Holding

Mere words uttered in a quarrel, without mens rea, do not amount to instigation and the suicide was not a proximate result of the appellant's conduct, so the charge under Section 306 IPC is untenable.

Summary

The appellant, brother of the deceased's wife, was charged under Section 306 IPC for allegedly abetting the suicide of his brother‑in‑law, Chander Bhushan, by allegedly telling him to "go and die" during a quarrel on 25 July 1998. The deceased was found hanged on 27 July 1998 and left a suicide note indicating personal stress and alcohol abuse. The Supreme Court examined whether the appellant's words amounted to "instigation" under Section 107 IPC and whether the suicide was a direct result of those words. It held that mere utterances in a fit of anger, without mens rea, do not constitute instigation and that the two‑day gap and the deceased's own circumstances broke the causal link. Consequently, the ingredients of abetment under Section 306 IPC were absent. The Court quashed the charge‑sheet and the High Court order, and discharged the appellant’s bail bond.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant's alleged statement "go and die" constitutes instigation under Section 107 IPC.
Whether the suicide of the deceased was a direct and proximate result of the appellant's conduct, thereby attracting liability under Section 306 IPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 306, s. 498A

Subjects

abetment of suicideinstigationSection 306 IPCSection 107 IPCmens reasuicide notequashing of chargedomestic violenceSection 498A

Judgment

-·
A SANJU @ SANJA Y SINGH SENGAR .
v.
STATE OF M.P.

MAY I, 2002
...
B [M.B. SHAH AND H.K. SEMA, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860-Sections 306 and 107-Abetment of suicide-On
facts, strained relation between parties-Quarrel between the parties where
C appellant allegedly using abusive language and telling the deceased to go and
die-Deceased coming home in an inebriated condition day after quarrel and
next day found hanging-Also left a suicide note a reading of which shows
deceased not a man with sound mind and sense-Appellant charge-sheeted-
Whether appellant abetted commission ofsuch suicide-Held, no since suicide
not direct result of quarrel-Further to say 'to go and die', itself does not
D constitute ingredient of instigation.

Words and Phrases:

'lnstigation'-Meaning of in the context of Section 107 of the Penal
Code, 1860.
E
Appellant was charge-s.heeted for an offence under Section 306 IPC.
According to the prosecution suicide by the deceased is the direct result of
the quarrel taken place two days prior to the incident wherein it is alleged
that the appellant had used abusive language and reportedly told the
deceased to go and die. Aggrieved, appellant filed a petition before the High
F Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing charges. The petition was ..__
dismissed. Hence the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

G HELD : 1.1. Courts below erroneously accepted the prosecution story
that suicide by the deceased is the direct result of the quarrel wherein it is
alleged that the appellant had used abusive language and_ had reportedly
told the deceased 'to go and die'. The courts relied on a statement of brother
of the deceased, However, going through the statement it is not found that
the deceased had told him that the appellant had asked him 'to go and die'.
H ~8
SANJU v. STATE OF M.P. 669
Even if the prosecution story that the appellant did tell the deceased 'to go A.
and die' is accepted, that itself does not constitute the ingredient of
'instigation'. [672-F-H; 673-A[

• 1.2. The word 'instigate' denotes incitement or urging to do some
drastic or unadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. Presence of mens
rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation. It is common knowledge B
that the words uttered in a quarrel or in a spur of the moment cannot be
taken to be uttered with mens rea. It is in a fit of anger and emotion. In
.., y the instant case, the alleged abusive words, said to have been told to the
deceased were ensued by quarrel and two days later deceased was found
hanging. Assuming that the deceased had taken the abusive language C
seriously, he had enough time in between to think over and reflect and,
therefore, it cannot be said that the abusive language, which had been used
by the appellant drove the deceased to commit suicide. Suicide by the
deceased is not proximate to the abusive language uttered by the appellant.
[673-A-C[
D
1.3. A plain reading of the suicide note would clearly show that the
deceased was in great stress and depressed. One plausible reason could be
that the deceased was without any work or avocation and at the same time
indulged in drinking as revealed from the statement of his wife. He was a
frustrated man. Also a day before hanging himself, deceased came home E
in an inebriated condition and was abusing his wife and other members of
the family. Reading of the suicide note suggest that it is not a handy work
of a man with sound mind and sense. The prosecution story, if believe,
shows that the quarrel between the deceased and the appellant had taken
place two days before the deceased hanged himself and if the deceased came
back to the house again a day before the incident it cannot be said that the F
suicide by the deceased was the direct result of the quarrel that had taken
place. Thus, the ingredients of 'abetment' are totally absent for an offence
under Section 306 I.P.C. It is in the statement of the wife that the deceased
always remained in a drunken condition. It is a common knowledge that
•v•essive drinking leads one to debauchery. Therefore, the deceased was a G
victim of his own conduct, unconnected with the quarrel that had ensued
and was himself responsible for his death. [674-F-H; 675-A-C[

Swamy Praha/addas v. State of MP. and Anr., [1995] Supp. 3 SCC 438;
Mahendra Singh v. State of MP., [1995[ Supp. 3 SCC 731 and Ramesh Kumar
v. State ofChhattisgarh, [2001 [ 9 sec 618, referred to. H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
572 of 2002. ~__,..

