Supreme Court of India
SANTHANAMversusSTATE OF TAMIL NADU
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 607
- Decided
- 24 April 2009
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The assault causing death, though intentional, did not satisfy the criteria for murder under Section 300 IPC and therefore the appellant is liable only for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I.
Summary
Santhanam and a co‑accused were charged with murder after Santhanam struck a farm‑servant with a wooden log during a dispute over a water pipeline, causing head injuries that led to the victim's death. The trial court convicted Santhanam under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to death; the High Court affirmed the conviction. Santhanam appealed, contending that the incident occurred in the course of an altercation and therefore fell under Section 304 Part I (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) rather than murder. The Supreme Court examined the statutory distinctions between Sections 299, 300 and 304, emphasizing the required intention and knowledge for murder. It held that the facts did not satisfy the criteria for murder under Section 300, and the appropriate conviction was under Section 304 Part I, imposing a ten‑year imprisonment. The appeal was allowed in part, reducing the conviction and sentence.
Issues considered
- Whether the assault resulting in death constitutes murder under Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I.
- How Sections 299 and 300 IPC should be interpreted with respect to intention and knowledge in determining murder.
- Appropriate quantum of punishment for the offence proved.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 299, s. 300, s. 302, s. 304
Subjects
murderculpable homicide not amounting to murderIPC Section 302IPC Section 304 Part Iintentionknowledgecriminal lawSupreme Court of India
Judgment
[2009) 6 S.C.R. 964
A SANTHANAM "'*
V.
STATE OF TAMIL NADU
-
(Criminal Appeal No. 826 of 2009)
APRIL 24, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.] »
PENAL CODE, 1860:
c
s. 304 (Part-I) - Accused with a wooden log causing
injuries on head of his rival - Resulting in victim's death -
Conviction by trial court u/s 302 - Affirmed by High court -
Plea that occurrence took place during the course of
altercation - Held: Proper conviction would be uls 304 (Part - -
D -(
I) - Accused convicted accordingly - Custodial sentence of
10 years would meet the ends of justice.
ss. ~99 and 300 - Distinction between - Explained.
E The appellant and another were prosecuted for
commission of offence, inter alia, punishable uls 302 IPC.
The prosecution case was that there arose a dispute
between the appellant and the farm-servant (deceased) ~-
of P.W.1 with regard to the water pipeline. Two days prior
F to the incident while the deceased was irrigating the
fields, the appellant closed the pipeline and on
questioning by the deceased, the former assaulted the
latter. On the day of incident when P.W.1 and her
husband wanted to convene a Panchayat in this
connection, the appellant along with his co-accused
G
reached the house of P.W.1 and pulled the deceased.
...•
The appellant assaulted the deceased with a wooden log
--
on his shoulder, forearm and head as a result of which
H
the victim fell down and fainted. Later on he died. The trial
964 -
SANTHANAM v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 965
-<:- court convicted and sentenced the appellant u/s 302 IPC A
and acquitted the co-accused of all the charces. Before
the High Court the appellant pleaded that the occurrence
took place during the course of altercation and, therefore,
s.302 IPC was not applicable. The High Court rejected the
plea and affirmed the conviction. B
Allowing the appeal in part, the Court
-•. HELD: 1.1. In the scheme of the IPC, culpable
homicide is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder'
is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. Speaking C
generally, 'culpable homicide' sans special
characteristics of murder is 'culpable homicide not
amounting tO murder'. For the purpose of fixing
punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic
offence, the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of D
culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called,
'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest
form of culpable homicide, which is defined in s.300 as
'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable
homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under E
the first part of s. 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide
of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable
homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the
lowest among the punishments provided for the three
grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable F
under the second part of s. 304. The safest way of
approach to the interpretation and application~of the
provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords
used in the various clauses of ss. 299 and 300. [Para 6
and 7) [969-B-G]
G
.... Rajwant and Anr. v. State of Kera/a AIR 1966 SC 1874;
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465; State of
Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. 1976 (4)
SCC 382; Abdul Waheed Khan @ Waheed and Ors. v. State
H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A of Andhra Pradesh JT 2002 (6) SC 27 4; Augustine Saldanha ~
v. State of Kamataka 2003 (10) SCC 472 and Thangaiya v.
State of Tamil Nadu 2005 (9) SCC 650, referred to. _,
1.2. In the peculiar facts of the instant case, the
proper conviction would be u/s 304 (Part I). Custodial
B
sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice.
[Para 19) [975-F-G]
~
Case Law Reference:- '
1966 SC 1874 referred to Para 10
c
AIR 1958 SC 465 referred to Para 11
1976 (4) sec 382 referred to Para 18
JT 2002 (6) SC 27 4 referred to Para 18
D
2003 (10) sec 472 referred to Para 18 -+ -
2005 (9) sec 650 referred to Para 18
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
E No. 826 of 2009.
