Supreme Court of India
SANT LAL BHARTIversusSTATE OF PUNJAB
- Citation
- 1987 INSC 354
- Decided
- 1 December 1987
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- SABYASACHI MUKHERJI
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the petition was rightly dismissed for lack of facts, that Article 14 does not permit striking down a State law merely because it differs from another State's law, and that Section 4 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 is not per se unreasonable.
Summary
Sant Lal Bharti, claiming ownership of premises in Punjab, filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 4 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, on grounds of violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) and alleged unreasonableness. The High Court dismissed the petition in limine because the petition did not specify the premises concerned, and the Supreme Court upheld that dismissal, noting that a challenge to a statute must be grounded in concrete facts. The Court held that Article 14 does not allow a law of one State to be struck down merely because it differs from the law of another State, and that legislative wisdom in determining rent fixation is not a basis for constitutional challenge. It further observed that fixing the basic rent on the basis of rates prevailing in 1938, as done in 1949, is not per se unreasonable given the historical context. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the validity of Section 4 was affirmed.
Issues considered
- Whether a petition challenging the constitutional validity of a statutory provision must be based on specific factual particulars and not be abstract.
- Whether Section 4 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 violates Article 14 of the Constitution by treating rent fixation arbitrarily.
- Whether the provision infringes the fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g).
- Whether comparative analysis with rent statutes of other States can be used to strike down a State law.
- Whether the provision is unreasonable or arbitrary in light of post‑World War II price increases.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. 14, s. 19(1)(g), s. 226, s. 32
- East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949s. 4
Subjects
constitutional validityrent controlArticle 14Article 19unreasonable legislationcomparative lawrent fixationwrit petitionhigh court dismissal
Judgment
SANT LAL BHARTI A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
DECEMBER t 1987
B
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 32 and 226-Petition
challenging Constitutional validity of certain provisions of a Statute--
Must be in the context of certain facts and not in abstract or vacuum-
Legislative wisdom of a legislation-Whether a ground for challenging
validity of the Act passed by one State in comparison with similar Acts c
passed by other States.
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949: .. Section 4-
Whether constitutionally valid-Rent prevalent in 1938--Basis for
determination of fair rent-Whether unreasonable.
D
The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court questioning
the vires of s. 4 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
He did not, however, mention the particulars of the premises of which
he claimed to be the owner, and in respect of which he was making a
grievance. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine.
E
Hence the appeal.
'\ It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that s. 4 of the Act
was ultra vires the Constitution and violative of Art. 14, and would be
an interference with the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.
19(1)(g) and was unreasonable, and unjust inasmuch as it provided
F
that rent prevalent in 1938 should be taken as the basis for the
determination of higher rent and that pegging the rent prevalent in
1938 as the basic rent, was inequitable and unjust in the background
of the tremendous rise in prices, and that the provisions of fixation of
rent in other States were different and were more fair and just and
reasonable in comparison.
G
Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: 1.1 A petition challenging the constitutional validity of
certain provisions must be in the context of certain facts and not in
abstract or vacuum. Il09E] H
107
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ri9ss1 2 s.c.R.
A In the instant case, the essential facts necessary to examine the
valitlity of the Act are lacking. On this ground the petition was rightly
rejected and this Conrt is not inclined to interfere with the order of 1
the High Conrt on·this ground alone. [109E-F)
B 2.1 Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of a law of
one State on the ground that in contrast with a law of another State on
the same subject its provisions are discriminatory or different. Nor
does it contemplate a law of the Centre or of the State dealing with
similar subjects being held to be unconstitutional by a process of
comparative study of the provisions of two enactments. The source of
authority for the two statutes being different, Art. 14 can have no
C application. I113C-D I
2.2 Each legislature in the several States has provided the
method of determination of fair rent on the basis of legal conditions,
as judged to be, by each such legislature. The legislative wisdom of
D such legislation is not a ground on which the validity of the Act can be
challenged. I ll3B I
2.3 It must be the function of the legislature of each State to
follow the methods considered to be suited for that State, that would
be no ground for judging the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of a
E particular legislation in question by comparison. What may be the
problem in Madras may not be the problem in Punjab. Il l3H; l l4A]
The Act in question was passed in 1949 and it pegged the rent
prevalent in the similar houses in 1938 and as such is not unreasonable '
per se. The rises started tremendously after the end of the Second
F World War after the partition of the country. It cannot, therefore, be
said that per se there is unreasonableness in fixing the prices in 1938
level. [l14A·BI
One of the objects of the Act was to restrict the increase in rent.
