Holding

In matrimonial offences the court may liberally invoke Section 473 CrPC to extend the limitation period and must quash proceedings when their continuation would constitute an abuse of process, setting aside the High Court order and dismissing the criminal case.

Summary

The appellants, Sanapareddy Maheedhar and his parents, were charged under Sections 498A and 406 IPC read with the Dowry Prohibition Act for alleged dowry harassment and cruelty towards the appellant's wife, who later obtained a divorce in the United States and remarried. The Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of the offences more than three years after the last alleged act of cruelty, prompting the appellants to seek quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the ground of limitation. The High Court rejected the petition, holding that the magistrate had taken cognizance within the statutory period and that the case could proceed. The Supreme Court examined the applicability of Sections 468, 470, 472 and, importantly, the liberal use of Section 473 CrPC in matrimonial offences, emphasizing that cruelty is a continuing offence and that the interest of justice may justify extending the limitation period. It also reiterated the narrow circumstances in which the High Court may exercise its inherent power to quash proceedings, particularly where continuation would amount to abuse of process. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court order and quashed the criminal case, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether a magistrate can take cognizance of offences under Sections 498A and 406 IPC after the expiry of the three‑year limitation period prescribed in Section 468 CrPC.
Whether Section 473 CrPC may be invoked to extend the limitation period in cases of matrimonial offences involving cruelty and dowry harassment.
Whether the High Court can quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the ground of limitation or abuse of process.
Whether the period of absence of the accused abroad under Section 470(4) CrPC excludes the time spent abroad from the limitation calculation.
Whether the order of a coordinate bench quashing proceedings against the parents binds the Single Judge hearing a subsequent petition.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 188, s. 468, s. 470, s. 473, s. 482
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 3, s. 4, s. 6
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 406, s. 498A

Subjects

dowry harassmentmatrimonial offenceslimitation periodSection 473 CrPCSection 482 CrPCabuse of processcontinuing offencecriminal breach of trust

Judgment

A SAN AP AREDDY MAHEEDHAR AND ANR
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ANR.

DECEMBER 13, 2007
B
[S.B. SINHA AND G.S. SINGHVI, JJ.]

CodeofCriminalProcedure, 1973;Ss.188, 468, 470, 473&482/
Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 406 and 498A/Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961;
c Ss. 4 & 6:
Matrimonial offences-Court's power to take cognizance beyond
period of limitation-Quashing ofproceedings before Magistrate on
ground oflimitation-Held: In the interest a/justice, court could take
D cognizance ofan offence after expiry oflimitation period by liberally
exercising power uls.473 Cr.P.C.-High Court should be extremely
cautious and slow to interfere with investigation/trial of criminal
cases-It could exercise inherent powers u/s.482 Cr.P.C. only when it
is satisfied that FIR does not disclose commission ofcognizable offence
E or prosecution is barred by limitation or to prevent abuse ofprocess
ofthe Court or continuation ofproceeding ofthe criminal case would
result in failure a/justice-Magistrate took cognizance ofoffence after
lapse ofthree years-A co-ordinate Bench ofHigh Court quashed the
proceeding qua the parents ofappellants on the ground that Magistrate ..
F could not have taken cognizance of offence after three years-
Appellants do not appear to have drawn attention ofSingle Judge of
the High Court about quashing of the said proceedings-Jn such
peculiar facts of the case, continuation of the proceedings would
amount to abuse ofprocess of the Court-Hence, the proceedings as
G against accused, pending in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate,
quashed-Limitation-Courts power to relax. ~-

Appellant No.1, an engineer working in USA, married the eldest
daughter of respondent no. 2. Before marriage, the appellant and their
H 478
SANAPAREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. STATE OF ANDHRA 479
PRADESH
parents demanded certain amount ofcash and jewellery as dowry. They A
also demanded transfer of certain property belonging to the parents of
the girl in favour of the parents of appellant No.l. Appellant No.1 and
his parents accepted the proposal and performed betrothal. Later, they
demanded Zen car and threatened to cancel the engagement unless the
car was given. The demand was fulfilled by the parents of the girl by B
raising loan. After marriage, when she went to USA along with the
parents of the appellants, she stayed at New Jersey in U.S.A. from
1.11.1998 to 2.12.1998. During this period, she was allegedly subjected
to cruelty and harassment by the appellants and their parents for
demand of more and more dowry. She left her matrimonial home and C
stayed with her relatives. Later, appellant No.1 instituted divorce
petition in Superior Court at New Jersey and an ex parte decree was
passed in his favour. In the meanwhile, the victim informed to her
parents about the ill-treatment meted out to her by her husband and
his parents. Thereupon, respondent no. 2-motherofthevictim, filed a D
complaint in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate. The Magistrate
referred the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P .C.
After investigation, the Inspector of Police, Women Protection Cell,
C.I.D., submitted the final report with the suggestion to close the case.
The Investigating Officer also made a reference to the direction given E
by Additional Director General of Police, CID to close the case due to
lack of evidence. The Magistrate rejected the final report and directed
the police to make further investigation. The police conducted further
investigation and a Notice was also issued to the victim to appear before
' )
CID Police. Respondent no. 2 filed a Criminal Petition under Section F
482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the notice for appearance of her daughter. The
same was disposed of by the Single Judge with liberty to the petitioner
to approach the investigating agency/Court and inform it about the
efforts being made by her daughter to come to India. Respondent no. 2
also filed a Writ Petition for issuance of a direction to the Regional G
Passport Officer to impound the passport ofappellant no.1. That petition
was allowed by the Single Judge of the High Court. The victim obtained
duplicate passport and visa and came to India. She appeared before
the Investigating Officer and gave statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
The police filed a charge-sheet UJ!der Sections 498A and 406 IPC read H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A with Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Act. The Magistrate took
cognizance of the case and issued summons to the appellants and their
parents. The parents of the appellants challenged the proceedings in
the Criminal Petition filed by the parents of the victim under Section
482 Cr.P.C. The Single Judge quashed the proceedings. The appellant
B also filed a petition for quashing the proceedings against him. However,
the Single Judge ofthe High Court held thatthe proceedings in Criminal
Petition cannot be quashed against him as the Magistrate had taken
cognizance within three years. Hence the present appeal.

