Supreme Court of India
SANJAY KUMAR KEDIA @ SANJAY KEDIAversusINTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NARCOTIC CONTROL BUREAU AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 1061
- Decided
- 20 August 2009
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- H S BEDIB S CHAUHAN
Holding
Extensions of custody beyond 180 days under Section 36A(4) are invalid unless the statutory conditions of a public prosecutor's report, progress of investigation, compelling reasons, and notice to the accused are satisfied, and therefore the appellant is entitled to bail.
Summary
The appellant Sanjay Kumar Kedia was arrested under the NDPS Act and his custody was extended twice under Section 36A(4) of the Act. The extensions were granted on applications that did not contain a report from the public prosecutor indicating investigation progress or compelling reasons, nor were notices given to the accused. The Supreme Court examined whether the statutory conditions for extending custody beyond 180 days were satisfied. It held that the applications failed to meet the mandatory requirements, rendering the extensions illegal. Consequently, the bail application filed by the appellant was entertained and he was released on bail. The Court set aside the orders of the Special Judge and the Calcutta High Court.
Issues considered
- Whether extensions of detention beyond 180 days under Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act are valid without a report of the public prosecutor, indication of investigation progress, compelling reasons, and notice to the accused.
- Whether bail can be granted when such extensions are found to be contrary to law.
- Whether the applications filed by the investigating officer can be treated as a report of the public prosecutor for the purpose of Section 36A(4).
Legislation cited
Subjects
NDPS ActSection 36Aextension of custodybailpublic prosecutor reportinvestigation progressnatural justiceCriminal Procedure Codedetention beyond 180 days
Judgment
[2010] 1 S.C.R. 555
SANJAY KUMAR KEDIA @ SANJAY KEDIA A
V.
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NARCOTIC CONTROL
BUREAU AND ANR.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 2008-2009 of 2008)
B
AUGUST 20, 2009*
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985:
c
s. 36-A (4), proviso - Extension of custody to complete
investigation - Conditions to be satisfied - Held: In the instant
case, there was no application of mind by the public
prosecutor - Progress of investigation was not indicated -
Compelling reasons which required extension of custody 0
beyond 180 days were not shown - Both the extensions
being contrary to law, struck down.
s. 36-A (4), proviso read with s. 167 (2) Cr. P.C. -
Application for bail on the ground that investigation was not
completed within the extended time - Extensions having been E
held contrary to law, appellant released on bail.
The appellant was arrested on 12.2.2007 on the
allegations that he committed offences punishable ulss
24, 29, 30 and 38 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic F
Substances Act, 1985. On 2.8.2007 respondent no.1
applied for and was granted extension of time u/s 36-A
(4) of the Act and custody of accused to complete the
investigation and file the complaint. Again on 30.1.2008
respondent no. 1 applied for and was allowed time till G
13.2.2008. On 4.2.2008 the appellant filed an application
for bail on the ground that the investigation was not
completed within the extended period. The application
was rejected. The appellant filed revision petitions before
* Judgment Received on 6.2.2010.
555 H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A the High Court challenging the orders granting the
second extension and rejecting his bail application. The
High Court dismissed both the petitions. Aggrieved, the
accused filed the appeals.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
B
HELD: 1.1. The proviso to s. 36-A (4) of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 authorizes
the period of detention which may in total go upto one
year, provided the stringent conditions laid down therein
C are satisfied and complied with. The conditions provided
are: (1) a report is given by the public prosecutor; (2)
which indicates the progress of the investigation; (3)
specifies the compelling reasons for seeking the
detention of the accused beyond the period of 180 days;
D and (4) after notice to the accused. [Para 9) [562-D-G]
1.2. The application dated 2.8.2007 shows that it has
been filed by the investigating officer of respondent no.1
and does not indicate even remotely any application of
E mind on the part of the public prosecutor. It further does
not indicate the progress of the investigation, nor the
compelling reasons which required an extension of
custody beyond 180 days. This application was allowed
by the Special Judge on the day on which it was filed '
which also reveals that no notice had been issued to the
F accused and he was not even present in court on that
day. The second application dated 30.1.2008 is even more
incomprehensible. A bare perusal of this application
would reveal that it does not even remotely satisfy the
tests laid down in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur's case. Thus the
G extensions granted to the investigating department under
the proviso to s. 36-A (4) did not satisfy the conditions
laid down therein and both the extensions, therefore,
being contrary to law, must be struck down accordingly.