With that object, the Act as provided certain provisions as to fixation
G of the fair rent. Therefore, having regard to the specific preamble of
the Act there is nothing unreasonable in the Scheme contemplated
unders.4oftheAct. [ll4B·CI
Prabhakara Nair and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others,
[1987] 4 S.C.C. 238 and M/s. Raval & Co. v. K. G. Ramachandran
H and others, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 818·[1974] 2 S.C.R. 629, referred to.
SANT LAL v. STATE OF PUNJAB [MVKHARJI, J.] 109
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. A
1637 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.3. 1986 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 1055 of 1986.
S.K. Bagga and Mrs. S.K. Bagga for the Appellant. B
R.S. Suri for the Respondent.
I
~
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASA CHI MUKHARJI, J. This appeal by special leave is c
directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab
& Haryana dated the 3rd March, 1986 dismissing the Writ Petition in
limine under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India filed by
the appellant before the High Court. The appellant states that he is
the owner of certain premises in Punjab. It must, however, be
mentioned that the petition is lacking in particulars as to what D
~
premises the appellant owned and in respect of which premises the
appellant is making the grievances. On this ground it is not possible
to decide the question of vires canvassed before the High Court and
repeated before us. A petition challenging the constitutional validity
of certain provisions must be in the conlext of certain facts and not in
' abstract or vacuum. The essential facts necessary to examine the E
validity of the Act are lacking in this appeal. On this ground the
petition was rightly rejected and we are not inclined to interfere with
the order of the High Court on this ground alone. Be that as it may
as the question of vires of Section 4 of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949, hereinafter called 'the Act', was challenged
before the High Court and canvassed before us. It is just as well that F
we did with that connection.
Shri S.K. Bagga, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that Section 4 of the said Act is ultra vires the Constitution and un-
- }-
reasonable inasmuch as the section provides that rent prevalent in
1938 the basis for the determination of fair rent if unreasonable and G
unjust. He urged that pegging the rent prevalent in 1938 the basic
rent was inequitable and unjust in the background of the tremendous
rise in prices. But it has to be borne in mind that certain increases
have been provided for in section 4 from the rent prevalent in 1938.
In must, however, be remembered that the Act was passed as the
preamble of the said Act which states, inter alia, "to restrict the H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.
A increase of rent". One of the objects of the Act was to restrict the
increase in rent. With that object the Act has provided certain pro-
visions as to fixation of the fair rent. Section 4 of the Act which is
under challenge may be conveniently set out as under:
"Section 4 "Determination of fair rent: ( 1) The Controller
shall on application by the tenant or landlord of a building
or rented land fix the fair rent for such building or rented
land after' holding such enquiry as the Controller thinks
fit. (2) In determining the fair rent under this section, the
Controller shall first fix a basic rent taking into considera-
tion:,
c
(a) The prevailing rates of rent in tlie locality for the
same or similar accommodation in simi!ar cifcumstances
during the twelve months prior to Ist January, 1939; and
D (b) the rental value of such building or rented land if
entered in property tax assessment register of the muni-
cipal, town or notified area committee, cantonment
board, as the case may be relating to the period men-
tioned in clause (a);
E Provided that, nothwithstanding anything contained in sub
sections (3), (4) and (5) the fair rent for any building in
the Urban area of Simla shall not exceed the basic rent.
(3) In fixing the fair rent of a residential building the
Controller may allow, if the basic rent:-
i) in the case of a building in existence befme the Ist
January, 1939-
(a) does not exceed Rs.25 per mensem an increase not
exceeding 81/2 per cent on basic rent;
(b) exceed Rs.25 per mensem, an increase but does not
exceed Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding
12- 1/2 per cent on such basic rent;
(c) exceeds Rs.50 per mensem an increase not exceeding
H 25 per cent on such basic rent;
SANT LAL v. STATE OF PUNJAB [MUKHARJI, J.I 111
(ii) in the case of building1 constructed on or after the Ist A
January, 1939-
(a) does not exceed Rs.25 per mensem, an increase not
exceeding 25 per cent on such basic rent;
8
(b) exceeds Rs.2~ but does not exceed Rs.50 per
mensem, an increase not exceeding 37-1/2 per cent on
such basic rent;
(c) exceeds Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding
50 per cent on such basic rent.
c
(4) in fixing the fair rent of a scheduled building the
controller may allow, if the basic rent-
(i) in the case of a building in existence before the Ist
January, 1939- o
(ii) does not exceed Rs.25 per mensem, an increase not
exceeding 13-1/z per cent on such basic rent;
(b) exceeds Rs.25 but does not exceed Rs.50 per
mensem, an increase not exceeding 171/z per cent on E
such basic rent;
(c) exceed Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding
30 per cent on such basic rent;
F
(ii) in the case of a building constrcting on or after the Ist
January, 1939
(a) does not exceed Rs.25 per mensem, an increase not
exceeding 30 per cent on such basic rent;
G
(b) exceeds Rs.25 but does not exceed Rs.50 per
mensem, an increase not exceeding 42'/z per cent on
such basic rent;
(c) exceeds Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding
55 per cent on such basic rent; H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.