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.8.200 I of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in M. Crl. C. No. 4125 of 2001.
•
B R.P. Gupta, J. Bey and Parmanand Gaur, for the Appellants. ~

f!.S. Banthia, for the Responde~t.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by y
""
c SEMA, J. Leave granted. \

Heard Mr. R.P. Gupta, learned Senior counsel on behalf of the appellant
and Mr. B.~. Banthia, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent.

The appellant felt aggrieved by an order dated 2nd July, 2001 passed
D by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sihora, in sessions trial No. 469 of 1998
whereby the appellant has been charge-sheeted for an offence under Section
306 of the Indian Penal Code, filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure for quashing the charge before the High Court without )..

any result, hence the appeal. ...
E Basic facts may be noted.

Appellant is the brother ofNeelam Sengar, wife of the deceased Chander
Bhushan @ Babloo. it is stated that the marriage between the sister of the
appellant and the deceased took place in 1993. It is also stated that immediately
after marriage she was subjected to continuous ill-treatment by the deceased
F and the family members forcing her to Jive separately along with her husband
and children for about a year. i_:hereafter, she went to her parents' house and
started living wi~h her brother the appellant herein. About two months prior
to the incident, the appellant advised the deceased to take his sister back to
her matrimonial house and treat her properly. On 25th July, 1998 (crucial
date), it is stated that the appellant visited the place of the parents of the
G
deceased and pleaded with them that his sister should be rehabilitated in the
matrimonial home and should not be physically ill-treated or harassed. It is
also alleged that on that day the appellant also said to have threatened the
parents of the deceased that if they do not mend their behaviour towards his -)-'-
sister, he would be compelled to resort to filing a complaint under Section
H 498 A of the Indian Penal Code, to which the parents of the deceased expressed
SANJU v. STATE OF M.P. [H.K. SEMA, J.] 671
helplessness as the deceased Chander Bhushan had been living separately A
from them. It is further stated that on this story being narrated to the deceased
by the mother of the deceased asking him to bring back his wife to avoid any
police case against them, the deceased went to the house of the parents of the
appellant followed by a quarrel between them. Thereafter, the deceased
• returned alone and told his brothers and other acquaintances that the appellant B
had threatened and abused him by using filthy words.

On the next date i.e. 27th July, 1998, the deceased was found hanging
with a rope by neck on the raft of his house and he was found dead. The
deceased also left a suicide note on a stray piece of wrapping paper. The
autopsy on the body of the deceased was held on 27th July, I 998 itself and C
it was revealed that the death was due to asphyxia as a result of hanging,
within 24 hours. The investigating officer recorded statement of the witnesses
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and after completion of the investigation, submitted
the charge-sheet and a charge was framed on 2nd July, 2001 against the
appellant for an offence under Section 306 l.P.C.
D
Section 107 l.P.C defines abetment to mean that a person abets the
doing of a thing if he firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or
secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy
for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance
of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly,
intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. E
Before we advert further, at this stage we may notice a few decisions
of this Court, relevant for the purpose of disposal of this case.

In Swamy Prahaladdas v. State of MP. and Anr., [1995] Supp. 3 SCC
438, the appellant was charged for an offence under Section 306 l.P.C. on the F
ground that the appellant during the quarrel is said to have remarked the
deceased 'to go and die'. This Court was of the view that mere words uttered
by the accused to the deceased 'to go and die' were not even prim a facie
enough to instigate the deceased to commit suicide.

In Mahendra Singh v. State of M.P., [1995] Supp. 3 SCC 731, the
G
appellant was charged for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C basically based
upon the dying declaration of the deceased, which reads as under:

"My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law (husband's elder
brother's wife) harassed me. They beat me and abused me. My husband H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A Mahendra wants to marry a second time. He has illicit connections
with my sister-in-law. Because of these reasons and being harassed
I want to die by burning."

This Court, considering the definition of 'abetment' under Section 107
I.P.C., found that the charge ang conviction of the appellant for an offence
B under Section 306 is not sustainable merely on the allegation of harassment
to the. deceased. This Court further held that neither of the ingredients of
abetment are attracted on the statement of the deceased.

In Ramesh Kumar. v. State of Chhatttsgarh, [200 I] 9 SCC 618, this
C Court while considering the charge framed and the conviction for an offence
under Section 306 I.P.C. on the basis of dying declaration recorded by an
r
'
Executive Magistrate , in which she had stated that previously there had been
quarrel between the deceased and her husband and on the day of occurrence
she had a quarrel with her husband who had said that she could go wherever
she wanted to go and that thereafter she had poured kerosene on herself and
D had set fire. Acquitting the accused this Court said:

"A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the
consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. If it
transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was
hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in
E domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged
and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to
induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to
commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied
for basing a finding that the accused charged for abetting the offence
of suicide should be found guilty."
F
Reverting to the facts of the case, both the courts below have erroneously
accepted the prosecution story that the suicide by the deceased is the direct
result of the quarrel that had taken place on 25th July, 1998 wherein it is
alleged that the appellant had used abusive language and had reportedly told
G the deceased 'to go and die'. For this,. the courts relied on a statement of
Shashi Bhushan, brother of the deceased, made under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
when reportedly the deceased, after coming back from the house of the
appellant, told him that the appellant had humiliated him and abused him
with filthy words. The statement of Shashi Bhuslian, recorded under Section
161 Cr.P.C. is annexed as annexure P-3 to this appeal and going through the
H statement, we find that he has not stated that the deceased had told him that
SAN.JU v. STATE OF M.P. [H.K. SEMA, l.J. 673
the appellant had asked him 'to go and die'. Even if we accept the prosecution A
story that the appellant did tell the deceased '4' go and die', that itself does
not constitute the ingredient of 'instigation'. The word 'instigate' denotes
incitement or urging to do some drastic or unadvisable action or to stimulate
or incite. Presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of
instigation. It is common knowledge that the words uttered in a quarrel or in B
a spur of the moment cannot be taken to be uttered with mens rea. It is in
a fit of anger and emotional. Secondly, the alleged abusive words, said to
have been told to the deceased were on 25th July, 1998 ensued by quarrel.
The deceased was found hanging on 27th July, 1998. Assuming that the
, y
deceased had taken the abusive language seriously, he had enough time in
between to think over and reflect and, therefore, it cannot be said that the C
abusive language, which had been used by the appellant on 25th July, 1998
drove the deceased to commit suicide. Suicide by the deceased on 27th July,
1998 is not proximate to the abusive language uttered by the appellant on
25th July, 1998. The fact that the deceased committed suicide on 27th July,
1998 would it self clearly pointed out that it is not the direct result of the
quarrel taken place on 25th July, 1998 when it is alleged that the appellant n·
had used the abusive language and also told the deceased to go and die. This
fact had escaped notice of the courts below.
.... The next and most important material is the suicide note left by the
deceased. The translated copy is annexed to this appeal as annexure P-1. It E
is extracted:

"SUICIDE NOTE

Danik Bhaskar F
581 South Civil Lines
Jabalpur.
Agent Name Sengar New Agency
Place Goshalpur
No. of copies
G
409 Date

Name of the person who prepared label

Gosalpur Sengar has threatened to report under Dowry demand and
threatned to involve family members due to this I am w~iting in my full H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A senses that Sanjay Sangar is responsible for my death. Sanjay Sangar also
Mukraj commander Loota Tha Sanjay ki.

Sengar New Agency

Gosalpur
B
I was threatened therefore I am dying Sengar
Gosalpur

My name Chander Bhushan Singh Goutam
Chander Bhushan Singh Goutam
c Babloo Goutam

In my senses
Sengar responsible for my death.

D My moti

Darling my moti. You look after my Chukho. My darling Moti Neelam
Sengar @ Chander Bhushan Singh Goutam Gandhigram Budghagar.

Sengar is responsible for my death
E Sanjay Sengar is responsible for my death

Sanjay Sengar is responsible for my death

Chander Bhushan Singh Goutam Gandhigram Bu9hagar".

F A plain reading of the suicide note woul.d clearly show that the deceased
was in great stress and depressed. One plausible reason could be that the
deceased was without any work or avocation and at the same time indulged
in drinking as revealed from the statement of the wife Smt. Neelam Sengar.
He was a frustrated man. Reading of the suicide note will clearly suggest that
·G such a note is not a handy work of a man with sound mind and sense. Smt.
Neelam Sengar, wife of the deceased, made a statement under Section 161
Cr.P.C. before the Investigation Officer. She stated that the deceased always
indulged in drinking wine and was not doing any work. She also stated that
on 26th July, 1998 her husband came to them in an inebriated condition and
was abusing her and other members of the family. The prosecution story, if
H believed, shows.,that the quarrel between the deceased and the appellant had
SANJU v. STATE OF M.P. [H.K. SEMA, J.] 675

taken place on 25th July, 1998 and if the deceased came back to the house A
again on 26th July, 1998, it cannot be said that the suicide by the deceased
was the direct result of the quarrel that had taken place on 25th July, 1998.
Viewed from the aforesaid circumstances independently, we are clearly .of
the view that the ingredients of 'abetment' are totally absent in the instant
case for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C. It is in the statement of the wife
that the deceased always remained in a drunken condition. It is a common B
knowledge that excessive drinking leads one to debauchery. It clearly appeared,
therefore, that the deceased was a victim of his own conduct unconnected
with the quarrel that had ensued on 25th July, 1998 where the appellant is
stated to have used abusive language. Taking the totality of materials on
record and facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, it will lead C
to irresistible conclusion that it is the deceased and he alone, and none else,
is responsible for his death.

In the result, this appeal succeeds. The .charge-sheet dated 2nd July,
2001, framed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sihora, in Sessions Trial No.
469 of I 998 for an offence under Section 306 J.P.C. and the order of the D
High Court under challenge are hereby quashed.

The appellant is on bail. His surety and bail bond shall stand discharged.

N.J. Appeal allowed.

,