[Para 14 and 16) [566-F-H; 567-A-B-G; 568-B-C]
H
1
SANJAY KUMAR KEDIA@SANJAY KEDIA v. 557
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NARCOTIC CONTROL 6UREAU
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others v. State of A
Maharashtra and Others 1994 (4) SCC 602 and Uday
Mohan/a/ Acharya vs. State of Maharashtra (2001) 5 SCC
453, relied on.
1.3. As rer •rds the rejection of the application for bail
8
filed by the acc,;used under the default clause, the Special
Judge observed that the period of investigation was
ext~nded on two occasions and the complaint had been
filed before that expiry of the last extended date and as
the allegations were serious, the appellant was not
entitled to ball. The High Court while noticing the decision C
in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur's case has deviated from its
observations and side stepped the very categorical
directions given by this Court, on wholly irrelevant
considerations. In this view of the matter, the orders dated
13.2.2008 and 5.9.2008 passed by the Special Judge and D
the High Court, respectively, are set aside and the
appellant is directed to be released on bail. [Para 17 and
20] [568-C-F; 571-C]
Case Law Reference: E
1994 (4) sec so2 relied on Para 4
(2001) s sec 453 relied on Para 4
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 2008-2009 of 2008. F
From the Judgment & Order dated 05.09.2008 of the High
Court of Calcutta in C.R.R. Nos. 411 and 765 of 2008.
U.U. Lalit, Manoj Prasad, for the Appellant. G
Avijit Bhattacharjee, Bikas Kargupta, for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Co• 1rt was delivered
H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A ORDER
These appeals arise out of the following facts:
1. The appellant was arrested on 12th February, 2007 for
offences punishable under Sections 24, 29, 30 and 38 of the
B Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
(hereinafter called the 'Act') and was produced before the
Special Judge who remanded him to judicial custody for fifteen
days, the period being extended from time to time. The
appellant also moved an application for bail before the Special
C Judge. This application was rejected on 28th May, 2007
whereafter the appellant moved the Calcutta High Court. This
application was rejected on 7th June, 2007. The appellant,
aggrieved by the order of 7th June 2007, preferred a special
leave petition in this Court on 10th July, 2007 which too was
D dismissed on 3rd December, 2007. It appears that as the
period of 180 days fixed under Section 36A (4) of the Act read
with Section 167 (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter called the Code) was to expire on 10th August,
2007, Respondent No.1, the Narcotics Control Bureau, filed an
E application under Section 36A (4) on 2nd August, 2007 seeking
a further period of six months for the completion of the
investigation and the filing of the complaint. The Special Judge
allowed this application by Order dated 2nd August, 2007. As
the extended period would have expired on 2nd February,
F 2008, the Bureau, moved yet another application under Section
36A (4) of the Act which too was allowed on 30th January 2008
and the time for the completion of the investigation was
extended to 13th February 2008, which would have (statedly)
brought the total custody to 1 year and 2 days.
G 2. The appellant moved another application for bail under
Section 36A (4) of the Act read with Section 167 (2) of the
'Code'. on 4th February, 2008 on the plea that the investigation
had not been completed within the stipulated period of time
fixed by the Special Judge. This application was rejected on
H
SANJAY KUMAR KEDIA@ SANJAY KEDIA v. 559
INTEL.LIGENCE OFFICER, NARCOTIC CONTROL BUREAU
13th February, 2008. The appellant also moved CRR No.411 A
of 2008 in the Calcutta High Court on 7th February, 2008
against the Order dated 30th January, 2008 whereby an
extension of six months had been granted. The complaint was
also filed by respondent No.1 on the 7th February 2008. The
appellant filed CRR No. 765 of 2008 before the Calcutta High B
Court challenging the order dated 13th February, 2008 rejecting
the application for bail. On 6th August, 2008, a learned Single
Judge of the Calcutta High Court released both the CRR's
aforementioned for want of jurisdiction as they were required
to be heard by a Division Bench. Both the matters came before c
the Division Bench and were dismissed by order dated 5th
September, 2008. The present appeal has been filed
impugning this order.