C Appellants contended that the Single Judge of the High Court
committed an error by refusing to quash the proceedings in the Criminal
Petition filed by the parents of the victim ignoring the fact that the
Magistrate had taken cognizance after almost four years of the last act
of alleged cruelty committed against the victim; that after dissolution
D of the marriage, the victim had taken back the Gold and Silverjewellery
and then contracted marriage with another person and this fact ought
to have been considered by the Single Judge of the High Court while •'
examining the appellants' pleas that the proceedings of criminal case
instituted against them amounts to an abuse of the process oflaw; and
E that in exercise of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court
is duty bound to quash the proceedings which are barred by time and
protect the appellants against unwarranted persecution.

Respondent No.2 submitted that Single Judge of the High Court
rightly declined to quash the proceedings in the criminal petition ftled
F by her because the offences committed by the appellants were
continuing in nature; that even though as on the date oftaking cognizance
of offences by the Magistrate, a period of more than three years had
elapsed, the proceedings in the Criminal Petition cannot be declared
as barred by limitation because the appellants were not in India and
G the period of their absence is liable to be excluded in terms of Section
470(4) Cr.P.C.; that offences ofcruelty and criminal breach oftrust are
continuing offences and prosecution launched against the appellants
cannot be treated as barred by time; that the Magistrate could also
exercise power under Section 473 Cr.P.C. for extending the period of
H
SANAP AREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. STATE OF ANDHRA 481
PRADESH

" f limitation because the appellants and their parents did not co-operate A
in the investigation and also prevented the victim from coming to India
to give her statement; and that the proceedings of the criminal case
cannot be quashed only on the ground oflack ofsanction under Section
188Cr.P.C.
B
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. While considering the applicability ofSection 468 Cr.P.C.
to the complaints made by the victims of matrimonial offences, the court
can invoke Section 473 Cr.P.C. and can take cognizance ofan offence
after expiry of the period oflimitation keeping in view the nature of c
allegations, the time taken by the police in investigation and the fact
that the offence of cruelty is a continuing offence and affects the society
at large. To put it differently, in cases involving matrimonial offences
the court should not adopt a narrow and pedantic approach and should,
in the interest of justice, liberally exercise power under Section 473 for D
extending the period oflimitation. [Para 23] [496-F, G; 497-A]
State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, [1981] 3 SCC 34; Venka
Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, [1993] 3 SCC 4; Arun Vyas v.
Anita Vyas, [1999] 4 SCC 690; State ofHimachal Pradesh v. Tara Dutt E
[2000] 1 SCC 230 and Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2005] 3 SCC
507, relied on.

2.1. The High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to
)
interfere with the investigation and/or trial ofcriminal cases and should
F
not stall the investigation and/or prosecution except when it is convinced
beyond any manner ofdoubtthatthe FIR does not disclose commission
of any offence or that the allegations contained in the FIR do not
constitute any cognizable offence or that the prosecution is barred by .
law or the High Court is convinced that it is necessary to interfere to
G
prevent abuse of the process of the court. In dealing with such cases,
the High Court has to bear in mind that judicial intervention at the
threshold of the legal process initiated against a person accused of
committing offence is highly detrimental to the larger public and societal
interest. (Para30] (501-E,F,G]
H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A R.P. Kapurv. State ofPunjab, AIR (1960) SC 866; State ofHaryana ,,
v. Bhajanlal, [1992] Supp.1 SCC 335; State ofBihar v.JA. C. Saldanha,
(1980] 1SCC554 and State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha,
'
[1982] 1SCC561 and Mis Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd.
Sharafal Haque, (2005) 7 SCC 254, referred to.
B
2.2. The people and the society have a legitimate expectation that
those committing offences either against an individual or the society
are expeditiously brought to trial and, if found guilty, adequately
punished. Therefore, while deciding a petition filed for quashing the FIR
or complaint or restraining the competent authority from investigating
c the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint or for stalling the trial
of the case, the High Court should be extremely careful and
circumspect. If the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint ,
discloses commission of some crime, then the High Court must keep
its hands off and allow the investigating agency to complete the
D
investigation without any fetter and al~o refrain from passing order which
may impede the trial. (Para 30) (501-H; 502-A, BJ
2.3. The High Court should not go into the merits and demerits of
the allegations simply because the petitioner alleges malus animus
E against the author of the FIR or the complainant. The High Court must
also refrain from making imaginary journey in the realm of possible
harassment which may be caused to the petitioner on account of
investigation of the FIR or complaint. Such a course will result in
miscarriage ofjustice and would encourage those accused of committing '
F crimes to repeat the same. However, ifthe High Court is satisfied that
the complaint does not disclose commission of any offence or
prosecution is barred by limitation or that the proceedings of criminal
case would result in failure ofjustice, then it may exercise inherent power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. [Para 30) [502-C, D, EJ
G
3.1. In the instant case, although the Single Judge of High Court
'I·
dealt with various points raised by the appellants and negatived the same
by recording the detailed order, his attention does not appear to have
been drawn to the order dated 24.10.2006 passed by the Co-Ordinate
H Bench in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003 whereby the proceedings of
SANAPAREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. STATE OF ANDHRA 483
PRADESH
CC No.240/2002 were quashed qua the parents of the appellants on the A
ground that the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance after three
years. Respondent No.2 is not shown to have challenged the order,
therefore, that order will be deemed to have become final. If attention
of the Single Judge who decided Criminal Petition filed by the appellants
had been drawn to the order passed by another Single Judge in Criminal B
Petition No.1302/2003, he may have, by taking note of the fact thatthe
·-' Magistrate did not pass an order for condonation of delay or extension
of the period oflimitation in terms of Section 473 Cr.P.C., quashed the
proceedings of CC No.240/2002. [Para 32] [502-F, G; 503-A, BJ
c
3.2. In the peculiar facts of this case, continuation of proceedings
of CC No.240/2002 will amount to abuse of the process of the Court. It
is not in dispute that after marriage, the victim lived with appellant No.1
for less than one and a half months. It is also not in dispute that their
marriage was dissolved by the Superior Court at New Jersey, U.S.A. D
~
• The victim is not shown to have challenged the decree of divorce. As a
matter offact, she had solemnized second marriage with another person
and has two children from the second marriage. She also received all
the articles ofdowry (includingjewellery). Almost nine years has elapsed
since the marriage of appellant No.1 with the victim and seven years E
from her second marriage. Therefore, at this belated stage, there does
not appear to be any justification for continuation of the proceedings in
CC No.240/2002. Rather, it would amount to sheer harassment to the
appellant and the victim who are settled in USA, if they are required to
)
come to India for giving evidence in relation to an offence allegedly F
committed in 1998-99. It is also extremely doubtful whether the
Government oflndia will, after lapse of such a long time, give sanction
in terms of Section 188 Cr.P.C. Hence, the proceedings of CC No.240/
2002, pending in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, are quashed.
[Paras 33 and 34] [503-B, C, D, E, F, G] G
CRIMINAL APPELLAfE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
-t
1708 of 2007.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.12.2006 of the High Court
of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Petition No.
H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A 4152 of2006. •,
Bina Madhavan and S. Udaya Kumar Sagar (for .Mis. Lawyer's Knit
& Co.) for the Appellants.

