Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal on the major offences due to lack of cogent evidence, but convicted appellant No. 3 for kidnapping under Section 363 IPC.

Summary

The case involves the kidnapping of a 16‑year‑old girl in 1992. The girl was later found and gave a written report alleging kidnapping, but her trial testimony was later embellished with claims of sexual abuse and an attempt to sell her into prostitution. The trial court acquitted all three accused due to contradictions in the girl’s statements and lack of cogent evidence for offences under Sections 366A and 372/511 IPC. The High Court set aside the acquittal, convicting all three under those sections. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the major offences and that the trial court’s acquittal on those counts was justified, but found sufficient evidence to convict appellant No. 3 for kidnapping under Section 363 IPC. Consequently, the Court acquitted appellants No. 1 and No. 2 and sentenced appellant No. 3 to three years’ rigorous imprisonment, noting the 15‑year lapse since the incident.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court was justified in overturning the trial court’s acquittal on charges under Sections 366A, 372 and 511 IPC.
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the offence of kidnapping with intent to commit sexual intercourse (Sec. 366A) or to sell the girl for prostitution (Sec. 372 read with Sec. 511).
Whether the age of the prosecutrix as a minor was duly established.
Whether the appellate court may convict on a lesser offence (Sec. 363 IPC) under Section 222 of the CrPC when the major charge is not proved.
Scope of the High Court’s power in an appeal from acquittal.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 222
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 35
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 363, s. 366A, s. 368, s. 372, s. 511

Subjects

kidnappingminor victimacquittal appealevidentiary contradictionsIPC 363IPC 366AIPC 372Section 222 CrPCconvictionsentencing

Judgment

[2008] 11 S.C.R. 243

SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. A
v.
STATE OF A.P.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1306 of 2003)
JULY 24, 2008
B
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 363, 366A, 368 and 372 rlw s.511:
Kidnapping of a girl by accused allegedly with intention C
to commit sexual intercourse/selling her for prostitution - Held:
Evidence given by prosecutrix in trial different from the one
set out in the complaint - There were contradictions in her
statements - In her deposition, the prosecutrix gave embel-
lished and more aggravated form of deposition by alleging D
commission of major offences of sexual abuse against ac-
cused persons and selling her for prostitution but in support
thereof no evidence adduced - No case under Ss. 366A or
372 rlw s.511 made out against accused- Hence, to that ex-
tent, trial Court justified in acquitting all the accused persons. E
Kidnapping from lawful guardianship - Charge under
s.363 /PC - Held: Though charge-sheet submitted by Police
for offence uls. 363 /PC but trial Court did not frame any charge i
- Offence under s.366A /PC is a major offence as compared
to offence under s. 363 /PC - In terms of s.222 Cr.PC. ac- F
cused could be convicted of a minor offence if such a case is
made out though he was not charged with it - Ingredients set
out ins. 363 IPC made out as against accused No.3- Hence,
accused No. 3 is convicted for committing the offence punish-
able uls. 363 /PC - However, since 15 years elapsed since G
occurrence of incident, interest of justice would be sub-served
by sentencing accused No. 3 to undergo rigorous imprison-
ment for a period of 3 years - Directed accordingly - Sen-
tencing - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 222.
243 H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A Appeal against acquittal - Power of High Court to review
~ ---
- Held: It can consider the entire evidence and come to con-
clusion either accepting the evidence which were rejected by
trial court or vice-versa.
Age of prosecutrix - Proving of - Held: Onus to prove
B
the age effectively discharged by Prosecution - She was a ~
minor on the date of offence.
Mother of the prosecutrix filed a missing report on
29.07.1992 in the Police Station stating that her youngest
c daughter aged about 16 years went to the college on
25.7.1992 at 12.30 p.m. and did not return home and that .._
'.--
they have got doubt on the appellants. The Police could
not trace out the girl. However, the girl was traced out on
11.9.1992 at the instance of PW 8 and PW9, the employ-
D ·ees of Agricultural Market Committee. They informed
whereabouts of the girl to her mother. The mother, along-
with the aunt and brother of the girl took her back to their A
house on 14.9.1992. On 19.9.1992, they informed the Po-
lice about tracing of the girl ~nd she was admitted to the
E Government General Hospital, for treatment as she was
found to be weak both physically and mentally. On
25.9.1992 she again went to the Police Station and filed a
complaint. Police examined the prosecutrix and recorded
her statement and thereafter also got the statement of PW-
8 and PW-9 recorded. After completion of investigation, a
F charge sheet was submitted by the Police against all the
three accused persons under Section 363, 366A, 368 and "· -~
Section 372 read with Section 511 of the IPC. Trial Court
acquitted all the accused persons as charges against
them have not been proved. Being aggrieved by the or-
G der of acquittal, State filed an appeal. The Single Judge
of the High Court set aside the order of acquittal passed
by the trial court holding that the evidence on record does )...
prove a case against the appellants/accused persons
both under Section 366 A and 372 read with Section 511
H IPC. They were sentenced to undergo rigorous impris-
SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 245
AP.
,'- ).
onment for a period of 10 years and also under Section A
-:'·
372 read with Section 511 IPC and were sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years
each. Hence the present appeal.
Accused-appellants contended that the High Cour,t
B
has set aside the order of acquittal without appreciating
""'- the grounds on which the trial court passed the order of
acquittal and also without giving any reason thereof.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The power of the High Court in an appeal
c
from acquittal is no different from its power in an appeal
from conviction when it can review and consider the en-
tire evidence and come to its own conclusions by either
accepting the evidence rejected by the trial court or re-
jecting the evidence accepted by the trial court. (Para - D
12) [255-C & D]
Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 9 SCC 136;
Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P, (2002) 4 SCC 85 and
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 - relied E
on.
2.1 It appears from the order of acquittal as passed
by trial court that it was based on appreciation that PW-1,
the prosecutrix made inconsistent versions from stage
to stage and the evidence given by her in the trial was F
totally different from the one set out in her report, there-
..... fore as there were contradictions in her versions, her evi-
dence was not accepted as trustworthy; that PW-1 gave
wrong information that she was an orphan and her par-
ents have died; and that certain contradictions in the evi- G
dence of PW-1 at different stages also pointed out and
on the basis thereof it was held that the nature of evidence
led in by the prosecution being wholly doubtful, the pros-
ecution story itself becomes doubtful and therefore it is a
case of acquittal. (Paras - 16 & 17) (258-D,E,F & G] H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
,.( --'--

