests. Bearing in mind the
objects sought to be achieved by the Conservation Act, we see no justifica-
tion to give a restrictive meaning to the expression 'forest land' used in
Section 2 of the Conservation Act. On the other hand the expression 'forest
land' should be given an extended meaning to cover a track of land covered
B with trees, shrubs, vegetation and undergrowth under mingled with trees
with pastures, be it of natural growth or man made forestation. This Court
in the case of Supreme Court monitoring Committee v. Mussoorie Dehradun
·Dev. Aty. & Ors., in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 749 of 1995 has held "that the
term 'forest land' has not been defined under the Indian forest Act, 1927
or the 1980 Act and, therefore, have to be understood as including an
C extensive track of land covered with trees and undergrowth sometimes
intermingled with pasture, i.e. it will have to be understood in the broad
dictionary sense. So understood any area which the State considers to be
forest and is governed under that law will also be subject to Section 2(ii)
of the 1980 Act". Viewed in this light, any land which the State of U .P. by
D Notification declares to be a forest would be governed under Section (ii)
of the 1980 Act. In T.N. Godavaraman Thirnmulkpad v. Union of India &
Ors., in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 202 of 1995, the question relating to
protection and conservation of the forests throughout the country was
considered by this Court, the Court observed : "The Forest Conservation
Act, 1980 was enacted with a view to check further deforestation which
E ultimately results in ecological imbalance: and therefore, the provisions
made therein for the conservation of forest and for matters connected
therewith, must apply to all forests irrespective of the nature of ownership
or classification thereof, The word 'forest : must be understood according
to its dictionary meaning. This description covers all statutorily recognised
p forests, whether designated as reserved, protected or otherwise for the
purpose of Section 2(i) of the Forest Conservation Act. The term 'forest
land', occurring in Section 2, will not only include 'forest' as understood in
the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the Govern-
ment record irrespective of the ownership. This is how it has to be
understood for the purpose of Section 2 of the Act. The provisions enacted
G in the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 for the conservation of forests and
the matters connected therewith must apply clearly to all forests so under-
stood irrespective of the ownership or classification thereof." The Court ·
also in the aforesaid case gave a general direction to the following effect :
"In view of the meaning of the word 'forest' in the Act, it is obvious that
H prior approval of the Central Government is required for any non-forest
SAMATHA v. STATE(PATIANAIK,J.] 497
activity within the area of any 'forest'. In accordance with Section 2 of the A
Act all on-going activity within any forest in any State throughout the
country, without the prior approval of the Central Government, must cease
forthwith. It is, therefore, clear that the running of saw mills of any kind ·
including veneer or ply-wood mills, and mining of any mineral are non-
forest purposes and are, therefore, not permissible without prior approval B
of the central Government. Accordingly, any such activity is prima f acie
violation of the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. Every
State Government must promptly ensure total cessation of all such ac-
tivities forthwith." In the case of Divisional Forest Officer a11d Others v. S.
Nageswaramma, [1996]:6 SCC 442, this Court has held that renewal of any
mining lease could be done only in accordance with the law prevailing on C
the date of renewal and, therefore, if any renewal of mining lease has been
done in violation of Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, in asmuchas
no prior approval of the Central Government has been obtained, then such
renewal is invalid and inoperative.
D
In view of the afroresaid legal position it is difficult to sustain the
conelusion of the High Court in the impugned judgment that the Conser-
vation Act applies only to a reserved forest. The said conclusion of the
High Court therefore, is set aside. Consequently, it must be held that no
mining activities can continue on any forest land unless prior approval of
the Central Government is obtained as required under Section 2 of the E
Conservation Act. Mr. Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents contended that he does not dispute the proposition that the
expression 'forest land' in the Conservation Act should be given wider
meaning and that mining activities over the forest land cannot continue
unless prior approval of the Central Government has been obtained in F
accordance with Section 2 of the Conservation Act. He vehemently con-
tended that the mining activities of the respondents are not over any forest
land and the appellants have not produced any material from which this
Court can come to the conclusion that it forms a part of the forest even
going by the extended meaning of the term 'forest'. As has been stated
earlier while narrating the pleadings of the parties, the private respondents G
have all along asserted that the mining activities in question and their
leasehold area over which mining activities are continuing do riot form a
part of the forest. The State Government though has filed an affidavit but
no assertion has been made as to whether the mining areas with which we
are concerned in these appeals formed a part of the forest land and thereby H
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A required the previous approval of the Central Government for being used
{_
for mining purpose. On the other hand, the affidavit of the Government
indicates that the mining leases in favour of the private respondents have
been granted in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules
and there has been no contravention of the provisions of the Forest
B Conservation Act.