I.V. Narayana, T.N. Rao, Manjeet Kirpal, Paramjeet Singh and L.D.
B Rajendar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G.S. SINGHVI, J. I. Leave granted.
c 2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 6.12.2006 passed
by the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court whereby
he dismissed the petition filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code (for short Cr.P.C) for quashing the proceedings
of CC No.240/2002 pending in the Court of XXII Metropolitan
D Magistrate, Hyderabad in relation to offences under Sections 498A &
406, Indian Penal Code read with Sections 4 & 6 of the Dowry ,•
Prohibition Act 1961 (for short 'the Dowry Act).
3. Bhavani Shireesha, the eldest daughter of respondent no. 2
Shrimati D. Shaila, is a doctor by profession. She was married to appellant
E no. 1 Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri who is working as Software
Engineer at New Jersey, USA on 22.04.1998 at Hyderabad. Before
marriage, the appellants and their parents demanded Rs. 5 lakh cash, 50
tola gold jewellery and Rs. 75,000/- towards Adapaduchu Katnam as
dowry. They also demanded transfer of the ground floor of the residential
F house belonging to respondent no. 2 and her husband in favour of the
parents of the appellants. Respondent no. 2 and her husband agreed to
pay Rs. 4 lakh cash, 60 tola gold jewellary and Rs. 75,000/- towards
Adapaduchu Katnam as dowry. They also agreed to bequeath the
ground portion of their house in the name of their daughter. The appellants
G and their parents accepted the proposal and performed betrothal on
16.04.1998. Thereafter, the parents of the appellants demanded Zen car
and threatened to cancel the engagement unless the car is given. This
compelled the husband of respondent no. 2 to raise loan of Rs. 4 lakh
and purchased the car; which is said to have been kept at the disposal of
H
SANAPAREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. STATE OF ANDHRA 485
PRADESH [SINGHVI, J.]
the parents of the appellants. After marriage, the appellants left for USA, A
but Shireesha Bhavani stayed back at Hyderabad with their parents
because she was undergoing training as House Surgeon. After completing
the training, Shireesha Bhavani went to USA along with the parents of
the appellants. She stayed at New Jersey from 1.11.1998 to 2.12.1998.
During this period, Shireesha Bhavani was subjected to cruelty and B
harassment by the appellants and their parents on the ground that she did
not bring enough dowry. On 3.12.1998 she went to Maryland (U.S.A.)
and stayed with her relatives. In April 1999, the parents of the appellants
returned to India. On 5.4.1999, appellant No. I instituted divorce petition
in Superior Court at New Jersey and an ex parte decree was passed in C
his favour on 15.12.1999.
4. In the meanwhile, Shireesha Bhavarii wrote letter dated
13.04.1999 to her parents complaining of cruelty by the appellants and
their parents. She disclosed that while she was staying with the parents D
\
of the appellants at Hyderabad, the mother-in-law always complained of
lack of dowry and abused and criticized her and asked her to do menial
job. She further disclosed that appellant no. 1 and his brother harassed
and also pressurized her to bring additional money for purchase of a house
at Hyderabad in the name of the in-laws. She gave detailed account of E
the alleged harassment and torture meted out by the appellants and their
parents. Thereupon, respondent no. 2 filed complaint dated 26.8.1999
in the Court ofXXII Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad (hereinafter
referred to as "the concerned Magistrate") detailing therein the facts
) relating to demand of dowry by the appellants and their parents and the F
incidents of cruelty and harassment to which her daughter was subjected
at Hyderabad and New Jersey. Respondent no. 2 also alleged that
immediately after marriage, the appellants and their parents complained
about lack of dowry by saying that appellant no. 1 could have been
married for a dowry of Rs. 35 lakhs. Another allegation made by G
respondent no. 2 was that her daughter was driven out of the house with
-j an indication that she will be allowed to return only after the demands of
the accused appellants and their parents are met. The learned Magistrate
referred the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. This
led to registration of Crime No.54/1999 at Women Police Station, CID, H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A Hyderabad. On 18.9.2000 the·Inspector of Police, Women Protection
Cell, C.l.D., Hyderabad submitted final report with the prayer that the ')
case may be treated as closed due to lack of evidence. He mentioned
that much progress could not be made due to non-availability of de facto
victim and other key witnesses in India and there was no immediate
B prospect of their coming to India. He also mentioned that the accused
party returned the personal belongings including gold jewellery to the de
facto victim in U.S.A. and that a decree of divorce had been passed by
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
Middlesex County. The Investigating Officer also made a reference to the
C direction given by Additional Director General of Police, CID to close
the case due to lack of evidence.
5. By an order dated 1.11.2000, the concerned Magistrate rejected
the final report and directed the police to make further investigation. In
D the opinion of the learned Magistrate, the investigation had not been done
properly and the final report submitted under the diet.ates of the Additional
j
Director General of Police was not acceptable. While doing so, the learned
Magistrate made a reference to the letter addressed by Director General
of Police, CID, Andhra Pradesh to the Regional Passport Office,
E Hyderabad wherein it was mentioned that Shrimati Bhavani Shireesha had
been subjected to cruelty and a request was made to cancel or impound
the passport of the appellants.
6. In compliance of the direction given by the learned Magistrate
the police conducted further investigation and recorded statements of 18
F persons. Notice was also issued to Shrimati Shireesha Bhavani to appear
before CID Police, Hyderabad. At that stage, respondent no. 2 filed
Criminal Petition No. 3912 of 2000 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for
quashing the notice issued by the Inspector of Police, CID, Hyderabad
for appearance of her daughter in connection with the Crime No. 54 of
G 1999. The same was disposed of by the learned Single Judge on
22.9.2000 with liberty to the petitioner to approach the investigating
agency and inform it about the efforts being made by her daughter to come
to India or to approach the concerned court for non-acceptance of final
report, if any, submitted by the police. Respondent no. 2 also filed Writ
H Petition No. 1173 of 2001 for issue of a mandamus to the Regional
SAN AP AREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. ST ATE OF ANDHRA 487
PRADESH [SINGHVI, J.]
! Passport Officer, Secunderabad to impound the passport of appellant no. A
1 herein. That petition was disposed of by the learned Single Judge on
26.9.2000 with a direction to the Regional Passport Officer to take
appropriate decision on the complaint made by respondent no. 2.
7. It is borne out from the record that on an application made by
B
respondent no. 2 the concerned Magistrate issued warrant for search of
the premises of the parents of the appellants for recovery of the dowry
articles and passport of her daughter. In the course of search conducted
by Sri P. Ventaka Rami Reddy, Inspector of Police (Women Protection
Cell) CID, Hyderabad on 19.7.2000 the parents of the appellants
disclosed that the passport has been sent to Shrimati B. Shireesha by
c
Ordinary Post some time in January/February, 1999, but they could not
produce any evidence to substantiate the same.
8. After disposal of Criminal Petition No. 3912 of2000, Bhavani
' \ Shireesha obtained duplicate passport and visa ·and came to India on D
26. 7.2002. She appeared before the Investigating Officer on 27. 7.2002
and gave statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Thereafter, the police filed
a charge-sheet under Sections 498A and 406 IPC read with Sections 3,
4 and 6 of the Dowry Act. On 4.10.2002 the concerned Magistrate took
cognizance of the case and issued summons to the appellants and their E
parents.
9. It is also borne out from the record that without disclosing the
) fact that the concerned Magistrate had already rejected the final report,
the appellants and their parents filed writ petition nos. 623 7 of 2001 and F
2284 of2001 with the prayer for quashing the proceedings of Crime No.
54of1999 on the file of Women Protection Cell, CID, Hyderabad. The
learned Single Judge who heard the writ petitions made a reference to
order dated 26.9.2000 passed by another learned Single Judge in Criminal
Petition No. 3912 of 2000 and disposed of both the petitions on G
-j 4.12.2001 by directing XXII Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad to
pass appropriate order on the final report within a period of two months
ofreceipt of the copy of the order.
10. The parents of the appellants challenged the proceedings of CC
H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A No. 240 of2002 in Criminal Petition No. 1302 of2003 filed under Section ',
482 Cr.P.C. They pleaded that in view of the bar contained in Section
468 Cr.P.C. the concerned Magistrate did not have the jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the offences under Sections 498A and 406 IPC read with
Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act. By an order dated 24.10.2006 the
B learned Single Judge accepted their plea and quashed the proceedings of
CC No. 240 of 2002. While doing so, the learned Single Judge also
expressed doubt regarding Bhavani Shireesha having come to India for •
the purpose of making statement before the police.
C 11. Encouraged by the success of litigious venture undertaken by
their parents, the appellants filed Criminal Petition No. 4152 of2006 for
quashing the proceedings in CC No. 240 of 2002. They pleaded that
after the expiry of three years counted from the date of filing the complaint,
the learned magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offences
D allegedly committed by them under Sections 498A and 406 read with
Sections 4 & 6 of the Dowry Act. Another plea taken by them was that i
in the face of the decree of divorce passed by the Superior Court at New
Jersey, USA and the fact that Shrimati Shireesha Bhavani had contracted
marriage with one Mr. Venkat Puskar in the year 2000, there was no
E warrants for initiation of criminal proceedings against them, and that the
offences allegedly committed by them outside India cannot be enquired
into or tried without obtaining prior sanction of the Central Government
in terms of Section 188 Cr.P.C.
12. The learned Single Judge briefly referred to the parameters for
F exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the
ingredients of Sections 498A & 406 IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry
Act and held that the proceedings in CC No.240/2002 cannot be quashed
because the learned magistrate had taken cognizance within three years.
The learned Single Judge distinguished the judgments of this Court in
G Mis. Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd v. Mohd Sharaful Haque,
[2005] 1 SCC 122 and Ramesh Chandra Sinha & Ors. v. State of ~·-