A 2:2 The High Court however, observed that PW-1 was -.
a minor being aged about 17 years and that she was un-
der lot of mental and physical strain and stress after she
was kidnapped. The Single Judge after examining the
-~-
evidence held that there was no reason to doubt the afore-
B said evidence and since there was no enmity between
her and the accused persons, the evidence of PW-1 was ~

fully justified to warrant the order of sentence in respect
of both the offences. (Para - 18) [258-G,H; 159-A]
2.3 From the deposition of PW-1, the prosecutrix and
c her mother PW-2, it is established that PW-1 in her depo-
sition in the trial has given a more embellished version of
what has happened between the period of her kidnap-
ping and the date when she was allowed to come back
although at the initial stage i.e. immediately after she came
D back after confinement of about 39 days she did not state
anything about sexual intercourse or rape being commit'."
ted on her by accused No. 1 and 3, but in her deposition
subsequently she gave embellished and more aggra-
vated form of deposition by alleging major offences
E against the accused persons by stating that she was
sexually abused by both the appellant No. 1 and appel-
lant No. 3 repeatedly on 5 or 6 occasions. (Paras - 28 &
35) [261-G; 263-E,F & G]
"1· ..
2.4 Although there are allegations that accused Nos.
F 1 and 3 wanted to sell her for prostitution, but neither there
is any reference nor an incident which shows that an at- ~ .
tempt was made to sell her in brothel house to do prosti-
-tution. (Para - 36) [263-G & H; 264-Al

G 2.5 Having gone through the entire evidence on
record, it cannot be said that any case under Section 366A
or a case under section 372 read with Section 511 IPC
was made out against any of the three accused persons.
To that ext~nt, the Trial Court was justified. (Para .... 37)
H [264-A & B]

T".
SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 247
A.P.
' ;.

2.6 In an offence under s.366A, IPC, the chief ingre- A
dient is that the girl is made to go from one place to other
with the intention or knowledge that she may be forced
to illicit intercourse. In the present case the evidence on
record does not reveal any such intention. That the pros-
ecutrix was subjected and forced to illicit intercourse B
came to be stated for the first time only during the trial
which is nothing but embellishment in order to see that
the accused persons are made and are subjected to ma-
jor punishments. (Para - 38) [264-E & F]
2.7 While appreciating the evidence, it will be obliga-
c
tion, duty ~nd responsibility of the court to see that chaff
are separated from the grains. The written report which
was submitted immediately after her recovery gave a clear
and true picture as to what had happened. The deposi-
tion of her which although contained a part of the state- D
ment recorded in the written report came to include em-
bellishments, trying to frame the three accused persons
for the major offences. (Para - 39) [264-E & F]
3. This Court is unable to accept the contention of E
the counsel of appellant that the appellant was a minor.
The prosecution has been able to establish the age of
the prosecutrix as below 18 years, as they have been able
to produce the school certificate which is proved by the
headmaster of the school from whom the certificate was
. ,. obtained. The aforesaid document being a legal document
and having evidentiary value, has to be given due
F

weightage. The onus on the prosecution to prove the age
of the prosecutrix was effectively discharged by the pros-
ecution. (Para - 42) [265-8,C, & G]
G
Chhattisgarh v. Lekhram (2006) 5 SCC 736 - relied on.
4. This Court is of the concluded opinion that the
prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the offence. How-
ever, it cannot be held that the accused persons are guilty
of the offence under Section 366A IPC or under Section H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A 372 read with Section 511 IPC. The prosecution has not
"' '·

been able to conclusively prove and establish by cogent
evidence that the prosecutrix was kidnapped by accused
persons with the intention of having sexual intercourse
with them or with any other person. No such reliable or
B cogent evidence have been laid by the prosecution to
prove the charge. Similarly, there is no reliable and cogent
evidence to prove and establish that she was kidnapped
by the accused persons with the intention of selling her
for prostitution. Therefore, the charge under Section 372
c read with Section 511 IPC is also not proved ag~inst the
accused persons. (Para - 43) [265-G & H; 266-A,B & C]
5.1 The High Court was of the opinion that even
though a case of rape was made out, but even then the
Trial Court did not frame charge in that regard. But how-
D ever the Single Judge of the High Court did not remand
the case back to the Trial Court for framing of charge un-
der Section 376 IPC for punishing the accused persons
under the aforesaid charge, as the same could have called
for protracted trial. To that extent he may be justified but
E there are number of cases which justify the court to con-
vert a case from major offence to minor offence, if a case
for conviction under such minor offence is made out.
(Para - 45) [266-D & E]
5.2 The charge-sheet was submitted also under Sec-
F tion 363 IPC by the Police but the Trial Court did not frame
any charge under Section 363 IPC. Charge was framed for
offences punishable under Section 366A and under Sec- .. "'
tion 372 read with Section 511, IPC. (Para - 46) [266-F]
5.3 Already a case of kidnapping was alleged against
G the appellants in respect of which a charge under Sec-
tion 366A was also framed and therefore the accused per-
sons knew that they were being charged for taking away
)..
a minor out of the custody of the lawful guardian and they
got full opportunity to defend themselves as against such
H an allegation. (Para - 48) [267-A]
SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 249
AP.
~ ).