3. Leave was granted in this matter on 5th December,
2008 and though, both the respondents i.e. the Narcotic Control D
Bureau and the State of West Bengal have been served, the
former has not put in appearance despite the passage of
almost a year. The State of West Bengal Respondent No.2
however, which is not really the contesting party, has file~ a
counter and is also represented by its counsel, Mr. Avijit E
Bhattacharjee. He, at the very outset, pointed out that he felt
gravely handicapped on account of the non-appearance of
respondent No.1, the primary party respondent, but he has
chosen to go ahead as it appears that the first respondent was
not interested in contesting the case. F
4. The broad facts given above have not been controverted
by the respondents. Mr. Lalit, the learned counsel for the
appellant has made two submissions before us:
(i) the two applications for extension dated 10th July, G
2007 and 30th January, , 2008 did not satisfy the
conditions laid down in Section 36A (4) of Act and
were without notice to the accused and as such the
orders were a nullity and any extension of time
beyond 180 days was, therefore, contrary to law. H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2010] 1 S.C.R.
A For this submission he has placed reliance on the
case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others
Versus State of Maharashtra and others [1994 (4)
sec 6021.
B (ii) that as the second extension would have ended on
2nd February, 2008 and the appellant had filed an
application for bail under Section 36A (4) of the Act
on 4th February, 2008, the said application was
pending for consideration before the Special Judge
when the complaint had been filed on the 7th
c February, 2008, the subsequent act of the filing the
complaint did take away the right which had accrued
to the appellant on 2nd February, 2008 as had been
held by this Court in Uday Mohan/al Acharya
Versus State of Maharashtra [2001 (5) SCC 453).
D
5. Mr. Bhattacharjee, has, however, supported the
judgment of the Special Judge and the High Court by submitting
that two applications for extension of time had been made by
respondent no.1 in accordance with the provisions of Section
E 36A (4) of the Act and that the Special Judge, had, after
applying his mind, granted the extensions. He has, further,
pointed out that both the Special Judge and the High Court had
taken all relevant factors into consideration and keeping in view
the larger purpose behind the Act and the great social and legal
F ramifications, which it raised, required that it should be strictly
enforced.
6. He has also pointed out that the submission that the
period of 180 days had ended on 2nd February, 2008 was
incorrect as the calculations would show that this period was
G to expire on 8th February, 2008 and the complaint having been
filed a day earlier made the ratio of the judgment in Uday
Mohan Lal Acharya's case (supra), inapplicable.
7. We have considered the arguments of learned counsel
H for the parties. Section 167 of the Code deals with the
SANJAY KUMAR KEDIA@ SANJAY KEDIA v. 561
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NARCOTIC CONTROL BUREAU
procedure wherein investigation cannot be completed in 24 A
hours and the various sub-sections provide for the maximum
period beyond which a person cannot be detained and this
period varies between 60 and 90 days keeping in view the
gravity of the offence - the maximum period of 90 days being
provided with respect to offences punishable with death etc. and e
60 days for other offences, and if the investigation is not
completed within this period, the accused is entitled to bail
under Section 167 sub-section (2) If he makes an application
for that purpose and is prepared to furnish bail. It will be seen
that Section 167 does not envisage an extension of the period c
of detention of an accused in custody beyond the specified
periods. The legislature, however, thought in its wisdom, that
certain special categories or situations required that the
investigating agencies should be given more time to investigate
a matter and to file their complaint or charge-sheets and such
0
provisions have been made under special statutes.
8. The Terrorist and Disruptive Prevention Act, 1987
(hereinafter called the 'TADA') and the Act are two such special
legislations. Section 36A (4) of the Act in so far as is relevant,
reads as under: E
"Section 36 A.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),-
F
(a) xxxx
(b) )()()()(
(c) xxxx
G
(d) )()()()(
(2) xxxx
(3) xxxx
H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R.
A (4) In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable
under Section 19 or Section 24 or section 27 A or for
offences involving commercial quantity the references in
sub-section (2) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), thereof to "ninety days",
B where they occur, shall be construed as reference to "one
hundred and eighty days":
Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the
investigation within said period of one hundred and eighty
days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to
c one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating
the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons
for the detention of the accused beyond the said period
of one hundred and eighty days.