Bihar & Ors., [2003] 7 SCC 254 by observing that in those cases the
magistrate had taken cognizance long after three years. He then observed
that each act of cruelty could be a new starting point of limitation and,
H therefore, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate cannot be treated as
SANAPAREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. STATE OF ANDHRA 489
PRADESH [SINGHVI, J.]
barred by time. As regards the ex-parte decree of divorce passed by A
the Court at New Jersey, the learned Single Judge observed that the foreign
judgment is not conclusive and that various facts are required to be proved
and established before the Criminal Court. The learned Single Judge
rejected the appellant's plea regarding lack of sanction of the Central
Government by observing that such sanction can be obtained even during B
the trial.
13. Ms. Beena Madhavan, learned counsel for the appellants
reiterated the contentions raised on behalf of her clients before the High
Court and argued that the learned Single Judge committed an error by
refusing to quash the proceedings of CC No.240 of2002 ignoring the
c
fact that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance after almost four
years of the last act of alleged cruelty committed against Shireesha
Bhavani. She submitted that after dissolution of the marriage, Shrimati
Shireesha Bhavani had taken back the Gold and Silver jewellery and then
D
\ contracted marriage with Mr. Venkat Puskar and this fact ought to have
been considered by the learned Single Judge while examining the
appellants' pleas that the proceedings of criminal case instituted against
them amounts to an abuse of the process oflaw. She then argued that in
exercise of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court is duty
E
bound to quash the proceedings which are barred by time and protect
the appellants against unwarranted persecution.
14. Shri I. Venkata Narayana, learned Senior Advocate appearing
• ) for respondent No.2, supported the order under challenge and argued
that the learned Single Judge of the High Court rightly declined to quash F
the proceedings of criminal case because the offences committed by the
appellants are continuing in nature. Shri Venkata Narayana further argued
that even though as on the date of taking cognizance of offences by the
learned magistrate, a J;vriod of more than three years had elapsed, the
proceedings of CC No. 24012002 cannot be declared as barred by G
limitation because the appellants were not in India and the period of their
-~
absence is liable to be excluded in terms of Section 470(4). Shri Venkata
Narayana relied on Section 472 and argued that offences of cruelty and
criminal breach of trust are continuing offences and prosecution launched
against the appellants cannot be treated as barred by time. He then H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A submitted that the learned Magistrate could also exercise power under '1