In this state of affairs even though we are of the considered opinion
that the forest land in Section 2 of the Conservation Act would receive an
extended meaning to include within its sweep an extensive track of land
covered with trees, shrubs, vegetation and undergrowth undermingled with
C trees with pastures, be it of natural growth or man made forestation, yet
unless and until it is so determined by the State Government that the
mining activities of the respondents are being carried on over forest land
it will not be possible to hold that the provisions of Section 2 of the
Conservation Act gets attracted. In this view of the matter, the only
D possible direction which this Court can issue in the facts and circumstances
of the present case is that the State of Andhra Pradesh through its officers
of the Forest Department should immediately inspect the mining areas of
the private respondents and find out whether the lands covered under the
mining leases in question form a part of the forest land and if it comes to
the conclusion that it is part and parcel of the forest land and no prior
E approval of the Central Government has been obtained for carrying out
the mining activities then immediate direction should be issued to the
respondents to stop the mining activities which would be in consonance
with the general direction issued by this Court in Godavaraman's case
(supra). We are forced to issue such direction in the case in hand as on
F the materials produced before us by the appellant and in view of the denial
in the counter-affidavit filed by the private respondents as well as the
affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh, it has not been
possible to come to the conclusion affirmatively that the land in question ·
formed a part and parcel of the forest land.

G WHETHER THE LEASES CAN BE SAID TO BE IN VIOLATION OF
THE ENVIRONMENT (PROTECTION) ACT 1986.

The aforesaid Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Environment Act')
was enacted by the Parliament as it was thought necessary to protect and
H improve the environment and to prevent hazards to human beings other
SAMATIIA v. STATE[PATIANAIK,J.] 499

living creatures, plants and property. A decision in this respect had been A
taken in June 1970 at the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment held at Stockholm in June, 1972 and India had participated
in the said conference. The Objects and reasons of the Act indicates that
the decline in the environmental quality has been evidenced by increasing
pollution, loss of vegetal cover and biological diversity, excessive con- B
centrations of harmful chemicals in the ambient atmosphere and in food
chains, growing risks of environmental accidents and threats to life support
systems and, therefore, word community's resolve to protect and enhance
the environmental quality found expression in the decisions taken at the
United Nations Conference on Human Environment held in Stockholm in
June, 1972. though in India there were several legislations for environmen- C
tal protection but a need for a general legislation became increasingly
evident and, therefore, an enactment was passed. At the outset it may be
made clear that in the Writ Petition filed before the High Court no
complaint has been made with regard to the violation of the provisions of
Environment Protection Act in the matter of granting lease or allowing the D
mining operation to be carried on. In this Court, however, Dr. Dhawan,
· learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the
large scale mining operations within the tribal area pollutes the environ-
ment in the tribal area and, therefore, the Central Government is under a
statutory obligation to protect the environment and coordinate the ac-
tivities of the State Government in the matter of granting mining leases E
within the tribal area which must be subject to the provisions of the
Environment Protection Act. And since no steps have been taken by the
State Government in this regard, the leases must be held to be invalid.
According to Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, learned senior counsel when several
industries have been closed down by this Court on the ground that the p
existence of such industries are hazardou3 to human life and thereby
violates Article 21 of the Constitution, the mining leases within the tribal
areas must also be annulled. As the mining activities pollutes the tribal
atmosphere, natural flora and fauna of the area and becomes hazardous
to the human life within the tribal area, the said activities must be stopped. G
In support of this contention the learned counsel placed reliance on the
decisions of this Court in the case of Tarun Bharat Sangh, Alwar v. Union
of India & Others., (1992) Supp (2) SCC 448, Subhasll Kumar v. State of .
Bihar & Ors., (1991) 1 SCC 598. Mr. Sudhir Chandra appearing for the
respondents contended that neither in the High Court nor in the Special
Leave Petition in this court basic facts have been averred to indicate how H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the mining lease in question infringe the provisions of the environmental
laws. He further contended that the decisions relied upon by the learned
counsel for the appellant connot have any application particularly in the
absence of any basic facts. Having examined the rival contentions on this
score, we find sufficient force in the contention of Mr. Sudhir Chandra. It
B is undisputed that no averment has been made in the Writ Petition filed
before the High Court alleging infraction of the environmental laws and
necessarily, therefore, no argument had been advanced and the High Court
had not considered this question at all. Even in the Special Leave petition
filed in this Court only infringement of the provisions of the Conservation
Act, the provisions of Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation and the
C provisions of Section 11(5) of the Mine and Minerals Regulation and
Development Act have been alleged. In paragraph 2 of the Special Leave
Petition the questions of law enumerated for consideration also do not
contain any question on the violation of environmental laws. In the absence
of any allegation and basic datas and consequently lack of opportunity to
D the respondents to prove the same it would not be safe for thi3 -Court to
embark upon an inquiry and come to a conclusion as to whether allowing
the mining operations within the tribal area has resulted in the infringe-
ment of the Environment protection Act. It would, therefore, be unneces-
sary to deal with the decisions cited by Dr. Rajiv Dhawan in support of his
contention. The Environment Act consists of four Chapters with 26 Section
E therein. Chapter-I contains the definitions, Chapter II contains General
power of the Central Government, Chapter III contains the prevention,
control and abatement of environmental pollution, and Chapter IV con-
tains misc. provisions. Environmental pollution has been defined in Section
2(c) to mean the presence in the environment of any environmental pol-
F lutant. "Environmental pollutant" has been defined in Section 2(b) to mean
any solid, liquid or gaseous substance present in such concentration as may
be, or tend to be injurious to environment. Section 7 prohibits persons
carrying on industry from emission or discharge of environmental pol-
lutants in excess of such standards, as may be prescribed. "Prescribed" had
been defined in Section 2(g) means prescribed by rules made under this
G Act. Thus the Rules standard had to be indicated, permissible limit of
emission environmental pollutant has to be indicated. Section 8 deals with
the embargo on handling of hazardous substances. Section 19 confers
power on the persons empowered by the Central Government to enter and
inspect any of the premises for the purposes enumerated under Clauses
H (a) to (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 10. Section 15 provides the penalty
SAMATIIA v. STATE[PATIANAIK,J.] 501
for contravention of the provisions of the Act and the rules made there- A
under. Section 19 confers power on the Court to take cognizance of any
offence on a complaint being made on that behalf. Section 24 is the
overriding provisions of the Act notwithstanding any thing inconsistent
therewith contained in any enactment. The combined reading of the
aforesaid provisions indicate that there must be necessary particulars to B
find out whether there has been any emission of the environmental pol-
lutant in excess of the standard fixed under the rules and it is only then the
question of complaining before a court and taking cognizance of the same
would arise. If the averments in the Special Leave Petition are examined