Willie (William) Slaney v. State of M.P (1955) 2 SCR A
1140 - relied on.
5.4 The ingredients of Section 363 IPC involve an act
of kidnapping of any person from the lawful guardianship.
(Para - 49) [267-8] B
5.5 Section 366A IPC also envisages an act of kid-
napping of a minor girl out of the lawful guardianship with
the intention of committing a sexual intercourse which is
of a higher degree than that of an offence under Section
363 IPC. (Para - 50) [267-D] c
5.6 Section 366A IPC is a major offence whereas Sec-
tion 363 IPC is a minor offence compared to that of Sec-
tion 366A IPC. There is therefore a difference in respect
of the said two offences in respect of the punishment also.
D
Section 366A IPC envisages a maximum punishment of
ten years whereas Section 363 IPC envisages a punish-
ment of seven years. (Para - 51) [267-E]
5. 7 Under the provisions of Section 222 of the Code
a provision is made that in a case where the accused is E
charged with a major offence and the said charge is not
proved, the accused could be convicted of a minor of-
fence if such a case is made out though he was not
charged with the same. [Para 52] [267-F & G]
F
Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar (2006) 8 SCC 560;
l> ,,,
Lakhjit Singh v. State of Punjab 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 173;
Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka (2001) 2 SCC
577; Willie (William) Slaney v. State of M.P (1955) 2 SCR
1140; State of WB. v. Laisal Haque (1989) 3 SCC 166);
G
Kammari Brahmaiah v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of AP
(1999) 2 SCC 52 and Dalbir Singh v. State of UP (2004) 5
sec 334 - relied on.
6. So far appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, there
is no evidence on record to prove and justify that they H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2ooa1 11-s.c.R.

A had any role to play in kidnapping of the prosecutrix, out
of the lawful guardianship without their consent. How-
ever, such a finding cannot be recorded as against ap-
pellant No. 3, for there is concurrent statement of the pros-
ecutrix on record to show that he was one among oJhers
B who took part in keeping her out of the lawful guardian-
ship without their consent, for they knew fully well as they
were carrying her, that she was a minor and under the
age of eighteen years but despite the fact they took her
away out of the custody of the lawful guardian, without
C their consent to a place away from home and kept her
confined there for 39 long days. The accused No. 3 was
in the auto rickshaw where she was put into and when
the said auto rickshaw was driving her away she was
sedated by a lady in the presence of appellant No. 3. The
D aforesaid evidence is adduced by the prosecutrix herself
and this court see ,no reason as to why she should un-
necessarily implicate appellant No. 3 when no case of en-
mity is made out. She was kept confined for 39 long days
after kidnapping her fr9m the lawful guardianship, and
E therefore, the ingredients set out in Section 363 IPC are
made out as against accused No. 3 at least. Hence the
appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are acquitted from all charges.
Whereas, the appellant No. 3 is held guilty of the offence
under Section 363 lf'C- and convicted ~ccordingly. How-
F ever, since the incident is that of the year 1992 and 15
years have gone by, therefore, interest of justice would
be sub-served if appellant No. 3 is sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. (Paras
- 55, 56, 57, 58, 59) [268-D,E,F,G,H; 269-A,B,C & D]
G 7. It is clarified that the period of detention of the said
accused will be set off from the period of punishment in
accordance with law. (Para - 60) [269-E]
Case Law Reference
H (2000) 9 sec 136; Relied on Para 12
SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 251
f' .. A.P. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

(2002) 4 sec 85; Para 13 A

(2007) 4 sec 415 Para 14
(2006) 5 sec 736 Para 42
(2006) 8 sec 560; Para 53
B
(1994) supp. (1) sec 173; Para 53
(2001) 2 sec 577; Para 53
(1955) 2 SCR 1140 Para 47
(1989) 3 sec 166 Para 54 c
(1999) 2 sec 52 Para 54
(2004) 5 sec 334 Para 54
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1306 of 2003 D

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.8.2003 of the High
Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Crl. Ap-
peal No. 1550/1997
M. Karpaga Vin~yakam, Satish Galla, A. Venayagam E
Balan and C.S.N. Mohan Rao for the Appellant.
Prabhakar Rao Voruganti and D. Bharathi Reddy for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court wad delivered by F
.. ,,.
DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. This appeal arises
out of the judgment and order dated 5.8.2003 passed by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Hyderabad, convicting the three appellants under the provisions
of Section 366A and Section 372 read with Section 511 Indian G
Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'IPC') and requiring each of them
~
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years and
5 years respectively on each count, which is to run concurrently.
By the said order, the order dated 16.12.1996 passed by the
learned Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Guntur in SC No. H
I

~

252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S. C.R.
.. .
A 25 of 1995, acquitting the three accused was set aside.
2. Shri Subba Rao - appellant No. 1 and smt. Dhanalakshmi
- appellant No. 2 are respectively the father and mother of Saqkar
- appellant No. 3. The mother of the prosecutrix filed a missing
report on 29.07.1992 at Pattabhipuram Police Station. In the
B
said report it was stated by her that her youngest daughter
Prabhavathi-prosecutrix studying in Inter 1st Year in B.H. Girls
Junior College went to the college on 25.7.1992 at 12.30 p.m.
and thereafter did not return to her house and that the family
made an enquiry amongst the relatives and friends both in the
c Guntur town and in the remaining villages but she could not be ._
~

traced anywhere. It was further stated that her whereabouts are
not known and that they have got doubt about her missing on
three persons namely Subba Rao, his wife and his son Sankar,
who are residents of old Pattabhipuram, Guntur. It was also
D stated that the missing girl was about 16 years of age and 5
feets 3 inches in height. ~
3. The aforesaid missing report was registered as Cr. No.
88/92. After receipt of the said report, the Police started inves-
tigation, but despite the said investigation they could not trace
E
out the girl. It transpires from the prosecution case that the girl \..-

was traced out on 11.9.1992, when she came to a bus shelter,
which is opposite to the Check Post of Agricultural Market at
Ravendrapadu.