A (5) In fixing fair rent of a non-residential building or
rented land the controller may allow, if the basic rent,
(i) in the case of building in existence before the Ist
January, 1939 or in the case of rented land;
(a) does not exceed Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not
exceeding 371/2 per cent on such basic rent; r
(b) exceeds Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding
c
50 per cent on such basic rent;
(ii) in case of building constructed after the Ist January
1939:-
1
J
(a) does not exceed Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not ~
exceeding 50 per cent on such basic rent;
D (b) exceeds Rs. 50 per mensem, an increase not exceed-
ing 100 per cent on such basic rent;
(6) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle the
Controller to fix the rent of a building or rented land
at an amount less than the rent payable for such buil-
E ding or rented land under a subsisting lease entered
into before the first day of the January 1939."
It was contended that Section 4 of the Act provides the manner
for determining the fair rent. But while laying down the procedure
for determining the fair rent it has laid down that the Rent Con-
F troll er, while deterptining the fair rent under this section shall take
into consideration the prevalent rates of rent in the locality for the
same or similar accommodation in similar circumstances during 12
months prior to Ist January, 1939. In other words, he has first to
determine the rent prevalent in the locality in the year 1938 and then
fix the rent accordingly. This it is submitted, was unreasonable and as
G such arbitrary and violative of Article 14 and would be an inter-
ference with the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19( l)(g)
of the Constitution. There has been according to the appellant, a
tremendous rise in prices and as such in pegging the rent at the rate
of Act of 1938 in an Act of 1949 was unreasonable. He drew our
attention to the relevant provisions of the Rent Act in Assam,
H Tripura and Haryana where the provisions of fixation of rent
SANT LAL v. STATE OF PUNJAB (MUKHARJI, J.] 113
according to him were different and were more fair an<l just and A
reasonable in comparison and submitted.that this provision of the Act
· in question was unfair and unjust.
We are unable to accept this contention because each legisla-
ture in the several States has provided the method. of determination
of fair rent on the basis of legal conditions, as judged to be, by each B
such legislature. It is well-settled that the legislative wisdom of such
legislation is not a ground for which the validity of the Act can be
challenged.
Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of a law of one
State OJl the ground that in contrast with a law of another State on C
the same subject its provisions are discriminatory or different. Nor
does it contemplate a law of the Centre or of the State dealing with
similar subjects being held to be unconstitutional by a prm:ess of
comparative study of the provisions of two enactments .. The sour{:e of
autho~ity for the two statutes being different, Article 14 can have no
application. D
See in this connection the decision of this Court in Prabhakaran
Nair and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, [1987] 4 S.C.C.
238.
Shri S.K. Bagga, learned counsel drew our attention, we must E
have hasten to add to the different statutes in different States on this
aspect. We cannot say that there was any better provision in those
statutes, there were undoubtedly different provisions and those
different provisions were judged by the legislatures of those State to
be suited to the neelis of.those States. It is not necessary for us to
examine in details those very provisions. F
Shri S.K. Bagga, learned counsel also drew out attention to the
observations of this Court in the case of Mis Raval & Co. v. K.G.
Ramachandran and Others, A.l.R. 1974 S.C. 818-1197412 S.C.R. 629.
He drew out attention how fair rent should be fixed by relying on the
certain observations of Bhagwati, J. as the thief Justice then was at G
Page No. 825 of the A.1.R. In the facts and in the context of this case
) it is not necessary to refer to these observations. These were made
entirely in a different context. It must be the function of the legis-
lature of each State to follow the methods considered to be suited for
that State, that would be no ground for judging the arbitrariness or
unreasonableness of a particular legislation in question by compari- H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.
A son. What may be the problem in Madras may not be the problem in
Punjab. It must however, be borne in mind that the Act in question
was passed in 1949 and it pegged the rent prevalent in the similar
houses in 1938 and as such is not unreasonable per se. The rises
stated tremendously after the end of the Second World War after the
B partition of the country. In that view of the matter, we can not say
that per se there is unreasonableness in fixing the prices in 1938 level.
Having regard to the specific preamble of the Act we find nothing
unreasonable in the Scheme contemplated under Section 4 of the
present Act.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, the challenge to Section 4 4
C on the grounds advanced before us must fail and it is accordingly
rejected. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There will be
no order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.
'
-\
f
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