- from the aforesaid point it would be seen that there is no iota of material
to come to the conclusion that on account of the mining operations C
conducted by the respondents there has been any emission of environmen-
tal pollutant in excess of the standard prescribed under the Rules, nor it
is possible to hold that there has been any environmental pollution on
account of carrying on the mining operations. In our considered opinion,
on the facts alleged it is not possible to embark upon the enquiry as to D
whether the grant of leases within the tribal area are in violation of the
provisions of Environment Protection Act nor the leases can be annulled
on that score. Contention of Dr. Dhawan on this score accordingly must
be rejected.

Whether the leases in question are contrary ta the provisions of the Mines and E
Minerals Regulation and Development Act (far short 'MMRD Act')

Dr. Dhawan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended
that in view of Section 11(5) of the MMRD Act as amended no mining
leases can be governed in favo1.1r of any person wh0 is not a member of
Scheduied Tribe. Section 11(5) of the MMRD Act reads, thus : .lm20. F
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act no prospecting
licence or mining lease shall be granted in the Scheduled Areas to
any person who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribe, provided
that this sub-section shall not apply to an undertaking owned or G
controlled by the State ·or Central Government or to a Society
registered or deemed to be registered under the Andhra Pradesh
Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, which is composed of members
of Scheduled Tribes".

There cannot be any dispute that on and after coming into force H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A Section 11(5) of the MMRD Act no mining leases can be granted or (
renewed within the Scheduled Area to any person who is not a member of
Scheduled Tribe within the State of Andhra Pradesh. The only exception
being as contained in the proviso, namely, an undertaking owned or con-
trolled by the State or Central Government or a society registered or
B deemed to be registered under Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act
which is composed of members of Scheduled Tribes are excluded from the
rigours of Sub-section (5) of Section 11. Therefore, after 1991 if any mining
lease is granted in favour of any non-Scheduled Tribe person then the said
lease would be void being repugnant to Section 11(5) of the Act but the
said provision does not affect the subsisting leases and, therefore, the leases
C in favour of the respondents cannot be said to be invalid on the ground of
infraction of Section 11(5) of the MMRD Act. The provisions is prospec-
tive in operation and would be applicable to .any or renewal of a lease
subsequent to the enactment of Section 11(5) of the MMRD Act. The
leases of the resp'Ondents being prior to the aforesaid enactment these are
D not hit the said provisions and therefore, Dr. Dhawan's contention on this
score cannot be sustained.