F 4. Having found the girl weeping at the bus stand, PW-8
and PW-9 who are respectively working as watchman and su- ,.. ~ ,
pervisor at the Agricultural Market Committee, Ravendrapadu
took her to the house of PW-8. The girl was kept in the house of
PW-8 for two days during the course of which both PW-8 and
G PW-9 tried to find out the background and particulars of the girl
and accordingly were able to trace out her house where they
met the mother and informed her the whereabouts of her daugh-
)...
ter. The mother, along-with the aunt and brother of the prosecu-
trix accompanied PW-8 and PW-9 to Ravendrapadu and there-
after they took back the girl to their house.
H
Ir"
SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 253
A.P. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

-
/- ).-

5. In terms of the aforesaid statement, the girl was taken A
back by the mother on 14.9.1992. She went to the police sta-
tion on 19.9.1992 and on the same date she was sent to the
Government General Hospital, Guntur for treatment as she was
found to be weak both physically and mentally. Thereafter on
.J
25.9.1992 she again went to the Police Station and presented B
a written report which was later on proved and exhibited in the
trial as Ex. P-1. On the same day i.e. on 25.9.1992, Police ex-
amined the prosecutrix and recorded her statement and there-
after also got the statement of PW-8 and PW-9 recorded. The
Police thereafter examined many other witnesses and visited c
the house of the three appellants who were accused in the re-
port submitted. Finally, a charge sheet was submitted by the
Police against all the three accused persons who are appel-
... lants herein under Section 363, 366A, 368 and Section 372
read with 511 of the IPC. D

' 6. During the course of the trial, 13 witnesses were exam-
ined, including the prosecutrix, her mother and the investigat-
ing officer who were examined as PW 1 , PW 2 and PW 12
respectively. The case of the accused was of clear denial. After
completion of the trial, arguments were heard by the Additional E
Asst. Sessions Judge who thereafter passed an order of ac-
quittal against all the three accused persons holding that the
whole prosecution story is doubtful and that any case against
the accused has not been proved, and therefore, they are en-
titled to benefit of doubt. F
~ )
7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of acquittal, an
appeal was filed in the High Court by the State against all the
three accused persons. The learned Single Judge after hear-
ing the appeal on 5.8.2003 passed a judgment and order set-
ting aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court, G
holding that the evidence on record does prove a case against
the appellants/accused persons both under Section 366 A and
372 read with Section 511 IPC. On the question of sentence
the learned Single Judge held that having regard to the nature
of the offence and the fact that a minor girl being dragged fore- H
,_
r-

254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A ibly into an auto rickshaw almost in the heart of the Guntur town
that too in a broad day light and the purpose for which she was
so kidnapped, warrant imposition of maximum sentence pre-
scribed under the aforesaid provisions. Having held thus, all
the three accused persons were convicted under Section 366A
B IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
a period of 10 years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each
and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of
two months and also under Section 372 read with Section 511
IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
c a period of five years each and also to pay a fine of Rs. 2,500/
- each and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of 30 days.
8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order
of conviction and sentence, the appellants filed the present ap-
D peal in this Court. We heard the learned senior counsel ap-
pearing for the appellants and learned counsel appearing for
the State and have also perused the records connected with
the criminal trial and also the appeal. While admitting the ap-
peal, the appellants were granted bail and therefore all the three
E appellants as on today are on b~I.
9. Mr. M. Karpuga Vinayakam, the learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants forcefully contended, inter alia, that
the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
has set aside the order of acquittal without discussing and ap-
F preciating the grounds on which the learned trial court passed
the order of acquittal and also without giving any reason for
setting aside the order of acquittal.
10. After placing strong reliance on various case laws, it
G was submitted before us that the High Court having not given
reasons for not accepting the conclusions reached by the Trial
Court while acquitting the accused persons committed a grave
error of law in setting aside the order of acquittal and convert-
ing the same to an order of conviction. It was further submitted
H that there was no compelling reasons for converting the order
SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 255
•
.... • A.P. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
of acquittal into order of conviction, especially in view of the two A
~
different versions of the prosecution case during the course of
,• trial.
i
11. The learned senior counsel has also taken us through
the entire evidence on record and on the basis thereof, he sub-
B
... mitted that as the prosecutrix herself has given two different
versions of the case she cannot be said to be a trustworthy
witness and therefore no conviction can be based on the basis
of her statement and the High Court should not have interfered
with the order of acquittal.
c
12. There could be no dispute with regard to the proposi-
tion of law, which is clearly laid down by this Court in various
decisions. The power of the High Court in an appeal from ac-
quittal is no different from its power. in an appeal from convic-
tion when it can review and consider the entire evidence and D
come to its own conclusions by either accepting the evidence
rejected by the trial court or rejecting the evidence accepted by
the trial court. In this regard we may refer to observations made
by this Court in the case of Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan,
[(2000) 9 sec 136] which are under:
E
u' 4 ....................... It is too well settled that the power of
the High Court, while hearing an appeal against an
acquittal, is as wide and comprehensive as in an appeal
against aconviction and it has full power to reappreciate
the entire evidence, but if two views on the evidence are F
reasonably possible, one supporting the acquittal and the
.. > ~
other indicating conviction, then· the High Court would not
be justified in interfering with the acquittal, merely because
it feels that it would, sitting as a trial court, have taken the
other view. While reappreciating the evidence, the rule of G
prudence requires that the High Court should give proper
weight and consideration to the views of the learned trial
-'I Judge. But if the judgment of the Sessions Judge was
absolutely perverse, legally erroneous and based on a
wrong appreciation of the eyidence, then it would be just
H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 11 S.C.R.