Section 473 for extending the period oflimitation because the appellants '
and their parents did not co-operate in the investigation and also prevented
Smt. Shireesha Bhavani from coming to India to give her statement. Lastly,
the learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of this Court in Ajay
B Agarwal V. Union of India, [1993] 3 sec 609 and argued that the
proceedings of the criminal case cannot be quashed only on the ground
oflack of sanction under Section 188, Cr.P.C.
15. We have considered the respective submissions and carefully
scrutinised the record. For deciding whether the learned Magistrate could
c take cognizance of offence under Sections 498 A and 406 IPC read with
Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Act after expiry of three years, it will be
useful to notice the scheme of Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal
Procedme. Section 468 which finds place in that Chapter creates a bar
against taking cognizance of an offence after lapse of the period of
D
limitation. Sub-section (1) thereoflays down that except as otherwise t
provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court, shall take cognizance of an
offence of the category specified in sub-sectioll'(2), after the expiry of
the period of limitation. Sub-section (2) specifies different periods of
limitation for different types of offences punishable with imprisonment for
E
a tenn exceeding one year but not exceeding three years , the period of
limitation is three years. Section 469 specifies the point of time with
reference to which the period oflimitation is to be counted. Section 470
provides for exclusion of time' in certain cases. Sub-section (4) thereof ii
lays down that in computing the period oflimitation, the time during which "'-"""
F
the offender has been absent from India or from any territory outside India I"-

which is under the administration of the Central Government or has avoided
arrest by absconding or concealing himself, shall be excluded. Section 472,
which deals with continuing offence declares that in case of a continuing
offence, a fresh period oflimitation shall begin to run at every moment of
G
the time during which the offence continues. Section 473, which begins
with non-obstante clause, empowers the Court to take cognizance of an .
offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied that the
delay has been properly explained and it is necessary so to do in the
interest ofjustice.
H
SANAP AREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. ST ATE OF ANDHRA 491
PRADESH [SINGHVI, J.]
16. In State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, [ 1981] 3 SCC 34, this A
r Court noted that the object of Section 468 Cr.P.C. is to create a bar
against belated prosecutions and to prevent abuse of the process of the
court and observed that this is in consonance with the concept of fairness
of trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.
B
17. In Venka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, [1993] 3
SCC 4 this Court considered the applicability of Section 468 to the cases
~l
involving matrimonial offences, referred to the judgment in Sarwan Singh 's
.
case (supra) and observed:
"It is true that the object of introducing Section 468 was to put a c
bar oflimitation on prosecutions and to prevent the parties from
filing cases after a long time, as it was thought proper that after a
long lapse of time, launching of prosecution may be vexatious,
because by that time even the evidence may disappear. This aspect
has been mentioned in the statement and object, for introducing a D
\ period oflimitation, as well.as by this Court in the case of Sarwan
Singh (supra). But, that consideration cannot be extended to
matrimonial offences, where the allegations are of cruelty,
torture and assault by the husband or other members of the
family to the complainant. It is a matter ofcommon experience E
that victim is subjected to such cruelty repeatedly and it is
more or less like a continuing offence. It is only as a last resort
that a wife openly comes before a court to unfold and relate
)
the day-to-day torture and cruelty faced by her, inside the
house, which many of such victims do not like to be made F
public. As such, courts while considering the question of
limitation for an offence under Section 498-A i.e. subjecting
a woman to cruelty by her husband or the relative of her
husband, should judge that question, in the light of Section
473 ofthe Code, which requires the Court, not only to examine G
as to whether the delay has been properly explained, but as
._,
to whether "it is necessary to do so in the interests ofjustice ".