My conclusions on different questions, as discussed above, are
summed up as under :

E 1. Under the British rule though steps had been taken to make
provision for special administration of the tribal areas but there had been
no prohibition for transfer of government land in favour of a non-tribal
within the scheduled area.

2. Under different laws and regulations operating in different tribal
F areas prior to coming into force of the Constitution there was restriction
in relation to transfer of lands belonging to the tribals in favour of a
non-tribal within the scheduled area but no such restriction was there so
far as the government land was concerned.

3. The legislative history and the debates in the Constituent Assembly
G culminating in engrafting of Schedule V of the Constitution conferring
power on the Governor to make regulation for administration of tribal area
were all aimed to prevent the tribals from exploitation of non-tribals and
the prohibition/restrictions were all in relation to the transfer of lands
belonging to the tribals in favour of non-tribals and it never intended to
H have any such prohibition in relation to government land.
SAMAlHA v. STATE[PATIANAIK,J.) 503

4. A combined reading of Article 244 and Schedule V of the Con- A
stitution would indicate that there is no constitutional obligation on the
Governor to make regulation prohibiting transfer of government land in
favour of a non-tribal within the scheduled area.

5. The word 'person' used in Section 3(1)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh
Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation as amended in 1970 has to be B
construed to convey and same meaning throughout the Section and the said
expression does not include the State Government.

6. Neither the legislative history nor the object with which special
power has been conferred on the Governor under Fifth Schedule to the C
constitution make it necessary to construe the word 'person' in the first
part of Section 3(1)(a) differently from the rest part of the Section so as
to include State Government within the said expression.

7. Though under Section 2 of the Forest conservation Act use of any
forest land for any non-forest purpose is prohibited without the prior D
consent of the Central Government and as such mining activities being a
non-forest purpose would attract the mischief of said Section 2 of the
conservation Act, but in the absence of any materials to conclusively come

. to the conclusion that the land over which the respondents are carrying on
the mining activities form a part of the forest land, it would not be proper
for this Court to issue any direction prohibiting the mining activities. At E
the same time it would be proper to direct the State of Andhra Pradesh
through its Forest Department to examine whether the mining activities are
being carried on over the forest land and if it comes to the conclusion that
the lands do form a part of the forest land then immediate steps should be
taken prohibiting continuance of the mining activities until the Central F
Government in exercise of power under Section 2 agrees to the same, and
we accordingly so direct.

8. The petitioner has not been able to make out any case of violation
of the provisions of the Environment Protection Act in the case in hand.
G
9. Section 11(5) of the MMRD Act b~ing prospective in nature will
have no application to the existing mining leases and, therefore, the leases
of the respondents' can't be annulled on that score.

The appeals are disposed of with the aforesaid observations and
directions. H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A C.A. No. 4603 of 1997. (

PATIANAIK, J. Leave granted.

This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the
B Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 27.8.1993 in writ petition No. 3734 of
1993. The present appellant was respondent No. 6 before the High Court
SAK.TI, a voluntary social organisation for the upliftment of tribals in East
Godavari District filed the writ petition in the Andhra Pradesh High Court
praying therein that the mining activities which are carried on by the
respondents 6 to 10 in the said writ petition should be immediately stopped
C as the grant of mining leases in their favour is in contravention of Section
3 of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land, Transfer Regulation, 1959
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Regulation') as well as Section 2 of the
Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Conserva-
tion Act'). It was averred in the writ petition that the villages where the
mining activities are being carried on were notified as protected forest
D under Section 24 of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967 with effect from
8.9.1975 and within the said forest area it is not permissible to continue any
mining activity in view of the provisions of the Conservation Act which
prohibits user of forest land for non-forest purpose.

E Respondents 1 to 4 before the High Court, who were the public
..
officers of the State Government supported the case of the petitioner and
took the stand that a joint inspection report had been conducted after
surveying the area over which the mining activities are being carried on by
the respondents 6 to 10 and the said report reveals that mining leases have
been granted over the forest area which is prohibited under the Conserva-
F tion Act without prior approval of the Central Government.