A and proper for the High Court to reverse the judgment of
acquittal, recorded by the Sessions Judge, as otherwise, F
there would be gross miscarriage of justice ................. . I,
~
" '
t
8 13. In the case of Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P, [(2002) t
4 sec 85], the trail court acquitted the accused but the High
Court convicted them. Negativing the contention of the appel-
. I
r-

lants that the High Court could not have disturbed the findings 'r-
facts ofthe Trial Court even if that view was not correct, this
Court observed:
c
"7. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned
counsel for the appellants that under Section 378 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court could not
disturb the finding of facts of the trial court even if it found
D that the view taken by the trial court was not proper. On the
basis of the pronouncements of this Court, the settled )

position of law regarding the powers of the High Court in
an appeal against an order of acquittal is that the court
has full powers to review the evidence upon which an
E order of acquittal is based and generally it will not interfere
with the order of acquittal because by passing an order of
acquittal the presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused is reinforced. The golden thread which runs
through the web of administration of justice in criminal
case is that if two views are possible on the evidence
F
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused
and the other to his innocenc.e, the view which is favourable
to the accused should be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction
limitatipn on the appellate court but Judge-made guidelines
for circumspection. The paramount consideration of the
G court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. A
miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal
of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an
innocent. In a case where the trial court has taken a view
ignoring the admis.sible evidence, a duty is cast upon the
H High Court to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal
SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 257
A.P. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
~~ ).

for the purposes of ascertaining as to whether all or any A
of the accused has committed any offence or not."
14. This Court in the case of Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka [ (2007) 4 SCC 415), after referring to the catena of
decisions has laid down following general principles with re-
B
gard to powers of the appellate court while dealing with an ap-
peal against an order of acquittal:
"42. From the above decisions, in our considered view,
the following general principles regarding powers of the
appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an c
order of acquittal emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is founded.
D
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate court on the evidence before
it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of
fact and of law.
E
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and
compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds",
"very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions",
"glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail
extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal F
against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in
.J ..t the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise
the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with
acquittar than to curtail the power of the court to review
the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. G
-\

~ (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that
_.
_ in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in
favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved ,_
,.
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
B
(5) If tWo reasonable conclusions are possible on the
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded
by the trial court."

C 15. In that view of the aforesaid general principles, we have
appreciated the entire evidence on record and also the judg-
ment and order passed by the Trial Court and High Court to
ascertain as to whether the order of acquittal passed by the
learned Trial Courtwasjustified and as to whether the High Court
o has set aside the order of acquittal without adhering to the settled
proposition of law as discussed hereinabove.
16. The order of acquittal, as it appears from the order,
was based on appreciation th·at PW-1, the prosecutrix made
inconsistent versions from stage to stage and the evidence
E given by her in the trial was totally different from the one set out
in her report which was· marked as Ex. P-1, therefore as there
were contradictions in her versions, her evidence was not ac-
cepted as trustworthy.

17. The learned Trial Court also held that PW-1 gave
F
wrong information that she was an orphan and that her parents
have died. The learnedTrial Court also pointed out certain con-
tradictions in the evidence of PW-1 at different stages and on
the basis thereof it was held that the nature of evidence led in
by the prosecution being wholly doubtful, the prosecution story
G itself becomes doubtful and therefore it is a case of acquittal.
18. In the appeal filed against the order of acquittal, the
High Court however, observed that PW-1 was a minor being
aged about 17 years and that she was under lot of mental and
H physical strain and stress after she was kidnapped. The learned
SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 259
... ). .
A.P. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
Single Judge after examining the evidence held that there was A
no reason to doubt the aforesaid evidence and since there was
no enmity between her and the accused persons, the said evi-
dence of PW-1 was fully justified to warrant the order of sen-
tence in respect of both the offences.
B
19. As stated hereinbefore the prosecutrix was missing
from her house from 25.7.1992 and the missing report came to
be filed by PW-2, the mother of the prosecutrix on 29. 7.1992.
Although the said missing report was treated as the First lnfor-
mation Report but the police was unable to trace out the girl.
She however was traced at the bus stand opposite to the Check
c
Post of Agricultural Market Committee, Ravendrapadu. She was
found weeping and was also giving incoherent statements but.
on the basis of the papers found with her, her family was traced
and after tracing, her mother and brother came and took her
away on 14.9.1992. She was, however, found to be under great D
·) mental strain and stress and therefore the police before whom
she appeared and filed a written report sent her for treatment.
20. In the Missing Report, the mother of the prosecutrix
named the three accused persons stating that they are sus-
E
pects. In the written report submitted, which is exhibited as Ex.
P-1, the prosecutrix has stated and has alleged as to how she
was kidnapped while she was going to the college. In the said
report it was stated by her that on 25. 7.1992 on the way while
going to the school at about 12.30 in the noon some unknown
F
person came on a bicycle and told her that appellant No. 3 was
• ... calling her and threatened her to go urgently. It is alleged that
out of fear she went to the house of Appellant No. 3 where she
met Appellant No. 2 who told her that Sankar would be coming
soon, she had also stated in the said report that Sankar asked
her to bring either 200 or 150 rupees and on refusal threatened G
~ her to collect the said amount. She went to the house to which
.-t the milk is daily supplied by her parents to collect the money,
when the Appellant No. 3 along with other persons was follow-
ing her and was keeping a guard on her.
H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 11 S.C.R.
"' 4,