From the Judgment & Order dated 11.4.2007 of the High
Court of Madras, Madurai Bench in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.
648 of 2004.
....
F Sushma Manchanda (SCLSC) for the Appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
G 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the
Division Bench of the Madras High Court, Madurai Bench, ....' .....
upholding the conviction of the appellant for offence punishable
under Sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short
the 'IPC'). The co-accused was tried for offence punishable
H
SANTHANAM v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 967
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
f under Section 302 read with Section 114 and 506(2) IPC and A
was found not guilty and was acquitted of the ch::irges.
"' 3. Prosecution version, in a nutshell, is as follows:
The incident in question took place at around 2 p.m. on
9.12.2001, P.W.1 and her husband were working in the Postal B
Department and they are the owners of land in their native
place, Kanjeerimalaipudur Kattukottagai. Thiruppathy
~;
(hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') was employed with
them as a farm servant. The land of the accused-appellant is
situated adjacent to the land of P.W. 1. They had a dispute c
regarding water pipe line. Two days before the date of incident
i.e. 9.12.2001 when the deceased was irrigating, the appellant
closed the water pipe line. The deceased asked him why he
had closed the water pipe line, the appellant abused him and
assaulted him with a stick. The deceased filed a complaint in D
the Uppiliyapuram Police Station. When P.W. 1 and her
husband came to know about the same on 11.12.2001, they
wanted to convene a Panchayat and, therefore, P.'N.1, her
husband and others gathered in front of the house of P.W. 1 at
about 2.00 p.m. At that time, the appellant and the second E
accused came in a TVS 50 vehicle and both of them pulled the
deceased Thiruppathy and assaulted him with hands. They
intervened and prevented them from attacking the deceased.
When the deceased, Thiruppathy went to the house of
Dhandapani, the appellant and the second accused followed F
the deceased. The appellant attacked the deceased,
Thiruppathy with a wooden log on his right shoulder, right
forearm and on his head and the deceased fell down and
fainted. The second accused took out billhook out of his shirt
and threatened the witnesses with dire consequences. Then the
. second accused gave billhook to the appellant and both of them
G
• ran away from the place of occurrence. Immediately thereafter,
P.W. 1 and her husband, Ramalingam went to Uppiliyapuram
Police Station and gave a complaint and on the basis of which
F.l.R. was lodged and a case was registered as Crime No. 658/
I H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 6 S.C.R.
A 2001 under Section 302 1.P.C. and investigation started.
P.W.12, conducted the Post-Mortem on 12.12.2001 and
opined that the deceased appeared to have died of shock and
haemorrhage due to injuries sustained on head.
Investigation was undertaken and on completion thereof
B
the chargesheet was filed.
The case was committed to the Court of Sessions.
Charges were framed. Since the accused persons pleaded ,1
innocence, trial was held.
c
In order to establish accusations, 14 witnesses were
examined. In order to prove its plea of innocence, three
witnesses were examined. The Trial Court found that
accusations were not established against the second accused
D and he was acquitted. Before the High Court the primary stand
was that the so called eye witnesses could not have seen the
-i:--
occurrence as claimed. This according to PW.4 she actually
did not see the occurrence and also not did not see the
accused persons assaulting but she came and found that the
deceased was lying severely injured. It was also submitted that .
E
the medical evidence was at variance with the so called ocular
evidence. Large number of criminal and civil cases were
pending between the parties and the present case was the
outcome of enmity. In any event, the occurrence took place in
course of altercation and _Section 302 IPC has no application.
...
F The deceased was working under PW1 and her husband. On
the earlier occasion when the deceased went over to the field
and questioned the conduct of the accused, altercation took
place and complaint was given against him. Panchayat was
convened. It was also submitted that the injuries were on non-
G vital parts and, therefore, it cannot be said that the accused had
intention to cause death. The High Court did not accept the
.
stand that the occurrence took place in the course of altercation "'
and other pleas.
H 4. The stand taken before the High Court was reiterated
•
SANTHANAM v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 969
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
f in the present appeal. Learned counsel for the respondent- A
State supported the judgment.
5. The basic question is whether Section 302 IPC has
application.
6. In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is genus B
and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but
.. '
not vice-versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans
'special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not-
amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment,
proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC c
practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The
first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first
· degree'. This is the gravest form of culpable homiCide, which
is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be
termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is D
-~
punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is
'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type
of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also
the lowest among the punishments provided for the three
grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under E
the second part of Section 304 .
•
7. The academic distinction between 'murder' and
'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed
-t the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of
F
the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature
in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute
abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation
and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in
focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299
and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in G
appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences.
H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 6 S.C.R.