[Emphasis added]
18. The court then compared Section 473 Cr.P.C. with Section 5 H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Add!.) S.C.R.

A of the Limitation Act and observed:
)
"For exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the
onus is on the appellant or the applicant to satisfy the court that
there was sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, whereas
Section 473 enjoins a duty on the court to examine not only
B whether such delay has been explained but as to whether it is
the requirement ofthe justice to condone or ignore such delay.
As such, whenever the bar of Section 468 is applicable, the .\..,

court has to apply its mind on the question, whether it is
necessary to condone such delay in the interests of justice.
c While examining the question as to whether it is necessary to
condone the delay in the interest of justice, the Court has to take
•
note of the nature of offence, the class to which the victim belongs,
including the background of the victim. Ifthe power under Section
473 of the Code is to be exercised in the interests ofjustice,
D
then while considering the grievance by a lady, of torture,
cruelty and inhuman treatment, by the husband and the I
relatives ofthe husband, the interest ofjustice requires a deeper
examination of such grievances, instead of applying the rule
of limitation and saying that with lapse of time the cause of
E action itselfhas come to an end. The general rule oflimitation is
based on the Latin maxim : v igilantibus, et non, dormientibus,
Jura subveniunt (the vigilant, and not the sleepy, are assisted by
the laws). That maxim cannot be applied in connection with offences
relating to cruelty against women."
F
[ Emphasis added]
19. In Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas, [1999] 4 SCC 690: 1999 SCC
(Cri) 629] this Court again considered the applicability of Section 473,
Cr.P.C. in cases relating to matrimonial offences and observed:
G
"The first limb confers power on every competent court to take
~
cogniz.ance of an offence after the period of limitation ifit is satisfied
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay "
has been properly explained and the second limb empowers such
H
SANAPAREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. STATE OF ANDHRA 493
PRADESH [SINGHVI, J.]

- t a court to take cognizance of an offence if it is satisfied on the facts A
and in the circumstances of the case that it is necessary so to do
in the interests ofjustice. It is true that the expression 'in the interest
of justice' in Section 473 cannot be interpreted to mean in the
interest of prosecution. What the court has to see is 'interest of
justice'. The interest ofjustice demands that the court should protect B
the oppressed and punish the oppressor/offender. In complaints
,)
under Section 498-A the wife will invariably be oppressed, having
been subjected to cruelty by the husband and the in-laws. It is,
therefore, appropriate for the courts, in case of delayed complaints,
to construe liberally Section 473 Cr.P.C. in favour ofa wife who c
is subjected to cruelty if on the facts and in the circumstances of
the case it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. When
the conduct of the aecused is such that applying the rule oflimitation
will give an unfair advantage to him or result in miscarriage of
-) justice, the court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry D
of the period oflimitation in the interests of justice. This is only
illustrative, not exhaustive."
20. In State ofHP. v. Tara Dutt, [2000] 1 SCC 230 a three Judges
Bench of this Court considered whether there can be a presumption of
E
condonation of delay under Section 473 Cr.P.C. and observed:
"Section 473 confers power on the court taking cognizance after
the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts
) and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been
properly explained and that it is necessary so to do in the interest F
ofjustice. Obviously, therefore in respect of the offences for which
a period oflimitation has been provided in Section 468, the power
has been conferred on the court taking cognizance to extend the
said period oflimitation where a proper and satisfactory explanation
of the delay is available and where the court taking cognizance finds G
-) that it would be in the interest of justice. This discretion conferred
on the court has to be exercised judicially and on well-recognised
principles. This being a discretion conferred on the court taking
cognizance, wherever the court exercises this discretion, the same
must be by a speaking order, indicating the satisfaction of the court H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A that the delay was satisfactorily explained and condonation of the ~

same was in the interest of justice. In the absence of a positive '
order to that effect it may not be permissible for a superior court
to come to the conclusion that the court must be deemed to have
taken cognizance by condoning the delay whenever the cognizance
B was barred and yet the court took cognizance and proceeded with
the trial of the offence. But the provisions are of no application to
the case in hand since for the offences charged, no period of
limitation has been provided in view of the imposable punishment
thereunder. In this view of the matter we have no hesitation to come
c to the conclusion that the High Court committed serious error in
holding that the conviction of the two respondents under Section
417 would be barred as on the date of taking cognizance the Court
could not have taken cognizance of the said offence. Needless to
mention, it is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court
D that if an accused is charged with a major offence but is not found
(
guilty thereunder, he can be convicted of a minor offence if the facts
established indicate that such minor offence has been committed."