A 21. It was stated that on her request she received 200 ru-
pees which she showed to Sankar, as she was asked to do so. It
was alleged that immediately thereafter she was dragged into
an auto rickshaw and she was made to forcibly sit in the middle
of the back seat with a man with beard and dark complexion on
B one side and the stout female with fair complexion on the other
side and the appellant No. 3 sat by the side of the auto driver.
She stated that as soon as she got into the auto rickshaw, she
was sedated by putting some drug in front of her nose. She stated
that after she was free of sedation, she found that she was in a
c room. In the said room, she stated to have met Subba Rao, the
appellant No. 1. She also alleged that she was beaten by them
for giving complaint against them by her parents. She stated in
that report that she was given instructions as to how she should
narrate the incidence to the police. She thereafter stated the
D manner in which she reached the bus stop near Ravendrapadu
village and thereafter how she was recovered by her family mem-
bers. In the said report however, there were no allegations of any ~·
rape on her by any of the accused persons.
22. The police thereafter having got some clues as to how
E the prosecutrix was kidnapped made investigation and exam-
ined many witnesses and also visited the house of the accused
persons and thereafter finally submitted a charge-sheet. The
charge-sheet was practically based on the similar line as what
was stated by the· prosecutrix in her written report submitted on
F 25.9.1992.
23. In the said charge-sheet, it was stated that on 19.9.1992 ).., .....
she was produced before the police and since she was found
not fit to make any statement due to physical and mental strain

G
and stress suffered by her, she was sent for medical examina-
tion to detect her mental condition and also to detect whether
any sexual assault was committed.
24. The doctor, who examined her, gave an opinion that
she was suffering from posttraumatic ice stress disorder and
)...
.
advised her to come for regular follow up. The other doctor who
H
SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 261
A.P. [DR MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
~

" is a Gynecologist gave an opinion that there was no sexual in- A
tercourse.
25. In the said charge-sheet, it was stated by the police
that the prosecutrix was a minor and was kidnapped against
her will for the purpose of selling her to a brothel house to do
B
prostitution and she was wrongfully confined for about 49 days
and was subjected to mental harassment and torture. The
charge-sheet was submitted under the provisions of Sections
366A, 363, 368 and 372 read with Section 511 IPC.
26. The learned Trial Judge, however, framed charge c
against all the three appellants herein under the. provisions of
Section 366A IPC and Section 372 read with Section 511 IPC.
After framing of charges against the said accused persons, the
trial court started the trial, during the course of which the pros-
ecution examined 13 witnesses including the prosecutrix and D
her mother.
-> 27. In order to prove her age, a School Leaving Certifi-
cate was produced according to which her date of birth was
recorded as 12.6.1975. To prove that she was a minor, the pros-
ecution also examined the headmaster of Pattabhipuram High E
School, Gunturwhere prosecutrix studied from Class VI to Class
X from the year 1986 to 1991. He was examined as PW-13
and he has categorically stated that in the Admission Register,
her date of birth was mentioned as 12.6.1975. He has also
proved the certificate dated 17.3.1994 which showed her date F
of birth as 12.6.1975. He was cross-examined at length by the
"".... ~ \
defense.
28. The prosecutrix was examined as PW-1 and in her
deposition, she gave embellished and more aggravated form
of deposition by alleging major offences against the accused G

- -II.
persons by stating that during the said period she was sexually
abused by both the appellant No. 1 and appellant No. 3.

29. We have carefully examined the said statement and
allegations made by the prosecutrix against both the accused H

•.
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
"' ~
A persons. She had stated in her deposition recorded on
14.5.1996 that the first accused i.e. father of appellant No. 3
sexually abused her for 5-6 times whereas the appellant No. 3
who is the son also sexually abused her for 5-6 times. It was
also stated by her that whenever both the accused were out-
B side the room, they used to lock the room from outside and that
she was provided meals by one lady.who used to take her out-
side to attend the calls of nature and she also used to lock the
room from inside whenever she used to stay .with her.

30. She further deposed that during the period of confine-
c ment of 39 days and the intermittent period after the first and
the third accused abused her sexually, the accused appre-
hended that her mother might give a complaint against them
ahd they may be in trouble, because of which the appellant No.
1 brought some letters and papers and asked her to write as if
D she was writing it as love letters to appellant No. 3 so that they
could be used by them in future to show and prove that she and ,_
the accused no. 3 loved each other and that she of her own
accord finally eloped with accused No. 3.
31. She further stated in her deposition that the first ac-
E
cused and that bearded person brought her out on one night
from that room and brought her to Railway Station where she F
f

was handed over to an old man from where the old man brought
her to Ravendrapadu Check Post and left her by telling her not
to reveal anything.
F
32. She stated that M. Sambasiva Rao, PW-8 met her at ;..
,,
.._
the bus stop and asked her to sit in the room of the Check Post
when he brought another person who was aged about 30 years
and that she was afraid that they may commit sexual act on her
G and that is why she was weeping, but they took her to the house
of PW-8 where her wife Aruna looked after her well. M.
Sambasiva Rao, PW-8 left the house in the morning of Sunday "'
and after enquiring about her residential address brought her )I...

mother and the elder brother to her house in the evening of
Monday and she came to her house with the all these persons.
H
SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 263
A.P. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
~