D (5) )()()()(
9. The maximum period of 90 days fixed under Section
167 (2) of the Code has been increased to 180 days for several
categories of offences under the Act but the proviso authorizes
E a yet further period of detention which may in total go upto one
year, provided the stringent conditions provided therein are
satisfied and are complied with. The conditions provided are:
(1) a report of the public prosecutor,
F (2) which indicates the progress of the investigation,
and
(3) specifies the compelling reasons for seeking the
detention of the accused beyond the period of 180
days, and
G
(4) after notice to the accused.
10. The question to be noticed at this stage is as to
whether the two applications for extension that had been filed
H by the public prosecutor seeking an extension beyond 180
SANJAY KUMAR KEDIA@ SANJAY KEDIA v. 563
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NARCOTIC CONTROL BUREAU
days met the necessary conditions. We find that the matter A
need not detain us as it is no longer res integra and is
completely covered by the judgment of this Court in Hitendra
Vishnu's case (supra). In this case, the Bench was dealing with
the proviso inserted as clause (bb) in Sub-section (4) of Section
20 of TADA, which is parimateria with the proviso to Sub- B
Section (4) of Section 36-A of the Act. This Court accepted the
argument of t.he accused that an extension beyond 180 days
could be granted but laid a rider that it could be so after certain
conditions were satisfied. It was observed :
"It is true that neither clause (b) nor clause (bb) of C
sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA specifically provide
for the issuance of such a notice but in our opinion the
issuance of such a notice must be read into these
provisions both in the interest of the accused and the
prosecution as well as for doing complete justice between D
the parties. This is a requirement of the principles of
natural justice and the issuance of notice to the accused
or the public prosecutor, as the case may be, would
accord with fair play in action, which the courts have always
encouraged and even insisted upon. It would also strike a E
just balance between the interest of the liberty of an
accused on the one hand and the society at large through
the prosecuting agency on the other hand. There is no
prohibition to the issuance of such a notice to the accused
or the public prosecutor in the scheme of the Act and no F
prejudice whatsoever can be caused by the issuance of
such a notice to any party.
11. Mr. Lalit, has further contended that the two
applications for extension of time could not, by any stretch of G
imagination, be said to be reports of the public prosecutor as
envisaged under Section 36A (4) and has again referred us to
the case ibidem:
A public prosecutor is an important officer of the
State Government and is appointed by the State under the H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R.
A Code of Criminal Procedure. He is not a part of the
investigating agency. He is an independent statutory
authority. The public prosecutor is expected to
independently apply his mind to the request of the
investigating agency before submitting a report to the court
B for extension of time with a view to enable the investigating
agency to complete the investigation. He is not merely a
post office or a forwarding agency. A public prosecutor
may or may not agree with the reasons given by the
investigating officer for seeking extension of time and may
c find that the investigation had not progressed in the proper
manner or that there has been unnecessary, deliberate or
avoidable delay in completing the investigation. In that
event, he may not submit any report to the court under
clause (bb) to seek extension of time. Thus, for seeking
D extension of time under clause (bb}, the public prosecutor
after an independent application of his mind to the request
of the investigating agency is required to make a report
to the Designated Court indicating therein the progress of
the investigation and disclosing justification for keeping the
accused in further custody to enable the investigating
E agency to complete the investigation. The public
prosecutor may attach the request of the investigating
officer along with this request or application and report, but
his report, as envisaged under clause (bb), must disclose
on the face of it that he has appli.ed his mind and was
F satisfied with the progress of the investigation and
considered grant of further time to complete the
investigation necessary. The use of the expression "on the
report of the public prosecutor indicating the progress of
the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention
G of the accused beyond the said period" as occurring in
clause (bb) in sub-section (2) of Section 167 as amended
by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of the
legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody
unreasonably and to grant extension only on the report of
H the public prosecutor. The report of the public prosecutor,
SANJAY KUMAR KEDIA@ SANJAY KEDIA v. 565
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NARCOTIC CONTROL BUREAU
therefore, is not merely a formality but a very vital report, A
because the consequence of its acceptance affects the
liberty of an accused and it must, therefore, strictly comply
with the requirements as contained in clause (bb). The
request of an investigating officer for extension of time is
no substitute for the report of the public prosecutor. B
12. The court further went on to say that even if the
application for extension of time was either rooted through the
public prosecutor or supported by him would not make the said
application a report of the public prosecutor.
c
13. Mr. Bhattacharjee has, however, pointed out that the
applications for extension filed by the public prosecutor Section
36A (4) of the Act did satisfy the aforesaid conditions and
merely because an independent report had not been tendered
would not change the nature of the application. We reproduce D
herein the application dated 2nd August, 2007 for extension of
time in extenso:
1. That, the aforesaid person was arrested on 12.02.2007
in connection with illegal distribution of psychotropic E
substances externally through the internet.