A Section 299 Section 300 ~
A person commits Subject to certain
culpable homicide exceptions
if the act by which culpable homicide
the death is caused if the act by which
B is done- is murder the death is caused
is done -
INTENTION .•
(a) with the intention (1) with the intention of
c of causing death; or causing death; or
(b) with the intention (2) with the intention of
of causing such bodily causing such bodily
injury as 'is likely to injury as the offender
cause death; or knows to be likely to
D cause the death of
the person to .whom the ~-
harm is caused;
or
E (3) With the intention of
causing bodily injury to
any person and the
bodily injury intended
to be inflicted is
F sufficient in the
ordinary course of
nature to cause death;
or
KNOWLEDGE
G
****
(c) with the knowledge (4) with the knowledge
that the act is likely to that the act is so
cause death. imminently dangerous
H that it must in all
SANTHANAM v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 971
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
probability cause A
death or such bodily
injury as is likely to
cause death, and
without any excuse for
incurring the risk of B
causing death or such
injury as is mentioned
above.
8. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2)
and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens c
rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by
the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a
peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm
caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that
such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient. o
to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is
noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential
requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the
bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the
likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, E
is sufficient to bring killing within the ambit of this clause. This
aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended
to Section 300.
9. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such
knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling F
under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant
causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the
victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen
or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that
particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen G
or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant
had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of
the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the
offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the H
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300,
instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the
corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously,
the distinction lies between a "bodily injury likely to cause death"
B and a "bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death." The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked,
may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between
clause
. (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 . is one J
of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended
bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability
c of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of
the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word 'likely' in
clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable as
distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily
injury....... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
D death" means that death will be the "most probable" result of
~-
the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.
10. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary
that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death
E ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwani and Anr.
v. State of Kera/a, (AIR 1966 SC 1874) is an apt illustration of
this point.
""+·
11. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1958 SC 465),
F
Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court, explained the meaning
and scope of clause (3). It was observed that the prosecution
must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under
Section 300, "thirdly''. First, it must establish quite objectively,
that a bodily injury is present; secondly the nature of the injury
G must be proved. These are purely objective investigations.
;.'
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict
that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or
unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. ·
Once these three elements are proved to be present, the
H
SANTHANAM v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 973
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
::t
enquiry proceeds further, and fourthly it must be proved that the A
injury of the type just described is made up of the three elements
set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and
inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the
offender. B
12. The ingredients of clause "Thirdly" of Section 300, IPC
were brought out by the illustrious Judge in his terse language
as follows:
"To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following c
facts before it can bring a case under Section 300,
"thirdly".
First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury
-~
is present. D
Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These
are purely objective investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to
inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say that it was E
not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of
injury was intended.
Once these three elements are proved to be present, the
enquiry proceeds further and, F
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just
described made up of the three elements set out above
is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential
and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender." G
13. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the
following words (at page 468):
"The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict
H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
- A a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to
inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show
that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify
such an inference, then of course, the intent that the section
requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the
B injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only
possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether
he knew of its seriousness or intended serious
consequences, is neither here or there .. The question, so
far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he
c intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree
of seriousness but whether he intended to inflict the injury
in question and once the existence of the injury is proved
the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the
evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite
conclusion."
D
..f-
14. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become
locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh's case
(supra) for the applicability of clause "Thirdly" is now ingrained
· 11"\ our legal system and has become part of the rule of law.
E Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is
murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.e. (a) that
the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing
death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury;
and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the
+
F ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that
there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which,
in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death,
viz., that the injury found to be present was the injury that was
intended to be inflicted.
G ~
15. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's -t-
' case, even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction
of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course
of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death,
the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to
H
SANTHANAM v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 975
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
Section 300 clearly brings out this point. A
16. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section
300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing
death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate
much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. 8
It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 would
be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the
probability of death of a person or persons in general as
distinguished from a particular person or persons - being
caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a C
pradical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender
must J:?e of the highest degree of probability, the act having
been .committed by the offender without any excuse for incu.rring
the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
17. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron D
- ·'- imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the
task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined
and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each
other that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment
to the matters involved in the second and third stages. E
18. The position was illuminatingly highlighted by this Court
in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr.
(1976 (4) SCC 382), Abdul Waheed Khan @ Waheed and
Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (JT 2002 (6) SC 274), and F
Augustine Saldanha v. State of Karnataka (2003 (10) SCC
4 72) and Thangaiya v. State of Tamil Nadu (2905 (9) SCC
650).
19. In the peculiar facts of the case, the proper conviction
would be under Section 304 Part I. Custodial sentence of 10 G ...,._,
years would meet the ends of justice.
20. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
R.P. Appeal partly allowed.
H
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