"'
33. She stated that she was thereafter sent for medical A
examination, after completion of which she submitted her re-
port which was exhibited as Ex. P-1. She also stated that she
knew all the accused and that she had no enmity with any of
them and that she had no relationship with them. She has also
stated that she was kidnapped so as to sell her to prostitution B
.)
home, which according to her was told by the first accused to
her, but as they could not succeed in selling her, they committed
rape on her and spoiled her. She stated that at the time of inci-
dent her age was about 15 years.
34. She was cross-examined at length by the defense.
c
PW-2 the mother of the prosecutrix was examined, she also
supported the case of PW-1 particularly in respect of her kid-
napping as she was informed by her daughter. She also stated
that she had suspicion on all the three accused persons as she
was told by one Vijaya Durga that first and third accused are D
used to kidnapping girls. She stated that she went to the house
·>
of first accused on the next day of missing of the girl who in-
formed her that the prosecutrix did not come to their house and
that she might have gone to Ananthapur, where a friend of her
was residing. She also stated that on 29. 7 .1992, she gave a E
report to the Police which was exhibited as Ex. P-2.

35. From the aforesaid narration of the deposition of PW-
1 and PW-2, it is established that PW-1 in her deposition in the
trial has given a more embellished version of what has hap-
pened between the period of her kidnapping and the date when
F
~ )
she was allowed to come back although at the initial stage i.e.
immediately after she came back after confinement of about
39 days she did not state anything about sexual intercourse or
rape being committed on her by accused No. 1 and 3, but in
her deposition subsequently she had reported sexual inter- G
course on her by accused Nos. 1 and 3 repeatedly on 5 or 6
I'
_.. occasions.

36. Although there are allegations that accused Nos. 1 and
3 wanted to sell her for prostitution, but neither there is any ref-
H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A erence nor an incident which shows that an attempt was made
to sell her in brothel house to do prostitution.
37. Having gone through the entire evidence on record,
we are of the considered opinion that it cannot be said that any
case under Section 366A or a case under section 372 read
8
with Section 511 IPC was made out against any of the three
accused persons. To that extent, in our considered opinion the
Trial Court was justified.
38. So far as Section 366A is concerned, in such an of-
C fence what is required to be proved by the prosecution is that
there is cogent and reliable evidence to prove and establish
that a minor girl under the age of 18 years was induced to come
from one place to the other with the intention that such girl may
be, forced to have illicit intercourse with another person. There-
D fore, in such an offence, the chief in·gredient is that the girl is
made to go from one place to otherwith the intention or knowl-
edge that she may be forced to illicit intercourse. The evidence
on record does not reveal any such intention. That the prosecu-
trix was subjected and forced to illicit intercourse came to be
stated for the first time only during the trial which according to
E us is nothing but embellishment in order to see that the accused
persons are made and are subjected to major punishments.
39. While appreciating the evidence, it will be our obliga-
tion, duty and responsibility to see that chaff are separated from
the grains. The written report which was submitted immediately
F after her recovery according to us gave a clear and true picture
as to what had happened. The deposition of her which although
contained a part of the statement recorded in the written report
came to include embellishments, trying to frame the three ac-
cused persons for the major offences.
G
40. We have to ignore that part of the evidence and when
we do so, we find that no offence is proved and established as
against accused-appellant No. 1 and appellant No. 2 or there
is even no allegation in the said written report which is exhib-
ited as Ex. P-1 that any of them had ·in any way contributed in
H kidnapping her from her lawful guardian.
SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 265
A.P. [DR MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
. ...
41. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of all the A
appellants also vehemently submitted that it cannot be said that
the appellant was a minor for according to the school certifi-
cate itself her age would be more than 17 years and there could
always be a difference of about 4-5 months in ascertaining age
and in order to ascertain the age, she should have been exam- B
ined by the medical expert, and therefore, the benefit should go
to the accused persons so far as the age is concerned.
42. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention for
according to us, the prosecution has been able to establish the
age of the prosecutrix as below 18 years, as they have been
c
able to produce the school certificate which is proved by the
headmaster of the school from whom the certificate was ob-
tained. The aforesaid document being a legal document and
having evidentiary value, has to be given due weightage as has
been held by this Court in the case of state of Chhattisgarh v. D
Lekhram [(2006) 5 SCC 736]. This court in the said case held
->
as under:
"12. A register maintained in a school is admissible in
evidence to prove date of birth of the person concerned
E
in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Such dates of
births are recorded in the school register by the authorities
in discharge of their public duty ...........................

13. . ....................... It may be true that an entry in the
school register is not conclusive but it has evidentiary value. F
,.(
Such evidentiary value of a school register is corroborated
by oral evidence as the same was' recorded on the basis
of the statement of the mother of the prosecutrix."
Therefore, according to us, the onus on the prosecution to
prove the age of the prosecutrix was effectively discharged by G
the prosecution.
43. In that view of the matter, we are of the concluded
~ opinion that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the of-
fence. We are, however, unable to persuade ourselves to be- H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A lieve that the accused persons are guilty of the offence under
Section 366A IPC or under Section 372 read with Section 511
IPC. The prosecution has not been able to conclusively prove
and establish by cogent evidence that the prosecutrix was kid-
napped by accused persons with the intention of having sexual
B intercourse with them or with any other person. No such reliable
or cogent evidence have been laid by the prosecution to prove )..
the charge. Similarly, there is no reliable and cogent evidence
to prove and establish that she was kidnapped by the accused
persons with the intention of selling her for prostitution. There-
C fore, the charge underSection 372 read With Section 511 IPC
is also not proved against the accused persons.
44. Even having come to aforesaid conclusion, we have a
further responsibility to see as to whether any other offence. is
made out.
D
· 45. The High Court was of the opinion that even though a
case of rape was made out, but even then the Trial Court did
not frame charge in that regard. But however the learned Single
Judge did riot remand the case back to the Trial Court for fram-
E ing of charge under Section 376 IPC for punishing the accused
persons under the aforesaid charge, as the same could have
called for protracted trial. To that extent he may be justified but
there are number of cases which justify the court to convert a
case from major offence to minor offence, if a case for convic-
F tion under such minor offence is made out.
46. The charge-sheet was submitted also under Section
363 IPC by the Police but the Trial Court did not frame any
charge under Section 363 IPC. Charge was framed for offences
punishable under Section 366A and under Section 372 read
G with Section 511, IPC. ·
4 7. The Supreme Court has held in the case of Willie (Wil-
liam) Slaney v. State of M.P [(1955) 2 SCR 1140] that any er-
ror or omission in framing charge could be rectified even at the
appellate stage provided no prejudice is caused to the accused
H persons.
~

SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 267
A.P. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
" "·
48. Already a case of kidnapping was alleged against the A
appellants in respect of which a charge under Section 366A
was also framed and therefore the accused persons knew that
they were being charged for taking away a minor out of the cus-
tody of the lawful guardian and they got full opportunity to de-
fend themselves as against such an allegation. B
--'
49. The ingredients of Section 363 IPC involve an act of
kidnapping of any person from the lawful guardianship. Kidnap-
ping from the lawful guardianship is defined under Section 361
IPC, where it is stated that whoever takes or entices any minor
under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of c
age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping
of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind,
without the consent of such guardian, a case of kidnapping is
made out.
D
50. Section 366A IPC also envisages an act of kidnap-
-> ping of a minor girl out of the lawful guardianship with the inten-
tion of committing a sexual intercourse which is of a higher de-
gree than that of an offence under Section 363 IPC.
51. Section 366A IPC is a major offence whereas Sec- E
tion 363 IPC is a minor offence compared to that of Section
366A IPC. There is therefore a difference in respect of the said
two offences in respect of the punishment also. Section 366A
IPC envisages a maximum punishment of ten years whereas
Section 363 IPC envisages a punishment of seven years. F
~
52. Under the provisions of Section 222 of the Code a
....- provision is made that in a case where the accused is charged
with a major offence and the said charge is not proved, the ac-
cused could be convicted of a minor offence if such a case is
made out though he was not charged with the same. G

53. In the case of Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar[(2006)
-.!..
8 SCC 560], this Court after relying upon the decision of this
--."
Co~rt in Lakhjit Singh v. State of Punjab [1994 Supp. (1) SCC
173] and the case of Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of H
,.
I

268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
.. ~

A Karnataka [(2001) 2 SCC 577] held that if the offence commit-
ted is clearly covered and have the ingredients of a minor of-
fence, in that event, the Court is empowered to convict the per-
son under minor offence by invoking the provisions of Section
222 of the Code.
B
54. In the case of Willie (William) Slaney (supra) it was stated
by this Court that the object of the charge is not to introduce a
provision that goes to the root of the jurisdiction but to enable the
accused to have a clear idea of what he is being tried for and of
the essential facts that he has to meet. The said decision was a
c Constitution Bench decision of this Court which has stood the test
1
of time and is being followed repeatedly by this Court. (See: State I

of WB. v. Laisal Haque [(1989) 3 SCC 166)]; Kammari
Brahmaiah v. Public Prosecutor, High Court ofA.P [(1999) 2 SCC
52]; Dalbir Singh v. State of UP [(2004) 5 SCC 334]).
D
55. So far appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, there is
no evidence on record to prove and justify that they had any role -t,-

to play in kidnapping of the prosecutrix, out of the lawful guard-
ianship without their consent. However, we cannot record the
same finding so far as appellant No. 3 is concerned, for there is
E
concurrent statement of the prosecutrix on record to show that
he was one among others who took part in keeping the pros-
,I.--
ecutrix out of the lawful guardianship without their consent, for
they knew fully well as they were carrying her, that she was a
minor and under the age of eighteen years but despite the fact
F
they took her away out of the custody of the lawful guardian,
without their consent to a place away from home and kept her ).

confined there for 39 long days.
56. The accused No. 3 was in the auto rickshaw where
G she was put into and when the said auto rickshaw was driving
her away she was sedated by a lady in the presence of appel-
lant No. 3.
>--
57. The aforesaid evidence is adduced by the prosecutrix ~,..,

herself and we see no reason why she should unnecessarily
H implicate appellant No. 3 when no case of enmity is made out
SANNAIA SUBBA RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF 269
A.P. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

in between the prosecutrix and the accused No. 3. She was A
kept confined for 39 long days after kidnapping her from the
lawful guardianship, and therefore, in our considered opinion
the ingredients set out in Section 363 IPC are made out as
against accused No. 3 at least.
B
58. Therefore, while acquitting all the accused persons
from the charge of offence under Section 366A and 372 read
with Section 511 IPC, we acquit the appellant Nos: 1 and 2
from all charges. Whereas, we hold that the appellant No. 3 is
guilty of the offence under Section 363 IPC and accordingly we· C
proceed to convict him accordingly.

59. Having held thus, we have to pass an order of sen-
tence against the said accused-appellant No. 3. The incident is
that of the year 1992 and 15 years have gone by, therefore,
interest of justice would be sub-served if appellant No. 3 is sen- D
- ) tenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three
years.

60. Bail bond submitted by Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 stand
discharged whereas the bail bond of accused No. 3 stands can- E
celled and he shall immediately surrender so as to undergo the
remaining punishment. We make it clear that the period of de-
tention of the said accused will be set off from the period of
punishment in accordance with law.

S.K.S. Appeal partly allowed.

_____..