2. That he was produced before your honour on
12.02.2007 and thereafter he was remanded to judicial
custody in Dum Oum Correctional Home.
F
3. That the investigation of the case is still on.
4. That a connected/related case against the associates
of the present accused person is being investigated by the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), USA and the
investigation report/collected documents are highly G
relevant/essential in proving the case. In this regard
necessary steps, sending letters to that competent
authority, has already been taken.
5. That, the Servers, Laptop, CDs etc. as seized in · · H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R.
A connection with this case, which has already been reported
before Your Honour earlier, were also been sent to the
Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) for
deciphering the data on 20.2.07 and several reminders
have been sent for obtaining the reports, but till date same
8 could not be received. It is pertinent to mention that a letter
from the end of CFSL has been received by NCB, wherein
they informed that in a short time it is not possible to send
the report.
6. That, considering the exigencies of the report of CFSL
c in proving the case against the accused person the
prosecution has to pray for further extension of time.
7. That, as per the provision of Section 36A Clause (4)
proviso the prosecution is submitting this petition for
D extension of time for filing. Complaint after completing the
investigation accepting the report of the prosecution kept
in the case file submitted herewith showing that the
detention of the aforesaid accused is further necessary.
In the abovementioned circumstances, it is hereby
E
prayed before your Honour that,
A further period of 6 months may kindly be given for
the completion of investigation and filing of complaint. And
the accused person may be remanded in judicial custody
F for further period.
And for this act of kindness, the petitioner as is duty
bound shall ever pray.
14. A bare perusal of this application shows that it has
G been filed by the investigating officer of respondent No.1 and
does not indicate even remotely any application of mind on the
part of the public prosecutor. It further does not indicate the
progress of the investigation, nor the compelling reasons which
required an extension of custody beyond 180 days. This
H application was allowed by the Special Judge on 2nd August,
SANJAY KUMAR KEDIA@ SANJAY KEDIA v. 567
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NARCOTIC CONTROL BUREAU
2007 i.e. on the day on which it was filed which also reveals A
that no notice had been issued to the accused and he was not
even present in Court on that day.
15. The second application dated 30th January, 2008 is
even more incomprehensible. We reproduce the same
8
hereinbelow:
IN THE COURT OF LO.JUDGE-SPECIAL COURT NDPS
ACT KOLKATA AT BARASAT NORTH 24 PGS
CASE NO.N-23/2007
Union of India c
Versus
Sanjay Kedia .... Accused Person
The humble petition on behalf of the prosecution.
D
MOST RESPECTFULLY STATES;
1. That today is the date fixed for submission of the
complaint.
2. That as the prosecution is not in a position to -submit E
the complaint today hence prays for further time for the
same.
Under the above circumstances it is prayed that a
short date may kindly allowed for the same for ends F
of justice
AND
For this act of kindness shall ever pray your
petitioner as is duty shall ever pray." G
A bare perusal of this unsigned application would reveal
that it does not even remotely satisfy the tests laid down in
Vishnu Thakur's case. The Special Judge allowed this
H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R.
A application as well on the day it was filed by a cryptic order and
without notice to the accused in the following terms:
"Aced. Sanjay Kedia is produced from J/C. Aced.
Filed a vakalatnama. Prosecutor files Hazira. Prosecution
B also files a petition praying for time. Considered prayer for
time is allowed to 13.2.2008 for production of the aced &
report from 1.0."
16. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the extensions
granted to the investigating department under the proviso to
C Section 36A (4) did not satisfy the conditions laid down therein
and both the extensions, therefore, being contrary to law, must
be struck down accordingly.