21. This Court then considered the earlier judgment in Arun Vyas
v. Anita l'Jlas (supra) and held :
E
"The aforesaid obseryations made by this Court indicate that the
order of the Magistrate at the time of taking cognizance in case of
an offence under Section 498-A, should indicate as to why the
Magistrate does not think it sufficient in the interest of justice to
F condone the delay inasmuch as an accused committing an offence
under Section 498-A should not be lightly let off. We have already
indicated in the earlier part of this judgment as to the true import
and construction of Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The said provision being an enabling provision, whenever a
G Magistrate invokes the said provision and condones the delay, the
order of the Magistrate must indicate that he was satisfied on the \,·
facts and circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly
explained and that it is necessary in the interest ofjustice to condone
the delay. But without such an order being there or in the absence
H of such positive order, it cannot (sic) be said that the Magistrate
SANAPAREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. ST ATE OF ANDHRA 495
PRADESH [SINGHVI, J.]
has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in law. It is no doubt true A
that in view of the fact that an offence under Section 498-A is an
offence against the society and, therefore, in the matter of taking
cognizance of the said offence, the Magistrate must liberally
construe the question of limitation but all the same the Magistrate
has to be satisfied, in case of period of limitation for taking B
cognizance under Section 468(2)(c) having expired that the
circumstances of the case require delay to be condoned and further
the same must be manifest in the order of the Magistrate itself. This
in our view is the correct interpretation of Section 473 of the Code
,,
~
of Criminal Procedure." c
22. In Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2005] 3 SCC 507 this
Court considered the issue of limitation in taking cognizance of an offence
under Section 498A and observed :
"On the point of limitation, we are of the view that the prosecution D
-~
cannot be nullified at the very threshold on the ground that the
prescribed period of limitation had expired. According to the
learned counsel for the appellants, the alleged acts of cruelty giving
rise to the offence under Section 498-A ceased on the exit of the
informant from the matrimonial home on 2-10-1997 and no further E
acts of cruelty continued thereafter. The outer limit of time for taking
cognizance would therefore be 3-10-200 0, it is contended.
However, at this juncture, we may clarify that there is an allegation
) in the FIR that on 13-10-1998/14-10-1998, when the informant's
close relations met her in-laws at a hotel in Chennai, they made it F
clear that she will not be allowed to live with her husband in
Mumbai unless she brought the demanded money and jewellery.
Even going by this statement, the taking of cognizance on 13-2-
2002 pursuant to the charge-sheet filed on 28-12-2001 would be
beyond the period oflimitation. The commencement oflimitation G
-i could be taken as 2-10-1997 or at the most 14-10-1998. As
pointed out by this Court in Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas (supra) the
last act of cruelty would be the starting point oflimitation. The
three-year period as per Section 468(2)(c) would expire by 14-
10-2001 even if the latter date is taken into account. But that is H
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A not the end of the matter. We have to still consider whether the
benefit of extended period of limitation could be given to the
infonnant. True, the learned Magistrate should have paused to
consider the question of limitation before taking cognizance and
he should have addressed himself to the question whether there
B were grounds to extend the period oflimitation. On account of
failure to do so, we would have, in the nonnal course, quashed
the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance and directed him to
consider the question of applicability of Section 473. However,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are
c not inclined to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution to remit the matter to the trial court for taking a
decision on this aspect. The fact remains that the complaint was
lodged on 23-6-1999, that is to say, much before the expiry of
the period of limitation and the FIR was registered by the All-
D Women Police Station, Tiruchirapalli on that day. A copy of the
FIR was sent to the Magistrate's Court on the next day i.e. on
24-6-1999. However, the process of investigation and filing of
charge-sheet took its own time. The process of taking cognizance
wa<> consequentially delayed. There is also the further fact that the
E appellants filed Writ Petition (Cr!.) No. 1719 of 2000 in the
Bombay High Court for quashing the FIR or in the alternative to
direct its transfer to Mumbai. We are told that the High Court
granted an ex parte interim stay. On 20-8-200 I, the writ petition
was permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh petition.
F The charge-sheet was filed four months thereafter. It is in this
background that the delay has to be viewed."
23. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that while considering
the applicability of Section 468 to the complaints made by the victims of
G matrimonial offences, the court can invoke Section 473 and can take
cognizance of an offence after expiry of the period of limitation keeping
in view the nature of allegations, the time taken by the police in investigation \-
and the fact that the offence of cruelty is a continuing offence and affects
the society at large. To put it differently, in cases involving matrimonial
H offences the court should not adopt a narrow and pedantic approach and
SANAPAREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. STATE OF ANDHRA 497
PRADESH [SINGHVI, J.]
) should, in the interest of justice, liberally exercise power under Section A
473 for extending the period of limitation.
24. At this stage, we may also notice the parameters laid down by
,. this Court for exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C to give effect to any order made under the Cr.P.C or to prevent
B
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
_) justice. In R.P. Kapur v. State ofPunjab, AIR (1960) SC 866 this Court
considered the question whether in exercise of its power under Section
561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Section 482 Cr.P.C. is
pari materia to Section 561A of the 1898 Code), the High Court could
quash criminal case registered against the appellant who along with his
c
mother-in-law was accused of committing offences under Section 420,
109, 114 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant unsuccessfully
-· filed a petition in the Punjab High Court for quashing the investigation of
the First Infonnation Report (FIR) registered against him and then filed
··~ D
appeal before this Court. While confirming the High Court's order this
Court laid down the following proposition:
"The inherent power of High Court under Section 561A, Criminal
P.C. cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered
by the other provisions of the Code. The inherent jurisdiction of E
the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper
case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal
) proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried
under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be F
reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory
stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any
inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent
jurisdiction."
G
25. This Court then carved out some exceptions to the above stated
-.;
rule. These are:
(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against
the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in
respect of the offences alleged. Absence of the requisite H
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category;
(ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged;
in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is
B a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First
Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is
disclosed or not;
(Iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do
c constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal
evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In
dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind
the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence
D or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly I
inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there '
is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not
support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon
E an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable
or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily
it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's
inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable
appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the
F accused would not be sustained."
26. In State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, [1992] Supp. l SCC 335
this Court considered the scope of the High Court's power under Section
482 of Cr.P.C and Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIR
registered against the respondent, referred to several judicial precedents
G including those of R.P. Kapoor v. State ofPunjab (supra), State ofBihar
v. JA.C. Saldanha [1980] l SCC 554 and State of West Bengal v. ..
Swapan Kumar Guha, [1982] l SCC 561 and held that the High Court
should not embark upon an enquiry into the merits and demerits of the
allegations and quash the proceedings without allowing the investigating
H
SANAPAREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. ST ATE OF ANDHRA 499
PRADESH [SINGHVI, J.]
agency to complete its task. At the same time, the Court identified the A
following cases in which the FIR or complaint can be quashed.
"( 1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
B
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a C
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case D
t. against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. E
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
) person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.
F
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance
of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in
the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for G
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." ~.