Respondent No. 6, the present appellant took the stand that the lease
having been granted much prior to the area in question was included as a
protected forest, the embargo contained in the provisions of the Conser-
G vation Act will not apply and in this connection reliance was placed on the
decision of this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram, [1995]
3 SCC 643. It was also contended that Section 3 of the Regulation has no
application to a transfer by the Government in respect of its land in favour
of a non-tribal and the word 'person' in Section 3 of the said Regulation
will not include the Government. It is not necessary for us to examine the
H stand taken by other private respondents, namely respondents 7 to 10.
SAMAIBA v. STAIB[PATIANAIK,J.) 505

The High Court by the impugned judgment came to the conclusion A
that the transfer of any land in scheduled area to a non-tribal is void under
Section 3 of the Regulation, and therefore, the lease in favour of respon-
dent no. 6 within the scheduled area is void. The High Court came to the
conclusion that the word 'person' in Section 3 of the Regulation includes
the Government, and therefore, leases granted by the State Government in B
scheduled area to a non-tribal is void. On the question of applicability of
the Conservation Act the High Court also relied upon the decision of the
Court in the Banshi Ram's case (supra) and caine to the conclusion that
for grant of mining lease in a protected forest area for non-tribal purpose
the prior approval of the Central Government is mandatory and since the
Government did not obtain the approval of the Central Government, leases C
are in contravention of Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980.
Having considered the judgment of this Court in Ambika Quany Works v.
State of Gujarat, [1987] 1 SCC 213 and taking into account the fact that
respondent no. 6 had completed the mining operation over 42 acres the
High Court permitted the said respondent no. 6 to remove the dug up D
mining in the presence of Joint Collector of the District, Assistant Director
of Mines and Geology and the District Surveyor of Forests. Respondent
No. 6, the present appellant was prohibited from mining operation in the
area with the aforesaid conclusion and thus the appeal by special leave .
• Learned counsel for the appellant argued with vehemence that the E
conclusion of the High Court that the word 'person' in Regulation 3(1)(a)
includes the State Government and the transfer of any land within the
scheduled area in favour of a non-tribal is null and void is wholly erroneous
as the embargo in question is applicable in respect of transfer of land
belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and not to land F
belonging to the State Government. The learned counsel also urged that
the restrictions and prohibitions in the Conservation Act will have no
application to an existing lease and the lease in favour of the appellant
having been granted much prior to the coming into force of the Conserva-
tion Act, the High Court committed error in holding that the leases are in
violation of the Conservation Act. Both these questions have been con- G
sidered in detail by us in Civil Appeal Nos. 4601-02/97 arising out of S.L.P.
© Nos. 17080- 81 of 1995 and for the reasons given therein and in view of
the conclusion in the said appeals to the effect that the word 'person' used
in Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation does not include the State Govern-
ment, and therefore, the prohibitions contained in the said Regulation with H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A regard to transfer of land in favour of a non-tribal will not apply to the
transfer of land made by the government for the purpose of mining lease, ..•
the conclusion of the High Court on this score is erroneous. But so far as
the question of applicability of the Conservation Act is concerned, in view
of our conclusion on the said question in the appeals arising out of SLPs
B referred to earlier (Samatha v. State of A.P. & Ors.) the conclusion of the
High Court in the impugned judgment has to be sustained. In view of the
inquiry report and the stand taken by the State officials the land over which
the appellant was permitted to carry on mining activities is a forest land
and before grant of lease in favour of the appellant no approval of the
Central Government has been taken. It is no doubt true that Conservation
C Act came into force much later than the grant of mining lease in favour of
the appellant, but in view of the general directions issued by this Court in
T.N. Godavannan Thimmulkpad v. Union of India & Ors. in Writ Petition
No. 202 of 1995, the mining activities being a user of the forest land for
non-forest purpose has to be stopped and in case it is intended to continue
D the mining activities the same can be done only after referring the matter
to the appropriate authority of the Central Government and getting the
permission of the same. In this view of the matter the conclusion of the
High Court in the impugned judgment so far as violation of Conservation
Act is concerned is unexceptionable, and therefore, the said conclusion is
upheld. Necessarily, therefore, the ultimate direction given by the High ..
E Court remains unaffected notwithstanding the conclusion of the High
Court on the first question with regard to the applicability of the provisions
of the Regulation having been reversed by us. In the premises as aforesaid
this appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances there will be no order as
to costs.

T.N.A. Appeals disposed of,