17. As would appear from what has been held above we
o must now deal with the order of the Special Judge dated 13th
February, 2008 whereby the application for bail filed by the
appellant under the default clause had been dismissed. The
special Judge observed that as the Supreme Court had
rejected the prayer for bail on 4th February, 2008 and that the
E period of investigation had been extended on two occasions
and that the complaint had been filed before the last extended
date had expired and having regard to the facts of the case in
as much that the allegations were serious, the appellant was
not entitled to bail. The High Court while noticing the decision
in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur's case (supra) has deviated from
F its observation and side stepped the very categorical directions
given by this Court, on wholly irrelevant considerations. We
reproduce certain observations of the High Court judgment to
support our opinion :
G The petition dated 02/08/2007 seeking to extend the
period of investigation for a further period of six months
was presented by the Intelligence Officer of the opposite
party No.1. However, the same was not presented by the
learned Public Prosecutor himself but the order passed by
H the learned Trial Court would show the same was
SANJAY KUMAR KEDIA@ SANJAY KEDIA v. 569
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NARCOTIC CONTROL BUREAU
proceeded in the presence of the learned Public A
Prosecutor.
However, "Specific reasons" and the "progress of
investigation" has been set out in the petition dated, 02/
08/2007 wherein it was shown that the offence against the
8
petitioned and his associates are being investigated even
in the United States of America and several electronic
equipment, which have been seized, were sent to the
Central Forensic Science Laboratory for deciphering and
the Report is yet to be received. Further time was sought
for and the learned Trial Court applied its judicial mind on C
the basis of a subjective satisfaction quoting the substance
of the prayer and allowed the time. As such, other portion
of the provisio of Subsection (4) of Section 36A of the said
Act with regard to the progress of investigation and the
specific reasons for detention of the petitioner beyond the D
period of one hundred eighty days, in our humble view,
have been complied with.
Now, if we see the phrase "on the report of the Public
Prosecutor" vis-a-vis the petition dated 02/08/2007 sent E
by the Intelligence Officer and submitted through the Public
Prosecutor and was moved in his presence- we must
make a purposive construction of the word "report of the
Public Prosecutor" and· give it a wider and meaningful
implication without doing violence to the Statue. F
Proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 36A has to be
construed in relation to the subject matter covered by the
said Section. The general Rule in construing an enactment
which contains a provisio is to construe them together
without making either of them redundant or otiose. G
In other words, the language of a proviso, even if
general, should be normally construed in relation to the
subject-matter covered by the Section to which the provisio
is so appended. H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R
A Once we have seen the efficacy of the order passed
on 02/08/2007 which cannot be sullied on the reasons
seen by us earlier-we find the undisputed position remains
that the period of further detention of the present petitioner
stands extended till 02/02/2008.
B
)()()()()()()()
Now, comes the legality of the order passed on 30/
01/2008 passed by the learned Trial Court. Of course, the
said order was preceded by a petition filed by the Public
c Prosecutor himself outlining the fact since the Prosecution
is not in a position to file the complaint some short time
may be allowed. Acting on the basis of the same the
learned Trial Court extended the period till 13/02/2008.
D A put up petition was preferred on behalf of the petitioner
for being released on bail on 04/02/2008 but in the
meanwhile on 07/02/2008 the petition of complaint was
filed on behalf of the Opposite Party No.1.
From a plan reading of the sequence of events it can
E be easily deciphered that the first phase of extension was
up to 02/02/2008 which was subsequE:1ntly, extended by
the order dated 30/01/2008 till 13/02/2008. It is within the
said period of extension i.e. on 07/02/2008 Petition of
Complaint has been filed.
F
In the light of our wholesome assessment of the
entire situation, we would be of the view that the position
as projected by Shri Basu turns out to be more academic
G than realistic. It has to be 'Just Justice'. Justice in the sens~
of Law and the Constitution and not to the individual
mindset of the Court. The said Act and its ramification has
to be understood in a wider context.
H 18. With great respect, these findings do no justice to the
SANJAY KUMAR KEDIA@ SANJAY KEDIA v. 571
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NARCOTIC CONTROL BUREAU
observations of this court in Vishnu Thakur's case as the very A
specific observations therein have been noticed and ignored
by the Division Bench.
19. In the light of what has been held above, Mr. Lalit's
second submission as to the expiry of the maximum period of
8
detention of one year based on Uday Mohan Lal Acharya's
case (supra), need not detain us more particularly, as the facts
are disputed by Mr. Bhattcharjee. We are, therefore, not
required to go into this aspect of the matter.
20. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order C
of Special Judge dated 13th February 2008 and High Court
dated 5th September, 2008 and direct that the appellant be
released on bail.
RP. Appeals allowed. o
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