27. The ratio of Bhajan Lal 's case has been consistently followed
in the subsequent judgments. In Mis Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd
v. Mohd Sharaful Haque (supra), this Court referred to a large number
of precedents on the subject and observed:
B
"The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of
the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power
requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see
that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound
c principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a
legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of
a State should normally refrain from giving aprimafacie decision
in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so
when the evidence has not been collected and produced before
D the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of ,+
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without
sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid
down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.
E It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of
the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine
whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises
arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It
would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude
F that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding
instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash
the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint
does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or
oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not
G constitute the offence cf which cognizance has been taken by the
Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in ~-

exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.
It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous
analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case
H would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read
SANAPAREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. STATE OF ANDHRA 501
PRADESH [SINGHVI, J.]

I as a whole. It if appears that on consideration of the allegations in A
the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the
ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is
no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or
vexatious, in that even there would be no justification for interference
by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police B
station and an offence is registered, then the mala jides of the
informant- would be of secondary importance. It is the material
collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which
decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala
jides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by c
themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings."
28. In the aforementioned judgment, this Court set aside the order
of the Patna High Court and quashed the summons issued by the First
Class Judicial Magistrate in Complaint Case No.1613© of2002 on the
D
ground that the same was barred by limitation prescribed under Section.
468 (2) © Cr.P.C.
29. In Ramesh Chand Sinha 's case (supra) this Court quashed the
decision of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna to take cognizance of the
offence allegedly committed by the appellants by observing that the same E
was barred by time and there were no valid grounds to extend the period
oflimitation by invoking Section 473 Cr.P.C.

)
30. A careful reading of the above noted judgments makes it clear
that the High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to interfere F
with the investigation and/or trial of criminal cases and should not stall
the investigation and/or prosecution except when it is convinced beyond
any manner of doubt that the FIR does not disclose commission of any
offence or thatthe allegations contained in the FIR do not constitute any
cognizable offence or that the prosecution is barred by law or the High G
Court is convinced that it is necessary to interfere to prevent abuse of
the process of the court. In dealing with such cases, the High Court has
to bear in mind that judicial intervention at the threshold of the legal
process initiated against a person accused of committing offence is highly
detrimental to the larger public and societal interest. The people and the H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A society have a legitimate expectation that those committing offences either
against an individual or the society are expeditiously brought to trial and,
if found guilty, adequately punished. Therefore, while deciding a petition
filed for quashing the FIR or complaint or restraining the competent
authority from investigating the allegations contained in the FIR or
B complaint or for stalling the trial of the case, the High Court should be
extremely careful and circumspect. If the allegations contained in the FIR
or complaint discloses commission of some crime, then the High Court
must keep its hands off and allow the investigating agency to complete
the investigation without any fetter and also refrain from passing order
C which may impede the trial. The High Court should not go into the merits
and demerits of the allegations simply because the petitioner alleges malus
animus against the author of the FIR or the complainant. The High Court
must also refrain from making imaginary journey in the realm of possible
harassment which may be caused to the petitioner on account of
D investigation of the FIR or complaint. Such a course will result in
miscarriage ofjustice and would encourage those accused of committing
crimes to repeat the same. However, ifthe High Court is satisfied that
the complaint does not disclose commission of any offence or prosecution
is barred by limitation or that the proceedings of criminal case would result
E in failure of justice, then it may exercise inherent power under Section
482 Cr.P.C.
31. In the light of the above, we shall now consider whether the High
Court committed an error by refusing to quash the proceedings of CC
No.240 of 2002.
F
32. Although, the learned Single Judge of High Court dealt with
various points raised by the appellants and negatived the same by
recording the detailed order, his attention does not appear to have been
drawn to the order dated 24.10.2006 passed by the co-ordinate bench
G in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003 whereby the proceedings of CC
No.240/2002 were quashed qua the parents of the appellants on the
ground that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance after
three years. Respondent No.2 is not shown to have challenged the order
passed in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003. Therefore, that order will be
H
SANAPAREDDY MAHEEDHAR v. STATE OF ANDHRA 503
PRADESH [SINGHVI, J.]
deemed to have become final. We are sure that if attention of the learned A
Single Judge, who decided Criminal Petition No.4152/2006 had been
drawn to the order passed by another learned Single Judge in Criminal
Petition No.1302/2003, he may have, by taking note of the fact that the
learned Magistrate did not pass an order for condonation of delay or
extension of the period of limitation in terms of Section 473 Cr.P.C., B
quashed the proceedings of CC No.240/2002.
33. We are further of the view that in the peculiar facts of this case,
continuation of proceedings of CC No.240/2002 will amount to abuse
of the process of the Court. It is not in dispute that after marriage, C
Shireesha Bhavani lived with appellant No. l for less than one and a half
months (eight days at Hyderabad and about thirty days at New Jersey).
It is also not in dispute that their marriage was dissolved by the Superior
Court at New Jersey vide decree dated 15.12.1999. Shireesha Bhavani
is not shown to have challenged the decree of divorce. As a matter of D
t fact, she married Sri Venkat Puskar in 2000 and has two children from
the second marriage. She also received all the articles of dowry (including
jewellery) by filing affidavit dated 28.12.195;9 in the Superior Court at
New Jersey. As on today a period of almost nine years has elapsed of
the marriage of appellant No. I and Shireesha Bhavani and seven years E
from her second marriage. Therefore, at this belated stage, there does
not appear to be any justification for continuation of the proceedings in
CC No.240/2002. Rather, it would amount to sheer harassment to the
appellant and Shireesha Bhavani who are settled in USA, if they are
)
required tq come to India for giving evidence in relation to an offence F
allegedly committed in 1998-99. It is also extremely doubtful whether the
Government of India will, after lapse of such a long time, give sanction in
terms of Section 188 Cr.P.C.
34. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the order
of the learned Single Judge of the High Court is set aside and the G
proceedings of CC No.240/2002, pending in the Court of XXII
Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, are quashed.
S.K.S. Appeal allowed.